

# The Effect of Self-Employment on Income Inequality\*

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## Abstract

It is well known that the self-employed are over-represented at the bottom as well as the top of the income distribution. This paper shifts the focus from the income situation of the self-employed to the distributive effects of a change in self-employment rates. With representative German data and unconditional quantile regression analysis we show that an increase in the proportion of self-employed individuals in the labor force increases income polarization by tearing down floors at the bottom and allowing higher income potentials at the very top of the hourly income distribution. Recentered influence function regression of inequality measures corroborate that self-employment is a source of income inequality in the labor market.

JEL-Classification: D31, L26

Keywords: income distribution, income inequality, income polarization, self-employment

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# 1 Introduction

Aghion et al. [2019] have shown that entrepreneurial income is over-represented relative to wage income among the top 1% incomes in the United States. In addition, there are many narratives about successful entrepreneurs and therefore one might conclude that entrepreneurship creates substantial potentials to become extremely wealthy. As these successful entrepreneurs also generate new jobs, active labor market policy frequently aims at fostering self-employment or entrepreneurship, respectively. Despite the considerable wealth enhancing potentials of entrepreneurship, it has become common knowledge that many self-employed earn less than paid employees [Hamilton, 2000, Levine and Rubinstein, 2017]. The self-employed hence are not just over-represented at the upper tail of the income distribution, but also at the bottom [Astebro et al., 2011]. One might therefore hypothesize that an increase in self-employment might contribute to income polarization by widening the top of the income distribution, but also by extending the bottom of the distribution [see Halvarsson et al., 2018].<sup>1</sup>

So far, little is known about the effects of increasing self-employment rates on the distribution of incomes and income inequality, respectively. In this regard, we find that countries with higher self-employment rates are more unequal (see Figure 1), where the mechanisms behind this pattern are still unclear. For this reason, we analyze the distributive effects of increasing self-employment rates and ask whether a higher share of self-employed individuals is associated with advantageous income effects at the top of the income distribution and adverse effects at the bottom of the income distribution. Both distinctive effects ultimately reinforce income polarization and income inequality.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Most studies on income differences between paid employees and the self-employed apply conditional quantile regression. However, this procedure usually does not allow conclusions

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<sup>1</sup>Note that Halvarsson et al. [2018] provide an excellent survey of the literature on entrepreneurship, income dynamics, and inequality.

about treatment effects on unconditional quantiles, but allows for statements about the income distribution as a whole. Political interest, in turn, usually focuses on the question how a change in self-employment rates alter the unconditional income distribution or the distributive effects, respectively. We therefore address the effect of an increase in the self-employment rate on the hourly income distribution by utilization of the unconditional quantile regression approach and utilize recentered influence function (RIF) regression [Firpo et al., 2009]. In addition, this methodology is applied to examine whether changes in self-employment also affect income inequality.

With representative German data of the year 2015, we corroborate that the self-employed are over-represented at the bottom as well as at the top of the hourly income distribution. The RIF regression results reveal that a rise in self-employment rates significantly increases income inequality. This effect is due to income polarization. Precisely, an increase in the share of self-employed is associated with adverse effects at the bottom of the income distribution as well as advantageous effects at the top. While the effect at the bottom is mainly driven by self-employed without any employees (solo self-employed), the increase of hourly incomes among the top earners is mainly due to self-employed with employees (employers).<sup>2</sup>

## 2 Data and variables

We use the German Socio-Economic Panel - version 32 (SOEP, doi:10.5684/soep.v32). The SOEP is a longitudinal survey of more than 10 thousand private households in Germany and is provided by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) Berlin. Basic data characteristics are described in Wagner et al. [2007] or Goebel et al. [2018]. The SOEP contains variables about demography, employment as well as the household. Note that in Germany, also other representative data sets are available. Recently, Sorgner et al. [2017]

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<sup>2</sup>Recent papers by Levine and Rubinstein [2017] as well as Halvarsson et al. [2018] distinguish between incorporated and unincorporated self-employment. In Germany, most studies differ between employers and solo self-employed [Lechmann and Wunder, 2017, Sorgner et al., 2017] because information on whether a business is incorporated is usually not available.

utilized the German Micro-Census in their study comparing incomes of self-employed and earnings of paid employees. This data set surveys monthly individual incomes in 24 groups of uneven size. Categories thereby range from 0-150 Euro to more than 18,000 Euro. In the SOEP, in turn, income is reported on a cardinal scale. The SOEP is therefore preferable because uneven categorization and right censoring in the Micro-Census would restrict our analysis of income inequality in a very sensitive way.

The dependent variable in our analysis is the hourly gross income. Precisely, the surveyed gross income achieved in the month before the interview is used as central measure of income, which is then normalized by the actual work time. In fact, the survey contains the weekly work time. This variable is therefore multiplied with the factor  $4.29^3$  to conclude about the monthly working hours. Our central variable of interest describes the employment status of respondents. In fact, individuals are asked to report whether they are paid employees or self-employed with or without employees.<sup>4</sup> Germany experienced a rise in self-employment levels, which was mainly driven by an increase in solo self-employment [Brenke, 2013, Fritsch et al., 2015, Maier and Ivanov, 2018]. According to Metzger [2015], 58.6% of full-time founders in year 2015 can be classified as solo entrepreneurs. We therefore concentrate on self-employed without any employees and those with employees. Note that the hourly income distribution differs distinctively by occupational status [see Figure 2 and Sorgner et al., 2017]. As both groups of self-employed individuals are disproportionately common at the tails of the distribution, this distinction might help to assess the impact of self-employment on the income distribution more accurately.

Insert Figure 2 about here

The SOEP includes information on demographics as well as employment history and household composition. In this study, a comprehensive set of control variables is included. These comprise age (squared), sex, nationality (German / non-German), marital status (married

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<sup>3</sup>30 days per month divided by 7 days per week.

<sup>4</sup>Freelancers are defined as self-employed as well. Our final sample consists of 480 individuals reporting to be self-employed and 246 freelancers.

/ single / other), children under 16 years in household (yes / no), and a regional indicator giving insights about the federal state, the respondent is living in. Also the educational level is accounted for by dummy variables (primary education or a lower secondary degree / upper secondary degree / tertiary degree) to address income differences due to qualification levels. Human capital indicators, such as the labor market experience in part-time jobs as well as in full-time jobs (measured in years) and years in unemployment are also controlled for. We additionally control for tenure (in years): For the self-employed, it reveals experience in the current self-employed work, while for employees, it describes the time at the current employer. For this reason, tenure is capable to capture the income effects associated with early or later stages of self-employment. Finally, we include dummy variables to control for the occupation via the German classification of occupations 2010 (KldB10), which is closely related to the International Standard Classification of Occupations 2008 (ISCO-08). Precisely, we generate dummy variables in accordance with the corresponding 3-digit codes. This allows to account for a maximum of 144 groups of jobs according to the tasks and duties undertaken in the job. Descriptive statistics on the variables included in the analysis are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.

