The Non-U.S. Bank Demand for U.S. Dollar Assets

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Abstract

The USD asset share of non-U.S. banks captures the demand for dollar by these marginal investors. An instrumental variable strategy identifies a causal link from the USD asset share to the USD exchange rate. Cross-sectional asset pricing tests show the USD asset share to be a highly significant pricing factor for carry trade strategies. The USD asset share forecasts the dollar with economically large magnitude and high statistical significance, both in sample and out of sample, pointing towards time varying risk premia. Contemporaneous exchange rate variations due to demand shocks revert over 2-5 years as risk premia normalize.

Keywords: Exchange Rate Disconnect, Intermediary Asset Pricing, Safe Asset Demand

JEL Classification Numbers: F3, G1
I. Introduction

Market commentary often associates exchange rate movements with “changes in positioning” and more generally demand and supply effects. In fact, Froot and Ramadorai (2005) show that institutional investors’ order flow helps explain transitory discount rate news of exchange rates, but not longer-term cash flow news. Furthermore, it is well known that exchange rates can deviate substantially and persistently from macroeconomic fundamentals (Rogoff 1996). As a result, an emerging recent literature has focused on documenting that demand and supply effects help explaining exchange rate movements (e.g., Engel and Wu 2018; Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig 2018; Lilley, Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger 2019).

In this paper, we present a new measure of foreign “safe asset” demand for the U.S. dollar (USD), constructed as the share of non-U.S. banks’ USD assets. We construct the “safe asset” demand metric for 26 advanced and emerging economies, and document that this metric is consistently related to exchange rate movements over time and can help forecast exchange rate both in sample and out of sample. Furthermore, average currency excess returns are systematically related to the cross-section of betas with respect to the USD asset share.

The USD asset share is computed for each economy as the ratio of assets denominated in USD to total assets of the non-U.S. banking system on nationality basis, based on where the ultimate parents of reporting banking-system are headquartered. The USD positions include international positions, that is the USD operations outside the U.S., and U.S.-based branch operations. We don’t include non-U.S. banks’ U.S.-based subsidiaries, because they are subject to local regulation in the U.S. similar to domestic legal entities.

Time-series regressions show that the non-U.S. bank demand for U.S. dollar assets significantly and with an economically large magnitude contributes to the explanation of contemporaneous movements in the U.S. dollar exchange rate with a partial $R^2$ of around 36 percent. The significance and economic magnitude are unchanged by including the U.S. Treasury premium and the home minus U.S. interest differential as controls. Furthermore, the USD asset share significantly correlates with 11 out of 16 bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate movements vis-à-vis individual foreign currencies with high $R^2$s.

The USD asset share is an endogenous variable, and hence we establish a causal relationship using valid demand shifters. The demand of USD denominated safe assets by non-U.S. banks would be expected to be a function of the safety and liquidity of substitute assets and the balance sheet capacity of non-U.S. banks to bear risks. One instrumental variable is the Treasury premium of non-U.S. G10, which is proportional to the convenience yield on substitute safe assets. A second instrumental variable is the sovereign risk of substitute Treasury securities from non-U.S. G10. These two instrumental variables used as demand shifters belong to the group that captures the safety and liquidity of non-U.S. G10 currencies, that is the closest substitute for the USD assets. A third instrumental variable used as demand shifter is the shock to the leverage of non-U.S. banks (orthogonal to the leverage of U.S. banks), which relates to the balance sheet capacity of non-U.S. banks to bear risks.

All three sets of instrumental variables are shown to be valid in a statistical sense, and economic intuition suggests that these are exogeneous demand shifters as they are correlated with USD asset demand, but not with the supply of USD assets. We find that an increase in the Treasury premium of non-U.S G10 is significantly associated with decreasing demand for USD assets by non-U.S. banks; higher sovereign risk in Treasury securities of non-U.S. G10 is associated with a significant increase in the foreign demand for
USD safe assets; and higher leverage of non-U.S. banks is significantly related to higher demand for safe USD assets. In addition, an overidentification test based on the Sargan $\chi^2$ statistic confirms that all three instrumental variables are valid exogenous demand shifters. In terms of economic significance, these instrumental variables alone account for more than 20% of the variation in contemporaneous changes of the USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks. Based on the critical values reported in Stock and Yogo (2002), we can reject the null hypothesis that the proposed instrumental variables are weak instruments.

When we investigate the relationship between the USD asset share and the U.S. dollar exchange rate in the second stage, we continue to find that the higher fitted values of USD asset shares of non-U.S. banks (obtained from first stage) account for a contemporaneous appreciation in the U.S. dollar exchange rate significantly at the 1% significance level. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient point estimates on changes in USD asset shares obtained by two-step-least square (2SLS) is around two times as large as those obtained by ordinary least squares (OLS). The $F$-statistic of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity rejects that the USD asset share is an exogenous variable. These results suggest that the slope of supply curve of USD assets is underestimated by OLS regressions because they use equilibrium information of price and quantity. This result suggests that our IV strategy identifies the supply curve and corrects the coefficient point estimates on the slope due to the usage of valid exogenous demand shifters.

