From Safety First to Reasonable Capitalism: 25-Year Experience of John R. Commons through the Lens of Safety Movements

Kota Kitagawa

Correspondence: Faculty of Economics, Kansai University, 3-3-35 Yamate-cho, Suita-shi, Osaka, 564-8680, Japan. Tel.: +81-6-6368-0634. Fax: +81-6-6339-7704. E-mail: kota.k@kansai-u.ac.jp

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Abstract

This study aims to reveal a new narrative from John R. Commons' 25-year experience (1907–1932), focusing on the spontaneous safety movement of middle management "safety experts" in large Midwest companies. We establish that Commons discovered, inherited, collaboratively developed, practiced, and successfully implemented their methods and the program. Examining Commons' relationship with these experts reveals two overlooked aspects in prior studies: the role of the state conciliator in the joint bargaining system and the methods employed to create a safety spirit and foster willingness to cooperate.

Keywords: safety expert; conciliator; educational work; willingness; time element

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Introduction

This study systematically reorganizes John R. Commons' "twenty-five years' experience", as described in his autobiography (1934a, p. 143), extracted into *Institutional Economics* (1934b). This period spans from the Pittsburgh Survey of 1907, where he examined the United States Steel Corporation, to the successful passage of the unemployment insurance law in Wisconsin of 1932." The aim is to unveil a new narrative of Commons's 25-year experience by focusing on the "safety movement" in the United States.

In the early 1900s, the U.S. safety movement originated with salaried middle managers in large private companies, particularly in the manufacturing and railroad sectors; U.S. Steel led this initiative. These individuals, referred to as "safety experts," "safety engineers," or "safety men," viewed accident prevention as an issue of personnel management rather than just mechanical engineering (Ueno 2020).[1] This group included middle managers and state government officers who oversaw safety in their organizations and collaborated with Commons since the 1910s.

In prior studies, Commons' 25-year experience has been interpreted as the story of how he discovered, drafted, and administered institutions of social insurance that induced employers to voluntarily improve employment conditions. This led to the mitigation of the sharp contrast between employers and employees that had disturbed capitalism at the time (Kaufman 2003; Chasse 2017; Kitagawa 2017). In 1907, Commons discovered a pioneering private institution of accident compensation when he made a field visit to U.S. Steel. Subsequently, he drafted the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin Bill (enacted in 1911) that had the authority to make and enforce safety orders and administer the Accident Compensation Act of 1911, cooperating with private mutual insurance companies. Next, he drafted the state Unemployment Insurance Bill in 1921, which his successors successfully passed in 1932. Commons campaigned to shape public opinion in the state and thus increase pressure for its legislation. Thus, Commons' 25-year experience is interpreted as his efforts to constitute the institutions that directed the involved parties to cooperate. The scheme of "cooperation by pressure" (Commons and Andrews 1936, p. 498) falls within Commons' ideal of "Reasonable Capitalism" (Commons 1934b, p. 891).[2] For him, it was justified as it demonstrated its efficacy in improving welfare, unlike the compulsory or authoritative scheme. Reflecting on his 25-year experience, Commons declared that "very little can be accomplished towards public welfare by compulsory legislation compared with what can be accomplished by the willingness and initiative of private effort and private cooperation if properly directed by the state in the competitive rivalry for profit" (Commons 1934b, p. 852).

However, this interpretation of Commons' 25-year experience has two deficits. Previous studies (Kaufman 2003; Chasse 2017; Kitagawa 2017) have emphasized how Commons achieved voluntary compliance from parties by including their representatives in the

process of drafting the Industrial Commission. Commons described the representatives in the advisory committee of the commission as the "joint bargaining system between representatives of opposing organized interests, with the state government acting as a conciliator" (Commons 1934b, p. 858). The question then arises: What were the methods employed by the "conciliator" to facilitate a resolution of conflicting interests in cases that would not necessarily reach an agreement?

Prior studies explained that the safety orders made by the joint bargaining system "provide employers with an incentive to voluntarily seek ways to promote safer, healthier conditions. In his words, employers suddenly get the 'safety spirit'" (Kaufman 2003, p. 9). This implies that changing the institution as an incentive structure changes behavior. This narrative closely aligns with the New Institutionalist framework (North 2005, p. 61). Moreover, while it is known to be an overstatement, it seems to closely align with the simple scheme of internalization of externalities in neoclassical economics. However, in the first two years (1911–1913) of the newly established accident prevention scheme, most employers did "not automatically" acknowledge the scheme and, thus, were not motivated to voluntarily participate in it (Commons 1934b, p. 858). As Commons (1934b, p. 856) wrote: "In the first two years, only about 10 per cent of the total number of eligible employees of the state. […] It compelled the state Commission to start campaign to induce employers willingly to come under the law.". Thus, between the scheme and employers' behavior, lies their recognition (in Commons' words, "meaning" or "valuing" as their active mental process) of the scheme, for instance, expected increase or decrease of cost, productivity, and employees' goodwill. Therefore, the commission was compelled to change employers' "futurity." The question remains, what was the "method" the commission adopted to change their recognition from "unwillingness" to "willing

cooperation" (Commons 1934b, p. 858)? The narrative and perspectives of previous studies have not addressed this missing link specifically, the method used to create a "collective spirit" (Commons 1934b, p. 858). While some studies (Atkinson and Whelen 2011, p. 53; Kitagawa 2018; Gislain and Théret forthcoming) viewed "willingness" (collective spirit) and "futurity" (collective forecast) of a "going concern" as a "cornerstone" of his institutional economics, they did not reveal methods to create them based on cases covered by Commons' works.

Clues to identify deficits regarding the methods of directing and encouraging employers to change their attitudes are visible throughout Commons' works. He (1934b, p. 856) briefly described a "safety organization" as an effective safety activity in pioneering private corporations. He further encouraged the reading of Crystal Eastman's *Work-Accidents and the Law* (1910), a volume of the series of *The Pittsburgh Survey*, which explained the safety organization of U.S. Steel. One of his major books (1934a, pp. 141–142) and an article by his student (Fitch 1911a) reveal that, in some progressive companies, middle management experts who were called safety experts played the leading role in developing the safety spirit of companies during the 1900s. In 1911, Charles W. Price who was the superintendent of welfare work, at International Harvester Corporation, "organized safety committees" of the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin (Commons 1934a, p. 161). In the 1910s, leading safety experts of private companies in the Midwest and their representative association, the National Safety Council (NSC) cooperated with both Commons and the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916).

"Large numbers" of enthusiastic and persuasive managerial-class experts networked and led a great movement comparable to the efficiency movement (U.S. Commission on

Industrial Relations 1916, p. 286). However, this has been forgotten in the current historical studies of U.S. socio-economy and economic thoughts except for a few scant remarks. For example, Harter (1967, pp. 111–112) briefly mentioned Price and NSC; Chasse (2017, p. 179) wrote one sentence, which implied the success of the safety movement in Wisconsin. Notwithstanding, no study has focused on the relationship between Commons and the safety movement. In the research doctrine of economic history, one study (Aldrich 1997) focuses on the mechanical side (i.e., development of safeguarding) rather than on social engineering (Brandt 1989). However, a Japanese researcher of economic history, Tsuguyoshi Ueno, studied the iron and steel industry journals, proceedings, and archives in Chicago and Wisconsin, revealing the whole picture of the safety movement although all of his papers were written in Japanese (Ueno 1994; Ueno 2020).

Thus, throughwhile we understand the relationship between Commons and the safety experts, this study aims to reveal the aforementioned two deficits of Commons' 25-year experience, that is, the role of the state conciliator in the joint bargaining system and the method of creating the safety spirit and developing their program to foster willingness. This is accomplished by surveying the movement of the safety experts and the relationship between Commons and the experts. This will help us understand an element of administration, that is, "educational work" (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1914) to which Commons (1934b, p. 858; 1950, p. 282) gave importance in the administration of labor law. Moreover, we uncover a new line of interpretation for Common's 25-year experience, which complements the predominant understanding of his effort to investigate, draft, and administer the incentive/pressure schemes and enhance the involved parties' "cooperation by pressure."

This paper is structured as follows. In "Overview of Safety Movements in the United States (1905–1915)", we outline the safety movements that originated in U.S. Steel and developed into a popular national movement. We identify a shared perspective, method, and "program" among safety experts in the nation. In "Pittsburgh Survey, 1907: J. R. Commons Investigated U.S. Steel", we describe how Commons uncovered accident prevention practices of safety experts. In "Creation and Administration of Industrial Commission (1911–1912)," we see the leadership of the safety expert, Price, in drafting the safety standard of the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin. We seek to understand the method of the state "conciliator" of collective action. In "C. W. Price's Educational Works for Safety (1911–1914)," we see the educational works of Price related to employers, superintendents, foremen, and employees in the state to create a collective spirit of "Safety First." We learn how willingness can be cultivated among the involved parties. In "Cooperation with NSC: Commons's Report of U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations (1913–1915)," we learn how, in 1915, Commons launched a program to develop industrial relations both in Wisconsin and in the federation that was aligned with the program of the safety experts. In "Disputed Points: Commons and Industrial Commission (late 1910s–1932)", we learn that, until 1932, Commons and the Industrial Commission continued their practices to implement the program. In "Conclusion," we confirm the role of the state conciliator and the method of creating willingness, both of which were elaborated by Price. We then drew upon his 25-year experience: Commons found, inherited, collaboratively developed, practiced, and advanced the method and the program of the safety experts.

Overview of Safety Movements in the United States (1905–1915)

Safety Movement in U.S. Steel (1905-1912): Illinois Steel and R. J. Young

This section overviews the historical development of the safety movement from 1905 to 1915 to better understand the 25-year experience of Commons. U.S. Steel pioneered the ideal safety method. Before 1906, its subsidiaries separately established safety departments to handle worker injuries after accidents occurred (Beyer 1910; Gurick 1924), later shifting their focus to accident prevention. The Chief Safety Inspector, Robert J. Young, of the Illinois Steel Corporation subsidiary, overhauled the plants and safeguarded the dangerous areas identified.

