Macroeconomic Effects of Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies

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Abstract

This paper examines the macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting in 44 emerging market economies (EMEs) during 1970-2017. We estimate a dynamic panel data model, which takes into account the endogeneity of inflation targeting regime and controls for a variety of factors affecting macroeconomic performance in EMEs. The main findings from our empirical investigation are as follows: inflation targeting is associated with lower average inflation, though its favourable effects, as compared to the alternative monetary strategies, are negligible; we provide firm evidence against the proposition that inflation targeting lowers inflation volatility; there is no evidence whatsoever that inflation targeting has favorable effects on output growth; we find that inflation targeting does not affect output growth volatility.

Motivation

- Since the late 1990s, inflation targeting has been increasingly adopted by emerging market economies (EMEs).
- It is presumed that inflation targeting reduced inflation rates and output volatility in EMEs.
- Distinctive institutional and macroeconomic features of EMEs hindering the design and implementation of effective monetary policy.
- EMEs provide much more valid evidence on the true effects of inflation targeting due to their varying historical experiences in controlling inflation (Walsh 2009).
- The selection bias can be minimized by focusing on EMEs (Gonçalves and Salles 2008).
- There is no consensus in the empirical literature on the macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting in EMEs.

Contribution of the paper

- Working with panel data enables us to avoid the arbitrariness with respect to determining the initial period for non-targeters.
- By adding dynamics, our empirical model incorporates the entire history of the variables.
- Our estimation procedure is capable of dealing with the endogeneity of inflation targeting.
- we investigate the effects of inflation targeting by controlling for several factors, such as: trade openness, foreign shocks, fiscal variables, exchange rate regimes, political factors.

Data and Model Specification

- Annual data for a panel of 44 EMEs during 1970-2017.
- 17 inflation targeters and 27 EMEs with different monetary regimes, serving as a control group.
- The baseline specification of our empirical model:

$$y_{it} = \theta + \alpha y_{i,t-1} + \beta I T_{it} + \delta_k \sum_{k=1}^K X_{k,it} + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- y_{it} denotes the dependent variable for each separate specification: average inflation, inflation volatility, output growth, and output growth volatility, respectively.
- IT_{it} , is a dummy variable which equals 1 if country n is an inflation targeter in period t, and 0 otherwise.
- Control variables: output gap, trade openness, foreign shocks, public debt, budget surplus, exchange rate regimes, and political factors.
- We employ the system GMM estimator. In order to reduce the number of instruments, we have restricted the number of lags used as instruments for endogenous and predetermined variables along with collapsing the instrument set.
- We apply the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction of the two-step variance-covariance matrix.