Perhaps more strikingly, those strong contemporaneous results are complemented with forecasting regressions. When there is a positive innovation to USD asset demand, the U.S. dollar appreciates contemporaneously, and then forecasts a U.S. dollar depreciation one, two, three, and five years out. These forecasting results are statistically significant and economically large. The $R^2$ for the U.S. dollar exchange rate changes eight quarters ahead is 36%, with the USD asset share significant at the 1% level. More strikingly, at the twenty-quarter-ahead horizon, the $R^2$ is 67% and the USD asset share is again at the 1% significance level.

There may be complementary economic channels at play. First, there is clearly a “safe asset demand channel” that is also demonstrated by Engel and Wu (2018), and Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018). Higher USD safe asset demand from non-U.S. banks is associated with a stronger U.S. dollar exchange rate contemporaneously. Second, our result coincides with the prediction by intermediary asset pricing theory that higher USD safe asset demand from non-U.S. banks corresponds to lower balance sheet capacity of non-U.S. banks, thus being associated with a significantly negative price of risk in the cross-section of currency excess returns, indicating that these institutions are marginal investors in the foreign exchange (FX) market. This finding resonates with Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) who find that intermediary balance sheet capacity is a significant pricing factor for risky assets. Third, we show that higher demand for USD safe assets from non-U.S. banks predicts U.S. dollar exchange rate depreciation over a longer horizon, but barely predicts the exchange rate dynamics at a shorter horizon. This suggests time variation in exchange rate risk premia. In particular, it reflects the stationary but persistent deviation from the uncovered interest parity that Duarte and Stockman (2005) and Engel (2014 and 2016) have document. Lilley, Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger (2019) also find that the U.S. purchase of foreign bonds is associated with risk premia after the GFC, because there is a strong correlation between these flows with traditional risk measures. In summary, because the demand for USD assets driven by risk-bearing capacity of non-U.S. banks is associated with time varying currency risk premia, it helps predict exchange rate dynamics.

We follow the tradition established by Meese and Rogoff (1983) and find these forecasting results also hold out of sample using Diebold-Mariano and Clark-West statistics, which means our forecasting model significantly outperforms the random walk prediction. We document highly significant (i.e., at the 1%
level) out-of-sample forecastability for the U.S. dollar exchange rates against a basket of 16 currencies, as well as for the vast majority of bilateral exchange rates. To our knowledge, the strength of out-of-sample forecasting power from a quantity variable is unprecedented in the literature on exchange rates.

As a robustness check, we augment the 9 popular exchange rate models surveyed by Rossi (2013) with the USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks in out-of-sample forecasting tests. We find that the out-of-sample forecasting performance improves after we incorporate the average USD asset demand for all 9 models.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly discusses the related literature. Section III describes the construction of the USD demand by non-U.S. banks. Section IV presents the main contemporaneous results, including the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions. Section V shows cross-sectional asset pricing evidence. Section VI gives the forecasting results. Section VII lays out robustness checks. Section VIII discusses implications for the literature. Section IX concludes.

II. A Brief Literature Review

We now provide a brief overview of the existing related work. A more detailed discussion of implications for the literature can be found in Section VIII. This paper is closely relevant to four threads of literature.

First, there is a large literature about the U.S.’ special role as the provider of international reserve currency. A number of papers document there is a positive and countercyclical safety premium for the U.S. dollar (e.g., Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan 2014; Du, Im, and Schreger 2018; Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig 2018; Verdelhan 2018). All these papers focus on the U.S. Treasury premium, which captures the scarcity of USD assets based on a single type of securities (1-year government bonds). Our paper first documents the counter-cyclicality in USD asset demand of marginal investors by using a quantity measure, i.e., the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks. Our paper shows there is a “safe asset demand channel” of non-U.S. financial intermediaries at play – the non-U.S. financial intermediaries pay a safety premium to hold the USD denominated assets, which provides an insurance when negative shocks happen because the U.S. dollar appreciates contemporaneously.

Second, starting with the seminal contribution of Meese and Rogoff (1983), there is a prevailing view that exchange rates follow a random-walk-like process and hence are not predictable, especially at a short horizon. Several well-known exchange rate puzzles result from this view. First, the “exchange rate disconnect puzzle” shows that the nominal exchange rate is not robustly correlated, even contemporaneously, with macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g., Mark 1995; Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual 2005; Engel and West 2005; Rogoff and Stavrakeva 2008). Second, the “UIP puzzle” implies that on average the interest differential is not offset by a commensurate depreciation of the investment currency (e.g., Fama 1984; Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen 2009). Our paper documents the demand for safe USD assets from non-U.S. banks is associated with a time-varying currency risk premium, so it not only helps account for contemporaneous changes in exchange rates, but also helps predict exchange rate dynamics over the longer horizon both in sample and out of sample.

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2 Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2010) and Farhi and Maggiori (2018) present models of the special role of the USD in the international financial system.
Third, there is a large literature about the “global financial cycle”, which is in fact a “global USD cycle”. For example, Rey (2013) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015) consider the VIX index and U.S. monetary policy as key drivers of global financial cycles, and Avdjiev, Du, Koch, and Shin (2019) find the broad U.S. dollar exchange rate is a risk barometer in global capital markets. Our paper contributes to this literature by establishing a causal relationship between USD asset demand, the U.S. dollar exchange rate, the U.S. Treasury premium, and the covered interest parity (CIP) deviation with a novel instrumental variable approach. It relates to a recent literature that explores the failure of CIP for LIBOR (e.g., Ivashina, Scharfstein and Stein 2015; Du, Tepper and Verdelhan 2018) and for Treasuries (e.g., Engle and Wu 2018; Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig 2018).

