

The Impact of the Retirement Slowdown on the U.S. Youth Labor Market*

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November 9, 2019

Abstract

Employment among older Americans has sharply risen since the mid-1990s, particularly in high-skill jobs. How has this labor-supply increase affected other participants in the labor market, and new entrants in particular? Exploiting cross-commuting zone differences in age composition among the old driven in large part by historical birth patterns, this paper explores the impact of retirement trends on youth employment outcomes between 1980 and 2017. I find that in commuting zones where fewer older workers retire due to the initial age structure, the share of younger workers in high-skill jobs declines while the share of younger workers in low-skill jobs rises. Fewer retirements also lead to a rise in the share of younger workers who have higher educational attainment than their job typically requires, declining youth wages, and lower job mobility. Together, the results suggest that the retirement slowdown has contributed to stagnant early career outcomes in recent decades, explaining 30 percent of the rise in the share of younger workers in low-skill jobs between 1980 and 2017.

JEL: J11, J21, J24, J26

*I thank Martha Bailey, Matthias Doepke, Jon Guryan, Lee Lockwood and Matt Notowidigdo for their guidance throughout this project. For helpful comments and discussions, I thank Lori Beaman, Dan Fetter, Ben Friedrich, Sasha Indarte, Seema Jayachandran, Cynthia Kinnan, Shariq Mohammed, Mel Stephens, as well as seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, NBER Labor Studies Fall Meeting, NBER Summer Institute, Northwestern University, Stockholm University, University of Michigan, and Washington University in St. Louis. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Pre-Doctoral Fellowship on the Economics of an Aging Workforce, awarded through the NBER.

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1 Introduction

One of the most striking developments in the U.S. labor market in recent decades has been the sharp rise in the labor supply of older Americans. As the top line in Figure 1 shows, the share of Americans aged 55+ that are employed has increased from 30 to 40 percent since the mid-1990s. This slowdown in retirements is generally attributed to a combination of greater financial incentives to work longer and a greater capacity to work longer (Coile, 2018).¹ Figure 1 also illustrates a lesser-known aspect of retirement trends: older workers are increasingly concentrated in high-skill jobs such as managerial and professional jobs, which is closely linked to the rise in the educational attainment of older generations (Burtless, 2013; Goldin and Katz, 2016).²

At the same time, there is mounting evidence that the youth labor market has stagnated in recent years (Beaudry et al., 2014; Abel et al., 2014). Figure 2 plots changes in occupation group-specific employment shares between 1980 and 2017 among young adults aged 22 to 30, for the group as a whole and separately for those with and without a college degree. While younger workers have made some gains in high-skill occupations, this can entirely be attributed to a rise in college attainment. The share of college-educated younger workers employed in high-skill jobs has actually gone *down* since 1980. Younger workers are increasingly starting their career in low-skill jobs such as retail and personal services, particularly those without a college degree.


Motivated by these two sets of facts, this paper explores the following question: To what extent has the rise in the labor supply of older Americans affected job prospects of younger Americans in recent decades? To answer this question, I compare the evolution of youth employment outcomes across U.S. commuting zones, which have experienced differential changes in the 55+ employment rate over the period 1980-2017. Estimating the causal effect of retirements on younger workers using cross-sectional variation is challenging because unobservable shifts in local labor demand tend to push outcomes of all workers in the same direction, resulting in a mechanical relationship between changes in the 55+ employment rate and changes in youth employment outcomes.

To address this empirical challenge, I employ an instrumental variables approach which

¹Greater financial incentives include changes in Social Security, a transition from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension plans, and rising life expectancy. A shift away from physically demanding jobs and improvements in late-life health have contributed to a greater work capacity.

²The share of Americans aged 55+ with a college degree has risen from 10 to 28 percent between 1980 and 2017. This trend has also contributed to rising employment among older Americans.

Figure 1: 55+ Employment Rate Decomposed by Occupation Groups, 1980-2018




Notes: This graph plots the 55+ employment-to-population ratio, decomposed into occupation groups. Low-skill occupations include agriculture, food/maintenance, personal services and sales (retail/misc). Middle-skill occupations include operators/laborers, office/clerical, production and protective services. High-skill occupations include sales (finance/business), technicians, professionals and managers.

Source: 1980-2018 Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (Flood et al., 2018).

relies on geographic variation in age composition *among* the old to predict retirement trends. Specifically, I construct a Bartik-style instrument by interacting local initial 45+ age shares with national 10-year retirement rates by age. The instrument draws its predictive power from the fact that Americans tend to exit the labor force at specific ages, typically in their 60s. As a result, commuting zones with a disproportionate share of soon-to-be-retired individuals tend to experience a relative decline in their 55+ employment rate over the next 10 years. To support the validity of the instrument, I show that a substantial fraction of the variation in 45+ age composition can be explained by historical birth patterns. This bolsters the notion that the variation underlying the instrument is largely pre-determined, so that 2SLS estimates identify the causal effect of retirement trends.

The main finding of this paper is that fewer retirements have a negative impact on younger workers, not so much in terms of employment levels, but rather in terms of occupations and wages. In commuting zones where fewer older workers retire due to the initial age structure, the occupational distribution among younger workers shifts away from high-

Figure 2: Change in Occupational Composition Among the Young (22-30), 1980-2017



Notes: This graph plots changes in occupation group-specific employment shares between 1980 and 2017, for different subgroups of young adults (*x*-axis). Skill groups are defined as in Figure 1.

Source: 1980 Census, 2016-2017 American Community Surveys.

skill jobs towards low-skill jobs. A one percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate leads to a 0.6 percentage point decline in the share of younger workers employed in high-skill jobs and a 0.5 percentage point rise in the share of younger workers employed in low-skill jobs over 10 years. This pattern of occupational downgrading further manifests itself through a 0.75 percentage point rise in the share of younger workers that are employed in jobs for which they are “overeducated,” in the sense that their educational attainment exceeds what is typically required for their job. Employment declines in high-skill jobs are slightly more pronounced among college graduates, who do experience negative employment effects. In contrast, increases in low-skill employment are concentrated among younger workers without a college degree.

A one percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate also leads to a 3 percent decline in youth wages and a 0.17 percentage point decline in the average job mobility rate among young adults. In response to deteriorating labor market prospects, young adults adjust in two ways: they tend to stay in school longer and net out-migrate away from commuting zones where fewer workers retire, particularly college graduates. While I primarily focus on young adults, teenagers (16-21) and middle-aged individuals (31-44) are also adversely affected, though to different extents and along different margins.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, using a novel empirical strategy, I shed

new light on how changes in the labor supply of the old can affect youth employment outcomes. On the one hand, studies that have exploited time series or state-level variation have found little evidence that the old “crowd out” the young (Gruber and Wise, 2010; Munnell and Wu, 2012). On the other hand, studies that have examined reforms raising the retirement age in European countries which differentially affected firms based on the composition of their workforce provide strong evidence that delayed retirements have short-run crowding out effects at the firm level (Martins et al., 2009; Boeri et al., 2016; Bovini and Paradisi, 2019). Recent work shows that delayed retirements also have a negative effect on promotion opportunities within firms (Bianchi et al., 2019).

The drawback of adopting a macro perspective is that it is hard to disentangle the effect of retirement trends from the effect of other aggregate trends in the economy. While firm-level studies address this by making plausibly exogenous cross-firm comparisons, they have shortcomings of their own. Firm-level research designs cannot capture what happens to the labor market as a whole since they are inherently silent on what happens to workers who are not hired. They also ignore job creation at new firms and job destruction at dying firms since they implicitly compare existing, surviving firms. Lastly, time horizons tend to be shorter given the recency of these policy changes, whereas labor markets typically take time to fully adjust.

This paper strikes a balance between these two approaches by using local labor markets as the unit of analysis (thereby accounting for local general equilibrium effects), studying 10-year changes over four decades, and isolating plausibly exogenous variation in retirement trends due to regional differences in age composition.³ In addition, I not only consider how retirements affect employment, which has been the primary focus of the existing literature, but also other important margins such as occupations, job mobility, schooling choices and location choices. In doing so I try to provide a comprehensive picture of the impact of retirements. I also emphasize the skill-biased nature of retirement trends in the U.S., which has been ignored so far and is essential to understanding their consequences.

The second contribution of this paper is that it provides a new explanation for stagnant youth labor market outcomes. While the misfortunes of young Americans in recent years have been well-documented, much less is known about the underlying causes. There are many potential explanations for worsening job prospects of younger workers without

³A related study is Bertoni and Brunello (2017), which exploits regional differences in age composition (in a different way) to show that delayed retirements induced by changes in the retirement age in Italy have had a negative impact on youth employment.

college degrees, but stagnant outcomes for college graduates are harder to explain. One exception is [Beaudry et al. \(2016\)](#), which argues that a reversal in the demand for cognitive skills driven by trends in information technology took place in the U.S. around 2000, subsequently reducing the demand for high-skill workers. The skill-biased retirement slowdown can be viewed as another important contributing factor. My estimates imply that it can account for 30 percent of the rise in the share of younger workers in low-skill jobs between 1980 and 2017. Alternatively, absent the retirement slowdown, the rise in the share of younger workers in high-skill jobs over this period would have been 45 percent larger.

These findings have important policy implications. To address imbalances in pay-as-you-go pension schemes due to aging populations, many countries are encouraging older workers to work longer, notably by raising the retirement age. It is therefore critical for policy makers to understand what greater labor supply at older ages implies for younger generations, whose burden these policies are supposedly designed to alleviate.

2 Conceptual Framework

In this section, I present a model of the labor market featuring occupational choice to illustrate how a skill-biased labor-supply increase among the old can lead to occupational downgrading among younger workers. The predictions of the model will provide a rationale for the empirical patterns I document in Section 4.