In May 1906, the General Solicitor of the Law Department of the corporation's headquarters, Charles McVeigh called a meeting of casualty managers of all subsidiaries including Young. Then, in 1907, subsidiaries began collaborating to prevent accidents (Young 1911; Ueno 2020). The Law Department focused on accident prevention within the safety departments because its legal environment had changed and was expected to change further. Around this time, some court decisions restricted the use of employers' common law defenses in suits for damages. This raised employers' legal uncertainty. Additionally, concerning legislative movements in the United States and other countries, the law department revealed that legislating the formulation of accident compensation laws with a no-fault liability of employers was inevitable in the United States (Asher 1987). The law department hoped to avoid conflicts between management and labor so that it would be able to rationally calculate its cost of accident compensation under the laws (Ueno 1994).

Based on the initial experiments in Illinois Steel, Young realized that the majority of accidents could not be prevented only by mechanical safeguarding. Human factors, involving a superintendent, foremen, and workers had to change. A "lack of interest"

existed in safety. It was observed that workers omitted mechanical safeguards that had been attached to machines because they felt that the safeguards reduced their operation efficiency. They viewed the safety recommendations of the company's upper class as "all nonsense and a hindrance to his work" (Young 1913, p. 80). Illinois Steel established three types of shop safety committees to change their customs: First, the central safety committee was responsible for setting safety standards in the company's plants. Second, the foremen's safety committee was present in each department of the plant consisting of permanent foremen. The "workmen's safety committee" comprised ordinary workmen on the shop floor who were replaced every two months. The committees conducted weekly or monthly inspections, reporting accidents and hazardous zones and suggesting preventive measures to encourage members to foster a "Safety First" mindset and take safety initiatives by acting as a peer jury (Young 1911, p. 42) and participating in a "suggestion system" (Fitch 1911a; Commons 1919, p. 155). The committees in a plant were complemented by inspections and deliberations by higher-level committees of the company.

In April 1908, U.S. Steel President Elbert H. Gary and MacVeigh convened a meeting with safety leaders from subsidiaries, including Young, to establish a permanent, central safety committee of U.S. Steel (hereafter, headquarters safety committee), launching a corporation-wide safety campaign (Eastman 1909; Commons 1913). The headquarters safety committee established safety standards and served as a "clearinghouse," compiling best practices of lower-level committees of subsidiaries and sharing information (Fitch 1911a). Thus, the multilayered safety committees were organized from the headquarters down to each shop. The method of organizing shop safety committees achieved remarkable success. In Illinois Steel, during the company-wide safety campaign, the

number of accidents was reduced to one-third (Young 1911).

Young and other safety experts of Illinois Steel incidentally recognized a ripple effect. In workmen's safety committees, workers began to actively suggest safety improvements in their shops, surprising the safety experts with their insights and practicability. Thus, a suggestion system was unexpectedly created. Through the actions of the safety committees, the efficiency, ethics, and goodwill of shops were improved. Safety experts and managers realized that their employees "arose" because of the practices of the safety committee as a peer education system and began viewing them as intelligent individuals open to negotiation (Tarbell 1915; 1916, p. 291).

It followed that the company institutionalized these unexpected side effects, which emerged from the safety movement. We observe the accidental invention and beginning of institutionalizing personnel management employing the shop safety committees (Davis 1911; Price 1920a; Ueno 1994). This genesis is not widely recognized by economic historians. To institutionalize labor-management dialogue, the South Chicago plant of the company established the Joint Safety Committee of Labor and Management in December 1912 (Ueno 1994).[3]

Connections of the Leading Safety Experts

Young had conveyed his knowledge enthusiastically to persons responsible for safety, regardless of whether they were officers of the U.S. Steel (Ueno 2020). One such person who was educated by him was his colleague Arthur H. Young, who became the Supervisor of Labor and Safety in January 1913 at the South Chicago Plant of Illinois Steel. Later, he became one of the greatest ideologues of the safety movement in the nation (Ueno 1999).

In the late 1900s, a superintendent of International Harvester, C. W. Price, sent a query about safeguards to R. J. Young, receiving a letter in response with photographs of safeguards devised by Young. Thus, Price began an ongoing learning process from Young. In the late 1900s, the safety expert of Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, Ralph C. Richards, gained knowledge from R. J. Young via the chairman of the headquarters safety committee of U.S. Steel, Robert W. Campbell. Campbell was a corporate lawyer of Illinois Steel (Richards 1913). Northwestern Railway was the pioneer public utility enterprise to start the safety campaign. In January 1911, it initiated a safety campaign that included the establishment of shop safety committees. Richards became the chairman of the central safety committee of the company, recognizing the institutional nature and impact of regular committee meetings. He described them as follows:

> These meetings provided for the first time in railroad history, a place where the men and officers could get together and discuss the subject of safety, about which there are no two sides. An opportunity was given to the employes and the men who are actually doing the work, to present, in a proper and orderly manner, their suggestions and the information which they gather in their daily work, which would help to bring about safer and more regular operation. […] Every member of all the committees was to attend the meetings, not as a machinist or a brake man or an engineer or an officer, but as a committee-man, and that everyone stood on a par in the committees, or in other words, the idea was to try and make all the members of the committees feel that they were equal partners in the enterprise and responsible for its success. (Richards 1913, pp. 89-90)

Thus, the success of the safety organization lies in making managers and labor “sit down to a table together” (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 281). From the later 1900s to the early 1910s, such safety movements grew rapidly in large companies. It was, of course, the result of the initiatives and ingenuities of the leading safety experts at each company, but their communication with R. J. Young and the clearinghouse function of the headquarters safety committee of U.S. Steel contributed to the development of safety movements in companies across the Midwest.

Institutionalization of Safety as a Profession

Various welfare workers attempted to formalize their profession (Wiebe 1967). At the time, a profession was socially recognized if it had an association of professionals, its journal, and a university curriculum. The history of organizing safety experts is a typical example of such institutionalization as by meeting the above conditions their profession was recognized (Ueno 1996). The Association of Iron & Steel Electrical Engineers (AISEE) established in 1907 focused on industrial accidents due to mechanical, especially electricity-related causes, and established a safety committee in 1908. It gradually understood the perspectives of safety experts who focused on the human factors of accidents (Ueno 1996).

Since 1911, with Wisconsin acting as the pioneer, workmen’s compensation acts were legislated in other states and the common law defense of the employers was sequentially abolished. The safety laws followed by the states after 1911 imposed higher-level safety standards than past laws. Moreover, in some states, these standards progressed faster because, as administrative orders, they were to be renewed rapidly by the permanent administration bodies, not by the periodic legislature. Under the new legal environment,

the demands of companies for accident prevention and therefore safety experts dramatically increased in the states (Commons 1918).

The AISEE's first Safety Conference was held from September to October 1912 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Commons 1913b; U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 300). R. J. Young was a member of its acting committee. At the conference, a motion was made to establish an organization that would serve as a national clearinghouse. In the second conference in September 1913 in New York, the National Safety Council (NSC) was established in Chicago, Illinois. The chairman of U.S. Steel's headquarters central committee, Campbell, was its first president. In 1913, a majority of the executive committee of NSC comprised public and private safety experts in Chicago (Illinois) and Wisconsin, including R.J. Young and Price. Campbell stated before the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations (1916, p. 295) in December 1913 "I believe frankly, gentlemen, that to-day there is no greater movement afoot than the accident prevention movement." Commons felt the "missionary zeal" of the new profession consisting of participants of the "great National Safety Council" (Commons 1919, p. 60; 1921, p. 295). He wrote the following:

> What the law has done by making accident compensation universal and compulsory has been to create a new profession. It has created the profession of safety expert, of welfare manager, a profession which now has its annual convention of men who are as devoted and enthusiastic as missionaries, for they feel that they are doing one of the great pieces of work in this country—saving the lives of fellow men. (Commons 1918)

> They perform a public service while they bring together the employer and his hundreds of workers in the mutual benefits of goodwill. As a profession, they become independent. (Commons 1919, p. 60)

This process witnessed safety movements in the companies in the Midwest forging connections with each other and advancing a great nationwide movement. Through this concerted effort, experts endeavored to establish their profession and advance their status within and beyond their affiliated companies and governments in response to new legal pressures.

Methods of Safety Experts

While mechanical safeguarding had a positive impact, it could not prevent one-third of accidents. Therefore, methods to change employee practice from careless to cautious and from unwillingness to willingness were necessary to boost safety and protect the remaining two-thirds from accidents. To make the employers realize that safety has a real, primal value in their shop, the attitudes of foremen must be changed. Likewise, the attitude of their boss, the employer, must be changed. Therefore, experts must "sell safety to" the top management (Commons 1919, p. 153), persuading employers by proposing the safety organization to turn their safety into profit.

The safety organization consists of a safety department that is independent of the shop's production quotas and multilevel safety committees such as those in U.S. Steel. Its major purpose is to change the practices of foremen and employees by conferring with their peers and bosses. In the safety organization, various ingenious campaigns were launched to stimulate the self-esteem of employees and a friendly rivalry among them by providing

buttons and badges to members of the workmen's safety committee, making them inspect other departments, and posting monthly high-achieving departments on notice boards of the shop to spur interdepartmental safety competition (Young 1911; Tarbell 1916). This resulted in reducing the number of lost days, thereby increasing efficiency in the shop, fostering goodwill, and enhancing the ingenuity of the employees (Commons 1919). Safety experts persuaded their employers to follow suit by showing them such pioneering cases of other companies.