In line with the tradition of studies applying conditional quantile regression approaches, we conduct cross-sectional analysis [Sorgner et al., 2017]. In fact, the latest year of the underlying SOEP version, that is year 2015, is considered. The analysis is restricted to individuals who report to be full-time employed. Also note that the analysis does not account for civil servants as the relation between gross and net incomes is distinctively different from other employees and the self-employed. Finally, the analysis is restricted to individuals aged between 19 and 65 years.

### 3 Methodology

Conditional quantile regression helps to understand the impact of covariates along the distribution of an outcome. Application of this approach acknowledges that different characteristics might exhibit a different impact among low- and high-income earners. For this reason, the methodology is so popular in economic studies, which assess the impact of a variable on a quantile/percentile of the outcome (conditional on other variables). This approach also has been applied a magnitude of studies analyzing the income of self-employed in comparison to paid employees [among others Hamilton, 2000, Sorgner et al., 2017]. Potentially heterogeneous effects, as in the case of self-employment, where self-employed at the bottom (top) are worse (better) off than employees, however, do not imply that an increase in self-employment has a stronger effect for the low (high) income earners, but for the conditionally low (high) income earners. Therefore, the results do not necessarily suggest that the unconditional income distribution is more disperse.

Quantile regression is a powerful method to examine the effects of self-employment on the conditional distribution of incomes. The political interest, however, mostly lies in how shifting self-employment rates alter the distributive effects. Such questions can be addressed by estimation of an unconditional quantile approach. The unconditional distribution can be thought of the product of the conditional distribution of income on self-employment and the marginal distribution of self-employment [cf. Alejo et al., 2014]. The effect of an increase in self-employment therefore depends on the interaction between the marginal distribution of self-employment as well as the conditional distribution of income. As pointed out by Alejo et al. [2014, p. 55], the step from conditional to unconditional distributive effects is not trivial and the unconditional quantile regression approach based on the concept of the RIF seems to be an important step towards this goal. The RIF approach is based on the properties of the influence function [Firpo et al., 2009], which is used in the robust statistics literature [Hampel et al., 1986]. The influence function is an analytical tool used to examine the effect or influence of adding an observation on the value of a statistic ( $\nu(F_Y)$ ) without

the need to recalculate the particular statistic [Borah and Basu, 2013]. In general, the RIF is defined as shown in equation (1). It contains the influence function (IF) and a functional of interest, which is utilized to recenter the influence function ( $\nu(F_Y)$ ).  $Y$  describes a random variable with cumulative distribution function  $F_Y(y)$ . In our case,  $Y$  describes the hourly income.

$$RIF(Y; \nu; F_Y) = IF(Y; \nu; F_Y) + \nu(F_Y) \quad (1)$$

Firpo et al. [2009] have shown that a RIF regression can be viewed as an unconditional quantile regression approach when the conditional expectation of  $RIF(y; q_\tau)$ <sup>5</sup> is modeled as a function of explanatory variables. Hence, after computing the functional of the RIF for the specific percentile of interest, we estimate a regression with covariates. The resulting coefficients can be interpreted, *ceteris paribus*, as the marginal effect of a small shift in the distribution of covariates on the specific unconditional percentile.

The RIF regression approach is also adequate to measure inequality. For example, IFs are available for the variance, the Gini coefficient, or other measures of inequality. Hence, one might use these IFs and run RIF regressions [see Choe and Van Kerm, 2018, Firpo et al., 2018]. In this paper, we start with an examination of the effect of a rise in self-employment on the variance of the hourly income. A higher variance is indicative of higher deviations from the mean and therefore higher inequality. We, moreover, apply the Gini index, the general entropy index as well as the Atkinson inequality measure, whereas all are prominent measures of wealth and income inequality [Cowell and Van Kerm, 2015]. The Gini index is utilized because it is one of the most popular measures in research on inequality. It ranges between zero and one, whereas one describes perfect inequality. As one might expect distinctive results at the bottom as well as at the top of the income distribution [Halvarsson et al., 2018], we also apply inequality measures, which are sensitive to changes at different parts of the hourly income distribution. In this regard, we calculate the RIFs for two general entropy measures, whereas the Theil index is more sensitive to differences at the top of the

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<sup>5</sup> $q_\tau$  stands for the hourly income at the quantile of interest ( $\tau$ ).

hourly income distribution than the mean log deviation. Finally, the Atkinson index allows to alter in which part changes of the income distribution will be most sensitive by changing  $\epsilon$ . Higher  $\epsilon$  implies rising sensitivity to changes at the bottom of the distribution. All the inequality measures have in common that higher values represent a higher level of inequality. Hence, estimation of a positive coefficient in the RIF regression is associated with a higher level of inequality.

## 4 Results

This section presents the central results. Linear regression reveals that the self-employed indeed obtain higher average hourly income than paid employees (Table A.2, Specification (1)). In fact, the average markup equals 3.64 Euros or 19.65% ( $= \frac{3.64}{18.52} * 100\%$ ), respectively. This is in line with the common knowledge that self-employed obtain higher average incomes than paid employees.<sup>6</sup> This positive effect, however, is essentially driven by the employers (Table A.2, Specification (2)), while average hourly incomes of solo self-employed and paid employees are rather similar.<sup>7</sup> These results show that it is important to distinguish between the solo self-employed and the employers.

Now, we shift the focus to the political view and address the question how an increase in self-employment rates changes the income distribution. This question is addressed by application of the RIF regression approach. Precisely, we examine the effect of an increase in self-employment on income inequality by application of a variety of different RIF regressions

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<sup>6</sup>Note that the set of control variables includes 140 dummy variables in accordance with the classification of occupations (KldB10), which describe tasks of a job. This ultimately allows interpretation of the effects as income differentials between self-employed and paid employees in similar jobs.

