STEPAN GORDEEV
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CONTRIBUTIONS

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▶ literature

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- · show importance of farm-level subsistence for aggr. agricultural productivity
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- \rightarrow HH kcal requirements
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- → HH non-farm income
- · Rescale HH kcal intake, output, income by HH kcal requirement
 - → "per capita" measures, weighted by energy needs

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
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
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 - avg share of output sold: 16%

Farm Size $\uparrow \rightarrow$ Shift Farm From Maize to Diversity, Commercialize






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MODEL

MODEL: HH PROBLEM

- heterogeneous households and agricultural products, solve GE ► details
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$$\max\left((1-\varphi_m)\left(\sum_{i=1}^n\varphi_i\varepsilon_{h,i}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}+\varphi_m\varepsilon_{h,m}^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}\right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}}$$

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CALORIC DEVIATION PENALTY f

· caloric deviation penalty fn (▶ properties):

$$f\left(\sum_{i} c_{h,i} k_{i}, K_{req,h}\right) = \psi\left(\frac{\sum_{i} c_{h,i} k_{i} - K_{req,h}}{K_{req,h}}\right)^{2} \frac{K_{req,h}}{\sum_{i} c_{h,i} k_{i}}$$

$$\downarrow \sum_{i} c_{h,i} k_{i}$$

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FARM BEHAVIOR IN MODEL AND DATA

log kcal intake **food diversity** ▶ *def* ▶ *nutrients* log output log non-farm income Ν Adi. R² * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	log kcal intake	food diversity ▶ def ▶ nutrients
	model: CES-only	
log output	0.732 (0.001)	
log non-farm income	0.289 (0.001)	
N Adj. R ²	35,520 0.937	

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

- \cdot CES-only ($\psi=0$): relative consumptions invariant to size/income
 - $-\,$ kcal intake \uparrow proportionally to total shadow income, diversity constant

	log kcal intake	food diversity ▶ def ▶ nutrients		
	model:	model:		
	CES-only	CES-only		
log output	0.732	-0.061		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
log non-farm	0.289	0.031		
income	(0.001)	(0.002)		
N	35,520	35,520		
Adj. R ²	0.937	0.054		

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	model:	model:	model:		
	CES-only	benchmark	CES-only		
log output	0.732	0.124	-0.061		
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)		
log non-farm	0.289	0.084	0.031		
income	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)		
N	35,520	33,613	35,520		
Adj. R ²	0.937	0.393	0.054		

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 - small: focus consumption on obtaining calories to reduce caloric deviation penalty

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	model:	model:	model:	model:	
	CES-only	benchmark	CES-only	benchmark	
log output	0.732	0.124	-0.061	0.428	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	
log non-farm	0.289	0.084	0.031	0.396	
income	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
N	35,520	33,613	35,520	33,613	
Adj. R ²	0.937	0.393	0.054	0.762	

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 - large: caloric requirement largely satisfied → diversify diet
 details ➤ comparison to Stone-Geary

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	model: CES-only	model: benchmark	data	model: CES-only	model: benchmark	
log output	0.732 (0.001)	0.124 (0.001)	0.091*** (0.005)	-0.061 (0.001)	0.428 (0.002)	
log non-farm income	0.289 (0.001)	0.084 (0.001)	0.063*** (0.004)	0.031 (0.002)	0.396 (0.002)	
N Adj. R ²	35,520 0.937	33,613 0.393	8,674 0.063	35,520 0.054	33,613 0.762	

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log output	0.732	0.124	0.091***	-0.061	0.428	0.395***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.034)
log non-farm	0.289	0.084	0.063***	0.031	0.396	0.857***
income	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.033)
N	35,520	33,613	8,674	35,520	33,613	8,675
Adj. R ²	0.937	0.393	0.063	0.054	0.762	0.131

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SELLING BEHAVIOR: MODEL & DATA

LARGE FARMS ARE MORE ACTIVE SELLERS ▶ details

- MODEL & DATA: farm size $\uparrow \rightarrow$ sell bigger fraction of output
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
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
SALES ARE SPECIALIZED ▶ details

- MODEL & DATA: sales are specialized compared to overall production
- model mechanism: sell only the most revenue-productive good, but can produce others for own consumption


SMALL SPECIALIZE, MEDIUM DIVERSIFY, LARGE COMMERCIALIZE: MODEL




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
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
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 - \rightarrow subsistence matters more for macro, nutrition matters for micro



CONCLUSION

Subsistence farmer nutrition demand



Farm production decisions



Aggregate agricultural productivity ↓

- smallest farms specialize in calories
- medium farms diversify diet & production
- largest farms become market-oriented
- if partially leave subsistence ightarrow agric. productivity \uparrow
- half because improved product choice
- calories matter less than subsistence itself