Lastly, our paper also sheds light on the theory of intermediary asset pricing. Prominent examples of such theories include Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), He and Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), and Adrian and Shin (2014). Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) find that the leverage of U.S. securities broker-dealers possesses significant explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation of expected returns for a wide range of asset classes. This paper focuses on non-U.S. banks and finds that the average USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks to be a global risk factor which can help to explain currency excess returns in the cross section.

III. Measuring Demand for USD Assets by Non-U.S. Banks

In this section, we first define our measure of demand for USD assets by non-U.S. banks and describe our data sources. We also take a glance at how the measure relates to the U.S. dollar exchange rate.

The bilateral exchange rate of any currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar is the relative value of this currency with respect to the U.S. dollar, i.e., the U.S. dollar is the numéraire. To be comparable, we want to measure the USD asset demand within each foreign economy as the relative holding denominated in USD to holding denominated in corresponding foreign currency. Given that non-U.S. banks from each foreign economy are the marginal investors for the foreign currency there, their demand should impact the bilateral exchange rate of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis this specific currency. We assume the total assets of non-U.S. banks from economy \( j \) are dominated by assets denominated either in currency \( J \) used in corresponding economy \( j \) or in USD, as the U.S. dollar historically has played a prominent role in global trade and financial flows (e.g., Farhi and Maggiori 2018; Gopinath and Stein 2018). As a result, we define the relative demand for USD assets by non-U.S. banks as the share of USD denominated assets to total assets.\(^3\)

Given that the analysis aims to measure the USD demand of non-U.S. banks, the nationality of which should matter most, which is determined by where ultimate owners of the banks are headquartered, as opposed to the domicile or residency basis. Due to data limitations on bank-level USD balance sheets, our analysis is performed by aggregating non-U.S. banks’ balance sheets at economy level on nationality basis. Relying on USD balance sheets by nationality of reporting non-U.S. banks, a graphical representation of the different aggregates is shown in Figure 1.

\(^3\) To avoid double counting, the interoffice claims are excluded from both USD denominated assets (the numerator) and total assets (denominator).
International Positions (IP) are the USD operations outside the United States, which capture (1) the cross-border positions of non-U.S. banks, and (2) the local positions of non-U.S. banks in foreign currency (i.e., USD) outside the United States. The analysis explores the USD-denominated claims from the BIS unpublished free and restricted database of BIS Locational Banking Statistics (LBS) on nationality basis.\(^4\) The Banks’ positions are broken down by currency, by sector (bank or non-bank), by country of residency of the counterparty, by country of residence of the reporting banks, and by nationality of the ultimate owner of reporting banks.\(^5\) Hence, the USD-denominated aggregates of IP positions can be constructed at the economy level on nationality basis, based on where the ultimate parents of reporting non-U.S. banks are headquartered.

Operations in the U.S. are the USD operations of non-U.S. banks within the U.S., which include both (3) non-U.S. banks’ branch operations and (4) non-U.S. banks’ subsidiary operations. In the BIS Locational Banking Statistics (LBS), the U.S. does not report local claims/liabilities of non-US banks (and of US banks too). Branch operations within the U.S. are constructed through a bottom-up aggregation based on nationality of balance sheet information available in FFIEC 002 Regulatory Filings. Subsidiary operations in the U.S. are similarly constructed using data from the Call Report Filings (FFIEC 031/041) of non-U.S.-owned subsidiaries, obtained via the S&P Global Market Intelligence platform. The underlying assumption is that the operations of non-U.S. banks in the U.S. are dominated by USD-denominated claims and liabilities.

In this paper, the non-U.S. banks’ balance sheet aggregates encompass the International Position (IP) and (3) U.S.-based branches. We don’t include U.S.-based subsidiaries, which constitutes the Foreign Position (FP), because non-U.S. banks’ U.S.-based subsidiaries are subject to local regulation in the U.S. similar to domestic legal entities, the funding and liquidity management decisions of which are at least partially (if not entirely) independent of the headquarter.\(^6\) In order to calculate the share of USD denominated assets to total assets, the local positions in local currencies by nationality of reporting banks are needed. However, there are data limitations for this series from BIS Locational Banking Statistics (LBS), which start only from 2012 for most nationalities. The aggregates of local positions in local currencies on nationality basis, which enter the denominator of USD asset share of non-U.S. banks, are obtained based on a bottom-up consolidated approach using FitchConnect and Factset database.\(^7\) The initial sample covers 26 economies, where USD operations are considered to be of systemic importance (based on the IMF 2019).\(^8\) For convenience, Germany is used as the representative for eight economies in the Euro Area, since the Euro has been adopted by most of those countries during our sample period (2001q2-2017q4).\(^9\) China and Russia are excluded, because the relevant USD aggregates only span over 2 years. We don’t include Hong

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\(^4\) While BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics (CBS) would be better suited, they do not contain the granularity required including the currency composition and the counterparty sectors (Cerutti, Claessens, McGuire 2012). A subset of BIS Locational Statistics on nationality basis is publicly available as well, however, the data with the granularity required for this analysis is only available through the BIS unpublished free and restricted database.

