

COLOMBIA'S PEACE PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF A VEXING SOCIETY

STRUGGLING FOR INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENT

JAIRO J. PARADA¹

Abstract: After more than fifty years of guerrilla warfare, Colombia is enduring a peace process with the most important guerrilla group through a peace agreement signed by the end of 2016. Despite this achievement, the basic conditions determined by John Fagg Foster for institutional adjustment were not fulfilled, affecting the implementation of the accord and facing strong opposition from conservative sectors. The resistance of the institutional matrix of this country's elites shows the difficulties and resistance to even moderate institutional changes in a society with a deep divide in political, social, and economic conditions. The case is unique, despite the obvious economic and social advantages of the peace deal and reveals the deep crucial role of traditional and ceremonial institutions in blocking social progress. The pandemic and the more conservative political orientation of the present government just worsened the difficulties amidst the current conditions, increasing the distance from the requirements established by J. Fagg Foster. An evaluation of the current process is presented and conclusions about possible outcomes are explored given the present upheaval and social movements we endure today.

Keywords: Colombia, peace process, institutional adjustment, John Fagg Foster.

JEL Classification Codes: B52, O54, P16.

¹ Jairo J. Parada is an Associate professor of Economics at the Department of Economics, Universidad del Norte. Barranquilla, Colombia.

Introduction

The Colombian conflict has drawn the attention of many scholars around the world because of the long endurance of this struggle, combined simultaneously with an important role that drug trafficking began to play since the 90s of the past century. Even today, Colombia still is going through a complex process of violence that has not receded strongly as expected since the Accord of the Peace Process was signed in November of 2016. This paper has seven sections starting with this introduction, followed by a section that referred to a necessary review of the Original Institutional Economics (OIE)'s approach to institutional change. Then I follow with an analysis of the advantages of signing the Peace Accord, and an evaluation of the outcomes after ending the conflict. Then the advantages of achieving this Accord are described, continuing with the examination of the main issues signed in the agreement, a balance of the process, and the deep resistance of the conservative elites to this process. At the end, conclusions and suggestions are explored.

Colombia is a country with a population of 48.2 million of inhabitants (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), 2019), with a GDP per capita of US \$6325,4 in 2017 (Banco de la República, 2019) and a life expectancy of 75 years in 2017 (World Bank, 2019). According to the National Survey of Quality of Life (2018), 34,8% of the households considered themselves poor (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), 2019), Multidimensional Poverty was 19.6% in 2018, and Monetary Poverty reached 27%, meanwhile, Extreme Monetary Poverty was 7.2%. It is important to underline that in rural areas Extreme Monetary Poverty was 15.4%. Also, the Gini coefficient in 2018 was 0,517, one of the highest in Latin America (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), 2019). Regarding social services, 93.4% of households have health coverage despite their deficiencies in

access, attention, and quality, with an education level of an average of 10.1 years for the whole population. Undoubtedly, there has been social progress in the country since the 1950s of the last century. However, the armed conflict that started in 1964 with the presence of leftist guerrillas has indeed hindered economic growth and social progress. Even though Colombia has not been always a violent country, her history reveals periods of huge armed conflicts followed by peaceful periods, reigniting violence later on².

A theoretical approach of the process of Institutional adjustment

To understand Colombia's peace process, it is important to depart from a precise theoretical approach about what Original Institutional Economics³ defines as the process of institutional change characterized as institutional adjustment. In Foster's view (Foster, 1981), human society always has problems to be solved, requiring institutional adjustments because technological and social change cannot be detained. Thus, humans always have to change their institutions. Institutions –formal or informal- are emergent properties of society and are classified as ceremonials or instrumental ones, according to Veblenian traditions. Ceremonial institutions are more based on authority or status. Instrumental institutions are referred to technological and societal 'rules of the game' that contributed to social efficiency and continuity of the social process. Institutions are defined as "as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions" (Hodgson, 2006). Any mechanical opposition between ceremonial and instrumental institutions has to be avoided as institutions can play both roles at different moments of a social process.

² After the Independence in 1819, civil warfare plagued the country with nine big conflicts until the end of the 19th century, followed in the 20th century by the period known as "The violence" which started in 1948 with the assassination of a popular leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and lasted until 1956, with 300,000 persons killed. The current leftist guerrilla warfare started in 1964.