<sup>7</sup>There is a discussion about comparability of incomes from self-employment and wages of paid employees [Lechmann, 2015]. Moreover, potential misreporting of incomes from self-employment are debated in the literature [Astebro and Chen, 2014]. In fact, Astebro and Chen [2014] showed that there is a sizable mean financial gain of entrepreneurship after correcting for misreporting. However, the correction methods heavily rely on the underlying assumptions, which can be "unpalatable" [Astebro and Chen, 2014, p. 88]. In our case, we already observe a meaningful average financial markup for the self-employed (see specification (1) in Table A.2). In addition the median income of the self-employed is slightly smaller than the one of paid employees (see specification (3) in Table A.2), which indicates that the median self-employed obtains slightly lower hourly incomes when compared with a paid employee with identical characteristics. Hence, systematic income under- or misreporting by the self-employed seems to be no problem in our study.



of inequality measures.<sup>8</sup> All RIF regressions presented in Panel A of Table 1 are in line with an inequality enhancing effect of self-employment. A more differentiated view suggests that an increase in self-employed without employees has a positive, but statistically insignificant effect on the variance of hourly incomes, while an increase in the rate of employers is suggested to increase wage dispersion (Table 1, Panel B). Estimation of the RIF regression with respect to the Gini index implies that an increase in the rate of both types of self-employment leads to a rise in inequality (specification (2)). The effect for employers, however, is three times larger when compared to the one for the solo self-employed. Also the estimates based on the general entropy measures shown in specifications (3) and (4) corroborate that an increase in self-employment significantly contributes to income inequality. Finally, the estimated coefficients regarding the Atkinson inequality measures are presented in specifications (5) to (7). The coefficients of both groups of self-employed increase with rising  $\epsilon$ . This also holds for the relative effects of the solo self-employed. The relative effects of employers, in contrast decrease with increasing  $\epsilon$ . This corroborates that solo self-employment is likely to introduce inequality by shifting the bottom incomes, while employers are likely to increase inequality at the top of the income distribution.

Insert Table 1 about here

The results shown in Table 1 clearly suggest that self-employment is a source of income inequality in the labor market. To conclude about the mechanisms, which cause increasing income inequality, we also apply unconditional quantile regression for each decile. On the one hand, an increase in self-employment rates shifts the hourly income distribution to left until the 6<sup>th</sup> decile (see Table 2, Panel A). The effects, however, are statistically significant up to decile 5. On the other hand, a rise in self-employment rates also contributes to significantly rising incomes for the top 20% of the income distribution. Self-employment thus is suggested to be a source of income polarization.

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<sup>8</sup>We are indebted to Philippe Van Kerm for sharing his *STATA* code to run the command *inequaly*, which helps to predict a variety of RIFs of a variable [Van Kerm, 2015]. Precisely, we applied his code for calculation of the RIF of the general entropy index as well as the Atkinson inequality measure.

Insert Table 2 about here

Our estimates presented in Panel B of Table 2 suggest that adverse effects are more pronounced among the solo self-employed. An increase in solo self-employment shifts the hourly income distribution to the left until the 7<sup>th</sup> decile. As the effect is statistically significant until the 6<sup>th</sup> decile, an increase in solo self-employment decreases the hourly incomes significantly at least for the bottom 60% of the distribution. More specifically, the coefficient of -3.1743 in specification (1) implies that an increase in solo self-employment from 4.39% to 5.39% reduces incomes in the lowest decile by about 0.3631% ( $= \frac{-0.031743}{8.7413} * 100\%$ ). This economically meaningful effect seems plausible because self-employed face business risks and are not subject to (hourly) minimum wages or incomes, respectively. As the effect is statistically significant as well as economically relevant, we conclude that the effects of an increase in solo self-employment exhibits considerable adverse effects for the bottom 10% of the full-time workforce. In the fifth decile, the corresponding effect of a one percentage point increase in solo self-employment reduces hourly income by about 0.1002% ( $= \frac{0.015766}{15.7343} * 100\%$ ). Specification (9) in Table 2 also adverts to positive effects for the top 10% of earners. The estimated effect of an increase in the share of solo self-employed, however, is only of weak statistical significance.

An increase in the share of employers exhibits statistically significant negative effects on hourly incomes for the bottom 30% of the distribution. In combination with the results for the solo self-employed, a rise in self-employment seems to tear down floors at the very bottom of the hourly income distribution. A rising share of employers, however, also exhibits positive income effects and significantly shifts the income distribution for earners above the 6<sup>th</sup> decile to the right. When the share of employers increases by one percentage point, hourly incomes among the top 10% are estimated to increase by 0.3099% ( $= \frac{0.096314}{31.0800} * 100\%$ ).

We also checked the robustness of our results. Although we control for working time and all individuals reported to be full-time employed, 225 individuals declared to work for less than 35 hours per week. We therefore examined whether our results are robust to

considering individuals with working hours of at least 35 hours per week. The final sample consists of 7,722 individuals (309 solo self-employed and 364 employers). The results of the RIF regression analysis for inequality are presented in Table S.5. The coefficients are qualitatively robust to the ones shown in Table 1. With respect to polarization (see Table S.6), the results are robust as well.

## 5 Discussion and avenues for future research

In this section, we discuss our main results and also hope to stimulate further research. In the past, Germany experienced a rise in solo self-employment [Brenke, 2013, Fritsch et al., 2015, Maier and Ivanov, 2018]. In this context, the results might be suggestive that the increase in self-employment was largely due to entry into the bottom of the hourly income distribution. Therefore, a promising avenue for future research is the analysis of occupational choice. In this regard, the literature has found for instance that entrepreneurs face finance and liquidity constraints [Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998]. When we assume that the quality of a business is positively correlated with start-up costs, then initial wealth inequality may be a reason for long tails in the income distribution of entrepreneurs because one might imagine that only the richer households can gain access to the good opportunities. We therefore encourage studies, which explicitly account for individual financial constraints. In addition, one might also study whether and how (private) start-up financing might help dampening adverse effects associated with occupational choice, liquidity constraints, and initial wealth inequality.

This paper, moreover, contributes to the literature on active labor market policy aiming at rising the self-responsiveness and fostering self-employment out of unemployment. In fact, most of subsidized start-ups are created by single founders or solo entrepreneurs, respectively. This particular group is also likely to remain in the state of solo self-employment [Caliendo et al., 2012].<sup>9</sup> Based on our results, policy interventions fostering entrepreneurship might

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<sup>9</sup>Caliendo et al. [2012] showed that about 70% of surviving subsidized business founders did not become

have unintended consequences on the income distribution because subsistence entrepreneurship tears down floors at the bottom of the income distribution and also increases inequality. As our analysis does not directly account for individual start-up subsidies, we encourage studies on the consequences of active labor market policy fostering entrepreneurship with respect to effects on the income distribution. Future research might also study whether increasing inequality induces unintended effects on the entrepreneurial ecosystem or causes spillover effects on politics or health.

Finally, note that the results can also be interpreted in a different way. In fact, lower self-employment rates are suggestive of decreasing income polarization. The adverse effects at the bottom of the income distribution hence might be dampened by less entry into self-employment. One might therefore cite Shane [2009, p. 141] and highlight that active labor market policy fostering entrepreneurship "is not a numbers game. It is about encouraging the formation of high quality [...] companies."

