The Information-Driven Financial Accelerator

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- Empirically, it is well-known that credit spreads are large, volatile and countercyclical (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012; Greenwood and Hanson, 2013)
- What are the sources of credit market and macroeconomic fragility?
- Existing theories have focused on frictions in financial intermediation (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; He and Krishnamurthy, 2013) and behavioral biases (Bordalo et al. 2018)

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- This paper shows that imperfect information in credit markets is a strong force behind credit cycles.
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Bond prices move in response to the arrival of noisy information, not just to changes in fundamentals.

 Policies that help to anchor investors' expectations could have substantial financial stability benefits.

Motivat	lion	Model	Results	Mechanism	Evidence
	New Fact Changes in prof		expectations of qu $[\pi_{t+1}] - \operatorname{E}_{t-1}[\pi_t]$	uarter-ahead corporate profit +1]	:
	jointly predict:	excess corporatemacroeconomic	e bond returns aggregates	at long horizons	

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		$R_{t \to t+k} = \alpha + \beta$	$\frac{3rev_t}{\sigma_t} + \gamma controls_t + u_t$!+ <i>K</i>	
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		 macroeconomic 	aggregates	-	
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			$\partial \widehat{R}_{t \to t+k} + \gamma \text{controls}_t$	$+ u_{t+k}$	
	The combined e	effect of \Downarrow rev $_t$ and \Uparrow	σ_t during 2007 financi	al crisis:	
	 spreads ↑ 	80 basis points			
	 investmen 	t \Downarrow 1 percentage poir	nt and GDP \Downarrow 40 basis	points	

Model

Results

Dynamic Model with Financing and Investment

Costly debt financing

default risk

Model

Results

Dynamic Model with Financing and Investment

Costly debt financing + Imperfect information

default risk

• investors do not observe firm's state

$$\mathbf{z}_t = \rho_z \mathbf{z}_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^z$$

learn from a noisy public signal

$$s_t = \varepsilon_t^z + u_t$$

using a Kalman filter

Model

Results

Dynamic Model with Financing and Investment

Costly debt financing + Imperfect information

• default risk

 $\underset{q_t(z_t)}{\Downarrow}$

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Imperfect information \implies

Dynamic Model with Financing and Investment

Costly debt financing +

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 $\downarrow q_t(z_t)$

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$$\bigcup_{q_t(s_t, s_{t-1}, ..., s_0)}$$

Model-based counterfactual for 2007 financial crisis:


- 1/2 of increase in spread
- 1/5 of contraction in aggregate investment

from noisy signals

Amplification


Results

Historical Bond Spread: Data vs. Model




Imperfect information model matches the size and cyclical variation of credit spreads






subjective default probability > actual default probability

Motivation	Model	Results	Mechanism	Evidence
Information un1. higher me2. countercy		and spreads		




- default probability p increasing in b'
- lending schedule r_b(p) increasing in b'
- recession $\Downarrow \rightarrow$ deleveraging $\rightarrow r_b \Downarrow b' \Downarrow$ (first-order effect)





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- recession ↓ → deleveraging → r_b ↓ b' ↓ (first-order effect)



lending schedule shifts to the left due to:
 (i) bad signal (s_L), (ii) noisy signal (σ_u ↑) in recession → r_b ↑ & b' ↓

Motivat	ion	Model	Results	Mechanism	Evidence
	Microdata: IBES: firm	n-level estima	ates of earning forecasts)	
	 ICE/IDC and Warga: bond-level spreads Compustat 		0	5,000 bonds & 10,000 (1982-2010)) firms

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More direct support for our mechanism:

- · Predictability results hold at the firm-level
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⇒ Imperfect information in credit markets is a quantitatively important source of macroeconomic fragility.