\(^5\) Due to data limitations, the currency breakdowns only include USD, EUR, CHF, JPY, GBP, so it is impossible to know the holding of assets denominated in corresponding currency specifically used at nationality level.

\(^6\) However, the conclusion of this paper doesn’t vary if we adopt Foreign Position (FP) concept rather than International Position (IP) plus US-based branches to measure USD asset demand. Relevant results can be provided upon request.

\(^7\) In addition, we have further validated the robustness of this approach by using local positions from the other depository corporation surveys as well.

\(^8\) Throughout this paper, economies are defined based on where the ultimate owners of reporting non-U.S. banks are headquartered. For example, non-U.S. banks of Germany means German banks around the world.

\(^9\) Eight Euro Area economies include: Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, and Spain. Using Germany as representative doesn’t mean non-U.S. banks for other Euro Area economies are not important in terms of USD operations, the conclusion of this paper doesn’t vary if we measure aggregates in Euro Area by adding up eight Euro Area economies. Relevant results can be provided upon request.
Kong SAR China for its adoption of the fixed exchange rate regime.\textsuperscript{10} Table 1 summarizes the sample of economies used in this paper, which covers 16 legal tender currencies with (managed) floating exchange rate regimes from 16 economies covering 10 advanced and 6 emerging economies.

Table 1 also presents the summary statistics of key variables that we are interested in in this paper. Columns (1) to (16) report the summary statistics by economies, and Column (17) reports those of the cross-sectional average across all 16 economies. In the upper panel, we report the summary statistics of key variables in levels. First, the variable $s_t$ stands for log nominal exchange rate per U.S. dollar, an increase of which means that the U.S. dollar appreciates. Second, the variable $D_{St}$ stands for the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks from specific economies (nationalities of reporting banks). For example, $D_{St}$ in Column (1) stands for USD asset share of the Australian banks around the world, opposed to that of non-U.S. banks reside in Australia, because out measure is constructed on nationality basis. The Swiss banks around the world has the highest USD asset share standing at 27.8 percent on average over the sample period, whereas that of Brazil has the lowest USD asset share at 3.8 percent instead. The average USD asset share across those 16 economies is around 9.5 percent during the sample period. Third, the variable $\Phi_t$ stands for the U.S. Treasury premium at the one-year horizon.\textsuperscript{11} The U.S. Treasury premium is positive across almost each economies, which suggests that investors are willing to pay a safe premium to hold U.S. Treasury securities relative to foreign government bonds in that economy. The only exception is that the U.S. Treasury has negative premium vis-à-vis Australia at around -6 bps on average.\textsuperscript{12} The U.S. Treasury has the largest premium vis-à-vis Brazil around 189 bps on average. The average U.S. Treasury premium, i.e., the U.S. Treasury premium against a basket of 16 government bonds, is around 38 bps over the sample period. The variable $y_t - y_{St}$ stands for the government bond yield differential between each economy and the United States. Emerging markets tend to have higher yield differentials against the United States. For example, the government bond yields in Brazil and Turkey are 9 percent higher than that of the United States on average. On the other hand, some safe heavens (e.g., Japan and Switzerland) have even lower yields than the United States. The average yield differential between the cross-sectional average of 16 economies and the U.S. is around 2.2 percent over the sample period. In the lower panel, we report the summary statistics of the quarterly changes of the key variables. The longest sample covers the period 2001q1-2017q4 for the levels in the upper panel and, correspondingly, 2001q2 to 2017q4 for the changes in the lower panel.

Figure 2 shows the time series properties of quarterly changes in log U.S. dollar exchange rate ($\Delta s_t$) and the quarterly changes in the USD asset share ($\Delta D_{St}$). the contemporaneous correlation is 58%. It is much higher than the correlation between the alternative proxy for safe asset demand, i.e., quarterly changes in the U.S. Treasury premium ($\Delta \Phi_t$) of 36%; or between fundamental factor such as interest differential ($y_t - y_{St}$) of -32%. Furthermore, and perhaps more strikingly, the USD asset share highly correlates with future exchange rate changes 3-years ahead (with a correlation of 55%, again much higher than the

\textsuperscript{10} The classification of regime is based on Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2018 (IMF 2018).

\textsuperscript{11} Following Du, Im, and Schreger (2018), $\Phi_{j,t} \equiv y_{j,t}^{govt} - \rho_{j,t} - y_{US,t}^{govt}$, where $y_{j,t}^{govt}$ and $y_{US,t}^{govt}$ denote 1-year government bond yield of economies $j$ and the 1-year U.S. Treasury yield of the United States (all issued in respective currencies), and $\rho_{j,t}$ is the 1-year market-implied forward premium for hedging currency $j$ against the U.S. dollar. The data source for government bond yields is from Bloomberg, and spot and forward exchange rates are from WM/Thomson Reuters.

\textsuperscript{12} Du, Im, and Schureger (2018) and Cerutti, Obstfeld, and Zhou (2019) point out that there is considerable heterogeneity in the determinants of the U.S. Treasury premium and LIBOR cross-currency basis across economies and time. For example, the heterogeneity in cross-currency finding gap can be one of the sources (IMF 2019).
corresponding correlation of the U.S. Treasury premium of 29% or the interest differential of 7%). These bilateral correlations are presented in Table 2.

