Divorce in Turkey: Determinants of Rising Union Instability

Abstract

This paper analyzes the determinants of rise in marriage dissolution in Turkey. Divorce rate began rising much later than advanced countries in Turkey, but it showed a notable increase during the past decades. Crude divorce rate (CDR) increased from 0.27 in 1970 to 2.1 in 2021. This increase can be attributed to significant demographic changes including increase in marriage age, lower fertility, higher education, and changing gender norms. Moreover, two legislative developments played an important role by expanding women rights: 1988 no-default divorce law and the 2001 amendments of the Turkish Civil Code. This paper identifies micro determinants of probability of divorce using five waves of Turkish Demographic and Health Surveys (1998, 2003, 2008, 2013 and 2018). In addition to commonly studied predictors of divorce (individual and union characteristics), the role of women's gender role attitudes, their tolerance of domestic violence and husbands' controlling behavior are included in the analysis. The findings provide evidence for the masculinist restoration thesis as opposed to the second demographic transition and gender revolution theories. It is argued that the increase in divorce rates can be understood in the context of rising pressures from the politics of masculinist restoration on one hand, and women's resistance to conform to the traditional gender roles on the other.

1. Introduction

The rise in divorce rates has become one the key components of demographic change in contemporary societies. Divorce began to increase in the United States in the 1950s and in most Western European countries in 1960s. There is a large body of literature on the determinants of divorce in these countries (Amato and James 2010, Lyngstad and Jalovaara 2010, Wagner and Weiβ 2006, Teachman 2010, MacDonald and Dildar 2018) as well as changing significance of these determinants over time (De Graaf and Kalmijn 2006, Härkönen and Dronkers 2006, Hogendoorn et al. 2022). However, divorce is less studied in developing countries, including Turkey.

Divorce rate began rising much later than advanced countries in Turkey, but it showed a notable increase during the past decades. Crude divorce rate (CDR) increased from 0.27 in 1970 to 2.07 in 2021 (TurkStat 2022). This increase can be attributed to significant demographic changes including increase in marriage age, lower fertility, higher education, and changing gender norms. Moreover, two legislative developments played an important role by expanding women rights: 1988 no-default divorce law and the 2001 amendments of the Turkish Civil Code (Kavas and Thorton 2013). With the 2001 amendments, marital property regime was changed. Women could claim a share of the property registered in their husband's name after divorce if the property was acquired during the marriage. Mothers also gained equal rights in terms of child custody (Arat 2010; Kavas and Gunduz-Hosgor 2010). These changes in legislation took place in a context of other socio-economic developments such as rapid urbanization, industrialization, and women's increased participation in economic life.

Crude divorce rate in Turkey is still below the OECD average (Figure 1) but showed a significant increase in the last two decades (Figure 2). The noticeable jump in CRD in 2001 is

mostly related to change in data collection method. Marriage and divorce data were started to be collected through the Central Population Administrative System (MERNIS). With the new system, the divorce data was collected more frequently and produced more accurate statistics, compliant with international standards. Figure 2 includes two data points for 2001 and 2002 with the old and new data collection method respectively and shows that the bigger portion of the jump (red) is related to improvement in the data collection method. The rest of the jump (yellow) can possibly be explained by the 2001 amendments in the Civil Code and the 2001 economic crisis. This paper focuses on the rise in divorce starting from 2000s.

[Figure 1 here]

[Figure 2 here]

The dramatic rise in divorce rates in advanced countries is usually explained by changing norms related to family life where individualistic attitudes become more prevalent because of modernization and secularization. Two theoretical frameworks have been used widely to explain the increase in marital dissolution: the second demographic transition theory and the gender revolution theory. The second demographic transition theory (SDT) focuses on ideational change from altruistic to individualistic norms to explain new patterns in family behavior such as rising cohabitation, decline in fertility and rise in divorce. The gender revolution theory, in contrast to SDT, emphasize structural change as opposed to ideational change and explains the rise in divorce with changing gender dynamics. This paper discusses the explanatory power and limitations of these theories for the Turkish case and argue that a third theoretical framework, the masculinist restoration thesis developed by Deniz Kandiyoti, might offer crucial insight to understand the divorce dynamics in Turkey.

Using five rounds of Turkish Demographic and Health Survey data (1998, 2003, 2008, 2013 and 2018), this paper estimates the micro-level predictors of divorce. In addition to typical socioeconomic determinants of divorce such as age at first marriage, education and number of children, women's gender role attitudes, their tolerance to intimate partner violence, their family background and husband's controlling behavior are included in the analysis. The impact of different individual and union characteristics on divorce probabilities are analyzed for three marriage cohorts; marriages formed before 1990, between 1990 and 2000, and after 2000. It is found that while some of these variables have consistently significant (negative) effect on divorce such as number of children or family conservatism, the importance of other variables changes in younger marriages. For example, the positive association between women's education and divorce weakens in the younger marriage cohorts. Similarly, destabilizing effect of women's progressive gender roles are weakest in the marriages after 2000. Husband's control behavior, on the other hand, becomes a stronger predictor of divorce in the younger marriage cohorts. When we look at components of control, two types of behavior particularly become more disruptive in marriages over time, limiting women's interaction with her own family and sexual jealousy. Among the gender role attitudes, rejecting pre-marital virginity norms is the strongest predictor of divorce. Considering these findings, I argue that divorce initiated by women are not driven by higher-order needs and individualization as suggested by the SDT theory, but women's need for basic human rights such as being free from phycological violence. Therefore, I argue that rising divorce rates in Turkey should be understood as women's resistance to intensifying patriarchal pressures under the politics of masculinist restoration.

This paper makes three important contributions to the literature. First, it analyzes divorce behavior using several rounds of nationally representative data which makes it possible to look at

changing importance of risk factors over different marriage cohorts. Second, it incorporates gender dynamics into the analysis and shows that patriarchal control is a significant determinant of divorce in Turkey even in younger marriages. Third, it applies the masculinist restoration thesis in an understudied area, divorce, and provides supporting evidence for the thesis.

2. Divorce in Turkey: The Second Demographic Transition, Gender Revolution or Masculinist Restoration?

The idea of a second demographic transition was developed by European demographic researchers to understand new patterns in family behavior after World War II in Western countries. The basic features of SDT includes postponement of marriage and parenthood, sustained sub-replacement fertility, and diverse living arrangements other than marriage, particularly a rise in pre-marital cohabitation (Lesthaeghe 2010; van de Kaa 1987). The key aspects of SDT and phases western countries went through during the transition is summarized in Table 1. The driving force behind this transition was argued to be ideational change—a dramatic shift from altruistic to idealistic attitudes and norms. According to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, greater economic development produces a shift in concerns about material needs (subsistence, shelter, physical and economic security) to a focus on non-material needs (freedom of expression, participation and emancipation, self-realization and autonomy, recognition). Higher-order needs drive people to avoid long-term commitments and escape from obstacles that marriage and childbearing creates for self-realization. In other words, the rise in divorce, together with other symptoms of SDT, is related to change in norms and attitudes.