The concept of selling safety was formulated by Price while working at the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin in 1911 (Ueno 2020). Such a brilliant concept developed by a leading safety expert was disseminated to other safety experts in the nation via not only personal networks but also the NSC and state authorities. Therefore, safety experts presented their employers with attractive and viable methods and devices. The safety movement evolved into a great nationwide movement due to the cooperation of public and private organizations that functioned as clearinghouses (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916). In 1915, the NSC had 5,500 members who were mostly private and public safety experts and progressive employers, representing 150 industries (Cameron 1915, p. 905).

In the quotation below, Commons described the characteristics of the profession using the managerial method shared by experts.

> They were experts in arousing the spirit of "safety first" and in organizing the shop so as to keep that spirit on the top. […] It is also this spirit of safety among the shop men [that is, "experienced factory man" (Price 1914)] that brings out the most effective safeguards—effective in the sense of full protection without interfering

> without output. The [technical] engineer can device safeguards—he needs the shop man to safeguard the output. The "safety expert" is the one who can bring these two elements together. (Commons 1913b)

> The safety engineer must be a social engineer. If he can invent and educate the "safety spirit" among the entire force from top to bottom, then the workmen and foremen will invent and demand and use more safety devices than he ever could think out and install by himself. He adds his personality to the going concern. He gives the corporation a soul. (Commons 1919, p. 153)

As Commons accurately characterized, the safety experts organized by the NSC were those who saw accident prevention as an issue of, in the current term, personnel management (Ueno 2020). The NSC was the association characterized and directed by such experts. Rather, the NSC functioned as an educational body that fostered such experts by instructions of the leading experts above mentioned and distributions of best practices discovered by its members. Moreover, to change the practices of shop employees, NSC developed external safety campaigns, for instance, in schools, homes, and social life. It cooperated with other occupations and organizations, such as teachers, visiting nurses, churches, and trolley companies to foster a spirit of safety in local communities. The NSC sought to create and improve safety consciousness by impacting the domestic sphere and society behaviors which, in turn, indirectly impacted industry (Tarbel 1916; Price 1920b; Commons 1921).

The Program of Safety Experts (1915)

Inspired by the secondary effects of the safety organization, safety experts devised a future step-by-step "program" of industrial relations (Cameron 1915; Ueno 1996).

First, as Richards stressed, developing industrial relations brings involved parties to the table. It is desirable to include a wide range of positions among the parties. For instance, it is undesirable to install safeguards against accident prevention based on the narrow discussions among select parties (while other parties are excluded), such as only "technical engineers" who focus on the mechanical and not human factors (Commons 1913b). Even if this would be ideal for them, it may be impracticable and unacceptable for other parties, such as foremen and workers. Therefore, the joint participation of different groups from all the parties is important to encourage them to adjust their practices to comply with the established safeguards and rules.

Second, the issue of safety is often a mutually agreeable topic that can be used as a starting point to foster good industrial relations between laborers and employers. In initial negotiations, they come to realize that they share advanced mutual understanding and begin to view each other as being open to negotiation and arriving at a consensus. In other words, a certain amount of industrial goodwill is established in the initial negotiation.

Third, having fostered goodwill through the less contentious issue, that is, the safety improvement, discussions can then progress to more conflicting issues, such as working conditions, wages, hours of labor, and education (Ueno 2000). In this step-by-step process, the safety organization can evolve into an institution responsible for managing industrial relationships (Ueno 1994).

Thus, comparing the early safety movement and the program, the relationship between safety issues and industrial goodwill was transformed. Originally, safety improvement was the "end" of the movement and industrial goodwill was an unintended effect.

However, in the program, safety issues and safety organization were seen as "means" of fostering industrial goodwill that was, now, seen as the "end." The program was shared formally throughout the NSC members by December 10, 1915 (Cameron 1915; Ueno 1996).

Some safety experts identified themselves as industrial relations experts and enjoyed successful careers as managers in their companies, by fostering goodwill in their shops. For instance, A.H. Young, worked at South Chicago Steel until 1916, after which he became the director of the Division of Industrial Relations of International Harvester and, finally, the vice president (Industrial Relations) of U.S. Steel (Ueno 1999). Price, advanced in his career from Superintendent of International Harvester to the assistant in the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, to the full-time general manager (field secretary) of the NSC, and finally the vice president of Elliott Service Company (American Labor Legislation Review 1927).

The program implied that the safety movement at the time was not necessarily limited to safety but one that was in the "search for order" in the U.S. political economy (Wiebe 1967).[4] Around 1910, conflicts between capital and labor were a menace to U.S. capitalism. For instance, in 1911, social reformers requested the U.S. President to establish a commission to investigate institutions and adjust industrial relations. A trigger to the request was "the strike of the structural iron-workers and the confessions of two of their leaders in the shocking dynamite explosion which destroyed the building of the Los Angeles Times and the lives of twenty workers in the building" (Kellogg 1911a; Commons 1934a, p. 166). Society had searched to envisage institutions to adjust the conflict. As the labor agitation revealed that the "employer gets his profits out of the flesh and blood of his workmen" (Commons 1921, p. 298), safety was seen as one of the most

critical issues of industrial relations from the late 1900s to the mid-1910s. The collective experiments of safety experts, based on the side effects of operations of the safety organizations, fortuitously discovered the program to adjust industrial relations. Shop safety across the nation had been developed by the nationwide movement (Commons 1920). Subsequently, issues of industrial relations shifted to efficiency problems, labor hours, labor turnover, and unemployment prevention (Commons 1921). The safety experts proposed the program to their employers and, by following the method of the safety organization, encouraged all relevant parties to work together to discuss other issues that could arise. This sense of involvement in the formation of the order may boost their collective enthusiasm.

Pittsburgh Survey, 1907: J. R. Commons Investigated U.S. Steel

In the mid-1900s, a survey of social progress, *Charity and the Commons* (its name was changed to *The Survey*, 1909) planned a comprehensive and large-scale on-site investigation of the economic and social situation of wage earners in Pittsburgh to reflect "the social expression of one of the master industries of the country" (Pittsburgh Survey. Colleagues in the Field Work 1907; Kellogg 1914, p. 493) and provide findings on social progress movements by publishing special issues of journals and a series of books (Kellogg 1909). The investigation, named the Pittsburg Survey, was conducted by various field staff from 1907 to 1908. Commons conducted the initial fieldwork and played the role of a supervisor of the field staff (Kellogg 1914). He stayed in Pittsburgh for a few months, interviewing wage earners, such as laborers and engineers in steel and mining industries, along with his three students, two of whom were John A. Fitch and William M. Leiserson (Commons 1909; Fitch 1911b; Kellogg 1911b; Commons and Leiserson

1914). In addition, as a supervisor, he took Crystal Eastman around with him (Commons 1934a, p. 141). Eastman was a staff of the director of the field staff, Paul U. Kellogg, and she investigated industrial accidents. Later, she wrote *Work-Accidents and the Law* (Eastman 1910), which greatly impacted the social progress movement for legislating accident compensation acts.

In his initial fieldwork at the steel factory, Commons admits, "I learned my first lesson in accident prevention." In 1907, "the United States Steel Company was then just becoming a pioneer in this field (Commons 1934a, p. 141). Its factories were "just beginning to employ safety engineers to prevent accidents. I made the acquaintance of these engineers." He "had been shown by the safety engineers of the steel corporation that if they were permitted and employed to go into the factories with their plants to prevent accidents, there would be no increase of costs whatever, and therefore no decrease of profits, no raising of prices to customers," and, under accident prevention laws that would be legislated in states in the near future, "no need of raising the premiums charged by the private insurance companies" (Commons 1950, p. 279). By an accident insurance law under the legal condition of employer's liability without fault, "it was amazing to" Commons "how greatly accidents could be prevented by safety experts if employers could be furnished an inducement to hire them" to increase their profit (Commons 1934a, p. 142). After that, when he drafted the Industrial Commission Bill in 1911 and administered it, he "had in mind, all along, the accident [prevention] work of the United States Steel Corporation" as one of best practices of employers (Commons 1934a, p. 156; Commons 1934b, p. 856).

Creation and Administration of Industrial Commission (1911–1912)

Commons Picked out C. W. Price

According to Edwin E. Witte, a disciple, Commons was not significantly involved in drafting the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911[5]. The bill he substantially drafted was the Industrial Commission Bill. The following two cases or ideas were related to the process of drafting and enforcing the Industrial Commission Bill.

The first was Commons' and his students' investigation of historical and contemporary administrative practices of European labor laws (Brethouwer 1928). He estimated that "the Belgian Superior Council of Labor" comprised "representatives of capital, labor and the public" (Commons 1934a, p. 154). He sought to "combine all departments engaged in the enforcement of labor laws into one commission, and to provide for [… such representative system], in the drafting and enforcement of the administrative orders which the commission would issue" (Brethouwer 1928, p. 17).

The second was the pioneer case of the safety works of U.S. Steel that emphasized not only the prevention of accidents over *ad hoc* handling of their compensation but also the cultivation of a collective spirit of "Safety First" (Brethouwer 1928; Commons 1913b).

The process of drafting and establishing the Industrial Commission Bill underwent the following sequence of events.

> The Workmen's Compensation Act creating this Industrial Accident Board was approved by the legislature on May 3, 1911 and was to become effective on September 1. Joseph D. Beck, being the Commissioner of Labor, became one of the members of the board. Governor [Francis E.] McGovern appointed John R. Commons and Charles H. Crownhart as the other two members. This board began work under the Act upon appointment (Brethouwer 1928, p. 15).

