

SUBJECTIVE CAUSALITY IN CHOICE

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MOTIVATION

- Beliefs about which correlations are **causal** affect behavior
 - ▶ E.g. why is duration of hospitalization correlated with death?
- Causation **requires** a model, and a **misspecified model** distorts agent's beliefs about her actions
- Can an analyst **reveal** the model that generates the agent's distorted beliefs from her behavior?

RUNNING EXAMPLE


- Doctor (the **DM**) decides between treatments
 - ▶ Leads to data on patient's health and several correlates

Health outcome: Alzheimer's or not


Correlates: amyloid plaque buildup, neurofibrillary tangles
- **Analyst**, e.g. drug company, sees treatment choices
 - ▶ Wants to know why she does not usually choose its treatment
 - ▶ Can misspecified causal model explain her decisions?
 - ▶ If so, what is doctor's causal model?

[Loosely based on FDA approval of aducanumab]


Following Pearl (1995) and Spiegler (2016), we model perception of causality with a **directed acyclic graph (DAG)**



- Arrows indicate **causes**
- **Flexible & non-parametric**
- predictions made “as if” each variable independent of its non-descendants given its direct causes
e.g. Health independent of Treatment & Tangles given Plaque



R_P





R_T

Evidence that a drug decreases Plaque should increase prescriptions with causal model R_P but not R_T

(even if R_P correct!)



► Example of an actual DAG used in health research

OTHER EXAMPLES



Human capital versus **signaling** models of education

OTHER EXAMPLES



Andre et al (2021) provide survey evidence that experts tend to use a **demand-side model** and laypeople a **supply-side model**

OBJECTIVES

A DM has a **subjective causality representation (SCR)** if she

- predicts outcome of her action using an endogenous dataset and a subjective causal model described by a **DAG**
- uses those predictions to maximize expected utility (plus Logit shock)

and her choices form a **personal equilibrium**:

choices affect data affect predictions affect choices affect ...
when model **misspecified**

OBJECTIVES

- Analyst observes only the DM's behavior, a **random choice rule** ρ over lotteries, not her model
- **Result 1:** Identifies subjective causal model from ρ
minimal causal chains revealed by behavior
Occam's razor – these “simplest” chains pin down model
- **Result 2:** Provides test of model in terms of ρ (axioms)

IMPLICATIONS

- Model accommodates lab evidence of biased inferences
 - ▶ selection neglect (Esponda and Vespa, 2018)
 - ▶ congruence bias (Wason, 1960)
 - ▶ illusion of control (Langer, 1975)
 - ▶ patternicity (Shermer, 1998)
- Mechanism: DM's behavior endogenously creates **correlations** that she misinterprets **as causation**
- Leads to two technical challenges in analyzing model:
 - ▶ **violation of regularity** (stochastic WARP)
 - ▶ **self-confirming behavior** (multiple equilibria)

BIG PICTURE

- Growing literature studying **misspecified** models:
 - ▶ **Spiegler (2016)**, Eliaz & Spiegler (2018), Eliaz et al. (2019), Schumacher & Thysen (2020), Spiegler (2020), etc.
 - ▶ Esponda & Pouza (2016), He (2018), Bohren and Hauser (2018), Heidhues et al. (2018), Samuelson & Mailath (2019), Frick et al. (2020), Fudenberg et al. (2021), Levy et al. (2021), Montiel Olea et al. (2021), etc.
- Given that the model is **misspecified**, how can we identify what the agent believes it is?
 - ▶ Lipman (1999), Ellis & Piccione (2017), Kochov (2018), Ke et al. (2021), Ellis & Masatlioglu (2021), etc.
 - ▶ **this paper**

OUTLINE

- 1 Model
- 2 Identification
- 3 Foundations

SETUP

- **Single, payoff-relevant** consequence, indexed $n + 1$, and n **covariates**, indexed $1, 2, \dots, n$
 - ▶ e.g. two correlates T, P (Tangles, Plaque) and **H** Health
DM only cares about health ($H = n + 1 = 3$)
- DM's **action** determines their distribution
action = full support **lottery** over vectors $\{G, B\}^{n+1}$
 - ▶ e.g. “given type of patient undergoes treatment”
lottery captures uncertain effects of treatment
- Analyst observes **random choice rule** indicating how often DM chooses each action a from **every** menu S : $\rho(a, S)$
 - ▶ e.g. how often doctor prescribes treatment a when only treatments $S = \{a, b\}$ available