## 6 Conclusion

This paper contributes to the literature in three distinctive ways: At first, we examine the income situation of self-employed in comparison to paid employees. Second, we study the effects of a change in the rate of self-employment on income inequality. Finally, we investigate the role of self-employment with regard to income polarization. The empirical analysis is based on the German SOEP data set with reference to survey year 2015. With respect to the first point, we confirm prior findings that many self-employed are worse off when compared to paid employees [e.g., Hamilton, 2000]. The pattern, however, becomes more differentiated when we distinguish between solo self-employed and self-employed who also managed to create jobs for others. Specifically, we show that especially the solo self-employed obtain

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employers 19 months after the start-up. This pattern is not restricted to subsidized founders. Lechmann and Wunder [2017] found that it is rather unlikely for solo self-employed to become employers. Also other studies showed that the majority of entrepreneurs has low growth ambitions [Hurst and Pugsley, 2011] and that entrepreneurship is frequently small scaled rather than taking the form of growing productive and prospering firms [Schoar, 2010, Stam, 2013].

lower hourly incomes than paid employees and employers. Employers, in turn, are likely to be among the top income earners. This result basically corroborates that the self-employed are over-represented at the bottom as well as at the top of the income distribution [Astebro et al., 2011].

Besides the income situation of the self-employed, we also analyzed whether and how an increase in self-employment affects the hourly income distribution. RIF regressions of inequality measures highlight the income inequalizing power of a rise in self-employment rates. We thereby corroborate the very recent findings presented in Halvarsson et al. [2018] who showed that entrepreneurship indeed affects overall workforce income inequality in Sweden. More specifically, Halvarsson et al. [2018] showed that self-employed in sole proprietorships increase inequality by widening the bottom of the income distribution. Self-employed in incorporated businesses mainly increase the number of high-income earners and therefore enhance inequality by widening the top of the distribution. With German data, we basically confirm this pattern by distinguishing between solo self-employed and employers.

Our paper extends the literature by showing that a rise in self-employment contributes to income inequality by income polarization. Precisely, the RIF regression results suggest that an increase in solo self-employment reduces hourly incomes for the bottom 60% of the considered workforce. An increase in self-employed with employees, in turn, shifts the hourly income distribution for the high income earners to the right and therefore rises the top-incomes. To conclude, income inequality is reinforced by tearing down floors at the bottom and by widening the top of the income distribution.

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## Tables included in the text

Table 1: Recentered influence function regression with dependent variable hourly gross income: Inequality measures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Variance	Gini	generalized entropy index Entropy 0 (mean log deviation)	Entropy: 1 (Theil Index)	relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 0.5$	Atkinson inequality measure relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 1$	relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 2$
Panel A							
Self-employed	584.5197*** (70.7778)	0.2191*** (0.0138)	0.2471*** (0.0152)	0.3284*** (0.0278)	0.1281*** (0.0091)	0.2140*** (0.0131)	0.3763*** (0.0208)
Paid employees							
Control variables				reference category included			
Panel B							
Solo self-employed	155.6314 (98.7388)	0.1341*** (0.0192)	0.1616*** (0.0212)	0.1501*** (0.0388)	0.0707*** (0.0128)	0.1400*** (0.0183)	0.3292*** (0.0291)
Self-employed with employees	963.1971*** (93.2695)	0.2942*** (0.0182)	0.3225*** (0.0200)	0.4858*** (0.0367)	0.1788*** (0.0120)	0.2794*** (0.0173)	0.4179*** (0.0275)
Paid employees				reference category included			
Control variables							
Inequality index	162.5798	0.2926	0.1435	0.1582	0.0718	0.1337	0.2472
Number of observations				7,947			

+ p<.10, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

Table 2: Recentered influence function regression with dependent variable hourly gross income

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Decile 1	Decile 2	Decile 3	Decile 4	Decile 5	Decile 6	Decile 7	Decile 8	Decile 9
Panel A									
Self-employed	-2.5224*** (0.3335)	-1.7521*** (0.3101)	-1.8585*** (0.3151)	-1.0689** (0.3300)	-0.9409* (0.3729)	-0.4068 (0.4452)	0.4453 (0.5291)	2.4217** (0.8480)	6.8526*** (1.4606)
Paid employees									
Control variables				reference category included					
Panel B									
Solo self-employed	-3.1743*** (0.5073)	-2.2492*** (0.4636)	-2.6118*** (0.4648)	-1.6194*** (0.4896)	-1.5766** (0.5571)	-1.2560+ (0.6467)	-0.2685 (0.7572)	0.6959 (1.1829)	3.7054+ (1.9015)
Self-employed with employees	-1.9467*** (0.4133)	-1.3132*** (0.3891)	-1.1934** (0.3993)	-0.5829 (0.4172)	-0.3797 (0.4089)	0.3430 (0.5765)	1.0755 (0.6963)	3.9453*** (1.1405)	9.6314*** (2.0566)
Paid employees									
Control variables				reference category included					
Hourly gross wages (deciles)	8.7413	10.4895	12.2235	13.9860	15.7343	17.8613	20.3963	24.2424	31.0800
Number of observations					7,947				

+ p<.10, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

## Figures included in the text




Figure 1: Inequality and self-employment rates across countries in year 2015

Fitted values	$\widehat{Gini} = 30.3783 + 0.1963 * \text{Self-employment}$
Robust standard error	(0.0346)
Corresponding t-statistic	5.67
Own calculations.	

Data source: Created from World Bank's World Development Indicators (SL.POV.GINI, SL.EMP.SELF.ZS, CC BY-4.0, accessed on November 09, 2018).



Figure 2: Kernel density estimates of hourly income by employment status

Number of observations: 7,947.

Own calculations.

# Appendix

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics

	mean	standard deviation	minimum	maximum
Hourly gross income	18.5191	12.7507	0.6713	329.2541
Self-employed	0.0914	0.2881	0.0000	1.0000
Solo self-employed	0.0439	0.2049	0.0000	1.0000
Self-employed with employees	0.0474	0.2126	0.0000	1.0000
Paid employees	0.9086	0.2881	0.0000	1.0000
Experience in full-time jobs	18.0591	11.2775	0.0000	49.0000
Experience in part-time jobs	1.4935	3.4435	0.0000	38.7000
Unemployment experience	0.5893	1.6594	0.0000	27.2000
Tenure	10.5609	9.9230	0.0000	48.8000
Male	0.6781	0.4672	0.0000	1.0000
Age	43.4025	10.6786	19.0000	65.0000
Age <sup>2</sup>	1,997.7987	918.1386	361.0000	4225.0000
German nationality	0.8328	0.3732	0.0000	1.0000
Upper secondary degree	0.5566	0.4968	0.0000	1.0000
Tertiary degree or higher	0.3584	0.4796	0.0000	1.0000
Lower educational levels	0.0851	0.2790	0.0000	1.0000
Single	0.2593	0.4383	0.0000	1.0000
Other marital status	0.1065	0.3084	0.0000	1.00000
Married	0.6342	0.4817	0.0000	1.0000
Children below age of 16 in household	0.4449	0.4970	0.0000	1.0000
Schleswig-Holstein	0.0263	0.1600	0.0000	1.0000
Hamburg	0.0193	0.1374	0.0000	1.0000
Niedersachsen	0.0883	0.2838	0.0000	1.0000
Bremen	0.0045	0.0672	0.0000	1.0000
Nordrhein-Westfalen	0.1903	0.3925	0.0000	1.0000
Hessen	0.0725	0.2593	0.0000	1.0000
Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland	0.0497	0.2173	0.0000	1.0000
Baden-Wuerttemberg	0.1320	0.3385	0.0000	1.0000
Bayern	0.1817	0.3856	0.0000	1.0000
Saarland	0.0081	0.0894	0.0000	1.0000
Berlin	0.0374	0.1897	0.0000	1.0000
Brandenburg	0.0347	0.1831	0.0000	1.0000
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	0.0189	0.1361	0.0000	1.0000
Sachsen	0.0634	0.2437	0.0000	1.0000
Sachsen-Anhalt	0.0330	0.1786	0.0000	1.0000
Thueringen	0.0400	0.1960	0.0000	1.0000
Dummy variables in accordance with the KldB10 code. Statistics available upon request.				
Number of observations	7,947			