We do want to acknowledge a caveat in our measure due to data limitations. Ideally, we want to capture the relative demand for USD assets by non-U.S. banks from each economy from a pure quantity perspective. However, we can only measure it by the aggregated value of USD assets over aggregated values of total assets of non-U.S. banks at the nationality level, because the BIS data do not allow us to separate the quantity of assets purchased from the exchange rate or price at which they are purchased. As a result, contemporaneous explanatory power in exchange rate movements may reflect the mechanical influence of the exchange rate on the value of USD assets purchases. We cannot simply isolate the movements of pure quantity by reconstructing our measure that keeps exchange rates constant at the beginning, because both price and exchange rate move together, and price information is still unavailable. Lilley, Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger (2019) also acknowledge this limitation of aggregated data and explore the pure quantities of U.S. foreign bond flows using the U.S. mutual fund holdings data from Morningstar, which can allow decomposition of market-value positions into exchange rates, prices and quantities. Their finding confirms that the reconnect between U.S. dollar exchange rate and U.S. foreign bond flows (denominated in USD) since the GFC is not due to the mechanical influence of exchange rate on the value of U.S. foreign bond purchases. There are two key distinctions between our paper and Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger (2019): 1) the power of USD asset share of non-U.S. banks in explaining the U.S. dollar dynamics is not restricted to the post-GFC sample; 2) we emphasize the role of marginal investors played by non-U.S. banks on the FX market rather than focus on the U.S. mutual funds. We view the two approaches as complementary.

IV. Exchange Rates and Demand for USD Assets

In this section, we first show that there is a strong contemporaneous relationship between the exchange rate and the demand for USD assets from non-U.S. banks in the time series. Second, we give a causal interpretation using a set of novel instrumental variables.

A. Time-series relationship

We examine the relationship between the demand for USD assets from non-U.S. banks and the exchange rate over time. We regress quarterly changes in the log nominal U.S. dollar exchange rate on contemporaneous quarterly changes in the demand for USD assets, captured by USD assets as share of total assets from non-U.S. banks. Our benchmark regression specification is given by:

\[
\Delta s_{j,t} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \Delta D_{s,j,t} + \beta_2 \Delta \Phi_{j,t} + \beta_3 \Delta (y_{j,t}^{Govt} - y_{s,t}^{Govt}) + \beta X_{j,t} + \varepsilon_t
\]  

(1)

where the dependent variable $\Delta s_{j,t}$ is the annualized quarterly change in the log nominal exchange rate of the USD vis-à-vis currency $j$, an increase of which means USD appreciates against currency $j$ between quarters $t-1$ and $t$. The variable $\Delta D_{s,j,t}$ denotes the quarterly change in the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks from economy $j$ between quarters $t-1$ and $t$. The variable $\Delta \Phi_{j,t}$ denotes the quarterly change in the U.S. Treasury premium vis-à-vis economy $j$ between quarters $t-1$ and $t$. The variable $\Delta (y_{j,t}^{Govt} - y_{s,t}^{Govt})$
denotes the quarterly change in the interest differential of economy $j$ over the United States between quarters $t-1$ and $t$. Finally, $X_{j,t}$ is a vector of control variables.13

[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

Table 3 shows our regression results. In Columns (1) to (7), we perform regressions by using the cross-sectional average series across 16 economies. It can be interpreted as a relationship between the annualized quarterly changes in the log U.S. dollar exchange rate against a basket of 16 currencies and the cross-sectional average of demand for USD assets by non-U.S. banks from those 16 economies. The coefficient point estimates on $\Delta D_{s,t}$ are positive and significant at the 1% level with similar magnitudes across all specifications. This is consistent with theory prediction (e.g., Engel and Wu 2018; Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig 2018), suggesting that an increase in USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks is associated with U.S. dollar appreciation against a basket of currencies. In terms of magnitude, the coefficient point estimate on $\Delta D_{s,t}$ from the univariate regression in Column (1) implies that a one percent quarterly increase in average USD assets (as share of total assets) of non-U.S. banks across 16 economies is associated with an appreciation of USD against a basket of 16 currencies by 6.8% in the same quarter.14 To provide a further sense of magnitudes, a positive shock to the USD asset share by one-standard deviation of 0.33% (Table 1) is associated with an appreciation in the USD vis-à-vis a basket of 16 currencies by around 2.2% in that quarter on average. In terms of economic significance, the variation in the USD asset demand of non-U.S. banks alone accounts for 36% of the variation in the contemporaneous movements of U.S. dollar vis-à-vis a basket of 16 currencies. Given the well-known exchange rate disconnect puzzle (Frankel and Rose 1995; Froot and Rogoff 1995), this magnitude of $R^2$ is very meaningful and surprisingly high.

Column (2) of Table 3 includes the contemporaneous quarterly change in the U.S. Treasury premium, which is an alternative measure of USD asset demand advocated by Engel and Wu (2018), and Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018). Our measure is different from theirs in at least three aspects: 1) we use quantity information instead of price information; 2) we focus on all USD-denominated assets rather than only one specific USD-denominated assets (U.S. Treasury at 1-year maturity); and 3) we only focus on marginal investors (i.e., banks) rather than all investors. In Column (2), the coefficient point estimate for $\Delta \Phi_t$ is positive as theory predicts but it is insignificant and the $R^2$ only increases marginally to 38%, which implies the additional information from this alternative measure documented in the literature is limited after controlling for the quantity measure of USD demand from non-U.S. banks, that is the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks.

