

# Wage effects of employer-mediated transfers

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# Motivation (1)

- ▶ Most governments use firms as intermediaries in the tax-benefit system  
E.g., payroll/income tax withholding; employer-based health insurance; **family transfers**, etc.
  - Sensitive information is revealed and rent opportunities arise (wage effects)
  - General assumption that benefits benefit individuals
  - However, benefits could be incident on employers (e.g., those on benefits could be paid less)
- ▶ Yet, little evidence on the **economic incidence/wage effects** of benefits  
“Identifying wage effects is a tough order” ([Nichols & Rothstein, 2015](#))
- ▶ We focus on **employer-mediated transfers/family allowances**, which are more widespread than publicly known

## Motivation (2)

### Employer-mediated family allowances around the globe:

#### ▶ Latin American countries

- ▶ Argentina (*Asignaciones Familiares*, 1995-2010 SFC)
- ▶ Brazil (*Salário Família*)
- ▶ Chile (*Asignación Familiar*)
- ▶ Paraguay (*Asignación Familiar*)
- ▶ Perú (*Asignación Familiar*)

#### ▶ Developed countries

- ▶ USA (*Advanced Earned Income Tax Credit*, 1979-2010)
- ▶ UK (*Working Family Tax Credit*, 1999-2003)
- ▶ Italy (*Bonus Renzi 80 Euro*)
- ▶ Switzerland (*Familienzulagen*)

# This paper

*Does it matter how child benefits are paid? Do employers capture part of the transfer when being the remitter? Yes!*

- ▶ We exploit a **change in the payment system** in ARGENTINA
  - Before: disbursed by **employers** (intermediaries)
  - After: disbursed by **social security adm** (direct deposit)
- ▶ **Key**: gradual transition of firms and workers btw 2003-2010  
*Switching date was set by the SSA rather than by firms*
- ▶ **Event study** by switching date: compare monthly wages of employees w/ vs wo/ children within firms
- ▶ **Data**: Population-wide employer-employee admin data (2003-2010)

## Preview of findings

### (1) **The way transfers are disbursed matters (affects the final incidence):**

- ▶ Monthly wages  $\uparrow$  when the govt' becomes the remitter
- ▶ Pass-through: employers captured  $\sim 6/10\%$  of the transfer by paying lower wages

### (2) **Mechanism (preliminary):** labor demand

Likely, transfer understood as wages under the old system

- ▶ Driven by **new hires** rather than **incumbents**; **small** and **less unionized** firms
- ▶ Exercises that rule out pay equity concerns (bargaining story)

# Related literature

## 1. Incidence:

- ▶ Classic result in PF: determined by relative supply-demand elasticities
- ▶ Taxes: **SSC** [Saez et al QJE'12; Saez et al. AER'19; Bozio et al '19]; **Salience** [Chetty et al AER'09]; **Remittance/compliance costs** [Slemrod NTJ'08; Kopczuk et al AEJ-EP'16]
- ▶ **In-work subsidies**: **EITC in the U.S.** [Rothstein AER'10; Leigh '10] and **WFTC in the U.K.** [Azmat QE'18; Brewer-Hoyne FS'19]
- ▶ Other studies: **Price effects of Food Stamps** [Hastings-Washington AEJ-EP'10; Jaravel AERpp'18]; **Health insurance subsidies** [Cabral et al AER'18]

## 2. Design of welfare programs and social protection:


→ *Unintended consequences of delegating key duties to firms*

*We focus on child benefits; change in payment system holding other features constant;  
novel data and research design + mechanisms*

# Outline

1. Setting: FA scheme, reform + staggered roll out
2. Data and empirical strategy
3. Results and robustness checks
4. Mechanisms (labor demand vs supply)
5. Toy model (if time permits)...

# Family Allowances (FA) in Argentina




Note: Schedule in place from 1996 to 2004. Then updated.

