

Political Voice and (Mortgage) Market Participation: Evidence from Minority Disenfranchisement*

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Abstract

This paper documents the link between political voice and economic decision-making. Combining the dilution of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act as a shock to the enfranchisement of Black Americans with granular data on the US mortgage market, we document a 14.7% decline in mortgage origination for Black Americans. This decline is driven by a reduction in applications rather than changes in the denial rate, suggesting their self-selection out of the mortgage market. Additionally, we observe a flight of Black demand to Black lenders, indicating an increase in racial homophily. Our results indicate disenfranchisement reduces demand by increasing the fear of rejection, potentially emanating from the fear of discrimination.

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1 Introduction

“So long as I do not firmly and irrevocably possess the right to vote I do not possess myself. I cannot make up my mind — it is made up for me. I cannot live as a democratic citizen, observing the laws I have helped to enact — I can only submit to the edict of others.”

-Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 1957 speech titled “Give Us The Ballot”

The power of individuals to affect election outcomes is the gateway to advancement in all aspects of life ([Button \(2014\)](#)). By exercising their options, the electorate can vote out of office any politician who provides barriers to the provision of basic necessities such as housing, safety, and jobs. Also, the right to vote empowers individuals with a political voice that allows them to draw greater public good toward themselves. Consequently, any change in the degree of enfranchisement can influence an agent’s decision-making by altering their physical and economic environment. While existing studies have highlighted the role of enfranchisement on public good provision, microeconomic evidence on the relationship between political voice and individual decision-making is limited – Do economic agents respond to changes in voting right through their economic and financial decisions? Can exclusion in the voting process result in exclusion from markets? To what extent can differences in voting rights across groups lead to inequality? What are the mechanisms through which exclusion from the voting process can increase inequality?

In this paper, we study the link between electoral disenfranchisement and economic decision-making in a setting that allows us to examine the channels through which disenfranchisement can widen existing economic cleavages. Specifically, we study the impact of the dilution of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which eroded the political voice of Black Americans, on their participation in the mortgage market and the consequent racial disparity in homeownership in the US. Home purchases are a natural setup for the empirical investigation, because houses are the most significant asset owned by most households and therefore one of the most important economic choices made by a household over its lifetime ([Chetty and Szeidl \(2007\)](#), [Chetty, Sándor and Szeidl \(2017\)](#)). Moreover, homeownership is an important medium of wealth accumulation and inter-generational wealth transfer. We focus on mortgage market outcomes as a setup to identify the effect of disenfranchisement on exclusion from markets, because home mortgages are an integral part of home purchases.¹ Another motivation to exploit the setup of mortgage markets follows from [Charles and Hurst \(2002\)](#), who suggest that differences in mortgage-application propensities can potentially explain the racial homeownership gap.

Theoretically, disenfranchisement can affect mortgage market outcomes through multiple channels – income, elevated uncertainty, fear of rejection, and migration. First, disenfranchisement can affect the economic well-being of the disenfranchised group by reducing their income ([Aneja and Avenancio-León \(2019\)](#), [Aneja and Avenancio-Leon \(2020\)](#)). The reduction in income can result in a greater propensity

¹ A large number of homes are purchased through mortgage borrowing. The 2021 Statistics Research Department report - “*Number of new home sales in the U.S. 2000-2020, by financing type*” states that two in three home purchases between 2000 and 2020 were financed through a conventional mortgage [<LINK>](#). Redfin analysis of home purchases indicates an average of 25% of homes were purchased using all cash between 2001 and 2021 [<LINK>](#). The 2014 survey of potential home-buyers by loanDepot finds that 71% of all Americans who want to buy a home will need financing [<LINK>](#).

among banks to reject the applications of potential borrowers. Additionally, reduced income can tighten the borrowing constraints and lead to lower demand for mortgages and illiquid assets, such as homes, manifesting as reduced applications (Campbell and Cocco (2003)). Second, disenfranchisement can lead to an increase in the uncertainty of the disenfranchised group about their economic and social conditions. Consequently, they can hold back their investment in home purchases leading to lower mortgage applications (Bloom (2009), Bloom (2014)). Third, disenfranchisement can result in an increased fear of rejection, manifesting as reduced applications for mortgages. The increased fear of rejection could either be due to the greater uncertainty following disenfranchisement or an expectation of increased discrimination in the mortgage markets. Disenfranchised groups will revise their expectation of discrimination upwards following a reduction in their political voice, because disenfranchisement can reduce the state's incentives to protect against discrimination by shifting the median voter. Also note that if the actual level of discrimination increases following disenfranchisement, and not just the expected level, it can also manifest as greater rejection and fear of rejection. Fourth, the disenfranchised group can move to other areas in search of better representation and resources as predicted by Tiebout (1956). The exodus of the disenfranchised group can mechanically result in fewer mortgage applications and originations. Disentangling these channels is crucial to understanding the underlying mechanisms through which exclusion from the voting process can increase inequality in mortgage markets.

A direct test to identify the effect of changes in enfranchisement or political voice on mortgage market outcomes requires an exogenous variation in the cost of voting. The temporal and spatial variation in federal voting rights protection created by the 2013 US Supreme Court ruling in *Shelby v. Holder* provides for such a variation. The VRA was signed into law on August 6, 1965. It outlawed many discriminatory voting practices in the US that prevented minorities in general and Black Americans in particular from participating in the electoral process. Section 2 of the VRA eliminated all nationwide voting restrictions that denied the right to vote on account of race. Section 5 of the VRA empowered federal authorities with oversight powers to protect minorities' right to vote by requiring compulsory preclearance of all changes in voting laws. Section 5 is widely considered the heart of the VRA because it shifted the burden of proof from voters to the election officials. Unlike Section 2, Section 5 of the VRA was applied to selected jurisdictions (mainly in the South) according to the formula prescribed in Section 4(b). The US Supreme Court, in its judgement on *Shelby v. Holder*, ruled that the coverage formula defined in Section 4(b) was unconstitutional, making Section 5 inoperable.

This judgement stripped VRA of its most potent provision and struck a blow to the political voice of Black Americans, as evidenced by Justice Ginsberg's dissenting judgement highlighting that "[t]hrowing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet." Removal of the preclearance requirement was immediately met with the enactment of controversial voter laws in jurisdictions previously covered by Section 5 of the VRA (Ang (2019)). For example, within 24 hours of the ruling, Texas announced and passed a strict photo identification law that had previously failed the preclearance under Section 5. Other states such as Georgia and North Carolina also implemented several discriminatory voter laws and purged

several Black Americans from its voter list. We establish the quantitative relevance of the dilution of the VRA as a potential shock to the political voice of Black Americans. We show that voter turnout during presidential elections declined sharply in counties previously covered by Section 5 of the VRA and a greater Black population share. This result, following the seminal work of [Tingsten \(1937\)](#), reflects a decline in the political voice of Black Americans after the Shelby ruling.

Therefore, the natural experiment created by the Shelby ruling allows us to study the effect of erosion in the voting rights of Black Americans on the racial homeownership gap. Since mortgage lending is imperative in determining homeownership, we exploit the richness of information available in mortgage markets to empirically investigate the role of voting rights in widening the existing racial economic disparity. We combine the spatial information on jurisdictions originally covered under Section 5 of the VRA with the detailed Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) dataset to identify the relationship between changes in the cost of voting and mortgage market outcomes.

Two features of our data allow for credible identification. First, the data provide information on the borrowers' race, which is imperative in examining the effect of the Shelby ruling across races. Second, detailed information on property location allows us to focus on contiguous counties separated only by jurisdictional borders in cases where one county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA and the other was not. The focus on contiguous counties is important because a direct comparison of all covered and uncovered counties is likely to contaminate the estimation, due to selection-bias issues or omitted variables potentially correlated with racial differences in economic status. The assumption of using this subsample of covered and uncovered contiguous counties is that these counties are immediately adjacent neighbors, are expected to be similar in both observable and, more importantly unobservables, and are likely to follow similar paths in the absence of policy changes.

Our empirical strategy uses a border discontinuity design. It estimates a dynamic differences-in-differences (DDD) specification that exploits three dimensions of heterogeneity - spatial differences in the coverage of Section 5 across adjacent counties, the difference in the impact of the repeal of Section 5 across races within a county, and time-series variation before and after the dissolution of Section 5. The key identifying assumption behind this empirical strategy is that, in the absence of the Shelby ruling, outcomes for Black and White borrowers in the treatment and control groups would have evolved according to parallel trends.

Using the dynamic triple-differences specification in a sample of bordering counties, we document a parallel movement before the Shelby ruling and a sharp decline in mortgage origination and applications for Black borrowers in the treated counties compared with Black borrowers in adjacent control counties following the Shelby ruling. Meanwhile, we do not observe changes in mortgage-rejection or -denial rates. The inclusion of county \times year, race \times year, county \times race, and county-pair \times race \times year fixed effects in the empirical specification indicates the results are not driven by time-varying shocks within a county, aggregate time-varying shocks to a race, the time-invariant status of a race within a county, or time-varying shocks to race within a pair of adjacent counties. The role of county-pair \times race \times year fixed effects is to ensure the outcome differences among Black and White households in the control group provide a counterfactual

of what would have happened to differences among Black and White households if the US Supreme Court would not have removed the pre-existing protections under Section 5.

We further supplement our baseline analysis with a geographic regression discontinuity (RD) wherein we estimate the effect of the Shelby ruling on mortgage market applications, originations, and denial rates measured at the census-tract level in a sample of bordering counties. The key innovation of the RD design is to include census-tract \times year fixed effects along with county-pair \times race \times year fixed effects, allowing us to address three issues: the large counties on each side of the border might not be similar enough; the economic shocks in a county may not evolve over space such that all areas within a county are affected similarly; and heterogeneous policy spillovers may occur within a county. The geographic RD results show that the mortgage-origination amount (number) for Black Americans in treated counties declined by 14.7% (8.3%) after the Shelby ruling. Additionally, the mortgage application amount (number) for Black Americans in treated counties declined by 12.5% (7.0%) after the Shelby ruling. However, as before, we find no effect on the denial rate around the Shelby ruling. The results indicate that lower mortgage origination for Black Americans in treated counties is almost entirely driven by the reduction in mortgage applications by Black borrowers and not by an increase in the mortgage-denial rate of Black Americans.

Our baseline results are robust to a placebo analysis wherein we randomize the treatment status indicating the relevance of the treatment status and non-spuriousness of our results. In addition, we document a 9.9% decline in the mortgage-origination amount for another minority – non-Black and non-White Hispanics – whose voting rights are also likely to be negatively affected by the Shelby ruling. Lastly, we document that lower number of applications and originations by Black borrowers in treated counties after the Shelby ruling translates into reduced home purchases for Black households. This finding indicates that the effect of disenfranchisement on mortgage origination and applications can result in real effects and further exacerbate the pre-existing racial homeownership gap.

A concern with the analysis so far is that Congress did not randomly choose the jurisdictions subject to the stringent oversight under Section 5. A state or a county was covered under Section 5 if it used a test or device to restrict voting, such as a literacy test, and had a voter turnout of less than 50% in the 1964 presidential elections. The inclusion of county \times race (census-tract \times race) and the border discontinuity design (geographic RD) addresses this concern to an extent. To further address this issue of selection bias, we conduct a differences-in-regression-discontinuity (DRD) analysis by restricting the sample to counties within a narrow margin of 5% around the treatment threshold of 50% voter turnout in the 1964 presidential election. The estimates from the DRD analysis also show that the origination and applications fell for Black Americans in treated counties after Shelby ruling, whereas the effect on the denial rate is economically small and statistically insignificant. The DRD analysis indicates the results are unlikely to be driven by the specific sample employed in baseline estimation or driven by selection bias.

A major concern with our analysis is that omitted aggregate factors correlated with the timing of the Shelby ruling drive our results. These contemporaneous omitted variables can include – aggregate macroeconomic shocks, such as interest rates, or regulatory changes, such as the final compliance deadline of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2013, which changed bank credit. Black and White households could have

different responses to such aggregate macroeconomic and regulatory changes given the wealth inequality between the two. However, for these aggregate shocks to explain away our results, we would need Black households in the treated and control counties to have different sensitivities to aggregate shocks. We verify this assumption using the data from the pre-Shelby period and find Black households in treated and control counties have similar sensitivity to a range of aggregate shocks such as, 15-year and 30-year mortgage rates, term spread, bank credit, and GDP growth rate. However, this assumption is insufficient to mitigate the concern if the relative sensitivity of the Black households in treated and control counties changes after 2013. Therefore, we further address this issue by re-running our baseline analysis while controlling for the triple-interaction term of macroeconomic shocks, the borrower's race, and the county's treatment status. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these controls. Hence, contemporaneous aggregate shocks are unlikely to drive our baseline effect. We also find that the Shelby ruling did not affect the refinancing of mortgages. Since refinancing is primarily a function of interest rates (Campbell (2006)), it provides additional support that our empirical specification is not capturing changes in interest rates that occurred around the Shelby ruling.

Next, we focus on the underlying mechanism that can explain our results. We disentangle the income and the fear-of-rejection channel through three tests. These tests indicate that the effect of the VRA on mortgage market outcomes is likely driven by increased fear of rejection following the Shelby ruling rather than being a downstream effect of income changes.

First, we document the flight of mortgage demand – applications – by Black borrowers to Black lenders in treated counties following the Shelby ruling. The intuition of this test is that if the decline in income, following the Shelby ruling, is the primary channel driving our results, the reduction in loan applications by Black Americans should be similar across all banks. However, if fear of rejection is the potential channel, one would expect a flight of mortgage applications from Black borrowers to Black friendly banks. Our results show that while applications by Black borrowers decline for non-Black lenders following the Shelby ruling, the applications to Black lenders increase. Specifically, Black borrowers' mortgage application amount (number) to Black lenders increased by 11.9% (15.0%) in treated counties relative to control counties, following the Shelby ruling. This finding indicates a flight of Black demand to Black lenders following the Shelby ruling. Overall, these results suggest that our baseline results are unlikely to be entirely driven by reduced income, and increased fear of being rejected by the non-Black lenders after the Shelby ruling could be an important driver. Another advantage of this test is that the inclusion of census-tract \times race \times year fixed effects allows us to better control for the asymmetric effect of observed and unobserved omitted aggregate factors correlated with the timing of the Shelby ruling.

Second, we examine the effect of the VRA on home purchases using mortgages and cash. The intuition of this test is that reduced income and greater future uncertainty, following the Shelby ruling, will result in an overall decline in home purchases through cash and mortgages. However, the fear-of-rejection channel will manifest only through mortgages. Additionally, the fear of rejection can result in the marginal Black home buyer who is initially indifferent between mortgage and cash to strictly preferring home purchases through cash. Using Zillow home-transaction data, we show that Black Americans reduced their usage

of mortgages to finance their home purchases and instead shifted to using cash for home purchases. This change in the choice of payment mode of the marginal Black household indicates that the reduction in mortgage applications is more consistent with the fear-of-rejection channel. Specifically, it suggests that the fear of rejection is likely driven by increased fear of anticipated discrimination in mortgage markets following the Shelby ruling.

Third, we investigate the size of our baseline effect over the income distribution of borrowers. The intuition of this test is that if the results are just a manifestation of reduced income, the effect would be more pronounced in the lower end of the income distribution, because the marginal effect of reduction in income is likely to be higher for low-income households. However, we document that the magnitude of the effect is stable over the income distribution, suggesting the impact of the Shelby ruling on Black mortgage demand is not just a downstream effect of reduced income.

Another channel that could mechanically generate our baseline results is the emigration of Black households from treated counties following the Shelby ruling. However, our analysis using the outflow and inflow of people in treated counties with a high Black population share and the precise shares population by race at the ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) before and after the Shelby ruling indicates the migration channel is unlikely to explain our results.

Overall, the majority of evidence shown so far seems to favor the fear of rejection as the primary channel that can explain our results. Specifically, we argue this fear of rejection is driven by greater anticipation of discrimination among Black households in the mortgage markets. Lastly, we document suggestive evidence that the increased expectation of being discriminated against could be fueled by increased hate crimes and hatred against Black households in treated counties following the Shelby ruling. Additionally, trust of state agents among Black Americans declines in treated counties after the Shelby ruling.

