Financial Dollarization in Emerging Markets: An Insurance Arrangement

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
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Motivation

Emerging markets are characterized by "Financial Dollarization"

- Credit Dollarization \rightarrow Firms borrow in foreign currency (FC)
- \bullet Deposit Dollarization \rightarrow Households save in FC




Dollarization: Pros vs Cons

- Dollarization: Interpreted as source of financial fragility
- Balance sheet effects (Aoki, Benigno, Kiyotaki (2016))
 - Mismatch: Local currency revenue vs dollar debt
 - Exchange rate depreciation \rightarrow Hurt balance sheets
 - Lower investment, higher unemployment
- Private benefits of holding dollars
 - Limits on dollarization counterproductive

- A model with endogenous dollarization
- Interest rate spread
- Dollarization: Useful insurance purpose
 - Income smoothing for households
- \bullet Household Dollar deposits \rightarrow Credit Dollarization
- $\bullet\,$ Policies to limit dollarization \to Reduce welfare
 - Protectionism

Facts: Deposit and Credit Dollarization

• Deposit Dollarization and Credit Dollarization correlated



Facts: Deposit Dollarization as Hedge

- Relation between GDP and Exchange rate
- I run the following regression

$$\Delta \log(\textit{GDP}_t) = \alpha + \beta \Delta \log\left(\frac{S_t}{P_t}\right) + \epsilon_t$$

- S_t : Exchange rate, LCU per USD
- *P*_t : CPI
- $\hat{\beta} < \mathbf{0}$: Purchasing power of USD is countercyclical
- Dollarized economies $\longrightarrow \hat{\beta} < 0$
- Non-Dollarized economies $\longrightarrow \hat{\beta}$ small or > 0

Facts: Deposit Dollarization as Hedge


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
Facts: Deposit Dollarization as Hedge

- Dollarization high: Depreciations \rightarrow Low growth
 - β (Δ ER, Δ GDP) < 0



Facts: Dollarization and Interest Rates

 \bullet Higher dollarization \rightarrow interest rate spread




Facts: Dollarization and Interest Rates

Dollarization comove with interest rate spreadSpread:


$$R_t^L\left(\frac{P_t}{\mathbb{E}(P_{t+1})}\right) - R_t^F\left(\frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}\frac{\mathbb{E}(S_{t+1})}{S_t}\right)$$

• Central Bank Survey of Expectations



Facts: Credit and Deposit Dollarization

• Credit and Deposit dollarization comove



Interpretation of the Facts

- \bullet Households hold dollars \rightarrow Demand for hedging
 - Exchange rate depreciates in recessions
- Supply of local currency saving is low
 - Local interest rates are higher
 - Limited participation of foreigners, "Original Sin"
- Firms induced to engage in risky dollar borrowing
 - Compensated because of interest rate spread
- Credit & Deposit Dollarization linked: Insurance mechanism whereby firms provide insurance to households.
- Limiting Dollarization limits this insurance mechanism

Literature


- Effects of global financial conditions on emerging markets
 - Neumeyer and Perri (2005); Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007); Fernández-Villaverde et al (2011); Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2016)
- Emerging markets interest rate spread
 - Martin (2013), Hassan (2013), Gabaix and Maggiori (2015)
- Balance sheet effects of dollarization
 - Bleakley and Cowan(2008); Rancieri et al (2010); Dalgic et al (2017)
- Small open economy with financial frictions
 - Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999); Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007); Faia(2007); Christiano et al (2011);
- Dominant role of the US Dollar
 - Eichengreen and Hausmann(1999), Maggiori et al (2017), Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2019), Gopinath et al (2019)
- Dollarization and Financial Crises
 - Christiano, Dalgic, Nurbekyan (2017)

The Model

• Risk averse households: Demand for dollar deposits

- Dollar saving as an insurance
- ► Corr(ΔC, ΔER) < 0</p>
- Limited participation of foreigners
 - Domestic firms need to provide the insurance
- Risk averse firms: Require compensation for risk
 - ► Interest rate spread: $R_t^{l} E_t \left(R_t^{f} \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \right) > 0$
- \bullet Interest rate spread \rightarrow Price of insurance

The Model-Goods Market




Households


- Consume Home good $(c_{h,t})$ and Foreign Good $(c_{f,t})$
- Investments in Home d_t and Foreign f_t assets

$$\max \sum_{t} \beta^{t} \mathbb{E}_{t} u(C_{t}, I_{t})$$
$$C_{t} = \left(\omega^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_{h,t}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\omega)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_{f,t}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

Budget constraint



The Model-Financial Markets



Entrepreneurs

- Operates capital for production
- Have access to Local and Foreign funds
- Subject to financial frictions
 - Costly State Verification (CSV)
 - Limited liability, costly to observe efficiency
- Each bank offers a menu of contracts which specifies an interest rate and leverage
 - ► Gale and Hellwig (1985)
- Entrepreneur net worth determines (N_t) the amount of investment
- Financial accelerator
 - Exchange rate depreciation hurts entrepreneur balance sheet
 - Effects of exchange rate are amplified

Shocks and Covariance

- Export demand shock x_t (Martin (2013), Hassan (2013))
 - Foreigners demand less Home good: $x_t \downarrow$
 - ★ Depreciation S_t ↑: Foreign good more expensive
 - ★ Endowment effect, HH is net buyer of foreign good