Table A.2: OLS and conditional quantile regression with dependent variable hourly gross income

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	OLS regression		Median regression	
Self-employed	3.6447*** (0.9024)		-0.4907 (0.5361)	
Solo self-employed		0.1759 (0.7887)		-1.6501* (0.7526)
Self-employed with employees		6.7075*** (1.4751)		0.7055 (0.9534)
Paid employees	reference category			
Experience in full-time jobs	-0.0314 (0.0285)	-0.0363 (0.0283)	-0.0156 (0.0128)	-0.0162 (0.0145)
Experience in part-time jobs	-0.1763*** (0.0373)	-0.1770*** (0.0371)	-0.0825*** (0.0200)	-0.0820*** (0.0201)
Unemployment experience	-0.3615***	-0.3493***	-0.2394***	-0.2314***

	(0.0515)	(0.0517)	(0.0171)	(0.0262)
Tenure	0.1729***	0.1680***	0.1786***	0.1768***
	(0.0170)	(0.0169)	(0.0080)	(0.0088)
Male	2.7925***	2.8081***	1.8873***	1.8604***
	(0.2955)	(0.2964)	(0.1369)	(0.1447)
Age	0.4831***	0.4896***	0.3569***	0.3643***
	(0.0860)	(0.0851)	(0.0346)	(0.0386)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.0043***	-0.0043***	-0.0037***	-0.0037***
	(0.0011)	(0.0010)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
German nationality	1.2700***	1.1697**	1.2383***	1.2239***
	(0.3716)	(0.3674)	(0.1296)	(0.1342)
Upper secondary degree	0.9825**	1.0599***	1.2136***	1.2003***
	(0.3021)	(0.3008)	(0.1225)	(0.1315)
Tertiary degree or higher	6.0958***	6.0806***	5.3157***	5.3004***
	(0.3790)	(0.3772)	(0.2377)	(0.2458)
Lower educational levels		reference category		
Single	-0.3292	-0.2219	-0.1415	-0.0865
	(0.3289)	(0.3290)	(0.1371)	(0.1397)
Other marital status	0.0531	0.1327	-0.0749	-0.0252
	(0.4008)	(0.3975)	(0.1735)	(0.1735)
Married		reference category		
Children below age of 16 in household	1.0905***	1.1029***	0.6043***	0.6585***
	(0.2827)	(0.2821)	(0.1151)	(0.1181)
Federal state dummy variables		included		
Classification of occupations dummy variables		included		
Constant	-9.7164***	-9.8706***	-3.7022	-3.7560
	(1.8053)	(1.7985)	(259.5595)	(263.0112)
Number of observations			7,947	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.3621	0.3674		
R <sup>2,adjusted</sup>	0.3483	0.3536		
Root mean squared error	10.2933	10.2512		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>			0.2941	0.2947

+ p<.10, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

## Supplementary material

Table S.1: Recentered influence function regression with dependent variable hourly gross income: Inequality measures - complete estimation results (Panel A)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Variance	Gini	generalized entropy index Gentropy 0 (mean log deviation)	Gentropy: 1 (Theil Index)	relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 0.5$	Atkinson inequality measure relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 1$	relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 2$
Self-employed	584.5197*** (70.7778)	0.2191*** (0.0138)	0.2471*** (0.0152)	0.3284*** (0.0278)	0.1281*** (0.0091)	0.2140*** (0.0131)	0.3763*** (0.0208)
Paid employees	-3.3046 (5.0901)	-0.0029** (0.0010)	-0.0029** (0.0011)	-0.0027 (0.0020)	-0.0013+ (0.0007)	-0.0025** (0.0009)	-0.0055*** (0.0015)
Experience in full-time jobs	-10.0459 (7.4258)	-0.0047** (0.0014)	-0.0047** (0.0016)	-0.0055+ (0.0029)	-0.0023* (0.0010)	-0.0041** (0.0014)	-0.0079*** (0.0022)
Experience in part-time jobs	-3.7269 (12.7835)	0.0030 (0.0025)	0.0023 (0.0027)	0.0024 (0.0050)	0.0011 (0.0017)	0.0020 (0.0024)	0.0023 (0.0038)
Unemployment experience	2.4964 (2.4828)	-0.0009+ (0.0005)	-0.0005 (0.0005)	-0.0008 (0.0010)	-0.0003 (0.0003)	-0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0002 (0.0007)
Tenure	95.9243+ (51.1282)	0.0232* (0.0100)	0.0234* (0.0110)	0.0300 (0.0201)	0.0120+ (0.0066)	0.0203* (0.0095)	0.0316* (0.0150)
Male	-1.5972 (15.3039)	-0.0088** (0.0030)	-0.0096** (0.0033)	-0.0102+ (0.0060)	-0.0045* (0.0020)	-0.0083** (0.0028)	-0.0171*** (0.0045)
Age	0.0854 (0.1728)	0.0002*** (0.0000)	0.0002*** (0.0000)	0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0003*** (0.0001)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-17.4834 (54.9304)	-0.0142 (0.0107)	-0.0119 (0.0118)	-0.0218 (0.0216)	-0.0075 (0.0071)	-0.0103 (0.0102)	-0.0089 (0.0161)
German nationality	10.5665 (72.0744)	-0.0378** (0.0140)	-0.0362* (0.0155)	-0.0279 (0.0283)	-0.0153 (0.0093)	-0.0314* (0.0134)	-0.0632** (0.0212)
Upper secondary degree	84.1626 (81.4918)	0.0013 (0.0159)	-0.0007 (0.0175)	-0.0070 (0.0320)	-0.0014 (0.0105)	-0.0006 (0.0151)	0.0001 (0.0239)
Tertiary degree or higher				reference category			
Lower educational levels				reference category			
Single	10.2200 (54.2056)	0.0002 (0.0106)	-0.0022 (0.0116)	0.0046 (0.0213)	0.0005 (0.0070)	-0.0019 (0.0101)	-0.0177 (0.0159)
Other marital status	21.7627 (65.5762)	0.0086 (0.0128)	0.0119 (0.0141)	0.0166 (0.0258)	0.0063 (0.0085)	0.0103 (0.0122)	0.0286 (0.0193)
Married				reference category			
Children below age of 16 in household	57.0162 (45.9581)	0.0246** (0.0089)	0.0236* (0.0099)	0.0292 (0.0181)	0.0120* (0.0059)	0.0204* (0.0085)	0.0335* (0.0135)
Federal state dummy variables				included			
Classification of occupations dummy variables				included			
Constant	-324.5680 (1685.0694)	0.2856 (0.3281)	0.1566 (0.3613)	0.1814 (0.6624)	0.0794 (0.2177)	0.1450 (0.3130)	0.3257 (0.4950)
Inequality index	162.5798	0.2926	0.1435	0.1582	0.0718	0.1337	0.2472
Number of observations					7,947		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0578	0.1533	0.1373	0.0885	0.1142	0.1373	0.1364
R <sup>2, adjusted</sup>	0.0374	0.1350	0.1186	0.0689	0.0951	0.1186	0.1177
Root mean squared error	1648.7675	0.3210	0.3536	0.6481	0.2130	0.3063	0.4843

