## A Temporary VAT Cut as Unconventional Fiscal Policy

Rüdiger Bachmann (Notre Dame, CEPR, ifo), Benjamin Born (Frankfurt School, CEPR, ifo), Olga Goldfayn-Frank (Bundesbank), Georgi Kocharkov (Bundesbank), Ralph Lütticke (University College London, CEPR), Michael Weber (University of Chicago, NBER, CEPR, ifo)

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## Background

Normal times: monetary (short-term interest rate) policy stabilization policy of choice
With ELB: unconventional monetary or fiscal policy
Unconventional fiscal policy:

- pre-announced increases or immediate, temporary cuts in consumption taxes
$\rightarrow$ increasing price path
- tries to mimic conventional monetary policy
$\rightarrow$ works through the Euler equation
$\rightarrow$ manipulating intertemporal trade-offs
So far: little empirical evidence about its efficacy


## What we do

Exploit a unique policy experiment during the Covid-19 pandemic in Germany

- June 3rd, 2020: Government announced surprise cut in the value added tax (VAT) $\rightarrow$ cut regular rate by $3 \%$, reduced rate by $2 \%$
- Effective July 1st, 2020, and lasting until December 31st, 2020
$\rightarrow$ strong political commitment for VAT to go back up on December 31st
- Expressly sold by politicians as stimulus to pull consumption forward
- Part of a larger stimulus package, including a "Kinderbonus"


## What we do

Did it work?
Two parts to this question:

1. Was the VAT cut passed through to prices? This paper is not about that
$\rightarrow$ literature says yes:

- Fuest, Neumeier and Stöhlker (2020) for retail prices
- Montag, Sagrimuldina and Schnitzer (2021) for gasoline prices
- Deutsche Bundesbank (2020) and Egner (2021), from the German Federal Statistical Agency, for aggregate consumer prices

2. Was consumption spending stimulated? This is what the paper is about

## Literature

- Unconventional fiscal policy: Correira, Fahri, Nicolini and Teles (2013), D'Acunto, Hoang, Weber $(2018,2021)$
- Empirical evaluations of VAT changes: Blundell (2009), Crossley, Low, and Sleeman (2014), Benzarti, Carloni, Harju and Kosonen (2020)
- Reactiveness of durable purchases: Erceg and Levin (2006), Monacelli (2009), McKay and Wieland (2021a/b)
- Policy simplicity as a virtue: Andre, Pizzinelli, Roth and Wohlfahrt (2021), Bianchi-Vimercati, Eichenbaum and Guerreiro (2021), D'Acunto, Hoang, Paloviita and Weber (2021)
- Descriptive evidence on the German VAT cut: Bachmann, Bayer, and Kornejew (2021), Behringer, Dullien and Gechert (2021), Fuest, Neumeier and Peichl (2021).


## Empirical approach

## Research challenges

- VAT affected every consumer in Germany. What is the control group?
- There was the (Covid-19) recession and a stimulus package happening
- Seasonality of consumption spending in a second half-year
- How to get at phenomena such as "less of a spending cut" due to VAT policy?

Hopeless?
Identification is key!

## Empirical approach

Use survey methods, proceeding in two steps:

1. Ex-ante approach: In July 2020, elicit level of informedness about VAT path. Down versus down-up. Identify lower bound for intertemporal substitution effect.

Control group: those that don't know that VAT will go up again at end of 2021.
2. Ex-post approach: In January 2021, elicit perception of perceived pass-through. Identify the total consumption spending effect.

Control group: those that do not perceive substantive pass-through.

## Data sets

## Ex-ante approach:

- supplement to the Bundesbank Online Household Panel (sometimes abbreviated as BOP-HH) in July 2020.


## Ex-post approach:

- supplement to the Bundesbank Online Household Panel in January 2021
- survey via the Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK) in January 2021
- scanner data from GfK: semi-durable and non-durable consumption spending


## Ex-ante approach: Left-hand side variable

Ordinal variable: are you planning your durable consumption spending in the second half of 2020 to be more, the same, or less than in a normal second half of a year?