³ In social sciences, there are many theories of social change. Here my theoretical approach is based on the Original Institutional Economics (OIE) that follows Veblen-Commons-Ayres's tradition far different from Neoclassical Institutional Economics known as New Institutional Economics (NIE).

In order to solve a social problem, Foster suggests an institutional adjustment that must follow three basic principles to be followed:

- 1) The *principle of technological determination, or technological primacy*, in the sense that adjusting institutional structures, must be correlated with the technological aspects of the problem, where technology must be understood in a sense that incorporates human knowledge in all dimensions such as the social and material realm. Humans must know the necessary steps to solve the problem given the 'state of industrial arts' as Veblen was used to asserting. (Foster, 1981).
- 2) The *principle of recognized interdependence* states that members of the society must recognize the need for the institutional adjustment that has been proposed as crucial for the necessary change. Patterns of human relationships stem from habits and attitudes but are determined at the end by deliberate action. For this reason, the proposed changes imply guided actions to achieve the purpose. In other words, most members of society must be willing to accept the new changes that demand this institutional adjustment (Foster, 1981).
- 3) The *principle of minimal dislocation establishes* that all institutional adjustment "must be capable of being incorporated into the remainder of the institutional structure" (Foster, 1981, pág. 933) to define the limits and the real possibilities of any institutional adjustment. This principle prevents us to fall into utopic solutions without taking into considerations all the previous principles. If the proposed institutional adjustment generates maxim dislocation, disruption will follow and the outcomes will be uncertain.

This theory of Institutional Adjustment allowed me to accomplish extended research about Colombia's institutional process. From the Pre-Hispanic era until the middle of the first decade of the current century, Colombia was deeply submerged in a violent process where survival of the state was at

stake, threatened by the guerrilla warfare and the increasing attacks of the paramilitary groups, conflicts that were fueled by money resources coming from drug trafficking in both sides. Several regions were analyzed with their specificities and particularities (Parada, Instituciones, Desarrollo y Regiones: El Caso de Colombia, 2011)⁴. At the conclusions of this research, I found that,

...the different outcomes show that the three main principles of institutional adjustment revealed problematic lack of correlation between the technological aspect of the processes and the adjustment of institutional structures. Moreover, during all the periods, the principle of recognized interdependence was violated in several stages generating conflicts because of exclusion and discrimination, due to the lack of a unifying project as a nation. In addition, in all the regions, it can be observed how there was not much effort to apply the principle of minimal dislocation where many institutional modifications clashed against the remainder of the institutional structure (Parada 2006b, 237).

Given the historical path dependence that Colombian society has endured during her history, it was hopeful the Colombian government announced on August 4, 2012, that formal conversations with the oldest guerrilla FARC in Latin America and the world, had started, opening new developments for a society that always seemed locked in continuous violence and military warfare. By that time, Colombia was the only country in Latin America going through a conflict with such characteristics, rooted in the structural unequal conditions of this society and the political processes and agency that the elites promote.

The Profound inequality of the Colombian Society

Despite some social and economic progress, Colombia ranks as one of the most unequal societies in the planet, even higher than on neighboring Brazil. As Thomas Piketty stated, “Colombia has one of the highest


⁴ An English version of this work can be read in (Parada, 2006b).

inequalities in the world” (El Espectador, 2016) where 20% of the total income is earned by 1% of the population. Moreover, according to Palma’s index (measured as the ratio of the wealthiest 10% over the poorest 40%) Colombia reaches 4.5, higher than Brazil (4.3) (World Bank, 2019).

Colombia is no exception compared with other countries in Latin America. The region suffers from a deep structural heterogeneity in the patterns of development, from which emerges high inequality levels, where informality in the labor market and low productivity in many sectors prevail (CEPAL, 2017). From these conditions a very high inequality arises in our Hispanic societies, that one can examine from the perspective of monetary income, wages participation in the GDP and wealth concentration in assets property.

In Fig. 1, one can appreciate how Gini coefficients diminished slightly from 2002 to 2016, a trend that was very likely fueled by the favorable cycle of commodity prices until 2014. Afterward the reduction was slower. Here we can point out that Colombia has a Gini coefficient that is higher than most of the countries

Fig. 1



Source: (ECLAC, 2017)

except for Guatemala, and very far away from countries such as Argentina and Uruguay. Despite some progress that has been made, Colombia is today a very unequal society.