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 - smallholder farmer support is central to public policy in poor countries
 - existing & proposed policies: encourage staples, biodiversity, or cash crops?
 - framework well suited for predicting nutritional, economic outcomes

economics literature:

SUBSISTENCE FARMING &
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY

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THIS PAPER:

explore farm-level subsistence, document scale-dependent product choice



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nutrition literature:

SUBSISTENCE FARMING &

NUTRITION

- Jones (2017), Sibhatu et al. (2015)
 - smallholder farm biodiversity related to dietary diversity
 - especially with poor market access
 - → farm characteristics matter for nutritional outcomes

- explore farm-level subsistence, document scale-dependent product choice
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Food consumption



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MODEL: HH PROBLEM

$$\max\left((1-\varphi_m)\left(\sum_{i=1}^n\varphi_ic_{h,i}\frac{\sigma^{-1}}{\sigma}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}+\varphi_mc_{h,m}\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\right)^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma-1}}-\underbrace{f\left(\sum_{i=1}^nc_{h,i}k_i,\ K_{req,h}\right)}_{\text{kcal deviation penalty}}\\ \sum_{i=1}^n\frac{x_{h,i}}{z_{h,i}}\leq L_h\\ \sum_{i=1}^nx_{h,i}^pp_id+p_mc_{h,m}\leq\sum_{i=1}^nx_{h,i}^s\frac{p_i}{d}+wN_h$$

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$$f(\sum_{i} c_{i}k_{i}, K_{req})$$
 PROPERTIES

Properties:

1.
$$f(bK_{in}, bK_{req}) = f(K_{in}, K_{req})$$

2.
$$f(bK_{req}, K_{req}) = f\left(\frac{K_{req}}{b}, K_{req}\right)$$

3.
$$\min_{K_{in}>0} f(K_{in}, K_{rea}) = f(K_{rea}, K_{rea}) = 0$$

4.
$$f_{11}(K_{in}, K_{req}) = \frac{2\psi K_{req}}{K_{i}^{3}} > 0$$

(homogeneity of deg. 0)

(symmetry around K_{req} in ratios)

(minimum and zero if eat K_{req})

(convex in intake)

back

- · Consider the problem of a household
- Suppose $\psi = 0$ (CES-only)

$$MU_i^{CES}(c_i) = MC_i$$
 (c_i FOC)

- · Consider the problem of a household
- Suppose $\psi > 0$ (benchmark)

$$MU_i^{CES}(c_i) - k_i f_1\left(\sum_i c_i k_i, K_{req}\right) = MC_i$$
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 - → predictions on kcal-diversity tradeoff in consumption and on farm product choice



Agricultural Goods

 $\boldsymbol{\cdot}$ 6 agricultural goods commonly produced and consumed

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Households

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- ► Calibration: parameters & moments

AGRICULTURAL GOODS USED IN CALIBRATION

- · Selected goods:
 - 1. maize
 - 2. pigeonpea
 - 3. groundnut
 - 4. tomato
 - 5. soybean
 - 6. tobacco
- · These goods account for, on average,
 - 70% of HH output market value
 - 43% of HH food consumption market value



$$\frac{1}{d} \sum_{h} x_{h,i}^{s} = d \sum_{h} x_{h,i}^{p} \quad \forall i$$

• Solve for agricultural prices $\{p_i\}_i$ s.t. edible good markets clear:

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$$\bar{p}_{\text{tobacco}} \left(\frac{1}{d} \sum_{h} x_{h, \text{tobacco}}^{\text{S}} - d \sum_{h} x_{h, \text{tobacco}}^{p} \right) \\
\underline{\text{tobacco exports}}$$

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 - some manufactured good is imported to balance the trade:

$$\bar{p}_{\text{tobacco}} \left(\frac{1}{d} \sum_{h} x_{h, \text{tobacco}}^{s} - d \sum_{h} x_{h, \text{tobacco}}^{p} \right) = p_{m} \left(\sum_{h} c_{h, m} - Y_{m} \right)$$
tobacco exports

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 - on avg, top good accounts for 91% in sales but 67% in output



Lower Trade Costs ightarrow All Specialize: Model & Data

- Model: $d \downarrow \rightarrow$ specialize production
 - below some cutoff $ilde{d}_h$, HH h only produces the revenue-maximizing good



Lower Trade Costs ightarrow All Specialize: Model & Data

- MODEL: $d \downarrow \rightarrow$ specialize production
 - below some cutoff $ilde{d}_h$, HH h only produces the revenue-maximizing good
- DATA:
 - HHs with better market access specialize production
 - **▶** table



quartile	sold output share
1 4	

sold output share
model
<1%
67%

output	sold output share	
quartile	model	data
1	<1%	13%
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• Larger farms are more active sellers:

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- Pure CES Model: no scale dependence in selling behavior
- · Model mechanism:

 $size \uparrow \longrightarrow energy intake \uparrow$

 \nearrow food diversity \uparrow

need revenue


• Larger farms are more active sellers:

output	sold output share		
quartile	model	data	
1	<1%	13%	
4	67%	31%	

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
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output	sold output share		
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1	<1%	13%	
4	67%	31%	

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· Model mechanism:

size $\uparrow \longrightarrow$ energy intake \uparrow



need revenue → sell

CUTOFF TRADE COST \bar{d}

$$ar{d}_h = \sqrt{rac{\max_i p_i Z_{h,i}}{\min_i p_i / k_i \cdot \max_i k_i Z_{h,i}}}$$

FOOD DIVERSITY

Food Diversity = Inverse Simpson Index

Food Diversity_h =
$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\frac{\text{food quantity}_{h,i} \times \text{median purchase price}_{i}}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} \text{food quantity}_{h,j} \times \text{median purchase price}_{j}}\right)^{2}\right)^{-1}$$

where h is the HH index, n is the total number of distinct foods in the dataset.

- · Simpson Index: sum of squared food shares within HH's consumption
 - same as HHI
 - interpretation: probability that two random dollars of (shadow) food expenditure come from the same product
- Inverse Simpson Index = $\frac{1}{SI}$, commonly used in measuring species diversity



NUTRIENT RICHNESS

	NRF9		NRF9.3	
_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log output	17.046***	5.695***	-13.296***	-13.400***
	(0.964)	(0.724)	(3.326)	(3.358)
log non-farm income	10.285***	2.441***	-7.257**	-7.305**
	(0.792)	(0.603)	(3.898)	(3.548)
log kcal intake		124.025*** (2.282)		0.550 (26.234)
N	8,675	8,674	8,675	8,674
Adj. R ²	0.054	0.451	0.002	0.002

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

- NRF9: sum of daily intakes (relative to recommended level) of 9 nutrients
- NRF9.3: subtracts the relative excessive consumption of 3 disqualifying nutrients



LOWER TRADE COSTS → ALL SPECIALIZE: DATA

production diversity

Ν

Adj. R²



^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

LOWER TRADE COSTS → ALL SPECIALIZE: DATA

production diversity

sold output share

Ν

Adj. R²



^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Lower Trade Costs \rightarrow All Specialize: Data

	production diversity
old output share	-0.044***
	(0.016)

N	4,042	
Adj. R ²	0.025	
* n < 0.1	** n < 0.05 *** n < 0.01	

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01



LOWER TRADE COSTS \rightarrow ALL SPECIALIZE: DATA

	production diversity
sold output share	-0.044*** (0.016)

1 [good mkt access]

N	4,042
Adj. R ²	0.025
+ 0.4	44

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01




Lower Trade Costs \rightarrow All Specialize: Data

	production diversity	
sold output share	-0.044*** (0.016)	
1 [good mkt access]		-0.164*** (0.018)
N	4,042	8,675
Adj. R ²	0.025	0.099

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01



PRODUCT FREQUENCY BY SIZE: DATA



parameter	value	moment/source	moment	moment
parameter	value	moment/source	data	model

parameter	value	moment/source	data moment	model moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_{h}\right)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902

parameter	value	moment/source	data moment	model moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h\right)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
$V(\log L_h)$	1.5	$V(\log \text{output}_h)$	1.528	1.385

parameter	value	moment/source	data moment	model moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h ight)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
$V(\log L_h)$	1.5	V(log output _h)	1.528	1.385
$P(N_h=0)$	0.112	P (non-farm income _h = 0)	0.112	0.117

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$P(N_h=0)$	0.112	P (non-farm income _h = 0)	0.112	0.117
$V(\log N_h \mid N_h > 0)$	2.103	V(log non-farm income _h)	2.103	1.924

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Parameters

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$V(\log N_h \mid N_h > 0)$	2.103	V(log non-farm income _h)	2.103	1.924
Parameters				
σ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_

parameter	value moment/source		data moment	model moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h\right)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
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Parameters				
σ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
γ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_

parameter	value	value moment/source		model moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h\right)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
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Parameters				
σ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
γ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_
d (agricultural trade cost)	1.75	avg share sold	0.159	0.203

