



# Luxury or Necessity: How will State and Local Governments Balance Budgets in the Wake of COVID-19?

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# SETTING & QUESTION

## Estimates of Government Revenue Shortfall in FY2021 due to Pandemic: Different Scenarios

	Slow Recovery	Second Wave
State (Whitaker, 2020)	-122.1 \$B	-238.1 \$B
Local (Whitaker, 2020)	-48.7 \$B	-111.8 \$B
Cities (Chernick, Copeland, and Reschovsky , 2020)	-9%	-15%

### Our Questions:

- 1) For which public good & service expenditures are revenue shortfalls felt most?
- 2) How does that vary by geography and level of government?

# EMPIRICAL APPROACH

## Our Approach:

- Apply **Deaton demand system** to **estimate budget share changes** in face of declining income
- Use the Great Recession as an estimating sample and **then project to pandemic**, taking revenue shocks under several scenarios from emerging literature

## **Under $H_0$ :** Budget shares remain constant after income shock

- Non-trivial choice: much practitioner focus on optimal public budgeting frameworks
- Empirical literature tends not to support constant budget shares (Reid 1988, Hoene and Pagano 2009, Desai, 2018)

# HISTORICAL DATA ON EXPENDITURES: US CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS

Near-universe of public entities: **86,608 governments**, including

- **50 states**
- **3,021 counties**
- **35,241 cities and towns**
- **13,430 independent school districts**
- **34,866 special government districts**


All governments surveyed every five years (...2002, 2007, 2012...)

Major governments surveyed every year (representing >90% of total dollars)

# GREAT RECESSION:

- Large negative shock to public revenues
- We estimate response from changes in expenditure between 2007 and 2012
- *Note: Public budgets tend to increase in real terms; even flat revenue is experienced as significant fiscal stress*

Real Revenue by Gov Type (Base Year: 2000)



# PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES: BUDGET SHARES

Allocate expenditures to:

- Civil Administration
  - Education – Elementary
  - Education – Higher
  - Public Safety
  - Health
  - Transport
  - Parks Recreation
  - Utilities
  - Welfare
  - Debt (current only)
  - Retirement (current only)
  - Unemployment (current only)
- Split all expenditures into **current operations** and **capital outlays**
  - Intergovernmental transfers, where targeted, are allocated to funding entity
    - E.g.: State transfer to local governments for safety programs count as State current operations on safety

## STATS: SUMMATION OF EXPENDITURES ACROSS GOVERNMENTS

Sums (combined cap & current)	2007 -\$B	2012 - \$B	2007 - %	2012 - %
• Civil Administration	\$347	\$352	11.0%	10.0%
• Education – Elementary	\$899	\$931	28.5%	26.4%
• Education – Higher	\$280	\$352	8.9%	10.0%
• Public Safety	\$245	\$273	7.8%	7.8%
• Health	\$225	\$274	7.1%	7.8%
• Transport	\$288	\$333	9.1%	9.5%
• Parks Recreation	\$99	\$98	3.1%	2.8%
• Utilities	\$247	\$269	7.8%	7.6%
• Welfare	\$222	\$228	7.0%	6.5%
• Debt (current only)	\$105	\$123	3.3%	3.5%
• Retirement (current only)	\$167	\$193	5.3%	5.5%
• Unemployment (current only)	\$29	\$96	0.9%	2.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$3,153</b>	<b>\$3,521</b>		

# EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY (1)

Almost Ideal Demand System, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) in 1<sup>st</sup> differences:

$$\Delta w_{ig} = \beta_i \Delta \log \left( \frac{X_g}{P} \right) + \sum_j \gamma_{ij} \Delta \log(p_{jg})$$

## Variables

- $\Delta w_{ig}$ : government  $g$ 's budget share for good  $i$
- $X_g/P$ :  $g$ 's real expenditure on good  $i$
- $p_{jg}$ : prices of the  $J$  goods available to  $g$ .