[Table 1 here]

The gender revolution theory, on the other hand, emphasizes structure rather than ideas to explain family change. It is argued that most of the SDT trends are not driven by a shift to higher order needs but occurred because of a structural change in gender relations. The gender revolution is argued to have two components: a rise in women's labor force participation and increased involvement of men in unpaid house and care work (Goldsheider et al. 2015). The first half of the revolution—the dramatic rise in labor force participation of women destabilized the family because women got little relief from their household responsibilities while they took substantial economic responsibilities. They added a "second shift" (Hochschild and Machung 1989). This was a "stalled" (England 2010), "incomplete" (Esping-Andersen 2009), or "unfinished" (Gerson 2010) revolution because workplaces and men were not adjusting to accommodate women's new economic roles. The result was a decline in fertility through delayed marriage and parenthood and a rise in divorce. However, the second half of the gender revolution—men's increased involvement in the private sphere is expected to reverse the STD trends, stabilizing families with less divorce and a fertility rebound. Although not yet far advanced, there is evidence that second half of the revolution is underway with studies showing more equal gender role attitudes among young men and increased time use among married men for household tasks (Gerson 2010; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001, Hofferth et al. 2012).

I argue that these two theoretical frameworks have limited relevance to explain change in family behavior in Turkey. Two crucial elements of SDT, pre-marital cohabitation and fertility outside of marriage, are almost completely absent. Getting married is still the norm, co-habitation without marriage is highly stigmatized. Fertility has been falling and divorce has been rising but it is difficult to argue that Turkey is going through a second demographic transition. On the other hand, when we look at the female labor force participation rates, a small steady increase is

observed after 2003 (Figure 3). However, Turkey has still very low labor force participation rates in comparison to other developing countries. Indeed, there is a substantial literature analyzing the reasons behind such low levels of female labor force participation, focusing on both demand and supply-side explanations (Toksoz 2011, Toksoz 2012, Ilkkaracan 2012, Dildar 2015, Dildar 2020, Tunali et al. 2021, Gevrek and Gevrek 2022). Since Turkey did not complete the first half of the revolution yet, explaining the increase in divorce with destabilizing effect of women's employment has limitations. Moreover, time use studies show that men's participation in housework and childcare do not increase significantly in dual earner households which shows that the second half of the revolution did not even start (Memis et al. 2012).

[Figure 3 here]

As an alternative to SDT and gender revolution theories which originated from advanced country experiences, the masculinist restoration thesis offers a locally grounded explanation for increasing tension and marital discord in Turkey. Deniz Kandiyoti developed the masculinist restoration thesis to understand the changing patterns of violence against women. She argues that soaring levels of violence against women and judicial resistance to punish gendered violence are not indicative of a secure patriarchy but of a crisis in the gender order in Turkey (Kandiyoti 2016). Violence against women is normalized through judicial resistance to punish perpetrators properly with sentence reductions for good behavior or sentence reductions in cases where female disobedience and insubordination is argued to act as primary triggers.

According to Kandiyoti, policing gender norms and enforcing conservative family values constitute a key part of the AKP ideology that operates in three crucial domains; i) using gender difference in the populist discourse and pitting an authentically national us (Sunni, AKP supporters) against an 'anti-national' them (political detractors and minorities); ii) in the alliance

of neoliberal welfare and employment policies with neo-conservative familialism; ii) normalization of gender-based violence (Kandiyoti 2016). The new patterns of violence against women and impunity can no longer be explained with "patriarchy as usual" but points to an unsecure patriarchy where notions of male dominance and female subordination are no longer securely hegemonic. Only an unsecure system requires high levels of coercion and the deployment of more varied ideological state apparatuses to ensure its reproduction (Kandiyoti 2019, 2020).

Kandiyoti identifies a dissonance between women's rising aspirations and men's resistance to give up their male privileges and controlling power behind the crisis in the gender order. The politics of restoration with its top-down and street level elements aim to "tame" women to sustain the unequal gender order. The top-down politics of restoration includes government's various attempts to strengthen family by confining women to traditional care giving roles with rising pro-natalism, limited access to abortion, defining women's role primarily as motherhood, withdrawal from the Istanbul convention, and conservative fatwas of Directorate of Religious Affairs (Yazici 2012, Acar and Altinok 2013, Akkan 2018, Dildar 2022). However, the masculinist restoration is far from achieving the goal of "keeping women in their place". On the contrary, restoration attempts create an anti-patriarchal resistance with a strong feminist movement as well as women's individual struggles to escape from patriarchal control. In this paper, I argue that divorce initiated by women can be seen as part of this anti-patriarchal resistance. The increase in divorce rates can be understood in the context of rising pressures from the politics of masculinist restoration on one hand, and women's resistance to conform to the traditional roles on the other.

3. Empirical Analysis

The major data source for the regression analysis come from Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys (TDHS). Five rounds of DHS data are used to analyze the probability of divorce among ever-married women. TDHS are nationally representative surveys of households and women aged 15-49, repeated in every five years from 1998 to 2018 in Turkey. A weighted, multistage, stratified cluster sampling approach was used in the selection of the samples for all survey years.[1] I use the ever-married women samples for my analysis. There are 5,484 ever-married women in TDHS-2018; 7,219, 7,405, 8,075 and 6,152 ever-married women in 2013, 2008, 2003, and 1998 surveys respectively. Additionally, three rounds of Turkey Family Structure Surveys (2006, 2016, 2021) are used to present descriptive data about self-reported reasons for divorce.

3.1 Self-reported reasons for divorce

According to Family Structure Surveys, infidelity was the most important reason for divorce in 2006. Irresponsible and indifferent attitude became the major reason in 2016 and 2021 for both genders (Figures 4 and 5). Cheating stayed in the top five list of divorce reasons for women, but it was not a major reason for men in the recent two years. There are two major differences between men and women. Disrespectful attitudes towards elders in the family is consistently among the top five reasons of divorce for men over the three survey years. Women do not bring this up as a reason for divorce as much. Instead, beating/maltreatment is a consistent reason for divorce for women over the years.

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[1] For more detailed information about the sample designs of DHS surveys, see the Demographic and Health Survey Sampling and Household Listing Manual at
https://www.dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/DHSM4/DHS6_Sampling_Manual_Sept2012_DHSM4.pdf.

The role of extended family in couples' life has decreased over time in Turkey with nuclearization of family. The share of extended families decreased from 32% in 1968 to 12% in 2011 (Koç 2014). However, the transition from extended to nuclear family does not fit the typical Western trajectory of family change. According to Kağıtçıbaşı (1996, 2002) extended family with total interdependence is not replaced by independent nuclear family in societies with collectivistic cultures of relatedness, such as Turkey. Instead, a hybrid family form emerges where newly married couple may not physically live with in-laws but keep the emotional connection with solidarity and support networks. This type of "emotionally extended family" interferes in marriage dynamics. Particularly, the traditional power dynamics between mother-in-law and bride still persists in Turkey. It is not surprising to see "disrespectful attitudes towards elders" comes up as a major reason for divorce for men in this context. Younger generations of women are more resistant to fit in these traditional family relationships.