In Colombia, wage participation in the GDP is very low since the economic model that is operating, is characterized by precarious labor markets, informal employment, and the continuous weakening of labor unions. For those reasons, wage sharing of the GDP is below 40% of the GDP, and very much stagnated in the last years (CEPAL, 2017, p17).

On the other hand, if one analyzes one of the most important wealth asset in the Colombian conflict, which is land ownership, it has been calculated that 0,05% of landowners control 44% of all the land. (DANE, 2014) The Gini coefficient referred to land distribution reaches 0,73, although a well-known researcher of this problem estimates it in 0,88 (Machado, 2009). It is well known, although denied by the Colombian elites, that the excessive concentration of land distribution is one of the main sources of the Colombian conflict. This fact is just an external manifestation of a hard pattern of capital accumulation in Colombia, where all the agrarian reforms that were attempted during the 20th century just failed due to the tough and violent resistance of great landowners. Now, if we explore the wealth concentration in the financial sector, the Gini coefficient is estimated in 0.93, although the financial sector no longer calculates this indicator.⁵ Wealth and income concentration generate a society where social mobility is very limited.

The advantages of overcoming the armed conflict in Colombia

A developing society needs to accelerate economic growth and social equality to achieve a higher level of economic development, which is in essence, a multidimensional process that incorporates cultural, political, environmental, and social variables. However, if a society is affected by a long-lasting armed conflict these

⁵ This number was in the press during the 90s, but the topic has been ignored today.

conditions are difficult to achieve. War is a costly activity not only in human lives but also in economic terms, diverting resources that can be used for development. For that reason, to move to a more progressive path for development, a society must end the inner armed conflict as democratization is promoted. Many researchers consider democratization as a door to sustainable peace that demands institutional arrangements that have to go further the armed conflict itself. If negotiation is achieved, it is hard to keep this balance if the same structures that generate poverty and exclusion prevail. Ending the war is just the first step to a complicated process to achieve this sustainable peace (Kurtenbach, 2019).

During the last decade research has demonstrated the economic, social, and political advantages of ending the armed conflict in Colombia, affected today by the terrible influence of drug trafficking. In research made by Santamaria, Rojas and Hernandez, estimations of reduction of security expenditures after a negotiation were made. They calculated that savings emerging from a peace process are very small at the beginning, 0.9% in the first year, and 4.5% in the second year but then increased exponentially to 64.3% in the fifth year, reaching 70% in the eight years (Santamaria, Rojas, & Hernandez, 2013). At the beginning of the process, security expenditures cannot be reduced *ipso facto* in order not to make the same mistakes that happened in Central America, because of the emergence of criminal groups that recruit their members among the previous forces. The same study shows that a peace process will increase the growth rate of GDP in 1% over the conditions before the peace negotiations.

Another similar research from the financial sector found that Colombia lost around 1.1% of the annual growth rate of the GDP since 1971 because of the armed conflict, generating losses of 20% in total GDP for the whole period. (ANIF, 2016). From these facts, illustrated elites of Colombia, and scholars that researched about the violence and the armed conflict of Colombia, were aware that this war was hindering the economic development of the country. Indeed, annual economic growth rates greater than 4 or 5% during three of four decades are required for a real take-off in development. A logical conclusion of the

necessity of ending this long conflict with the greatest guerrilla FARC stemmed from a rational balance comparing the costs of the conflict vis-à-vis the implementation of a peace process, where saving human lives was a powerful additional factor in favor of the negotiations. From this perspective, it was very difficult for the international opinion to understand how almost one-half of the population was against the peace conversations that took place in la Habana, for more than four years, given the results of the plebiscite on October 2, 2016. On this day, by surprise and very unexpectedly, those in favor of not signing the agreements of la Habana came out with a victory for a narrow margin⁶. The right-wing parties that supported the negation of the agreement used faked propaganda against the agreement convincing people that it will lead Colombia to a situation like Venezuela's *castrochavism* (a term that symbolizes the economic and political systems that predominate today in Cuba and Venezuela). These allegations were combined with a conservative atmosphere that rejected some instruction manuals about student formation that the Ministry of Education of Santos's government was promoting related to sexual education, which falsely were accused of promoting gay gender issues.

