Risk Compensation after COVID-19 Vaccination

Jisoo Hwang¹ Seung-sik Hwang¹ Hyuncheol Bryant Kim² Jungmin Lee¹ **Junseok Lee**^{*3}

¹Seoul National University

²Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

³University of California, Berkeley

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- Vaccine take-up is essential to address the COVID-19 pandemic.
- But, some concerns about its risk compensation effect.
 - vaccination $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ infection risk $\downarrow \Rightarrow$ social distancing \downarrow ?
 - A medical study shows 3.2-fold increase in exposure would halve vaccination benefit.
- Our Question: Does COVID-19 vaccination reduce social distancing behaviors?
 - Exploit RD design based on birth date cutoff of vaccine rollout in South Korea
 - Use comprehensive data: survey data and credit card data
- Our Finding: No evidence of risk compensation effect

2. Institutional Background and Data

3. Empirical Strategy

4. Results4.1 LATE4.2 Selection Heterogen4.2 External Validity

4.3 External Validity

COVID-19 vaccine rollout in South Korea

- During 2021, due to vaccine shortage, the govt prioritized immunizing old people.
- Eligibility dates were determined by date of birth.

| Year of birth | 1st dose | 2nd dose | |
|---------------|----------|----------|--|
| -1946 | Apr 1 | Apr 22 | |
| 1947-1956 | May 27 | Aug 12 | |
| 1957-1961 | June 7 | Aug 23 | |
| 1962-1966 | July 26 | Sept 6 | |
| 1967-1971 | Aug 16 | Sept 27 | |
| 1971- | Aug 26 | Oct 7 | |

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- Our main cutoff: 1961 cohort vs 1962 cohort



Source: Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency



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Data

- 1. Survey data
 - Conduct survey for 3,018 individuals of cohort 1961–1962
 - Collect vaccine status, social distancing behaviors, individual characteristics, and perception of vaccine
 - Outcome Variable: mean of indicators for the 10 types of self-reported social activities
- 2. Credit card data
 - Shinhan Card: a credit card company with the largest market share (21.5%)
 - Record credit card usage by category (e.g., restaurant, travel, offline retail)
 - Outcome Variable: daily number of offline transactions

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Empirical Strategy

- Fuzzy RD model using the cutoff of date of birth (DOB_i)

$$\begin{array}{ll} (\text{First Stage}) & D_i = \beta_{\text{FS}} \cdot \mathbb{I} \ (\text{DOB}_i \geq \tau) + f \ (\text{DOB}_i) + \varepsilon_i \\ (\text{Intention-To-Treat}) & Y_i = \beta_{\text{ITT}} \cdot \mathbb{I} \ (\text{DOB}_i \geq \tau) + f \ (\text{DOB}_i) + \varepsilon_i \end{array}$$

with

- D_i: indicator of vaccine take-up
- Y_i: outcome variable of social activities
- τ : eligibility cutoff (Dec 31, 1961)
- Then we can identify LATE from $\beta_{\text{LATE}} = \beta_{\text{ITT}} / \beta_{\text{FS}}$.
 - Interpretation of $\beta_{LATE} \Rightarrow$ risk compensation effect of vaccine compliers

(1)

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First Stage Effect

Survey Data



- A huge increase in vaccine take-up among those in the eligible group
 - $\beta_{FS} = 0.634$ (Std. Err. 0.029)
- In other words, 63.4% of those at the cutoff are vaccine compliers.

LATE Survey Data



- No increase in social activities among those in the eligible group

- $\beta_{ITT} = 0.012 \, (\text{Std. Err. } 0.010)$

- Thus, no evidence of risk compensation effect among vaccine compliers
 - $\beta_{\text{LATE}} = 0.012/0.634 = 0.019$ (Std. Err. 0.016)
- Precisely estimated zero
 - 95% confidence interval can rule out even modest effect (at most 5% point ↑)

LATE Survey Data



- No evidence of risk compensation effect in any social activities

Intention-to-Treat Effect

1st Dose (July 1–July 25)

Credit Card Data

2nd Dose (Aug 26-Sept 4) 0.60 0.60 **Daily offline transactions Daily offline transactions** 0 55 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.40 90 180 270 360 360 on 90 180 270 360 Birth date relative to December 31 1961 Birth date relative to December 31 1961

- No increase in offline transactions among those in the eligible group (if any, negative)
- We can infer no evidence of risk compensation effect.

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Compliance Groups

Identification: Graphical Intuitioin



- Previous no risk compensation effect is only for vaccine compliers ($P_{C} = 64\%$).
- But their effect could differ from other compliance groups if they have heterogeneous characteristics.