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Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h ight)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
$V(\log L_h)$	1.5	V(log output _h)	1.528	1.385
$P(N_h = 0)$ 0.112 $P(\text{non-farm})$		P (non-farm income _h = 0)	0.112	0.117
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Parameters				
σ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
γ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_
d (agricultural trade cost)	1.75	avg share sold	0.159	0.203
ψ (kcal deviation penalty)	0.5	output elasticity of K_{in}	0.091	0.124


parameter value moment/source		data moment	model moment	
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h\right)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
$V(\log L_h)$	1.5	$V(\log \text{output}_h)$	1.528	1.385
$P(N_h=0)$	0.112	P (non-farm income _h = 0)	0.112	0.117
$V(\log N_h \mid N_h > 0)$	2.103	V (log non-farm income _h)	2.103	1.924
Parameters				
σ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
γ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_
d (agricultural trade cost)	1.75	avg share sold	0.159	0.203
ψ (kcal deviation penalty)	0.5	output elasticity of K_{in}	0.091	0.124

Good characteristics


parameter	value	moment/source	data moment	model moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h ight)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
$V(\log L_h)$	1.5	V(log output _h)	1.528	1.385
$P(N_h=0)$	0.112	P (non-farm income _h = 0)	0.112	0.117
$V(\log N_h \mid N_h > 0)$	2.103	V(log non-farm income _h)	2.103	1.924
Parameters				
σ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
γ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_
d (agricultural trade cost)	1.75	avg share sold	0.159	0.203
ψ (kcal deviation penalty)	0.5	output elasticity of K_{in}	0.091	0.124
Good characteristics φ_m (manuf. taste weight)	0.5	aggr. non-farm income aggr. farm output	1.539	1.632

parameter	value	moment/source	data moment	model moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h\right)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
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$P(N_h=0)$	0.112	P (non-farm income _h = 0)	0.112	0.117
$V(\log N_h \mid N_h > 0)$	2.103	V(log non-farm income _h)	2.103	1.924
Parameters				
σ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
γ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_
d (agricultural trade cost)	1.75	avg share sold	0.159	0.203
ψ (kcal deviation penalty)	0.5	output elasticity of K_{in}	0.091	0.124
Good characteristics				
$arphi_{m}$ (manuf. taste weight)	0.5	aggr. non-farm income aggr. farm output	1.539	1.632
$\bar{p}_{ ext{tobacco}}/p_{ ext{maize}}$	5.4	aggr. tobacco output share	0.091	0.094


- Compare "farm-gate" production to final consumption ("aggregate productivity")
 - farm production only accounts for product choice changes



- · Compare "farm-gate" production to final consumption ("aggregate productivity")
 - farm production only accounts for product choice changes
 - final consumption also accounts for mechanical losses from d




- Compare "farm-gate" production to final consumption ("aggregate productivity")
 - farm production only accounts for product choice changes
 - final consumption also accounts for mechanical losses from d




 $d \rightarrow$ 1: aggr. productivity \uparrow 78% ($\frac{1}{3}$ due to product choice)

- · Compare "farm-gate" production to final consumption ("aggregate productivity")
 - farm production only accounts for product choice changes
 - final consumption also accounts for mechanical losses from d



- $d \rightarrow 1$: aggr. productivity $\uparrow 78\%$ ($\frac{1}{3}$ due to product choice)
- $d\downarrow$ s.t. avg share sold 16% \rightarrow 50%: aggr. productivity \uparrow 42% ($\frac{1}{2}$ due to product choice)

AGGREGATE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY ACROSS MODELS




Trade Costs $\downarrow \rightarrow$ Heterogeneous Effects in Farm Size

• $d \downarrow$ s.t. avg share sold 16% \rightarrow 50%:


Trade Costs $\downarrow \rightarrow$ Heterogeneous Effects in Farm Size

- $d \downarrow$ s.t. avg share sold 16% \rightarrow 50%:
 - farm productivity: small ↑ the most, large ↑ the least



Trade Costs $\downarrow \rightarrow$ Heterogeneous Effects in Farm Size

- $d \downarrow$ s.t. avg share sold 16% \rightarrow 50%:
 - farm productivity: small ↑ the most, large ↑ the least
 - consumption: small \uparrow the most, medium \uparrow the least



FARM SIZE AND FOOD CONSUMPTION: STONE-GEARY

Household food consumption vs farm size: Stone-Geary vs baseline model and data

		log kcal intake			food diversity		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	model : Stone-Geary	model : baseline	data	model : Stone-Geary	model : baseline	data	
log output	0.260	0.124	0.091***	-0.118	0.428	0.395***	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.034)	
log non-farm	0.223	0.084	0.063***	0.029	0.396	0.857***	
income	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.033)	
N	35,483	33,613	8,674	35,483	33,613	8,675	
Adj. R ²	0.819	0.393	0.063	0.196	0.762	0.131	

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01