The advantages of overcoming the armed conflict are also more relevant when one considers the tremendous human costs of the conflict not just based on economic valuation regarding GDP growth. According to the *Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica* (between 1985 and March 31, 2013), 166,069 civilians were killed during the conflict and 40,787 combatants lost their lives. This means that roughly 220,000 persons were killed, 81,5% being civilians and 18,5% combatants. This outcome gives us a ratio of four civilians killed per combatant. During this period, 25,007 persons were disappeared, 1,754 children were victims of sexual violence and 4,744,046 persons were displaced within the country. Moreover, from 1970 to 2010, the conflict generated 27,023 kidnappings and 10,189 persons were injured with antipersonnel mines (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013). Massacres also permeated the conflict, activity

⁶ During that day, with political participation of only 37.43% of the electoral census, 49.78% voted yes to the Peace agreement and 50,21% voted no. Nobody was expecting that result.

oriented to have a political effect in the areas where they were implemented. The paramilitary groups that surged during the 1980s and 1990s, executed 1,166 massacres, the guerrillas performed 343, 158 were attributed to the Army and Police forces, and 295 to non-identified groups (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013, pág. 36). From these figures, one can easily infer that a real path to development in this society was hindered by the deep impact of the dynamics of the military conflict.

The Final Peace Agreement

The Final Peace Agreement (Acuerdo Final de Paz, 2016) was built on six pillars:

1) *The integral rural reform*, which in essence points toward an extreme poverty eradication program in rural areas and 50% of the rural poverty in ten years, the recovery and reactivation of the rural economy and the development of the peasant and communitarian agriculture. Many of these issues were already proposed by an official government commission appointed years before as the Rural Development Mission, headed by a former Ministry of Agriculture Jose A. Ocampo, who later on became secretary of the ECLA. When one studies carefully the agreement it does not imply any land expropriation of landlords which are very powerful in Colombia. The proposed Land Bank will be constituted by public or state-owned lands and many properties expropriated to the illegal drug economy. The agreement also ordered an update of the official valuation of rural lands, called the multipurpose cadastre, aimed to improve tax collections of poor municipalities. This crucial point for a guerrilla very much linked to rural areas, barely began to be implemented by the current government after almost one year in power. This project aims to update the value of 5 million of hectares and 360,000 farms, including 65,000 legal titles. It should end circa 2025. (DNP, 2019).

2) *Political Participation*, which demands a widening process of the limited Colombian democracy, that demands a political reform and the legalization of the FARC guerrilla as a legal political party. The new party was created with the same initials but with the name of People's Alternative Revolutionary Force, but their members have been under attack in many areas and 130 members of the new party had been murdered since Dec 1, 2016 in just one year since the agreement was signed (El Tiempo, 2017). The political reform is still pending in the Colombian Congress.

3) *The end of the conflict with FARC*, an objective that took place in reality, with the submission of weapons to the UN Peace Commission (the notion of surrendering weapons looked like a defeat of the guerrilla and for that reason was rejected). The FARC delivered 8,994 weapons, became a political party and, registered 73 candidates for the parliamentary election of 2018. They were able to get five seats in the Senate and five seats in the House of Representatives based on the agreement. The electoral votes they got in the 2008 election were minimal, less than 1% of the total votes. The disarming of the guerrilla was the most important point for Colombian elites, not being very interested in the rest.

4) A solution to *the problem of illicit drugs* through a public policy that does not consider peasant coca growers as criminals, aiming to crop substitution, financial support, and local development programs in these areas. Today, the Colombian government is moving toward reinitiating aerial sprayings over coca crops, a policy that has failed in the past and that discards the essence of this point in the Peace Agreement, based more on voluntary eradication programs and crop substitution. Moreover, a recent ruling of the Constitutional Court, opened a door to allow the government to spray again on some areas, given a set of preconditions that must be checked by the National Council of Narcotics, an organism that is completely in control of the government.

5) The Peace Agreement included an international innovation in matters of *justice and compensations* in the sense that has been unique, paying attention to victims and creating an Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)⁷, with a court and magistrates that give special treatment to those in the military and the guerrilla affected by special crime accusations. The main idea was to allow the victims to be compensated for knowing about their cases and imposing moderated sanctions on the victimizers if they confess their crimes truly. Since this special justice system initiated its work, it became under attack from the political right-wing organizations accusing it to be biased in favor of the Left and being weak regarding the necessity of strong sanctions on the victimizers coming from the guerrilla side and alleging that the system promotes impunity. The negotiators of the Peace Agreement knew that this was a crucial point to the result of the process and that a regular justice system would be unable to open the path to the signing of the accord. During the first semester of 2019, the Government attempted to modify the agreement objecting the legal functioning of the special justice system, an objective the Colombian Congress and the Constitutional Court rejected. This issue contributed to polarize even more the political climate regarding the agreement. Despite the opposition of the current Government, the Colombian Congress and the Constitutional Court approved the statutory law, a crucial mechanism to implement the justice system.