MODEL

DM calibrates her model using the (endogenous) dataset ρ^S


$$\rho^S(a, x_P, y_T, z_H) = \rho(a, S) a(x_P, y_T, z_H)$$

generated by combining the **lotteries** in a menu S with the **frequency** with which they are chosen

e.g. $\rho^S(a, G, B, G)$ is fraction of patients who got treatment a , had good level of plaque, had bad level of tangles, and good health

MODEL







Uses ρ^S to estimate the causal effects in the **DAG** R



Predicts that chance of good health if she takes action a is

$$\begin{aligned}
 \rho_R^S(G_H|a) &= \sum_{y=G,B} \rho^S(y_T|a) \left[\sum_{x=G,B} \rho^S(x_P|y_T, \textcolor{red}{a}) \rho^S(G_H|y_T, \textcolor{red}{x_P}, \textcolor{red}{a}) \right] \\
 &= \sum_{y=G,B} \rho^S(y_T|a) \left[\rho^S(G_H|y_T) \right]
 \end{aligned}$$

RUNNING EXAMPLE: DAGs



DEFINITION

Random choice rule ρ has **subjective causality representation (SCR)** if there exists “well-behaved” DAG R and continuous, increasing u so that for every menu S and action $a \in S$:

$$\rho(a, S) = \frac{\exp\left(\sum_{z=G,B} u(z) \rho_R^S(z_H|a)\right)}{\sum_{a' \in S} \exp\left(\sum_{z=G,B} u(z) \rho_R^S(z_H|a')\right)}$$

Equivalent to maximizing

$$\sum_{z=G,B} u(z) \rho_R^S(z_H|a) + \epsilon_a$$




when $\epsilon_a \sim$ iid extreme value

► Accommodates biases

DAG is well-behaved if

- 1 Nothing causes action (uninformed)
- 2 Path from action to outcome (nontrivial)
- 3 Common causes are linked (perfect)
predicts marginal distribution of each variable correctly




Identify DAG by revealing its \subseteq -minimal paths
 each path represents a chain of causal relationships



Min Paths: (0, P, H)

(0, P, H), (0, T, H)

(0, T, P, H)



Min Paths: (0, T, H)

(0, H)

(0, P, T, H)

THEOREM


Let ρ have a SCR (R, u) and R' be a well-behaved DAG

Then, ρ also has a SCR (R', u') **if and only if**
every R' minimal path is a R minimal path & vice versa
and there is β so that $u(x) = u'(x) + \beta$ for all $x \in \{G, B\}$

two DMs behave same only if agree on causal chains

- 1 Any DAGs that represent ρ agree on minimal paths
 - ▶ Occam's razor
- 2 Only the variables in some minimal path matter
 - ▶ The rest can be dropped without loss
- 3 Links in minimal paths capture most causal relationships
 - ▶ Only exceptions are those between common parents

INTUITION: OCCAM'S RAZOR



ρ represented by $R \iff$ rep'ed by $\hat{R}^\rho \iff$ rep'ed by R' :

- for R , saw $\rho_R^S(G_H|a) = \rho_{\hat{R}^\rho}^S(G_H|a)$
- for R' , y_P integrates out so $\rho_R^S(x_T|a) = \rho_{R'}^S(x_T|a)$ for any x

PROOF

Two steps to reveal the minimal paths:

- 1 Reveal the sets of variables that intersect every path to consequence from action


They “**separate**” or “block all paths to” outcome from action

- 2 **Order** minimal separators to recover which causes which

Key observation: If two variables are ρ^S -**independent** of each other, then DM estimates the causal effect to be **zero**

