

# The Rise and Fall of Global Currencies Over Two Centuries

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# Overview

- This is a measurement paper, first product of an extensive work of original historical data collection.
- Follows a growing literature of long-run historical data contributions to international finance (Reinhart and Rogoff, NBER 2008; Jordà et al., NBER 2016).
- First draft/presentation of the paper with the full two centuries dataset, suggestions very much welcome!
- Hopefully, first step of a research agenda on the 1) determinants of global currency status, 2) relationship between the IMS architecture and financial stability and 3) long-run dynamics of FX markets.

# Motivation

- Renewed interest in dollar dominance
  - Longstanding debate: Triffin Dilemma, exorbitant privilege.
  - New: IPS, DCP, Global Financial Cycle...
- What a transition out of dollar dominance would look like?
  - Winner takes-all
  - Multipolarity
  - Euro, renminbi, private and/or multilateral digital currency
- Is a multipolar IMS sustainable and/or desirable?
  - Outside the US, multipolarity seems desirable from a policy perspective.
  - Farhi and Maggiori (QJE 2018).
- Hard to get an empirical perspectives on these questions without looking at long run historical data...

# Contribution

- ① A continuous measure of the relative dominance of global currencies, comparable over time, since 1825.
  - New extensive original dataset of historical weekly exchange returns.
  - I classify a global representative sample of countries in fuzzy currency blocs based on exchange-rate behavior, over two centuries.
- ② A systematic documentation of previous episodes of global currency competition
  - I build on the work of Eichengreen and co-authors on the interwar period and uncover new episodes of global currency competition.
- ③ A quantification of the overall IMS architecture and degree of competition over two centuries.
  - I document the two centuries correlation between the level of IMS competition and the prevalence of financial crises globally.

# Summary of Results

- **Dollar dominance is an historical anomaly**, from a two centuries perspective.
  - Size and persistence of its lead vs. competing global currencies.
- The previous pound sterling hegemon dominance was frequently challenged by close competitors.
  - Rise of the franc in 1850s and 1930s, fall of the dollar end of 1920s...
- Interwar period is the sample global maximum of measured multi-polarity.
  - Classical gold standard competition levels are significantly lower.
- Positive correlation between levels of IMS competition and prevalence of financial crises, in line with Farhi and Maggiori (QJE, 2018).
  - This is however mostly driven by 1918-1939 and 1950-1973 sub-periods.

# Outline

- ① Literature Review
- ② Data
- ③ Empirical Strategy
- ④ Results
  - Rise and Falls of Global Currencies
  - Overall IMS Architecture
- ⑤ Conclusion and Research Agenda

# Two Views of Dollar Hegemony (1/2)

- **"Harvard view"** (Eichengreen, 2019)
- Gopinath (NBER 2015), Gopinath and Stein (QJE 2021):
  - Prevalence of network externalities and feedback-loops among different functions of global currencies.
- Farhi and Maggiori (QJE, 2018), Farhi and Maggiori (AEA P&P, 2019):
  - A multipolar IMS is vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises, transition out of dollar hegemony likely to be towards a new hegemon.
- Grounded in the new literature on the channels of dollar dominance and classical work on gold-exchange standard instability by Nurkse (1944) and Triffin (1960).

## Two Views of Dollar Hegemony (2/2)

- **"Berkeley view"** (Eichengreen, 2019)
- Eichengreen et al. (2017) summarizing previous work:
  - An hegemonic IMS is an exception in historical perspective.
  - Network externalities did not prevent sudden IMS shifts in the past.
  - A more multipolar IMS is sustainable, conditional on effective policy coordination.
- Grounded in a long run view of the IMS, with the classical gold standard providing an example of stable multipolar IMS.
- Multipolarity increasingly seen as desirable from a policy perspective (Carney, 2019) due to international spillovers, scarcity of safe assets.