+ p<.10, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.



Table S.2: Recentered influence function regression with dependent variable hourly gross income: Inequality measures - complete estimation results (Panel B)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Variance	Gini	generalized entropy index Gentropy 0 (mean log deviation)	Gentropy 1 (Theil Index)	relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 0.5$	Atkinson inequality measure relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 1$	relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 2$
Solo self-employed	155.6314 (98.7388)	0.1341*** (0.0192)	0.1616*** (0.0212)	0.1501*** (0.0388)	0.0707*** (0.0128)	0.1400*** (0.0183)	0.3292*** (0.0291)
Self-employed with employees	963.1971*** (93.2695)	0.2942*** (0.0182)	0.3225*** (0.0200)	0.4858*** (0.0367)	0.1788*** (0.0120)	0.2794*** (0.0173)	0.4179*** (0.0275)
Paid employees	-3.9039 (5.0787)	-0.0030** (0.0010)	-0.0030** (0.0011)	reference category	-0.0014* (0.0007)	-0.0026** (0.0009)	-0.0055*** (0.0015)
Experience in full-time jobs	-10.1385 (7.4079)	-0.0047** (0.0014)	-0.0048** (0.0016)	-0.0055+ (0.0029)	-0.0023* (0.0010)	-0.0041** (0.0014)	-0.0079*** (0.0022)
Experience in part-time jobs	-2.2164 (12.7551)	0.0033 (0.0025)	0.0026 (0.0027)	0.0031 (0.0050)	0.0013 (0.0016)	0.0023 (0.0024)	0.0024 (0.0038)
Unemployment experience	1.8920 (2.4788)	-0.0010* (0.0005)	-0.0006 (0.0005)	-0.0011 (0.0010)	-0.0004 (0.0003)	-0.0005 (0.0007)	0.0001 (0.0007)
Tenure	97.8513+ (51.0059)	0.0235* (0.0099)	0.0238* (0.0109)	0.0308 (0.0200)	0.0123+ (0.0066)	0.0206* (0.0095)	0.0318* (0.0150)
Male	-0.7874 (15.2676)	-0.0087** (0.0030)	-0.0094** (0.0033)	-0.0099+ (0.0060)	-0.0044* (0.0020)	-0.0082** (0.0028)	-0.0170*** (0.0045)
Age	0.0861 (0.1724)	0.0002*** (0.0000)	0.0002*** (0.0000)	0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0003*** (0.0001)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-29.8803 (54.8344)	-0.0166 (0.0107)	-0.0144 (0.0118)	-0.0269 (0.0215)	-0.0092 (0.0071)	-0.0125 (0.0102)	-0.0073 (0.0161)
German nationality	20.1334 (71.9172)	-0.0359* (0.0140)	-0.0343* (0.0154)	-0.0239 (0.0283)	-0.0140 (0.0093)	-0.0298* (0.0134)	-0.0622** (0.0212)
Upper secondary degree	82.2759 (81.2960)	0.0009 (0.0158)	-0.0011 (0.0174)	-0.0078 (0.0319)	-0.0017 (0.0105)	-0.0010 (0.0151)	-0.0001 (0.0239)
Tertiary degree or higher	23.4840 (54.1171)	0.0028 (0.0105)	0.0004 (0.0116)	0.0101 (0.0213)	0.0022 (0.0070)	0.0004 (0.0101)	-0.0162 (0.0159)
Lower educational levels	31.5942 (65.4373)	0.0105 (0.0127)	0.0139 (0.0140)	0.0207 (0.0257)	0.0076 (0.0085)	0.0120 (0.0122)	0.0297 (0.0193)
Single	58.5608 (45.8481)	0.0249** (0.0089)	0.0239* (0.0098)	reference category	0.0298+ (0.0180)	0.0123* (0.0059)	0.0336* (0.0135)
Children below age of 16 in household	-343.6348 (1681.0127)	0.2818 (0.3272)	0.1528 (0.3606)	0.1735 (0.6606)	0.0768 (0.2171)	0.1417 (0.3124)	0.3236 (0.4948)
Federal state dummy variables				included			
Classification of occupations dummy variables				included			
Constant	162.5798	0.2926	0.1435	0.1582	0.0718	0.1337	0.2472
Inequality index							
Number of observations					7,947		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0624	0.1576	0.1409	0.0936	0.1189	0.1409	0.1369
R <sup>2, adjusted</sup>	0.0421	0.1393	0.1223	0.0739	0.0998	0.1223	0.1182
Root mean squared error	1644.7654	0.3202	0.3528	0.6463	0.2124	0.3057	0.4842

+ p < .10, \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.