ILLUSTRATION: SEPARATES

- Suppose that plaque is **independent** of all other variables regardless of how DM chooses from $\{a, b\}$
- If DM **doesn't believe** either action or tangles causes Health, then **infers** that all treatments lead to same expected health
- Hence indifferent: $\rho(a, \{a, b\}) = \rho(b, \{a, b\})$
- $\{P\}$ **separates** if indifferent for all such $\{a, b\}$; **reveals** that **all** paths from 0 to H go through P



PROOF: SEPARATES

DEFINITION


A subset of covariates I **separates** if $\rho(a, \{a, b\}) = \frac{1}{2}$, i.e. DM is indifferent, whenever the variables indexed by I are **independent** of all others, regardless of how DM chooses from $\{a, b\}$

LEMMA


*A subset of covariates I **separates** if and only if every path from 0 to $n + 1$ in the DM's DAG intersects I*

Notation: $\mathcal{A} = \{I \subset N : I \text{ is a minimal set that separates}\}$


ILLUSTRATION: SEPARATORS




$\mathcal{A}: \{\{P\}, \{H\}\}$




$\mathcal{A}: \{\{T\}, \{H\}\}$




$\{\{T, P\}, \{H\}\}$



$\{\{H\}\}$



$\{\{T\}, \{P\}, \{H\}\}$



$\{\{T\}, \{P\}, \{H\}\}$

ILLUSTRATION: ORDERING

- in illustration, if $\mathcal{A} \neq \{\{P\}, \{T\}, \{H\}\}$, done;
otherwise, need to know whether DM believes plaque or tangles **directly** cause disease
- If we know direction of causality, done;
otherwise, we need to reveal it





ILLUSTRATION: ORDERING

Intuition: if a variable is **independent** of the next variable in the chain, then the causal chain is “**broken**” so DM is **indifferent**

- H causes nothing, so H comes last
- if **equally likely** to choose either whenever Plaque buildup **independent of** Alzheimer's, then P is third
- if **equally likely** to choose either whenever presence of Tangles **independent of** Alzheimer's, then T is third
- remaining correlate is second
- action is first


PROOF: ORDERING

LEMMA

\mathcal{A} can be (uniquely) ordered $\mathcal{A} = \{A_1^*, \dots, A_{|\mathcal{A}|}^*\}$ so that (i_0, \dots, i_m) **is a minimal path** from 0 to $n+1$ **if and only if** for every j there exists k so that

$$i_j \in A_k^* \setminus A_{k+1}^* \text{ \& } i_{j+1} \in A_{k+1}^* \setminus A_k^*$$

where $A_0^* = \{0\}$.



$$\implies A_1^* = \{1, 2\}, A_2^* = \{2, 3\}, A_3^* = \{4\}$$

PROOF: ORDERING

$\{n + 1\}$ always in \mathcal{A} and causes nothing, so $A_{|\mathcal{A}|}^* = \{n + 1\}$

DEFINITION

The set $A_i^* \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{A_{i+1}^*, \dots, A_{|\mathcal{A}|}^*\}$ causes A_{i+1}^* if

- $\rho(a, \{a, b\}) = \frac{1}{2}$ whenever the variables indexed by A_{i+1}^* are **independent** of those indexed by A_i^* regardless of how DM chooses from $\{a, b\}$, and
- A_i^* has \subseteq -largest intersection with A_{i+1}^*

- first condition generalizes illustration
 - ▶ requires variables in $A_i^* \cap A_{i+1}^*$ are independent of others
- if second condition failed, then we would have a cycle

IMPLICATIONS

DEFINITION

For $j, k \in \{0, 1, \dots, n+1\}$, j is revealed to cause k for ρ , written $j\hat{R}^\rho k$, if jRk **whenever** ρ has SCR (R, u)

- If more than one DAG represents ρ , \hat{R}^ρ common to all
- Similar to Masatlioglu et al (2012)

PROPOSITION

If ρ has a SCR, then $j\hat{R}^\rho k$ if and only if there exists i so that $j \in A_i^$ and $k \in A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*$ when $A_0^* = \{0\}$.*