[Figure 4 here]

[Figure 5 here]

Another interesting change in family dynamics is about men's economic roles. For women, failing to provide for family became an important reason for divorce in 2016 and 2021. This might be due to multiple factors, including men's withdrawal from traditional male breadwinner role, worsening of economic conditions and/or an increase in women's expectations of better living standards. There is, indeed, qualitative evidence for a trend of men taking less responsibility for economic wellbeing of the family. Focusing on divorce experiences of highly educated professional women, Kavas and Gündüz-Hoşgör (2010) finds that husbands' reluctance to be involved in household financial responsibilities was the leading cause of divorce initiated by women (13 out of 31 participants). Domestic violence (8 participants), infidelity (6),

emotional estrangement (5), and irreconcilable differences in character (2) were the other major reasons for divorce. Using qualitative data from a sample of working-class women, Yıldırım (2017) shows similar findings. Husbands' failure to provide for family is one of the major causes of divorce. However, domestic violence is a more prevalent cause of divorce among poor and less educated women. According to the narratives of both groups of women (professional women in Kavas and Gündüz-Hoşgör (2010) and working-class women in Yıldırım (2017)'s sample) husbands show a similar reluctance to take up more household responsibilities when they are unemployed, and their wives are the sole providers.

3.2 Micro-level predictors of divorce

Previous research has identified several macro and micro determinants of divorce including women's increasing educational attainment and labor force participation, age at marriage, number of children, economic cycle, modernization and changing gender roles. Lower age at marriage is consistently found to be strong predictor of divorce. (Peters 1986, Heaton 1991; Teachman 2002). There is also a widely supported negative relationship between the number of children and divorce risk (Cherlin 1977, Lee 2006, Sandstrom 2011). The impact of women's education is less straightforward. Theoretically, women's education can increase divorce because it improves women's labor market chances and independence, lowering the gains from marriage (Becker 1981). On the other hand, women's education can increase marital stability by improving resources and communication between the spouses (Amato 1996). The impact of education on divorce changes with the development and modernization process of countries. Goode (1962, 1993) argues that positive association between women's education and divorce would gradually fade away with modernization as legal, social and economic barriers to divorce

become lower. Testing Goode's hypothesis for European countries, Härkönen and Dronkers (2006) find that the relationship between women's education and divorce was positive in France, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Spain and negative in Austria, Flanders, Lithuania, and the United States. Isen and Stevenson (2010) argues that there is an inverted u-pattern of divorce rates by educational attainment in the U.S. Divorce rates are the lowest among those with a college degree, the highest for those with some college, and in-between for those with a high school degree or below.

The research on the impact of women's employment on marital stability provides mixed results as well. Wife's income can destabilize the marriage through an *independence effect* or strengthen the family by increasing the quality of life through an *income effect.* Theoretically, the independence effect is expected to outweigh the income effect (England and Kilbourne 1990; Oppenheimer 1997; Ross and Sawhill 1975; Sayer and Bianchi 2000, MacDonald and Dildar 2018). The impact of changing cultural roles and their interaction with women's economic resources are also studied in the context of divorce (Sayer and Bianchi 2000, Kalmijn et al. 2004, Greenstein 1995, Furtado et al. 2013). The destabilizing effect of wife's income is found to be lower when women have more egalitarian values (Kalmijn et al. 2004, Sayer and Bianchi 2000).

The empirical literature on the determinants of divorce in Turkey is sparse. There are few studies using nationally representative surveys. Using TDHS-2008, Yüksel-Kaptanoğlu et al. (2012) finds that the risk of divorce is higher among childless or single-child women, women who marry older, women who spent their childhood in relatively developed regions, women who had arranged marriages, and women whose mother tongue is Turkish as opposed to Kurdish or Arabic. Caarls and de Valk (2018) analyze regional variation in divorce using two rounds of

Demographic and Health Surveys (2003 and 2008). In terms of micro-level risk factors, they find that women's education increases the risk of divorce while having children lowers the risk. Marriages where husband is older are more stable according to their analysis. Unlike Yüksel-Kaptanoğlu et al. (2012), they find that arranged marriages are more stable. Using descriptive data from 2006 and 2011 rounds of Family Structure Survey, Çavlin (2014) also shows that divorce is more common among educated women. Marital duration is negatively related to divorce and number of children is the main mediating factor in this relationship. As number of children increases with the duration of marriage, divorce becomes more difficult. Aytac and Rankin (2009) test the family stress model in Turkey and find that households experiencing greater economic hardship have more marital problems. Unlike previous studies conducted for developed countries, the impact of economic stress has a direct impact on marital stability instead of an indirect effect mediated by emotional stress. They argue that this could be due to more traditional gender ideology where economic hardship can be interpreted as husband's failure to perform the breadwinner role.

In this paper, I analyze the micro-level determinants of divorce using five rounds of nationally representative DHS data. Besides the typical individual co-variates, I include gender role attitudes, family conservatism, and women's attitudes towards domestic violence into the model. Additionally, the latest three rounds of DHS surveys (2008, 2013, 2018) allow me to include a key variable, husband's controlling behavior, into the analysis as a measure of intensifying patriarchal pressures and conflict potential in the marriage.

3.2.1 Method

The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the current marital status of the respondent is divorced or separated. In other words, the term "divorce" includes women who are legally divorced and those who are separated from their husbands but have not implemented formal divorce proceedings yet. I only focus on first marriages because second and higher order marriages can have different dynamics. The probability of divorce is estimated using logistic regression analysis. The model takes the following form:

$Pr(y=1) = \exp(\alpha + \beta x_i + \delta d_i)/(1+\exp(\alpha + \beta x_i + \delta d_i))$; where i indicates observation, y = 1 if the outcome occurs—here, if women is divorced—x is a vector of continuous variables, and δ is a vector of dichotomous variables. I interpret the results of the model in terms of the changes in the odds. The odds ratios indicate that for a unit change in x_i, the probability is expected to change by β_i, holding all the other independent variables constant.

First, I estimate the following model for five survey years separately (1998, 2003, 2008, 2013 and 2018). Then, I pooled the latest three rounds of data and include husband's controlling behavior in the analysis. I used the pooled data to estimate the same model for three different marriage cohorts—marriages formed before 1990, between 1990 and 2000, and after 2000.

$$Divorce_i^* = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Gender\ role\ attitudes_i + \beta_3 husband's\ control\ behaviour_i +$$

$$+\beta_4 Disaaproval\ of\ violence_i + \beta_5 Family\ conservatism_i + \beta_6 Region\ dummies + \varepsilon_i$$

$$(1)$$

The link between the observed binary $Divorce_i$ and the latent $Divorce_i^*$ is made with a simple measurement equation (Long and Freese 2006):

$$Divorce_i = \begin{cases} = 1\ if\ Divorce_i^* > 0 \\ = 0\ if\ Divorce_i^* = 0 \end{cases}$$

X_i is a vector of individual and household characteristics including respondents' age at first marriage, number of children, education, employment status, mother tongue, her mothers' education, household wealth quintile, husband's schooling, marriage decision and urban dummy, and ε_i is an error term.