Contribution: The primary contribution of our work is to investigate the economic impact of disenfranchisement. The extant literature has studied the relationship between the expansion of enfranchisement and provision of public goods and government spending.² [Aneja and Avenancio-Leon \(2020\)](#) and [Aneja and Avenancio-León \(2019\)](#) provide evidence showing that improvement in voting rights of Black Americans increased government incentives to improve Blacks' relative economic position through increased public employment. [Facchini, Knight and Testa \(2020\)](#) find that, following enactment of the VRA, Black arrest rates fell for less serious offenses, for which police might have more enforcement discretion. Broadly, these works examine the change in the government's relationship with the (dis)enfranchised group. In contrast, this paper documents that individuals alter their economic decision-making in response to changes in their political voice. Specifically, using mortgage markets as a setup, our results show mortgage origination declines for Black Americans after their de facto disenfranchisement, primarily driven by a reduction in their demand. Our work highlights that disenfranchisement reduces demand directly by increasing the fear

²See [Husted and Kenny \(1997\)](#), [Lott and Kenny \(1999\)](#), [Miller \(2008\)](#), [Moehling and Thomasson \(2012\)](#), [Naidu \(2012\)](#), [Cascio and Washington \(2014\)](#), [Carruthers and Wanamaker \(2015\)](#), [Fujiwara \(2015\)](#), [Debnath, Kapoor and Ravi \(2017\)](#), [Aidt and Jensen \(2009\)](#), and [Aidt and Jensen \(2013\)](#), among others.

of rejection. Overall, this paper shows discrimination in the voting process can result in exclusion from the markets and the underlying channels.

Our work joins the literature that attempts to understand racial differences in mortgage lending. [Munnell et al. \(1996\)](#) document the role of discrimination in explaining the racial disparity in mortgage lending. Several works since then have highlighted the role of the supply side in explaining the racial differences in mortgage originations.³ [Bhutta and Hizmo \(2021\)](#) show that gaps by race and ethnicity in interest rates reflect their differences in liquidity or preferences to sort to different locations on the schedule. Our results add to this set of papers by showing that changes in the socio-political environment may cause Black Americans to self-select out of the mortgage market, thereby exacerbating the existing racial divide. We document that reduction in political voice through disenfranchisement can reduce demand for home mortgages by increasing the fear of rejection. Hence, our result is closest in spirit to the hypothesized explanation for racial differences in mortgage origination presented in [Charles and Hurst \(2002\)](#): “We speculate that the portion of the gap that remains unexplained after controlling for income, demographics, and wealth may be the result of Blacks anticipating a greater chance of rejection when they apply for mortgages.”

Our paper also contributes to the broad literature studying the impact of political influence on expansion in consumer credit supply and delaying foreclosure on delinquent mortgages.⁴ [McCartney \(2021\)](#) shows that a decline in local house prices decreases the voter participation rate of the average mortgaged homeowner. [Gyongyosi and Verner \(2021\)](#) show conflict between creditors and debtors can shape political outcomes after household debt crisis. [Akey et al. \(2018\)](#) find a reduction in credit supply in less competitive political races where politicians’ have lower incentives to cater to their constituents’ preferences. We differ from this literature in two ways. First, we show the primary instrument of political voice – electoral enfranchisement – can have a role in mortgage outcomes in general and participation of disenfranchised groups in particular. Second, we argue the reduction in politicians’ incentives to cater to the disenfranchised groups and protect them against discrimination manifests as a direct reduction in demand. Hence, our results highlight the role of changes in political incentives in changing the individual choice set.

We document the flight of Black borrowers to Black banks following the attenuation of their political voice. This finding indicates the dilution of one’s political voice can make racial identity salient and increase homophily, turning Black Americans to community-based institutions for insurance against such shocks. This result supports the theoretical work of [Ambrus, Mobius and Szeidl \(2014\)](#) showing social networks can provide insurance against such shocks. Hence, we contribute to the literature examining the role of of cultural, racial, and social proximity in determining economic outcomes in general and bank lending in particular.⁵

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses background information on the VRA. Section

³See [Holmes and Horvitz \(1994\)](#), [Tootell \(1996\)](#), [Ross et al. \(2008\)](#), [Ghent, Hernandez-Murillo and Owyang \(2014\)](#), [Cheng, Lin and Liu \(2015\)](#), [Hanson et al. \(2016\)](#), [Bartlett et al. \(2021\)](#), [Bhutta, Hizmo and Ringo \(2021\)](#), [Fuster et al. \(2020\)](#), and [Giacoletti, Heimer and Yu \(2021\)](#), among others.

⁴See [Mian, Sufi and Trebbi \(2010\)](#), [Mian, Sufi and Trebbi \(2013\)](#), [Agarwal et al. \(2018\)](#), [Chavaz and Rose \(2019\)](#), [Antoniades and Calomiris \(2020\)](#), and [Akey, Heimer and Lewellen \(2020\)](#), among others.

⁵See [Karlan \(2007\)](#), [Hjort \(2014\)](#) [Fisman, Paravisini and Vig \(2017\)](#), [Haselmann, Schoenherr and Vig \(2018\)](#), [Agarwal et al. \(2019\)](#), and

3 describes the data. Section 4 delineates the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the baseline effect of the repeal of Section 5 of the VRA on mortgage market outcomes. Section 6 documents the underlying mechanisms. Section 7 discusses external validity of our findings. Section 8 concludes.

2 Institutional Details

This section discusses the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its significance for Black Americans. We then highlight the 2013 US Supreme Court judgement in *Shelby v. Holder* that declared Section 4(b) of the VRA – which determines which jurisdictions are covered by Section 5 – unconstitutional making Section 5 of VRA – which required preclearance for any change in voting rules – inoperable.

2.1 The Voting Rights Act

The growing racial disparity in the US led to the emergence of the American Civil Rights movement during the mid 1950s.⁶ The “Jim Crow” laws and the subsequent decline in the economic and social status of Black Americans put the right to vote at the heart of the American Civil Rights movement.⁷ The enactment of the VRA in 1965 is regarded as the biggest legislative achievements of the Civil Rights movement. The law was enacted following the aftermath of Selma’s “Bloody Sunday” and provided life to the 15th amendment. President Lyndon B. Johnson described the VRA as “the goddamndest, toughest voting rights act [possible].”

2.1.1 What Did the VRA Do?

The VRA prohibited the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color, forbidding all electoral structures that deny racial minorities the “opportunity...to participate [equally] in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” The VRA achieved the equal opportunity to vote through two principal mechanisms enshrined in its Sections 2 and 5.

Section 2 eliminated all voting restrictions, in the spirit of Jim Crow laws, that denied the right to vote on account of race. Section 2 is seen as the reinforcement of the VRA guaranteed in the 14th and the 15th amendments. This section was implemented nationwide and increased citizens’ ability to sue as means of enforcing equal voting opportunity and challenging vote-denying practices.

Section 5 of the VRA empowered federal authorities with oversight powers to protect minorities’ right to vote. Section 2 made striking down discriminatory voting laws easier. However, as noted by [Pitts \(2003\)](#), suspension of discriminatory laws in the past often resulted in an immediate enactment of new discriminatory rules hampering the ability of such ex-post checks. Section 5 of the VRA addresses this issue by requiring compulsory pre-clearance of all changes in voting laws from either the US Attorney General or the US District Court for DC. The jurisdictions, proposing changes to voting laws, were required to demonstrate that the proposed change neither had a discriminatory purpose nor an effect on Black American

[Fisman et al. \(2020\)](#), among others. We direct the readers to [Jackson, Rogers and Zenou \(2017\)](#), and [Shayo \(2020\)](#) for an in-depth review of the literature highlighting the economic consequences of social network structure.

⁶We expound on this background in appendix B.

⁷The southern state legislatures enacted several laws between the late 19th and the early 20th century, referred to as the “Jim Crow” laws, to impose de-facto suffrage restrictions on Black Americans.

voters. Hence, Section 5 shifted the burden of proof from voters to the election officials and is widely considered the heart of the VRA.

2.1.2 Implementation and Impact of VRA

While Section 2 was implemented nationwide, Section 5 of the VRA was primarily active in the South where the voting rights of the Black Americans had been suppressed the most. The counties or states where Section 5 was active were referred to as “covered” jurisdictions. Specifically, Section 5 applies to jurisdictions encompassed by the “coverage formula” prescribed in Section 4(b). The coverage formula includes any jurisdiction – such as city, state, or county – if it employed a test or device and had less than a 50% voter turnout in the 1964 presidential election.⁸ Section 5 was initially applied to all counties in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, 41 counties in North Carolina, and one county in Arizona. Amendments to the VRA, in 1970 and 1975, extended coverage to all counties in Texas and several counties in Florida, Oklahoma, Arizona, New Mexico, Michigan, California, New York, and New Hampshire. We refer to the counties covered by Section 5 of the VRA in 1975 as the covered counties or the treated counties. Figure 1 shows the counties covered under Section 5 of the VRA in 1975.

The VRA was instrumental in reducing the widespread political and economic disparity across races. The impact of the VRA on enfranchisement of Black Americans was immediate. [Valelly \(2009\)](#) shows that between the 1964 and 1968 presidential elections, Black voter registration increased 67% among southern states. Using data for the 40 years since 1975, [Ang \(2019\)](#) shows the preclearance oversight of Section 5 increased the long-run voter turnout by four to eight percentage points, due to lasting gains in minority participation in the electoral process. [Cascio and Washington \(2014\)](#) find counties with a higher Black population share in former literacy test states saw greater increases in both voter turnout and state transfers after the implementation of the VRA. [Aneja and Avenancio-León \(2019\)](#) show the enactment of Section 5 helped reduce the Black-white labor market inequality over the second half of the 20th century. They argue the Black-White convergence in labor market inequality is driven by changes in the incentives all politicians face rather than just the increased presence of Black elected officials. [Facchini, Knight and Testa \(2020\)](#) find that, following the enactment of the VRA, Black arrest rates fell for less serious offenses, for which police might have more enforcement discretion.

2.2 Section 5 of the VRA and *Shelby County v Holder*

The US Supreme Court ruling of 2013 in the case of *Shelby County v Holder* came as a massive blow to Section 5 of the VRA. The US Supreme Court ruled by 5 to 4 that the coverage formula defined in Section 4(b) was unconstitutional, reasoning that it was an old formula and no longer responsive to current conditions. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts claimed the social climate in the South had changed, and using 40-year-old facts to define preclearance today was not logical. Justice Roberts

⁸The term “test or device” is defined based on Section 201 and Section 4(f)(3). It includes the four devices prohibited nationally by Section 201. These devices include literacy tests, educational or knowledge requirements, proof of good moral character, and requirements that a person be vouched for when voting. Another device defined in Section 4(f)(3) is also included – in jurisdictions, where more than 5% of the citizen voting age population are members of a single language minority group, any practice or requirement by which registration or election materials are provided only in English.

further proposed that political discrimination was no longer a problem and the law was no longer needed. Others on the bench expressed doubt to the majority opinion. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg argued that the increased voting equality is due to the VRA and warned against the dangers of overthrowing the act - “throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.” The unconstitutionality of Section 4(b) made Section 5 inoperable until Congress enacted a new coverage formula. While Congress has attempted to enact several new preclearance formulas since the 2013 ruling, none have passed the Congress. Therefore, the 2013 US Supreme Court ruling freed all states and counties covered by Section 5 from federal oversight.

2.3 Voting Laws after *Shelby County v Holder*

The effect of the removal of protections provided under Section 5 on electoral process was rather immediate. Since the *Shelby v Holder* ruling of 2013, several covered jurisdictions have implemented controversial voting changes ([Ang \(2019\)](#)). Within 24 hours of the ruling, Texas announced and passed a strict photo identification law that was previously rejected by the US Attorney General under preclearance. Mississippi and Alabama also began to enforce photo identification laws that had previously been barred because of federal preclearance. Less than two months after the *Shelby* ruling, North Carolina enacted a voting bill that instituted a strict photo identification requirement, curtailed early voting, eliminated same-day registration, restricted pre-registration, ended annual voter registration drives, and eliminated the authority of county boards of elections to keep polls open for an additional hour. This law was later struck down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in July 2016. However, the discriminatory law remained active in North Carolina for three years, highlighting the challenges of ex-post litigation as opposed to the preventive machinery under Section 5.

The *Shelby* ruling also had a quantitative effect on voter turnout. [Ang \(2019\)](#) shows that following the *Shelby* decision, voter turnout in the covered counties declined by 1.5 percentage points, the largest drop in voter turnout since 1975. The 2018 state-of-voting study by the Brennan Center for Justice found that voters in 23 states were likely to face tougher voting restrictions than they did in 2010 ([Weiser and Feldman \(2018\)](#)). These restrictions include tougher voting identification laws, additional burden for registration among voters, and cutbacks to early voting and absentee voting. The study notes that after the *Shelby* decision, voters experienced a seesaw effect as new voting rules were imposed, blocked by courts, and then reinstated in modified form, only to be challenged again, preventing thousands of voters to cast their ballots across multiple elections. Another 2018 Brennan Center report found previously covered states had purged voters off their rolls at a significantly higher rate than non-covered jurisdictions ([Brater et al. \(2018\)](#)). The study calculates that 2 million fewer voters would have been purged over those four years if jurisdictions previously subject to federal preclearance had purged at the same rate as those jurisdictions not subject to that provision in 2013. For instance, after the *Shelby* decision, Georgia purged twice as many voters as it did before the ruling.

2.3.1 Disproportionate Effect on Black Americans

The variety of voting restrictions implemented after the Shelby ruling raised the cost of voting and disproportionately affected minorities. For example, the North Carolina law HB 589, passed within a month of the Shelby ruling, had an outsized impact on the state’s growing African-American population. Three years after the implementation of HB 589, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found the North Carolina voter identification law was an unconstitutional effort to “target African-Americans with almost surgical precision” (*NAACP v McCrory*). Voting purges and strict voting identification laws are likely to adversely affect the voting power or cost of Black Americans more than whites. Several preclearance requests regarding voter identification laws, before the Shelby ruling, were rejected by the federal government on the grounds that such requirements impose an undue burden on minorities such as Hispanics and Black Americans. The purging of voters also disproportionately affects minorities. The crosscheck program, used for purging voters, eliminates voters based on common names. The 2010 US Census states that 16.3% of Hispanic people and 13% of Black people have one of the 10 most common surnames, compared with 4.5% of White people. Therefore, purging programs based on common names are more likely to purge minority voters than White voters. Moreover, the undue burden of voting restrictions on Black voters was brought to national attention during the 2018 race for Georgia’s governor involving Stacey Abrams and Brian Kemp. The US Commission on Civil Rights released a report on September 12, 2018, documenting the adverse effects of voter identification laws, voter roll purges, reduction in early voting, and polling-place closures on minority voter participation ([The US Commission on Civil Rights \(2018\)](#)).

3 Data

The empirical analysis of this paper hinges on different datasets. This section provides a brief description of the data sources. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the key outcome variables explored in this paper.

Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Our primary analysis uses mortgage application data collected and provided under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). The HMDA dataset provides application-level information on requested loan amount, purpose (home purchases/home improvement/refinancing), final status of application (approved/denied), and census-tract-level location of property for which loan is applied, along with information on the race and ethnicity of the borrower. Our sample period spans from 2008 to 2019 to include six (five) years before (after) the repeal of the VRA. Finally, we restrict the sample to adjacent county pairs that straddle states covered by Section 5 in accordance with our identification strategy (see Figure 2). Our final dataset includes county-race-year- or tract-race-year-level aggregated data covering 426 counties in 30 states.

American Community Survey (ACS). ACS collects housing and demographic information from over 3.5 million households each year. We use the 1-year ACS Summary Files (ACSSF) from 2009 through 2019 and construct the national and state-level home-ownership rate by race. We also use the two waves of 5-year ACSSF—2008-2012 and 2013-2017—to construct the home-ownership rate and the proportion of Black

Americans at the ZCTA. Additionally, we use the ACS Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) from 2008 through 2012 to explore the difference in key demographic variables between the covered and uncovered counties in Figures 1 and 2,

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS maintains the address reported by individuals in their tax-report filing. Consequently, through a year-on-year change in the address, the IRS maintains data on migration.

Hate-crime data collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Hate Crime Statistics Program of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program collects data regarding geographically tagged criminal offenses that were motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias against the victim's race/ethnicity/ancestry, gender, gender identity, religion, disability, or sexual orientation, and were committed against persons, property, or society. We focus on hate crimes against Black Americans from 2010 to 2019 for our analysis.

American National Election Series (ANES). ANES is an in-person survey conducted on a stratified random sample of individuals around each presidential election. The data provide information on the respondent's race, gender, and state along with their stated political preferences. We use the survey waves of 2008, 2012, and 2016 focusing on the *feeling thermometer* recording responses of White males toward Black Americans. The feeling thermometer records the level of warmth or coldness that the respondent feels toward an issue or a group, in this case, Black Americans, on a scale ranging from 0 to 97. with higher values indicating a higher degree of warmth.