- ▶ Child benefit for wage earners
  - Monthly payment that varies by:
    - (i) Number of kids < 18 years old
    - (ii) Monthly wage (3 brackets)
  - Individually-based; one spouse is entitled
- ▶ Funding: contributory system based on employer SSC (7.5% devoted to FA)
- ▶ Adjusted  $\approx$  annually due to inflation
  - ▶ More
  - ▶ Wage Distribution
  - ▶ Macro Context




# The reform: a change in the payment system

## Old system (SFC)




## New system (SUAF)




# Staggered roll-out

- ▶ Gradual roll-out: btw Jun-2003 and Jun-2010 (8 years)
  - Limited capacity to incorporate millions of beneficiaries at once
  - Important: # beneficiaries and FA spending don't ↓ ▶
- ▶ Incorporation: switching date set by the SSA rather than firms



# Staggered roll-out: using E-E microdata


► Macro roll-out



Note: Gradual transition of firms and workers out of the old system.


► Event frequency

## Roll-out by firm size



Note: Large firms switched first into the new system (size = N of employees in 2003).  
(N firms by group: 86,868 small, 23,159 medium, 5,839 large). ▶ Delinquency rate

# Empirical strategy: event study



## ► Sample: unbalanced panel of firms

- paying FA from  $t=-6$  to  $t=0$
- present in  $-6/+6$  months around the event
- with eligible & non-eligible workers in the window:
  - T: employees w/ children ages [0-17]
  - C: employees wo/ children ages [0-17]
- collapse data at the firm-month-year level ( $f,t$ )

## ► Run a regular event-study specification

$$G_{f,t}^{\bar{w}} = \sum_{j=-13}^{12} \gamma_j \cdot d_{f,t}^j + \mu_f + \mu_t + \epsilon_{f,t}$$

# Administrative Data

## 1. **Employer-employee (SICOSS)** (2003-2010)

- ▶ E-E panel available since 1995 [**monthly frequency**]
- ▶ Main vars: monthly pre-tax wage, monthly transfer


## 2. **Family relationships database**

- ▶ Links family members (spouse, children); also DOB

## 3. **Other:** (a) Monthly financial situation of employers (Apr'03-Nov'04); (b) Union's CBA dataset

# First stage: Benefit delivered by employers


► Saliency: Pay Slip




Note: On average, treated workers receive  $\sim 90$  pesos more in transfer, paid by employers, than the control group (simple mean difference). About 10% of average monthly wages.

# Wage effects: 12 months

(a) Average wage levels



(b) Average wage gap




Note: Mean wage of workers w/ kids increased by  $\sim 6$  pesos, relative to workers wo/ kids, after firms switched to new system (pre Aug'08).  $G_{f,t}^{\bar{w}} = \sum_{j=-13}^{12} \gamma_j \cdot d_{f,t}^j + \mu_f + \mu_t + \epsilon_{f,t}$  ► p25 vs p75




# Wage effects: 24 months

(a) Average wage levels



(b) Average wage gap



Note: Mean wage of workers w/ kids increased by  $\sim 12$  pesos, relative to workers w/o kids, after firms switched to new system (pre Aug'08).  $G_{f,t}^{\bar{w}} = \sum_{j=-13}^{12} \gamma_j \cdot d_{f,t}^j + \mu_f + \mu_t + \epsilon_{f,t}$  ► Composition

# Pass-through rate

	All post periods [0;11] (1)	Last 6 periods [6;11] (2)	Last period [11] (3)
<b>Reduced form</b>			
$\Delta$ monthly wage (in pesos)	4.69*** (1.21)	5.93*** (1.52)	5.73*** (1.88)
<b>First stage</b>			
$\Delta$ transfer ( $\tau^e$ ) (in pesos)	-94.13*** (0.35)	-95.28*** (0.37)	-93.94*** (0.38)
<b>2sls</b>			
$\frac{\Delta wage}{\Delta transfer(\tau^e)}$	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)
Number of firms	26,226	26,226	26,226
Observations	2,285,705	2,128,349	1,998,351
Avg wage at t-1	871	871	871

Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses.

$$G_{f,t}^w = \beta_1 Window_{f,t} + \beta_2 \cdot Window_{f,t} \cdot Post_{f,t} + \beta_3(1 - Window_{f,t}) \cdot Post_{f,t} + \mu_f + \mu_t + \epsilon_{f,t},$$

where *Window* is an indicator for the *event window*.