Gender dynamics are incorporated into the analysis with four additional variables. *Gender role attitudes* is formed using the opinion questions in the survey. It is an index constructed by taking the average of the z-scores of eight dummy variables each of which equals to one if the respondent expressed a progressive opinion. The respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with statements such as "men should also do the housework" or "women should be virgins when they get married". Table B1 in Appendix B shows the opinion questions used in this index for different rounds of TDHS surveys.

Disapproval of IPV is another index variable created by taking the average of the z-scores of four dummy variables each of which equals to one if the respondent disapproved a husband's performance of physical violence to his wife under the situations of wife: i) burning food; ii) neglecting children; iii) refusing sex; iv) arguing with the husband. *Family conservatism* gives information about women's family background. It is an index variable constructed by taking the average of the z-scores of the following dummy variables: i) if there is a blood relationship between woman's mother and father, ii) if there is a blood relationship between her and her husband, iii) if she has attended a Quran course during her childhood and iv) if brides' money was paid before her marriage. Finally, *husband's controlling behavior* is created by taking the average of the z-scores of five dummy variables which equal to one if respondent experienced the following controlling behaviors in their relationship with their (current or last) husband; i) prevent her from seeing her female friends, ii) limit her contact with her family, iii) insist on

knowing where she is at all times, iv) distrust her with money, and v) accuse her of being unfaithful. Descriptions of all variables used in the regression analysis can be found in the Appendix A.

3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 shows the marital status of ever-married women at the time of each survey. Divorce rate reported in the table is calculated as the percentage of ever-married women who are divorced or separated. Divorce rate shows a notable increase from 1.7% in 1998 to 7.3% in 2018. Table 3 presents the demographic profile of the divorced women in each survey year. One striking feature of the divorced women is that they are very young. They marry at a young age and most of them are still below the age of 30 at the time of divorce. The relationship between divorce and education is not linear in all survey years. Primary school graduates have the highest percentages of divorce in 1998 and 2003. Divorce rates of secondary and higher school graduates increase in 2013 and 2018. There is a clear rural-urban divide as expected, divorce is more common in urban areas. There is also significant regional variation where better developed western regions have much higher divorce rates than eastern regions. Couple initiated marriages have lower risk of divorce as opposed to arranged marriages in the later years. It is understandable why this is not case in 1998 and 2003. When divorce is less prevalent and more stigmatized, women who went through arranged marriages would not have the courage to end their marriages.

[Table 2 here]

[Table 3 here]

The latest three years of surveys also included a question about who took the decision to end the marriage. More than fifty percent of the divorces were initiated by women in all three years. When we look at divorce decision according to education and urbanization, women's power to

take the decision alone is not higher in urban areas and does not increase with education (Table

5). In fact, "no education" category has the highest divorces initiated by women in 2013. This is

an unexpected finding but shows that women choose to exit marriages even if there are no job

opportunities outside or they do not have the education to support themselves.

[Table 4 here]

3.2.3 Regression Results

Table 5 presents the odds ratios from the logistics regression analysis for separate survey years.[2]

As age at first marriage increases, divorce risk goes down. Children also has the expected effect

or lowering divorce probability. A woman with three or more children has 80% lower probability

of getting divorce in 2018. Current employment is positively associated with divorce, but it is

difficult to make any causal claim. This is one of the major limitations of the data, it does not

have information about the employment status of women at the time of divorce. It is not possible

to test independence or income effects of women's earnings on marital stability. Women's

education does not always increase the divorce risk according to these results, but higher

education increases the odds of getting divorce significantly in 1998, 2003 and 2013. Taking the

marriage decision as a couple lowers the probability of divorce as expected (except from 1998).

Having Kurdish as mother tongue decreases the probability of divorce about 40% in the recent

survey years. Mother's education is a good proxy for women's socioeconomic background and

class position. Having a mother with higher education is a privilege for the older cohorts of

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[2] 1998 TDHS did not have two variables used in other regressions, household wealth quintile and respondent's
mother's education. Husband's controlling behavior was only available for the latest three years. The dummy
variables used in the gender role attitudes index change slightly for different survey years (see Table B1 in
Appendix B for the available dimensions in each year). I choose to use all the available information in each year,
therefore gender role attitudes index used in Table 5 is not uniform across the years.

women in the samples. It increases the probability of divorce significantly in 2003 and 2008. Husband's schooling lowers the risk of divorce in each year. Residence in urban areas increases the odds of divorce, about three times in the latest survey year. There is significant geographical variation. For example, living is Istanbul increases the odds of divorce about seven times in comparison to living in Southeast Anatolia in 2013.

[Table 5 here]

Family conservatism is a strong predictor of divorce. Women with conservative families have much lower probability of divorce. For example, in 2018 one standard deviation increase in family conservatism index lowers the odds of divorce by 32%. *Disapproval of IPV* is not a significant determinant of divorce risk. *Gender role attitude index* is positively correlated with divorce, but it is not significant in 2018. In 2013, a standard deviation increase in gender role attitude index increases the odds of divorce by 35%. *Husband's controlling behavior* has the strongest impact on divorce, one standard deviation increase in the index increases the odds of divorce by 75% in 2018. These two variables, gender role attitudes and husband's controlling behavior, give crucial information about change in gender norms and power dynamics inside the marriages. While the impact of women's progressive attitudes is decreasing over time, husband's control behavior stays as a strong predictor of divorce in the latest round of the surveys. Therefore, I focus on these two variables in the rest of the paper and analyze the changing importance of them in different marriage cohorts.

Table 6 presents odds ratios from the pooled regressions for all marriages as well as marriages formed in three different periods: before 1990, between 1990 and 2000, and after 2000. Having a secondary or higher education degree was much more important in early marriage cohorts than the later. Even higher education is not a significant predictor of divorce in marriages formed after

2000. Living in urban areas was also more strongly correlated with divorce in older marriages. Husband's schooling and family conservatism are consistently important correlates of divorce across different marriage cohorts. Regional disparities also did not lose their significance over time, living in the western parts of the country is still strongly correlated with divorce in the youngest marriage cohort. Progressive gender role attitudes became less significant predicting divorce over time. Husband's controlling behavior, on the other hand, has the largest impact on divorce in the marriages formed after 2000. What explains these unexpected results? Are men becoming more controlling or women becoming less tolerant to patriarchal control in younger generations?