Firm Production

Consider a representative firm combining capital K and labor L according to a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce Q :

$$Q = L^{1-\alpha} K^\alpha \tag{1}$$

where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ captures the degree of substitution between capital and labor. Labor can be decomposed into two types, low-skill (L_L) and high-skill (L_H), which I will refer to as jobs throughout this section. These jobs can be performed by two types of workers, young (L_{Ly}, L_{Hy}) and old (L_{Lo}, L_{Ho}). Labor types are aggregated according to a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) structure, similar to [Card and Lemieux \(2001\)](#):

$$L = (\theta_L L_L^\beta + \theta_H L_H^\beta)^{1/\beta} \tag{2}$$

$$L_L = (\theta_{Ly}L_{Ly}^\gamma + \theta_{Lo}L_{Lo}^\gamma)^{1/\gamma} \quad \text{and} \quad L_H = (\theta_{Hy}L_{Hy}^\gamma + \theta_{Ho}L_{Ho}^\gamma)^{1/\gamma} \quad (3)$$

where $\sum_j \theta_j = 1$ and $\sum_k \theta_{jk} = 1$ for $j \in \{L, H\}$ and $k \in \{y, o\}$. The key parameters of the model are $\beta \leq 1$ and $\gamma \leq 1$, which respectively capture the degree of substitution between low-skill and high-skill labor, and the degree of substitution between younger and older workers within skill types. Higher values of β and γ imply greater substitutability between inputs. The firm optimally chooses labor inputs and capital to maximize profits, taking the output price p , wages w_{jk} and the rental rate of capital r as given:

$$\max_{(K, L_{jk})} L^{1-\alpha} K^\alpha - rK - \sum_j \sum_k w_{jk} L_{jk} \quad (4)$$

where the output price has been normalized to 1.

Occupational Choice and Capital Supply

On the labor supply side, younger and older workers are either of the low-education or high-education type. Denote their labor supply by $(L_y^\ell, L_y^h, L_o^\ell, L_o^h)$, where the superscripts ℓ and h denote education types. The mapping between skill types and education types is not one-to-one. In particular, I assume that high-education type workers can perform both low-skill and high-skill jobs, whereas low-education type workers are confined to low-skill jobs. Moreover, high-education type workers are endowed with heterogeneous abilities to perform high-skill jobs relative to low-skill jobs. Let u and z respectively denote the relative ability parameters of younger and older workers (in terms of relative efficiency units), distributed according to the cumulative distribution functions $F(u)$ and $G(z)$. Therefore, a younger worker with ability u can either earn $u \cdot w_{Hy}$ in a high-skill job or w_{Ly} in a low-skill job, and the choice is governed by whether or not her ability u exceeds the threshold u^* defined by the following indifference condition:

$$w_{Ly} = u^* \cdot w_{Hy} \quad (5)$$

If her ability is higher than u^* , she will choose to work in a high-skill job; if it is lower than u^* , she will choose to work in a low-skill job.

To simplify the exposition, I assume that the ability threshold for high-education type older workers is fixed at \bar{z} , i.e. they no longer respond to changes in relative wages, for

example due to unobserved occupational mobility costs.⁴ As a result, a fraction $F(u^*)$ of high-education type younger workers and a fraction $G(\bar{z})$ of high-education type older workers supply their labor in low-skill jobs, while the remaining fractions $1 - F(u^*)$ and $1 - G(\bar{z})$ supply their labor in high-skill jobs. I make two final simplifying assumptions: (1) education types are perfect substitutes in low-skill jobs, and (2) all workers supply their labor inelastically. This leads to the following labor supply equations:

$$L_{Ly} = L_y^\ell + F(u^*) \cdot L_y^h \quad \text{and} \quad L_{Hy} = \left\{ \int_{u^*}^{\infty} u \cdot f(u) \cdot du \right\} \cdot L_y^h \quad (6)$$

$$L_{Lo} = L_o^\ell + G(\bar{z}) \cdot L_o^h \quad \text{and} \quad L_{Ho} = \left\{ \int_{\bar{z}}^{\infty} z \cdot g(z) \cdot dz \right\} \cdot L_o^h \quad (7)$$

The inelastic labor supply assumption implies that the only labor supply response to a change in wages is the self-selection response among high-education type younger workers, which is embedded in the cutoff u^* . To close the model, I follow [Dustmann et al. \(2017\)](#) and assume that capital is supplied according to $r = K^\lambda$ where $\lambda \geq 0$.

Comparative Statics: Skill-Biased Labor-Supply Increase Among Older Workers

Consider an increase in the labor supply of older workers concentrated in high-skill jobs. In the context of the model, this is equivalent to a labor-supply increase $(d \log L_o^\ell, d \log L_o^h)$ satisfying the following condition:

$$s_{Ho} \cdot d \log L_o^h > s_{Lo} \cdot (s_o^h \cdot d \log L_o^h + s_o^\ell \cdot d \log L_o^\ell) \quad (8)$$

The left-hand side of (8) is the *effective* labor-supply increase of older workers in high-skill jobs, expressed as the initial share of older workers in high-skill jobs $s_{Ho} = (\theta_{Ho} L_{Ho}^\gamma)^{1/\gamma} / L_H$ times the growth in the labor supply of high-education type older workers. Similarly, the right-hand side of (8) is the effective labor-supply increase of older workers in low-skill jobs, which is equal to the weighted average of the growth in the labor supply of low and high-education type older workers ($s_o^h + s_o^\ell = 1$ denotes the initial mix of education types in low-skill jobs), scaled by the initial share of older workers in low-skill jobs $s_{Lo} = (\theta_{Lo} L_{Lo}^\gamma)^{1/\gamma} / L_L$. Letting $d \log L_o^\ell = \delta \cdot d \log L_o^h$ without loss of generality, condition (8) can be restated more succinctly as $s_{Ho} > s_{Lo} \tilde{\delta}$ where $\tilde{\delta} = (s_o^h + s_o^\ell \delta)$.

⁴This is consistent with evidence showing that occupational mobility rates tend to be relatively low at older ages ([Kambourov and Manovskii, 2008](#)). Shutting down self-selection among older workers is not strictly necessary and can be relaxed at the cost of minor additional assumptions.

How do equilibrium wages and the occupational composition of younger workers change in response? To understand what drives changes in the wages of younger workers, consider the totally differentiated first-order conditions for L_{Hy} and L_{Ly} in (4), where the first-order condition for K has already been combined with the capital supply equation and substituted in (see Online Appendix D for details):

$$d \log w_{jy} = \varphi \cdot d \log L + (\beta - 1) \cdot (d \log L_j - d \log L) + (\gamma - 1) \cdot (d \log L_{jy} - d \log L_j) \quad (9)$$

where $\varphi = -\alpha\lambda/(1 - \alpha + \lambda)$. These equations capture optimality on the labor demand side and illustrate the forces at work. The first term captures the complementarity between labor and capital: unless capital is fully elastic ($\lambda = 0$), all wages must go down in response to an overall increase in labor since labor and capital are q -complements under the Cobb-Douglas assumption. The second term captures the complementarity between skill types: assuming imperfect substitutability between skill types ($\beta < 1$), a labor-supply increase “biased” towards high-skill jobs has a positive effect on low-skill wages and a negative effect on high-skill wages since skill types are q -complements under the CES assumption. The greater the substitutability between skill types, the smaller the magnitude of this effect. Similarly, the third term captures the complementarity between age types within skill types: assuming imperfect substitutability between age types ($\gamma < 1$), an increase in the supply of older workers has a positive effect on the wages of younger workers. However, because the labor-supply increase is more pronounced in high-skill jobs, the positive effect on youth high-skill wages is greater than the positive effect on youth low-skill wages.

To obtain the equilibrium change in wages, we have to take into account the occupational choice response of high-education type younger workers, which will have an indirect effect on wages. This response is summarized in the following equation, obtained by totally differentiating the threshold condition (5):

$$d \log u^* = d \log w_{Ly} - d \log w_{Hy} \quad (10)$$

What matters is the change in relative wages, which hinges on whether the skill complementarity effect dominates the age complementarity effect or vice-versa, since they exert opposite pressure on the cutoff u^* (the capital-labor effect cancels out). It turns out that the skill complementarity effect dominates as long as younger and older workers are more substitutable within skill types than skill types themselves, i.e. $\gamma > \beta$, which has empirical

support (e.g., [Card and Lemieux, 2001](#)). In that case, the decline in high-skill wages relative to low-skill wages prompts high-education type younger workers to reallocate away from high-skill jobs towards low-skill jobs until equilibrium is restored. This self-selection response, driven by marginal-ability workers, effectively dampens the change in relative wages.⁵ The following equation gives the equilibrium change in relative youth wages:

$$d \log w_{Ly} - d \log w_{Hy} = \frac{(\gamma - \beta) \cdot (s_{Ho} - s_{Lo} \tilde{\delta})}{1 - (\beta - 1) \cdot \eta_u \cdot A - (\gamma - 1) \cdot \eta_u \cdot B} \cdot d \log L_o^h \quad (11)$$

where $\eta_u > 0$ captures the elasticity of $F(\cdot)$ around the initial threshold u^* , and $A > 0$ and $B > 0$ are just functions of model parameters and initial labor shares (see Online Appendix D for exact definitions). The numerator captures the direct effect of the labor supply shock via firm optimality, whereas the denominator captures the indirect effect via self-selection among younger workers. Under the premise of condition (8) and $\gamma > \beta$, the numerator will be strictly positive and the threshold u^* will go up. The arguments in this subsection are summarized in the following proposition:

Proposition 1. *Consider an increase in the labor supply of older workers satisfying condition (8). If younger and older workers are more substitutable within skill types than low-skill and high-skill labor, i.e. $\gamma > \beta$, then this leads to the following:*

1. *Decline (rise) in the share of younger workers in high-skill (low-skill) jobs:*

$$d \log L_{Hy} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad d \log L_{Ly} > 0$$

2. *Rise in the share of high-education type younger workers in low-skill jobs:*

$$d \log u^* > 0$$

3. *Decline in youth high-skill wages relative to youth low-skill wages:*

$$d \log w_{Hy} < d \log w_{Ly}$$

Proof. See Online Appendix D. □

⁵The response of high-education type older workers, which I have ignored for simplicity, constitutes another dampening effect since it effectively attenuates the skill-biasedness of the original labor supply shock. Assuming either that the labor-supply increase is sufficiently skill-biased and/or that the mass of older workers around the initial ability threshold z^* is not too large is sufficient for the intuition above to go through.

In summary, the conceptual framework laid out in this section illustrates how an increase in the labor supply of older workers concentrated in high-skill jobs can lead in occupational downgrading among younger workers through supply and demand forces. The empirical strategy, which I now turn to, consists in comparing local labor markets which have experienced differential increases in the labor supply of the old. In Section 4, I will show that in places where fewer older workers retire: (1) the share of younger workers in high-skill jobs declines while the share of younger workers in low-skill jobs rises, (2) the share of younger workers that are “overeducated” for their job rises, and (3) wages of younger workers in high-skill jobs decline by more than wages of younger workers in low-skill jobs, consistent with Proposition 1.