► Robustness Checks

► Dynamic window

# Potential Mechanisms

→ Anecdotal/survey evidence on **misperception** of transfers

## Labor demand story?

- ▶ Employers exploit confusion of the old regime and capture part of the transfer
  - Result driven by **new hires** rather than **incumbents**
  - Result driven by **small** and **incorporated** firms
  - Wage effect larger for **less unionized** firms

## Bargaining story? unlikely

- ▶ Confused employees bargain more aggressively after the event (pay equity concerns)
  - Ruled out by **immediate effect at  $t=0$**  and **new hires**
  - Also effect broken by **firm exposure** is not U-shaped

# Anecdotal evidence about recipient's perception

## 1. Quote from a book on social security:

*"... the old system (SFC) blurred the image of the State as responsible for it. (...) The roles are confused. People consider that these benefits integrate their salary and that employers are responsible for them. They even ignore that it is the State that pays for the benefit ..."*

CIESS (2007). *"Políticas de Protección familiar, Régimen de Asignaciones Familiares y principales planes sociales en la República Argentina"*


## 2. SSA phone survey (2018)

Who is the responsible of paying the transfer (FA)?

Answers	
A. Government	35.4%
B. Employer	8.6%
C. Other	4.0%
D. Don't know	52.0%

Source: Based on a SSA report ([Cruces, 2019](#)).


## Wage effects: new hires vs incumbents




Note: incumbents: workers present  $-7/+7$  months around the event. The difference between lines captures the wage effect on new hires.  $G_{f,t}^{\bar{w}} = \sum_{j=-6}^5 \gamma_j \cdot d_{f,t}^j + \mu_f + \mu_t + \epsilon_{f,t}$

# Wage effects: By size and type of business

(a) Small vs Non-small firms




(b) Incorporated vs Unincorporated



Note: Firm size is the average number of employees from t-12 to t-1.

## Unionization: Pass-through by firms' share of unionized workers



Note: Each dot refers to a separate regression. Wage effects are greater in less unionized firms.

## Potential Mechanisms

→ Anecdotal/survey evidence on **misperception** of transfers

### Labor demand story?

- ▶ Employers exploit confusion of the old regime and capture part of the transfer
  - Result driven by **new hires** rather than **incumbents**
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  - Wage effect larger for **less unionized** firms


### Bargaining story? unlikely

- ▶ Confused employees bargain more aggressively after the event (pay equity concerns)
  - Ruled out by **immediate effect at  $t=0$**  and **new hires**
  - Also effect broken by **firm exposure** is not U-shaped



## Horizontal equity? Pass-through by firm exposure to FA

► Exposure Density



Note: Each dot refers to a separate regression. Wage effects are greater when firms have a higher share of employees receiving child benefits.

# Conclusions

- ▶ **The way transfers are disbursed matters (affects the final incidence)**  
(i.e., benefits are not captured dollar-for-dollar by workers)
- ▶  $\Delta$  in the remittance system (from employers to the govt):
  - ▶ Wages  $\uparrow$  after firms switch to the government-based system
  - ▶ Pass-through: employers capture  $\sim 6/10\%$  of the transfer by paying lower wages
  - ▶ Labor demand mechanisms seem to be at play
- ▶ These results raise concerns about the use of firms as intermediaries to disburse benefits
  - ▶ Less salient schemes may lead to capture by employers
  - ▶ Welfare improving reform from workers' point of view

## Theoretical framework (if time permits)

Simple model to rationalize our findings (based on Gruber 1997):

$$L^s = L^s(\tilde{w}) = L^s(w(1 + (1 - q)\tau^e)) \quad (1)$$

$$L^d = L^d(w) \quad (2)$$

where  $\tilde{w}$ : **perceived wage** as fx of true wage ( $w$ );  $q$ : **perception parameter**;  $\tau^e$ : **transfer delivered by employers**, with  $\tau^e = \bar{\tau} - \tau^g$