Zillow Transaction and Assessment Database (ZTRAX). The ZTRAX is the US's largest real estate transaction database and contains more than 400 million public deed records across more than 2,750 counties. The data include, but are not limited to, property characteristics, geographic information, types of deed records, transaction price, and the names of sellers and buyers with their addresses. We start from the universe of raw deed records and exclude non-residential property sales and partial-interest sales. We also exclude non-market transactions such as intra-family sales and the transfer of ownership caused by the affidavit of death. We then distinguish mortgage-based housing transactions from cash-based transactions, using the dollar amount of mortgages recorded in the deeds. We identify the race of home buyers based on the last name of the buyers (Imai and Khanna (2016)).

Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The CCES is the largest survey of Congressional elections conducted before and after the US presidential and midterm elections. It surveys more than 50,000 persons in election years and studies Americans' views on Congress and their representatives, such as the president, governors, and the Supreme Court. We use the sample of CCES in election years from 2008 through 2018 and make use of the questionnaires inquiring about Americans' approval of the legislature, president, governors, and Supreme Court.

Data on Voter Turnout. The data on voter turnout are obtained from Data and Lab (2020), which provides data on the turnout for every federal election, aggregated at the county level. We map the voting statistics to bordering counties and analyse the change in turnout after the Shelby ruling, particularly in the counties dominated by Black Americans.

4 Empirical Strategy

This paper aims to evaluate the effect of disenfranchisement on mortgage market outcomes for new home purchases. The empirical strategy compares the counties covered under Section 5 of VRA with the uncovered counties. The Shelby ruling took away the protections from the covered counties, instated half a century ago. However, the ruling did not affect the status quo in uncovered counties.

Two keys empirical challenges exist with a direct comparison of all covered counties with all uncovered counties. First, the counties covered under Section 5 were not randomly assigned. The geographic coverage of Section 5 was deliberately designed to target counties with a high degree of racial discrimination. Second, comparing covered and uncovered counties tantamount to comparing the American Deep South with the rest of America – two regions that exhibit systematic differences along economic, social, and cultural dimensions. Therefore, a direct comparison of all covered and uncovered counties is likely to contaminate the estimation either due to selection bias or the presence of unobserved confounding variables, rendering the exercise futile.

We address these issues using a county-border discontinuity design exploiting policy discontinuities at county borders. This empirical strategy uses variation in coverage of Section 5 of the VRA within pairs of counties that share a border, and thus compares households exposed to similar local economic conditions.⁹ Figure 2 presents the subsample of bordering covered and uncovered counties used in the analysis. Specifically, we compare mortgage outcomes of White and Black households in counties covered under Section 5 with outcomes of White and Black households in contiguous counties, which were not subject to Section 6 of the VRA, before and after the 2013 US Supreme Court judgement in *Shelby v Holder*.

Table 2 presents summary statistics of key variables for our sample in 2010, just before the 2013 Shelby ruling. Panel A shows the average characteristics and the difference in these characteristics for the full sample of covered and uncovered counties as shown in Figure 1. Panel B shows the average characteristics and the difference in these characteristics for the sample of bordering covered and uncovered counties as shown in Figure 2. Additionally, Panel B examines the differences in average characteristics within county-pairs of bordering uncovered and covered counties. Table 2 provides evidence supporting our empirical design of comparing outcomes in bordering county-pairs as the differences between counties are attenuated when we restrict the data to county-pairs of neighboring covered and uncovered counties.

We combine the sample of contiguous covered and uncovered counties with data on mortgage market applications, denial rates, and originations by race to investigate the impact of the 2013 Shelby decision. We refer to the counties covered by Section 5 of the VRA prior to the Shelby ruling as treated counties and the uncovered counties as control counties. Specifically, we estimate a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) specification that compares the mortgage market outcomes for Black households with White households in treated counties with their counterparts in the control counties. The identification

⁹The empirical methodology of comparing bordering counties to evaluate the effect of a policy change has been used in prior works evaluating the effects of banking deregulation (Huang (2008)), minimum wage (Dube, Lester and Reich (2010)), credit supply (Favara and Imbs (2015)), and enfranchisement (Ang (2019), Aneja and Avenancio-Leon (2020), Aneja and Avenancio-León (2019)), among others.

strategy compares outcomes for Black and white households in treated and control counties in all border-county pairs before and after the 2013 ruling.

The underlying assumption in employing a county-pair DDD strategy rather than a standard DDD strategy is that Black and White households are more similar to Black and White households, residing in contiguous counties than to households residing in randomly chosen counties. Also, by using only variation within pairs of bordering counties, this strategy controls for time-varying differences across county-pairs and race, such as differences in local economic or credit market conditions by race. The role of the outcome differences among Black and White households in the control group is to provide a counterfactual of what would have happened to differences between Black and White households if the US Supreme Court had not removed the pre-existing protections under Section 5. Accordingly, the key identifying assumption is that outcomes for Black and White households in treatment and control groups would have evolved according to parallel trends in the absence of the Shelby ruling. Therefore, we estimate the following dynamic DDD specification:

$$y_{r,c(c \in p),t} = \sum_{k=2008, k \neq 2013}^{2019} \beta_k \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot 1(t = k) + \alpha_{r,c} + \alpha_{c,t} + \alpha_{p(c \in p),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,c,t} \quad (1)$$

where, $y_{r,c,t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the county (c), race (r), and time (t) level. Each county is a part of a county-pair (p), which comprises a cluster of bordering counties. The different key dependent variables employed in this paper include the natural logarithm of the number and amount of mortgage originations, the natural logarithm of the number and amount of mortgage applications, and the denial rate. The coefficients of interest in equation 1 are the sequence of estimates $\{\beta_k\}$ associated with the triple- interaction term. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black applicants and 0 for White applicants. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of VRA, and 0 otherwise, for the sample of bordering counties identified in Figure 2. $1(t = k)$ is a time indicator, with 2013 being the omitted year. The specification includes $\alpha_{r,c}$ control for non-time-varying characteristics that are specific to a race living in a county and allows the estimation to exploit time-series variation due to the 2013 Shelby ruling. Importantly, county-race fixed effects ($\alpha_{r,c}$) non-parametrically account for the 1965 county-race-specific characteristics that can explain selection into the treatment group. $\alpha_{c,t}$ control for all time-varying characteristics that might affect a county and allows the identification from variation in race. Finally, the specification includes county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{p(c \in p),r,t}$) fixed effects. It accounts for all time-varying race-specific shocks in the county-pairs and allows the estimation in $\{\beta_k\}$ to come from variation in treated and control counties for the same race within the same county-pair. The standard errors are estimated by clustering at the county level and regressions are weighted by the 2010 county population.¹⁰

Another underlying assumption of this analysis is that the 2013 Shelby ruling negatively affected the political voice of Black Americans in the treated counties relative to control counties, and, consequently, there are substantial differences in treatment intensity of Black households within border-county pairs.

¹⁰Our results are robust to not including weights in our regression as shown in appendix Table D.1.

Evidence in favor of this assumption comes from the narrative analysis discussed in section 2.3.1 and estimating the voter-turnout in Presidential elections using the following dynamic specification:

$$y_{c(c \in p),t} = \beta \cdot \text{High Black}_c \cdot \text{Treat}_c \cdot \text{Post}_t + \alpha_c + \sum_k \gamma_k \cdot \text{Treat}_c \cdot 1(t = k) + \alpha_{p(c \in p),t} + \varepsilon_{rct} \quad (2)$$

where, $y_{c(c \in p),t}$ denotes the primary outcome variable in county (c) during year (t). Specifically, we use the voter turnout in presidential elections as our primary outcome variable to demonstrate the effect of the Shelby ruling on the mobilization of voters as in [Ang \(2019\)](#), [Aneja and Avenancio-Leon \(2020\)](#) and [Aneja and Avenancio-León \(2019\)](#). Treat_c takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 and 0 otherwise for the sample of bordering counties identified in Figure 2. Post_t takes a value of 1 for years after 2013. High Black_c takes a value of 1 if the 2010 Black population share in county c is greater than the median population of our sample counties in 2010. The intuition for examining the effect by the county's Black population share is that the Shelby ruling adversely hit the counties with a greater Black population. α_c , and $\alpha_{p(c \in p),t}$ denote county fixed effects, and county-pair \times year fixed effects, respectively. Additionally, we control for time-varying shocks to treated counties relative to the control counties, estimating β using variation in the Black population share among treated counties.

We further supplement our baseline analysis with a geographic regression discontinuity (RD) wherein we estimate the effect of the Shelby ruling on mortgage market applications, originations, and denial rates measured at the census-tract level in a sample of bordering counties. Specifically, we estimate the following regression specification:

$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot \text{Black}_r \cdot \text{Treat}_c \cdot \text{Post}_t + f(\text{location}_v) + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t} \quad (3)$$

where $y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contiguous county-pair (p), race (r), and time (t) level. As before, the key-dependent variables include natural logarithm of the number and amount of mortgage originations, the natural logarithm of the number and amount of mortgage applications, and the denial rate. The coefficient of interest in equation 3 is the interaction term of Black_r , Treat_c , and Post_t . Black_r is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for White Americans. Treat_c takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of VRA, and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. Post_t is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling, and 0 otherwise. The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. $f(\text{location}_v)$ is a local linear polynomial in two dimensions, latitude and longitude, for every census tract estimated separately on each side of the border.¹¹

The key innovation of this RD design is to include census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects addressing three concerns. First, it allows us to relax the assumption that the economic shocks in one county must

¹¹Our results are robust to omitting the two dimensional local linear polynomial ($f(\text{location}_v)$) as shown in appendix Table D.2.

evolve over space such that all areas within a county are affected similarly. Second, the census-tract \times year fixed effects non-parametrically control for the within-county population distribution relative to the border addressing the concern – that the large counties on each side of the border might not be similar enough.¹² Third, the census-tract \times year fixed effects allow us to control for heterogeneous policy spillovers within a county under the assumption that spillovers are uniform within a census tract. This ability is important to ensure that the null results in denial rates are not driven by spillovers. Another advantage of the geographic RD design is the inclusion of $f(location_v)$. [Dell \(2010\)](#) and [Michalopoulos and Papaioannou \(2016\)](#) argue that adding this two-dimensional local linear polynomial helps the regression absorb spatial trends that might be spuriously driving the results. Hence, the RD approach augmented with the census-tract \times year fixed effects allows for more precise comparison of the average difference in outcomes at the border.

5 Results

This section begins by establishing the relevance of the dilution VRA as a potential shock to the enfranchisement of Black Americans. We, empirically investigate the causal link between disenfranchisement of Black Americans and racial differences in mortgage outcomes.

5.1 Voter Turnout and the Repeal of VRA

This section establishes the relevance of the dilution of VRA as a potential shock to the political voice of Black Americans. This test builds on the narrative analysis in section 2.3.1 and is vital to verify the underlying assumption that the repeal of Section 5 of VRA led to de-facto disenfranchisement of Black Americans by reducing their electoral participation.

We compare the voter turnout in presidential elections for our sample of bordering treated and control counties with a varying Black population share by estimating equation 2. Table 3 reports these results. The table shows the voter turnout declines after the dilution of VRA in treated counties with high Black population share. Specifically, treated counties with a high Black population share experienced a decline of 2.7-3.4 percentage points in voter turnout relative to high Black control counties. This effect is statistically significant and represents a 5% decline over the sample average. The magnitude of the estimate is large compared with the average margin of victory for Presidential elections (2.97%). The documented decline in voter turnout following the Shelby ruling is consistent with [Ang \(2019\)](#) and suggests the Shelby ruling reduced the political voice of Black Americans.

Figure 3 documents similar results using a dynamic specification for voter turnout around the Shelby ruling. Figure 3 shows two key takeaways. First, pre-trends in voter turnout across treated and control counties with a high Black population share are limited. Second, a sharp decline occurs in voter turnout among treated counties with high Black population share following the 2013 Shelby ruling. Therefore, Figure 3 provides visual support of a first-stage political effect of the Shelby ruling, as well as support for the parallel-trends assumption.

¹²[Dieterle, Bartalotti and Brummet \(2020\)](#) suggest controlling for the moments of the within-county population distribution relative to the border can effectively approximate the RD coefficient estimated using more granular but infeasible data along the border.

We supplement this analysis using data on Google searches for the term “Voting Rights Act” around the Shelby ruling, reported in appendix Figure C.1. We find the searches are 11 percentage points higher in the treated counties than in the control counties, thus providing additional evidence on the relevance of the dilution of the VRA as a shock to the treated counties. These results, following the seminal work of [Tingsten \(1937\)](#), suggest an increase in political inequality and the consequent erosion of the political voice of Black Americans.

5.2 Baseline Results

This section explores the impact of increasing the cost of voting on mortgage market outcomes. We use the natural experiment of the 2013 Shelby ruling as a negative shock to the voting ability of Black Americans, relative to White Americans, to identify the effects on mortgage market outcomes.

5.2.1 Evolution of Mortgages for Black and White Americans around the Shelby Ruling

We begin our analysis by examining the differential effect of the Shelby ruling on Black and White Americans in treated counties relative to the control counties. Figure 4 plots the weighted average of the county-level aggregate amount of mortgage originations (Figure 4a) and applications (Figure 4b) of Black and White Americans in treated counties relative to the control counties for each year from 2008 through 2019.¹³ The mortgage-origination index (Treat–Control) is computed by estimating the weighted average of the natural logarithm of the amount of mortgage originations and applications for Black and White Americans for treated and control counties and taking the difference between the two. The mortgage-origination index for both Black and White Americans is standardized to a value of 0 in 2013. The solid red line reports the mortgage-origination index (Treat–Control) for Black borrowers, and the dashed blue line reports the mortgage-origination index (Treat–Control) for White borrowers.

The results presented in Figure 4 provide prima-facie evidence indicating the mortgage origination declined for Black Americans in treated counties relative to control counties post 2013 Shelby ruling. However, the mortgage origination for White Americans remained largely similar in both the treated and the control counties. Meanwhile, we do not find any difference in the mortgage originations across races in the pre-Shelby period. The pattern thereby suggests a structural change for Black borrowers while leaving the White borrowers largely unaffected.

5.2.2 Results from the Estimation of Border Discontinuity Design

This section presents results from the estimation of our baseline specification. Figure 5 reports the dynamic evolution of $\{\beta_k\}$ around the Shelby ruling based on the estimation of equation 1 using a sample of bordering counties. Figure 5a shows no difference exist in mortgage originations between Black and White Americans across treated and control counties before the dilution of the VRA in 2013. However, after the repeal, we see a sharp decline in mortgage origination for Black borrowers in the treated counties compared to Black borrowers in adjacent control counties. Next, in Figure 5b, we focus on mortgage applications and find no

¹³The sample of treated and control counties is shown in Figure 2. Each observation is weighted by the 2010 county population, and the county-race-year level aggregate data on mortgage origination and applications comes from the HMDA dataset from 2008 through 2019.

difference in applications by race before the dilution of the VRA, but a sharp decline in the applications of Black Americans in the treated counties after the Shelby ruling. In Figure 5c, we focus on the denial rate and find no difference in the denial rate between Black and White borrowers either before or after the dilution of the VRA.

The results together indicate the reduction in mortgage origination for Black borrowers is driven by a decrease in applications, suggesting Black borrowers' demand for mortgages declined after the Shelby ruling. Meanwhile, the lack of temporal dynamics in the relative denial rate by race around the Shelby ruling suggests little changes in the credit supply to Black borrowers.

5.2.3 Results from the Estimation of Geographic Regression Discontinuity

Next, we present the analysis at the census-tract level by estimating the RD specification as in equation 3 that includes census-tract \times year fixed effects, census-tract \times race fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year fixed effects. Table 4 reports the estimate of β for our key dependent variables aggregated at the census tract-race-year level. Columns (1) and (2) use the natural logarithm of the total amount and number of mortgage originations, respectively, for new home purchases as the dependent variable. The estimate of β associated with the triple interaction term is negative and statistically significant. We find the mortgage-origination amount (number) for Black Americans in treated counties declined by 14.7% (8.3%) after the Shelby ruling. Columns (3) and (4) report results using the natural logarithm of the total amount and number of mortgage applications, respectively, for new home purchases as the dependent variable. As before, the estimate of the triple interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results indicate the mortgage application amount (number) for Black Americans in treated counties declined by 12.5% (7.0%) after the Shelby ruling. Finally, column (5) reports results using the denial rate as the dependent variable. We find no effect on the denial rate around the Shelby ruling. The coefficient reported in column (5) is economically small, precisely estimated, and statistically insignificant. The results taken together resonate with the results presented in section 5.2.2 and indicate that lower mortgage origination for Black Americans in treated counties is almost entirely driven by the reduction in mortgage applications by Black borrowers and not by an increase in the mortgage-denial rate to Black Americans.