3 Empirical Strategy

3.1 Data

The main data sources used in the empirical analysis are the 1980, 1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses 5% samples, as well as the 2006, 2007, 2016 and 2017 American Community Surveys (ACS) 1% samples (Ruggles et al., 2018). I pool the 2006-2007 and 2016-2017 ACS to get a better snapshot of local labor markets in 2007 and 2017. I exclude from the sample individuals confined to institutional group quarters and individuals on active military duty. All outcomes are constructed using Census sampling weights.

I approximate local labor markets using the concept of commuting zones (CZ) . Commuting zones are 741 clusters of counties characterized by strong commuting ties within CZs and weak commuting ties across CZs (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996). I drop Alaska and Hawaii to focus on the continental U.S., resulting in a total of 722 CZs. Since CZs are not directly identifiable in the Census, I follow standard practice and assign individuals living in areas that overlap with multiple CZs to each of those CZs with weights that add up to one and reflect how an area’s population is distributed across those CZs (see Online Appendix A.1 for details). In order to study changes in occupational structure over multiple decades, I use the time-consistent classification scheme developed by Dorn (2009). It distinguishes between 330 individual occupations which I organize into 12 occupation groups similar to Autor (2015). County-level measures of job mobility for the period 2000-2017 come from the Census Bureau’s Quarterly Workforce Indicators.

3.2 Empirical Specification

The empirical strategy in this paper consists in comparing the evolution of youth employment outcomes across commuting zones, some of which have experienced greater increases in the labor supply of the old than others over the period spanning 1980 to 2017.⁶ I measure changes in the labor supply of the old using changes in the 55+ employment rate. Although older workers are often defined as aged 55-64, I include people aged 65+ given that working past 65 has become increasingly common. Online Appendix Figure 1 shows that changes in the 55+ employment rate exhibit a substantial amount of variation, both across CZs and across periods. For the period 2007-2017, the distribution ranges from -7.3 to 8.1 percentage points, with a median of 1.9 and an interquartile range of 3.5 percentage points. Let c denote commuting zones and t denote time periods. The main regression specification pools first-differences across four time periods (1980-1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2007, 2007-2017), controlling for period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ characteristics:⁷

$$\Delta y_{ct} = \alpha_t + \beta \cdot \Delta \text{emp/pop}_{ct}^{55+} + \Gamma \cdot \text{CZ controls}_{c,t-1} + \varepsilon_{ct} \quad (12)$$

where y_{ct} is some outcome of interest. The CZ controls include the employment share of manufacturing, the employment share of routine occupations, an index which measures the extent to which occupations are susceptible to offshoring, the population share of immigrants, the unemployment rate, the female employment rate, as well as demographic composition in terms of age, gender, race and education.⁸

The main coefficient of interest, β , denotes the effect of a one percentage point increase in the local 55+ employment rate on changes in youth employment outcomes over 10 years. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of β is likely to be biased for two reasons. First, changes in the 55+ employment rate not only capture flows from employment to inactivity (i.e. retirements), but also flows between employment and unemployment (i.e. hires and separations). This is problematic because hires, layoffs and voluntary quits all tend to be strongly correlated with the state of the local economy, which also affects younger workers. Put differently, in regions where the economy is booming (slumping), firms tend to hire (lay

⁶Dustmann et al. (2016) refer to this method of estimating the effect of labor supply shocks as the “pure spatial” approach. By not classifying older workers into education or occupation cells, this approach recovers the total impact of changes in the labor supply of the old.

⁷Following Autor et al. (2013), first-differences for the period 2000-2007 are scaled by 10/7, so that outcomes are implicitly measured in terms of $10 \times$ mean annual changes for comparability across periods.

⁸Routine occupations are defined as in Autor and Dorn (2013). The full list of controls along with summary statistics is given in Online Appendix Table 1.

off) workers of all age groups resulting in a mechanical relationship between changes in the 55+ employment rate and changes in youth employment outcomes.

Second, retirement decisions can themselves be influenced by the state of the economy. [Coile and Levine \(2011\)](#) find that the retirement propensity of individuals eligible for Social Security rises during downturns, particularly among less educated workers. On the other hand, [Goda et al. \(2011\)](#) argue that asset losses during the Great Recession induced some individuals to delay their retirement plans. Either way, the sensitivity of retirement flows to economic conditions reinforces the notion that changes in the 55+ employment rate may not only reflect labor supply-side variation, but also labor demand-side variation.

3.3 IV Strategy: Local Age Composition Among the Old

To address this endogeneity, I employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach. The idea is that since older Americans tend to exit the labor force at specific ages, it is possible to predict what fraction of people will retire in a given commuting zone over the next 10 years simply based on their initial age composition. As long as age composition *among the old* is uncorrelated with local labor demand conditions, exploiting this variation to instrument for changes in the 55+ employment rate will isolate the causal effect of retirement trends.

To see how the propensity to retire varies over the life cycle, Appendix Figure [A.1](#) plots 10-year retirement rates by age at the national level, defined as the difference between the employment rate of a birth cohort at the beginning of the period and the employment rate of the same birth cohort 10 years later. For example, the 10-year retirement rate of 45 year olds in 1990 is equal to the employment rate of 45 year olds in 1990 minus the employment rate of 55 year olds in 2000. In other words, it captures the proportion of 45 year olds in 1990 who have retired at some point between 1990 and 2000.⁹ Two features stand out. First, the overall bell shape peaking between the ages of 55 and 60 reflects the fact that most Americans retire in their 60s. Conversely, the tails imply that relatively few people retire by the time they reach their late 50s while people in their late 60s and beyond have already retired for the most part. Second, there are noticeable discontinuities at ages 52, 55, 62 and 65, which are tied to eligibility for Social Security and Medicare.¹⁰

⁹For the period 2000-2007, 7-year retirement rates are converted into 10-year equivalents based on the 2000 employment rate-by-age profile. Specifically, the age-specific scaling factors are the ratio of the relevant 10-year and 7-year “retirement rates” according to this profile. These factors range from 3 to 1.2 for 45 and 59 year olds respectively, implying that naively scaling by 10/7 would be a poor approximation.

¹⁰62 is the earliest age one can claim Social Security benefits, while 65 is the universal eligibility age for Medicare.

The implication of these empirical regularities is that one can exploit cross-sectional differences in the age composition among the old to predict future retirement trends, and thereby isolate labor supply-side variation in changes in the 55+ employment rate. I construct a Bartik-style instrument, which I will refer to as “predicted retirement intensity,” by interacting start-of-period CZ-specific 45+ age shares with 10-year national retirement rates by age. Formally, predicted retirement intensity in commuting zone c for the period t to $t + 10$ is defined as:

$$\widetilde{\text{PRI}}_{ct}^{45+} = \sum_{a=45}^{80} \frac{\text{pop}_{ct}^a}{\text{pop}_{ct}^{45-80}} \times \left(\text{emp/pop}_{(-c),t}^a - \text{emp/pop}_{(-c),t+10}^{a+10} \right) \quad (13)$$

where $\text{emp/pop}_{(-c),t}^a$ are national employment rates by age a , excluding the commuting zone under consideration to avoid any mechanical correlation in the first-stage relationship.¹¹ The shape of the 45+ age distribution exhibits a fair amount of variation across commuting zones, as shown in Online Appendix Figure 2. For the period 2007-2017, the distribution of predicted retirement intensity ranges from 18.8 to 21.8 percent, with a median of 20.4 percent and an interquartile range of 0.6 percentage points. Note that, unlike local industry composition or the spatial distribution of immigrants by country of origin (which underlie other common Bartik IV strategies), age distributions are constantly shifting so that whether an area is characterized by high or low predicted retirement intensity naturally varies over time.

3.4 Understanding Variation in Age Composition Among the Old

As argued in [Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. \(2019\)](#), the identifying assumption required for the validity of Bartik-style IV strategies depends on what types of asymptotics are most appropriate given the empirical setting. This paper most naturally falls into the case of locations going to infinity while periods and Bartik share categories are fixed (722 CZs, 4 periods, 36 age categories). In that scenario, the validity of the IV approach hinges on the exogeneity of the initial 45+ age distribution. More specifically, given that the Bartik IV estimator is numerically equivalent to a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator using individual age shares as instruments (and a weight matrix which is a function of 10-year retirement rates by age), the implicit assumption is that the individual 45+ age shares are all valid instruments. To assess the plausibility of this identifying assumption

¹¹I truncate the 45+ age distribution at 80 since age is truncated at 90 in the Census.

this section explores two related questions: (1) which age shares “matter” the most in terms of driving the estimates? (2) what drives cross-sectional variation in 45+ age composition?

To answer the first question, I draw on the insights from [Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. \(2019\)](#). The Bartik IV estimator can be rewritten as a weighted sum of just-identified IV estimators using individual age shares as instruments. The weights—referred to as “Rotemberg weights”—can be positive or negative, sum to one, and capture how sensitive the overidentified estimate of β is to endogeneity of any of the age shares. Appendix Figure A.2 plots the Rotemberg weights for each age share.¹² Interestingly, the pattern in this figure mirrors the pattern in Appendix Figure A.1, with the five age shares for 55-59 having the largest weights. This can be explained by the fact that Rotemberg weights are a direct function of 10-year retirement rates by age, though it need not be the case that the growth rate component dominates (see the examples in [Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2019](#)). These weights shed light on the identifying variation: they imply that 2SLS estimates using predicted retirement intensity as an instrument are essentially comparing commuting zones with an above vs. below-average fraction of people with the highest propensity to retire over the next 10 years. This naturally leads to the next question of whether places with different initial 45+ age distributions, and different initial shares of 55-59 year olds in particular, are valid counterfactuals for one another if the goal is to estimate the impact of retirement trends on youth labor market outcomes.

By definition, cross-sectional variation in age composition can come from three sources: (1) patterns in birth rates, (2) patterns in migration rates, and (3) patterns in mortality rates. Birth rates in the distant past are plausibly orthogonal to current local labor market conditions. On the other hand, migration and mortality patterns could potentially be correlated with the state of the local economy. For example, industrial decline in some areas might simultaneously lead to poor youth employment outcomes and rapid aging as the working-age population gradually out-migrates over time. Given that a large initial share of elderly implies low predicted retirement intensity, this could lead us to overstate the (negative) impact of an increase in the 55+ employment rate. Therefore, an important consideration is how much variation in age composition can be explained by past birth rates alone.¹³

¹²There are technically 36×4 Rotemberg weights (for each age-period combination), which I have summed up across periods by age for expositional purposes. Also note that these weights were estimated using 10-year retirement rates by age that do not vary across CZs, since the Rotemberg decomposition only holds for national growth rates.