Column (3) of Table 3 includes the contemporaneous quarterly change in the interest differential. The result is consistent with simple predictions from textbook models of exchange rate determination – interest rate increases in the U.S. relative to a basket of currencies are associated with USD appreciation. However, this relationship is not significant.15 Furthermore, the additional contribution to the $R^2$ is negligible.

13 In some regressions, we control $\Phi_{s,t-1}$ and $(y_{j,t-1} - y_{s,t-1})$ as Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018). In addition, we also control for $D_{s,t-1}$.
14 The dependent variable $\Delta s_t$ is annualized quarterly change, so the point estimate on $\Delta D_{s,t}$ is divided by 4 to get the magnitude for change in that quarter.
15 Additional analysis splits the sample between advanced countries and emerging markets. The results of the former support the textbook model prediction, violating the uncovered interest parity (UIP) and are significant at the 1% level. For the latter, however, the relationship between interest rate differential and U.S. dollar exchange rate supports the UIP – interest rate in U.S. increases relative to a basket of currencies is associated with USD depreciation, but statistically insignificant.
Column (4) of Table 3 includes both covariates of $\Delta \Phi_t$ and $\Delta (y_{t}^{Govt} - y_{t}^{Govt})$ along with changes in the USD asset share ($\Delta D_{S,t}$). The $R^2$ rises to 40%, and the coefficient point estimate on $\Delta \Phi_t$ becomes marginally significant at the 10% level, and coefficients and significance for other variables are nearly unchanged. In Column (5), we include other potential drivers (the one quarter lags of $\Delta \Phi_t$ and $(y_{t}^{Govt} - y_{t}^{Govt})$ at quarter $t - 1$), the $\Delta \Phi_t$ becomes significant at the 1% level and the $R^2$ rises to 50%. This specification is equivalent to including the AR (1) innovations of the three factors discussed above. It is consistent with the finding of Jiang, Krishnamurthy, Lustig (2018) that the AR (1) innovations of $\Delta \Phi_t$ has additional information on contemporaneous movements of exchange rates.\footnote{16} Note that the coefficient point estimates and significance of $\Delta \Phi_t$ are nearly unchanged.

In Columns (6) and (7), we present the results for pre-GFC (2001q2 to 2006q4) and post-GFC (2010q1 to 2017q4) using the same specification as in Column (5). For the pre-GFC episode, the coefficient point estimate on $\Delta D_{S,t}$ drops by 40% but is still significant at the 1% level, and $\Delta \Phi_t$ loses explanatory power and flips sign, and the coefficient point estimate on $\Delta (y_{t}^{Govt} - y_{t}^{Govt})$ violates the textbook prediction.\footnote{17} For the post-GFC episode, the magnitude of the coefficient point estimate on $\Delta D_{S,t}$ is back to the magnitude of the whole sample presented in Column (5) and remains significant at the 1% level, and $\Delta \Phi_t$ gains explanatory power, and the coefficient point estimate on $\Delta (y_{t}^{Govt} - y_{t}^{Govt})$ supports the text book prediction but becomes insignificant again. The $R^2$ is above 50% for both episodes. The result for the pre-crisis episode distinguishes our findings from the recent development in exchange rate disconnect literature, which documents a reconnection between the dollar exchange rate and measures of risk or liquidity has emerged only after Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2009.\footnote{18}

In the right panel of Table 3, we adopt the same specification as in Column (5) but focus on the bilateral exchange rate of the USD vis-à-vis different individual currencies in our sample (see, Columns (8) to (23)). We find that the contemporaneous relationship between the USD asset share of non-banks from economy $j$ and the exchange rate of the USD vis-à-vis currency $j$ significantly holds for 11 out of 16 cases.\footnote{19} The significant coefficient point estimates on $\Delta D_{S,j,t}$ vary from 6.5 (CHF) to 65.9 (BRL). The changes in the U.S. Treasury premium also have explanatory power for 10 out of 16 cases. The changes in interest differential have more explanatory power for bilateral exchange rates: 9 out of 16 cases support the textbook prediction. The cross-sectional average results are mostly contaminated by currencies in emerging markets, where they either have contradictive and significant signs (MXN, TRY, ZAR) supporting the UIP condition or have insignificant results (BRL, INR, and MYR).

Taken together, these results show that the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks is a robust explanatory variable for the variation in the U.S. dollar exchange rate over time. The explanatory power doesn’t change before or after Global Financial Crisis. Adding additional drivers does not affect the explanatory power of quantity measure of USD safe asset demand captured by USD asset share, especially in the case of controlling for the price measure of USD safe asset demand (the U.S. Treasury premium).

\footnote{16} The results are uniformly weaker if we use changes in 3-month U.S. Treasury premium, which is consistent with findings from Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018), likely because the 3-month U.S. Treasury premium is a noisy measure of the long-term expectation term that drives exchange rates.

\footnote{17} The finding that $\Delta \Phi_t$ loses explanatory power and flips sign can be due to our shorter sample (starting from 2001q2) compared to the sample staring in 1988q1 of Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018).