5.3 Robustness Tests

This section explores several dimensions of the data and institutional details to probe the robustness of the results. First, this section discusses the ability of aggregate macroeconomic shocks correlated with the timing of the Shelby ruling to confound our results – and the way we address it. Next, we also use an alternative identification strategy employing an RD design and DRD design exploiting the treatment status based on the 1964 presidential election voter turnout threshold. We perform a placebo analysis to verify the salience of treatment status and rule out spuriousness. We also investigate effect on another minority – non-Black and non-White Hispanics. Finally, we use a different outcome variable – home purchases.

5.3.1 Macroeconomic Confounders

A key concern with our estimation strategy is that our period of analysis includes the recovery years of the 2008 global financial crisis. This period is characterized by multiple regulatory changes, changes in the interest rate regime, and changes in the supply of bank credit. Prior literature has documented households with different incomes and wealth levels have different sensitivity to macroeconomic shocks (see [Kaplan and Violante \(2018\)](#) for survey of this literature). Therefore, these shocks can have asymmetric effects across Black and White households given the wealth differences across the two.¹⁴ As a result, changes in macroeconomic conditions can hinder the estimation of the effect of Shelby ruling on mortgage market outcomes for Black households.

The inclusion of census-tract \times year fixed effect controls for all local and global policy changes in a census tract. Moreover, the inclusion of county-pair \times race \times year fixed effects in our estimation strategy is likely to control for the asymmetric effect of aggregate shocks across Black and White households within a narrowly defined cluster of counties. The effectiveness of county-pair \times race \times year fixed effects in mitigating the asymmetric effects of aggregate shocks relies on the assumption that aggregate shocks do not have an asymmetric effect by race and the treatment status. We test this assumption by examining the sensitivity of Black households in treated counties relative to control counties in the pre-Shelby period from 2008 until 2012. Specifically, we estimate the following regression specification where ΔX_t denotes aggregate shocks:

$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot \Delta X_t + f(location_v) + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t} \quad (4)$$

Table 5 reports 20 pairs of estimate (β) and standard errors from the estimation of equation 4 with four dependent variables and five macroeconomic shocks. We use the natural logarithm of the amount and number of mortgage applications and originations as our key dependent variables. Macroeconomic shocks (ΔX_t) include changes in the 30-year mortgage rate, 15-year mortgage rate, bank credit, term spread, and GDP growth rate. All estimates associated with the triple-interaction term in equation 4 are statistically insignificant and economically small. These results indicate the Black households in treated and control counties are likely to have similar sensitivity to aggregate shocks, implying our structure of fixed effects may be sufficient to control for the asymmetric effect of aggregate shocks by race.

The results in Table 5 suggest the lack of an asymmetric effect of aggregate shocks by race and treatment status. However, completely ruling out the concern that omitted macroeconomic factors correlated with the timing of Shelby ruling drive our results is difficult in an observational setting. Therefore, we report additional results by augmenting specification 3 to include the triple-interaction term of Black, treatment status of the county, and macroeconomic shocks, in addition to the triple-interaction term of Black, treatment

¹⁴We direct readers to [Kuhn, Schularick and Steins \(2020\)](#) for the most recent documentation of persistent wealth and income inequality across Black and White households over the last 70 years from 1949 until 2016. [Bhutta et al. \(2020\)](#) extend this analysis to more recent years and document similar wealth inequality across Black and White households for 2019.

status of the county, and post. Specifically, we estimate the following specification:

$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + \sum_k \gamma_k \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot \Delta X_t^k + f(location_v) + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t} \quad (5)$$

where ΔX_t^k denotes the vector of macroeconomic shocks including changes in the 30-year mortgage rate, 15-year mortgage rate, bank credit, term spread, and GDP growth rate. Table 6 present the estimate β of the triple-interaction term – $Black_r \times Treat_c \times Post_t$ – from the estimation of equation 5. The estimate of β is negative and statistically significant from columns (1) through (4). Moreover, the estimates are economically and statistically similar to the estimates reported in Table 4, indicating our baseline result is unlikely to be driven by other macroeconomic variables.

The results taken together serve two purposes. First, macroeconomic shocks do not have an asymmetric effect on the mortgage market outcomes by race across the treatment and the control counties in the pre-Shelby period given our fixed-effects structure. Second, controlling for major macroeconomic shocks such as changes in interest rates, bank credit, and GDP growth rate does not affect the economic stability of our baseline estimates. Hence, our baseline effect is unlikely to be driven by contemporaneous aggregate shocks.

5.3.2 Falsification: Effect on Refinancing

This section investigates the impact of the dilution of VRA on the refinancing of existing mortgages. This test serves two purposes. First, it addresses the concern that our baseline results are not driven by policy changes or macroeconomic factors – such as an increase in interest rates – with asymmetric effects on the Black population across treated and control counties. Households choose to refinance existing mortgages to benefit from interest rates changes (Campbell (2006)). Hence, mortgage refinancing provides an ideal laboratory to verify that changes in interest rates do not drive our results. Second, refinancing is unlikely to be driven by the loss of political voice. Moreover, the fear of rejection is likely to be muted for refinancing, because these borrowers have a pre-existing relationship with a bank, prior experience in the mortgage markets, and credit history. Hence, mortgage refinancing presents itself as a falsification setup whereby the hypothesized treatment effect on applications is unlikely to be present.

Table 7 presents these results. We find no differential effect on refinancing applications from Black Americans across treated and control counties after the dilution of the VRA. The coefficients are statistically and economically insignificant with a magnitude close to zero. Thus, the “null” results on mortgage refinancing serves both as a falsification test to the dilution of VRA and highlights that the results are not driven by macroeconomic factors.

5.3.3 Alternate Identification Strategy: Regression Discontinuity Using 1964 Voter Turnout

This section supplements our baseline empirical strategy of comparing bordering counties with an alternate specification using an RD design. A state or a county was covered under Section 5 of the VRA if it used a

test or device to restrict voting, such as a literacy test, and had a voter turnout of less than 50% in the 1964 presidential elections. We use the counties within a narrow margin of 5% around the treatment threshold of 50% voter turnout to conduct an RD estimation. Our RD design includes counties treated in 1965 with the 1964 voter turnout between 45% and 50% as a sample of treated counties, and the sample of counties with 1964 voter turnout between 51% and 55%, on which Section 5 was never applied, as a sample of control counties.¹⁵ Appendix Figure D.1 shows the treated and the control counties used in the RD design. The identifying assumption of this test is that the counties within a small interval around the threshold are randomly distributed around the 50% voter-turnout threshold. However, counties on one side of the threshold were covered under Section 5, and others were not. This setting allows us to estimate the local treatment effect devoid of selection bias.

Table 8 reports the results using the RD design around the 50% voter-turnout threshold using the sample identified in Figure D.1. Panel A reports the simple RD analysis while controlling for a function of the running variable of voter turnout and its interaction with the treatment. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) are county-level mortgage-origination growth in amount and number, respectively, for Black Americans relative to White Americans from 2013 to 2016. Similarly, columns (3) and (4) use county-level mortgage-application growth in amount and number for Black Americans relative to white Americans from 2013 to 2016 as dependent variables. Column 5 uses county-level changes in denial rates for Black Americans relative to White Americans from 2013 to 2016. The estimates for origination and applications are negative and statistically significant, whereas the estimate for the denial rate is small and statistically insignificant. The point estimates are larger in magnitude than the baseline estimates but are statistically similar to the baseline estimates. Figure 6 presents a graphical depiction of results reported in Panel A of Table 8. The RD plots show a discontinuity in mortgage applications and originations but no discontinuity for denial rates around the voter-turnout threshold.

Furthermore, Panel B of Table 8 presents the results from the DRD design, which examines the coefficient of the interaction term of *Black*, *Treat* and *Post* using the sample of counties around the 5% interval of the voter-turnout threshold shown in Figure D.1. The results reported in Panel B are similar to our baseline estimates. They show that applications and originations decline for Black Americans following the Shelby ruling, whereas the denial rates are unaffected.

Overall, this alternative identification strategy using a RD design and a DRD design lends further credence to our baseline results. Furthermore, it indicates that the results are unlikely to be an artifact of the border discontinuity design, the specific sample employed in baseline estimation, or selection bias.

5.3.4 Placebo Analysis

We conduct a placebo test wherein we randomize the treatment variable keeping the timing of the Shelby ruling fixed. This test addresses two concerns. First, it addresses whether the treatment status is meaningful, by checking if the results disappear if the treatment is selected randomly in a non-meaningful way. Second, it validates the non-spuriousness of the results. A placebo treatment variable is generated from a binomial

¹⁵Data on county-level 1964 Presidential election voter turnout comes from [Ang \(2019\)](#).

distribution for each census tract within a county-pair. The probability of treatment assignment is equal to the empirical probability of treatment in the sample. We estimate equation 3 using the new placebo treatment. We repeat this process of random treatment assignment 1,000 times and estimate the baseline specification for each randomly assigned treatment status. Appendix Figure D.2 plots the kernel density of the estimated coefficient on $Black_r \cdot Placebo-Treat_c \cdot Post_t$ obtained from 1,000 Monte-Carlo simulations where we randomize the treatment status of census tracts within county-pairs. The distribution of the coefficient of the triple-interaction term in the placebo analysis is centered around zero, and the average effect is statistically indistinguishable zero. Moreover, the exercise cannot generate an effect of a size equivalent to the baseline estimate. The results from the placebo analysis indicate that the treatment status is meaningful, and our results are unlikely to be spurious.

5.3.5 Effect of Shelby Ruling on Other Minorities: Hispanics

This section expands the baseline estimation to evaluate the effect of the Shelby ruling on other minorities, specifically non-Black and non-White Hispanics.¹⁶ We expand our sample to include mortgage market outcomes of Hispanics in addition to Blacks and Whites. Appendix Table D.3 reports the results from baseline specification 3 augmented to include the triple-interaction term of Hispanic, treatment status of the county, and post-Shelby ruling. The coefficients associated with this triple-interaction term are negative for mortgage originations and applications. Specifically, the estimates indicate a decline in mortgage origination (application) amount by 9.9% (5.3%) for Hispanics. Although the negative estimate associated with the mortgage-origination amount is statistically significant, the estimate related to the application amount is not statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient associated with the triple-interaction term for Hispanics is smaller than the magnitude for Black borrowers. However, we cannot reject the null that these estimates for Hispanics are statistically similar to the estimates for Black borrowers. This result indicates that the Shelby ruling may adversely affect the mortgage market outcomes of other minorities.

5.3.6 Effect on Home Purchase

This section complements the baseline analysis by employing an alternative measure to identify the effect of the Shelby ruling on Black Americans. Specifically, this section examines the effect on home purchases. These data comes from the Zillow database.¹⁷ We predict the race of each purchaser based on the name and location of the purchaser. We aggregate the home-purchase data at the county-race-year level and analyze the effect of the Shelby ruling on home purchases of Black Americans in treated counties following specification 1. Figure 7 reports the dynamic estimates and illustrates two key takeaways. First, pre-trends in home purchases across Black and White households in treated and control counties are limited. Second, a sharp decline of 15% occurs in the number of home purchases by Black Americans in treated counties following the 2013 Shelby ruling. This result indicates that the decline in mortgage origination

¹⁶We refer to the group of non-Black and non-White Hispanics simply as Hispanics, hereafter.

¹⁷We restrict the analysis using Zillow data to span from 2009 until 2018, because the Zillow data became stable only after 2009 and have a lot of missing observations after 2018.

and applications translates to lower home purchases among Black Americans, further exacerbating the pre-existing racial home-ownership gap.

6 Mechanism

Four potential channels can drive our results. First, the dilution of voting rights could lead to a reduction in income and consequently a reduction in the ability to obtain mortgages.¹⁸ Second, disenfranchisement could make the future prospect uncertain for the disenfranchised group, leading them to increase the zone of inaction (Bloom (2009), Bloom (2014)). Consequently, home applications could go down. Third, distinct from the income channel, an increased fear among the minorities could manifest as fear of rejection, leading to a reduction in mortgage applications. The increase in fear of rejection could stem from an increase in future economic and personal uncertainty or greater expected discrimination following the Shelby ruling. Fourth, migration of Black Americans could occur from areas that experienced a reduction in voting rights, which can mechanically generate a decrease in mortgage applications by Black borrowers. This section highlights that the decrease in mortgage origination and applications is primarily driven by the third channel – increased fear of rejection following the Shelby ruling.

6.1 Flight of Black Mortgage Applications to Black Lenders

This section documents the flight of mortgage demand, applications, by Black borrowers to Black lenders in treated counties following the Shelby ruling. The objective of this test is to disentangle the mechanism of increased fear of rejection, either due to greater anticipated discrimination or future uncertainty, from the income channel, by exploiting the role of the perceived racial affiliation of a bank. The intuition of this test is that if a decline in income, following the Shelby ruling, is the primary channel driving our results, the reduction in loan applications by the Black Americans should be similar across all banks. However, if fear of rejection is the potential channel, one would expect a flight of mortgage applications from the Black borrowers to the Black banks. This argument follows the literature that highlights the role of group affiliation as insurance in mitigating the fear of anticipated discrimination and future uncertainty by making racial identity salient, following group-specific shocks, for economic decision-making as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Akerlof and Kranton (2005), and Shayo (2020).¹⁹ An additional advantage of this test is that it allows us to rule out the effect of observed and unobserved aggregate macroeconomic shocks as long as these shocks affect Black and non-Black lenders uniformly across the treated and control counties.

¹⁸ Aneja and Avenancio-León (2019) and Aneja and Avenancio-León (2020) document that the income of Black Americans is sensitive to the dilution and implementation of the Voting Rights Act, respectively.

¹⁹ Baradaran (2017) describes Black banks as quasi-crusaders filling the void created by Jim Crow and segregation to offer services to Black individuals amidst exclusion. Black banks are often founded by Black Americans in response to economic segregation with the aim of providing financial inclusion to Black communities. Baradaran (2017) notes some of the earliest Black banks were started by former slaves, for example the True Reformers Savings Bank founded in 1888 in Richmond Virginia, as a direct response to white-owned banks' discriminatory practices. Black banks are often headed and run by Black entrepreneurs and supported by Black community leaders. The recent founding of the Greenwood Bank, a Black bank, by rapper and activist Killer Mike is a case in point. The importance of Black community banks, and the counterfactual in their absence, is reminiscent of the community banker George Bailey, a character in "It's A Wonderful Life." The importance of community-affiliated banks in mitigating group-specific discrimination is not specific to Black Americans. The modern-day Bank of America was founded as the Bank of Italy (United States) in 1904 in retaliation to the exclusion of Italians by the banking system of that time.

6.1.1 Definition of Black Lenders

We define Black lenders using lending data of lenders operating in the sample counties shown in Figure 2. We do so because Black lenders defined at the national level could differ from lenders to which Black borrowers in the sample counties feel comfortable and close. We then aggregate HMDA data for the pre-Shelby period, i.e. 2008 to 2012, at the lender level and sort the lenders by the share of Black borrowers in their mortgage lending portfolio. We define lenders above the 90th percentile as Black-friendly lenders.²⁰ We can identify 569 Black lenders using this methodology. These banks are usually small banks and primarily cater to a small geographic area. Appendix Table D.4 provides a description of five representative banks that are defined as Black banks using our methodology.

6.1.2 Results

We identify the effect of change in demand by examining the change in mortgage-applications from Black Americans to Black and non-Black banks following the Shelby ruling. Specifically, we estimate the following regression specification using mortgage applications data aggregated at the census tract (v), race (r), lender type (l), and time (t) level:

$$y_{r,l,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Black_l \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + f(location_v) + \alpha_{v,r,l} + \alpha_{v,l,t} + \alpha_{v,r,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,l,t} + \varepsilon_{r,l,v,t} \quad (6)$$

where, $y_{r,l,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the the natural logarithm of total amount and number of mortgage applications aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contagious county-pair (p), race (r), lender type (l), and time (t) level. Bank type (l) is either a Black lender or a non-Black lender. $Black_l$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black lenders defined in section 6.1.1. The coefficient of interest is β , associated with the quadruple-interaction term. This specification allows us to control for a richer set of fixed effects including census-tract \times race \times year and county-pair \times race \times lender-type \times year fixed effects in addition to census-tract \times lender-type \times race and census-tract \times lender-type \times year fixed effects. Specifically, census-tract \times lender-type \times race allows us to control for agglomeration of lenders types in certain areas and their pre-existing importance in those areas.

