Measuring U.S. Fiscal Capacity using Discounted Cash Flow Analysis

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### Valuation using Textbook Finance

Government securitizes claim to surpluses

Assets	Liabilities
$PV_{2021}(\{T\})$	$PV_{2021}(\{G\})$
	Debt

▶ Debt is fully backed by PDV of surpluses; **Fiscal Capacity** as of 12/31/2021:  $PV_{2021}({T - G}_{2022}^{2052}) + PV_{2021}(D_{2052}) = PV_{2021}({T - G}_{2022}^{\infty})$ 

Suppose U.S. government collects tax revenue *T*/*Y*, spends *G*/*Y* and runs surplus *S*/*Y* that are constant as % of GDP.

$$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}) = \frac{S}{Y} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \frac{Y_{2021+j}}{(1+r^{\$,y})^j} = pd^y \times \frac{S}{Y} \times Y_{2021}$$

Only GDP is risky in this calculation: GDP growth is i.i.d. with mean *g* Extra fiscal capacity per % of surplus: Total Wealth/GDP Ratio

$$pd^{y} = \frac{1}{r^{\$,y} - g} = \frac{1}{r^{f} + term + rp^{y} - g}$$

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# U.S. Steady-State Fiscal Capacity

Total wealth/GDP ratio is given by

$$pd^{y} = \frac{1}{(r^{f} + term) + rp^{y} - g} = \frac{1}{2.07\% + 2.60\% - 3.50\%} = \frac{1}{1.17\%} = 85.8$$

• Total wealth is  $85.8 \times GDP$ 

=

• What is steady-state surplus S/Y needed to get to  $PV_{2021}({T-G}) = 0.99 \times Y_{2021}$ ?

Asset	s/GDP	Liabiliti	es/GDP
$PV_{2021}(\{T\})/Y_{2021}$	$19.7 = 23.06\% \times 85.8$	$PV_{2021}({G})/Y_{2021}$	$18.7 = 21.9\% \times 85.8$
		$D/Y_{2021}$	$0.99 = 1.16\% \times 85.8$

- Need a steady-state primary surplus of 1.16% of GDP to get to D/Y = 0.99
- ▶ But, CBO projects primary surplus of -3.19% per year until 2052.

### Upper Bound on U.S. Steady-State Fiscal Capacity

► Tax revenue *T*/*Y* is pro-cyclical and spending *G*/*Y* is counter-cyclical

- ▶ Higher risk premium on *T* claim  $rp^T \ge rp^Y$ ; lower multiple  $pd^T \le pd^Y$
- ▶ Lower risk premium on *G* claim  $rp^G \leq rp^Y$ ; higher multiple  $pd^G \geq pd^Y$

 Assets	/GDP	Liabilitie	es/GDP
$PV_{2021}(\{T\})/Y_{2021} \leq$	$19.7 = 23.0\% \times 85.8$	$PV_{2021}({G})/Y_{2021} \ge$	$18.7 = 21.9\% \times 85.8$
		$D/Y_{2021} \leq$	$0.99 = 1.16\% \times 85.8$

Hence, 0.99 is really an upper bound on fiscal capacity

$$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}) \le pd^y \times \frac{S}{Y} \times Y_{2021} = 0.99 \times Y_{2021}$$

# **Boosting Fiscal Capacity**

► If tax revenue T/Y is *counter*-cyclical (safe) and spending G/Y is *pro*-cyclical (risky) in PDV:  $pd^T > pd^G$ 

• Then we can have positive fiscal capacity and steady-state deficits  $\frac{T}{Y} < \frac{G}{Y}$ 

$$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}) = pd^T \times \frac{T}{Y} \times Y_{2021} - pd^G \times \frac{G}{Y} \times Y_{2021}.$$

Assets/GDP	)	Liabilities/GE	)P
$PV_{2021}(\{T\})/Y_{2021} \ge$	$\frac{T}{Y} \times 85.8$	$PV_{2021}(\{G\})/Y_{2021} \leq$	$\frac{G}{Y} \times 85.8$
	-	$FC \ge$	$rac{S}{Y}  imes 85.8$

Taxpayers provide insurance and U.S. Treasury collects insurance premium

Treasury does not run primary surpluses during recessions, pandemics, and financial crises, nor will it anytime soon!

- 1. **Deterministic Economies Approach** ( $rp^y = 0$ ): Debt is not fully backed by PDV of surpluses;  $PV_{2021}(D_{2221}) \neq 0$  because we're discounting at  $r^f g < 0$ 
  - ▶ We can keep rolling over the debt. There's a lot more wealth than you think:  $pd^y \rightarrow \infty$

	Assets			Liabilities
Until 2221	$PV_{2021}({T}_{2022}^{2221})$		$PV_{2021}(\{G\}_{2022}^{2221})$	
After 2221	$PV_{2021}(D_{2221})$	eq \$0		
			D	$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2221}+D_{2221})$

- 2. **Our Textbook Finance Approach** ( $rp^y > 0$ ): Debt is fully backed by PDV of surpluses;  $PV_{2021}(D_{2221}) \rightarrow 0$  because we're discounting at  $r^f + term + rp^y g > 0$
- 3. **Bubbly Finance Approach**. ( $rp^y \approx 0$ ): Debt is not fully backed by future surpluses and PDV of future debt  $PV_{2021}(D_{2221}) \neq 0$  because we're discounting at DR < 0
  - Bubble in some long-lived assets, typically in models without long-lived investors; Total wealth/GDP ratio *pd<sup>y</sup>* → ∞ (missing investors, missing wealth hypothesis)