[Table 6 here]

A detailed analysis of the components of these two indices, gender role attitudes and husband's control behavior, reveal some interesting information. Table 7 presents the regression results from the same model used in Table 6 but include the components of these two indices as separate dummy variables. The single most important dimension of the attitudes index driving the previous results is related to women's sexuality. Divorce is about three times more likely for women who are against the sexual double standards and think that women do not have to be virgins before the marriage. The importance of this variable increases in younger marriage cohorts. When we look at the attitudes that might be associated with the gender revolution, opinions about women's work outside the home (first component of the revolution) and men's contribution to the household responsibilities (second component), they do not have the expected impact. For example, women's expectations of more equal division of labor does not increase the divorce risk. About the components of control, two dimensions of control becomes stronger predictors of divorce in the younger marriage cohorts; "limit contract with her family" and

"accuse her of unfaithfulness". When we look at the frequency of control behavior in different marriage cohorts, mean values do not increase significantly (Table B2 in Appendix B). In other words, younger men are not necessarily more controlling. However, this kind of behavior is less acceptable for younger women. The importance of controlling women's interactions with their own family reveals another double standard in the culture if we remember "disrespectful attitudes towards elders in the family" was an important self-reported reason of divorce for men. Men want to continue the tradition of emotionally extended family but only with their side of family. The destabilizing effect of sexual control variable should be thought together with women's increasing disapproval of pre-marital virginity norms in the attitude index. These results show that more traditional aspects of patriarchal culture and women's resistance to them are shaping the divorce dynamics.

[Table 7 here]

4. Conclusion

Divorce rate showed a notable increase in Turkey in the last two decades. This paper analyzes the micro-level predictors of divorce using five rounds of Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys. Besides the well-studied socioeconomic determinants of marital dissolution, the paper incorporates gender dynamics into the analysis with additional variables such as gender-role attitudes, acceptance of domestic violence, family conservatism and husband's control behavior. The regression analysis confirms previous findings from divorce literature about the inverse relationship between divorce and age at first marriage and number of children. There is a positive association between women's education and divorce, but this relationship weakens in younger marriage cohorts. Regional variation in divorce did not diminish over time, living in the western

parts of the country is still a strong predictor of divorce in the youngest marriage cohort (marriages formed after 2000). Family conservatism has negative significant impact on divorce in each survey year from 1998 to 2018 and in all marriage cohorts. Progressive gender role attitudes are positively associated with divorce, but the significance of this variable diminishes in younger marriage cohorts. The attitude most strongly correlated with divorce is about pre-marital virginity norms for women. Divorce is more likely for women who reject sexual double standards. Husband's controlling behavior has a strong positive association with divorce and this relationship becomes stronger in younger marriage cohorts. Two types of control behavior particularly become more important for younger marriages: sexual control and limiting women's relationship with her own family.

In this paper, I argue that the second demographic transition and gender revolution theories have limited explanation power for divorce in Turkey. Two significant elements of SDT, premarital cohabitation and childbearing, is completely missing. Divorce initiated by women is not driven by higher-order needs but the need for basic liberties such as physical mobility or being free from psychological violence in the form of controlling behavior. The gender revolution theory has also limited relevance because revolution is largely missing. Female labor force participation trends do not show a drastic increase that would be expected to destabilize marriages. Moreover, according to the regression results, the most important attitudinal change increasing divorce risk is related to women's sexual liberation, not women's employment or men's housework (two components of gender revolution). Husband's controlling behavior, on the other hand, is strongly associated with divorce risk. Women's resistance to traditional patriarchal control increases in later marriage cohorts and destabilizes family. These results support the masculinist restoration thesis which argues that gender relations in Turkey are shaped by restoration attempts with top-

town and street level elements on one hand, and women's resistance to conforming to traditional gender roles on the other. Increasing divorce rates is one manifestation of an unfulfilled restoration agenda, soaring levels of violence against women (not analyzed in this paper) is another.

This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing change in family behavior over the last twenty years in Turkey. It shows that increasing divorce rates is one of the consequences of a crisis in the gender order where women no longer succumb to patriarchal control. It offers a locally grounded explanation, the masculinist restoration thesis, to understand the divorce dynamics in Turkey as opposed to alternative frameworks used in advanced countries.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Key aspects of the SDT in Western countries

Basic features of the SDT (van de Kaa 1987)	Phases of the SDT (Lesthaeghe 1996)
- The weaking of marriage as the only type of family structure - High divorce rates - A rise in cohabitation - Sub-replacement fertility	- Phase I (1955-1970) increasing divorce, fertility decline, contraceptive revolution - Phase II (1970-1985) rise in premarital cohabitation, rise in non-marital fertility - Phase III (1985-onward) divorce rates plateau, decline in remarriage, recuperation of 30+fertility

Source: Authors' re-interpretation of Table 1 in Zaidi and Morgan (2017)

Table 2: Women's marital status at the time of survey and divorce rate (ever-married sample)

	1998		2003		2008		2013		2018	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Married	5,893	95.8	7,686	95.2	7,042	95.1	6,835	94.7	5,156	94
Widowed	153	2.5	181	2.2	146	2	120	1.7	89	1.6
Divorced	77	1.3	134	1.7	156	2.1	194	2.7	192	3.5
Living separate	29	0.5	74	0.9	61	0.8	70	1	47	0.9
Total	6,152	100	8,075	100	7,405	100	7,219	100	5,484	100
Divorce rate*	1.72%		4.78%		4.81%		6.07%		7.33%	

*Divorce rate =percentage of ever-married women who divorced or separated from their first marriage.Source: Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013 and 2018.

Table 3: Demographic profile of divorced women (%)

	1998	**2003**	**2008**	**2013**	**2018**
Current Age					
15-19	0.9	0.3	1.1	1.1	1.0
20-29	16	24.9	22.8	17.8	12.7
30-39	42.5	44	39.6	45.0	43.0
40-49	40.6	30.8	36.5	36.1	43.3
Age at First Marriage					
<20	75.5	61.7	32	53.9	52.2
20-24	20.8	30.1	33.2	31.3	31.6
25-29	2.8	6.7	17.4	11.6	12.7
>30	0.9	1.5	17.4	3.2	3.5
Age at Divorce					
15-19		16.6	13	8.2	8.2
20-29		52.3	52.3	50.9	47
30-39		22.5	26.1	32.2	31.1
40-49		8.6	8.7	8.9	13.7
Education					
No education	25.5	13.2	18.5	5.0	8.0
Primary	62.3	52.1	44.1	45.2	33.6
Secondary	7.6	24.9	12.4	34.7	40.1
High school/higher	4.7	9.8	25.0	15.1	19.9
Number of children					
0	13.2	16.6	19.7	17.6	15.7
1	19.8	29.8	25.8	29.7	31.8
2	30.2	25.1	30.1	29.7	28.4
3+	36.8	28.5	24.4	23.1	24.1
Work status					
Employed	43.4	35.5	37.6	42.5	41.3
Not employed	56.6	64.5	62.4	57.5	58.7
Household wealth					
Quintile 1		15.3	17.1	15.5	15.9
Quintile 2		21.2	19.4	23.3	19.9
Quintile 3		24.4	24.4	23.1	22.4
Quintile 4		19.4	20.2	16.2	19.4
Quintile 5		19.7	18.8	21.9	22.4
Residence					
Rural	34	18.9	21.4	19.2	15.2
Urban	66	81.1	78.7	80.8	84.8
Marriage period					
Before 1980	62.3	25.7	5.3	1.3	0.0
[1980-1990]	31.1	36.3	22.2	19.6	11.2
[1991-2000]	6.6	35.5	34.8	34.4	38.1