However, after further consideration of the accident compensation, the commissioners of the board developed the idea that accident prevention is more important.[6] Commons presented his idea of the representative system that has legislative and administrative functions of labor laws including safety orders and the Compensation Act and "secured the support of Governor McGovern and that of part of the legislative committee which had proposed the workmen's compensation bill, passed earlier in the session. The [Industrial Commission] bill which they sponsored was passed by the legislature on June 30, 1911, to become effective immediately." The board was then abolished and the three board members were appointed by the governor as the three commissioners of the Industrial Commission. They made "a mental picture of the kind of man they wanted" as the leading staff of the commission. Representatives of employers wanted a mechanical engineer "who could invent and install safety devices." However, based on investigated cases of the pioneer companies of safety works, the commissioners decided to hire a practical expert who could organize and coordinate representatives of involved parties and inspire their voluntary cooperation toward improved safety measures. The commissioners started to explore such experts. They interviewed all safety experts they could reach, from Maine to California, and visited factories to witness their achievements.[7] "Fifteen or twenty different persons were considered for" the position. Price was chosen as the best safety expert for Wisconsin, "because of the charm of his personality, his broad social vision, his civic spirit, and the high recommendations of his employers, plus a really big record of things actually accomplished."[8] All commissioners admired his personality, ability, and accomplishments in their speeches and writings.[9]

C. W. Price Organized and Coordinated the Advisory Committee

In November 1911, Price began working as "Advisor to Industrial Commission," traveling to Wisconsin two days per week; on other days, he continued to work in International Harvester. On January 26, 1912, the commission appointed him as a full-time "Assistant to Industrial Commission."[10]

According to Commons (1921; 1934a) and Altmeyer (1932), Price organized the Advisory Committee on Safety and Sanitation Standards. However, as per a manuscript containing a speech that may have been written by Commons, it is assumed that Price and the commissioners called on organized interests to nominate the most practical persons, skilled mechanics, and intelligent experts (Commons 1950, p. 280).[11] The committee comprised representatives of the Wisconsin State Federation of Labor (two members), the Milwaukee Merchants and Manufacturers Association (two members), the Wisconsin Manufacturers Association (two members), the Milwaukee Health Department (a chief inspector), workmen's compensation insurance companies (one member), and the commission itself (four members) (Commons 1913b). Among these four commission representatives, two were safety experts employed by private companies, one— Ira L. Lockney—was a deputy inspector of the commission, who had been employed as an assistant factory inspector of the Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics, which was integrated into the commission in 1911, and the last one was Price. During the initial meeting of the committee on November 25, 1911, Price was elected as the permanent secretary of the committee.

Price coordinated the advisory committee's drafting process of safety standards, which marked the first such attempt in the United States. The minutes of the meetings of the committee and public hearings describe his contributions:

First, Price (and the commissioners) suggested a process to formulate safety standards. For instance, in November 1911, he stated that "it was the thought of the Commission that, […] in view of the fact that it will help promote the work just at this time to give the manufacturers some information regarding the standards which the Commission propose to establish, it will be advisable to at once send out a preliminary statement to the manufacturers which shall cover the more obvious points of danger on which there is practically no difference of opinion; such as gears, belts, setscrew, etc."[12] This suggestion led to the public hearing two months later, as described below. The Industrial Commission Act stated that "after the issuance of any order any employer and other interested person might petition the commission for a hearing on the reasonableness of such order" (Brethouwer 1928, p. 20). However, the commissioners and Price creatively interpreted the act concerning its actual implementation (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1912a; Brethouwer 1928, p. 21). In the advisory committee, Price proposed holding hearings on its tentative order "before" it could be issued as the commission order (Brethouwer 1928, p. 22). This procedure enhanced the practicability and acceptability of the orders and therefore reduced the risk of going to court. In fact, "there has been no complaint claiming the unreasonableness of any of the Commission's orders that have resulted in court action" at least up to 1928 (Brethouwer 1928, p. 22).

Second, Price suggested using "the book of Rules and Instructions for Protection Against Injury, which has been issued by the International Harvester Company," as a basis for committee discussions. In the same meeting, books of safety rules of other leading companies, such as the Illinois Steel Co., Pfister & Vogel Leather Company in Milwaukee, and "the rules which were formulated at the Wisconsin Inspectors' meetings" comprising employers, organized labor, insurance companies, and officers of the Bureau

of Labor and Industrial Statistics, were adopted as discussion materials (Brethouwer 1928, pp. 31–32).[13] In meetings related to drafting, he provided practical knowledge of safeguarding and education that he had elaborated in the International Harvester.

Third, Price conferred with manufacturers of the state in a public hearing. Before the commission formally adopted the safety standard as its order, the advisory committee released its proposed standard, calling for a public hearing on January 27, 1912. In liaison with the chairman of this hearing, Edward J. Kearney (chairman of the advisory committee, a representative of the Milwaukee Merchants and Manufacturers Association, and the founder of Kearney & Trecker Co.), and the commissioners, Price responded to criticisms of manufacturers. However, concerning valid criticisms of some safety codes, he stated that the committee would reconsider the codes to improve their practicability. After the "thorough discussion" at the public hearing, and taking into consideration the criticisms, he reformulated the codes, conferring with "the manufacturers and their superintendents and foremen" including a representative of the employer associations.[14]

Fourth, Price planned and conducted a field survey of special industries, especially woodworking and paper industries, which were unfamiliar to the members of the committee. He then formulated the initial code of the industries to submit to the committee. On February 9, 1912, the committee appointed Price, Kearney, and J. D. Beck (a commissioner) as members of the "special investigation" of the special industries. Price was in charge of the investigation along with four deputy inspectors of the commission. Then, Price reformulated the tentative codes of the investigated industries and submitted them to the committee.[15]

Fifth, Price avoided a drafting process that could risk deliberate omission of codes by manufacturers, which could be viewed as one-sided, drawing possible criticism from

workmen. In the discussion regarding how the committee could draft the rules for special industries, which were unfamiliar to its members, Joseph Derfus, representing the Milwaukee Health Department, "suggested that the manufacturers be asked to formulate the rules for their respective industries." However, Price "strongly objected to this, stating that it would result in many rules being omitted, and would offer a temptation to the manufacturers to consider first their own selfish interests." Price "strongly favored the special investigations" that could retain a process of investigation and drafting conducted by both manufacturers and workmen.[16]

In the final phase, the advisory committee adopted the reformulated codes of the special industries that were developed based on the special investigation and also adopted elevator codes reformulated by its special committee on elevators (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1912).[17] It completed and agreed upon its general orders on safety in April 1912, which were adopted and issued by the commission on May 14 and became effective on June 14 (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1912).

Thus, joint action by opposing organized interests to create a collective spirit of willing cooperation was institutionalized mainly by the commissioners and C. W. Price. Commons drafted the Industrial Commission Act of 1911 based on his investigation of foreign administrative institutions and the pioneer case of U.S. Steel. Price also made a great contribution by operating the actual procedure of the joint bargaining system of this act. It was written in the Industrial Commission Act that commissioners could appoint unpaid advisors. Also, it was written in the Act that once the commission issued its orders, it had to listen to the opinions of interested persons who petitioned against them. There was much room for interpretation in matters that were not explicitly written in the act.

Price (and perhaps commissioners) organized the "most antagonistic elements in the

state" (Commons 1913a). Price then inspired the advisory committee members to accomplish the first public experiment in the United States: rulemaking of the public standards of safety by the organized interests themselves. Price coordinated the process of "thorough investigation" and "thorough discussion" among the organized interests. The commissioners and Price, through the creative interpretation of the written act, ensured that the discussion was partly open to all involved parties across the whole Wisconsin state in the public hearings. Such inclusion led to enhanced practicability and acceptability of the standard and forestalled possible criticism of the involved parties.[18] This process involving the inclusion of conflicting interests, "exhaustive inquiry and discussion,"[19] drafting by the organized interests themselves, public hearing, revision, and finally adoption by the commission became a customary practice of the commission. The rulemaking of safety among voluntarily organized employers and employees was soon imitated by other states. Later, Commons (1937) abstracted such a method of the joint bargaining system into the following expression: "It is very important to have the most reactionary as well as the most radical leaders—the farthest to the right and the farthest to the left in these cooperative investigations, under the leadership of these skilled and trained investigators from the administrative department." Here, "investigators" refer to "conciliator" "intermediator," and "sociological practitioner" (Commons 1913a; 1914; 1934b). In its initial and model case in Wisconsin, the "investigator" is Price, who, according to a speech of a commissioner, was "one of the foremost safety men in the country."[20]

C. W. Price's Educational Works for Safety (1911–1914)

Photography Exhibition

In 1911, some of the common law defenses of employers in a suit for damages were withdrawn by the new law and therefore their risk of being held liable for compensation increased. Even in the changed legal environment, in the first two years after the act was passed, "the number of employers who 'elected' voluntarily to come under the law covered […] only about 10 per cent of the total number of eligible employees of the state" (Commons 1934b, p. 856). How did the Industrial Commission convince employers to recognize that the voluntary law of accident compensation with no-fault liability was better than the old employers' liability law? How did they convince the manufacturers to understand that accident prevention would reduce the expected cost of accident compensation? How could they make them more enthusiastic about prevention and supportive of the law? Some workers were also unwilling to change their practices to comply with the safety rules and the safeguards in their shop. How did the commission increase workers' interest in safety? Price was asked a similar question by numerous visitors to Wisconsin: "How has the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin secured this co-operation of the manufactures and the labor interests?" (Price 1914, p. 2).

We highlight the method of educational works in the administration of the commission, which created "co-operation for safety between Wisconsin Industrial Commission and manufacturers and workmen" (Price 1914). We focus on three educational works: photography exhibition, organizing shops, and safety round tables.