## Ex-ante approach: Reasons for increased durable spending plans



Price reasons dominate resource reasons and "Children bonus" (child-related transfer), even for families with children.

## Ex-ante approach: Identification



About $60 \%$ are fully informed, $40 \%$ are not (almost all knew about VAT cut).

## Ex-ante approach: Results

| Plans to buy durables <br> 2020HY2 vs. typ. sec. half-year | All <br> $(1)$ | COVID-19 cases, low <br> $(2)$ | COVID-19 cases, high <br> $(3)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| Fully informed | $0.098^{* * *}$ | $0.096^{* *}$ | $0.099^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.033)$ | $(0.046)$ | $(0.046)$ |
| Constant | $-0.241^{* * *}$ | $-0.233^{* * *}$ | $-0.249^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.025)$ | $(0.035)$ | $(0.035)$ |
| Observations |  |  | 902 |

- VAT policy makes households 10 pp more likely to increase durable purchases relative to the less informed
- Covid-19 exposure does not seem to matter
- Robustness with lots of controls


## Ex-ante approach: Heterogeneity

| Plans to buy durables 2020HY2 vs. typical second half-year | All <br> (1) | Net Wealth |  | Expected income growth |  | Age |  |  | Expected inflation |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Low <br> (2) | High <br> (3) | Low <br> (4) | High (5) | Young <br> (6) | Mid <br> (7) | Old <br> (8) | Low <br> (9) | High <br> (10) |
| Fully informed | $\begin{gathered} 0.098^{* * *} \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.163^{* * *} \\ (0.048) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.026 \\ (0.044) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.182^{* * *} \\ (0.049) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ (0.044) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.153^{* *} \\ & (0.066) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.097^{*} \\ & (0.056) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.078 \\ (0.049) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.039 \\ (0.059) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.109 * * * \\ (0.042) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} -0.241^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.378 * * * \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.112^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.364^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.134^{* * *} \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.146^{* * *} \\ (0.048) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.246 * * * \\ (0.044) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.304^{* * *} \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.159 * * * \\ (0.047) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.256^{* * *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 1,794 | 806 | 978 | 770 | 988 | 462 | 601 | 731 | 559 | 1,100 |

Effect driven by:

- younger, financially less well-off households
- direct evidence of intertemporal substitution


## Ex-ante approach: Heterogeneity

| Plans to buy durables 2020HY2 vs. typical second half-year | All | Young |  | Mid |  | Old |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Net Wealth |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Low <br> (1) | High <br> (2) | Low <br> (3) | High <br> (4) | Low <br> (5) | High <br> (6) |
| Fully informed | $\begin{gathered} 0.098^{* * *} \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.269 * * * \\ (0.085) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.014 \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.139 * \\ & (0.083) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.042 \\ (0.074) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.057 \\ (0.076) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.054 \\ (0.064) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} -0.241^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.262^{* * *} \\ (0.061) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ (0.073) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.417^{* * *} \\ (0.061) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.094 \\ (0.059) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.453^{* * *} \\ (0.055) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.196^{* * *} \\ (0.051) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 1,794 | 275 | 186 | 264 | 334 | 267 | 458 |
| Plans to buy durables |  | Young |  | Mid |  | Old |  |
| 2020HY2 vs. typical |  | $\overline{\text { Expected Income Change }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| second half-year | All | Low <br> (1) | High <br> (2) | Low <br> (3) | High <br> (4) | Low <br> (5) | High <br> (6) |
| Fully informed | $\begin{gathered} 0.098 * * * \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.159 \\ (0.099) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.095 \\ (0.089) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.293^{* *} * \\ (0.074) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.121 \\ & (0.083) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.085 \\ (0.086) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.081 \\ (0.062) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} -0.241^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.269 * * * \\ (0.066) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.010 \\ & (0.067) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.453^{* * *} \\ (0.054) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.008 \\ (0.065) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.343^{* * *} \\ (0.066) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.287 * * * \\ (0.048) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 1,794 | 204 | 253 | 313 | 280 | 253 | 455 |

## Ex-ante approach: Summary

The Euler equation appears to be alive and well in Germany!