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  - We cannot keep rolling over the debt because r<sup>f</sup> cannot always be smaller than g without creating arbitrage opps. Total wealth/GDP ratio pd<sup>y</sup> → ∞

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Until 2221	$PV_{2021}(\{T\}_{2022}^{2221})$		$PV_{2021}(\{G\}_{2022}^{2221})$	
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Until 2221	$PV_{2021}({T}_{2022}^{2221})$		$PV_{2021}({G}_{2022}^{2221})$	
<i>After</i> 2221	$PV_{2021}(D_{2221})$	$\not\rightarrow$ \$0		
			D	$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2221}+D_{2221})$

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Need to believe U.S. Treasury has special ability to engineer bubbles. U.K. has not been able to do this in three centuries (Chen et al 2022):

#### Outline

- 1. Simple Steady-State Example
- 2. Fiscal Capacity Measurement using CBO Projections
- 3. Duration Mismatch

# U.S. Treasury Balance Sheet using CBO Projections



- Feed in CBO surplus projections until 2052
- Combined with CBO interest rate and GDP growth rate projections:  $(D/Y)_{2052}$  is 185%.
- Assumption: Treasury runs surpluses of 2.16% after 2052 such that  $(D/Y)_{2052} = 85.8 \times 2.16\% = 185\%$

# U.S. Treasury Balance Sheet using CBO Projections

• CBO projects surpluses until 2052 and debt outstanding at 2052.

	Assets		Liabilitie	S
Until 2052	$PV_{2021}(\{T\}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$124.95	$PV_{2021}({G}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$146.11
<i>After</i> 2052	$PV_{2021}(D_{2052})$	\$33.54		
			Fiscal Capacity	\$ 12.38

Baseline fiscal capacity estimate of **\$12.38 trillion**:

 $PV_{2021}^{upper}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2052}) + PV_{2021}^{upper}(D_{2052}) = -\$21.16 + \$33.54 = \$12.38 \text{ tr.} <<\$22.40 \text{ tr.}$ 

- ► Fiscal capacity limited despite
  - very low interest rates at end of 2021
  - strong assumption on large surpluses after 2052 (2.16%)
  - upper bound

# U.S. Treasury Balance Sheet with Convenience Yields

- ▶ US. Treasurys are special and earn convenience yields.
- Assumption: Treasury collects 0.598% of GDP in convenience yield revenues per year (0.60% × 99.6%)

	Assets		Liabilitie	S
Until 2052	$PV_{2021}({T}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$124.95	$PV_{2021}(\{G\}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$146.11
Until 2052	$PV_{2021}(\{CS\}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$4.04		
After 2052	$PV_{2021}(D_{2052})$	\$33.54		
			Fiscal Capacity	\$ 16.42

Comprehensive fiscal capacity estimate of **\$16.42 trillion**:

Still below observed debt of \$22.40 trillion in 2021

# Reverse Engineering Observed Fiscal Capacity

• If we set  $rp^y = 1.37\%$ , we match the valuation of Treasurys at \$22.40 tr.

	Assets		Liabilitie	5
Until 2052	$PV_{2021}(\{T\}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$150.57	$PV_{2021}(\{G\}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$176.55
After 2052	$PV_{2021}(D_{2052})$	\$48.38		
			Fiscal Capacity	\$ 22.40

▶ Fiscal capacity estimate boosted to \$ 22.40 trillion by increasing PDV of future debt:

 $PV_{2021}^{upper}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2052}) + PV_{2021}^{upper}(D_{2052}) = -\$25.98 + \$48.38 = \$22.40 \text{ tr.}$ 

• We have generated a bubble:  $pd^y \to \infty$ 

$$(r^f + term) + rp^y - g = 2.07\% + 1.37\% - 3.50\% < 0.$$

All un-levered companies growing at rate of GDP have infinite valuations; Missing wealth hypothesis!

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# Backloaded Surpluses





- Treasury runs primary deficits of 3.19% until 2052 ; projected (D/Y)<sub>2052</sub> 185%
- Treasury runs primary surpluses of 2.16% after 2052 such that  $(D/Y)_{2052} = 85.8 \times 2.16\% = 185\%$
- Surpluses have high duration (171), but the Treasury's debt does not (5).

	Net Cash Inflo	ws	Cash	Outflows
Until 2052	$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2052})$	(\$21.16)		
After 2052	$PV_{2021}(D_{2052})$	\$33.54		
			FC	\$ 12.38

Treasury has not matched cash inflows and outflows.

# Interest Rate Increase



- Interest rate level shock of +1%
- Treasury need to run surpluses of 4.82% after 2052 such that  $(D/Y)_{2052} = 46.18 \times 4.82\% = 223\%$
- An increase in surpluses by 2.67% of GDP every year after 2052!

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	Net Cash Inflows		Cash Outflows	
Until 2052	$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2052})$	(\$18.07)		
After 2052	$PV_{2021}(D_{2052})$	\$30.09		
			FC	\$ 12.03

▶ Low risk-free rates and *rp<sup>y</sup>* increase FC, but also increase duration mismatch.

#### Conclusions

- ▶ Textbook finance framework for analyzing fiscal capacity using CBO projections
- ▶ U.S. Treasury's fiscal capacity is limited, unless you think
  - U.S. GDP risk premium is very low  $\Rightarrow$  more wealth than commonly thought
  - U.S. Treasury has engineered permanent violations of the no-bubble constraints in securities markets
- Backloading of surpluses exposes Treasury to interest rate risk (more so if GDP risk premium is low)