In 1912, Price planned exhibitions of photographs of mechanical safeguards and safety practices[21] with the following purposes: first, it aimed to show, concerning each safety order of the commission, the right way, the wrong way, and the best practices of other companies in Wisconsin and across the nation. Second, it aimed to awaken the safety spirit of visitors (employers, superintendents, foremen) and help them understand "how

practicable it is for establishments [their shops] to devise and install their own safeguards without depending too much on patented articles" (Commons 1913b).

The photographs and blueprints were compiled in the *Bulletin of the Commission* and the commission actively circulated it among all the involved parties in the state (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1912a). The photography exhibition and *Bulletin* were part of the clearinghouse function of the commission.

Although safety museums in Europe exhibited machines and safeguards, it would have been difficult for the commission to exhibit safety devices to managers in the broader state because of cost and portability issues. Thus, the commission used three sets of copies of 1,200 photographs. One set was featured in the permanent exhibition in Milwaukee. Two other sets accompanied Price and deputy inspectors when they inspected shops in a region. These exhibitions occasionally included evening lectures, wherein Price and the deputies explained the safety orders and the economic effectiveness of the safety works in the pioneer companies (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 286).

> Our [Industrial Commissions'] deputies were expected to call on the manufacturers personally and interest them in having their superintendents and foremen visit the exhibit, which they did in large numbers, and in some towns hundreds of people besides the representatives of the manufacturers visited them, and they made a careful study of this exhibit of the practical results of the companies which had delivered the goods. (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 286).

Some photographs and blueprints were provided by pioneer companies, especially, International Harvester. Thus, it was an outcome of Price's career and professional

network. However, all the photographs were approved by the advisory committee of the commission (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1912b, p. 163), which meant that they were examined by representatives of organized interests, who acknowledged their efficiency, practicability, and acceptability.

Organizing Each Large Shop (1913–1916)

Price had expended much effort to coordinate the drafting of the general safety orders since the inception of the Industrial Commission. Around the beginning of 1913, the commission began a campaign to encourage the involved parties to foster a spirit of safety and participate in the Compensation Act. Its primary aim was to support the establishment of shop safety committees in larger plants in Wisconsin, which Price largely did alone, with his missionary zeal. First, he organized plants that had over 300 employees. It was almost completed in 1914, after which he expanded his targets to plants that had over 200 employees.

The safety organization was necessary to achieve a significant reduction in accidents, because, as the leading safety experts stressed, reducing "two-thirds" of accidents requires increased worker interest and voluntary action. Giving them responsibilities in the workers' safety committees in their respective shops was a way to increase their interest. The attitude of the manager is important to make the workers confirm that safety is the first value in the shop. Therefore, it is necessary for safety experts to "sell" the safety organization (safety department and the multilevel safety committees) to management. Price testified before the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations regarding how to do this.

The first job of safety experts is to convince top-level management of the economic

benefits of accident prevention (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 293). Specifically, Price showed the manager his "blueprint" depicting accidents and their solutions in other companies, explaining how they avoided potential economic losses (lost days, lost wages, demoralization, and reduction in efficiency) because of the established safety works (safeguards and organization). Although we cannot see Price's "blueprint" and other materials, from his testimony and letters, we can surmise that he used pictures of accidents and practical devices, as well as statistics, based on his and other deputies' investigations, as shown in Table 1 (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 288).[22]

Table 1. Accident-related lost days lost reported by companies

	July & August 1912	July & August 1913	Reduction percentage
Simmons Mfg. Co.	269	146	45.6%
Pfister & Vogel Leather Co.	371	106	71.4%
Nordberg Mfg. Co.	177	63	64.4%
Bucyrus Company	379	172	54.7%
Chain Belt Company	121	58	52.1%
National Brake & Electric Co.	127	29	77.1%

Note. In his letter, Price explains that the companies listed in the table established safety organizations after August 1912[23].

He emphasized two points: first, the importance of conveying to the managers not what the commission wants you to do, but what other companies are doing, which was what the managers were interested to learn; second, the futility of blaming managers for accidents. Instead, managers could be persuaded by proposing the safety organization as a part of business organization to improve efficiency, as has been proved by others.

Once managers' interest was piqued upon realizing the economic benefits of safety, Price encouraged managers to not only create a safety organization but also implement

safeguards to demonstrate to their employees that they were doing everything they could to ensure their safety. In addition, Price instructed managers to express "frankness" when dealing with their employees and conduct open discussions about their safety works to ensure success.[24]

It is noteworthy that institutional incentives are provided for management to establish a safety organization. Shops with an effective safety organization receive a discount (about 10%) on their mutual insurance rate.[25]

Regarding an individual manager, how did his persuasion change the manager's thoughts about safety? Price said:

> It took me six months to get one of the most stubborn men in Wisconsin, and when we finally got him he broke loose and there was no limit to it, when we showed him the economic side. (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 292)

How have workers come to think about safety as a result of organizing? In 1916, Price distributed a letter to deputies that "was received by Mr. B. F. Shattuck [the safety experts employed by Kimberly-Clark Co.] from one of the workmen in the Kimberly-Clark paper mills and is a fine tribute to the good work which the company has been doing along safety lines."[26]

> Some three years or more ago, when the Kimberly-Clark Co., with whom I am employed, started the Safety First movement I was somewhat doubtful as to what the outcome would be and what it would ultimately mean to all concerned. Today I am not a doubter but a willing worker to the cause of Safety First. The organization work

> that has been done in our mill has improved everything to such an extent that it surpassed our greatest expectations. The pleasant atmosphere of the men and women workers toward their employers is much to be commended, the co-operation of the employer and employes in every phase of Safety Organization work is wonderful.
>
> The mill today has everything possible righted and fixed up, guarding against accidents of almost any description. No more dangerous practices, sanitary working conditions, and the co-operation of all, both employer and employes to a point where they believe and teach Safety First.
>
> I cannot imagine myself working under the old conditions and I know of my others who have expressed the same viewpoint.[27]

The letter did not represent all the attitudes of employers and employees in the state toward the Industrial Commission. In some letters, some employers complained to a commissioner that the instructions of inspectors would make them close shop. Moreover, in September 1916, Price warned deputies that he "had a feeling that in some of the shops where they have organized Safety Committees, there is a little waning of interest"[28]

However, generally, his persuasion and organizing enjoyed great success. For instance, by 1915, Price solely accomplished supporting most of the plants employing over 200 workers to establish the shop safety organization (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1915).[29]

In 1914, the Industrial Commission revealed that "although the Wisconsin compensation act is elective, it is now nearly universal in actual operation" because "about 12,500 employers, with 250,000 employes, are under the act and only 600 employers of four or more persons are outside the act. During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1914, 90.8 per

cent of all accidents reported to the Industrial commission were under compensation" (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1914, p. 39).

Safety Round Tables

Price had organized safety round tables in several cities across Wisconsin State, providing superintendents and foremen the opportunity to discuss specific safety problems and gain insight into practical solutions devised by other companies. This initiative aimed to change plant managers' perceptions so that they could tell their workers to prioritize safety improvement in their plants above other things (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 308). Originally, the round table was experimented in AISEE's first Safety Conference in 1912. Then, it was conducted formally at the second safety conference in 1913. Price soon applies it in Wisconsin. First, in 1913, Price organized several small experimental round tables. Then, the advisory committee of the commission decided to organize larger tables, supported by the Milwaukee Merchants and Manufacturers Association, and appoint Price as a member of the "program committee." He programmed general topics and invited speakers that would inspire participants' interest in safety improvement. Topics were, for instance, "How to Interest the Workmen," "Prevention of Eye Injuries," and "Dangerous Practices" (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1915, p. 6). The program committee also provided photographs and materials to activate discussions. The round table in Milwaukee was held on the second Tuesday of every month and included between 50 and 150 participants. Then, from July 1914 to June 1915, considering the successful round table in Milwaukee as a model, Price organized 12 round tables encompassing 22 regions (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1915). As he envisioned initially (Price 1913), they took on

the role of "Local Council" of the NSC.[30] They had an impact on participants' safety works in shops. For instance, Price wrote to Beck as follows:

> While in Milwaukee I visited the Allis-Chalmers plant and found they have done some remarkably good punch press guarding since the round table on punch presses. It looks now as if they will be able to equip nearly every job with a guard which will protect the hands of the workmen. I had a talk with Search and he is very much interested in safety work. They are following up their safety work very closely with complete reports showing just how accidents happen, etc.[31]

The commission, in its annual report, stressed that the tables fostered a shift in recognition among superintendents and foremen of shops.

> The safety round tables have proved one of the most effective means thus far adopted to keep up interest in safety work and to give superintendents and foremen an opportunity to learn the most effective methods of preventing accidents. The suggestions heard at these meetings have weight with foremen and superintendents because they usually are made by men who speak from experience and who have acted on the suggestions in their own plants. (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1915, p. 6)

Thus, Price was highly skilled in convincing involved parties to shift from unwillingness to willingness to cooperate, through organized and thorough discussions starting from the agreeable points. During these mediational and educational efforts, he employed ideas

and data to persuade and convince the parties involved. He gathered ideas and data through various activities: First, investigations were conducted by himself and the deputy inspectors of the industries. Second, active exchanges of opinions occurred between himself, the deputy inspectors, safety experts in mutual insurance companies, and mechanical experts of manufacturers. Third, experiments on safeguards were conducted with mechanical experts and progressive manufacturers. Some ideas, photographs, blueprints, and other materials were provided to him by the NSC as the national clearinghouse and from the personal connections of safety experts, as detailed below. Thus, he functioned with the support of the institutions, that is, the personal and organizational connections of public and private safety experts. Now, we understand that Commons' concept of "conciliator" or "investigator" originated from such an "experienced factory man" (Price 1914), supported by institutional backing.