- Sizeable intertemporal substitution in the extensive margin of durable purchases ( $29 \%$ of the respondents of the Bundesbank Online Household Panel in January 2021 did not buy any durables at all in the second half of 2020).
- Heterogeneity, effect driven by: younger households in financially less favorable situations, making the temporary VAT cut a progressive policy.
- Ex-ante results make it less likely that in our ex-post identification consumers justify higher durable purchases with perceived lower prices ex post.
- No evidence of Covid-exposure mattering.
- No evidence of financial constraints mattering.


## Ex-post approach: Identification





Classify about 65\% of respondents as perceiving a high pass-through.

## Ex-post approach: Threat to identification





Reverse causality story-those that are price-sensitive shoppers know more about the pass-through-is not plausible.

## Ex-post approach: Results (durables, survey data)

| Euro spending on durables in 2020HY2 | BOP-HH |  |  |  |  |  | GfK survey |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { OLS } \\ & (1) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | OLS <br> (2) | $\begin{gathered} \text { OLS } \\ (3) \end{gathered}$ | OLS <br> (4) | Tobit (5) | Tobit (6) | OLS <br> (7) | OLS <br> (8) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { OLS } \\ & (9) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { OLS } \\ & (10) \end{aligned}$ | Tobit (11) | Tobit (12) |
| High perceived pass-through | $\begin{gathered} 0.418^{* *} \\ (0.167) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.553^{* * *} \\ (0.210) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.555^{* *} \\ (0.233) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.674^{* *} \\ (0.273) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.496^{* * *} \\ (0.074) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.357^{* * *} \\ (0.082) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.662^{* * *} \\ (0.105) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.470 * * * \\ (0.114) \end{gathered}$ |
| Pass-through percent |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.159 * * \\ (0.069) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.199 * * \\ (0.087) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.138 * * * \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.088^{* * *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Female |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.702^{* * *} \\ (0.229) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.710^{* * *} \\ (0.229) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.959^{* * *} \\ (0.295) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.122 \\ (0.085) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.121 \\ (0.085) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.182 \\ (0.116) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age: below 45 |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.109 \\ (0.397) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.094 \\ (0.397) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.137 \\ & (0.509) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.076 \\ (0.138) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.081 \\ (0.138) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.023 \\ (0.188) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age: 45-60 |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.362) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.016 \\ (0.362) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.006 \\ (0.459) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.182 \\ (0.113) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.186 \\ (0.113) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.215 \\ (0.157) \end{gathered}$ |
| Education: Bachelor or above |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.056 \\ (0.221) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.044 \\ (0.220) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.068 \\ (0.283) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.032 \\ (0.091) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.042 \\ (0.091) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.035 \\ (0.122) \end{gathered}$ |
| Employed full time |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.326 \\ (0.296) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.311 \\ (0.297) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.380 \\ (0.385) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.535^{* * *} \\ (0.196) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.534^{* * *} \\ (0.197) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.774^{* * *} \\ (0.290) \end{gathered}$ |
| Retired |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.298 \\ (0.387) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.305 \\ (0.389) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.407 \\ (0.495) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.417^{* *} \\ & (0.209) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.414^{* *} \\ & (0.209) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.601^{*} \\ & (0.307) \end{aligned}$ |
| Has children |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.514^{* *} \\ & (0.257) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.520^{* *} \\ & (0.257) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.650^{*} \\ & (0.344) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.530^{* * *} \\ (0.120) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.526^{* * *} \\ (0.120) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.697^{* * *} \\ (0.160) \end{gathered}$ |
| Low income |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.957^{* * *} \\ (0.235) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.958^{* * *} \\ (0.236) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -1.195^{* * *} \\ (0.316) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.665^{* * *} \\ (0.088) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.666 \\ (0.088) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.823^{* * *} \\ (0.120) \end{gathered}$ |
| Low net wealth |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.277 \\ (0.217) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.268 \\ (0.217) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.396 \\ (0.287) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.505^{* * *} \\ (0.083) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.515^{* * *} \\ (0.083) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.634^{* * *} \\ (0.114) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 5.125^{* * *} \\ (0.136) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.055^{* * *} \\ (0.670) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.167^{* * *} \\ (0.127) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.106 * * * \\ (0.671) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.237^{* * *} \\ (0.191) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.621^{* * *} \\ (0.906) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.835^{* * *} \\ (0.060) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.168^{* * *} \\ (0.275) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.962^{* * *} \\ (0.049) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.283 * * * \\ (0.272) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.952^{* * *} \\ (0.093) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.307^{* * *} \\ (0.394) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 2,242 | 1,401 | 2,242 | 1,401 | 2,242 | 1,401 | 10,243 | 7,916 | 10,243 | 7,916 | 10,243 | 7,916 |