- ▶ **q=1**: perfect perception  $\rightarrow$  perceived wage equals the true wage  $\tilde{w}_1 = w$
- ▶ **q=0**: full misperception  $\rightarrow$  perceived wage includes the transfer  $\tilde{w}_0 = w(1 + \tau^e)$

## Theoretical framework (if time permits)

Totally differentiating supply and demand, and rearranging terms we get:

$$\left. \frac{d\ln(w)}{d\ln(1 + \tau^e)} \right|_{\bar{\tau}=\tau^e+\tau^g, \bar{q}=q} = \frac{\eta^s \cdot (1 - q) \cdot \left[ \frac{(1+\tau^e)}{(1+(1-q)\tau^e)} \right]}{\eta^d - \eta^s} \quad (3)$$

Extreme cases:

- ▶ **q=1**, perfect understanding  $\longrightarrow \frac{d\ln(w)}{d\ln(1+\tau^e)} = 0$  **standard incidence result**
- ▶ **q=0**, full misperception  $\longrightarrow \frac{d\ln(w)}{d\ln(1+\tau^e)} = \frac{\eta^s}{\eta^d - \eta^s} < 0$  **wage effects!!**

## Change in perception ( $q$ )

- $\Delta$  in the remitter  $\longrightarrow \Delta$  the information content to employees  
 $\longrightarrow \Delta$  scheme's perception ( $q$ ), therefore on final incidence.


$$\left. \frac{d \ln(w)}{d \ln(1 + \tau^e)} \right|_{\bar{\tau} = \tau^e + \tau^g} = \frac{(1 + \eta^{(1-q)}) \cdot \eta^s \cdot (1 - q) \cdot \left[ \frac{(1 + \tau^e)}{(1 + (1 - q)\tau^e)} \right]}{\eta^d - \eta^s} \quad (4)$$

with  $\eta^{(1-q)} = \frac{\partial(1-q)}{\partial \tau^e} \cdot \frac{\tau^e}{(1-q)} > 0 \longrightarrow$  *misperception elasticity* i.e., how much  $(1 - q)$  changes as the money disbursed by employers increases (reinforces the main effect)


# Workers' composition

► Go back

(a) Levels



(b) Difference




Note: Workers' composition stable at the beginning and then favors workers without children.

$$G_{f,t}^N = \sum_{j=-13}^{14} \gamma_j \cdot d_{f,t}^j + \mu_f + \mu_t + \epsilon_{f,t}$$

# Total employment

► [Go back](#)



Note: Firms size increases in the long-run (driven by workers wo/ children).  $N_{f,t} = \sum_{j=-13}^{14} \gamma_j \cdot d_{f,t}^j + \mu_f + \mu_t + \epsilon_{f,t}$