Table S.3: Recentered influence function regression with dependent variable hourly gross income - complete estimation results (Panel A)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Decile 1	Decile 2	Decile 3	Decile 4	Decile 5	Decile 6	Decile 7	Decile 8	Decile 9
Self-employed	-2.5224*** (0.3335)	-1.7521*** (0.3101)	-1.8585*** (0.3151)	-1.0689** (0.3300)	-0.9409* (0.3729)	-0.4068 (0.4452)	0.4453 (0.5291)	2.4217** (0.8480)	6.8526*** (1.4606)
Paid employees	0.0688** (0.0217)	0.0740*** (0.0196)	0.0731*** (0.0198)	0.0431* (0.0213)	0.0251 (0.0235)	0.0025 (0.0285)	-0.0741* (0.0315)	-0.1828*** (0.0483)	-0.1374+ (0.0726)
Experience in full-time jobs	0.0111 (0.0299)	0.0129 (0.0287)	0.0141 (0.0290)	0.0003 (0.0316)	-0.0448 (0.0349)	-0.0578 (0.0430)	-0.1727*** (0.0465)	-0.4241*** (0.0690)	-0.4341*** (0.1054)
Experience in part-time jobs	-0.3677*** (0.0721)	-0.3958*** (0.0606)	-0.3774*** (0.0605)	-0.3284*** (0.0547)	-0.2845*** (0.0572)	-0.2923** (0.0646)	-0.3327*** (0.0627)	-0.4059*** (0.0883)	-0.3526** (0.1155)
Unemployment experience	0.0589*** (0.0085)	0.0955*** (0.0087)	0.1335*** (0.0093)	0.1801*** (0.0102)	0.2159*** (0.0118)	0.2561*** (0.0145)	0.2465*** (0.0167)	0.2731*** (0.0260)	0.1582*** (0.0394)
Tenure	0.6478*** (0.1965)	1.0542*** (0.1913)	1.2666*** (0.1982)	1.5375*** (0.2113)	2.0331*** (0.2386)	2.6030*** (0.2872)	2.9190*** (0.3337)	4.4917*** (0.5162)	4.8190*** (0.7695)
Male	0.3800*** (0.0669)	0.4584*** (0.0630)	0.4639*** (0.0623)	0.6513*** (0.0637)	0.5917*** (0.0688)	0.6700*** (0.0788)	0.6687*** (0.0879)	0.7420*** (0.1329)	0.5269** (0.1967)
Age	-0.0050*** (0.0007)	-0.0059*** (0.0007)	-0.0059*** (0.0007)	-0.0079*** (0.0007)	-0.0069*** (0.0008)	-0.0074*** (0.0009)	-0.0064*** (0.0010)	-0.0049*** (0.0016)	-0.0014 (0.0024)
German nationality	0.7645** (0.2337)	1.3728*** (0.2309)	1.2686*** (0.2317)	1.5827*** (0.2372)	1.7072*** (0.2537)	1.4757*** (0.2937)	1.5727*** (0.3233)	1.7093*** (0.4930)	1.2138 (0.7388)
Upper secondary degree	1.6109*** (0.3582)	1.6582*** (0.3349)	1.7829*** (0.3215)	1.5829*** (0.3150)	1.4017*** (0.3215)	1.7579*** (0.3488)	0.7022* (0.3577)	-0.0421 (0.4830)	-0.7768 (0.6104)
Tertiary degree or higher	2.5685*** (0.3798)	3.1410*** (0.3582)	3.8598*** (0.3492)	4.4477*** (0.3536)	5.5562*** (0.3743)	7.1933*** (0.4258)	7.3473*** (0.4612)	9.3271*** (0.6725)	10.2874*** (0.9631)
Lower educational levels	-0.0085 (0.2127)	0.0200 (0.2069)	-0.0472 (0.2125)	-0.4058+ (0.2267)	-0.5497* (0.2562)	-0.6118* (0.3034)	-0.5164 (0.3475)	-0.7098 (0.5256)	0.1920 (0.7386)
Single	0.0053 (0.2496)	0.0806 (0.2483)	0.2834 (0.2483)	-0.0439 (0.2689)	-0.2544 (0.3035)	-0.2774 (0.3651)	-0.4835 (0.4196)	-0.8683 (0.6338)	0.2529 (0.9601)
Other marital status	0.0603 (0.1756)	0.2114 (0.1720)	0.2615 (0.1745)	0.2048 (0.1866)	0.2614 (0.2087)	0.2934 (0.2502)	0.7656** (0.2898)	1.7249*** (0.4525)	2.9688*** (0.6722)
Children below age of 16 in household	-1.2789 (1.4414)	-1.8861 (1.3785)	0.1005 (1.3899)	-18.5140*** (1.4424)	-16.7359*** (1.5787)	-18.2168*** (1.8365)	-16.1316*** (2.0791)	-20.7790*** (3.0941)	-13.3125** (4.5485)
Federal state dummy variables	8.7413	10.4895	12.2235	13.9860	15.7343	17.8613	20.3963	24.2424	31.0800
Classification of occupations dummy variables									
Constant									
Hourly gross wages (deciles)									
Number of observations					7,947				
R <sup>2</sup>	0.1991	0.2994	0.3590	0.3933	0.4116	0.4010	0.3716	0.3340	0.2317
R <sup>2, adjusted</sup>	0.1818	0.2843	0.3452	0.3802	0.3989	0.3881	0.3580	0.3196	0.2151
Root mean squared error	6.1097	6.1113	6.3204	6.7596	7.5632	9.0430	10.4302	16.1517	24.4962