# IMS Competition in Historical Perspective (1/2)

- 1825-1870
  - **Gold** (Britain), **Bimetallic** (France) and **Silver** (Central-Eastern Europe, Asia) monetary standards.
  - French initiative towards harmonisation of the IMS around the franc in the 1860s (Latin Union).
  - 1870 Franco-Prussian war indemnities destabilise French external position (largest historical transfer of foreign assets).
- 1871-1914
  - German unification, international **shift towards British gold standard**.
  - Generally portrayed as a British dominated but multipolar IMS.
  - Quantification by Lindert (1969): sterling accounted for 50% of global reserves, the remainder being equally shared by the franc and the mark.

# IMS Competition in Historical Perspective (2/2)

- 1918-1939
  - Successive collapses of global currencies, including GBP in 1931.
  - **Old view** (Triffin, 1964; Chinn and Frankel, NBER 2005): inertia, network effects meant the dollar only overtook the sterling after WW2.
  - **New view** (Eichengreen and Flandreau, EREH 2009; Eichengreen and Flandreau, OER 2012; Chitu et al., JDE 2014): the dollar overtook the sterling as soon as the end of WW1 looking at global reserves, trade finance and bond markets.
- 1945-2021
  - Dollar-exchange standard 1945-1973.
  - **Increase of dollar dominance since end of gold convertibility** (Gourinchas, 2021; Iltzetki et al., QJE 2019.).

# Related Work

- ① Eichengreen and Flandreau (1994), Reinhart and Rogoff (QJE, 2004).
- ② Iltzetzki et al. (QJE 2019)
  - 1945-2020, monthly data.
  - Classification algorithm focused on correctly describing countries' exchange rate arrangements, based on narrative and quantitative data.
  - Winner takes all view of global currencies.
- ③ Ito and McCauley (JIMF 2020)
  - 1970-2020, monthly data.
  - Classification algorithm focused on relative influence of global currencies, based on currency co-movements.
  - Fuzzy view of global currencies (one country can be apportioned into several currency blocs).

This paper: weekly (monthly 1825-1846) data 1825-2020, algorithm based on currency co-movements, fuzzy view of global currencies.

# New Data

- Extensive work (hundreds of hours...) of manual digitisation of exchange-rate prices from original printed sources.
- For the first time, exchange-rate prices at weekly frequency for the entire London FX market between 1846 and 1939.
- Merged with existing commercial (Global Financial Data) and official (BIS) exchange-rate data.
- Continuous coverage, excluding WW1 and WW2, of around 80% of global GDP and 90% of global trade between 1825 and 2020.
- Monthly frequency until 1846, then weekly as soon as available.
- Sample entry is likely to be endogenous to the IMS structure, I therefore include a country in the sample as soon as data are available.

# Sources

## ① 1825-1914:

- Monthly: Global Financial Data or own digitization of selected currencies, until available at weekly frequency.
- Weekly: Own data digitised from The Economist magazine or the Bank of England Weekly Accounts. Global Financial Data otherwise.

► 19th Century Sample

## ② 1918-1939

- Own data digitised from The Economist magazine or The Bankers' Almanac.


► Interwar Sample

## ③ 1950-2020


- Global Financial Data until series is available from BIS.

► Post-WW2 Sample

# Sample Coverage



# G10 FX Volatility Over Two Centuries



# Global Currency Competition and FX Co-Movements

- My measurement of global currencies and the IMS relies on FX co-movements.
- FX co-movements are found to positively correlate with more direct measures of functions of global currencies (McCauley and Shu, JIMF 2019).
- Channels might differ over time:
  - Positive co-movement relates to financial and trade relationships (Fratzscher and Mehl, EJ 2014).
  - As foreign balance accumulation becomes a monetary policy tool in the mid/late 19th century, policy intervention should also play a role.
- In a nutshell: I assign shares of each country to global currency zones according to FX behaviour.