Table 9 reports the results documenting the flight of Black applicants to Black banks. Columns (1) and (2) report results from the estimation of baseline specification 3 restricted to the sample of non-Black banks. These results mirror the baseline results documenting a decline in mortgage applications for Black borrowers in treated counties following the Shelby ruling. Columns (3) and (4) report results from the estimation of baseline specification 3 restricted to the sample of Black banks. The effect of the Shelby ruling on mortgage applications by Black borrowers for the sample of Black lenders stands in stark contrast to the baseline results and the results documented for non-Black lenders. Specifically, Black borrowers' mortgage application amount (number) to Black lenders increased by 11.9% (15.0%). Finally, columns (5)

²⁰ Ross et al. (2008) show that lenders with substantial numbers of Black applicants treat them more favorably than lenders with predominantly white application pools.

and (6) estimate equation 6 for the entire sample with the richer set of fixed effects. The estimate associated with the quadruple interaction term is positive and statistically significant, documenting a relative increase in mortgage applications by Black borrowers to Black lenders in treated counties relative to control counties following the Shelby ruling. This finding indicates a flight of Black demand for home mortgages to Black lenders following the Shelby ruling.

Table 9 presents three key takeaways from the analysis presented in . First, the flight of Black demand to Black lenders after the Shelby ruling indicates an increase in racial homophily. Second, the asymmetric effect of applications by lender type suggests our baseline results are unlikely to be entirely driven by reduced income and increased fear of being rejected by the non-Black lenders after the Shelby ruling could be an important driver. Third, the inclusion of census-tract \times race \times year allows us to better control for the asymmetric effect of observed and unobserved macroeconomic shocks across Black and White households in treated and control counties as discussed in section 5.3.1. The underlying assumption of this inference is that Black and non-Black banks in treated and control counties are likely to respond similarly to macroeconomic shocks.

6.2 Mode of Home Purchase: Cash vs. Mortgage

This section investigates the substitution of mortgages towards cash usage for home purchases by the Black households. As before, the objective of this test is to disentangle the income and uncertainty channels from the fear-of-rejection channel. The intuition behind this test is that if our baseline results are primarily driven by the reduction in the income of Black Americans following the Shelby ruling, we would expect a decline in home purchases through both cash and mortgages. Moreover, an increase in anticipated future economic uncertainty will increase the liquidity and precautionary demand for money. As a result, we would expect a decline in home purchases through cash if the results are primarily driven by an increase in anticipated future economic uncertainty. However, if fear of rejection due to greater anticipated discrimination is the primary channel, the reduction in home purchases will manifest only through mortgages but would entail an increase in cash usage for home purchases.

We analyze the usage of cash and mortgages for home purchases by merging the Zillow dataset with the HMDA dataset and identifying the primary mode of payment – cash or mortgage – for each housing transaction. We estimate the dynamic specification 1 for home purchases financed through mortgage and paid using cash separately and report the results in Figure 8. Figure 8 shows no significant difference in home purchases through mortgages or cash by Black Americans in treated and control counties before the Shelby ruling. However, following the Shelby ruling, we observe a divergence in the tendency of Black Americans to pay for their home purchases through mortgages and cash. Specifically, Figure 8 documents a decline in home purchases financed through mortgages and an increase in home purchases paid for in cash by Black Americans in treated counties relative to the control counties, following the Shelby ruling. Hence, this result suggests a substitution in the mode of home purchases by Black Americans in treated counties following the Shelby ruling, i.e., Black Americans reduced their usage of mortgages to finance their home purchases and shifted to using cash. Specifically, this result sheds light on the change in the behavior of the

marginal Black household after the Shelby ruling, who was initially indifferent between usage of mortgage or cash to pay for their home purchase. This change in the choice of payment mode of the marginal Black household indicates that the reduction in mortgage applications is more consistent with the fear-of-rejection channel.

6.3 Bank vs Non Banks

This section investigates whether there is any difference in the application of home mortgages by Black Americans across banks and non-banks. The idea follows [Howell et al. \(2021\)](#), who highlight that non-banks in general and fintech lenders, in particular, have a lower propensity to discriminate based on racial characteristics. Consequently, if fear of discrimination drives the reduced Black mortgage applications post the dilution of VRA, the effect should be muted for non-banks.

Table [D.6](#) reports the results from our baseline specification of mortgage market outcomes performed separately for banks and non-banks. Panels A reports the results for mortgage applications. Columns 1-2 and 3-4 report the results for non-banks and banks, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 combine the non-bank and bank samples and augment the primary explanatory variable $Black \times Treat \times Post$ with a dummy variable indicating if the lender is a bank. We do not find any differential impact on loan applications across races for non-banks. The coefficients in columns 1 and 2 are statistically insignificant and economically small. Meanwhile, the results using banks in columns 3 and 4 reflect our baseline results. In columns 5 and 6, where we include several lender-specific fixed effects, the results reflect a relative decline in Black loan applications for banks post the dilution of VRA. Panel B reports qualitatively similar results for mortgage originations. Again, we find a relative decrease in Black mortgage originations for banks post the dilution of VRA.

6.4 Effect Over Income Distribution

Next, we investigate the size of our baseline effect over the income distribution of borrowers. Specifically, we examine whether our baseline result mainly comes from lower-income households. The intuition behind this test is that if the results are just a manifestation of reduced income, the effect would be more pronounced at the lower end of the income distribution, because the marginal effect of reduction in income is likely to be higher for low-income households. Moreover, because uncertainty shocks amplify in the presence of greater financial frictions, lower-income Black households are likely to have a greater zone of inaction relative to higher-income Black households if uncertainty is the primary channel ([Alfaro, Bloom and Lin \(2018\)](#)).

We conduct this exercise by grouping the population into different income buckets and estimating the baseline specification for each bucket in the income distributions. Figure [9](#) reports the estimates of the triple-interaction term in equation [1](#) for each income bucket. We note that our baseline result of the reduction in mortgage applications from Black Americans in treated counties, following the Shelby ruling, holds across all income buckets, i.e., the estimate of the triple-interaction term is negative across all buckets. Moreover, the estimate is stable across the income distribution, i.e., they are economically and statistically equivalent to each other and also to our baseline estimate reported in column (3) of Table [4](#). This result

provides additional support to our thesis that the impact of the Shelby ruling on Black mortgage demand is not just a downstream effect of reduced income or heightened uncertainty.

6.5 Migration of Black Americans

Another channel that could mechanically generate our baseline results is the emigration of Black households from treated counties following the Shelby ruling. Black Americans could circumvent the adverse effects of disenfranchisement by moving to other areas within the US where their voting rights are relatively better protected.²¹ Therefore, emigration of disenfranchised groups would lower the housing demand among the disenfranchised group, consequently reducing mortgage applications. This section examines the importance of the migration channel in explaining our baseline results.

Using the IRS data on the aggregate inflow and outflow of people to examine the effect of the Shelby ruling on the migration of Black people in treated counties relative to people in the control counties. We define a county as a high Black county if its 2010 Black population share was greater than the median value of the Black population share in all sample counties in 2010. The intuition for using the Black population share to classify counties is that the counties with a greater percentage of the Black population are likely to be most adversely hit by the Shelby ruling. Table 10 reports these results using different measures of migration. Columns (1), (2), (3), and 4 use the natural logarithm of county outflows, the natural logarithm of county inflows, the natural logarithm of county outflows minus the natural logarithm of county inflows, and the difference between county outflows and inflows divided by the 2010 county population, respectively. Across all migration measures, the coefficient of the triple-interaction term is statistically and economically insignificant. This result suggests migration is likely to play an insignificant role in explaining our results.

A shortcoming of the analysis presented in Table 10 is that we cannot precisely identify the migration of Black individuals in the IRS data. Therefore, the results of Table 10 can only be inferred as suggestive. Thus, we further refine our analysis by constructing ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) level population by race using the 2013 American Community Survey (ACS) five-year estimates and the 2018 five-year estimates. This exercise yields the pre- and post-Shelby share of the population by race over essentially the same period as the core analysis in this paper. Table 11 reports results using the ACS data. The estimate of the interaction term of *Treat* and *Post* using the White and Black population share as the dependent variables in columns (1) and (2), respectively, indicate statistically and economically insignificant change in the share of population by race following the Shelby ruling. Column (3) estimates the coefficient of the triple-interaction term of *Black*, *Treat*, and *Post* with a richer set of fixed effects and finds little change in the relative Black population share in treated counties compared with the control counties following the Shelby ruling. Overall, these results reinforce the findings of Table 10 and indicate emigration of Black households from treated counties is unlikely to explain our results.

²¹The movement of 6 million African Americans out of the rural Southern United States to the urban Northeast, Midwest, and West between 1916 and 1970, also known as the Great Migration, in search of better economic opportunities and freedom from oppression is a case in point.

6.6 How Real Is the Fear?

The mechanism of the results that we observe appears to be driven by fear of rejection which is likely a manifestation of the plight of Black Americans in the treated counties after the Shelby ruling. However, is this fear real? Has the plight of Black Americans worsened since the dilution of the VRA?

To shed light, this section examines the change in violence and attitudes towards Black Americans following the 2013 Shelby ruling. The state provides protection against discrimination and all forms of violence. The 2013 Shelby ruling decreases the political voice of Black Americans and reduces the incentives of the state to provide such protections to them, hence attenuating the barriers to explicit animosity and violence against Black Americans by racist individuals and groups. This increased risk of violence, resulting in loss of life or destruction of property, can reduce the investment horizon, thereby reducing housing demand among Black Americans.²²

Table 12 documents the change in the extent of hate crimes against Black Americans following the Shelby ruling using the FBI's hate crime data from 2010 to 2019. The estimates in Table 12 shows that the number of incidents of violent hate crimes against Black people increased by 16%-29% in treated areas relative to control areas following the Shelby ruling. We provide additional evidence using the ANES data on reported warmth for Black Americans among White males in the US around presidential elections. Appendix Table D.5 reports these results showing that the warmth towards Black Americans declined by 4.5 percentage points in treated areas relative to control areas following the Shelby ruling. The two results together indicate the usage of violence and animosity against Black Americans by non-state actors increased following the Shelby ruling.

Lastly, we document the Shelby ruling's effect on the trust of Black Americans in the ability of the state to provide adequate protection. Using the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) Survey data from 2008 until 2018, we show the approval of state agents – State Legislatures, Congress, President – and the Supreme Court declined among Black individuals in treated counties after the Shelby ruling (see Table 13).²³ This result suggests the dilution of political voice results in a decline in trust in the state.

6.7 The Role of Racial Animus

The results so far highlight the importance of increased fear of rejection following the Shelby ruling. Specifically, we argue the increase in fear of rejection comes from the increased fear of discrimination among Black Americans after the Shelby ruling. This section provides some evidence indicating the relevance of anticipated discrimination in explaining the decline in mortgage originations and applications.

²²Historically, the Black community has faced destruction of their property by White supremacist groups and have had little ex-ante protection or ex-post justice by the state. The 1912 Tulsa race riots are a case in point. White rioters rampaged through a Black neighborhood in the Greenwood district of Tulsa in Oklahoma, also referred to as the *Black Wall Street*, killing men and destroying property on the ground and from private aircraft. There was little to no state support or protection provided to the Black community and no charges were made against White rioters (Cook (2014)). The Rosewood massacre of 1923 in rural Levy County, Florida is another example. Violence against Black Americans and destruction of their property is not simply an historical phenomenon. The 2017 Hate Crime Victimization Report by the US Department of Justice documents that 35.4% of all violent hate crime victims between 2011 and 2015 were Black Americans, whereas Black Americans accounted for 22% of all victims of violent non-hate crime incidents. The FBI's annual Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA) report of 2019 documents that 26% of hate crime incidents were racially motivated and targeted Black Americans.

²³Our results are robust to restricting the analysis until 2016, before the Trump presidency.

Our measure of anti-Black racial animus comes from [Stephens-Davidowitz \(2013\)](#). This measure is calculated at the level of the designated media market and measures the percentage of an area's Google searches that contain racially charged words.²⁴ We augment our baseline specification 3 to include a quadruple-interaction term of Black, Treat, Post, and High racial animus. The intuition behind this test is that preexisting anti-Black sentiment is likely to become dominant – at least in expectations of Black Americans – in treated areas after the Shelby ruling, as the state's incentives to protect Black Americans against racial discrimination decline.

Table 14 presents the results from this analysis. The estimate associated with the quadruple-interaction term is negative and statistically significant for originations and applications. However, there is no effect on the denial rate. This result indicates the applications, and consequently originations, decline for Black Americans in treated counties with a high preexisting level of anti-Black sentiment. These results indicate the salience of fear of rejection – fueled by racial animus – in driving our results.

7 External Validity

This section provides external validity to our analysis showing the link between the cost of voting and the racial homeownership gap is not just a VRA issue but a much larger phenomenon related to racial harmony. We do so by examining the correlation between the cost of voting and the racial homeownership gap at the state level.²⁵ The data on state-level racial homeownership gap come from the one-year summary files of the American Community Survey between 2009 and 2019, and the annual state-level data on Cost of Voting Index (COVI) during the same period come from [Schraufnagel, Pomante and Li \(2020\)](#).

Figure 10a presents the relationship between the state-level racial homeownership gap, the gap between White and Black Americans, and the state-level COVI. The state-level racial homeownership gap regression estimate on state-level COVI is 0.012 and significant at the 5% level. The scatter plot and the best-fit line indicate the homeownership gap between White and Black Americans increases with the cost of voting. COVI can explain 20% of the total variation in the racial homeownership gap. However, significant cross-sectional heterogeneity exists across states in the amount of total variation in the racial homeownership gap that COVI can explain. Figure 10b presents the variation in the model R^2 , for each state, obtained from state-wise time-series regression of racial homeownership gap on COVI. Next, we evaluate the correlation between racial harmony and the ability to explain the racial homeownership gap. The measure of state-level racial harmony comes from [Dougal et al. \(2019\)](#). Figure 10c shows the heterogeneity in the R^2 across states can be explained by the extent of racial harmony in the state. The estimate of the cross-sectional regression of state-level model R^2 on racial harmony is -0.145 and significant at the 5% level. This finding suggests the total variation in the racial homeownership gap that COVI can explain increases with a decline in racial harmony.

²⁴ Appendix figure D.3 presents a geographical distribution of the racial animus variable for our sample.

²⁵ A caveat of this analysis is that it is not a well-identified analysis, and the results from it should be treated as correlation.

8 Conclusion

In this paper, we identify the effect of electoral disenfranchisement of Black Americans on their mortgage borrowing decisions. We combine the spatial information on jurisdictions previously covered under Section 5 of the VRA with the race and location of mortgage applicants and use a triple-difference estimation strategy. We document that the amount (number) of total mortgage originations fell by 14.7% (8.3%) for Black borrowers in treated counties relative to control counties, following the Shelby ruling.

We find the reduction in mortgage origination is driven by a decline in mortgage applications by Black Americans, whereas the denial rate of applications remains unchanged. These results suggest the political disenfranchisement can push Black Americans to self select out of the mortgage market. The real impact is manifested through a reduction in homeownership among Black Americans after the Shelby ruling. Finally, we show these effects are driven by an increased fear of rejection following the Shelby ruling rather than being a downstream effect of income changes or heightened uncertainty.

Broadly, the results expand our understanding of the social and economic impact of changes in voting power. This paper documents that individuals alter their economic decision-making as a response to changes in their political voice. Hence, our paper proposes a new channel through which discrimination in the voting process can result in exclusion from markets. Our work is also relevant to policy-makers working on issues of voting rights, racial disparity, and community banks. Our results highlight that 50 years after the passage of the VRA, the ballot may still needs to be protected especially for the historically marginalized.

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
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
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Figure 1: Jurisdictions under Preclearance Coverage




The figure shows all counties subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by 1975. The counties covered under Section 5 require preclearance from either the US Attorney General or the US District Court of DC. This list of counties covered under Section 5 is obtained from the US Department of Justice. [<LINK>](#)

Figure 2: Sample of Bordering Counties Used in the Analysis



The figure shows the sample bordering counties used in the analysis. The covered counties were subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by 1975. The counties covered under Section 5 require preclearance of all changes in voting laws from either the US Attorney General or the US District Court of DC. This list of counties covered under Section 5 is obtained from the US Department of Justice. [<LINK>](#) The uncovered counties in the immediate border of the covered counties are shown marked in navy blue.