After 2001	0	2.6	37.6	44.7	50.8
Marriage decision					
Couple	56.6	65	35.1	39.7	49.5
Families/Other	43.4	35	64.9	60.3	50.5
Divorce decision					
Herself			53.9	54.6	52.9
Husband			13.6	16.6	10.2
Both			29.3	25.8	33.5
Other			3.2	3.0	3.5
Region					
Istanbul	13.2	15.5	9	12.8	12.2
West Marmara	4.7	6.7	7.6	7.8	13.4
Aegean	13.2	12.2	11	11.4	11.2
East Marmara	12.3	8	11.2	7.3	9.5
West Anatolia	8.5	7.3	9	10.3	7
Mediterranean	13.2	14.5	12.9	16.2	12.2
Central Anatolia	8.5	8.3	5.9	9.4	8.5
West Black Sea	11.3	8.3	10.4	8.7	8.5
East Black Sea	3.8	4.4	3.1	6.6	4
Northeast Anatolia	1.9	3.6	3.7	3	4.2
Central East Anatolia	0	3.1	5.3	3.9	3.5
Southeast Anatolia	3.8	8	11	2.7	6
Number of dissolutions	106	386	356	438	402

Source: Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, 2018

Table 4: Who decided to end marriage (%)

	Herself			Her husband			Together		
	2008	**2013**	**2018**	**2008**	**2013**	**2018**	**2008**	**2013**	**2018**
Rural	53.4	45	59	19.2	25.3	8.2	23.3	21.3	27.9
Urban	54	56.8	51.8	12.1	14.4	10.5	30.9	26.8	34.5
No education	48.4	68.2	53.1	25	18.2	15.6	23.4	13.6	21.9
Primary	55.8	51.8	54.1	12.3	20.5	14.1	26.6	22.1	27.4
Secondary	51.2	53.4	55.8	13.9	13.5	8.6	34.9	31.8	35
Higher	56	61.3	43.8	7.1	11.3	4.1	35.7	27.4	46.6

Source: Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys 2008, 2013, 2018

Table 5: Determinants of divorce risk, 1998-2018

Odds ratios	1998	2003	2008	2013	2018
Age at marriage	0.791***	0.893***	1.155***	0.914***	0.943***
	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Children-one	0.79	0.784	0.675**	0.749*	0.714*
	(0.291)	(0.136)	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.139)
Children-two	0.652	0.352***	0.617**	0.361***	0.292***
	(0.224)	(0.064)	(0.116)	(0.066)	(0.060)
Children-three or more	0.402***	0.301***	0.496***	0.294***	0.202***
	(0.142)	(0.056)	(0.102)	(0.060)	(0.045)
Primary education	0.651	1.019	0.773	1.555*	0.76
	(0.189)	(0.195)	(0.15)	(0.416)	(0.192)
Secondary education	0.362**	1.517*	1.541*	1.429	0.852
	(0.178)	(0.365)	(0.403)	(0.419)	(0.233)
Higher education	3.102*	2.900***	1.089	1.841*	0.857
	(2.098)	(0.985)	(0.298)	(0.658)	(0.29)
Current employment	1.326	1.680***	1.343**	1.493***	1.813***
	(0.307)	(0.202)	(0.177)	(0.176)	(0.229)
Urban	1.346	1.692***	1.101	1.329*	2.815***
	(0.339)	(0.257)	(0.19)	(0.211)	(0.522)
Marriage decision	3.464***	0.633***	0.545***	0.554***	0.577***
	(0.769)	(0.0817)	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.080)
Mother tongue-Kurdish	0.258**	0.397***	0.604**	0.667*	0.610**
	(0.157)	(0.095)	(0.151)	(0.155)	(0.145)
Mother tongue-Other	0.424	1.056	0.719	0.953	1.104
	(0.321)	(0.306)	(0.255)	(0.317)	(0.3)
Husband's schooling	0.802***	0.934***	0.916***	0.914***	0.952**
	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Gender role attitudes	0.924	1.350***	1.645***	1.737***	1.032
	(0.156)	(0.132)	(0.236)	(0.214)	(0.145)
Disapproval of IPV	0.839	1.015	1.023	1.057	1.005
	(0.137)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.097)
Family conservatism	0.353***	0.784**	0.722**	0.714***	0.458***
	(0.077)	(0.086)	(0.099)	(0.092)	(0.066)
Husband's control behavior			2.552***	2.624***	2.426***
			(0.162)	(0.155)	(0.153)
Wealth quintile 2		0.945	0.853	1.001	0.988
		(0.178)	(0.181)	(0.194)	(0.21)
Wealth quintile 3		0.82	0.948	0.955	0.848
		(0.158)	(0.215)	(0.198)	(0.193)
Wealth quintile 4		0.564***	0.774	0.756	0.692
		(0.117)	(0.194)	(0.175)	(0.172)
Wealth quintile 5		0.477***	0.667	1.004	0.752
		(0.111)	(0.193)	(0.249)	(0.202)
Mother-primary		0.715**	1.035	0.987	1.126
		(0.108)	(0.157)	(0.129)	(0.161)
Mother-secondary		1.372	2.568***	0.475*	1.082
		(0.469)	(0.924)	(0.2)	(0.341)

Mother-higher		1.755*	3.153***	1.508	1.452
		(0.552)	(1.017)	(0.418)	(0.4)
Istanbul	1.023	1.339	0.913	6.982***	1.783*
	(0.566)	(0.345)	(0.271)	(2.716)	(0.547)
West Marmara	0.641	2.090**	1.032	4.841***	1.908**
	(0.432)	(0.637)	(0.319)	(1.987)	(0.588)
Aegean	0.806	2.457***	1.324	5.873***	2.034**
	(0.451)	(0.676)	(0.374)	(2.317)	(0.633)
East Marmara	1.616	1.744*	1.1	5.544***	1.511
	(0.905)	(0.509)	(0.309)	(2.266)	(0.48)
West Anatolia	0.993	1.844**	1.007	6.412***	1.357
	(0.597)	(0.545)	(0.296)	(2.543)	(0.456)
Mediterranean	0.623	1.451	0.735	5.687***	1.35
	(0.346)	(0.368)	(0.194)	(2.141)	(0.401)
Central Anatolia	1.321	1.811**	0.772	5.759***	1.836*
	(0.792)	(0.522)	(0.245)	(2.283)	(0.591)
West Black Sea	0.943	1.678*	0.835	5.341***	1.367
	(0.536)	(0.482)	(0.24)	(2.136)	(0.449)
East Black Sea	0.412	1.1	0.431**	3.871***	0.918
	(0.286)	(0.374)	(0.167)	(1.591)	(0.349)
Northeast Anatolia	0.539	0.994	0.400***	2.150*	1.046
	(0.473)	(0.338)	(0.139)	(0.987)	(0.406)
Central East Anatolia	0.539	0.821	0.584*	2.826**	0.827
	(0.473)	(0.288)	(0.19)	(1.251)	(0.323)
Observations	5,694	8,005	7,348	7,152	5,372
Pseudo R2	0.1776	0.092	0.1879	0.1838	0.1785

Notes: Odds ratios are reported. Estimation is performed using STATA 15.0.