Compliance Groups

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- Previous no risk compensation effect is only for vaccine compliers ($P_{C} = 64\%$).
- But their effect could differ from other compliance groups if they have heterogeneous characteristics.
- Definition of other compliance groups:
 - Never-takers: $DOB_i \ge \tau$ but $D_i = 0$
 - Always-takers: $DOB_i < \tau$ but $D_i = 1$

Identification: Graphical Intuition



Identification: Graphical Intuition



- Restricting non-takers sample $(D_i = 0)$

Identification: Graphical Intuition



- Restricting non-takers sample $(D_i = 0)$
- $\mathbb{E}[X \mid \text{Ineligible Non-takers}]$ equals to

$$\frac{P_{\mathsf{C}}}{P_{\mathsf{C}} + P_{\mathsf{N}}} \mathbb{E}\left[X \mid \mathsf{C}\right] + \frac{P_{\mathsf{N}}}{P_{\mathsf{C}} + P_{\mathsf{N}}} \mathbb{E}\left[X \mid \mathsf{N}\right]$$

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- Identification of selection heterogeneity between N and C near the cutoff:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[X \mid \mathsf{N}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[X \mid \mathsf{C}\right] = \frac{P_{\mathsf{C}} + P_{\mathsf{N}}}{P_{\mathsf{C}}} \cdot \beta_{D_{i}=0}$$

- Similiarly, if restricting $D_i = 1$,

$$\mathbb{E}\left[X \mid \mathsf{A}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[X \mid \mathsf{C}\right] = -\frac{P_{\mathsf{C}} + P_{\mathsf{A}}}{P_{\mathsf{C}}} \cdot \beta_{D_{i}=1}$$

Estimation Result

| | (1) | (2) |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Always-takers | Never-takers |
| Variable | Compliers | Compliers |
| Male | -0.031 | -0.108 |
| | (0.093) | (0.089) |
| Married | 0.042 | 0.002 |
| | 0.062 | 0.065 |
| Middle school or less | -0.003 | 0.146** |
| | (0.054) | (0.066) |
| College or more | 0.043 | -0.192** |
| | (0.081) | (0.093) |
| White-collar job | -0.037 | -0.207*** |
| | (0.073) | (0.070) |
| Conservative | 0.111 | 0.115 |
| | (0.088) | (0.082) |
| Belief about vaccine effectiveness | -0.217 | -1.605*** |
| | (0.517) | (0.482) |
| Worry about vaccine side effects | -0.164 | 2.126*** |
| | (0.596) | (0.566) |

- No difference between Always-takers and Compliers
- Compared to Compliers, Never-takers
 - are less educated
 - have less white-collar jobs
 - have negative belief about vaccine effects
 - worry about side effects

: 95%, *: 99%

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External Validity

Testable Restrictions

- Let $G_i \in \{A, C, N\}$ denote the compliance types.
- Our study has external validity if

$$G_i \perp (Y_i(0), Y_i(1)) \mid \mathsf{BOD}_i$$
 (2)

- Testable restrictions of external validity near the cutoff:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y(0) | \mathbf{N}] - \mathbb{E}[Y(0) | \mathbf{C}] = \frac{P_{\mathsf{C}} + P_{\mathsf{N}}}{P_{\mathsf{C}}} \cdot \beta_{D_{i}=0} = 0$$
(3)
$$\mathbb{E}[Y(1) | \mathbf{A}] - \mathbb{E}[Y(1) | \mathbf{C}] = -\frac{P_{\mathsf{C}} + P_{\mathsf{A}}}{P_{\mathsf{C}}} \cdot \beta_{D_{i}=1} = 0$$
(4)

- The failure to reject the joint test of (3) and (4) lends support to external validity (Bertanha and Imbens 2020).

External Validity Test Result

| | Means at the cutoff | | | Difference in Means | | Joint <i>F</i> -Test | |
|-------------------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|---------------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | | | (1) - (2) = 0 |
| | Always | Treated | Untreated | Never | | | and |
| Variable | -takers | compliers | compliers | -takers | (1) - (2) | (3) - (4) | (3) - (4) = 0 |
| Index: | 0.250 | 0.248 | 0.227 | 0.223 | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.039 |
| social activities | (0.019) | (0.012) | (0.021) | (0.008) | (0.026) | (0.023) | [0.981] |

- We can conclude that selection in vaccine take-up does not necessarily imply treatment effect heterogeneity.

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Conclusion

- We study the causal effect of COVID-19 vaccination on social distancing behaviors.
 - Exploit RD design based on birth date cutoff of vaccine rollout in South Korea
 - Use comprehensive data: survey data and credit card data
- Find no evidence of risk compensation effect for all vaccine compliance groups

Thank you!