 - ★ Lower investment, lower wages

• Interest Rate Shock (N&P (2005); Gertler et al (2007))

► R_t^f ↑

- ★ Investment \downarrow : Cost of borrowing \uparrow + Balance sheet effects
- ★ Consumption ↓: Wages ↓ + Price of composite good \uparrow
- * $Cov(S_t, C_t) < 0$
- Productivity shock z_t
- Volatility shock σ_{Rt}
 - Moves the spread
 - Fernández-Villaverde et al (2011)

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
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Parameters


Parameter	Value	Explanation	
β	$(1.03)^{-1/4}$	Discount factor	Steady state 3% annual rate
R	$1/\beta$	Steady state interest rate	
ω	0.7	Home Bias	Import/Consumption
σ	1.5	CES elasticity	Faia 2007, Backus et al (1992)
γ	5	Risk aversion	Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
			Fernández-Villaverde et al (2013)
ϕ	7.7	Inverse Frisch elasticity	Christiano et al (2011)
\bar{d} \bar{f}	13.3	SS level of local assets	Deposit dollariztion: 33%
	4.45	SS level of foreign assets	Credit dollarization: 41%
$L^f = L^l$	2.04	Steady state leverage	Dalgic et al(2017)
α	0.36	Capital Share	
φ	1	Elasticity of export demand	Gertler and Gilchrist (2005), Aoki et al (2016)
σ_e	0.26	Entrepreneur cross section sdev	Faia 2007, Gertler and Gilchrist (2005)
μ	0.12	Monitoring cost	Faia 2007,Gertler and Gilchrist (2005)
$F(\cdot)$	Lognormal	Entrepreneur distribution	Faia 2007, Gertler and Gilchrist (2005)
			Christiano et al (2011)
ρ_R	0.96	Interest rate shock persistency	Data, Fernández-Villaverde et al (2013)
σR	0.0025	Interest rate shock	Fernández-Villaverde et al (2013)
σ_{R}	0.08	Technology shock	Output Volatility 3%
σ_x	0.04	Export shock	RER Volatility 4%
$\sigma_{\sigma R}$	0.25	Interest rate volatility shock	VIX Index
PσR	0.72	Volatility shock persistence	VIX Index
Pok	0.12	tolating shock persistence	muck

Moment	Model	Bulgaria	Chile	Peru	Hungary	Turkey
σ Industrial Output	3.25%	3.52%	2.16%	3.76%	3.22%	4.24%
σ Real exchange rate	4.25%	6.85%	4.15%	4.43%	2.34%	7.09%
Corr(FC Deposit, FC Credit)	0.58	0.35	0.71	0.34	0.46	0.43
Corr(FC Deposit, Spread)	0.71	0.33	0.47	0.27	0.19	0.37


- I move consumption-ER Correlation
 - SS interest rate spread is generated endogenously
 - Level of spreads is lower than the data



- Corr(ΔC , ΔER) \rightarrow Dollarization
- \bullet More negative correlation \rightarrow Higher Dollarization



• Credit & deposit dollarization related in steady state



Benchmark - Frictionless International Finance

- Imagine risk neutral deep pocket international investors
- Any expected risk premium is erased

$$R_t = R_t^f \mathbb{E}\left(\frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t}\right)$$

- Credit dollarization \rightarrow 0
 - Entrepreneurs do not like risk
- Deposit dollarization ightarrow 1
 - Invest in dollars as long as cov(C, S) < 0</p>

Policy Exercise: Limit Household Dollar Deposits

• Preventing household dollar deposits

- Baseline: Access to foreign assets
- 2 Policy: Households need to pay tax hold foreign assets
- **1** Intenational investors: Risk neutral investors

	Baseline	Tax on Dollar Deposits	International Investors
Deposit Dollarization	33.6%	7.68%	100%
Credit Dollarization	43.7%	17.2%	0%

Policy Exercise: Limit Household Dollar Deposits


	Tax on Dollar Deposits	International Investors
ΔWelfare (In C-units)	-0.42%	16%
$\Delta cov(\Delta C, \Delta S) $	58.62%	-61.3%
Δ Capital	-0.53%	24.4%
Δ Total Saving	5.32%	-11.02%
Δ Entrepreneur Net Worth	-1.81%	10.6%

Preventing Dollarization lowers welfare

- $\bullet~$ GE: Local rates go up \rightarrow Lower investment, output
- Lower capital \rightarrow Lower entrepreneur net worth
- Lower wages + higher saving \rightarrow Lower consumption

Balance Sheet vs Insurance

- Foreign interest rates go up!
- Policy makes the economy more vulnerable



Conclusion

• Increase in dollar credit is a source of worry

- Currency mismatch in non-financial sector
- $\bullet~\mbox{Credit}~\mbox{Dollarization}~\rightarrow~\mbox{Driven}$ by Households' desire for insurance
- Restrictions on dollarization: Counterproductive
 - Undermine a valuable insurance arrangement
 - Improves trade balance
- Other Considerations
 - Limitation on Monetary Policy (For later)
 - Implicit government guarantees (Burnside et al, 99)