Central Bank Digital Currency and Quantitative Easing

Martina Fraschinī, Luciano Somoza, Tammaro Terracciano
1 Swiss Finance Institute, 2 HEC, University of Lausanne, 3 GFRI, University of Geneva

Summary

Problem:
Study how the introduction of a CBDC interacts with ongoing monetary policies (standard policy or quantitative easing).

Results:
The equilibrium impact of a CBDC depends on the ongoing monetary policy.
The introduction of CBDCs can be neutral to the economy under specific conditions.
Under quantitative easing, commercial banks optimally use their excess reserves to accommodate retailiers’ demand for switching from bank to CBDC deposits.
Introducing a CBDC is likely to render quantitative easing a quasi-permanent policy.

What is a Central Bank Digital Currency?
“[A CBDC is] a digital payment instrument, denominated in the national unit of account, that is a direct liability of the central bank.”
(BIS, 2020)

Motivation

When conducting quantitative easing policies, the central bank creates new reserves and uses them to purchase assets. The result is an increase in the size of the central bank’s balance sheet and an abundance of reserves in the banking system.
• FED’s balance sheet size: ~ 9 trillions USD
• Excess reserves in US: ~ 4 trillions USD
• Bank deposits in US: ~ 17 trillions USD

Model

We extend the 2-period model in Magill, Quinzii and Rochet (2020) by adding an interest-bearing CBDC.

Main assumptions:
• Bank deposits and CBDC deposits are not perfect substitutes;
• The central bank holds assets to back CBDC deposits.

Monetary policies:
1. standard pre-2008 policy:
   → central bank holds treasuries as assets
2. quantitative easing (QE) policy:
   → central bank holds risky securities as assets

CBDC introduction mechanism
When households want to transfer 1 unit of their savings from bank deposits into CBDC deposits, the commercial bank needs to transfer 1 unit of resources to the central bank. The central bank can:
• Liquidate 1 unit of its assets in favour of the central bank → central bank balance sheet: + 1 unit
• Swap 1 unit of excess reserves into CBDC deposits → central bank balance sheet: ± 0 unit

When possible, the central bank prefers to liquidate excess reserves to accommodate households’ demand for CBDC.

Definition. We define the introduction of a CBDC as neutral for equilibrium economic allocations when it has no impact both on bank’s lending and on taxes.

CBDC impact under standard policy
• Since the liquidity requirement is binding, the commercial bank can only liquidate assets in favor of the central bank to accommodate CBDC demand.
• The central bank indirectly channels funds back to the commercial bank.
• The reduction in bank deposits is fully compensated and lending to the economy not affected.

Theorem. Under standard policy, introducing a CBDC is neutral for the economy when there is no impact on taxes:

\[
R^T = (1 + \mu) R^0 - \frac{1}{1 + \mu} R^0
\]

CBDC impact under quantitative easing
• Since the liquidity requirement is not binding, the commercial bank prefers to reduce its excess reserves to accommodate CBDC demand.
• If the demand for CBDC deposits is lower than the amount of excess reserves, lending to the economy remains unchanged.
• If the demand for CBDC deposits is greater than the amount of excess reserves, the central bank is not able to channels funds back to the commercial bank and lending decreases.

Theorem. Under QE, introducing a CBDC is neutral for the economy when there is no impact on lending:

\[
R^T = (1 + \mu) R^0 - \frac{1}{1 + \mu} R^0
\]

and no impact on taxes:

QE tapering: reverting asset-purchase programs, the central bank sells assets back to the banking sector in exchange for reserves.

This operation would be much harder after introducing a CBDC for two reasons:
1. Commercial bank’s reserves have been transferred to households in the form of CBDC deposits.
2. Deposits tend to be inelastic.

The adoption of a CBDC under QE policy might render quantitative easing quasi-permanent.

Selected literature