\footnote{18} Lilley, Maggiori, Neitman, and Schreger (2019) find U.S. purchases of foreign bonds, implied volatility of the S&P index (VXO), the return of the stock market (S&P 500), credit spread constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), the returns of financial intermediaries composed by He, Kelly, and Manela (2017), and the U.S. Treasury premium introduced by Du, Im, and Schreger (2018) only establish economically sizable and statistically significant connection with the U.S. dollar exchange rate after the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2009.

\footnote{19} Among 5 insignificant cases, the point estimates on $\Delta D_{S,j,t}$ for INR, NOK, SGD, and ZAR have the positive signs consistent with theory prediction, however, that of GBP flips the sign.
Our findings suggest that the U.S. dollar exchange rate vis-à-vis individual foreign currency of corresponding economy is, to a large extent, driven by a simple safe asset demand story from the perspective of non-U.S. banks. Higher demand for the USD by non-U.S. banks from that economy is driving down the currency where the respective banks are headquartered. This finding coincides with the earlier findings in the literature that order flows as quantity proxies for demand are significant determinants of exchange rates contemporaneously (e.g., Evan and Lyons 2002).

What is strikingly different from the existing literature is the magnitude of the correlations. The proxy for USD safe asset demand, i.e., the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks, accounts for 36% of the variation in the U.S. dollar exchange rate over time (in terms of the $R^2$), which is quantitatively beyond anything that has been documented in the literature so far.

Though striking, Table 3 is just the beginning of our empirical investigation. We next turn to an instrumental variable approach that allows us to establish a causal relationship between the USD safe demand and the U.S. dollar exchange rate in subsection B. Then we move to asset pricing in Section V and to forecasting relationships in Section VI.

B. Causal relationship

We now turn to establish the causal interpretation between the demand for USD safe assets from non-U.S. banks and exchange rates using novel instrumental variables. It is a classical challenge in economics to separate supply and demand effects. If the demand and supply curves shift simultaneously over time, the observed data on relative quantities (USD assets as percent of total assets) and relative prices (exchange rates) reflect a set of equilibrium points on both curves. Consequently, an OLS regression of relative prices on relative quantities fails to identify or to trace out either the supply or demand relationship. Exogeneous curve shifters (i.e., instrumental variables) can be used to address this problem. Furthermore, we extend this strategy to the U.S. Treasury premium and LIBOR cross-currency basis, which helps us identify different roles played by the “safe asset demand channel” and the “financial intermediation channel”, two channels proposed in the literature.

In the previous subsection, the underlying assumption for the OLS regression to obtain a consistent estimate of the supply curve is that the observed changes in quantities and prices are solely due to demand shifts. This might not be a very strong assumption for any given individual economy but might be too strong for their average as a whole. In this subsection, we try to adopt a conservative approach – find exogeneous demand shifters for USD assets of non-U.S. banks in each economy. A valid demand shifter should affect demand conditions of USD denominated assets exogenously without affecting cost conditions of supplying USD denominated assets. Based on this principle, we propose two groups of instrumental variables:

Safety of substitute currencies. The costs of substitutes are often used as demand shifters in the literature (Angrist and Krueger 2001). As the closest substitute for USD denominated assets to serve as global safe assets, we only focus on sovereign securities denominated in six non-USD currencies from non-U.S. G10 economies – that is, Canadian Dollar for Canada; Swiss Franc for Switzerland; Euro for Euro Area economies; Japanese Yen for Japan; Pound Sterling for United Kingdom; and Swedish Krona for Sweden.

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20 Angrist and Krueger (2001) provide a comprehensive literature survey on using instrumental variables to identify causal economic relationships.
We consider two different variables that can capture the safety of assets denominated in substitute currencies:

(i) The first measure is the Treasury premium of substitute economies, which is proportional to the convenience yield on substitute safe assets. This is built on the work of Du, Im, and Schreger (2018) that defines the U.S. Treasury premium, which is proportional to the convenience yield on U.S. safe assets of non-U.S. investors. Similarly, the Treasury premium of substitute economy, \( \Phi_{j,t}^{sub} \), is equal to \( (y_{j,t}^{govt} - \rho_{j,t} - y_{sub,t}^{govt}) \), where \( y_{j,t}^{govt} \) and \( y_{sub,t}^{govt} \) denote 1-year Treasury yield of economy \( j \) and that of substitute economy (all issued in respective currencies), and \( \rho_{j,t} \) is the 1-year market-implied forward premium for hedging currency \( j \) against the substitute currency. By construction, it captures the premium that investors are willing to receive less from holding the substitute Treasury securities relative to government bonds in economy \( j \).

(ii) The second measure is the sovereign CDS spread of substitute Treasury securities, which capture the sovereign risk of substitute safe assets that are denominated in substitute currencies. In fact, sovereign risk is a key component that influences the Treasury premium (Du, Im, Schreger 2018; Engel and Wu 2018). We obtain the sovereign CDS spreads from Markit for government bonds with 5-year maturity (the most liquid maturity).

These two measures of safety of substitute currencies are simple averages across six non-USD G10 currencies, including Canadian Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, Pound Sterling, Swedish Krona, and Swiss Franc. We would expect when the Treasury premium (sovereign CDS spread) of substitutes increases (decreases), the substitute currencies become safer – the demand for USD safe assets from non-U.S. banks would be substituted more by demand for other safe assets denominated in substitute currencies.