+ p<.10, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table S.4: Recentered influence function regression with dependent variable hourly gross income - complete estimation results (Panel B)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Decile 1	Decile 2	Decile 3	Decile 4	Decile 5	Decile 6	Decile 7	Decile 8	Decile 9
Solo self-employed	-3.1743*** (0.5073)	-2.2492*** (0.4636)	-2.6118*** (0.4648)	-1.6194*** (0.4896)	-1.5766** (0.5571)	-1.2560+ (0.6467)	-0.2685 (0.7572)	0.6959 (1.1829)	3.7054+ (1.9015)
Self-employed with employees	-1.9467*** (0.4133)	-1.3132*** (0.3891)	-1.1934** (0.3993)	-0.5829 (0.4172)	-0.3797 (0.4689)	0.3430 (0.5765)	1.0755 (0.6963)	3.9453*** (1.1405)	9.6314*** (2.0566)
Paid employees	0.0679** (0.0217)	0.0733*** (0.0196)	0.0721*** (0.0198)	0.0423* (0.0213)	0.0242 (0.0235)	0.0013 (0.0285)	-0.0751* (0.0314)	-0.1852*** (0.0482)	-0.1418+ (0.0725)
Experience in full-time jobs	0.0110 (0.0299)	0.0128 (0.0288)	0.0139 (0.0290)	0.0002 (0.0316)	-0.0450 (0.0349)	-0.0580 (0.0429)	-0.1729*** (0.0465)	-0.4245*** (0.0690)	-0.4348*** (0.1054)
Experience in part-time jobs	-0.3654*** (0.0722)	-0.3940*** (0.0607)	-0.3748*** (0.0606)	-0.3265*** (0.0549)	-0.2823*** (0.0574)	-0.2893*** (0.0647)	-0.3301*** (0.0628)	-0.3999*** (0.0883)	-0.3415*** (0.1155)
Unemployment experience	0.0580*** (0.0085)	0.0948*** (0.0087)	0.1325*** (0.0093)	0.1793*** (0.0102)	0.2150*** (0.0118)	0.2549*** (0.0145)	0.2455*** (0.0167)	0.2707*** (0.0260)	0.1537*** (0.0394)
Tenure	0.6507*** (0.1965)	1.0565*** (0.1913)	1.2700*** (0.1983)	1.5399*** (0.2114)	2.0360*** (0.2388)	2.6068*** (0.2875)	2.9222*** (0.3339)	4.4995*** (0.5167)	4.8332*** (0.7698)
Male	0.3813*** (0.0668)	0.4593*** (0.0630)	0.4653*** (0.0622)	0.6523*** (0.0636)	0.5929*** (0.0687)	0.6716*** (0.0788)	0.6701*** (0.0878)	0.7452*** (0.1327)	0.5328*** (0.1964)
Age	-0.0050*** (0.0007)	-0.0059*** (0.0007)	-0.0059*** (0.0007)	-0.0079*** (0.0007)	-0.0069*** (0.0008)	-0.0074*** (0.0009)	-0.0064*** (0.0010)	-0.0049** (0.0016)	-0.0014 (0.0024)
Age <sup>2</sup>	0.7457** (0.2342)	1.3584*** (0.2313)	1.2468*** (0.2320)	1.5668*** (0.2374)	1.6888*** (0.2537)	1.4512*** (0.2935)	1.5521*** (0.3229)	1.6594*** (0.4925)	1.1228 (0.7380)
German nationality	0.7457** (0.2342)	1.3584*** (0.2313)	1.2468*** (0.2320)	1.5668*** (0.2374)	1.6888*** (0.2537)	1.4512*** (0.2935)	1.5521*** (0.3229)	1.6594*** (0.4925)	1.1228 (0.7380)
Upper secondary degree	1.6255*** (0.3580)	1.6693*** (0.3348)	1.7997*** (0.3210)	1.5952*** (0.3146)	1.4159*** (0.3208)	1.7768*** (0.3478)	0.7181* (0.3566)	-0.0036 (0.4813)	-0.7066 (0.6073)
Tertiary degree or higher	2.5657*** (0.3794)	3.1388*** (0.3579)	3.8565*** (0.3487)	4.4453*** (0.3533)	5.5535*** (0.3740)	7.1895*** (0.4253)	7.3442*** (0.4606)	9.3195*** (0.6715)	10.2736*** (0.9613)
Lower educational levels	0.0117 (0.2133)	0.0353 (0.2074)	-0.0239 (0.2123)	-0.3887+ (0.2265)	-0.5301* (0.2560)	-0.5855+ (0.3030)	-0.4943 (0.3469)	-0.6564 (0.5242)	0.2893 (0.7369)
Single	0.0202 (0.2493)	0.0920 (0.2421)	0.3006 (0.2478)	-0.0312 (0.2685)	-0.2399 (0.3035)	-0.2579 (0.3650)	-0.4671 (0.4194)	-0.8287 (0.6330)	0.3251 (0.9588)
Other marital status	0.0627 (0.1754)	0.2132 (0.1719)	0.2642 (0.1744)	0.2068 (0.1865)	0.2637 (0.2086)	0.2964 (0.2502)	0.7682** (0.2898)	1.7312*** (0.4525)	2.9801*** (0.6722)
Children below age of 16 in household	-1.3079 (1.4416)	-1.9082 (1.3788)	0.0670 (1.3896)	-18.5385*** (1.4424)	-16.7642*** (1.5780)	-18.2546*** (1.8357)	-16.1633*** (2.0782)	-20.8558*** (3.0914)	-13.4524*** (4.5396)
Federal state dummy variables	8.7413	10.4895	12.2235	13.9860	15.7343	17.8613	20.3963	24.2424	31.0800
Classification of occupations dummy variables									
Constant									
Hourly gross wages (deciles)									
Number of observations					7,947				
R <sup>2</sup>	0.1997	0.2998	0.3597	0.3936	0.4119	0.4014	0.3718	0.3346	0.2326
R <sup>2, adjusted</sup>	0.1823	0.2845	0.3458	0.3805	0.3992	0.3884	0.3581	0.3201	0.2159
Root mean squared error	6.1076	6.1103	6.3176	6.7584	7.5618	9.0407	10.4291	16.1460	24.4830

+ p<.10, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table S.5: Recentered influence function regression with dependent variable hourly gross income: Inequality measures - complete estimation results with individuals reporting at least 35 working hours

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Variance	Gini	generalized entropy index Gentropy 0 (mean log deviation)	Gentropy: 1 (Theil Index)	relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 0.5$	Atkinson inequality measure relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 1$	relative inequality aversion $\epsilon = 2$
Panel A							
Self-employed	517.3733*** (62.2274)	0.2013*** (0.0130)	0.2288*** (0.0140)	0.3001*** (0.0251)	0.1177*** (0.0083)	0.1994*** (0.0122)	0.3690*** (0.0196)
Paid employees				reference category included			
Control variables							
Panel B							
Solo self-employed	140.9554 (88.6949)	0.1275*** (0.0186)	0.1586*** (0.0200)	0.1444*** (0.0357)	0.0685*** (0.0119)	0.1382*** (0.0174)	0.3455*** (0.0280)
Self-employed with employees	823.1275*** (80.6340)	0.2612*** (0.0169)	0.2859*** (0.0182)	0.4266*** (0.0325)	0.1577*** (0.0108)	0.2491*** (0.0158)	0.3881*** (0.0255)
Paid employees				reference category included			
Control variables							
Inequality index	142.1399	0.2872	0.1377	0.1484	0.0684	0.1286	0.2401
Number of observations				7,722			

+ p < .10, \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.

Table S.6: Recentered influence function regression with dependent variable hourly gross income - complete estimation results with individuals reporting at least 35 working hours

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Decile 1	Decile 2	Decile 3	Decile 4	Decile 5	Decile 6	Decile 7	Decile 8	Decile 9
Panel A									
Self-employed	-2.7094*** (0.3503)	-1.9992*** (0.3227)	-1.9935*** (0.3252)	-1.3317*** (0.3389)	-1.2325** (0.3846)	-0.7468 (0.4541)	0.0032 (0.5408)	1.5950+ (0.8597)	5.6201*** (1.4520)
Paid employees									
Control variables									
Panel B									
Solo self-employed	-3.4967*** (0.5468)	-2.6329*** (0.4942)	-2.8625*** (0.4900)	-1.9686*** (0.5140)	-1.9943*** (0.5849)	-1.6748* (0.6672)	-0.7137 (0.7881)	0.0213 (1.2276)	2.5316 (1.9262)
Self-employed with employees	-2.0700*** (0.4268)	-1.4846*** (0.3990)	-1.2877** (0.4071)	-0.8143+ (0.4222)	-0.6137 (0.4787)	0.0069 (0.5837)	0.5855 (0.7022)	2.8733* (1.1351)	8.1287*** (2.0194)
Paid employees									
Control variables									
Hourly gross wages (deciles)	8.7413	10.4895	12.2378	13.9860	15.7343	17.8710	20.3963	24.1841	30.8858
Number of observations					7,722				

+ p<.10, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.