# Frankel-Wei Factor Model

- Factor models of FX-returns introduced by Haldane and Hall (EJ 1991) and Frankel-Wei (NBER 1997).
- Recent work in the context of the global currency literature by Ito and McCauley (JIMF 2020) and Fratzscher and Mehl (EJ 2014).

$$\Delta \ln \frac{X_{i,t}}{\text{Numéraire}_t} = \alpha + \sum_h \beta_h \Delta \ln \frac{\text{Reference}_{h,t}}{\text{Numéraire}_t} + \gamma'_t \mathbf{\Pi}_t + \epsilon_t \quad (1)$$

- Clean "horse race" between potential key currencies, yields intuitive monetary dominance factors that can be given a "share" interpretation.
- Important for specification is the choice of *numéraire* and global currency factors to be included.

## Choice of *Numéraire*

- The literature typically favors a freely floating small-open economy currency (NZD, CHF) or an international unit of account such as the SDR or Gold (Frankel and Xie, AEA P&P 2010).
- No currency fulfills the above criteria over the 1825-2020 sample.
- I therefore turn to precious metals, and rely on the price of Silver (XAG) in London as my preferred *numéraire* throughout the sample.
- As a robustness check, I also provide results using a small-open economy currency that, over the sub-sample, is not strictly pegged to a global currency and does not experience a currency black-market.
  - 1825-1914: Dutch Guilder
  - 1918-1939: Hong Kong Dollar
  - 1950-2020: Swiss Franc

# Choice of Global Currency Factors


- 1825-1914
  - **Pound sterling, French franc and German mark** (Hamburg Banco Mark before 1873).
  - No rational to include USD, US are a capital importer with close to no role in foreign-balances (Lindert, 1969).
- 1918-1939
  - **Pound sterling, French franc and US dollar.**
  - German mark excluded as Germany experiences sovereign default, hyperinflation and extensive capital controls.
- 1950-2020
  - **Pound sterling, German mark (EUR), US dollar and Japanese yen.**
  - French franc excluded.
  - Yen only included from 1968.
  - Renminbi outside of the scope of the paper, given the empirical challenge due to dollar anchor (Kawai and Pontines, JIMF 2016).

# Yearly Global Currency Weights Algorithm


Bottom-up approach similar to Ito and McCauley (JIMF 2019), run the factor model for each polity and then aggregate up following three steps.

- 1 **Weekly coefficient:** Factor-models estimated, for each polity, at the highest frequency available with six-years rolling windows: yields for each global currency factor  $h$  and each polity  $i$  a  $\widehat{\beta}_{it}^h$  that varies at the weekly (monthly) frequency.
- 2 **Annual polity score:**  $\widehat{\beta}_{it}^h$  coefficients are inverse-variance weighted over each year and polity, excluding negative values, and normalised so that  $\sum_{h=1}^H \widehat{\beta}_{iht}$  sums to 1. When data frequency transitions from monthly to weekly, the annual weight is represented by their average for the first 5 years of overlap.
- 3 **Annual global score:** For each global currency factor, the yearly world-level average weight is computed as the average of polity-level yearly scores, weighted by the polity share of global GDP or trade (In 1914, 1929 or 2010 depending on the sub-period).


# The Rise and Fall of Global Currencies over Two Centuries




# A Regional View over Two Centuries



# Multipolarity and a Challenged British Hegemony




# Multipolarity and a Challenged British Hegemony






# Global Currency Collapses and Fortune Reversals



# Dollar Dominance



# Tentative Summary of Major Discontinuities (1/2)

## • Rises...










- GBP, 1830s, banking crisis in France, BoE Effective LOR.
- FFR, 1850s-1860s, rising external surplus, regional integration, proactive internationalisation policy.
- DEM, 1870s, military victory against France, regional integration (unification), rising external surplus.
- USD, 1920s, WW1, rising external surplus.
- FFR, 1930-1936, GBP devaluation, rising external surplus, proactive internationalisation policy.
- GBP, 1933, USD devaluation.
- USD, 1936, 1939-1950, FFR devaluation, WW2.
- DEM/EUR, 1970-..., USD devaluation, regional integration, stable monetary policy, rising external surplus.
- USD, 1985, geopolitical strength, stable monetary policy.