¹³[Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. \(2019\)](#) recommend correlating the Bartik IV as well as the top 5 Rotemberg weight shares with observable characteristics. Online Appendix Tables 2 and 3 show that the initial share of soon-to-be-retired people is not correlated with industrial or occupational composition, but is correlated with

As an intermediate step, Panels A and B of Appendix Table A.2 try to predict population counts by age $a \in \{45, \dots, 80\}$, CZ c and year $t \in \{1980, 1990, 2000, 2007\}$ using the lagged age structure in 1980. For example, the number of people aged 60 in a CZ in 2000 is predicted using the number of people aged 40 in the same CZ in 1980, adjusting for mortality. Population counts by age at the county level in 1980 come from the Census Bureau’s Intercensal Population Counts and are “projected forward” using life tables from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (see Online Appendix A.2 for details). Panel A regresses actual population counts on predicted population counts separately by year in columns 1-4, and then pooling years together in the remaining columns with various fixed effects (age categories and CZs are pooled in all columns). Panel B shows analogous regressions where age counts are replaced with corresponding 45+ age shares.

The 1980 age structure is strongly predictive of future age structure, with R^2 ’s in the 0.96-0.98 range in Panel A. Age shares are somewhat harder to predict because it involves correctly predicting both the numerator and denominator, but the R^2 ’s in Panel B are nevertheless in the neighborhood of 0.7-0.8 depending on the specification. Panels C and D go one step further and try to predict 45+ age counts and shares using data on historical births by county (Bailey et al., 2018). In this case, the number of people aged 60 in a CZ in 2000 is predicted using the number of people born in 1940 in the same CZ, again adjusting for mortality. Because coverage is incomplete in the first half of the 20th century, these regressions cover a subset of age categories and a subset of CZs depending on the year. Remarkably, historical birth patterns are strongly predictive of future age structure. The R^2 in the preferred specification pooling all years and without any fixed effects in column 5 is 0.7 in Panel A and 0.6 in Panel B.

These findings imply that much of the variation in 45+ age composition can be traced back to past birth patterns which are arguably unrelated to current labor market conditions, lending support to the validity of the IV strategy. Although for the sake of precision I proceed with the Bartik instrument for the baseline results, Section 4.5 shows that the main results are robust to: (1) replacing actual initial 45+ age shares in (13) with predicted age shares based on 1980 age structure or historical birth rates, (2) exploiting the initial share of the 45+ population aged 55-59 as an instrument, and (3) exploiting initial 45+ age shares as separate instruments in a GMM estimation procedure.¹⁴

demographic composition, the female employment rate, the unemployment rate, and the population share of immigrants (all of which are controlled for in the regressions).

¹⁴I will also show that the instruments pass overidentification tests for all the main outcomes.

Before moving on to the empirical analysis, I briefly discuss some remaining threats to identification. To address concerns that areas with different age structures may be trending differentially, I will show that the results are robust to flexibly controlling for regional time trends (state or commuting zone-specific). Another potential concern is that age composition among the old is correlated with age composition among the young via fertility patterns. This could potentially bias the estimates as it may affect both the size and the average experience of younger cohorts. The cohort size concern is alleviated by the fact that I control for the shape of the overall age distribution (population share of 16-21 vs. 22-30 vs. 31-44 vs. 45+ year olds). I address the age composition concern in two different ways: (1) by explicitly adjusting youth outcomes for observable composition (incl. age), and (2) presenting results for 5-year age groups.

A final concern is that, even if local age composition is truly exogenous, it could potentially affect labor demand for younger workers via consumption patterns by age. The type of goods and services that people consume evolves over the life cycle, which may in turn affect the demand for workers across different sectors (Cravino et al., 2019). In other words, do younger workers end up in retail jobs because of skill-biased retirement trends, or because of rising consumer demand? The consumption story would seem to require wages in low-skill jobs to rise, but in Section 4.3 I show that the opposite occurs. In the context of the model, this can be rationalized by imperfect substitutability between capital and labor and the notion that the supply of capital is not perfectly elastic, favoring the labor supply story.

4 Results

4.1 Employment, Unemployment & Labor Force Participation

Table 1 shows the effect of retirement trends on youth employment, unemployment and labor force participation, all measured in 10-year changes as a share of the youth population. Throughout the analysis, observations are weighted by the start-of-period CZ share of national population to lend more weight to larger commuting zones, and standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for within-state correlation in the error terms, both across CZs and over time.

The OLS estimates in Panel A imply that changes in the 55+ employment rate are positively correlated with changes in youth employment. For example, a one percentage point

Table 1: The Effect of Retirement Trends on Youth Employment, Unemployment and Labor Force Participation: OLS and 2SLS Estimates

Dependent variable: Youth outcome (22-30)					
Δ Emp/pop					
	All	Part-time	Full-time	Δ Unemp/pop	Δ Out of labor force/pop
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A: OLS estimates</i>					
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.344*** (0.051)	-0.170*** (0.044)	0.515*** (0.084)	-0.134*** (0.030)	-0.210*** (0.043)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates</i>					
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	-0.140 (0.220)	0.777*** (0.185)	-0.917*** (0.274)	0.142 (0.096)	-0.002 (0.193)

Notes: $N = 2,888$ (722 CZs \times 4 time periods). All regressions include period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

increase in the 55+ employment rate is associated with a 0.34 percentage point increase in the youth employment rate, with a corresponding decline in youth unemployment and non-labor force participation, all statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Youth employment also shifts from part-time to full-time jobs, where part-time jobs are defined as working fewer than 35 hours a week. As discussed in Section 3, OLS estimates are likely biased towards finding a positive relationship between changes in employment among the old and young due to unobservable labor demand shifts.

Panel B instruments for changes in the 55+ employment using predicted retirement intensity based on the initial 45+ age distribution. The first-stage results are shown in Panel A of Appendix Table A.1, separately by period in columns 1-4 and pooling them together in column 5. The instrument has significant explanatory power, with all F -statistics large enough that weak instruments is not a concern. In terms of magnitude, a one percentage point increase in the share of 45+ year olds predicted to retire over the next 10 years is associated with a 1.3 percentage point decline in the 55+ employment rate on average.¹⁵ In contrast to the OLS estimates, the 2SLS estimates in Panel B of Table 1 imply that increases

¹⁵The first-stage coefficient would be closer to one if the dependent variable was the analog of the instrument, i.e. the start-of-period 45+ employment rate minus the end-of-period 55+ employment rate.

in the 55+ employment rate have no effect on youth employment. However, the null effect on youth employment masks a simultaneous decline in full-time employment and rise in part-time employment among the young.

Appendix Table A.3 splits the 2SLS results for the young (22-30) by gender and education (college vs. non-college), and shows corresponding results for teenagers (16-21) and the middle-aged (31-44). While the patterns are similar across genders, college graduates experience a statistically significant 0.35 percentage point decline in their employment rate in response to 1 percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate. There are also large differences across age groups. While the middle-aged are mostly unaffected, teenagers experience an employment decline on the order of 0.8 percentage points. Interestingly, this decline is offset by an increase in non-labor force participation rather than an increase in unemployment. I will later show that this reflects an increase in the share of teenagers attending school.

4.2 Occupational Composition

Table 2 shows the impact of retirement trends on changes in the share of younger workers employed in low-skill, middle-skill and high-skill occupations. Low-skill occupations include jobs in agriculture, food preparation, retail sales and personal services. Middle-skill occupations include operators and laborers, administrative jobs, production jobs, and protective services (e.g. firemen). High-skill jobs include technicians (e.g. air traffic controllers), jobs in finance and real estate, professionals, and managers. These skill categories respectively accounted for roughly 21, 41 and 38 percent of the U.S. workforce in 2000.¹⁶

The OLS estimates in columns 1-3 of Panel A imply that in commuting zones where the 55+ employment rate goes up, youth occupational composition shifts away from low-skill and high-skill occupations towards middle-skill occupations. To assess whether or not that represents a net improvement, column 4 examines changes in mean occupational wage premiums. These premiums are obtained by regressing log hourly wages on occupation fixed effects while flexibly controlling for observable characteristics using the sample of full-time workers aged 25 to 54 in the 2000 Census.¹⁷ The resulting occupation fixed effects are then extracted and used to measure changes in the “average” job held by younger

¹⁶Online Appendix Table 4 documents employment shares and mean hourly wages in 2000 for the five most common occupations in each occupation group.

¹⁷The controls for observable characteristics include fixed effects for gender, race, education, potential experience (defined as age minus years of education minus 6), and state of residence.

Table 2: The Effect of Retirement Trends on Youth Occupational Composition: OLS and 2SLS Estimates

Dependent variable: Youth outcome (22-30)				
Δ Employment share				
	Low-skill occupations (1)	Middle-skill occupations (2)	High-skill occupations (3)	Δ Mean occ. wage premium (4)
<i>Panel A: OLS Estimates</i>				
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	-0.234*** (0.045)	0.349*** (0.059)	-0.115** (0.056)	0.070*** (0.025)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS Estimates</i>				
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.499*** (0.164)	0.109 (0.222)	-0.607*** (0.164)	-0.521*** (0.112)

Notes: $N = 2,888$ (722 CZs \times 4 time periods). All regressions include period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

workers in terms of mean hourly wages (net of observables). The mean occupational wage premium among younger workers goes up by 7 log points in response to a one percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate. Therefore, OLS estimates indicate that changes in job quality among younger workers are positively correlated with changes in the 55+ employment rate, which again likely reflects unobservable labor demand shifts.

In contrast, the 2SLS estimates in Panel B imply that youth occupational composition *deteriorates* in commuting zones where fewer older workers retire due to the initial 45+ age distribution. A one percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate reduces the share of younger workers employed in high-skill jobs by 0.6 percentage points and raises the share of young employed in low-skill jobs by 0.5 percentage points. The coefficient on middle-skill employment is positive but not statistically significant. To get a better sense of the magnitude of these effects, going from the 25th to the 75th percentile commuting zone in terms of the change in the 55+ employment rate leads to a 3.2 percentage point decline in the youth high-skill employment share and a 2.6 percentage point increase in the youth low-skill employment share, relative to national means of 37 percent and 27 percent

respectively in 2017.¹⁸ Consistent with the notion that younger workers downgrade to lower skill jobs, the 2SLS estimate in column 4 shows that the mean occupational wage premium declines by 0.52 percent for every percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate.