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## Ex-post approach: Back to data

Advantages of using two separate surveys:

1. Corroboration of our results across two very different surveys.
2. Can investigate a broader set of heterogeneities.
3. Through GfK, we gain access to their scanner data for semi- and non-durables.

## Ex-post approach: Heterogeneity (durables, survey data)

| A) BOP-HH, January 2021 | Full Sample |  | Bargain Hunter |  | Net Wealth |  | Age |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Euro spending on durables in 2020HY2 | w/o controls <br> (1) | controls <br> (2) | Yes <br> (3) | No <br> (4) | Low <br> (5) | High <br> (6) | Young (7) | Mid <br> (8) | Old <br> (9) |  |  |
| High perceived pass-through | $\begin{aligned} & 0.418^{* *} \\ & (0.167) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.553^{* * *} \\ (0.210) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.875^{* * *} \\ (0.321) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.238 \\ (0.195) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.710^{* * *} \\ (0.245) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.128 \\ (0.265) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.656^{* *} \\ & (0.322) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.745^{* *} \\ & (0.306) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.072 \\ (0.254) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 5.125^{* *} * \\ (0.136) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.055^{* *} * \\ (0.670) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.709 * * * \\ (0.264) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.288^{* * *} \\ (0.157) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.943^{* * *} \\ (0.197) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.489^{* * *} \\ (0.222) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.448^{* * *} \\ (0.268) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.258^{* *} * \\ (0.249) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.828^{* * *} \\ (0.206) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Observations | 2,242 | 1,401 | 637 | 1,605 | 911 | 981 | 550 | 668 | 982 |  |  |
| B) GfK, January 2021 | Full Sample |  | Price Sensitive |  | Public Servant |  | Financial Literacy |  |  | Planning i | Advance |
| Euro spending on durables in 2020HY2 | w/o controls <br> (1) | controls (2) | Yes <br> (3) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { No } \\ & (4) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Yes (5) | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { No } \\ & (6) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Yes <br> (7) | Somewhat <br> (8) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { No } \\ & \text { (9) } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Yes } \\ (10) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { No } \\ (11) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| High perceived pass-through | $\begin{gathered} 0.496 * * * \\ (0.074) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.357^{* * *} \\ (0.082) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.517^{* * *} \\ (0.091) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.277^{* *} \\ & (0.131) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.589^{* * *} \\ (0.167) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.447 * * * \\ (0.082) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.278^{* *} \\ & (0.138) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.554^{* * *} \\ (0.116) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.563^{* * *} \\ (0.131) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.452^{* * *} \\ (0.101) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.441^{* * *} \\ (0.105) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 4.835^{* * *} \\ (0.060) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.168^{* * *} \\ (0.275) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4.691^{* * *} \\ & (0.073) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.558^{* * *} \\ (0.109) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.183^{* * *} \\ (0.140) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.778^{* * *} \\ (0.066) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.160 * * * \\ (0.114) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.733^{* *} \\ (0.094) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.731^{* * *} \\ (0.104) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.356^{* * *} \\ (0.084) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.385^{* * *} \\ (0.083) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 10,243 | 7,916 | 6,619 | 3,058 | 2,045 | 8,169 | 3,067 | 4,049 | 3,097 | 5,126 | 5,104 |

- Results driven by bargain hunters and price sensitive households.
- Confirm ex-ante result for younger, financially less fortunate households.
- Using "public servant" as a proxy for income risk, we see little difference.
- No evidence that the results are concentrated in "sophisticated" households.