# Tentative Summary of Major Discontinuities (2/2)

- ...and Falls

- FFR, 1836, banking crisis.
- GBP, 1866, banking crisis.
- DEM, 1873, banking crisis.
- USD, 1928, monetary policy tightening (?).
- GBP, 1929-1931, BoP crisis., banking crisis, devaluation.
- USD, 1933, banking crisis, devaluation.
- FFR, 1936, political polarisation, devaluation.
- GBP, 1956, geopolitical tensions, BoP crisis.
- GBP, 1967, BoP crisis, devaluation, political polarisation.
- USD, 1970-73, BoP crisis., devaluation.
- EUR, 2010, political polarisation, banking crisis.


# Robustness Checks and Further Results

- Pooled Regressions 
- Alternative Numéraire and Weights
  - GBP 
  - FFR 
  - DEM 
  - USD 
  - JPY 
- Individual Polity Maps
  - 1825-1914 
  - 1918-1939 
  - 1950-2020 


# The Overall IMS Architecture over Two Centuries

- Competition Structure
  - **Herfindahl-Hirschman Index** of competition intensity computed from the yearly world GDP-weighted average weight for each global currency.
  - **Leader-“runner up” distance**, computed as the difference between the highest and the second highest global currency weight in any given year.
- Relationship between competition structure and the intensity of IMS competition relying on Reinhart and Rogoff (NBER 2008) Index of Composite Crises since 1825.

# The Structure of IMS Competition Over Two Centuries



# IMS Competition and Financial Stability





# Conclusion

- Current levels of one-currency leadership are an historical anomaly, given the prolonged large lead enjoyed by the dollar on other global currencies.
  - A benign interpretation: structural shift in financial technology consistent with DCP paradigm, higher distance is evidence of stable outlook looking at the model by Farhi and Maggiori (QJE 2018).
  - A more pessimistic take: given unprecedented levels of hegemony, and the evidence I uncover regarding rapid shifts in IMS dominance, an incoming discontinuity might be even more destabilising than in the past (Farhi et al., 2011).
- Positive relationship between levels of IMS competition and financial instability.
  - Driven by interwar period instability and Bretton Woods stability.
  - However, the stable Classical Gold Standard does not look particularly multi-polar in historical perspective.

# Research Agenda

- ① Measurement of the IMS
  - Rise and Fall of Global Currencies
  - With more data, extend back Iltetzki et al. (QJE 2019) classification of individual countries de facto exchange-rate regime.
- ② Determinants of Global Currency Status
  - Correlates of estimated global currency weights, network effects, forecast exercise.
  - Episodes of exogenous discontinuity might help identification.
- ③ IMS Competition and Global Financial Stability
  - Behaviour of macro and financial aggregates around major IMS discontinuities and global currency collapses.
  - Test of self-fulfilling crisis.
- ④ Foreign-exchange markets in the long-run
  - FX puzzles, safe heaven currencies...

# Pooled Regressions - 1820-1914

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GBP	0.608*** (0.0623)	0.589*** (0.0609)	0.738*** (0.0815)	0.678*** (0.0382)	0.673*** (0.0384)	0.477*** (0.0570)
FFR	0.271*** (0.0620)	0.304*** (0.0631)	0.331*** (0.0884)	0.0573** (0.0257)	0.0604** (0.0269)	0.0208 (0.0341)
DEM	-0.0197 (0.0326)	-0.0325 (0.0331)	-0.0199 (0.0661)	0.213*** (0.0365)	0.214*** (0.0364)	0.278*** (0.0576)
Controls	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
Numéraire	XAG	XAG	NLG	XAG	XAG	NLG
Period	1820-1870	1820-1870	1820-1870	1871-1914	1871-1914	1871-1914
Obs.	13,646	13,646	14,678	36,887	36,887	39,862
R-squared	0.058	0.058	0.018	0.73	0.73	0.017

Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. Controls include first-differences of proxies for liquidity and risk-premium, as well as weekly log-changes of commodity prices. Pooled regression using Silver as *numéraire* exclude the Netherlands for comparability.