Cooperation between Safety Experts in Chicago (R. J. Yong, etc.) and Wisconsin

The leading safety experts in Chicago continuously supported the cultivation of a collective spirit of Safety First in Wisconsin. They supported the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin in drafting its safety orders, developing safety devices, operating the Accident Compensation Act, and facilitating education initiatives.

The pioneer safety expert, R. J. Young (chief safety inspector for the Illinois Steel Company), supported the commission right from its inception. For instance, along with commissioners Beck and Crownhart, Young addressed a night meeting attended by the officers and employees of the J. I. Case Plow Works in Racine, on August 16, 1911.[32] Based on his experience operating the private institution of accident compensation in U.S. Steel, he responded to a question from Crownhart about the Workmen's Compensation

Law in a letter. He responded to inquiries about safeguarding from Price. He voluntarily shared the results of his experiments of safeguarding in Illinois Steel to Price and Beck in letters. They forwarded these letters to their deputy inspectors. Young, quickly and precisely, examined every code of tentative orders of the "advisory committee on orders covering specific points in paper mills" in response to an inquiry letter in November 1914.[33]

In the safety round tables in 1914 programmed by C. W. Price, the leading safety experts in Chicago addressed and discussed issues with participants (employers, superintendents, foremen) concerning the pioneer cases of organizing safety works.[34] In the round table, Young spoke about how the Illinois Co. has reduced its accident rate by one-third. Cameron (American Steel Foundry in the U.S. Steel) spoke about "Safety in Foundries." Campbell (president of the NSC) spoke about the "National Campaign for Safety." Richards (Northwestern Railway) spoke about "Making Safe Men" (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1913a; 1913b).

Price shared the results of the experiments of the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin and his method (that he had elaborated in Wisconsin) of persuading employers to conduct safety initiatives with safety experts affiliated with the NSC. Private and public safety experts (the assistant and the deputy inspectors of the commission) and other state officials (for instance, the commissioners) mutually cooperated in personal networks and conferences in Wisconsin (especially, Madison and Milwaukee) and Illinois (Chicago).

Cooperation with the NSC: Commons' Report of U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations (1913–1915)

In 1913, Commons was appointed commissioner of the U.S. Commission on Industrial

Relations after his term as commissioner of the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin ended (Chasse 2017). The U.S. Commission was established following the petition to the U.S. president by the network of social reformers to investigate methods for industrial adjustment (Kellogg 1911a; Schieffelin et al. 1911). The petition proposed to investigate the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin (Schieffelin et al. 1911). As Chasse (2017) noted, the initial witnesses of the U.S. Commission (December 29, 1913) seemed to have been arranged by a commissioner, Commons. Although Chasse (2017) focused on Raymond Robins, we focus on witnesses who testified before her (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 3), including Beck, Price, Campbell, and Cameron, the latter three of whom were executives of the NSC. Here, we witness the cooperation between Commons, the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, and the NSC to disseminate their method to cultivate industrial goodwill. Their witnesses stressed three points. Beck, a commissioner of the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, highlighted the effectiveness of bringing conflicting interests to the same table and entrusting them to voluntarily draft rules to which they would conform. Price and Campbell explained the effectiveness of shop safety organizations, with Price introducing his method to "sell" the concept of shop safety organizations to managers. Campbell spoke of the effectiveness of round tables in various states and the importance of the NSC clearinghouse function.

Given the Commons' role in arranging the initial safety expert witnesses for the U.S. Commission, we emphasize the essential points of the opposing opinion of Commons (hereinafter, it is referred to as the Commons' report) that was submitted to the 64th Congress by the commission on August 23, 1915. "The contest between capital and labor is more serious than any of the other contests" (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 183), "but," he wrote:

> There are certain points where the interests of capital and labor are harmonious or can be made more harmonious. In fact, this field where there is no real conflict between employers and employees is much wider than at first might be imagined. (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 172)

For him, the major case of "points where the interests of capital and labor […] can be made more harmonious" was safety (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, pp. 172, 189). Here, he declared the program in line with the safety experts of the NSC.

> There are unbridled agitators of this kind on both sides of the contest [who initially make extreme claims], and it is only when the two sides are brought together, and their charges, countercharges, and alleged grievances are boiled down by investigation to the residuum of facts, that mere unfounded agitation can be expected to give way to deliberations on remedies for recognized evils.
>
> This does not mean that both sides can be made to agree on remedies for all evils and grievances, even after they have agreed on the facts. It means only that there is found to be a much larger field than was supposed where they can agree, and it is worthwhile for legislation to provide the means for bringing both sides together for a continuous search after the common points of agreement. When they have agreed upon and disposed of less disputatious points, they are in a position to go on to those disputed points which had been thought irreconcilable. This is the main reason for creating Industrial Commissions with adequate powers of impartial investigation, with conferences and discussions by both sides, and with power to decide on

regulations and then to enforce them. (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 183)

For Commons, Beck, and the leading safety experts,[35] major cases of "the means for bringing both sides together for a continuous search after the common points of agreement" were shop safety committees and the advisory committee for safety in the state (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 189). Commons advocated for a program in which the representatives of the parties involved first begin discussions on less controversial points ("safety"), moving on to other controversial issues in labor-management relations ("working hours, wages, and working conditions") while increasing mutual understanding and goodwill between capital and labor (p. 157). This approach is identical to the "program" which was established by NSC safety professionals by 1915 at the latest (Cameron 1915). Commons generalized these institutional methods and the program to include the administration of not only labor law but also finance, public utilities, and fair trade. Thus, his report generalized the institutional methods and the program that had been elaborated cooperatively by organized safety experts and the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin into the program to conciliate various capitalistic conflicts in the nation.

Commons and the Industrial Commission (late 1910s–1932)

The Next Step in Industrial Relations in Wisconsin

After 1915, Commons did not describe the program explicitly in his writings for the following reasons.

First, in shops generally across all of Wisconsin in the late 1910s and 1920s, the program

had not progressed as far as Commons had expected. This was revealed by the industrial investigation by Commons and his students in 1919 (Commons et al. 1921; Chasse 2017). Second, in the 1920s, industrial relations in the Midwest had been relatively stabilized compared with conditions in the 1910s and during the Great Depression. A reason for this was that some large companies advanced their personnel management by introducing joint committees as an employee representation system (Ozanne 1967; Ueno 2000). Some workers accepted it as an institution of industrial democracy for achieving well-being (Cohen 2014) and devoted themselves to climbing the corporate ladder (Commons 1934b, p. 889).

Third, the Unemployment Prevention Bill (Huber Bill) that Commons drafted was rejected for the 10 years following 1921 in every legislative term. Thus, in the term "disappointing decade" of Commons (Chasse 2017, p. 173), *Legal Foundations of Capitalism* (Commons 1924) pays much more attention to the role of courts in adjusting conflicts than his other famous works, that is, Commons' report for the U.S. Commission (1916), *Institutional Economics* (1934b), and *Economics of Collective Action* (1950).

Contrary to Commons' disappointment explicated and implicated in his writings, when we examine the practices of Commons and the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin during the term, they seemed to work steadily to advance their practices for the progress of the program by, for instance, identifying new issues of industrial relations, searching for collaborations with various experts of personnel management and welfare, and exploring ways to adjust disputed issues between capital and labor other than the issue of safety. We highlight five noteworthy aspects of their experiments.

First, the coverage of the Compensation Act was expanded to occupational diseases in 1919. Second, the minimum wage order for minors, women, and children was issued in

1919. The legislature enacted this in 1913 and gave its administrative authority to the Industrial Commission. It organized the minimum wage advisory committee to administer the law. Similar to the advisory committee for the safety standard, the minimum wage committee contains representatives of organized labor, employers, and citizens (one of the representatives of citizens was Commons). For six years, the committee had exhaustively investigated and discussed employment situations, living costs, and "living wage," holding "many public hearings."[36] Finally, the committee arrived at an agreement and the commission issued the order.

Third, part of the educational initiative for safety was combined with part of the curriculum for vocational schools. Price had trained deputy inspectors of the commission concerning conducting close inspections, their attitude toward managers and laborers in shops in Wisconsin, and their capacity to encourage shops to organize safety committees (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1914). They continued to cultivate the safety spirit in the state. In the bakery and confectionery industry, which suffered from low efficiency and poor sanitation, the deputy inspectors discovered a novel approach to ignite a spirit of safety, which involved educating young bakers on safety and sanitation, as a part of their vocational training on scientific rationality and efficiency of the industry. To address a plea for a school by one of the deputies, C. J. Kremer, the Milwaukee Bakery School was institutionalized. It would be a foothold in "a closer relation between the Industrial Commission, the bakers, and the state and local Boards of Industrial Education" (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1914, pp. 68-72).