# Transfer saliency in payslip

► Go back

EMPLEADOR: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX		CAJA: XXXXXXXX	
DOMICILIO: LA PLATA		Nº DE INSCRIPCIÓN:	
LEGAJO Nº	APELLIDOS Y NOMBRES	FECHA DE PAGO	SUELDO O JORNAL
3	XXXXXXXXXXXX	04/06/2010	1302.27
FECHA DE DEPÓSITO		FECHA INGRESO	DOCUMENTO
07/05/2010 04/10		01/03/1987	
BANCO		SECCIÓN	TARIFA
Pcia.Bs.As.			MAB
CODIGO	CONCEPTO	HABERES	DEDUCCIONES
1	Sueldo básico	30	1302.27
2	Antigüedad	23	419.33
3	Presentismo	8.33%	299.71
200	Jubilación	11%	222.34
201	Ley 19.032	3%	60.64
202	Obra Social	3%	116.93
203	Cuota Sindical	2%	77.95
208	P.A.E.C.T.S.	0.5%	16.11
301	Asig. sijo.		720.00
502	Asig. Acuerdo. 01 2010		75.00
504	Acuerdo Colect. 04 2009		300.00
505	Acuerdo Colectivo Abril 08		444.32
CUIL: XXXXXXXX		Categoría: MAESTRANZA B	
Hab. Mo Rem: 819.32		Acred. en: Efectivo	
LUGAR DE PAGO		TOTAL HABERES	TOTAL DEDUC.
XXXXXX		3560.63	487.97
		NETO A COBRAR: 3072.66	
RECIBI CONFORME LA SUMA DE: PESOS TRES MIL SETENTA Y DOS CON 66/100			
EN CONCEPTO DE MES HABERES CORRESPONDIENTES AL PERÍODO AÑADA INICIADO Y SEGUN LA PRESENTE LIQUIDACION, ELIANDO CONSTANCIA DE HABER RECIBIDO UN DUPLICADO DE ESTE RECIBO.			
FIRMA EMPLEADO			

Transfer = \$720  
(\$180 x 4 kids)  
ATR = 23%

Paid by employers (SFC)


EMPLEADOR: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX		CAJA: XXXXXXXX	
DOMICILIO: LA PLATA		Nº DE INSCRIPCIÓN:	
LEGAJO Nº	APELLIDOS Y NOMBRES	FECHA DE PAGO	SUELDO O JORNAL
3	XXXXXXXXXXXX	04/08/2010	1302.27
FECHA DE DEPÓSITO		FECHA INGRESO	DOCUMENTO
07/07/2010 06/10		01/03/1987	
BANCO		SECCIÓN	TARIFA
Pcia.Bs.As.			MAB
CODIGO	CONCEPTO	HABERES	DEDUCCIONES
1	Sueldo básico	30	1302.27
2	Antigüedad	23	419.33
3	Presentismo	8.33%	143.41
200	Jubilación	11%	205.15
201	Ley 19.032	3%	55.95
202	Obra Social	3%	99.27
203	Cuota Sindical	2%	66.18
208	P.A.E.C.T.S.	0.5%	16.54
502	Asig. Acuerd. 06 2010		75.00
503	Acuerdo 01 2010		100.00
504	Acuerdo Colect. 04 2009		300.00
505	Acuerdo Colectivo Abril 08		344.32
506	Asig. Acu. Emer 2008		100.00
507	Ad. Mo Rem. Ac. 06 2010		396.14
508	Presentismo art 40		109.58
CUIL: XXXXXXXX		Categoría: MAESTRANZA B	
Acred. en: Efectivo			
LUGAR DE PAGO		TOTAL HABERES	TOTAL DEDUC.
XXXXXX		3290.05	443.09
		NETO A COBRAR: 2846.96	
RECIBI CONFORME LA SUMA DE: PESOS DOS MIL OCHOCIENTOS CUARENTA Y SEIS CON 96/100			
EN CONCEPTO DE MES HABERES CORRESPONDIENTES AL PERÍODO AÑADA INICIADO Y SEGUN LA PRESENTE LIQUIDACION, ELIANDO CONSTANCIA DE HABER RECIBIDO UN DUPLICADO DE ESTE RECIBO.			
FIRMA EMPLEADO			

Paid by govt (SUAF)




# Inflation and Indexing

► Back FA



(a) Persistent inflation




(b) Evolution of FA brackets and MW


Notes: (a) CPI denotes consumer price index; RIPTE index is the average monthly wage of registered workers (in current pesos). (b) FA brackets are adjusted roughly once per year, with some gaps.

# GDP and Employment

► Back FA



(c) **Economic activity (EMAE)**




(d) **Private employment**

Notes: (a) large drop in economic activity from August 2008 onwards;

(b) stabilization of employment in the third quarter of 2008.


# Distribution of monthly wages

► Back FA



Note: figure corresponds to May'04; employees w/ kids working for 12 months.  
Notch 1 is located at p40, Notch 2 is located at p70, Notch 3 is located at p80.