Figure 3: Black Voter Turnout and the Shelby Ruling




This figure uses county-level voter turnout data and plots coefficients $\{\beta_k\}$ from the specification

$$\text{Voter Turnout}_{c(c \in p),t} = \sum_{k=2000, k \neq 2012}^{2020} \beta_k \cdot \text{High Black}_c \cdot \text{Treat}_c \cdot 1(t = k) + \alpha_c + \sum_{k=2000, k \neq 2012}^{20120} \gamma_k \cdot \text{Treat}_c \cdot 1(t = k) + \alpha_{p(c \in p),t} + \varepsilon_{c,t},$$


where $\text{Voter Turnout}_{c(c \in p),t}$ denotes the voter turnout in presidential elections as our primary outcome variable in county (c) during year (t). Treat_c takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise, for the sample of bordering counties identified in Figure 2. $1(t = k)$ denotes year dummies for 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020 with 2012 as the omitted category. High Black_c takes a value of 1 if the 2010 Black population share in county c is greater than the median population of our sample counties in 2010. α_c , and $\alpha_{p(c \in p),t}$ denote county fixed effects and county-pair \times year fixed effects, respectively. Additionally, we control for time-varying shocks to treated counties relative to the control counties. The sample includes the 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections. Capped spikes drawn with the estimated coefficients $\{\beta_k\}$ indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained from standard errors clustered at the county level.

Figure 4: Mortgage Market Outcomes and the Shelby Ruling



This figure uses the HMDA data aggregated at the county-race-year level for the period 2008 to 2019 and plots the mortgage origination, application and denial-rate index for Black and White Americans in treated counties relative to the control counties. Figure 4a uses the amount of mortgage origination. Figure 4b uses the number of mortgage origination. Figure 4c uses the denial rate. The mortgage-origination index (Treat–Control) is computed by estimating the weighted average of the mortgage-origination amount (Figure 4a), application-amount (Figure 4b) and denial rate (Figure 4c) for Black and White Americans in treated and control counties, and taking the difference between the two groups of counties for each race. The county population in 2010 is used as a weight. The sample of treated and control counties is shown in Figure 2. The mortgage origination, application and denial-rate index is standardized to a value of 0 in 2013. The blue dashed line reports the indices (Treat–Control) for the White borrowers, and the red solid line reports the indices (Treat–Control) for Black borrowers.

Figure 5: Racial Differences in Mortgages and the Shelby Ruling




This figure uses the HMDA data aggregated at the county-race-year level for the period 2008 to 2019 and plots coefficients $\{\beta_k\}$ from the following specification:

$$y_{r,c(c \in p),t} = \sum_{k=2008, k \neq 2013}^{2019} \beta_k \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot 1(t = k) + \alpha_{r,c} + \alpha_{c,t} + \alpha_{p(c \in p),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,c,t},$$

where $y_{r,c,t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the county (c), race (r), and time (t) level. Each county is a part of a county-pair (p), which comprises a cluster of bordering counties. The different key dependent variables employed in this paper include the natural logarithm of number and amount of mortgage originations, the natural logarithm of the number and amount of mortgage applications, and the denial rate. The figure plots the sequence of estimates $\{\beta_k\}$ associated with the triple-interaction term. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black applicants and 0 for white applicants. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise, for the sample of bordering counties identified in Figure 2. $1(t = k)$ is a time indicator, with 2013 being the omitted year. $\alpha_{r,c}$, $\alpha_{c,t}$, and $\alpha_{p(c \in p),r,t}$ represent race \times county, county \times year, and county-pair \times race \times year fixed effects, respectively. As dependent variables, Figure 5a uses the natural logarithm of total mortgage-origination amount for home purchases, Figure 5b uses the natural logarithm of the total mortgage application for home purchases, and Figure 5c uses the denial rate. Regressions are weighted by the total county population in 2010. Capped spikes drawn with the estimated coefficients $\{\beta_k\}$ indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained from standard errors clustered at the county level.

Figure 6: Regression Discontinuity around the Voter-Turnout Threshold



This figure plots the scatter plot and the local best-fit linear polynomial of the county-level mortgage-origination growth for Black Americans relative to White Americans from 2013 to 2016 (Y-axis) against the running variable, that is, 0.5 minus the voter turnout in the 1964 Presidential election (X-axis). The sample of treated and control counties is shown in Figure D.1. The solid red line illustrates the local best-fit linear polynomial for the treated counties whose 1964 presidential voter turnout was between 46% and 50%. The navy dashed line shows the local best-fit linear polynomial for the control counties whose 1964 Presidential voter turnout was between 40% and 45%. The black vertical dashed line separates the treated and control groups, and the solid gray line indicates the 95% confidence interval of the local best-fit linear polynomials.

Figure 7: Home Purchase and the Shelby Ruling




This figure uses the Zillow data aggregated at the county-race-year level for the period 2009 to 2018 and plots coefficients $\{\beta_k\}$ from the following specification:

$$y_{r,c(c \in p),t} = \sum_{k=2008, k \neq 2013}^{2018} \beta_k \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot 1(t = k) + \alpha_{r,c} + \alpha_{c,t} + \alpha_{p(c \in p),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,c,t},$$

where $y_{r,c,t}$ denotes the natural logarithm of the number of new home purchases aggregated at the county (c), race (r), and time (t) level. Each county is a part of a county-pair (p) that comprises a cluster of bordering counties. The figure plots the sequence of estimates $\{\beta_k\}$ associated with the triple-interaction term. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black home buyers and 0 for White home buyers. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise, for the sample of bordering counties identified in Figure 2. $1(t = k)$ is a time indicator, with 2013 being the omitted year. $\alpha_{r,c}$, $\alpha_{c,t}$, and $\alpha_{p(c \in p),r,t}$ represent race \times county, county \times year, and county-pair \times race \times year fixed effects, respectively. Regressions are weighted by the total county population in 2010. Capped spikes drawn with the estimated coefficients $\{\beta_k\}$ indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained from standard errors clustered at the county level.

Figure 8: Change in Mode of Home Purchase and the Shelby Ruling: Cash vs. Mortgage




This figure uses the home transactions data from Zillow merged with HMDA and aggregated at the county-race-year level for the period 2009 to 2018 for homes purchased through cash and mortgages and plots coefficients $\{\beta_k\}$ from the following specification:

$$y_{r,c(c \in p),t} = \sum_{k=2009, k \neq 2013}^{2018} \beta_k \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot 1(t = k) + \alpha_{r,c} + \alpha_{c,t} + \alpha_{p(c \in p),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,c,t},$$

where $y_{r,c,t}$ denotes the natural logarithm of the number of new home purchases through mortgages or cash aggregated at the county (c), race (r), and time (t) level. Each county is a part of a county-pair (p) that comprises a cluster of bordering counties. The figure plots the sequence of estimates $\{\beta_k\}$ associated with the triple interaction term. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black applicants and 0 for white applicants. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise, for the sample of bordering counties identified in Figure 2. $1(t = k)$ is a time indicator, with 2013 being the omitted year. $\alpha_{r,c}$, $\alpha_{c,t}$, and $\alpha_{p(c \in p),r,t}$ represent race \times county, county \times year, and county-pair \times race \times year fixed effects, respectively. Regressions are weighted by the total county population in 2010. Capped spikes drawn with the estimated coefficients $\{\beta_k\}$ indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained from standard errors clustered at the county level.

Figure 9: Effect over Income Distribution



This table reports the coefficient β from the following regression specification estimated for separately for seven income buckets:

$$y_{r,c,t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + \alpha_{r,c} + \alpha_{c,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(c \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,c,t},$$

where $y_{r,c(c \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the county (c) lying within a contagious county-pair (p), race (r), and time (t) level. The key-dependent variables include natural logarithm of the amount of mortgage applications. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term of $Black_r$, $Treat_c$, and $Post_t$. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for white Americans. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling and 0 otherwise. The specification includes race \times county ($\alpha_{r,c}$), county \times year ($\alpha_{c,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(c \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. The data span all bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2019. Regressions are weighted by the total county population in 2010. Capped spikes drawn with the estimated coefficients indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained from standard errors clustered at the county level. The seven income buckets are less than equal to 50,000 (≤ 50), 51,000-100,000 (51-100), 101,000-150,000 (101-150), 151,000-200,000 (151-200), 201,000-250,000 (201-250), and greater than 250,000 (> 250).

Figure 10: Racial Home-Ownership Gap and the Cost of Voting Index




Figure 10a presents the relationship between the racial home-ownership gap between Black and White Americans, and the cost of voting index (COVI) at the state level from 2009 to 2019. The data on the state-level racial home-ownership gap come from the one-year summary files of the American Community Survey between 2009 and 2019. The annual state-level data on COVI between 2009 and 2019 come from [Schraufnagel, Pomante and Li \(2020\)](#). Figure 10b presents a heat map of the model R^2 , for each state, obtained from a state-wise time-series regression of racial home-ownership gap on COVI. Figure 10c plots the the model R^2 against the racial harmony measure for each state. The model R^2 for each state comes from state-wise time-series regression of racial home-ownership gap on COVI. The measure of state-level racial harmony comes from [Dougal et al. \(2019\)](#).

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	P25	P50	P75
Origination					
<i>LN(Amount)</i>	2.056	2.409	0.798	2.468	3.949
<i>LN(Number)</i>	1.452	2.092	0.095	1.808	3.223
Application					
<i>LN(Amount)</i>	2.372	2.307	1.176	2.754	4.157
<i>LN(Number)</i>	1.752	2.013	0.742	2.092	3.405
Denial Rate	0.156	0.217	0.000	0.089	0.212
LN(Number of Housing Transactions)	4.792	2.660	3.140	4.970	6.763
Voter Turnout	0.394	0.087	0.334	0.392	0.454
Migration					
<i>LN(Outflow)</i>	0.034	1.009	-0.707	-0.113	0.696
<i>LN(Inflow)</i>	0.031	0.999	-0.682	-0.111	0.695
<i>LN(Outflow/Inflow)</i>	0.003	0.164	-0.078	0.001	0.085
<i>LN((Outflow-Inflow)/Population in 2010)</i>	0.007	0.959	-0.384	0.072	0.506
Share of White Population	0.610	0.262	0.429	0.663	0.829
Share of Black Population	0.157	0.196	0.021	0.074	0.214
LN(Hate Crime)	0.490	0.716	0.000	0.000	0.693
Approval of Job, Legislature	2.2	0.9	1	2	3
Approval of Job, Congress	1.8	0.9	1	2	2
Approval of Job, President	2.3	1.3	1	2	4
Approval of Job, Supreme Court	2.3	0.9	2	2	3

This table presents the summary statistics for the key outcome variables explored in this paper. The first two rows report summary statistics for the natural logarithm of the mortgage-origination amount and number for home purchases, followed by the summary statistics for the natural logarithm of mortgage applications amount and number. We then report the summary statistics for the denial rate, defined as the ratio of the number of denied applications to the total number of applications for home purchases. Next, we report the natural logarithm of the number of housing transactions. The mortgage market variables are constructed from the HMDA database and are at the census-tract and year level. The number of housing transactions is computed from the ZTRAX database at the county-year level. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level to minimize the influence of outliers. We also include other variables – the migration and share of the White and Black population collected from IRS and ACS, respectively. Incidents of hate crimes are constructed from the FBI database. Americans’ approval of the legislature, Congress, president, and the Supreme Court is collected from CCES. One indicate strong disapproval, and four indicates strong approval.

Table 2: Balance Test: Comparing Bordering County Characteristics in 2010

Panel A: All Counties						
	Uncovered Counties	Covered Counties	Mean Difference	P-Value		
Mean Income	33159.486	29991.869	3167.617	0.001		
Mean Age	37.476	35.314	2.162	0.000		
Share of Black Pop	0.040	0.216	-0.177	0.000		
Share of Urban Pop	0.409	0.430	-0.021	0.095		
Share of Pop Owning Home	0.681	0.643	0.038	0.001		
Share of Mortgage Users	0.756	0.720	0.036	0.000		
Employment Rate	0.908	0.911	-0.003	0.185		
Share of Labor Force	0.773	0.750	0.023	0.000		
Share of Manufacturing	0.096	0.078	0.018	0.000		
Share of Trade	0.129	0.123	0.005	0.004		

Panel B: Bordering Counties						
	Uncovered Counties	Covered Counties	Simple Difference		Difference (within county-pairs)	
			Magnitude	P-Value	Magnitude	P-Value
Mean Income	31959.662	31223.474	736.187	0.769	1737.668	0.566
Mean Age	37.146	35.827	1.319	0.039	-0.881	0.126
Share of Black Pop	0.102	0.177	-0.075	0.000	0.013	0.133
Share of Urban Pop	0.455	0.454	0.002	0.960	0.018	0.458
Share of Pop Owning Home	0.642	0.609	0.033	0.217	-0.037	0.270
Share of Mortgage Users	0.755	0.733	0.022	0.191	-0.019	0.200
Employment Rate	0.897	0.903	-0.006	0.291	0.004	0.572
Share of Labor Force	0.753	0.753	0.000	0.999	-0.003	0.778
Share of Manufacturing	0.071	0.081	-0.010	0.380	0.008	0.407
Share of Trade	0.124	0.118	0.006	0.188	-0.006	0.114

This table reports average characteristics across Section 5 (covered) and non-Section 5 (uncovered) counties. Panel A reports average characteristics across Section 5 (covered) and non-Section 5 (uncovered) counties, for the full county sample shown in Figure 1. Panel B reports average characteristics across Section 5 (covered) and non-Section 5 (uncovered) counties, for the sample of bordering counties shown in Figure 2. Simple difference reports the average difference across covered and uncovered counties. Difference (within county-pairs) reports the average value of the difference between covered and uncovered estimated within-county-pairs of bordering counties.

Table 3: Voter Turnout and the Shelby Ruling

Dep Var: Voter Turnout	(1)	(2)	(3)
High Black x Treat x Post	-0.0274*** (0.0086)	-0.0342*** (0.0093)	-0.0274*** (0.0082)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes		
Treat × Year FE		Yes	Yes
County Pair × Year FE			Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.8031	0.8038	0.9457
# Obs	3,747	3,747	3,747

This table reports the coefficient β from the following specification:

$$y_{c(c \in p),t} = \beta \cdot \text{High Black}_c \cdot \text{Treat}_c \cdot \text{Post}_t + \alpha_c + \sum_k \gamma_k \cdot \text{Treat}_c \cdot 1(t = k) + \alpha_{p(c \in p),t} + \varepsilon_{c,t},$$

where $y_{c(c \in p),t}$ denotes the voter turnout in presidential elections as our primary outcome variable in county (c) during year (t). Treat_c takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise, for the sample of bordering counties identified in Figure 2. Post_t takes a value of 1 for years after 2013. High Black_c takes a value of 1 if the 2010 share of Black population in county c is greater than the median population of our sample counties in 2010. α_c and $\alpha_{p(c \in p),t}$ denote county fixed effects and county-pair × year fixed effects, respectively. Additionally, we control for time-varying shocks to treated counties relative to the control counties. The sample includes 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020 presidential elections. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 4: Geographic Regression Discontinuity: Mortgage Market Outcome and the Shelby Ruling

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Origination		Application		Denial Rate
	LN(Amount)	Ln(Number)	LN(Amount)	LN(Number)	
Black x Treat x Post	-0.1466*** (0.0322)	-0.0828*** (0.0251)	-0.1261*** (0.0313)	-0.0695*** (0.0246)	0.0004 (0.0054)
Census Tract x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Census Tract x Race FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Pair x Race x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2D Local Linear Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.8634	0.8868	0.8619	0.8864	0.4180
# Obs	346,825	346,825	346,825	346,825	346,825

This table reports the coefficient β from the following regression specification:

$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + f(location_v) + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t},$$

where $y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contagious county-pair (p), race (r) and time (t) level. The key-dependent variables include natural logarithm of the amount (column (1)) and number (column (2)) of mortgage originations, the natural logarithm of amount (column (3)) and number (column (4)) of mortgage applications, and denial rate (column (5)). The coefficient of interest is the interaction term of $Black_r$, $Treat_c$, and $Post_t$. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for White Americans. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of VRA and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling and 0 otherwise. The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. $f(location_v)$ or 2D local linear polynomial refers to the local linear polynomial in two dimensions, latitude and longitude, for every census tract estimated separately on each side of the border. The data span all census tracts in bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2019. Regressions are weighted by the total tract population in 2010. Standard errors clustered at the tract level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 5: Robustness: Relative Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Shocks