(Each good  $i$ 's demand is a function of all prices.)



## EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY (2)

Almost Ideal Demand System, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) in 1<sup>st</sup> differences:

$$\Delta w_{ig} = \beta_i \Delta \log \left( \frac{X_g}{P} \right) + \sum_j \gamma_{ij} \Delta \log(p_{jg})$$

### Features

1.  $\beta_i$  is the sensitivity of budget share to a changes in real expenditures
2. Sum of all goods elasticities,  $\beta_i$ , equals zero in first differences.
3. The null,  $\beta_i = 0$ , is proportional changes in expenditures with changes in budget
4.  $\beta_i < 0$  means that an income reduction leads to an **increase** in relative budget share for good  $i$  (less than one-for-one cuts).... a “**necessity**” good.
5.  $\beta_i > 0$  means that an income reduction leads to a **decrease** in relative budget share for good  $i$  (more than one-for-one cuts) .... a “**luxury**” good.

# RESULTS – PART 1

ESTIMATING THE  $\beta_i$  FROM  $\Delta w_{ig} = \sum_j \gamma_{ij} \Delta \text{LOG}(p_{jg}) + \beta_i \Delta \text{LOG}\left(\frac{X_g}{P}\right)$

- By expenditure category (education, health, etc.) and by jurisdiction type (state, county, etc.)
- Our best specification: Estimate the  $\beta_i$  for sub-state entities within each state to pick up elasticity heterogeneity



## RESULTS FROM $\beta_i$ ESTIMATIONS:

Summarizing which categories have statistically significant changes in budget shares

<b>Elasticity</b>	<b>Necessities</b>	<b>Luxuries</b>
State	Higher Education, Retirement	Transport, Civil Admin
County	Public Safety, Civil Admin; Transport	Public Health, Capital Investments
Cities	Public Safety; Civil Admin, Debt	Utilities; Capital Investments


## PREDICT THE EFFECT ON COVID-19 ON PUBLIC GOODS PROVISIONS

- Requires an assumption about the intensity of the COVID-19 economic shock on government budgets
- In the paper, we use 3 simulations:
  - A 9% government revenue shock (akin to “slow recovery” in literature)
  - A 15% government revenue shock (akin to “second wave” in literature)
  - **Heterogeneous shocks by State (a la Whitaker (2020)):**
    - “Second wave” with muted economic effects (e.g., partial shutdowns)






Total Government Response, Heterogenous Shocks (High)




- Necessities:
- K-12 Educ.
  - Higher Ed
  - Retirement
  - Safety
  - Debt Pymt

Total Government Response, Heterogenous Shocks (High)





Total Government Response, Heterogenous Shocks (High)




**These are the rebalancing effects**

- Necessities:
- K-12 Educ.
  - Higher Ed
  - Retirement
  - Safety
  - Debt Pymt

- Luxuries:
- Welfare
  - Civil Admin
  - Transport
    - Current
    - Capital
  - K-12 Ed
  - Capital

Total Government Response, Heterogenous Shocks (High)






# RESULTS – PART 2: HETEROGENEITIES BY STATE

MAP WHAT MATTERS MORE / LESS ACROSS STATES






Reduction due to Rebalancing, 2nd Wave Scenario: Elem Ed (CUR)



Reduction due to Rebalancing, 2nd Wave Scenario: Transport (CUR)





# TAKEAWAYS

1. Crisis response of shifting capital allocations to current spending
2. Classification of public goods and services into “necessities” and “luxuries”:
  - a) Necessities: education (K12 and Higher), retirement, public safety
  - b) Luxuries: capital spending, transportation, welfare
  - c) Priorities vary by level of government
3. Wide regional heterogeneities in budgetary priorities
  - a) Exogenous factors (weather; geography) shape fiscal response
  - b) Demographic factors also appear important (e.g., unemployment allocations)