Results							
	sGMM (1)	sGMM (2)	sGMM (3)	sGMM (4)	sGMM (5)	sGMM (6)	
Lagged inflation volatility	0.406***		0.405*** (0.113)	0.418*** (0.143)	0.453*** (0.141)		
IT dummy	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.004**	0.004***	0.005***	
Foreign inflation volatility	(0.001) 0.250**	(0.001) 0.326***	(0.001) 0.333***	(0.002) 0.340*	(0.001) 0.313*	(0.002) 0.289*	
Output gap volatility	(0.123) 0.398**	(0.121)	(0.114)	(0.197) 0.298	(0.158)	(0.167)	
(Hamilton filter) Output gap volatility	(0.184)	0.560***		(0.205)	0.485**		
(H-P filter) Output growth volatility		(0.171)	0.348***		(0.230)	0.347**	
	0.006	0.000	(0.084)			(0.183)	
Budget surplus	0.006 (0.01 <i>5</i>)	0.009 (0.013)	0.013 (0.015)				
Budget surplus volatility				0.067 (0.210)	-0.020 (0.230)	-0.014 (0.159)	
Fixed exchange rates dummy	0.007** (0.003)	0.005**	0.005**	0.006**	0.005	0.006**	
Terms of trade volatility	0.027*	(0.002) 0.031**	(0.002) 0.025*	(0.003) 0.028**	(0.003) 0.027**	(0.003) 0.027**	
Constant	(0.014) 0.001	(0.013) 0.0008	(0.013) 0.001	(0.013) 0.001	(0.012) 0.001	(0.011) 0.001	
Cross-sections	(0.001) 43	(0.001) 43	(0.001) 43	(0.001) 43	(0.001) 43	(0.001) 43	
Number of instruments	41	41	41	41	41	41	
AR(1) Test	0.102	0.091	0.119	0.118	0.094	0.116	
AR(2) Test Hansen J Test	0.573 0.542	0.518 0.442	0.636 0.486	0.569 0.226	0.514 0.194	0.627 0.433	
Tiunstir o Test	0.5 1.2	0.112	0.100	0.220	0.10	0. 100	
		sGMM	sGMN	4 sC	MM	sGMM	
		(1)	(2)		(3)	(4)	
Lagged output growth volatility		0.125***			14***	0.122***	
IT dummy		(0.042) -0.001***	(0.042 -0.0009	-	.042) 001**	(0.042) -0.0008**	
		(0.0004) 0.014	(0.000		0004)	(0.0003)	
Inflation volatility	Inflation volatility		-0.000 (0.038		.022 .051)	0.012 (0.044)	
Foreign inflation volatility		(0.029)	0.162***			0.135*	
Change of exports volatility		0.083***	(0.049 0.072**		070**	(0.068) 0.063***	
		(0.017)	(0.018	(0	.029)	(0.019)	
Budget surplus).003 .019)	-0.006 (0.014)	
Budget surplus volatility		0.127	0.161			(0101.)	
Tring d		(0.104)	(0.105		0008	0.001	
Fixed exchange rates dummy		0.0006 (0.001)	0.000		0008	0.001 (0.001)	
Constant		0.002***	0.001**	* · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	02***	0.002	
		(0.0005)	(0.000		0004)	(0.000)	
Cross-sections		42	42		42	42	
Number of instruments		40	41		40	41	
AR(1) Test		0.000	0.000		.000	0.000	
AR(2) Test		0.203	0.182		.240	0.234	
Hansen J Test		0.740	0.735	0	.602	0.706	

Results					
	OLS	FE	sGMM		
Lagged inflation	(1) 0.767***	(2) 0.640***	(3) 0.653***		
Lagged Inflation	(0.029)	(0.064)	(0.072)		
IT dummy	-0.008***	-0.024***	-0.014**		
11 Guilling	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.006)		
Foreign inflation	0.432***	0.560***	0.645***		
1 0101611 111111111111	(0056)	(0.060)	(0.126)		
Output gap	-0.275***	-0.305***	-0.667***		
1 5 1	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.235)		
Public debt	0.007	0.034***	0.051*		
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.030)		
Fixed exchange rates dumn		-0.010*	-0.018**		
2	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.008)		
Trade openness	-0.011**	0.012	-0.015*		
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.008)		
Constant	0.012**	-0.005	-0.0006		
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.015)		
AR(1) Test			0.006		
AR(2) Test			0.601		
Hansen JT est			0.317		
	OLS	FE	sGMM		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
Lagged output growth	0.266***	0.186***	0.194***		
	(0.036)	(0.060)	(0.076)		
IT dummy	-0.0077***	-0.0056	-0.010		
	(0.0023)	(0.0044)	(0.0073)		
Inflation	-0.060***	-0.061***	-0.0011		
Fired evaluates mtos	(0.0159) 0.0012	(0.019) 0.0044	(0.045) 0.0178		
Fixed exchange rates dummy	(0.0030)	(0.0057)	(0.0178		
Change of exports	0.103***	0.100***	0.107***		
onango or onporto	(0.0122)	(0.018)	(0.021)		
Short-term foreign debt					
_	-0.0013	0.0024	-0.062		
	(0.0096)	(0.016)	(0.045)		
Public debt	-0.0093**	-0.0177**	-0.030*		
	(0.0044)	(0.0062)	(0.015)		
Constant	0.038***	0.044***	0.053***		
	(0.0037)	(0.0062)	(0.0124)		
AR(1)			0.003		
AR(1) AR(2)			0.003 0.500		

Conclusion

✓ Our empirical study suggests that the advantages of inflation targeting in EMEs seem to be limited by the weak institutional and macroeconomic environment (low central bank credibility, lack of fiscal discipline, fragile financial sector, exposure to sudden capital flows and to adverse shocks, etc.) as well as the need to compromise inflation targets with other short-run goals (smoothing exchange rate fluctuations).

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