Macroeconomic Shock → Dep Var: ↓	(1) 30-Year Mortgage Rates	(2) 15-Year Mortgage Rates	(3) GDP Growth Rate	(4) Term Spread	(5) Bank Credit
Mortgage Origination					
LN(Amount)	-0.0115 (0.0495)	-0.0157 (0.0575)	0.0015 (0.0142)	0.0048 (0.0472)	0.0028 (0.0086)
LN(Number)	0.0044 (0.0385)	0.0026 (0.0446)	0.0030 (0.0110)	0.0102 (0.0369)	-0.0006 (0.0067)
Mortgage Applications					
LN(Amount)	-0.0227 (0.0478)	-0.0263 (0.0553)	-0.0054 (0.0134)	-0.0192 (0.0458)	0.0124 (0.0084)
LN(Number)	-0.0247 (0.0376)	-0.0292 (0.0434)	-0.0013 (0.0104)	0.0001 (0.0361)	0.0036 (0.0065)

This table reports the coefficient β for the following regression specification for different dependent variables and macroeconomic shocks:

$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot \Delta X_t + f(location_v) + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t},$$

where $y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contiguous county-pair (p), race (r), and time (t) level. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term of $Black_r$, $Treat_c$ and ΔX_t . $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for White Americans. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. ΔX_t includes macroeconomic shocks including changes in the 30-year mortgage rate, 15-year mortgage rate, term spread, bank credit, and GDP growth rate. The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. $f(location_v)$ or 2D local linear polynomial refers to the local linear polynomial in two dimensions, latitude and longitude, for every census tract estimated separately on each side of the border. The data spans all census tracts in bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2012 with total observations of 146,011. Regressions are weighted by the total tract population in 2010. Each pair of estimate and standard error is estimated from separate regressions using a different dependent variable and macroeconomic shocks. The four different dependent variables include the natural logarithm of the amount and number of mortgage originations and the natural logarithm of the amount and number of mortgage applications. The four dependent variables and five macroeconomic shocks result in creation of this 4X5 matrix estimated using 20 different regressions. Standard errors clustered at the tract level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 6: Robustness: Baseline Effect after Controlling for Macroeconomic Shocks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Origination		Application		Denial Rate
	LN(Amount)	Ln(Number)	LN(Amount)	LN(Number)	
Black x Treat x Post	-0.1456*** (0.0484)	-0.0801** (0.0380)	-0.1279*** (0.0470)	-0.0704* (0.0371)	0.0025 (0.0090)
Tract x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tract x Race FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Pair x Race x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2D Local Linear Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for Macroeconomic Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.8634	0.8868	0.8620	0.8864	0.4180
# Obs	346,825	346,825	346,825	346,825	346,825

This table reports the coefficient β from the following regression specification:

$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + \sum_k \gamma_k \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot \Delta X_t^k + f(location_v) + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t},$$

where $y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contagious county-pair (p), race (r), and time (t) level. The key-dependent variables include natural logarithm of the amount (column (1)) and number (column (2)) of mortgage originations, the natural logarithm of amount (column (3)) and number (column (4)) of mortgage applications, and denial rate (column (5)). The coefficient of interest is the interaction term of $Black_r$, $Treat_c$, and $Post_t$. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for White Americans. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of VRA and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling, and 0 otherwise. ΔX_t^k refers to the vector of macroeconomic shocks that include changes to 30-year mortgage rates, 15-year mortgage rates, bank credit, term spread, and GDP growth rate. The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. $f(location_v)$ or 2D local linear polynomial refers to the local linear polynomial in two dimensions, latitude and longitude, for every census tract estimated separately on each side of the border. The data span all census tracts in bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2019. Regressions are weighted by the total tract population in 2010. Standard errors clustered at the tract level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 7: Falsification: Null Effect on Mortgage Refinancing

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Application		Denial
	LN(Amount)	Ln(Number)	Rate
Black x Treat x Post	0.0095 (0.0531)	0.0101 (0.0474)	-0.0041 (0.0063)
Tract x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tract x Race FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Pair x Race x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
2D Local Linear Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.7666	0.7742	0.4474
# Obs	346,825	346,825	346,825

This table reports the coefficient β from the following regression specification:

$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + f(location_v) + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t},$$

where $y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contagious county-pair (p), race (r), and time (t) level. The key dependent variables include the natural logarithm of amount (column (1)), number (column (2)), and denial rate (column (3)) for application for mortgage refinancing. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term of $Black_r$, $Treat_c$ and $Post_t$. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for White Americans. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of VRA, and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling, and 0 otherwise. The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. $f(location_v)$ or 2D local linear polynomial refers to the local linear polynomial in two dimensions, latitude and longitude, for every census tract estimated separately on each side of the border. The data span all census tracts in bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2019. Regressions are weighted by the total tract population in 2010. Standard errors clustered at the tract level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 8: Regression Discontinuity around the Voter-Turnout Threshold

Panel A: Regression Discontinuity					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Origination		Application		$\Delta Denial$
	$\Delta LN(Amount)$	$\Delta LN(Number)$	$\Delta LN(Amount)$	$\Delta LN(Number)$	Rate
Treat	-0.2374** (0.1148)	-0.2049** (0.0896)	-0.2224* (0.1209)	-0.1992* (0.1010)	-0.0099 (0.0253)
Adjusted R^2	0.0413	0.0452	0.0356	0.0312	-0.0107
# Obs	164	164	164	164	164
Panel B: Differences-in-Discontinuity Design					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Origination		Application		Denial
	LN(Amount)	Ln(Number)	LN(Amount)	LN(Number)	Rate
Black x Treat x Post	-0.1101*** (0.0347)	-0.0860** (0.0374)	-0.1035*** (0.0346)	-0.0838** (0.0377)	-0.0010 (0.0062)
County x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County x Race FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Race x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.9909	0.9917	0.9916	0.9920	0.6308
# Obs	5,314	5,314	5,314	5,314	5,314

Panel A use the HMDA data aggregated at the county level and report the coefficient β from the specification:

$$\Delta y_{c,Black} - \Delta y_{c,White} = \alpha + \beta \cdot Treat_c + \gamma_1 \cdot Turnout_c + \gamma_2 \cdot Treat_c \cdot Turnout_c + \varepsilon_c.$$

Panel B use the HMDA data aggregated at the county-race-year level for the period 2008 to 2019 and report coefficients β from the following specification:

$$y_{r,c,t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + \alpha_{r,c} + \alpha_{r,t} + \alpha_{c,t} + \varepsilon_{r,c,t},$$

where subscript r , c , and t indicate race, county, and year, respectively. $Treat_c$ is an indicator variable that takes 1 for counties whose voter turnout in the 1964 presidential election is greater than 45% but less than 50% and 0 for counties whose voter turnout in the 1964 presidential election is greater than 50% but less than 55%. The sample of treated and control counties is shown in Figure D.1. $Turnout_c$ is voter turnout in the 1964 Presidential election. $Black_r$ is an indicator variable that takes 1 for Black borrowers, and $Post_t$ is an indicator variable that takes 1 for years from 2014. $\alpha_{r,c}$, $\alpha_{r,t}$, and $\alpha_{c,t}$ represent race-county, race-year, and county-year fixed effects, respectively. $\Delta y_{c,Black}$ and $\Delta y_{c,White}$ denote the change in the natural logarithm of the amount and number of mortgage originations and applications and denial rates from 2013 to 2016 for Black and White Americans, respectively. Panel B uses the natural logarithm of the total amount and number of originations, applications, and denial rate as the dependent variable. Panel A reports heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Panel B reports standard errors clustered at the county level. All regressions are weighted by the total county population in 2010. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 9: Flight of Mortgage Applications from Black Borrowers to Black Lenders

	Non-Black Lender		Black Lender		All	
	(1) LN(Amount)	(2) LN(Number)	(3) LN(Amount)	(4) LN(Number)	(5) LN(Amount)	(6) LN(Number)
Black x Treat x Post	-0.1524*** (0.0461)	-0.1028*** (0.0379)	0.1188 (0.0797)	0.1500** (0.0652)		
Black x Treat x Post x Black Lender					0.2090** (0.0876)	0.2037*** (0.0714)
Tract x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Tract x Race FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
County Pair x Race x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
2d Local Linear Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tract x Year x Race FE					Yes	Yes
Tract x Year x Black Lender FE					Yes	Yes
Tract x Race x Black Lender FE					Yes	Yes
County Pair x Year x Race x Black Lender FE					Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.8765	0.8935	0.7875	0.7898	0.9262	0.9347
# Obs	204,250	204,250	145,977	145,977	350,227	350,227

This table reports the coefficient β from the following regression specification:

$$y_{r,l,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Black_l \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + f(location_v) + \alpha_{v,r,l} + \alpha_{v,l,t} + \alpha_{v,r,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,l,t} + \varepsilon_{r,l,v,t},$$

where $y_{r,l,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contiguous county-pair (p), race (r), lender type (l), and time (t) level. Bank type l is either Black lender or non-Black lender. Black lenders are defined as in section 6.1.1. The key-dependent variables include the natural logarithm of total amount and number of mortgage applications. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term of $Black_r$, $Black_l$, $Treat_c$, and $Post_t$. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for White Americans. $Black_l$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black lenders defined in section 6.1.1. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling and zero otherwise. The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. $f(location_v)$ or 2D local linear polynomial refers to the local linear polynomial in two dimensions, latitude and longitude, for every census tract estimated separately on each side of the border. The data span all census tracts in bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2019. Regressions are weighted by the total tract population in 2010. Standard errors clustered at the tract level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 10: Migration and the Shelby Ruling: County-Level Analysis Using IRS Data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ln(Outflow)	Ln(Inflow)	$\text{Ln}(\frac{\text{Outflow}}{\text{Inflow}})$	$\frac{\text{Outflow}-\text{Inflow}}{\text{Pop}_{2010}}$
High Black \times Treat \times Post	-0.0065 (0.0106)	-0.0027 (0.0164)	-0.0037 (0.0129)	0.0571 (0.0480)
Treat \times Post	0.0124 (0.0107)	0.0133 (0.0124)	-0.0008 (0.0106)	0.0155 (0.0556)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County-Pair \times Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
High Black \times Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.9915	0.9890	0.4363	0.6043
# Obs	6,387	6,387	6,387	6,387

This table uses IRS's county-level migration data and reports coefficients β from the following specification:

$$y_{c(c \in c(p)),t} = \beta_1 \cdot \text{High-Black}_c \cdot \text{Treat}_c \cdot \text{Post}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Treat}_c \cdot \text{Post}_t + \alpha_c + \alpha_{c(p)(c \in c(p)),t} + \alpha_{hb,t} + \varepsilon_{c(c \in c(p)),t},$$

where the subscripts c , hb , and t indicate county, high Black, and year, respectively. County (c) lies within a contagious county-pair ($c(p)$). *High-Black_c* is an indicator variable that takes 1 for counties with more than median share of Black population in 2010. *Treat_c* takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in figure 2. *Post_t* is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling, and 0 otherwise. α_c , $\alpha_{c(p)(c \in c(p)),t}$, and $\alpha_{hb,t}$ represent county, county-pair \times year, and high Black \times year fixed effects, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) use the natural logarithms of inflow and outflow as the dependent variable, respectively. Column (3) uses the natural logarithm of the ratio of outflow to inflow, and column (4) uses migration (i.e., outflow minus inflow) as a share of population in 2010 as the dependent variables. Inflow refers to the number of new individuals who filed the income tax returns in a particular county and year. Outflow refers to the number of individuals who had filed the income tax return in a county in the previous year, but filed in a different county in a given year. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 11: Migration and the Shelby ruling: ZCTA-Level Analysis Using ACS Data

Dep Var: Sh. Population	(1)	(2)	(3)
	White	Black	All
Treat x Post	0.0005 (0.0025)	-0.0009 (0.0021)	
Black x Treat x Post			-0.0014 (0.0042)
ZCTA FE	Yes	Yes	
County Pair x Post FE	Yes	Yes	
ZCTA x Post FE			Yes
ZCTA x Black FE			Yes
County Pair x Black x Post FE			Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.9879	0.9556	0.9741
# Obs	11,085	11,085	22,170

This table reports the estimation results from the following specification:

$$y_{z(z \in c(p)), r, t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + \alpha_{z, t} + \alpha_{z, r} + \alpha_{c(p)(z \in c(p)), r, t} + \varepsilon_{z(z \in c(p)), r, t}$$

where the subscripts z , r , and t indicate the ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) located in county c within county-pair $c(p)$, race and time, respectively. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for white Americans. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of VRA and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling and 0 otherwise. The specification includes race \times ZCTA ($\alpha_{z, r}$) fixed effects, ZCTA \times year ($\alpha_{z, t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(z \in c(p)), r, t}$) fixed effects. The unit of analysis is ZCTA-race-year where the key dependent variable is the share of population. We constructing ZCTA-level population by race using the 2013 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates and the 2018 5-year estimates. We have one observation in the pre-period and another in the post-Shelby period. Columns (1) and (2) restrict the sample to Black and White population and estimate the effect associated with Treat \times Post for each population group. Column (3) estimates the triple-interaction term by including both Black and White population shares. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 12: Hate Crime and the Shelby Ruling

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Poisson	(4) Poisson	(5) OLS
Treat x Post	0.2244** (0.1002)	0.2914*** (0.1049)	0.2173*** (0.0690)	0.2601*** (0.0665)	0.1611* (0.0966)
Sample	All States	Border States	All States	Border States	Border Counties
State/County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Within R^2	0.0192	0.0398	-	-	0.0056
# Obs	490	290	490	290	2,090

This table uses the FBI's hate crime statistics summarized at the state (columns (1) through (4)) and county (column (5)) level for the period 2010 to 2019 and reports coefficients β from the following specification:

$$y_{c(s)t} = \beta \cdot \text{Treat}_{c(s)} \cdot \text{Post-Shelby}_t + \alpha_{c(s)} + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{c(s)t},$$

where subscript c , s , and t indicate county, state, and year, respectively. $\text{Treat}_{c(s)}$ is an indicator variable that takes 1 for VRA-treated counties (states). The sample of treated and control counties (states) is shown in Figure 2 (Figure 1). Post-Shelby_t is an indicator variable that takes 1 for years from 2014. As dependent variables, columns (1), (2), and (5) use the natural logarithm of one plus the number of hate crime against Black Americans, and columns (3) and (4) use the raw number of hate crimes against Black Americans. Columns (1), (2), and (5) report OLS estimates, and columns (3) and (4) report Poisson estimates. Regressions in columns (1) through (4) are weighted by the total state population in 2010, and the regression in column (5) is weighted by the total county population in 2010. Standard errors clustered at the state level in columns (1)-(4) and county level in column (5) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 13: Approval of State Agents

Dep Var: Approval of State Agents	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
State Legislature	-0.1857** (0.0943)	-0.3305*** (0.0655)	-0.2857*** (0.0679)	-0.2807*** (0.0673)	-0.3261*** (0.0851)
Congress	-0.1484* (0.0881)	-0.2947*** (0.0755)	-0.2383*** (0.0768)	-0.2186*** (0.0766)	-0.1586** (0.0780)
President	-0.2930*** (0.0893)	-0.1982*** (0.0591)	-0.1961*** (0.0598)	-0.2024*** (0.0610)	-0.1859*** (0.0593)
Supreme Court	-0.1849* (0.0983)	-0.2529*** (0.0766)	-0.2355*** (0.0747)	-0.2420*** (0.0712)	-0.2147*** (0.0743)
Race X Year FE	Yes				
County X Race FE	Yes				
County X Year FE	Yes				
County-pair X Race X Year FE	Yes				
Party Affiliation X Race X Year FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party Affiliation X County X Race FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party Affiliation X County X Year FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party Affiliation X					
County-pair X Race X Year FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls			Yes	Yes	Yes
Income Bucket FE				Yes	Yes
Zipcode FE					Yes