## Macro roll-out (official budget information) [► Go back](#)




Note: gradual decline in the share of FA paid through the old system (SFC).

# FA spending and Beneficiaries

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(e) **FA spending (micro vs macro)**



(f) **Beneficiaries (number of children)**

Notes: (a) increase in FA spending over time; replicate macro aggregates using micro-data.

(b) N children receiving the transfer increases (economy booming + formalization).

# Incorporation schedule: memo (1)

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## (a) Memo (body text)

*Resolución N° 333/2005<sup>1</sup>*

### *Cronograma de inclusión de empleadores al Sistema Único de Asignaciones Familiares. A.N.Se.S.*

**Artículo 1°**— Apruébase el cronograma de inclusión al Sistema Único de Asignaciones Familiares (S.U.A.F.) respecto de los empleadores que se encuentran detallados en el Anexo que forma parte integrante de la presente, y que obligatoriamente serán incluidos formalmente al Sistema Único de Asignaciones Familiares en forma paulatina hasta el mes devengado diciembre de 2005.

**Artículo 2°**— La Gerencia de Prestaciones notificará fehacientemente a los empleadores referenciados en el artículo 1° de la presente sobre los requisitos que deberán cumplir y la documentación que deberán presentar ante la Unidad de Atención Integral/Área Central de esta Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social, a los efectos de quedar incluidos formalmente en el Sistema Único de Asignaciones Familiares.

## (b) Memo annex (with employer identifiers)



333

Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social




ANEXO

20-05047024-6	JUAN NESTOR NARCISO
20-07924169-6	BORDA PAULINO APARICIO
20-14131275-9	WINGEYER HUGO DANIEL
20-17071721-0	BALLARIO JORGE ALBERTO
20-17639159-7	FRIGERIO FERNANDO DANILO
20-20195515-8	CIPOLLONE RAUL ALBERTO
20-22126363-5	RUIZ DIAZ EULOGIO ANTONIO
23-05243056-9	MOROSI RICARDO EDER
23-14940864-9	ROJAS RICARDO ALFONSO
27-13881818-2	HULZANQUI PATRICIA CARMEN
27-22127177-2	GONZALEZ MARIELA ALEJANDRA
30-57189536-2	LINEA 22 SOCIEDAD ANONIMA
30-63872707-9	GREEN S A
30-65464085-4	SE NE MI SRL
30-66760328-1	ASOCIACION COOPERADORA HOSPITAL MUNICIPAL

# Scheduled vs observed incorporation (micro-data)

► Go back



- We digitized 50+ schedule plans:  
~60K firms with their “internal deadline”
- Compare *internal* deadline with the *effective* incorporation date
- **Take away:** high compliance  
~ 90% of firms incorporated before internal deadline

# Formal approval: memo (2)

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## (a) Memo (body text)

*Resolución N° 456/2006<sup>1</sup>*

### *Incorporación de empleadores al Sistema Único de Asignaciones Familiares. A.N.Se.S.*

**Artículo 1°**— Incorpóranse formalmente al Sistema Único de Asignaciones Familiares a los empleadores que se encuentran detallados en el Anexo que forma parte integrante de la presente, a partir del período mensual devengado correspondiente a agosto de 2006.

**Artículo 2°**— Los empleadores deberán continuar abonando las asignaciones familiares a sus trabajadores a través del Sistema de Fondo Compensador hasta el período mensual devengado correspondiente a julio de 2006.

**Artículo 3°**— Los empleadores referenciados en el artículo 1° de la presente, no podrán compensar las asignaciones familiares abonadas a sus trabajadores, a partir del período devengado agosto de 2006.