A very important issue related to the first point of the agreement was the formulation and implementation of sixteen (16) development programs at a regional level, covering 170 municipalities affected by the conflict (See Fig. 2). The Government claims that 500 community projects were initiated in 52 municipalities, including improvements of rural roads (United Nations Security Council, 2019). A key issue here is that these special development plans would be in reality executed, hoping they will be very well funded and monitored. Otherwise, they will be just documents on the shelves. Today, most of

⁷ JEP: The initials in Spanish: Justicia Especial para la Paz.


the development programs have been written but they are waiting for real funding from the Government. So far, it seems the Government is waiting for international donations to fund the projects, an attitude that endangers the realization of the projects as international cooperation is very limited. Government funding should be the real mechanism but the Government claims fiscal restrictions to enforce them.

6) This point of the agreement included *mechanisms of verification and implementation* that included a special commission for monitoring, promoting, and endorsing the agreement. It was joined with an international advisory team that involved the countries that were guarantees of the process, the United Nations, and the Kroc Institute For International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame, aiming to build a stable and lasting peace.

This point had been very problematic and complex, as the Agreement has to be implemented by a new government since August 7, 2018, that was opposed to the Peace Process. The new government tried to modify the JEP through proposed bills presented to Congress that was rejected by the parliament.

Fig. 2

Sub regions Selected for PDET



Source: (Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), 2018, pág. 701),

In balance, the peace process registers positive achievements and many other negative troublesome situations. The FARC delivered 8,994 weapons, transformed themselves into a political party, and presented 73 candidates for the Senate and the House of Representatives. The agreement granted them five seats in both chambers that they finally obtained.

One important point of the Agreement was the creation of a special electoral district for the victims of the conflict in Colombia, that will give them access to the House of Representatives. A coalition of the right-wing parties in Congress blocked this possibility that finally was enforced by a ruling of the Constitutional Court that force the current government to implement these districts for the next elections in March 2022.


The Peace Agreement after six years (2016-2021)

After six years of problematic implementation of the Peace Accord, a clear balance can be made of a process that should last a minimum of twelve years (three different governments), amidst a lot of threats and challenges that stem from the precarious institutional that plague the territories where the agreement is implemented facing the resistance of local oligarch elites linked to land concentration and very much involved with conservative political forces.

An important issue is to examine the behavior of homicides in the country during the implementation of the Peace Accord. According to Indepaz (Indepaz, 2021). In 2002 Colombia suffered 81,190 cases, in 2016 there were 1238 and in 2019 the nation had less than 697. In Fig. 3 one can appreciate a peak in 2002 of violent homicides followed by a continuous decline until 2019 which is a positive trend but has some caveats. Since the Agreement was signed, 1270 Human Rights leaders have been murdered, and 872 of these killings have occurred during the current government. In 2007, 207 of these leaders were killed, and in 2020 the numbers climbed to 310. For these reasons, despite some lower trends in 2021, analysts are cautious about the future.

Fig. 3

Colombia-Number of people killed by Homicides (1985-2019)



Source: Indepaz, 2024. Taken from the National Registry of victims-Unidad de Victims -Colombian Government.


Today, more than one hundred municipalities are affected by violence against the social leaders being the government completely incompetent to prevent these killings, especially in rural areas subjected to the special development plans designed for conflictive zones. (Indepaz, 2021). Twenty-one provinces⁸ of a total of 32 are affected by these events. This violence has targeted indigenous and afro Colombian areas, reflecting the struggle for controlling political power and hindering the rule of law and state monopoly of weapons, disputing illegal rents that surge from narcotics trafficking and illegal mining. In 2020 Colombia suffered 91 massacres with 381 victims, and during 2021 the nation

⁸ In Colombia, the provinces are called departments.

suffered 88 massacres and 313 victims⁹. By November 2021, 299 former members of FARC that signed the agreement have been killed by paramilitary groups and other guerrilla movements that are still active, concentrated in provinces such as Cauca, Nariño and Antioquia¹⁰. One crucial problem that still remains is the internal displacement of the population caused by the internal war that still is going on (See Fig. 4).