Appendix Figure A.3 decomposes the 2SLS estimates from Table 2 at the occupation group level. It shows that the decline in high-skill jobs among young adults is primarily driven by managerial jobs (and to a lesser extent jobs in finance/real estate and technicians), while the increase in low-skill jobs is roughly evenly spread across food preparation, personal services and retail jobs. Note that the statistically insignificant effect for middle-skill occupations masks a reallocation from production jobs to operators/laborers, which pay nearly 20 percent less in terms of mean hourly wages. Appendix Table A.4 reveals that the increase in low-skill employment is concentrated among workers without a college degree, while the decrease in high-skill employment is most pronounced among college-educated workers. Occupational downgrading is also more pronounced among young female workers than young male workers. Interestingly, the patterns for teenage workers are similar to the ones for younger workers without a college degree, while middle-aged workers mostly downgrade from high-skill to middle-skill jobs.¹⁹

Another way to uncover occupational downgrading among the young is to examine changes in the share of younger workers that are “overeducated,” in the sense that their education attainment exceeds what is typically required for their job. To construct this outcome, I first categorize occupations into those that require a high school degree or less, those that require some college education (e.g. an Associate’s degree), and those that require a 4-year college degree or more. One option is to follow Abel et al. (2014) and exploit job descriptions from the Department of Labor’s Occupational Information Network (O*NET) which contains data on educational requirements (see Online Appendix A.3 for details). An alternative approach, following Clark et al. (2017), is to assign the most common education level observed in the data.²⁰ I construct two separate overeducation measures using this last approach: one based on the modal education level in 2000

¹⁸To ensure that these results do not hinge on the specific way in which I aggregated occupations, Online Appendix Table 7 shows results using an alternative method. Following Autor and Dorn (2013), I rank the 330 individual occupations according to mean hourly wages in 1980 and combine them into three equal-sized “skill terciles,” each containing a third of total employment in 1980. The 2SLS estimates using this alternative grouping of occupations are very similar.

¹⁹Online Appendix Figures 5 and 6 display heterogeneity by age and education in the occupation group-specific effects.

²⁰Online Appendix Table 5 summarizes educational requirements by occupation group. As expected, occupations at the upper end of the spectrum tend to have higher educational requirements.

and another where the modal education level is allowed to vary over time. Overeducation is then defined as one of two instances: (1) having a college degree or more and being employed in an occupation that does not require one, or (2) having some college education and being employed in an occupation that only requires a high school degree or less.

Table 3 shows the impact of changes in the 55+ employment rate on the share of younger workers with some education beyond high school that are overeducated. While the OLS estimates in Panel A are small and (mostly) insignificant, the 2SLS estimates in Panel B are large and statistically significant across the board. They imply that a one percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate leads to a 0.75-0.95 percentage point rise in the share of younger workers that are overeducated. For comparison, the national share of overeducated younger workers was around 29 percent in 2017 according to O*NET requirements, and 47 percent according to modal education levels in the 2000 Census (see Online Appendix Table 6).²¹ Online Appendix Table 8 shows that overeducation rises among both college and non-college-educated younger workers, though slightly more among the latter. The overeducation patterns by demographic group broadly mirror the occupational composition results in Appendix Table A.4.

The pattern of occupational downgrading among the young documented in this section is consistent with the first two predictions of Proposition 1. Recall that these predictions are valid under two assumptions. The first assumption is that younger and older workers are more substitutable within skill types than low-skill and high-skill workers. Using survey data from 1960 to 1997, Card and Lemieux (2001) estimate an elasticity of substitution between age types within skill types $1/(1 - \gamma)$ in the 4-6 range, and an elasticity of substitution between skill types $1/(1 - \beta)$ in the 2-2.5 range. This implies a value of γ between 0.75 and 0.83, and a value of β between 0.5 and 0.6, which is in line with the premise of Proposition 1.

The second assumption is that retirement trends are biased towards high-skill jobs. While this is certainly true at the national level, the extent to which retirement trends are skill-biased likely varies across commuting zones. In fact, a corollary of Proposition 1 is that the extent of occupational downgrading among the young is directly related to the skill-biasedness of retirement trends. Online Appendix Table 9 tests this prediction in two different ways. Panel A first separates the effect of changes in the employment rate of older

²¹While overeducation is a temporary phase for many workers, it has been rising since 2000. Note that the trend in the measure of overeducation based on yearly modal education levels is harder to interpret due to rising educational attainment over time.

Table 3: The Effect of Retirement Trends on Youth Overeducated Employment:
OLS and 2SLS Estimates

	Dependent variable: Δ Share workers overeducated (22-30)		
	Educational requirement in O*NET database (1)	Modal education level in 2000 Census (2)	Modal education level in Census (by year) (3)
<i>Panel A: OLS Estimates</i>			
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.148*** (0.051)	0.120* (0.067)	0.031 (0.066)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS Estimates</i>			
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.759*** (0.178)	0.934*** (0.224)	0.951*** (0.217)

Notes: $N = 2,888$ (722 CZs \times 4 time periods). All regressions include period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

college-educated vs. non-college-educated individuals. To do so, I decompose changes in the 55+ employment rate into two additive components corresponding to the contribution of each education group. I then estimate the effect of these two components separately using two instruments defined as in (13), except that age shares are replaced with age-by-education group shares, and 10-year retirement rates by age are education group-specific. The 2SLS estimates for occupational outcomes in columns 1-5 show that an increase in the employment rate of college-educated older individuals has a more negative effect than an equally large increase in the employment rate of non-college-educated older individuals. Alternatively, Panels B and C estimate of the effect of changes in the 55+ employment rate in below vs. above-median CZs in terms of the initial share of workers aged 45+ in high-skill jobs. Again, occupational downgrading seems to be more pronounced in CZs where the rise in the labor supply of older workers is likely to be more skill-biased. The conceptual framework from Section 2 therefore provides a coherent explanation for the occupational patterns observed in the data.

4.3 Wages

Table 4 shows the impact of retirement trends on changes in mean log hourly wages of younger workers.²² Column 1 pools all occupations together while columns 2-4 examine wages of workers employed in low-skill, middle-skill and high-skill occupations separately. The OLS estimates in Panel A are all positive and statistically significant. Combined with the positive effect on youth employment in Panel A of Table 1, this is yet another sign that changes in the 55+ employment rate likely capture shifts in labor demand. In the remainder of the analysis, I only discuss 2SLS estimates which rely on variation in 45+ age composition.

The baseline estimate in column 1 of Panel B implies that wages of younger workers *decline* by a statistically significant 3 percent in response to a one percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate. How much of this decline mechanically reflects younger workers downgrading to lower-paying jobs? The 2SLS estimate for the mean occupational wage premium suggests only about 17 percent. Coming back to the model, declining wages in response to an increase in total labor supply is consistent with the notion that capital is not perfectly elastic at the commuting zone level. Proposition 1 also makes the following wage prediction: youth high-skill wages should decline relative to youth low-skill wages. However, this statement applies to wages *per efficiency unit*. The average wage among younger workers in high-skill jobs, which is what we observe in the data, depends on the latent ability distribution:

$$\overline{w_{Hy}} = \int_{u^*}^{\infty} u \cdot w_{Hy} \cdot f(u) \cdot du = w_{Hy} \cdot E(u|u > u^*) \quad (14)$$

Totally differentiating (14) yields:

$$d \log \overline{w_{Hy}} = d \log w_{Hy} + \eta_E \cdot d \log u^* \quad (15)$$

where $\eta_E > 0$ is the elasticity of $E(u|u > u^*)$ around the initial ability threshold u^* . The first term on the right-hand side of (15) is negative assuming capital is sufficiently inelastic. On the other hand, the second term is positive since $d \log u^* > 0$. Intuitively, it captures the fact that average ability among younger workers who remain in high-skill jobs goes up due to self-selection (recall that marginal ability workers optimally reallocate towards

²²Wage measures exclude the self-employed and are averaged using labor supply weights (Census sampling weights multiplied by annual hours worked). See Online Appendix A.4 for additional details.

Table 4: The Effect of Retirement Trends on Youth Wages: OLS and 2SLS Estimates

	Dependent variable: Δ Log wage (22-30)			
	All occupations	Low-skill occupations	Middle-skill occupations	High-skill occupations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: OLS Estimates</i>				
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.981*** (0.140)	1.056*** (0.151)	1.184*** (0.153)	0.617*** (0.137)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS Estimates</i>				
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	-3.094*** (0.697)	-2.976*** (0.744)	-2.594*** (0.689)	-3.520*** (0.645)

Notes: $N = 2,888$ (722 CZs \times 4 time periods). All regressions include period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

low-skill jobs). Therefore, it is unclear whether we should observe a greater decline in youth high-skill wages than youth low-skill wages. While I cannot statistically reject the null hypotheses that the estimates in columns 2-4 are equal, wages of younger workers in high-skill jobs decline by 3.5 percent relative to wage declines of 3 percent and 2.6 percent for younger workers in low-skill and middle-skill jobs respectively. Columns 6-8 in Online Appendix Table 9 test the prediction that this gap should be greater in CZs where retirement trends are likely to be more skill-biased. Unlike the corresponding results for occupational composition in columns 1-5, the wage patterns seem to imply the opposite if anything, though the estimates are generally imprecise.