Fourth, the Industrial Commission expanded topics of its Milwaukee conference that involved managers, labor, government officials, and university researchers, from safety to all topics related to industrial relations, such as "employment department, organization

and methods," "hours of labor and production," and "reducing labor turnover."[37] The conferences were held in cooperation with the committee on safety and sanitation of the Milwaukee Association of Commerce. The name of the conference changed from the Safety Conference in 1918 to the Industrial Service Conference. The term industrial service implied conserving "human resources," especially, to "reduces avoidable [labor] turnover and secures for his employer the 'goodwill' of labor." It overlapped with "employment management" and "scientific management."[38] The Industrial Service Conference was held every year from 1918 to 1921. In the Conference, Commons spoke about "Industrial Good Will" in 1919 and "Unemployment—The Cause and Prevention" in May 1921.[39] One of the leading safety experts, Arthur H. Young, who at that time expanded his business from safety into the adjustment of industrial relation in companies following the methods of safety experts, was invited to address the conference in 1918 by the commission, as the "best speaker in United States on this subject" of "Employment and Labor Turnover."[40] "The interest manifested in the conference [in 1918] to the establishment of a course [of Industrial Service] of at the University of Wisconsin" was realized in 1918 and a course was conducted for training persons on safety, industrial service, and employment management (Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 1918, p. 7). The course was administered by Commons and Arthur J. Altmeyer in cooperation with the Industrial Commission.[41]

Fifth, persistent campaigns to create institutions to regularize employment in shops and the state's labor market had been conducted since 1921. The institutions of regularization included the "Huber Bill" of unemployment prevention that Commons drafted, which was discussed in Congress in 1921. On August 19, 1921, the president of the Milwaukee Merchants and Manufacturers Association called a "meeting on unemployment" "due to

the report issued by Dr. Commons," which may have referred to the manuscript addressed in the Industrial Service Conference in May 1921 and a draft by Commons (1921) published in October. Commons addresses it to 70 participants including members and representatives of "city, county, civic organizations, railroad companies, public utilities, and state departments" who discuss how to "devise ways and means whereby the unemployment problem could be relieved."[42] At the end of the meeting, it was decided that a "representative committee of twelve" of participants of the meeting would be appointed by the chairman for further investigations and discussions. Thus, Commons aimed to evoke the "employment spirit" (Commons 1934b, p. 858) of organized interests for the introduction of the Unemployment Prevention Bill and to shape the understanding of the state's manufacturers about the bill. Commons "was asked, in 1924, to become chairman of the joint unemployment insurance scheme previously agreed upon by collective bargaining" by the men's clothing industry of Chicago (Commons 1934b, p. 863). He contributed to establishing and administering private funds for unemployment insurance, which became a pioneering example of the voluntary institution of unemployment insurance.

Reflecting on these practices, the Industrial Commission drew its past trial and future program of "industrial relations" in Wisconsin in two speech manuscripts (written after 1919 before 1928) quoted below, the latter of which was by its chairman Fred M. Wilcox, written around 1927–1928:

> The period since 1911 marks a record of progress in industrial relations not surpassed by any state. The future will demonstrate more clearly than we recognize in this day, the judgment of its course. In those days it will be worthy of note that as a state,

> Wisconsin was not content to wait for some other commonwealth to establish a program, but was ready to blaze the trail. [43]

> Outstandingly the greatest progress has been made in the safety field. […] It is not possible in any brief statement to detail the many things in connection with the administration of the labor laws of the state which go to prove advancing standards and progress in relations between men and management. […] We expect the year [1928] to bring about deeper concern on the part of employers for reduction of labor turnover, for fewer periods of idle departments, and less of enforced unemployment. We expect the experience of those industries that have gone for long periods without lost time accidents to be the signal to other industries for like intensive work in that direction. We expect that mercantile establishments will give active thought to plans for a mid-week closing of their stores similar to the Saturday afternoon which manufacturing industries are so generally adopting as a regular schedule.[44]

The speech manuscripts reveal that, after the greatest progress in its safety campaign, in the 1920s, the commission went on to explore avenues of cooperation between the commission and employers related to the disputed points of industrial relations, specifically the regularization of employment and production. The commission intentionally explored "a program" of industrial relations in Wisconsin that was shared, or aligned, with the views of NSC's safety experts.

Cooperation during the Great Depression (1930–1932)

Industrial relations across the nation seemed relatively stable during the 1920s. However,

with the onset of the Great Depression following the New York stock market crash in 1929, industrial unrest became a serious problem, prompting growing interest in methods and institutions for reconciliation. The federal and state governments began to increasingly intervene to address the employment problem, systematically implementing public works and income subsidies for the unemployed. In addition, in Wisconsin, the state's free employment offices administered by organized interests of an advisory committee to the Industrial Commission directed a proportion of unemployed persons to public works.

On April 9, 1930, the Industrial Commission called a citizen's conference on unemployment and invited "prominent citizens" including the representatives of organized interests, for instance, the Wisconsin Manufacturers' Association (WMA), the Wisconsin State Chamber of Commerce (WSCC), WSFL, and the Milwaukee Citizens' Committee on Unemployment. Governor Walter J. Kohler "opened the conference with an informal address."[45] At the end of the conference, it unanimously adopted that it ask the Governor "to appoint state-wide citizens committee to study the problem of unemployment and attempt to work out practical ways and means of stabilizing employment."[46] In June 1930, the governor appointed members of "Wisconsin Citizens' Committee on Unemployment." The chairman was the governor, while the vice-chairmen included representatives of WSCC and WSFL, as well as the chairman of the Industrial Commission, Fred M. Wilcox, but did not include WMA.[47] It was backed by the Industrial Commission, which delegated members of their staff for the conference leveraging their extensive knowledge and employment statistics. The members of the Citizens' Committee investigated and discussed the situation of unemployment in Wisconsin and the means to adjust it. The report was adopted "after thorough discussion" and published in June

1931.[48] The report stated that "the committee never formally endorsed unemployment insurance. However, we have carried on a good deal of educational work. We drew up a summary of unemployment insurance plans. In all our lectures and contacts with local groups, we have explained the necessity and desirability of some form of insurance for unemployment."[49]

In the 1931 session of Congress, three different bills of unemployment compensation were submitted including the "Groves Bill." The Congress decided to establish the Interim Committee on Unemployment, which included the representatives of WSFL and WMA. Its executive secretary was A. J. Altmeyer, the secretary of the Industrial Commission. Commons advocated the compulsory plan and provided his knowledge to the committee (Legislative Interim Committee on Unemployment 1931, pp. 66, 68). While the representative of WMA voted against the compulsory bill, the report was adopted by a majority and submitted to the special session of the Congress on November 10, 1931, justifying the compulsory bill, by quoting the report of the Citizens' Committee based on its "detailed studies" (Legislative Interim Committee on Unemployment 1931, p. 37). Commons had contributed to "an energetic campaign launched in 1931" (Malisoff 1939). Commons, Francis E. McGovern (who was the governor during the legislation of the acts in 1911), and seven other individuals constituted the Wisconsin Committee for Unemployment Reserve Legislation and sent an "Open Letter to the Members of the Wisconsin Legislature" in November 1931, immediately after the Interim Committee submitted its report to the special session of Congress.[50] The special session of the Congress, in November 1931, passed the Groves Bill that had been amended through a compromise with WMA in January 1932 (Nelson 1967-1968; Kitagawa 2017).

Thus, the Industrial Commission strongly supported and sometimes facilitated a series of

investigations and discussions with the conference, committees, and Congress. Cooperating with the governor and Commons, the commission played a crucial role in organizing conflicting interests and providing its secretary, investigation staff, accumulated knowledge, and employment statistics. In this way, the commission molded and directed their recognition and public opinions regarding unemployment compensation through thorough investigation and discussion.

Commons' masterpiece *Institutional Economics* (1934b) stated that the industrial goodwill in Wisconsin was formed through 20 years of negotiation and administration of the Workers Compensation and Industrial Commission Acts among capital, labor, and state officials, enabling them to agree to the Unemployment Compensation Bill. Their "customs" of cooperation that had been constructed based on their experience of the joint bargaining of the safety rules between capital and labor in the advisory committee and their voluntary compliance to the rules under the collective spirit of Safety First "led to the acceptance of the Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Law of 1932" (Commons 1934b, p. 863). Although the program that Commons declared in Commons' report of 1915 was not declared in Commons (1934b), this pioneering case written as part of the subsection "Accidents and Unemployment" in Chapter X "Reasonable Value" in Commons' book (1934b, pp. 840-873) reflected the conduct and success of the program between capital and labor for 20 years. As Uni (2022) noted, this subsection reflected Commons' criticism of Fascism and Socialism which was detailed in the proceeding Chapter entitled "Communism, Fascism, Capitalism." Thus, the subsection implies his preferred method of institutional reformations toward his "ethical ideal type," that is, Reasonable Capitalism. Therefore, the program (whereby representatives first discuss safety before confrontational issues of labor and management) can be seen as a dynamic

element reaching toward Reasonable Capitalism. This program is further implied in *The Economics of Collective Action* (Common 1950, pp. 277-331) which was published posthumously.

Conclusion

This study reorganizes Commons' activities from 1907 to 1932 by examining the safety movements led by experts in the Midwest, revealing a new narrative. In 1907, Commons identified the pioneering "Safety First" initiative at U.S. Steel. In 1911, he investigated safety movements nationwide and selected C. W. Price, a prominent expert from the International Harvester. Price played a key role in formulating balanced safety rules within the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin. He coordinated the initiatives to ensure that rulemaking did not become one-sided, favoring manufacturers. He established an actual procedure following which members initially discuss fewer conflicting issues, encouraging them to experience negotiations and agreements. By 1915, Commons declared the program that begins with "less disputatious points" that would then "go on to those disputed points" (U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 1916, p. 183). It would appear that Commons learned the program from observing the administration of the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, especially, the outstanding contributions of Price. We can affirm that Commons, the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, and the leading safety experts affiliated with the NSC shared a common objective. Their collaboration on this program lasted for two decades. This cooperation, amidst conflicting interests, under the administration of the Industrial Commission, culminated in the acceptance of the Unemployment Compensation Bill of 1932. This program is alluded to in his seminal work *Institutional Economics* (1934b) as a method of achieving the capital-

labor adjustment for his ethical ideal of “Reasonable Capitalism.”

By constructing this narrative, we revealed two deficiencies of the previous studies on Commons regarding the cultivation of a “collective spirit of willing cooperation” (Commons 1934b, p. 858). The first relates to the methods employed by the state “conciliator” within the joint bargaining system. It was not always straightforward for conflicting interests to reach an accord. How did the state conciliator (in our case, Price) facilitate settlements on both sides? The first technique involved controlling the rulemaking procedure to prevent it from being viewed as favoring only one side. The second technique involved providing an initial draft, as a basis for discussion, indicating that the conciliator had considered and enhanced practicability and acceptability for the organized interests, based on a thorough investigation. The third technique is to establish a protocol that encourages conflicting parties to begin with a less disputed issue. These techniques were validated by leading safety experts in progressive large businesses and state safety administration. Commons referred to this role of the conciliator as “investigator” and “mediator.”