**Artículo 4°**— Dése cuenta a la Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos (A.F.I.P.).

**Artículo 5°**— De forma.

#### ANEXO

CUIT	Razón Social	U.D.A.I.
30-963840333-8	Agroexport S.A.	U.D.A.I. San Juan

## (b) Memo annex (with employer identifiers)




#### ANEXO

CUIT	RAZON SOCIAL	UDAI
30575438772	CONFRAVE S A I C	GERENCIA UCA
30651778170	CONFRAVE INDUMENTARIA S R L E	GERENCIA UCA
30505426661	TEJEDURIAS NAIBERGER SAICI Y F	GERENCIA UCA
30515772746	TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL	GERENCIA UCA
30515923329	FAMOFEL FABRICA MODELO DE	GERENCIA UCA
30516142452	EPIFANIO VELASCO E HIJOS S A I C I	GERENCIA UCA
30500834087	VIDRIERIA ARGENTINA SOCIEDAD	GERENCIA UCA
30626831660	INDUSTRIAS 9 DE JULIO S A	OFICINA 9 DE JULIO
30666501396	COOP DE COOPERATIVAS DE	OFICINA 9 DE JULIO
30545724819	COOPERATIVA ELECTRICA Y DE	OFICINA 9 DE JULIO
30545744569	COOPERATIVA DE ELECTRICIDAD	OFICINA BALCARCE
30593302462	MHOR INDUSTRIAL S A	OFICINA ESCOBAR
30610738369	ASOCIACION CIVIL NAUTICO	OFICINA ESCOBAR
30608964076	MARTIN BARROCAS Y CIA SRL	OFICINA ESCOBAR
30520473501	MANDOLA MATEO LORENZO Y	OFICINA ESCOBAR
30662051868	ABRANTES SA	OFICINA ESCOBAR
20101633331	SZYKULA MIGUEL ANGEL	OFICINA ESCOBAR
20121737052	KANDRACHOFF NESTOR PABLO	OFICINA ESCOBAR
30578380015	GOYAIKE S A A C I Y F	OFICINA ESCOBAR
30653466931	GNC ESCOBAR SA	OFICINA ESCOBAR
30580736528	BEST PAINT S A	OFICINA ESCOBAR
30559721502	PRENSADORA MURO SOCIEDAD DE	OFICINA ESCOBAR
30522601264	COOP ELECT CONS Y SERVICIOS	OFICINA GENERAL ALVEAR



## Formal vs observed incorporation (micro-data)

► Go back



- Hard to track universe of approval memos
- We make public queries on a random sample of 300 firms to check the formal incorporation date (see next slide)
- Compare *formal* vs *observed* dates
- **Take away:** high compliance  
~ 80% incorporated right at the formal approval date  
No incentives to delay: can't *compensate* paid transfers

► [Go back](#)



**ANSES** autopista de Servicios

2.0

Consulta de Habilitación de Empresas en SUAF

CUIT:  (Ingrese sólo dígitos)

Ingrese el código de la imagen: 

**Consultar**

**Datos de la Empresa**

Razón Social: TERRA CITRUS SRL

Estado: HABILITADO

Detalle: DESDE EL DEVENGADO 08/2004 POR RESOLUCION. D.E. ANSES Nº 641/03 DEL 29-05-03

# Notification to employees (affidavit)

► Go back

<b>ANSES</b>	Form. PS.1.61	<b>Notificación del Régimen de Asignaciones Familiares Sistema Único de Asignaciones Familiares</b>
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Frente 1

**Este Formulario reviste carácter de Declaración Jurada y se debe completar en letra de imprenta, sin tachaduras ni enmiendas**

## RUBRO I - DATOS DEL TRABAJADOR (a completar por todos los trabajadores con o sin cargas de familia)

Apellido y Nombre Completo		Fecha de Nacimiento		Nacionalidad
CUIL	Tipo y N° Doc./CUIL		Sexo	Estado Civil
Domicilio - Calle - Numero				
Piso	Depto.	Código Postal	Localidad	Provincia
Teléfono		Dirección de Correo Electrónico		

## RUBRO II - DATOS DEL EMPLEADOR

Razón Social		CUIT		
Domicilio - Calle - Numero				
Piso	Depto.	Código Postal	Localidad	Provincia
Teléfono		Dirección de Correo Electrónico		