Online Appendix Table 10 documents heterogeneity in the wage effects across demographic groups. Average wage declines hover around 3 percent for every percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate, with the exception of middle-aged workers who experience only a 1.3 percent decline. The patterns by age group discussed so far resemble a “job ladder,” in which older age groups are less affected by declines in retirements than younger age groups. While the model only featured two age groups, this goes counter to what one would expect under competitive labor markets. If middle-aged workers are closer

substitutes for older workers than younger ones, which should be the case if accumulated experience is the primary difference between age groups, frictionless models of the labor market would predict larger wage declines among middle-aged workers in response to an increase in the labor supply of the old. If wages of middle-aged workers exhibit rigidities, as in [Dustmann et al. \(2017\)](#), then labor market clearing would require stronger disemployment or occupational downgrading effects. However, the results in the previous sections have shown that middle-aged workers are relatively unaffected along other dimensions as well. This implies that real-world labor markets are not perfectly competitive, and that one would need to add some type of friction to the model in Section 2 in order to rationalize the patterns by age group.²³

4.4 Job Mobility, School Attendance & Internal Migration

Quits tend to trigger a chain of vacancies, as workers reshuffle across jobs ([Mercan and Schoefer, forthcoming](#)). Given that retirements are a natural form of quits, Appendix Table A.5 explores the effect of retirement trends on job mobility for three age groups: teenagers (14-21), young adults (22-34), and the middle-aged (35-44). I measure overall job mobility at the CZ level using the “turnover” rate, defined as the sum of all hires and separations in a given quarter divided by employment. I then average quarterly turnover at the year level. Since data on hires and separations is only available for most states starting in 2000, I restrict this analysis to the periods 2000-2007 and 2007-2017.²⁴ Panel A shows that an increase in the 55+ employment has a negative but not statistically significant effect on *changes* in the turnover rate for all age groups. Because the turnover rate is a flow rather than a stock measure, Panel B looks at *average* turnover rates over the corresponding periods instead. The estimates imply that a one percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate reduces average turnover by 0.45, 0.17 and 0.09 percentage points among teenagers, young adults and the middle-aged respectively (relative to means of 24, 13 and 8 percent). In light of the finding in [Topel and Ward \(1992\)](#) that upward job mobility is an important component of early career wage growth, this provides another explanation for the wage results in the previous section.

Past studies have shown that college attendance among the young tends to rise during

²³One possibility is that firms naturally find it easier to adjust wages of new workers, and that seniority rules or firm-specific human capital shield incumbent workers from job loss. Relatedly, [Lazear et al. \(2018\)](#) emphasize the importance of job slots and competition among applicants for them.

²⁴See Online Appendix A.5 for details on constructing turnover rates.

downturns as the opportunity cost of going to school falls. [Betts and McFarland \(1995\)](#) find a positive relationship between community college enrollment and the unemployment rate. [Charles et al. \(2018\)](#) show that the housing boom of the 2000s reduced enrollment at 2-year colleges as labor market prospects improved. Given the results so far, one may wonder whether the option to go back to (or remain in) school similarly serves as an adjustment mechanism in response to rising labor supply among the old. In Panel A of Appendix Table [A.6](#), I estimate the effect of retirement trends on school attendance. Column 1 indicates that the share of young adults attending school increases by 0.6 percentage points in response to a one percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate. School attendance also rises significantly among teenagers, consistent with the positive effect on non-labor force participation documented earlier. In contrast, there is no discernible effect among the middle-aged; school attendance is probably not an important adjustment mechanism for people in their 30s or 40s, and I have shown that they are less affected to begin with.

There are two ways to interpret the school attendance finding. First, it can be viewed as corroborating evidence that youth labor market prospects indeed deteriorate in commuting zones where fewer older workers retire. Second, to the extent that school attendance raises individuals' future earnings potential, higher educational attainment could potentially mitigate/offset the immediate labor market consequences of increases in the labor supply of the old, a point which I return to in Section 5.

Another way in which young adults can adjust is migration across commuting zones, particularly since they exhibit the highest mobility rates among all age groups ([Molloy et al., 2014](#)). Panel B of Appendix Table [A.6](#) shows the effect of retirement trends on population growth. I find strong evidence of net out-migration among the young: a one percentage point increase in the 55+ employment rate leads to a 3.2 percent contraction in the youth population over 10 years. Although I cannot determine whether this reflects greater out-migration or reduced in-migration, the evidence in [Monras \(2018\)](#) suggest that the latter likely plays an important role. The fact that college graduates appear to be most responsive in terms of geographical mobility is consistent with similar findings in the literature ([Bound and Holzer, 2000](#); [Wozniak, 2010](#); [Notowidigdo, forthcoming](#)). In contrast, the population of teenagers and middle-aged individuals is stable.²⁵

²⁵Online Appendix Table 11 explores three additional adjustment margins: marital status, fertility and living arrangements. An interesting finding is that rentership goes up among all demographic groups at the expense of homeownership, except among teenagers who are more likely to live with their parents instead. Marriage rates also decline among young women without a college degree, teenagers, and the middle-aged.

4.5 Robustness Checks

Isolating Variation in 1980 Age Structure or Historical Birth Patterns

The baseline instrument exploits the start-of-period 45+ age distribution in each commuting zone. Although I showed in Section 3.4 that most of the variation in age composition can be explained by plausibly exogenous variation in past age structure or historical births, one might worry that some of the residual variation reflects endogenous migration or mortality patterns. I now show that the results are robust to solely relying on variation in 1980 age structure or historical births by constructing two alternative instruments in which age shares in (13) are replaced with corresponding predicted age shares from Appendix Table A.2.

Appendix Table A.7 displays 2SLS estimates using these alternative instruments for the main outcomes of interest. Panel A reproduces the baseline results for ease of comparison. The results based on 1980 age structure in Panel B are slightly larger in magnitude but otherwise similar, except that occupational downgrading among the young is more evenly distributed across low-skill and middle-skill jobs. Note that using predicted age shares naturally results in a loss of power, with the first-stage F -stat dropping from 112.3 to 61.3. Exploiting historical births additionally leads to a loss of sample size from 2,888 to 1,202 given that the birth data does not go back far enough to predict 45+ age shares in 1980, and 1990 for nearly all commuting zones (the first-stage F -stat further drops to 17.1).²⁶

Panel C shows the baseline estimates for the subset of CZ-periods for which the birth instrument can be computed. Relative to the estimates in Panel A, the estimates in Panel C are slightly smaller in magnitude and more imprecise, but the patterns are qualitatively similar. The corresponding results in Panel D using the birth instrument are somewhat larger in magnitude (except for the wage coefficient which is statistically insignificant), but similarly show that younger workers are less likely to be employed in high-skill jobs and more likely to be overeducated in commuting zones where fewer older workers retire. Overall, I view these results as evidence that the variation in initial 45+ age composition underlying the main findings is largely pre-determined.

²⁶The birth instrument is based on 45-75 rather than 45-80 age shares to retain as many CZs as possible. I use the same weights as in the baseline specification, which implies that later periods have more weight due to greater coverage. Online Appendix Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the variation in these two alternative instruments.

Adjusting Outcomes for Changes in Demographic Composition

In light of the migration results, particularly the fact that young college graduates reallocate away from CZs where fewer older workers retire, one legitimate concern is that changes in average youth outcomes reflect changes in the composition of the youth population. In other words, does occupational downgrading among the young simply reflect a decline in the share of college graduates? The answer to this question is yes and no. Because college graduates are more likely to be employed in high-skill jobs, some of the decline can be attributed to a shift in the educational composition of the young. However, the results by education group in Appendix Table A.4 showed that *both* education groups experience occupational downgrading, implying that the overall effect is not purely mechanical.

To probe this point, I generate “composition-adjusted” outcomes using the two-step procedure in Shapiro (2006). First, using individual-level Census/ACS data, I regress the analog of each outcome (e.g. an indicator for being employed in a high-skill job) on a comprehensive set of individual controls (gender, race, education and potential experience fixed effects) as well as CZ fixed effects, separately by year. I then extract the estimated year-specific CZ fixed effects and take first-differences to obtain changes in average outcomes that are not mechanically driven by changes in the local demographic composition (see Online Appendix A.6 for additional details). Note that this procedure can only account for changes in terms of observable characteristics.

The 2SLS estimates for the composition-adjusted outcomes are displayed in Appendix Table A.8. The coefficients are up to 30 percent smaller in absolute terms than the corresponding estimates in Tables 1-4, consistent with the notion that composition does play a role, but the main findings are otherwise unchanged.

Additional Robustness Checks

While the empirical strategy eliminates level differences across commuting zones, one possible concern is that CZs with different age structures may be trending differentially. In Panel A of Online Appendix Table 12, I allow for state-specific time trends by augmenting the baseline specification (12) with state fixed effects. The resulting estimates are very similar to the baseline estimates. Panel B goes further and allows for commuting zone-specific time trends, thereby only exploiting within-CZ variation in predicted retirement intensity over time. Although the loss of power leads to larger standard errors (the first-stage F -stat drops to 16.3), there is no significant change in the magnitude of the coefficients.

The baseline specification controls for the initial share of workers that are employed in manufacturing and routine occupations to address the fact that CZs may have been differentially exposed to the secular decline of manufacturing and the rise of automation. More generally, there could be other industry or occupation-specific trends that I am not accounting for. Panel C of Online Appendix Table 12 shows that the results are robust to fully controlling for initial differences in terms of industrial/occupational composition.

Online Appendix Table 13 evaluates the robustness of the main findings to alternative sample restrictions. Given the school attendance results, one might be worried that the findings partly reflect the fact that students are more likely to work in part-time, low-paying jobs than non-students. Panel A therefore excludes students from the construction of dependent variables. While composition-adjusted outcomes cannot account for changes in the underlying youth population in terms of unobservables, one way to mitigate the impact of net migration across commuting zones is to exclude individuals who have moved or are likely to have moved in the recent past. Panels B and C respectively drop people residing in a different state than their state of birth and people who recently migrated from another state (where “recent” means within the last 5 years in the Census and within the last year in the ACS).²⁷ Lastly, Panel D omits the period 2007-2017 from the sample to ensure that the results are not driven by the Great Recession and its aftermath. The main findings are remarkably stable across all panels. Online Appendix Figure 7 plots 2SLS estimates by 5-year age groups. While there are clear differences across age groups, as emphasized already, the main findings do not hinge on the exact age cutoffs used to define young adults.

Motivated by the finding in Section 3.4 that the key variation driving the results is the initial share of the 45+ population aged 55-59, Panel A of Online Appendix Table 14 directly uses this variable as an instrument. Panel B follows the recommendation in [Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. \(2019\)](#) and uses individual 45+ age shares as separate instruments in an overidentified limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation procedure. While the coefficients are slightly smaller in magnitude in both panels, the main findings are unchanged. This shows that the exact way in which one chooses to exploit variation in initial 45+ age composition does not really matter, which is reassuring. In addition, the overidentification tests in Panel B show that for all main outcomes, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid.