Fig. 4

Colombia- Number of displaced people per year because of the conflict



Source: Indepaz, 2021.


⁹ A massacre involves at least three victims.

¹⁰ The Post-Agreement FARC group that rejected the Peace Agreement has around 3500 -5200 members, 22 narco-paramilitary groups have 2,700-3500 members and the ELN (National Liberation Army) has 3,000 combatants. Government forces have more than 450,00 members, being one the biggest army in Latin America given the 50 million population of Colombia. Yet they are not able to guarantee the control of the territory.

Regarding the achievements and challenges that still remains related with the six points of the Peace Agreement, as it is depicted in Fig. 5. The Peace Accord has been more or less successful in Point 3 (end of the conflict) and Point 6 (implementation and verification) which still consolidation is needed. The weakest point has been rural reform (Point 1), and the rest of points (political participation, victims and illicit used crops). The lack of political will of the current government has been evident assuming a double posture as progressive in terms of the peace process when it faces the international community such as United Nations and NGOs, but

Fig. 5

Colombia- Implementation Level by Point of the Peace Accord



Source: (Kroc Institute, 2021)

very conservative and stubborn not allowing the necessary political reform to promote the other points. Several rulings of the Constitutional Courts try to force the government to enforce these policies reflecting the divide between the legality of decrees and laws, and the naked reality in several territories. The Land Reform has advanced minimally, and the Land Fund must be consolidated. Not much financial resources have been allocated and implementation is very weak. Only 310,000 hectares have been adjudicated so far¹¹ (the target is 5 million!) Public officials are not very much interested in the topic. The local PDET plans have been formulated which is a step forward but implementation still remains pending. Political Reform has been blocked in Congress with no results so far. Political participation is weak with no guarantee from retaliation coming from armed groups being very urgent the need to protect the human rights and social leaders. Regarding the National Program of Substitution of Illegal Crops (PNIS), only 2% of rural families are involved (of more than 80,000 families), given the lack of financial support of the government and the continuous threat of using aerial aspersion with glyphosate to fight the illegal crops, a policy that has failed before. (Kroc 2021).

Despite the political pressures of conservative sectors, the JEP (Special Justice For Peace) has advanced and has opened several judiciary cases affecting former military and guerrilla leaders, showing an important advance compared with other peace processes of the world, pointing to truth, reparations and no repetition. This experience is admired in the world but very much attacked by Colombian conservative and right-wing groups that are trying to eliminate it, and not very much appreciated by a large portion of the domestic population, mainly in minor cities and rural towns, that are prone to conservative views, quite different from the political opinion of the major cities. This issue is just an outcome of the deep contradictions of our society and a social and very complex institutional matrix that remains a strong obstacle to social and political progress.

¹¹ Data were taken from the National Unit of Land Restitution of the government (www.restituciondetierras.gov.co).

In sum, even though there have been important advances in the regulatory framework to foster the solutions to the problems suggested by the six points of the Peace Accord, there is still a long way to fulfill the conditions of durable and solid peace, challenged today by the emergence of more paramilitary groups and the slow growth of guerrilla groups very much linked to drug trafficking.

Conclusions

Since the nineteenth century, armed conflict and social struggles have been permanent in our history, where we had periods of relative calm followed by periods of violence and civil wars. This does not mean that Colombia is a violent society and wars prevailed always. However, this fact generates habits of mind (Institutions as Veblen put it), that easily recurs to violence to solve problems. Being a very unequal and fragmented society, especially at a regional level, these problems are complex to solve and the Peace Agreement was no exception. Peace can be conceived in a minimal way as the absence of war, or from elite's standpoint aiming to disarm the opponent. But Peace is not just a state of the world or a situation but a complex process through which society must undergo to improve the conditions of the underlying population. As Kurtenbach posits, peace is not a linear process, where the main objectives of preserving the physical integrity of the population, guaranteeing individual and collective rights amidst ethnic differences, and a constructive transformation of conflicts should be the main targets (Kurtenbach, Un concepto global de Paz, 2021).