IMPLICATIONS

PROPOSITION

If ρ has a SCR (R, u) , then

$$\rho_R^S \left(x_{\cup_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{A}|} A_i^*} | a \right) = a \left(x_{A_1^*} \right) \prod_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{A}|-1} \rho^S \left(x_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | x_{A_i^*} \right)$$

for ever $x \in \{G, B\}^{n+1}$

$(x_E$ for $E \subset \{1, \dots, n+1\}$ is projection of x onto E)

LESSONS SO FAR

When ρ has a SCR (R, u) , then the DM's choices reveal the **minimal causal chains** in her model


- **Identify** and then **order** the set of minimal separators

Minimal causal chains suffice to recover **every causal** relationship that **must** be in model and **pin down** the DAGs that represent ρ

How can we **refute** the model?

BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERIZATION

- Provide axioms equivalent to ρ having SCR
- Statements given within context of running example with $\mathcal{A} = \{\{P\}, \{H\}\}$



AXIOM (FULL-SUPPORT)

For any menu S and action $a \in S$, $\rho(a, S) > 0$.

- every treatment prescribed with positive probability

AXIOM (BOUNDED MISPERCEPTION)


The Luce ratio is bounded:

$$\sup_{S; a, b \in S} \frac{\rho(a, S)}{\rho(b, S)} < \infty$$

- relative frequency of prescribing a pair of treatments
is **bounded above** by that of
treatment **known** to lead to good health and one **known** to
lead to bad health
- limits how much DM misperceives distribution
similar to Weak Monotonicity in Ellis and Piccione (2017)

AXIOM (CONSISTENT REVEALED CAUSES)

The sets $\{H\}$ and $\{P\}$ are the only sets that separate



- **General:** possible to order \mathcal{A} as in Lemma


► Statement

AXIOM (I5)

(Indifferent If Identical Immediate Implications)

For any $a, b \in S$ and any S ,
if $\text{marg}_P a = \text{marg}_P b$, then $\rho(a, S) = \rho(b, S)$.

- equally likely to perform any pair of treatments with same chance of plaque buildup



- General:** identical distribution over variables immediately caused by action, i.e. in A_1^* , implies indifference ► Statement

AXIOM (LCI)

(Luce's Choice Axiom Given Inferences)

For any menus S, S_1, S_2, \dots with $a, b \in S_m \cap S$ for each m , if

$$\rho^{S_m}(x_H|z_P) = \rho^S(x_H|z_P) \text{ for all } x, z \in \{G, B\},$$

then

$$\frac{\rho(a, S_m)}{\rho(b, S_m)} = \frac{\rho(a, S)}{\rho(b, S)}$$

- if relationship between plaque and Health is (almost) the same, then (almost) satisfies Luce's choice axiom
- General: almost same inferences implies LCA close to holding

Selection

AXIOM (LCI)

(Luce's Choice Axiom Given Inferences)

For any menus S, S_1, S_2, \dots with $a, b \in S_m \cap S$ for each m , if

$$\rho^{S_m}(x_H|z_P) \rightarrow \rho^S(x_H|z_P) \text{ for all } x, z \in \{G, B\},$$

then

$$\frac{\rho(a, S_m)}{\rho(b, S_m)} \rightarrow \frac{\rho(a, S)}{\rho(b, S)}$$

- if relationship between plaque and Health is (**almost**) the same, then (**almost**) satisfies Luce's choice axiom
- **General:** almost same inferences implies LCA close to holding

► Statement

DEFINITION

A menu S is **(revealed to be) correctly perceived** if

$$a(x_H|z_P) = b(x_H|z_P)$$

for all $x, z \in \{G, B\}$ and $a, b \in S$

General: menu correctly perceived whenever revealed causes match actual conditional independence structure of menu

$X_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} \perp X_{A_j^* \setminus A_i^*}$ given $X_{A_i^*}$ for all $j < i$ regardless of how DM chooses

► Statement

AXIOM (CORRECTLY PERCEIVED LOGIT)