* p<0.1.

** p<0.05.

*** p<0.01.

Table 6: Divorce risk in different marriage cohorts (Pooled data from 2008, 2013 and 2018)

Odds ratios	All marriages	Before 1990	1990-2000	After 2000
Age at marriage	1.022***	0.893***	1.017	1.065***
	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Children-one	0.720***	0.994	0.454***	0.672***
	(0.074)	(0.473)	(0.097)	(0.088)
Children-two	0.428***	0.358**	0.177***	0.389***
	(0.045)	(0.158)	(0.036)	(0.060)
Children-three or more	0.348***	0.245***	0.111***	0.487***
	(0.040)	(0.105)	(0.024)	(0.093)
Primary education	0.98	1.642**	1.061	0.743
	(0.123)	(0.4)	(0.232)	(0.168)
Secondary education	1.254	5.415***	2.140***	0.844
	(0.178)	(1.812)	(0.535)	(0.201)
Higher education	1.196	6.278***	1.916**	0.705
	(0.206)	(2.635)	(0.55)	(0.198)
Current employment	1.553***	1.417**	1.403***	1.650***
	(0.109)	(0.241)	(0.153)	(0.191)
Urban	1.581***	2.358***	1.432**	1.389**
	(0.152)	(0.557)	(0.216)	(0.215)
Marriage decision	0.653***	0.669**	0.588***	0.728***
	(0.044)	(0.111)	(0.063)	(0.076)
Mother tongue-Kurdish	0.654***	1.043	0.788	0.469***
	(0.088)	(0.334)	(0.181)	(0.101)
Mother tongue-Other	1.062	1.169	0.93	1.036
	(0.184)	(0.555)	(0.294)	(0.253)
Mother's education-primary	1.065	1.004	1.272*	1.154
	(0.085)	(0.224)	(0.156)	(0.146)
Mother's education-secondary	1.049	2.208	1.21	1.247
	(0.21)	(1.338)	(0.452)	(0.336)
Mother's education-higher	1.740***	7.841***	2.480***	1.918***
	(0.284)	(4.911)	(0.702)	(0.436)
Family conservatism index	0.621***	0.559***	0.698***	0.670***
	(0.048)	(0.098)	(0.086)	(0.082)
IPV disapproval index	1.002	1.19	0.972	0.931
	(0.056)	(0.151)	(0.082)	(0.086)
Gender role attitudes index	1.412***	1.529**	1.394***	1.235*
	(0.106)	(0.262)	(0.175)	(0.146)
Husband's schooling	0.914***	0.893***	0.949***	0.898***
	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Husband's control behavior	2.506***	2.571***	2.422***	2.754***
	(0.086)	(0.209)	(0.131)	(0.156)
Istanbul	1.991***	1.996*	1.700*	2.142***
	(0.341)	(0.831)	(0.486)	(0.562)
West Marmara	1.975***	1.43	1.336	2.300***
	(0.352)	(0.638)	(0.396)	(0.634)
Aegean	2.243***	1.892	1.877**	2.259***
	(0.385)	(0.787)	(0.533)	(0.609)

East Marmara	1.874***	1.444	1.401	2.502***
	(0.331)	(0.639)	(0.42)	(0.665)
West Anatolia	1.817***	1.709	1.743*	1.828**
	(0.324)	(0.77)	(0.508)	(0.511)
Mediterranean	1.604***	1.351	1.487	1.495
	(0.258)	(0.521)	(0.398)	(0.374)
Central Anatolia	1.807***	1.662	1.698*	2.067***
	(0.323)	(0.732)	(0.503)	(0.567)
West Black Sea	1.635***	3.113***	1.084	1.388
	(0.29)	(1.238)	(0.326)	(0.401)
East Black Sea	1.065	1.367	0.806	1.142
	(0.215)	(0.642)	(0.276)	(0.354)
Northeast Anatolia	0.835	0.204**	0.769	1.149
	(0.178)	(0.159)	(0.264)	(0.354)
Central East Anatolia	0.993	1.107	0.788	1.051
	(0.205)	(0.491)	(0.287)	(0.33)
Observations	19,872	4,025	7,297	8,550
Pseudo R2	0.1496	0.211	0.189	0.1623

Notes: Odds ratios are reported. Estimation is performed using STATA 15.0.

* p<0.1.

** p<0.05.

*** p<0.01

Table 7: Divorce risk in different marriage cohorts with components of husbands' control and women's gender role attitudes

| Odds ratios	All marriages	Before 1990	1990-2000	After 2000
Women's gender role attitudes				
Men take important decisions (D)	1.217	1.314	1.455*	1.018
	(0.154)	(0.343)	(0.323)	(0.208)
Men should do housework (A)	0.773***	0.998	0.738**	0.680***
	(0.058)	(0.199)	(0.088)	(0.081)
Women should not work outside (D)	0.901	0.548***	0.858	0.973
	(0.071)	(0.108)	(0.11)	(0.122)
More women should be in politics (A)	1.071	1.166	0.769*	1.203
	(0.101)	(0.292)	(0.113)	(0.182)
It is better to educate a son (D)	1.207	1.414	1.590**	0.871
	(0.163)	(0.404)	(0.371)	(0.186)
Women should be virgins (D)	2.502***	2.594***	2.605***	2.697***
	(0.194)	(0.537)	(0.321)	(0.331)
Husband's control behavior				
Prevent seeing female friends	2.798***	3.503***	2.795***	2.379***
	(0.416)	(1.232)	(0.733)	(0.548)
Limit contract with her family	4.230***	3.275***	3.939***	6.054***
	(0.636)	(1.213)	(1.012)	(1.436)
Insist on knowing where she is	1.362***	1.119	1.573***	1.429***
	(0.115)	(0.244)	(0.21)	(0.19)
Distrust her with money	2.041***	4.397***	2.045***	1.248
	(0.317)	(1.471)	(0.507)	(0.351)
Accuse her of unfaithfulness	2.722***	0.845	2.539***	4.854***
	(0.491)	(0.42)	(0.771)	(1.319)
Observations	17,134	3,448	6,339	7,347
Pseudo R2	0.1754	0.2208	0.2181	0.1944

Notes: Odds ratios are reported. Estimation is performed using STATA 15.0. All other control variables in Table 6 are also included in these estimations but not reported in Table 7.
* $p<0.1$.
** $p<0.05$.
*** $p<0.01$

Figure 1: Crude Divorce Rate, OECD

Source: OECD Marriage and Divorce Statistics
Notes: Divorces per 1000 people. For Spain, 1985 crude divorce rate was used instead of 1970 since data was not available from 1970.