The second deficiency relates to the educational approach for involved parties within the state. Based on their experience in progressive companies and state administration, the leading safety experts formulated methods to change attitudes, awareness, and practices of the parties, to encourage them to hold regular meetings at various levels: department, shop, corporation, local and statewide settings, and change the attitudes and practices of the parties involved by “conferring with” those in other companies, peers, and conflicting interests. Specifically, first, the safety experts encouraged the involved parties to arrange the shop safety organizations and the local and state safety round tables. Second, a central organization, such as the committee of U.S. Steel, the Industrial Commission of

Wisconsin, and the NSC, investigated and collected more practicable and acceptable safety equipment, standards, and practices. These were circulated to the involved parties, and presented in their meetings as a basis for constructive discussion. Third, they persuaded top management to introduce a safety organization as a "business" operation by showing them efficiency data from other companies where this was already established. Kaufman (2003, p. 9) said that "in his words [Commons (1919, p. 59)], employers suddenly get the 'safety spirit.'" The word "suddenly" was originally used by Price (1913, p. 4). Price employed the method with his missionary zeal, fostering a safety spirit in Wisconsin within just two years.

In the subsection "Accidents and Unemployment" of Commons's book (1934b), he states that "no law can be effective without a collective spirit of willing cooperation." Hence, in a thesis on his reasonable capitalism, he states that "very little can be accomplished towards public welfare by compulsory legislation compared with what can be accomplished by the willingness and initiative of private effort and private cooperation if properly directed by the state in the competitive rivalry for profit" (Commons 1934b, p. 852). This involves not only legal pressure but also an "investigator" and "education" to cultivate a spirit of willing cooperation. By focusing on the safety movement, this study reveals that its essence was to change the attitudes of involved parties from "unwillingness" to "willing cooperation" though "thorough investigation and discussion" as a joint body consisting of various (labor and management) organized interests.

Since Commons' report of the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations in August 1915, no explicit reference to the program had been made, not even in his masterpiece written in 1934 (or his last book in 1950). However, in his speech in 1937, in the context of a criticism of the administration of the Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1933, which was a

major policy of the New Deal, Commons once again brought attention to the program, referencing the experience of the drafting of the safety standards in the advisory committee of the Industrial Commission in 1911–1912.

> In such a scheme [that is, the joint bargaining system of conflicting, organized interests] nobody gets what he wants, but they all get what they can agree upon at the present point of time. The most important thing is the time element. You can begin on things that can be agreed upon and if then in the course of administration that works satisfactorily and gets results you can go further at a later time. (Commons 1937)

This declaration implied that, in 1937, the 20-year experiment of the program involving the safety experts, Commons, and the Industrial Commission tentatively proved its effectiveness when the Unemployment Compensation Act was passed in Wisconsin in 1932.

Notes

1. This study uses the terms “man” in “safety man,” “workman,” and “foreman” to give priority to the original historical documents at that time. I understand this does not conform to contemporary gender ethics.
2. Commons’ meanings of “reasonable value” are explained by Kitagawa (2017) and Whalen (2020).
3. The effectiveness of the joint committee in the South Chicago plant was soon

referred to in the safety conference of the NSC. It has attracted attention from other associations (Ueno 1994).

4. The socioeconomic backgrounds that led the safety experts to invent the program in the mid-1910s are as follows (Ueno 1914). First, at that time, various movements of personnel management under different names were generated and developed. Second, the large numbers of unskilled immigrant workers were seen as a risk to destabilize industrial relations. It was empirically revealed that the safety organization would be an effective method to organize and control them and subject them to personnel management. Third, employers wanted to decline the "foreman's empire" and transfer their authority over personnel issues to personnel management divisions. The safety movement succeeded in transferring some of its authority to the safety department.
5. Edwin E. Witte to Lafayette G. Harter, February 9, 1960, box 5, folder 2, John R. Commons Papers, 1832–2005. Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.
6. Typescript of speech, n.d., C1040, box 107, folder 1911–1912, Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations: Subject Files, 1911–1983, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin (Hereafter, cited as DILHR).
7. Typescript of speech by J.D. Beck, February 18, 1912, C 1040, box 107, DILHR.
8. P.J. Watrous to B. Rosing, September 2, 1916, C476, box 89, DILHR.
9. Typescript of speech "Explains the New Industrial Law" by C.H. Crownhart, November 4, 1911, C 1040, box 107, DILHR.
10. Typescript of "Press" release, January 26, 1912, C 448, Box 48, DILHR.
11. Typescript, n.d., C1040, box 107, folder 1911–1912, DILHR.

12. Typescript of minutes for “Meeting of Committee on Book of Standards,” November 25, 1911, C 882.1, box 39, DILHR.
13. Typescript of minutes for “Meeting of Committee on Book of Standards,” November 25, 1911, C 882.1, box 39, DILHR.
14. Charles W. Price to Joseph D. Beck, April 4, 1912, C 882.1, box 39, DILHR.
15. Charles W. Price to Joseph D. Beck, April 4, 1912, C 882.1, box 39, DILHR.
16. Typescript of minutes for “Meeting of the Committee on Safety and Sanitary Standards,” February 9, 1912, C 882.1, box 39, DILHR.
17. Charles W. Price to Joseph D. Beck, April 4, 1912, C 882.1, box 39, DILHR.
18. Typescript of minutes for “Meeting of the Committee on Safety and Sanitary Standards,” February 9, 1913, C 882.1, box 39, DILHR
19. Typescript of “Industrial Commission of Wisconsin-to-Wisconsin Employers: Call for a hearing on January 27,” n.d. [c.a. 1912], C 882.1, box 39, DILHR.
20. Typescript of speech, n.d., C1040, box 107, folder 1911–1912, DILHR.
21. Typescript of “Press” release, January 26, 1912, C 448, box 48, DILHR.
22. Charles W. Price to Deputies, July 17, 1915, C 661, box 16, DILHR.
23. Charles W. Price to Charles H. Crownhart, March 7, 1914, C 476, box 89, DILHR.
24. Typescript of speech “Getting Next to the Men” by Charles W. Price, n.d. [c.a. 1911–1912], C1040, box 107, DILHR.
25. Joseph D. Beck to Deputies, June 13, 1916, C 661.1, box 34, DILHR.
26. Charles W. Price to All Deputies, June 2, 1916, C 661.1, box 34, DILHR.
27. Copy of letter from a workman of Kimberly-Clark to B. F. Shattuck, April 10, 1916, C 661.1, box 34, DILHR
28. Charles W. Price to Joseph D. Beck, September 11, 1916, C476, box 89, DILHR.

29. Typescript of the speech “The Work of the Industrial Commission,” n.d., C1040, box 107, folder 1915–1930, DILHR.
30. Charles W. Price to Joseph D. Beck, September 11, 1916, C476, box 89, DILHR.
31. Charles W. Price to Joseph D. Beck, September 11, 1916, C476, box 89, DILHR.
32. Typescript of “Press” release, August 17, 1911, C448, box 89, DILHR.
33. Robert J. Young to Charles W. Price, 20 November 1914, C 882.3, box 40, DILHR.
34. Typescript of minutes for “Program Committee of Safety and Sanitation Committee,” December 3, 1913, C 882.1, box 39, DILHR.
35. See Richards (1913, pp. 89–90) quoted in the Overview of Safety Movements in the United States (1905–1915).
36. Typescript of speech “The Industrial Commission and Its Function,” n.d., C1040, box 107, folder 1915–1930, DILHR.
37. Sidney J. Williams to the Factory Inspectors, March 28, 1918, C 661, box 34, DILHR.
38. Typescript of “The Profession of Industrial Service Courses Offered During the Academic Year 1918–1919 in Cooperation with the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin,” n.d. [c.a. 1918], C 1633, box 108, DILHR.
39. Brochure of the program of “Second Annual Industrial Service Conference,” 28-30 April 1919, C 1633, box 109, DILHR.
40. Sidney J. Williams to Arthur H. Young, March 26, 1918, C 1633, box 108, DILHR.
41. Brochure of “The Profession of Industrial Service Courses Offered During the Academic Year 1918-1919 in Cooperation with the Industrial Commission of

Wisconsin," n.d. [c.a. 1918], C 1633, box 108, DILHR.

42. Typescript of minutes for "Meeting on Unemployment Held in the City of Milwaukee," August 19, 1921, C 763, box 104, DILHR.
43. Typescript for speech "The Industrial Commission and Its Function," n.d., C 1040, box 107, DILHR.
44. Typescript of Speech, Fred M. Wilcox, "The Administration of Wisconsin's Labor Laws," n.d., C 763, Box 104, DILHR.
45. Typescript of news article "The Industrial Commission Calls Conference on Unemployment," 9 April 1930, C 763, box 104, DILHR.
46. Typescript of minutes for "Conference on Unemployment," April 9, 1930, C. 763.1, box 104, DILHR.
47. Don D. Lescohier to Helen Gill, September 25, 1930, C. 763.2, box 104, DILHR.
48. Typescript of "Policies Recommended to Wisconsin Employers by Citizens' Committee on Employment," February 28, 1931, C. 763.2, box 104, DILHR; Typescript of "Report of Citizens' Committee on Employment," 19 June 1931, C. 763.2, Box 104, DILHR.
49. Typescript of "Report of Citizens' Committee on Employment," June 19, 1931, C. 763.2, Box 104, DILHR.
50. Typescript of "An Open Letter to the Members of the Wisconsin Legislature," Final Draft, November 24, 1931, box 3, folder 6, John R. Commons Papers. 1832–2005. Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.

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