There exists a increasing $u : \{G, B\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ so that

$$\rho(a, S) = \frac{\exp \left(\sum_{x=G,B} u(x) a(x_H) \right)}{\sum_{b \in S} \exp \left(\sum_{x=G,B} u(x) b(x_H) \right)}$$

for every correctly perceived menu S

- When DM perceives menus correctly, acts “rationally”
- “independence,” “monotonicity,” and “continuity”

THEOREM

*A random choice rule ρ has a SCR **if and only if** ρ satisfies Full-Support, Bounded Misperception, Consistent Revealed Causes, I5, LCI, and Correctly Perceived Logit*

Axioms make clear when & why ρ differs from Logit-EU

- BM – maximum deviation from Luce rule
- LCI – only violates Luce rule when inferences change
- I5 – same (incorrect) perception implies same frequency
- Correctly Perceived Logit

COROLLARY

*A random choice rule ρ is Logit-EU **if and only if** ρ has a SCR and $\mathcal{A} = \{\{n+1\}\}$ **if and only if** $\mathcal{A} = \{\{n+1\}\}$ and ρ satisfies Full-support, I5, Bounded Misperception, LCI, and Correctly Perceived Logit*

When $0 \leq R \leq n+1$:

- $A_1^* = \{n+1\}$ so coincidence of a and b 's consequence distribution implies equal probability of choosing either
- hypothesis of LCI holds vacuously, so choice axiom holds

PROOF OUTLINE

- 1 For any S , let S'_1 be a correctly perceived copy of S :
for each $a \in S$ there is $a' \in S'_1$ so that

$$a'(x) = a(x_{A_1^*}) \prod_i \rho^S(x_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | x_{A_i^*})$$
- 2 Form a nested sequence of menus $(S'_m)_m$ so that each S'_m is correctly perceived and $|S'_m| \rightarrow \infty$;

$$\rho^{S'_m}(y_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | y_{A_i^*}) = \rho^S(y_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | y_{A_i^*}) \text{ for all } i, y$$

Pick any $a, b \in S$

- 3 BM implies $\rho(S, S \cup S'_m) \rightarrow 0$ and so

$$\rho^{S'_m \cup S}(y_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | y_{A_i^*}) \rightarrow \rho^S(y_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | y_{A_i^*}) \text{ for all } i, y$$
- 4 I5 implies $\frac{\rho(a', S'_m \cup S)}{\rho(b', S'_m \cup S)} = \frac{\rho(a, S'_m \cup S)}{\rho(b, S'_m \cup S)}$ for each m
- 5 LCI implies that $\frac{\rho(a', S'_m \cup S)}{\rho(b', S'_m \cup S)} = \frac{\rho(a, S'_m \cup S)}{\rho(b, S'_m \cup S)} \rightarrow \frac{\rho(a', S'_1)}{\rho(b', S'_1)}$
- 6 LCI also implies $\frac{\rho(a, S'_m \cup S)}{\rho(b, S'_m \cup S)} = \frac{\rho(a', S'_m \cup S)}{\rho(b', S'_m \cup S)} \rightarrow \frac{\rho(a, S)}{\rho(b, S)}$

Applying Correctly Perceived Logit completes proof


OTHER LITERATURE

- **DAG as causal model:** Pearl (2009)
- **Axioms for normative model of causality:** Schenone (2020)
- **Boundedly Rational Stochastic Choice:** Manzini & Mariotti (2014), Brady & Rehbeck (2016), Cattaneo et al. (2020), etc.
- **Stochastic Choice with rich alternatives:** Gul & Pesendorfer (2006), Lu (2016), Apesteguia & Ballester (2018), etc.