To alleviate any concerns that the results might be driven by specific parts of the coun-

²⁷Note that the first restriction implicitly drops foreign-born individuals, implying that the results are not driven by immigrants.

try, Online Appendix Table 15 shows that the results are robust to excluding Census divisions one-by-one. While commuting zones are the conventional way to define U.S. local labor markets, Online Appendix Table 16 uses states instead. As before, the OLS estimates in Panel A show that changes in the 55+ employment rate are positively correlated with changes in youth outcomes. In contrast, the 2SLS estimates in Panel B based on an analogous definition of the predicted retirement intensity instrument show that an increase in the 55+ employment has a negative impact on youth labor market outcomes (but not employment), consistent with the CZ-level results.²⁸

5 Discussion

Overall, the findings in the previous section indicate that younger workers get “pushed” down the job ladder in places where fewer older workers retire. Going back to the original motivation of the paper, this suggests that the slowdown in retirements has likely contributed to deteriorating youth labor market prospects, especially given that older workers are increasingly concentrated at the top of the job ladder. A back-of-the-envelope calculation helps put these trends into perspective. Between 1980 and 2017, the 55+ employment rate rose by 6.4 percentage points. Over the same period, the share of younger workers in low-skill jobs rose by 9.5 percentage points while the share of younger workers in high-skill jobs rose by 6.5 percentage points. Using the preferred composition-adjusted 2SLS estimates from Appendix Table A.8, this implies that the retirement slowdown can account for 30 percent of the aggregate rise in youth low-skill employment between 1980 and 2017. Alternatively, had the 55+ employment rate had remained at its 1980 level, youth employment in high-skill occupations would have risen by 9.4 rather than 6.5 percentage points between 1980 and 2017. Of course, these calculations ignore general equilibrium effects, and so should be interpreted with caution.²⁹

This provides a new explanation for stagnant early career outcomes, particularly among college graduates. Unlike individuals with lower levels of education, their struggles cannot easily be explained by the decline of unions, globalization or automation. The labor supply-side hypothesis proposed here does not preclude a role for labor demand factors. Notably, [Beaudry et al. \(2016\)](#) argue that the rise in productivity in the information technology (IT)

²⁸For power reasons, the state-level instrument is based on national retirement rates by age (not leave-out).

²⁹For instance, any positive impact of the rise in the labor supply of older Americans that is common across CZs is implicitly absorbed in the period fixed effects.

sector during the 1990s followed by a slowdown after 2000 can explain the “Great Reversal” in the demand for cognitive skills which took place over this period. It is possible that rising demand in high-skill jobs due to the IT revolution outpaced declining demand due to the skill-biased retirement slowdown during the 1990s, and that the latter became more prominent in the 2000s as IT reached maturity and overall economic conditions stalled.³⁰ However, regardless of the underlying aggregate forces, the empirical strategy in this paper isolates the impact of older workers’ labor supply.³¹

Poor initial job prospects matter because they can have lasting effects. Multiple studies have documented long-term “scars” associated with graduating during a downturn (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012; Altonji et al., 2016; Schwandt and von Wachter, 2019). More broadly, using data on individual earnings histories, Guvenen et al. (2017) find that early career outcomes are an important determinant of cross-cohort and within-cohort patterns in lifetime income inequality. Therefore, one key question is to what extent individuals entering the labor market at times and in places where fewer older workers retire are able to recover over time, particularly in light of the school attendance results. Appendix Table A.9 provides some suggestive evidence on the long-term effects of retirement trends by examining changes in *cohort-specific* outcomes. For ease of comparison, Panel A reproduces the results from Panel B of Online Appendix Table 13, where outcomes of people aged 22-30 today are compared to outcomes of people aged 22-30 ten years later.³² Alternatively, we can follow the same cohort over time and compare outcomes of people aged 22-30 today to outcomes of people aged 32-40 ten years later. The resulting estimates in Panel B reveal that the effects on occupational composition are persistent over time. Even after 10 years, young adults “exposed” to fewer retirements are still significantly less likely to be employed in high-skill jobs than their more fortunate peers, though they are more evenly spread across low-skill and middle-skill jobs. This is reflected in the effects on the mean occupational wage premium and the share of overeducated workers, which are about half as large as the baseline estimates. The wage impact is about a quarter of the size of the baseline effect, but still statistically significant. While this evidence is merely suggestive, it is consistent with the notion that catch-up is imperfect.³³

³⁰It is worth noting that high-skill employment among older workers experienced no reversal after 2000.

³¹Another potential explanation for diverging outcomes between the young and old are increasing returns to experience. However, the evidence in Jeong et al. (2015) does not support this hypothesis.

³²For this exercise, I restrict the sample to individuals residing in their state of birth to abstract away from internal migration as much as possible.

³³This complement firm-level evidence suggesting that delayed retirement have a lasting negative impact on co-workers’ earnings (Bovini and Paradisi, 2019).

The findings in this paper have important implications in the context of retirement age policy. Population aging is putting enormous pressure on pay-as-you-go pension schemes, in which the current generation of workers supports the current generation of retirees through taxes.³⁴ To address this problem, policymakers have overwhelmingly opted to try to expand the size of the labor force relative to the size of the retired population by raising the age at which individuals are eligible for partial or full retirement benefits and discouraging early retirements.³⁵ Indeed, many European countries (e.g. France, Germany, Spain, U.K.) as well as the U.S. are gradually raising their retirement age to 67 or 68.

While the fiscal benefits of these policies are evident, potential costs, if any, are less clear. One concern that is often brought up is the potential crowding-out of younger workers. A common belief is that retirements directly affect the number of jobs available for the young, an example of the “lump-of-labor” fallacy. This kind of zero-sum perspective of the labor market has been widely rejected by economists (Börsch-Supan, 2013). As mentioned in the introduction, studies for the U.S. have found little evidence that the old crowd out the young (neither does this paper), and are often cited in policy discussions to support the view that delayed retirements do not affect younger generations (United States Government Accountability Office, 2012; The PEW Charitable Trusts, 2012). The results in this paper, together with recent firm-level evidence (Bianchi et al., 2019), suggest that we should look beyond employment and consider how retirements may affect career advancement opportunities of younger generations.

6 Conclusion

Older Americans have been working increasingly longer since the mid-1990s, especially those in high-skill jobs. This paper investigates how the retirement slowdown has affected the U.S. labor market, and younger Americans in particular. To do so, I compare the evolution of youth employment outcomes across U.S. commuting zones over the period 1980-2017, isolating variation in retirement patterns driven by geographic differences in age composition among the old. Given the predictability of labor force exits, differences in age composition naturally generate variation in the size of the soon-to-be-retired population,

³⁴The Social Security Administration projects that the Trust Fund’s reserves will be depleted by 2034 (OASDI Board of Trustees, 2016).

³⁵In the U.S., complementary measures include the elimination of the Social Security earnings test for individuals who have reached the normal retirement age and delayed retirement credits, which compensate individuals who claim Social Security benefits past their normal retirement age (up to age 70).

and can be traced back to plausibly exogenous historical birth patterns.

I find that fewer retirements lead to occupational downgrading among the young. In commuting zones where fewer older workers retire due to the initial age structure, the share of younger workers in high-skill jobs declines while the share of younger workers in low-skill jobs rises. Correspondingly, the share of younger workers whose educational attainment exceeds what is typically required for their job rises. Fewer retirements also have a negative impact on youth wages and job mobility. The young partly adjust to deteriorating labor market prospects via greater school attendance and net out-migration, both of which have been found to be important adjustment mechanisms in other contexts. While this paper mostly focuses on young adults aged 22 to 30, teenagers (16-21) and middle-aged individuals (31-44) are shown to be adversely affected as well, though along different margins and to varying extents.

Overall, the findings suggest that the skill-biased retirement slowdown has contributed to stagnant early career outcomes in recent decades. More specifically, it can help explain why recent cohorts of college graduates have not fared as well as in the past despite the fact that economic forces have largely favored them. Looking ahead, a combination of changing norms, rising life expectancy, and a policy shift toward delayed retirements implies that the old will likely keep working longer, not just in the U.S. but around the world. This paper offers new evidence on how this structural shift could affect labor markets, and younger generations in particular.

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
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
Appendix

Figure A.1: 10-Year Retirement Rates by Age, 1980-2017




Notes: The 10-year retirement rate of a birth cohort (start-of-period age \times year) is defined as the start-of-period employment rate of this cohort minus the end-of-period employment rate of the same cohort at the national level.

Figure A.2: Rotemberg Weights, Summed Across Periods



Notes: This figure plots Rotemberg weights for each age share, where weights are summed across the four periods in the analysis. See [Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. \(2019\)](#) for a definition of Rotemberg weights.

Figure A.3: Occupation Group-Specific Effects: 2SLS Estimates



Notes: Each bar represents the coefficient corresponding to the change in the 55+ employment rate from a separate 2SLS regression (baseline specification with period fixed effects and CZ controls), where the dependent variable is the change in the share of younger workers (22-30) employed in a particular occupation group (x -axis). The error bars represent the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.