Revising the conditions for Foster's institutional adjustment, the first condition is very well known based on the world experience in these peace processes. The steps are very well defined, combining stabilization and transformation, rooted on the material and social reality, aiming to take care of the main points of the agreement, where clearly, they can be achieved. The problems stem out from the

second condition: Colombian society is deeply divided regarding the process and the principle of recognized interdependence does not prevail. The process is opposed by powerful sectors of the elite and large portions of the population, especially in rural areas and minor cities. The current extractive model based on controlling the land presents a powerful obstacle to implementing the first point of the agreement despite its modesty. The third condition is also difficult to achieve. The agreement promotes political transformations in political participation, that entrenched elites are not willing to allow. War still remains in many areas fueled by monetary resources that come from drug trafficking and illegal rents. Yet Colombian society must pursue the agreement cementing future accords with political armed organizations, as we are convinced, following Clarence Ayres 'words, social progress is inevitable despite all the obstacles we find on the road.

References

Acuerdo Final de Paz. (2016). Recovered on 2 de September de 2016, de Alto Comisionado de Paz:

www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co

ANIF. (2016). Dividendos, Costos y Beneficios del Proceso de Paz en Colombia. Bogotá: Anif.

Banco de la Republica. (13 de June de 2019). Obtenido de <http://www.banrep.gov.co>

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2013). Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad. Bogotá, Colombia:

Departamento de la Prosperidad Social-Gobierno de Colombia.

CEPAL. (2017). Panorama Social de América Latina. Santiago: Naciones Unidas.

DANE. (2014). Tercer Censo Nacional Agropecuario 2014. Recuperado el 26 de June de 2019, de DANE:

www.dane.gov.co

Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE). (June 12, 2019 de June de 2019). Obtenido de <http://www.dane.gov.co>

Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). (20 de November de 2018). Departamento Nacional de Planeacion.

Recuperado el 20 de May de 2019, de <https://www.dnp.gov.co/DNPN/Paginas/Plan-Nacional-de-Desarrollo.aspx>

DNP. (17 de July de 2019). Begin Implementation of New Policy Multipurpose Cadastre in Colombia. Recuperado el 22 de July de 2019, de Departamento Nacional de Planeacion: www.dnp.gov.co

ECLAC. (2017). Social Panoram for Latin America and the Caribbean . Santiago: United Natios.

El Espectador. (2016). La Desigualdad de Colombia es una de las mas altas del mundo.

El Tiempo. (17 de Junio de 2017). Unos 130 ex-combatientes de las FARC asesinados desde el Acuerdo. Recuperado el 18 de julio de 2017, de <https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/cali/unos-130-excombatientes-de-las-farc-asesinados-desde-el-acuerdo-376388>

Foster, J. F. (1981). Syllabus for Problems in Modern Society: The Theory of Institutional Adjustment. Journal of Economic Issues, XV(4), 929-935.

Hodgson, G. (2006). What are Institutions. Journal of Economic Issues, XL(1), 2.

Indepaz. (2021). Cinco Años del Acuerdo de Paz. Recuperado el December de 2021, de INDEPAZ: <http://www.indepaz.org.co/>

Kroc Institute. (2021). Five years of Peace Agreements Implementation in Colombia. Obtenido de Kroc Institute: <https://kroc.nd.edu/>

Kurtenbach, S. (2021). Un concepto global de Paz. En K. B. (eds)., Los enredos de la Paz (págs. 35-43). Bogota: Fescol-GIGA.

Kurtenbach, S. (June de 2019). The Limits of peace in Latin America. Peacebuilding. doi:10.1080/21647259.2019.1618518

Machado, A. (2009). La Reforma Rural. Una Deuda Social y Política. Bogota: CID, Universidad Nacional.

Parada, J. (2006b). A Pragmatic Institutional Economics Approach on Development and Institutions: The Case of Colombia. Kansas City, MO, USA.

Parada, J. (2011). Instituciones, Desarrollo y Regiones: El Caso de Colombia. Barranquilla, Colombia: Universidad del Norte.

Santamaría, M., Rojas, N., & Hernández, G. (2013). Crecimiento Económico y Conflicto Armado en Colombia. (DNP, Ed.) Archivos de Economía (400).

United Nations Security Council. (2019). United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. Report, United Nations, Bogota.

World Bank. (13 de June de 2019). Obtained from <http://www.worldbank.org>

World Bank. (21 de June de 2019). Global Monitoring Report 2014-2015. Obtained from <http://datatopicsworldbank.org/gmrpalma-index/html>