Dejo constancia, por medio de la presente, que en el día de la fecha, me he notificado de las normas básicas y principales derechos que me asisten con relación al Régimen de Asignaciones Familiares y que surgen del cuadro existente al dorso de la presente, recibiendo copia, en este acto, de la Ley N° 24.714, sus normas reglamentarias y de la Resolución ANSES N° 292/08 y sus modificatorias. Asimismo, me notifico que los trámites para solicitar la liquidación y pago de las Asignaciones Familiares que me correspondan deberá realizarlos personalmente o a través de un "Representante" designado por mí para tal fin, dentro de los plazos que surgen del cuadro existente al dorso de la presente, en cualquiera de las Unidades de Atención de ANSES, presentando -cuando corresponda-, debidamente confeccionados, los Formularios respectivos y la documentación que en cada caso se detalla, además de la que adicionalmente me pudiera ser requerida. Tomo conocimiento, además, que cualquier reclamo deberá formularlo personalmente ante ANSES dentro de los plazos de caducidad establecidos por la normativa vigente, presentando el Formulario PS.2.72 "Reclamos Generales para los Sistemas SUAF y UVHI", debidamente cumplimentado.

Dejo constancia también, que asumo el compromiso de notificar a mi empleador toda novedad/modificación que se produzca con relación a mis cargas y relaciones de familia, acompañando la documentación que las acredite, a efectos de que éste las informe a ANSES a través del Programa de Simplificación Registral.

Me comprometo a informar a ANSES el medio de pago a través del cual deseo percibir las Asignaciones Familiares. Finalmente me notifico que todos los datos que aporte a ANSES personalmente, a través de un "Representante" o de mi Empleador, para la percepción de las Asignaciones Familiares, tendrán carácter de Declaración Jurada, reconociendo el derecho de ANSES a reclamarme su restitución o compensar automáticamente los importes con otras asignaciones en caso de percepción indebida de mi parte, sin necesidad de notificación previa por parte del citado Organismo.

Localidad, ..... de ..... de .....


Firma/Aclaración de Firma  
del Trabajador

Firma/Aclaración de Firma y  
Sello del Empleador


- Within ten days after the switch, firms must inform their workers about the new payment mechanism of family allowances
- Employer and employees must sign this affidavit acknowledging the change
- The affidavit + change in pay slips, make the policy change more salient

# Event frequency [► Go back](#)

(a) Excluding 2010




(b) Full period



Note: massive incorporation in Aug'08 (Recession), Jun'09, Mar-Jul'10.

# Distribution of firm exposure to family allowances




Note: exposure defined as the within-firm share of workers with children.

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# Dynamic effects: rolling window of events

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


Note: Each dot refers to a different regression with a *rolling* window of events.

► Go macro context

## Wage effects: $\Delta p_{25}$ and $p_{75}$


► [Go back](#)



Note: Increase in wage is larger for workers located at the bottom of the distribution ( $p_{25}$ ); likely more treated due to the progressive transfer scheme.

## Wage effects: Balanced panel

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


Note: Results remain unchanged for a balanced panel of firms present in the 96 months of data.



## Sensitivity to months of transfer payments (2SLS)


► [Go back](#)



Note: The result is very stable when we vary the sample of firms based on the number of months they were paying family allowances right before the event. We consider firms paying at least 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 months.

## Sensitivity to the event window


► [Go back](#)



Note: Results remain unchanged when we use a time window of 6 months before and after the event instead of 12 months.


## Alternative treatment group definition

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Note: Results remain unchanged when using a treatment group with workers that are fully treated during the period 2003-2010 (with children ages less than 18 years old during the whole roll-out period).


# Wage effects under alternative specifications (including controls)

[► Go back](#)

Note: Event-study estimates for the main specification (blue); controlling for firm size (green); controlling for the gap in the number of T and C workers (orange).

## Delinquency rates: past due debt (90+ days)

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Note: firms switching btw Oct'03 and Jul'04 and in 2005 (N=10,481).