Ex-post approach: Semi-durables and non-durables (scanner data)

| Euro spending | Semi-durables |  | Non-durables |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| in 2020HY2 | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| High perceived pass-through | $0.131^{* * *}$ | $0.107^{* * *}$ | $0.047^{* * *}$ | $0.022^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.035)$ | $(0.039)$ | $(0.010)$ | $(0.011)$ |
| Constant | $6.616^{* * *}$ | $6.689^{* * *}$ | $7.962^{* * *}$ | $8.047^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.028)$ | $(0.139)$ | $(0.008)$ | $(0.034)$ |
|  |  |  |  | No |
| Controls | No | Yes | Yes |  |
| Observations | 8,342 | 6,477 | 9,742 | 7,517 |

## Ex-post approach: Dynamic profile

Effects tend to get stronger towards December
(GfK scanner data for semi-durables and non-durables)


## Ex-post approach: Summary

- Households with high perceived pass-through spent about $36 \%$ more on durables relative to those that perceive low pass-through
- Semi- and non-durable spending higher by $11 \%$ and $2 \%$
- Back-of-the-envelope calculation: aggregate consumption effect of 34 billion Euros
- Revenue short-fall for fiscal authorities of [11, 14]-billion Euros
- Heterogeneity: bargain hunters, price sensitive households.
- Confirm ex-ante heterogeneity result: younger, financially less fortunate HHs.
- Key to success: simplicity. HHs with financial literacy do not benefit more.
- Increasing effect over time, especially for semi-durables.


## Conclusion

- The VAT policy worked as a measure of unconventional fiscal policy.
- It stimulated consumption spending substantially, especially on durable goods.
- Its distributional impact was likely propitious.
- Its directness and simplicity appeared to have helped.
- We make no claims on optimality or appropriateness.


## Ex-ante approach: Threat to identification

What if households that plan to buy more durables for other reasons than the VAT cut are also better informed about the VAT policy (think: rational inattention)?



Reverse causality story-those that buy more durables for other reasons than VAT know more about the VAT path-is not plausible.

## Ex-post approach: Results—Durability of goods

Intratemporal Euler equation:

$$
\frac{U_{D}\left(C_{t}, D_{t}\right)}{U_{C}\left(C_{t}, D_{t}\right)}=\left(1-(1-\delta) \frac{1+\tau_{t+1}}{1+\tau_{t}} \frac{\Pi_{t+1}}{R_{t+1}}\right)
$$

The higher $\delta$, that is, the less durable a consumption good is, the less a given change in the consumption tax, $\frac{1+\tau_{t+1}}{1+\tau_{t}}$, will impact $\frac{U_{D}\left(C_{t}, D_{t}\right)}{U_{C}\left(C_{t}, D_{t}\right)}$ which under standard specifications behaves like $\frac{C}{D}$.

## - back

## Ex-post approach: Results-Back-of-the-envelope calculation

Let's do some back-of-the-envelope aggregate calculations!
Assume that the actual aggregate durable, semi-durable, non-durable consumption expenditures from the VGR in the second half of 2020 were produced by two groups: those that perceived high pass-through and those that perceived low pass-through.

Counterfactual: assume that high pass-through group spent like low pass-through group in the second half of 2020.

Aside: To compute aggregate consumption, we need to compute the results for services as well, and so we use the same estimate as for non-durables.

## Ex-post approach: Results-Back-of-the-envelope calculation

- 34 billion Euros of additional aggregate consumption spending.
- Revenue short-fall for fiscal authorities of [11, 14]-billion Euros, depending on what we assume about how government consumptive purchases (Vorleistungen) and residential investment were affected by the VAT policy.


## Ex-post approach: Results—Dynamic Profile

External evidence from another monthly consumption survey commissioned by the Federal Statistical Agency in the second half of 2020:

Temporary VAT cut


[^1]
[^0]:    Aggregate Effects

[^1]:    Error bars denote 95\% Cls