Table A.1: 2SLS: First-Stage Results

	Dependent variable: Δ Emp/pop (55+)						
	1980-1990 (1)	1990-2000 (2)	2000-2007 (3)	2007-2017 (4)	1980-2017 (5)	1980-2017 (6)	1990-2017 (7)
<i>Panel A: Baseline IV</i>							
Predicted retirement intensity (45+)	-1.276*** (0.247)	-1.536*** (0.192)	-2.048*** (0.564)	-1.879*** (0.314)	-1.285*** (0.121)		
<i>Panel B: Exploit 1980 age composition</i>							
Predicted retirement intensity (45+)						-0.942*** (0.120)	
<i>Panel C: Exploit historical births</i>							
Predicted retirement intensity (45+)							-0.438*** (0.106)
<i>F</i> -stat	26.79	64.09	13.18	35.7	112.18	61.2	17.12
Period fixed effects					✓	✓	✓
<i>N</i>	722	722	722	722	2,888	2,888	1,208

Notes: All regressions include start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

Table A.2: Predicting 45+ Population Counts and Shares Using 1980 Age Structure or Historical Births, 1980-2007

	Period						
	1980 (1)	1990 (2)	2000 (3)	2007 (4)	1980-2007 (5)	1980-2007 (6)	1980-2007 (7)
Predicting population counts/shares using 1980 age structure							
<i>Panel A: Dependent variable: population count</i>							
Predicted population count	0.994*** (0.000)	1.041*** (0.001)	1.050*** (0.001)	1.107*** (0.001)	1.059*** (0.001)	1.012*** (0.001)	0.979*** (0.001)
R ²	0.998	0.988	0.976	0.962	0.974	0.984	0.992
Age range in sample	45-80	45-80	45-80	45-80	45-80	45-80	45-80
N (age × CZ × year)	25,992	25,992	25,992	25,992	103,968	103,968	103,968
<i>Panel B: Dependent variable: population share (among those aged 45-80)</i>							
Predicted population share	1.015*** (0.003)	0.736*** (0.003)	0.714*** (0.002)	0.665*** (0.002)	0.729*** (0.001)	0.608*** (0.003)	0.552*** (0.004)
R ²	0.822	0.728	0.858	0.771	0.784	0.797	0.817
Age range in sample	45-80	45-80	45-80	45-80	45-80	45-80	45-80
N (age × CZ × year)	25,992	25,992	25,992	25,992	103,968	103,968	103,968
Predicting population counts/shares using historical births							
<i>Panel C: Dependent variable: population count</i>							
Predicted population count	1.578*** (0.013)	1.491*** (0.008)	0.973*** (0.004)	0.913*** (0.004)	1.008*** (0.003)	0.483*** (0.002)	0.538*** (0.002)
R ²	0.600	0.647	0.672	0.713	0.651	0.941	0.955
Age range in sample	45-65	45-75	45-80	45-80	45-80	45-80	45-80
N (age × CZ × year)	9,888	17,107	23,279	25,406	75,680	75,680	75,680
<i>Panel D: Dependent variable: population share (among those aged 45-75)</i>							
Predicted population share	—	0.314*** (0.008)	0.537*** (0.003)	0.608*** (0.004)	0.563*** (0.002)	0.161*** (0.004)	0.096*** (0.003)
R ²	—	0.359	0.678	0.589	0.608	0.742	0.789
Age range in sample	—	45-75	45-75	45-75	45-75	45-75	45-75
N (age × CZ × year)	—	2,852	14,596	20,445	37,893	37,893	37,893
Constant	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Year FEs						✓	
Age FEs						✓	
CZ FEs						✓	
Year × age FEs							✓
Year × CZ FEs							✓
CZ × age FEs							✓

Notes: See Online Appendix A.2 for details on constructing predicted population counts/shares. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

Source: 1980, 1990, 2000 Censuses, 2006-2007 ACS, 1980 Intercensal County Population Counts, [Bailey et al. \(2018\)](#).

Table A.3: The Effect of Retirement Trends on Employment, Unemployment and Labor Force Participation: Heterogeneity of 2SLS Estimates by Age, Gender and Education

	Dependent variable:				
	Δ Emp/pop			Δ Unemp/pop	Δ Out of labor force/pop
	All	Part-time	Full-time		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
<i>Panel A: Young (22-30) \times gender</i>					
Male	-0.131 (0.229)	0.694*** (0.182)	-0.825** (0.349)	0.077 (0.116)	0.054 (0.158)
Female	-0.081 (0.324)	0.850*** (0.205)	-0.931*** (0.302)	0.212** (0.090)	-0.131 (0.315)
<i>Panel B: Young (22-30) \times education groups</i>					
Less than college	0.019 (0.231)	0.811*** (0.182)	-0.793*** (0.269)	0.094 (0.106)	-0.113 (0.211)
College or more	-0.350** (0.173)	0.742*** (0.234)	-1.092*** (0.241)	0.211*** (0.075)	0.140 (0.171)
<i>Panel C: Other age groups</i>					
Teenagers (16-21)	-0.788*** (0.194)	0.259* (0.146)	-1.047*** (0.209)	0.183* (0.109)	0.605*** (0.162)
Middle-aged (31-44)	0.023 (0.187)	0.187** (0.082)	-0.164 (0.164)	0.028 (0.041)	-0.051 (0.183)

Notes: $N = 2,888$ (722 CZs \times 4 time periods). All regressions include period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

Table A.4: The Effect of Retirement Trends on Occupational Composition: Heterogeneity of 2SLS Estimates by Age, Gender and Education

	Dependent variable:			
	Δ Employment share			Δ Mean occ. wage premium
	Low-skill occupations	Middle-skill occupations	High-skill occupations	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
<i>Panel A: Young (22-30) \times gender</i>				
Male	0.231 (0.154)	0.197 (0.283)	-0.429** (0.194)	-0.411*** (0.104)
Female	0.800*** (0.209)	0.037 (0.170)	-0.837*** (0.192)	-0.635*** (0.129)
<i>Panel B: Young (22-30) \times education groups</i>				
Less than college	0.532** (0.209)	-0.235 (0.230)	-0.297** (0.138)	-0.368*** (0.105)
College or more	0.183 (0.151)	0.272 (0.168)	-0.455** (0.227)	-0.519*** (0.141)
<i>Panel C: Other age groups</i>				
Teenagers (16-21)	0.463** (0.230)	-0.180 (0.176)	-0.283** (0.127)	-0.281** (0.117)
Middle-aged (31-44)	-0.122 (0.089)	0.410** (0.167)	-0.288** (0.134)	-0.129** (0.063)

Notes: $N = 2,888$ (722 CZs \times 4 time periods). All regressions include period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

Table A.5: The Effect of Retirement Trends on Job Mobility, 2000-2017: 2SLS Estimates

	Teenagers (14-21)	Young (22-34)	Middle-aged (35-44)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A: Dependent variable: Δ turnover</i>			
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	-0.154 (0.265)	-0.125 (0.127)	-0.071 (0.091)
<i>Panel B: Dependent variable: Average turnover</i>			
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	-0.448*** (0.109)	-0.166*** (0.050)	-0.089** (0.038)

Notes: $N = 1,422$. See Online Appendix A.5 for details on constructing turnover measures. All regressions include period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

Table A.6: The Effect of Retirement Trends on School Attendance and Net Migration: 2SLS Estimates

	Young (22-30)					Teenagers (16-21)	Middle-aged (31-44)
	All	Male	Female	Less than college	College or more		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: Dependent variable: Δ Share attending school</i>							
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.602*** (0.169)	0.545*** (0.183)	0.658*** (0.175)	0.688*** (0.177)	0.519** (0.203)	1.080*** (0.209)	0.128 (0.079)
<i>Panel B: Dependent variable: Δ Pop_t/pop_{t-1}</i>							
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	-3.224*** (1.035)	-3.577*** (1.118)	-2.934*** (0.982)	-2.669*** (0.939)	-6.472*** (1.700)	0.268 (0.841)	-0.662 (1.002)

Notes: $N = 2,888$ (722 CZs \times 4 time periods). All regressions include period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

Table A.7: Alternative Instruments Based on 1980 Age Structure or Historical Births:
2SLS Estimates

Dependent variable: Youth outcome (22-30)						
Δ Employment share			Δ Mean occupational wage premium	Δ Share workers "overeducated" (O*NET)	Δ Log wage	
Low-skill occupations	Middle-skill occupations	High-skill occupations				
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
<i>Panel A: Baseline IV (First-stage F-stat = 112.18)</i>						
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.499*** (0.164)	0.109 (0.222)	-0.607*** (0.164)	-0.521*** (0.112)	0.759*** (0.178)	-3.094*** (0.697)
<i>Panel B: Exploit 1980 age composition (First-stage F-stat = 61.2)</i>						
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.517** (0.203)	0.654*** (0.216)	-1.172*** (0.254)	-0.754*** (0.168)	0.882*** (0.235)	-3.674*** (0.927)
<i>Panel C: Baseline IV: subset of CZ-periods with non-missing historical birth IV (First-stage F-stat = 29.74)</i>						
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.705* (0.366)	-0.234 (0.334)	-0.471** (0.202)	-0.391** (0.167)	0.281 (0.173)	-1.943*** (0.725)
<i>Panel D: Exploit historical births (First-stage F-stat = 17.12)</i>						
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.519 (0.520)	0.555* (0.319)	-1.073*** (0.287)	-0.625** (0.262)	0.342** (0.148)	-1.334 (1.373)

Notes: $N = 2,888$ (722 CZs \times 4 time periods) in Panels A and B, $N = 1,202$ in Panels C and D. All regressions include period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

Table A.8: Adjusting for Changes in Demographic Composition: 2SLS Estimates

	Dependent variable: Youth outcome (22-30)					
	Δ Employment share			Δ Mean occupational wage premium	Δ Share workers "overeducated" (O*NET)	Δ Log wage
	Low-skill occupations	Middle-skill occupations	High-skill occupations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.453** (0.201)	-0.000 (0.181)	-0.453*** (0.160)	-0.437*** (0.118)	0.540*** (0.172)	-3.086*** (0.761)
<i>N</i>	2,886	2,886	2,886	2,886	2,879	2,888

Notes: See Online Appendix A.5 for details on constructing composition-adjusted outcomes. All regressions include period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.

Table A.9: The Effect of Retirement Trends on Cohort Outcomes: 2SLS Estimates

	Dependent variable:					
	Δ Employment share			Δ Mean occupational wage premium	Δ Share workers "overeducated" (O*NET)	Δ Log wage
	Low-skill occupations	Middle-skill occupations	High-skill occupations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Average outcomes of people aged 22-30 today vs. people aged 22-30 ten years later</i>						
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.581** (0.255)	0.143 (0.232)	-0.724*** (0.175)	-0.501*** (0.142)	0.801*** (0.218)	-3.377*** (0.820)
<i>Panel B: Average outcomes of people aged 22-30 today vs. people aged 32-40 ten years later</i>						
Δ Emp/pop (55+)	0.375** (0.149)	0.464** (0.211)	-0.839*** (0.201)	-0.227*** (0.074)	0.528*** (0.180)	-0.848*** (0.222)

Notes: $N = 2,888$ (722 CZs \times 4 time periods). Sample excludes individuals born out-of-state. All regressions include period fixed effects and start-of-period CZ controls (manufacturing employment share, employment share of routine occupations, mean offshoring index, female employment rate, population share of immigrants/young (22-30)/middle-aged (31-44)/old (45+)/females/Blacks/Asians/other non-whites/some college-educated/college-educated). For the 2000-2007 period, outcomes of people aged 22-30 in 2000 are compared to outcomes of people aged 29-37 in 2007, and these 7-year cohort-specific changes are scaled by 10/7. Observations are weighted by start-of-period CZ share of national population. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.