

30 December 2023

## **Big picture**



- Rebuilding Ukraine's financial sector will be key to post-war reconstruction and development:
  - o To mobilize local and foreign savings and channel them efficiently to worthwhile investment projects...
  - ...but also to help channel significant official reconstruction and development assistance expected to be provided by Ukraine's allies
- Key challenge: Combining speed, scale, and stability
  - Risk: Ukrainians' exposure to earlier bouts of financial instability eroded popular support for a market-based economic system


### Status quo ante




 Stock of private-sector loans small at 28 percent of GDP. Half of sector assets on-lent to the state

 Sector successfully overhauled after 2014. Half of banks closed and largest bank (Privatbank) nationalized. State banks now dominate even more

 Non-bank financial sector even smaller: limited insurance market; thin and fragmented equity market






# Connected lending endemic up to 2014



After the war started in 2014, NPLs peaked at
 >50 percent of all credit. Declined after 'cleanup'


 In 2016, authorities introduced a simplified approach for out-of-court financial restructuring via arbitration (aka 'Kyiv Approach')



## Capital markets underdeveloped, too



- Macroeconomic pre-conditions for capital markets were emerging before the war
- However, legal and regulatory environment not conducive, capital market infrastructure fragmented (e.g., four separate exchanges), little liquidity in fixed income and virtually no liquidity in equity markets
- Local investor base absent although discussions of ISAs, some penetration of foreign investment (including via Clearstream)



### Financial resilience (so far)



- Banking system 'clean up' since 2014 paid off during the war only one small bank failed (while two small Russian state banks were liquidated)
- Liquidity injections and supervisory forbearance by the NBU helped stabilize banks
- Unlimited deposit guarantee announced early in the war reduced the risk of a bank run
- Yet, private sector lending virtually seized while non-performing loans increased (including due to the destruction of physical assets)
- Capital markets disrupted; repo market suspended; cross-border forex payments prohibited; recently launched UONIA benchmark index unable to reflect interbank operations, which seized

# Reform priorities after the war – key principles



- 1. Getting banks back on track: AQR, NPL resolution, recapitalization
- 2. Fewer state banks/remaining SOBs more commercially run
- 3. More market-based finance and public/private equity
- 4. Prompt but stable integration into the European financial sector
- 5. Fostering financial inclusion

## **Banking-sector resolution**



- War-related asset destruction will translate into a high stock of NPLs
- Already during the war, the NBU will need to prepare for an asset quality review (AQR);
  as peace returns, launch the AQR to determine bank-specific recapitalization needs
  (note: 2023 stress tests just released, 5 banks to strengthen capital base)
- Next, an NPL-resolution process will need take place which should be quick, efficient and even-handed. In parallel, launch a bank-specific recapitalization process
- Past approaches to NPL resolution include decentralized (e.g., Ukraine after 2014/15), semi-centralized (e.g., Sweden) and centralized (e.g., Korea after 1998) options

### Other priorities



### Bank commercialization and privatization

- 1. NPLs resolved? Privatize state banks, incl. to reputable foreign strategic investors
- 2. No credible investors in the short run? Consider intermediate options, such as partial listing or inclusion into a national investment fund to be commercially run
- 3. Reduce progressively political lending, including by remaining state banks
- 4. Strengthen incentives for state banks to resolve NPLs: currently reluctant to write off or restructure debt in a way that reduces the value of any (collateralised) state assets

### Regulatory alignment with the EU

- Complete alignment work to obtain a positive EBA conclusion: Will facilitate entry and expansion of EU banks
- Pursue further alignment effort in securities sector but also in other key areas (such as professional secrecy and confidentiality)

# **Priorities (cont'd)**



#### **Developing the hryvnia money market**

- 1. Revert back to a flexible exchange rate once the situation permits
- 2. Encourage the development of new financial products linked to EUONIA
- 3. Deepen the repo markets with settlement or other risk augmentations if needed

#### **Developing capital markets**

- 1. Legal framework for capital markets requires much work e.g., financial collateral law, legislation on derivatives (to obtain a clean ISDA legal opinion), covered bonds and other securitization legislation
- 2. Establish regulatory frameworks for sustainable, social and infrastructure bonds (including to benefit from international impact and responsible investors)
- 3. Ensure products common in the European markets (e.g., convertible debt, warrants, mezzanine, preferred equity) are regulated in line with best practices
- Consider establishing a blended pool of capital that could be deployed for funding equity investments (perhaps to be managed by a development finance institution)
- 5. Prioritize creation of a local investor base (e.g, second pension pillar, ISAs, etc)

## **Priorities (cont'd)**



#### Foster financial inclusion

- Focus on SME access to credit
- 2. Establish risk mitigation programs for small entrepreneurs, incl. women/youth
- 3. Assist small businesses to re-orient to EU after closing of markets in Russia and Belarus
- 4. Resources permitting: SME IPO fund (like in EU and Baltics)

### Maintain financial stability

- 1. Strengthen cross-border coordination with EU bank supervisors
- 2. Remain vigilant on forex risks
- 3. Keep macro-financial framework under review to avoid booms and busts
- 4. Strengthen supervisory authorities (e.g. align securities regulator with IOSCO practices)

#### More details:

Chapter 6 in <u>Rebuilding Ukraine: Principles and Policies</u> (edited by Gorodnichenko, Sologoub and Weder di Mauro, 2022)