Figure 2: Crude Divorce Rate in Turkey, 1990-2021

Source: Author calculations based on Turkstat 2001-2021; SIS 1990-2002

Figure 3: Women's labor force participation, 1988-2021

female labor force participation rate (%)

Figure 4: Top five reasons of divorce for men, 2006, 2016 and 2021

Men

2021
- Disrestpecful attitudes towards elders in the… 3.6
- Cheating 8.2
- Being unable to financially provide for the family 9.7
- Elders in family interference in family matters 11
- Irresponsible and indifferent attitude 41.2

2016
- Abondening/being abondened 12.2
- Being unable to financially provide for the family 17.8
- Disrestpecful attitudes towards elders in the… 24
- In-law interference in family matters 24.5
- Irresponsible and indifferent attitude 40.2

2006
- Alcoholism and gambling 2.9
- Being cheated 4.9
- Disrestpecful attitudes towards elders in the… 15.5
- Irresponsible and indifferent attitude 16.5
- Cheating 29.1

Source: Turkey Family Structure Surveys, 2006, 2016 and 2021

Figure 5: Top five reasons of divorce for women, 2006, 2016 and 2021

Women

2021
- Alcoholism: 8.7
- Being unable to financially provide for the family: 9.9
- Beating/maltreatment: 14.6
- Cheating: 19.3
- Irresponsible and indifferent attitude: 24.2

2016
- Disrestpecful attitudes towards elders in the family: 24.6
- Cheating: 32.2
- Beating/maltreatment: 36.4
- Being unable to financially provide for the family: 42.6
- Irresponsible and indifferent attitude: 61.5

2006
- Alcoholism and gambling: 11.3
- Being cheated: 11.3
- Beating/maltreatment: 17.4
- Irresponsible and indifferent attitude: 18.9
- Cheating: 21.1

Source: Turkey Family Structure Surveys, 2006, 2016 and 2021

Appendix A
List of Variables

Dependent Variable

Divorce: A dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is divorced from her first marriage.

Independent Variables

- *Age at marriage*: The age of the respondent at the time of her first marriage.

- *Number of children:* A dummy variable that categorizes number of living children in four groups; i) no child (reference group), ii) one child, iii) two children, iv) three or more children

- *Education*: A dummy variable that categorizes education in four groups; i) no education (reference group), ii) primary education, iii) secondary education, iv) high school and higher education.

- *Employment status:* A dummy variable equal to one if respondent is currently employed.

- *Urban:* A dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives in an urban area.

- *Marriage decision:* A dummy variable equal to one if the respondent decided on marriage together with her husband, instead of being decided by her or his family.

- *Mother tongue:* A dummy variable that categorizes respondents' mother tongue in three groups; i) Turkish (reference group), ii) Kurdish, iii) Other (Arabic and other).

- *Mother's education*: A dummy variable that categorizes respondent's mother's education in four groups; i) no education (reference group), ii) primary education, iii) secondary education, iv) high school and higher education.

- *Husband's schooling:* Respondent's husband's (current or past) years of schooling.

- *Wealth quintile:* A dummy variable that categorizes household wealth in five wealth quintiles. The wealth quintiles are constructed using the Filmer-Pritchett asset index in the DHS surveys. The asset index was already constructed in the raw TDHS dataset using

the durable goods in the household and some other characteristics of the household. Wealth Quintile 1 (reference group) is the poorest and Wealth Quintile 5 is the richest.

- *Region:* 12 dummy variables for main geographical regions in Turkey (Southeast Anatolia is the reference region)

- *Gender role attitudes:* an index constructed by taking the average of the z-scores of six dummy variables each of which equals to one if the respondent gave a progressive answer to the opinion questions listed below:

    o Men should also do the housework like cooking, washing, ironing, and cleaning
    o A married woman should not work outside the home
    o Men are usually wiser than women
    o A woman should not argue with her husband
    o Women should be more involved in politics
    o The important decisions in the family should be made only by men of the family
    o Women should be virgins when they get married
    o It is better to educate a son than a daughter

- *Disapproval of domestic violence:* an index constructed by taking the average of the z-scores of four dummy variables each of which equals to one if the respondent disapproved a husband's performance of physical violence to his wife under the situations of wife
    o burning food
    o neglecting children
    o refusing sex
    o arguing with the husband

- *Husband's controlling behavior:* an index constructed by taking the average of the z-scores of five dummy variables which equal to one if respondent experienced the following controlling behaviors in their relationship with their (last) husband
    o Prevent her from seeing her female friends
    o Limit her contact with her family
    o Insist on knowing where she is at all times
    o Distrust her with money
    o Accuse her of being unfaithful

- *Family conservatism:* an index constructed by taking the average of the z-scores of the following dummy variables:
    o If there is a blood relationship between woman's mother and father.
    o If there is a blood relationship between her and her husband.
    o If she has attended a Quran course during her childhood.
    o If brides' money was paid before her marriage

Appendix B

Table B1: Women's gender role attitudes (ever-married sample)

	1998	2003	2008	2013	2018
Men are usually wiser than women *(Disagree)*	66.3	76.2	82.2		
A woman should not argue with her husband *(Disagree)*	51.4	55.7	55.4		
It is better to educate a son than a daughter *(Disagree)*	76.4	82.9	87.2	88.4	91.4
The important decisions in the family should be made by men *(D)*	60.1	68.1	79.8	86	86.9
Men should also do the housework *(Agree)*			64.7	70.9	67.3
A married woman should not work outside the home* *(Disagree)*			90.3	45.2	54.8
Women should be more involved in politics *(Agree)*			77.5	82.8	79.2
Women should be virgins when they get married *(Disagree)*			15.2	19.8	28.9

*This question was asked in different ways in the surveys. In 2008 TDHS: A married women should work outside the home if she wants to (Agree, %). In 2013 and 2018 TDHS: Women should not work, if they have small children (Disagree, %).
Source: TDHS 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, 2018

Table B2: Women's gender role attitudes and husband's controlling behavior in different marriage cohorts

	Before 1990		1990-2000		After 2000	
	mean	std	mean	std	mean	std
Women's gender role attitudes						
The important decisions in the family should be made by men (D)	0.78	0.42	0.85	0.36	0.87	0.34
Men should also do the housework (A)	0.66	0.47	0.69	0.46	0.68	0.46
A married woman should not work outside the home* (D)	0.71	0.46	0.66	0.47	0.61	0.47
Women should be more involved in politics (A)	0.81	0.39	0.83	0.38	0.77	0.42
It is better to educate a son than a daughter (D)	0.83	0.37	0.89	0.32	0.92	0.28
Women should be virgins when they get married (Disagree)	0.11	0.31	0.17	0.38	0.28	0.45
Husband's controlling behavior						
Prevent her seeing her female friends	0.035	0.18	0.034	0.18	0.035	0.18
Limit her contact with her family	0.031	0.17	0.030	0.17	0.025	0.16
Insist on knowing where she is all the time	0.22	0.41	0.21	0.41	0.24	0.43
Distrust her with money	0.029	0.18	0.028	0.16	0.022	0.15
Accuse her of being unfaithful	0.014	0.12	0.015	0.12	0.015	0.12

*This question was asked in different ways in the surveys. In 2008 TDHS: A married women should work outside the home if she wants to (Agree, %). In 2013 and 2018 TDHS: Women should not work, if they have small children (Disagree, %).
Source: TDHS 2008, 2013, 2018