WRAP UP

- Provided identification and axiomatization result for model of subjective causality
- Extensions:
 - ▶ Relationships to cognitive biases [▶ Details](#)
 - ▶ Comparative statics on dropping nodes/links in DAG
 - ▶ Deterministic vs. random choice
 - ▶ Exogenous datasets
- Directions for future research:
 - ▶ Information
 - ▶ Imperfect DAGs
 - ▶ Empirical/experimental implementation

Thank you



Actual DAG used by Evandt et al. (2017, *Environmental Health*)

GENERAL FORMULA

Let $R(i) = \{j : jRi\}$, called parents of i

Given $p \in \Delta\mathcal{X}$, $p_R \in \Delta\mathcal{X}$ is such that

$$p_R(x) = p(x_0) \prod_{j=1}^{n+1} p(x_j | x_{R(j)})$$

when nothing causes 0

For comparison,

$$p(x) = p(x_0) \prod_{j=1}^{n+1} p(x_j | x_{\{0, \dots, j-1\}})$$

BIASES

Consider a doctor who thinks plaque alone causes Alzheimer's,
BUT both actually caused by tangles

- treatment- π has good P iff good T
- treatment- ι has P independent of T
- Then, **predicted** effect of lowering Plaque increases with fraction treated using π
- May incentivize more prescription of π , reinforcing the effect
- Can cause a **regularity violation**:

$$\rho(\iota, \{\iota, \pi\}) < \rho(\iota, \{\iota, \pi, \nu\})$$

Explains illusion of control and patternicity

BIASES

Consider a doctor who thinks plaque alone causes Alzheimer's, **BUT** both actually caused by tangles

- Status quo: no effect on disease and plaque buildup only if diseased
- New drug: prevents the disease and plaque buildup only if healthy
- If usually takes status quo treatment, then predicts new drug increases chance of plaque buildup and so also disease
- If usually prescribes new drug, then predicts status quo treatment harms patients

Explains congruence bias and status quo bias [◀ Back](#)

AXIOM (CONSISTENT REVEALED CAUSES)

$\{n+1\} \in \mathcal{A}$, and for $i = 1, \dots, |\mathcal{A}|$, A_i^* exists.

That is, exactly one of the following holds:

- (1) $\{H\}$ and $\{P\}$ are the only sets that separate,
so $A_1^* = \{H\}$ and $A_2^* = \{P\}$
- (2) $\{T\}$ and $\{P\}$ are the only sets that separate,
so $A_1^* = \{T\}$ and $A_2^* = \{P\}$
- ...
- (6) $\{H\}$, $\{T\}$, and $\{P\}$ are the only sets that separate and
 $X_T \perp_{\{a,b\}} X_H$ implies $\rho(a, \{a, b\}) = \frac{1}{2}$,
so $A_1^* = \{H\}$, $A_2^* = \{T\}$, and $A_3^* = \{P\}$

AXIOM (I5)

For any $a, b \in S$ and any S ,
if $\text{marg}_{A_1^*} a = \text{marg}_{A_1^*} b$, then $\rho(a, S) = \rho(b, S)$.

◀ Back

LCI

- Recall: variables in A_i^* revealed to cause those in $A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*$
- Reveals menus for which DM makes same or similar inferences
- if for all i and x

$$\rho^{S'}(x_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | x_{A_i^*}) = \rho^S(x_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | x_{A_i^*}),$$

then DM makes the **same inferences** about health outcome of each treatment when facing S as when facing S'

- and if for all i and x

$$\rho^{S'}(x_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | x_{A_i^*}) \approx \rho^S(x_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | x_{A_i^*}),$$

then DM makes **almost the same inferences** about health outcome of each treatment when facing S as when facing S'

AXIOM (LCI)

For any $S, S_1, S_2, \dots \in \mathcal{S}$ with $a, b \in S_m \cap S$ for each m : if

$$\rho^{S_m}(x_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | x_{A_i^*}) \rightarrow \rho^S(x_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | x_{A_i^*})$$

for every $i = 1, \dots, |\mathcal{A}| - 1$ and $x \in \{G, B\}^{n+1}$, then

$$\frac{\rho(a, S_m)}{\rho(b, S_m)} \rightarrow \frac{\rho(a, S)}{\rho(b, S)}$$

DEFINITION (GENERAL)

A menu S is **(revealed to be) correctly perceived** if

$$b(x_{\cup_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{A}|} A_i^*}) = b(x_{A_1^*}) \prod_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{A}|-1} a(x_{A_{i+1}^* \setminus A_i^*} | x_{A_i^*})$$

for any $a, b \in S$ and $x \in \{G, B\}^{n+1}$