This table reports the coefficient β for the following regression specification for different dependent variables:

$$y_{i,z(z \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_i \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + \alpha_{a,r,c} + \alpha_{a,c,t} + \alpha_{a,r,t} + \alpha_{a,c(p)(z \in c(p)),r,t} + \alpha_z + \gamma X_{it} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

where, $y_{i,z(z \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the approval of the state agent reported by individual i , with political affiliation (a) residing in ZIP code z in county (c) lying within a contagious county-pair (p), with race (r) at time (t). The coefficient of interest is the interaction term of $Black_i$, $Treat_c$ and $Post_t$. $Black_i$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for white Americans. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ takes a value of 1 for years after 2013 and 0 otherwise. The specification includes political affiliation \times race \times year, party affiliation \times county \times race, party affiliation \times county \times year, party affiliation \times county-pair \times race \times year and zip code fixed effects. Individual level controls include gender, birth year fixed effects, marital status, union member, has children, and income-bucket fixed effects. Political affiliation is divided into seven buckets – strong Democrat, not very strong Democrat, lean Democrat, independent, lean Republican, not very Strong Republican, and strong Republican. The data comes from Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) for the years 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. Regressions are weighted by individual survey weights. Each pair of estimate and standard error is estimated from separate regressions using a different dependent variable and a different set of fixed effects. The four different dependent variables are approval of the state legislature, Congress, president and the Supreme Court. Each respondent gives their approval rating on a four-point scale – strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, and strongly disapprove. The four dependent variables and five sets of different fixed effects result in creation of this 4X5 matrix estimated using 20 different regressions. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table 14: Mortgage Market Outcomes and the Shelby ruling: The Effect of Racial Animus

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Origination		Application		Denial Rate
	LN(Amount)	Ln(Number)	LN(Amount)	LN(Number)	
Black x Treat x Post	0.0869*	0.0499	0.0858*	0.0523	0.0044
	(0.0520)	(0.0408)	(0.0514)	(0.0403)	(0.0082)
Black x Treat x Post x High Racial Animus	-0.3403***	-0.1990***	-0.3119***	-0.1853***	-0.0063
	(0.0651)	(0.0509)	(0.0639)	(0.0501)	(0.0105)
Tract x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tract x Race FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Pair x Race x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2D Local Linear Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.8628	0.8866	0.8614	0.8862	0.4122
# Obs	335,413	335,413	335,413	335,413	335,413

This table reports the coefficient β from the following regression specification:


$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta_1 \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + \beta_2 \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t \cdot HighRacialAnimus + f(location_v) + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t},$$

where $y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contagious county-pair (p), race (r), and time (t) level. The key-dependent variables include natural logarithm of amount (column (1)) and number (column (2)) of mortgage originations, the natural logarithm of amount (column (3)) and number (column (4)) of mortgage applications, and denial rate (column (5)). The coefficient of interest is β_2 , coefficient associated with the interaction term of $Black_r$, $Treat_c$, $Post_t$ and High Racial Animus. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for white Americans. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling and 0 otherwise. High Racial Animus takes a value of 1 if the value of racial animus is greater than the median value in the sample, and 0 otherwise. The measure of racial animus comes from Stephens-Davidowitz (2013). The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. $f(location_v)$ or 2D local linear polynomial refers to the local linear polynomial in two dimensions, latitude and longitude, for every census tract estimated separately on each side of the border. The data spans all census tract in bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2019. Regressions are weighted by the total tract population in 2010. Standard errors clustered at the tract level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Online Appendix for:
*“Political Voice and (Mortgage) Market Participation:
Evidence from Minority Disenfranchisement”*

Appendix A Framework

Figure A.1: How Can Disenfranchisement Affect Mortgage Applications?



The figure shows a representative process for buying a home through mortgage and the three effects of disenfranchisement.

Appendix B Background and Enactment of the VRA


The years following the enactment of the three reconstruction amendments – the 13th, the 14th, and the 15th amendments – were marked by active involvement of the Black American population in politics, including the holding of public offices, and their economic prosperity ([Logan \(2020\)](#)). The increasing political and economic involvement of the Black Americans led to a widespread campaign among southern Whites to overturn the Reconstruction-era policies. This movement of re-establishing the antebellum racial hierarchy is referred to as the Southern Redemption. Several works including [Woodward \(1981\)](#), [Ayers \(2007\)](#), [Lemann \(2007\)](#), and [Rable \(2007\)](#) among others have noted the Southern Redemption was concentrated on reducing Black political involvement both through laws and intimidation. As a result, southern state legislatures enacted several laws between the late 19th and early 20th century, referred to as the “Jim Crow” laws, to impose de-facto suffrage restrictions on Black Americans.

The goals of these laws were achieved through imposition of poll taxes, literacy tests administered in a discriminatory manner by county officials, Whites-only party primaries, and so on, which were unduly burdensome to the Black Americans.²⁶ [Valelly \(2009\)](#) notes these restrictions disenfranchised most eligible Black Americans before the civil rights era. Furthermore, these restrictions contributed to the decline in the social and economic status of Black Americans ([Sundstrom \(2007\)](#), [Wanamaker \(2017\)](#), [Logan \(2020\)](#)).


²⁶We direct the readers to [Perman \(2003\)](#) for an extensive discussion on the disenfranchisement of Black Americans in the South during this period.

Appendix C Political Voice and Repeal of the VRA

Figure C.1: Google Search for Voting Rights Act



(a) Across Counties



(b) Covered vs Uncovered Counties

This figure plots the geographic dispersion in the google search index for the term “Voting Rights Act” from January 1, 2012, until December 30, 2014. Figure C.1a plots the heat map for google search index across different counties. Counties with no data have very low search traffic for the term “Voting Rights Act.” Figure C.1b plots the average search index for the term “Voting Rights Act” for counties covered and not-covered by Section 5 of the VRA. The t-statistic for the equality of the average search index across covered and uncovered counties is 19 and significant at the 1% level.

Appendix D Robustness

Table D.1: Robustness: Unweighted Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Origination		Application		Denial
	LN(Amount)	Ln(Number)	LN(Amount)	LN(Number)	Rate
Black x Treat x Post	-0.1179*** (0.0308)	-0.0615** (0.0242)	-0.1016*** (0.0302)	-0.0494** (0.0238)	0.0011 (0.0053)
Tract x Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tract x Race	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Pair x Year x Race	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2D Local Linear Polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.8589	0.8811	0.8572	0.8802	0.4205
# Obs	346,825	346,825	346,825	346,825	346,825

This table reports coefficient β from the following regression specification:

$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + f(location_v) + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t},$$

where $y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contagious county-pair (p), race (r), and time (t) level. The key-dependent variables include natural logarithm of the amount (column (1)) and number (column (2)) of mortgage originations, the natural logarithm of the amount (column (3)) and number (column (4)) of mortgage applications, and denial rate (column (5)). The coefficient of interest is the interaction term of $Black_r$, $Treat_c$, and $Post_t$. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for White Americans. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling and 0 otherwise. The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. $f(location_v)$ or 2D local linear polynomial refers to the local linear polynomial in two dimensions, latitude and longitude, for every census tract estimated separately on each side of the border. The data span all census tracts in bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2019. Standard errors clustered at the tract level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table D.2: Robustness: Without 2D Local Linear Polynomial


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Origination		Application		Denial Rate
	LN(Amount)	Ln(Number)	LN(Amount)	LN(Number)	
Black x Treat x Post	-0.1146*** (0.0271)	-0.0621*** (0.0214)	-0.1022*** (0.0265)	-0.0518** (0.0210)	0.0013 (0.0047)
Tract x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tract x Race FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Pair x Race x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2D Local Linear Polynomials	No	No	No	No	No
Adj R2	0.8717	0.8931	0.8705	0.8925	0.4307
# Obs	454,310	454,310	454,310	454,310	454,310

This table reports the coefficient β from the following regression specification:

$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t},$$


where $y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contiguous county-pair (p), race (r), and time (t) level. The key-dependent variables include natural logarithm of the amount (column (1)) and number (column (2)) of mortgage originations, the natural logarithm of the amount (column 3) and number (column 4) of mortgage applications, and denial rate (column 5). The coefficient of interest is the interaction term of $Black_r$, $Treat_c$, and $Post_t$. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for White Americans. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling and 0 otherwise. The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. The data span all census tracts in bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2019. Standard errors clustered at the tract level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Figure D.1: Sample of Treated Counties and Control Counties used in Regression Discontinuity



The figure shows the sample of treated and control counties used in the regression discontinuity analysis. The covered counties were subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The counties covered under Section 5 require preclearance from either the US Attorney General or the US District Court of DC. The list of counties covered under Section 5 is obtained from the US Department of Justice. [LINK](#) The covered counties with the 1964 presidential voter turnout from 45% to 50% are included in the treated sample. The uncovered counties are counties that were never covered by Section 5 and have the 1964 presidential voter turnout from 51% to 55%.

Figure D.2: Placebo Test: Randomizing the treatment status



This figure plots the kernel density of the point estimates β obtained from 1,000 Monte-Carlo simulations of the treatment status $Placebo-Treat_c$ in the following specification:

$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Placebo-Treat_c \cdot Post_t + f(location_v) + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t},$$

where $y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contiguous county-pair (p), race (r), and time (t) level. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for White Americans. $Placebo-Treat_c$ is generated from a binomial distribution for each census tract within a county-pair with the probability of treatment being equal to the empirical probability of treatment. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling and 0 otherwise. The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. $f(location_v)$ or 2D local linear polynomial refers to the local linear polynomial in two dimensions, latitude and longitude, for every census tract estimated separately on each side of the border. The data span all census tracts in bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2019. Regressions are weighted by the total county population in 2010. Panels A and B use the natural logarithm of the mortgage-origination amount and number, respectively. Panels C and D use the natural logarithm of mortgage application amount and number, respectively. The dashed black line denotes the magnitude of the baseline estimate corresponding to the dependent variable.

Table D.3: Mortgage Market Outcome and the Shelby ruling: Effect on Hispanics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Origination		Application		Denial Rate
	LN(Amount)	Ln(Number)	LN(Amount)	LN(Number)	
Black x Treat x Post	-0.1497*** (0.0322)	-0.0852*** (0.0251)	-0.1277*** (0.0312)	-0.0718*** (0.0246)	0.0001 (0.0053)
Hispanic x Treat x Post	-0.0987** (0.0462)	-0.0537 (0.0352)	-0.0530 (0.0454)	-0.0186 (0.0352)	-0.0002 (0.0080)
Tract x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tract x Race FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Pair x Race x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2D Local Linear Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.8478	0.8731	0.8420	0.8688	0.3329
# Obs	446,031	446,031	446,031	446,031	446,031

This table reports the coefficient β from the following regression specification:

$$y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + \gamma \cdot Hispanic_r \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + f(location_v) + \alpha_{r,v} + \alpha_{v,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t} + \varepsilon_{r,v,t},$$

where $y_{r,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contagious county-pair (p), race (r), and time (t) level. The key dependent variables include - natural logarithm of the amount (column (1)) and number (column (2)) of mortgage originations, the natural logarithm of the amount (column (3)) and number (column (4)) of mortgage applications, and denial rate (column (5)). $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans. $Hispanic_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for non-Black and non-white Hispanics. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling and 0 otherwise. The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. $f(location_v)$ or 2D local linear polynomial refers to the local linear polynomial in two dimensions, latitude and longitude, for every census tract estimated separately on each side of the border. The data spans all census tract in bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2019. Regressions are weighted by the total tract population in 2010. Standard errors clustered at the tract level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Table D.4: Example of Black Lenders

FDIC Certificate No.	Name	City	State	Est. Date	2013 Total Assets (\$ thou.)
20856	LIBERTY BANK & TRUST CO	NEW ORLEANS	LA	11/16/1972	547,984
8033	CITIZENS TRUST BANK	ATLANTA	GA	6/18/1921	387,410
33938	CAPITOL CITY BANK & TRUST CO	ATLANTA	GA	10/3/1994	286,761
35241	SOUTH CAROLINA CMTY BANK	COLUMBIA	SC	3/26/1999	67,203
22229	COMMONWEALTH NATIONAL BANK	MOBILE	AL	2/19/1976	59,613

This table presents examples of Black lenders in southern states. Lenders are defined as Black lenders if they operate in border counties and are above the 90th percentile when sorted by the share of Black borrowers in their mortgage lending portfolio in 2008 to 2012.

Table D.5: Warmth towards Black Americans and the Shelby ruling


	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treat \times Post	-4.6808*** (1.6654)	-4.6335*** (1.7080)	-4.3129** (1.7855)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes		Yes
Age Group-Year FE		Yes	
# Obs	3250	3250	133
Within R^2	0.0017	0.0017	0.0436
Sample	Respondent	Respondent	State

This table uses the American National Election Series (ANES) data and reports coefficients β from the following specification:

$$y_{i(s)t} = \beta \cdot \text{Treat}_s \cdot \text{Post-Shelby}_t + \alpha_s + \alpha_{t(\text{age},t)} + \varepsilon_{i(s)t},$$

where subscripts i , s , age , and t indicate individual, state, individual's age, and year, respectively. Treat_s is an indicator variable that takes 1 for VRA-treated states. Post-Shelby_t is an indicator variable that takes 1 for 2016 (i.e., the survey year after the repeal of VRA). α_s and $\alpha_{t(\text{age},t)}$ represent state and year (age group-year) fixed effects. The dependent variable is the feeling thermometer measuring the level of warmth toward Black Americans on a scale ranging from 0 to 97 with a higher value indicating a higher degree of warmth. The sample comprises White male American survey respondents in the ANES survey waves of 2008, 2012 and 2016. Columns (1) and (2) use respondent-level data, and column (3) uses data averaged at the state level. All observations are weighted by survey weights. Standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Figure D.3: Geographic Distribution of Racial Animus



This figure presents the geographic distribution of the racial animus variable for our sample. The measure of anti-Black racial animus comes from [Stephens-Davidowitz \(2013\)](#). This measure is calculated at the level of the designated media market and measures the percentage of an area's Google searches that contain racially charged words.

Table D.6: Bank vs Non-Bank

	Non-Bank		Bank		All	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	LN(Amount)	LN(Number)	LN(Amount)	LN(Number)	LN(Amount)	LN(Number)
Panel A: Mortgage Application						
Black x Treat x Post	-0.0131 (0.0428)	0.0409 (0.0338)	-0.1630*** (0.0375)	-0.1103*** (0.0292)		
Black x Treat x Post x Bank					-0.1623*** (0.0552)	-0.1614*** (0.0437)
Adjusted R^2	0.8460	0.8653	0.8440	0.8635	0.8796	0.8927
# Obs	289,723	289,723	320,202	320,202	560,014	560,014
Panel B: Mortgage Origination						
Black x Treat x Post	0.0262 (0.0433)	0.0748** (0.0340)	-0.1845*** (0.0387)	-0.1235*** (0.0297)		
Black x Treat x Post x Bank					-0.2459*** (0.0587)	-0.2238*** (0.0462)
Adjusted R^2	0.8436	0.8639	0.8412	0.8626	0.8837	0.8965
# Obs	289,723	289,723	320,202	320,202	560,014	560,014
Tract x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Tract x Race FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
County Pair x Race x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
2d Local Linear Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tract x Year x Race FE					Yes	Yes
Tract x Year x Black Lender FE					Yes	Yes
Tract x Race x Black Lender FE					Yes	Yes
County Pair x Year x Race x Black Lender FE					Yes	Yes

This table reports the coefficient β from the following regression specification:

$$y_{r,l,v(v \in c(p)),t} = \beta \cdot Black_r \cdot Bank_l \cdot Treat_c \cdot Post_t + f(location_v) + \alpha_{v,r,l} + \alpha_{v,l,t} + \alpha_{v,r,t} + \alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,l,t} + \varepsilon_{r,l,v,t},$$

where $y_{r,l,v(v \in c(p)),t}$ denotes the variable of interest aggregated at the census tract (v) in county (c) lying within a contagious county-pair (p), race (r), lender type (l), and time (t) level. Bank type l is either bank or non-bank. A non-bank is defined as a mortgage lender regulated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The key-dependent variables include the natural logarithm of total amount and number of mortgage applications and originations. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term of $Black_r$, $Bank_l$, $Treat_c$, and $Post_t$. $Black_r$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for Black Americans and 0 for White Americans. $Bank_l$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for lenders not categorized as a non-bank. $Treat_c$ takes a value of 1 if the county was covered by Section 5 of the VRA, and 0 otherwise. All counties included in the sample are identified in Figure 2. $Post_t$ is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for years after the 2013 Shelby ruling and zero otherwise. The specification includes race \times census-tract ($\alpha_{r,v}$), census-tract \times year ($\alpha_{v,t}$) fixed effects, and county-pair \times race \times year ($\alpha_{c(p)(v \in c(p)),r,t}$) fixed effects. $f(location_v)$ or 2D local linear polynomial refers to the local linear polynomial in two dimensions, latitude and longitude, for every census tract estimated separately on each side of the border. The data span all census tracts in bordering counties identified in Figure 2 from 2008 until 2019. Regressions are weighted by the total tract population in 2010. Standard errors clustered at the tract level are reported in parentheses.