# Pooled Regressions - 1918-1939

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GBP	0.685*** (0.0275)	0.685*** (0.0276)	0.637*** (0.0293)	0.499*** (0.0226)	0.498*** (0.0226)	0.479*** (0.0232)
FFR	0.0467*** (0.00752)	0.0471*** (0.00757)	0.0492*** (0.00745)	0.269*** (0.0163)	0.266*** (0.0164)	0.320*** (0.0179)
USD	0.139*** (0.0263)	0.142*** (0.0265)	0.144*** (0.0281)	0.161*** (0.0171)	0.168*** (0.0173)	0.114*** (0.0139)
Controls	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
Numéraire	XAG	XAG	HKD	XAG	XAG	HKD
Period	1918-1930	1918-1930	1918-1930	1931-1939	1931-1939	1931-1939
Obs.	19,712	19,712	20,695	15,624	15,624	15,390
R-squared	0.404	0.404	0.367	0.708	0.708	0.672


Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. Controls include first-differences of proxies for liquidity and risk-premium, as well as weekly log-changes of commodity prices. Pooled regressions using Silver as *numéraire* exclude Hong Kong for comparability.

# Pooled Regressions - 1950-2020


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GBP	0.327*** (0.0150)	0.329*** (0.0150)	0.333*** (0.0160)	0.0556*** (0.00423)	0.0517*** (0.00424)	0.0684*** (0.00418)
DEM	-0.00276 (0.00690)	-0.00304 (0.00695)	-0.000934 (0.00834)	0.404*** (0.00445)	0.401*** (0.00444)	0.411*** (0.00728)
USD	0.669*** (0.0165)	0.668*** (0.0165)	0.626*** (0.0212)	0.553*** (0.00486)	0.551*** (0.00485)	0.497*** (0.00414)
JPY	-	-	-	-0.00647** (0.00324)	-0.0100*** (0.00343)	-0.00580* (0.00341)
Controls	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
Numéraire	XAG	XAG	CHF	XAG	XAG	CHF
Period	1948-1973	1948-1973	1948-1973	1974-2020	1974-2020	1974-2020
Obs.	57,799	57,799	56,241	110,326	110,152	101,182
R-squared	0.833	0.833	0.04	0.859	0.859	0.341

Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. Controls include first-differences of proxies for liquidity and risk-premium, as well as weekly log-changes of commodity prices. Pooled regressions using Silver as *numéraire* exclude Switzerland for comparability.


# GBP - Baseline and Alternative Weights



# FFR - Baseline and Alternative Weights




# DEM - Baseline and Alternative Weights







# USD - Baseline and Alternative Weights




# JPY - Baseline and Alternative Weights




# 1830: A Bipolar System post-Vienna Congress




# 1840: Large GBP Gains in Dominance in the 1830s




# 1848: GBP Dominance Unscathed by the People's Spring




# 1858: Rise in FFR Dominance with the Second Empire



# 1866: Peak of FFR Dominance as Paris Hosts the 1st International Monetary Conference




## 1873: Major International Monetary System Discontinuity with the German Unification







# 1885: A Tripolar Classical Gold Standard (I)




# 1895: A Tripolar Classical Gold Standard (II)




# 1913: A Tripolar Classical Gold Standard (III)




# 1922: Rise of the USD after WW1




# 1927: Peak of USD Dominance in the Interwar




# 1929: A Shortlived Comeback of the GBP in 1929



# 1931: The FFR Steps into the Instability of the GBP and the USD




# 1936: FFR Dominance Before the 1936 French Election







# 1939: GBP and USD Bipolarity at the Eve of WWII




# 1950: USD Dominance after WWII




# 1964: "Privilège Exhorbitant"




# 1974: The Beginnings of a DEM Zone




# 1988: "German Dominance Hypothesis"




# 1996: Limited Fall of DEM Influence after the EMS Crisis



# 2002: The EUR Builds on the DEM Legacy



# 2012: EUR Influence Resists Despite the Crisis





## 2019: USD Dominance Persists