**Balance sheet constraints of non-U.S. banks.** The risk-taking capacities of non-U.S. banks should matter for their demand for safe assets. We build on the work of Adrian, Etula, Shin (2010) and Adrian, Etula, Muir (2014) to measure the risk-taking capacities of non-U.S. banks as the logarithm of the book leverage ratio. We use the bank balance sheet data from Fitchconnect and match with the bank ownership information from Bankscope to make sure that the leverage ratios that we construct share the same economies as USD asset share of non-U.S. banks where they are headquartered. We orthogonalize this economy-specific bank leverage measure with respect to the leverage of the U.S. banking system, so that the residual is irrelevant to the pricing kernel of U.S. financial intermediaries. We would expect that when the (orthogonalized) leverage ratio of non-U.S. banks increases, balance sheet capacity deteriorates, and the demand for USD assets increases.

Table 4 reports our Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) results using the two groups of instrumental variables discussed above. As before, we focus on time-series regressions of the cross-sectional average of 16 economies over the full sample period.

21 Substitute currency refers to the simple average across six non-USD G10 currencies (Canadian Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, Pound Sterling, Swedish Krona, and Swiss Franc). Correspondingly, substitute jurisdiction refers to the simple average of non-U.S. G10 jurisdictions (Canada, Euro Area, Japan, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland). The Treasury yield of German government bond is used as the Euro Area representative, so as the respective CDS spread of German bonds is used as the Euro Area representative for the second instrumental variable.
In the upper panel of Table 4, we investigate the first stage relationship – between the USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks, captured by USD asset share, and three different instrumental variables proposed above. In particular, we run the following regression:

\[
\Delta \tilde{D}_{S,t} = \alpha_1^1 + \beta_1^1 \Delta \tilde{D}_{S,t}^{sub} + \beta_2^1 \Delta \text{Sovereign CDS}_{S,t}^{sub} + \beta_3^1 \Delta \text{Leverage}, + \beta_4^1 \tilde{X}_t + \varepsilon_1^1
\] (2)

From Columns (1) to (5), the coefficient point estimates on \(\Delta \tilde{D}_{S,t}^{sub}\) are negative with similar magnitudes across all specifications, and significant at the 10% level or above for 3 out of 5 specifications; the coefficient point estimates on \(\Delta \text{Sovereign CDS}_{S,t}^{sub}\) are positive and significant at the 1% level with similar magnitudes across all specifications. This is consistent with our prior, suggesting that non-U.S. banks tend to reduce demand for safe USD assets when the safety and liquidity of substitute currencies increases. The coefficient point estimates on \(\Delta \text{Leverage}\) are positive and significant at the 1% level with similar magnitudes across all specifications. This suggests that non-U.S. banks tend to increase demand for safe USD assets when their balance sheet capacity to bear risk deteriorates. In terms of economic significance, the variation from the predicted changes in the USD asset share alone accounts for 7% of the variation in the contemporaneous changes of the USD dollar exchange rate (Column 2).

In terms of economic significance, the variation from the predicted changes in the USD asset share alone accounts for 7% of the variation in the contemporaneous changes of the U.S. dollar exchange rate (Column 22). In particular, we run the following regression:

\[
\Delta \tilde{D}_{S,t} = \alpha_1^2 + \beta_1^2 \Delta \tilde{D}_{S,t} + \beta_2^2 \Delta \Phi_t + \beta_3^2 \Delta (\tilde{y}^{Gvt}_t - y^{Gvt}_t) + \beta_4^2 \tilde{X}_t + \varepsilon_2^2
\] (3)

Specifications in Columns (1) to (5) are the same as the ones in Table 3, except instead of the observed values (\(\Delta \tilde{D}_{S,t}\)) we use the fitted values of USD asset demand (\(\Delta \tilde{D}_{S,t}\)), which are purely driven by demand conditions of USD denominated assets of non-U.S. banks obtained from the first stage, but not by the supply of USD denominated assets. From Columns (1) to (5), the coefficient point estimates on \(\Delta \tilde{D}_{S,t}\) are positive and significant at the 1% level across all specifications.

Note that the magnitude of the coefficient point estimates on \(\Delta \tilde{D}_{S,t}\) obtained by 2SLS are around two times as larger as those obtained by OLS in Table 3, and we can reject that the USD asset share is an exogenous variable from all specifications at the 10% level or higher based on the \(F\) statistic of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity. This result suggests the slope of the supply curve is underestimated by the OLS estimation, because observed data in relative quantities (USD assets as a percent of total assets) and relative prices (exchange rates) is a reflection of a set of equilibrium points on both supply and demand curves. In addition, we confirm that three instrumental variables together are exogenous based on inference from the Sargan \(\chi^2\) statistic of overidentification. This result suggests that our instrumental variable (IV) strategy manages to identify the supply curve and corrects the coefficient point estimates using valid demand shifters that are exogeneous to supply conditions.

In terms of economic significance, the variation from the predicted changes in the USD asset share alone accounts for 7% of the variation in the contemporaneous changes of the U.S. dollar exchange rate (Column 22). The superscripts 1 (or 2) differentiate the first stage (or the second stage) in the Equation 2 (or 3).

22 Controls included in the first stage are the same as the ones in the second stage.

23 The superscripts 1 (or 2) differentiate the first stage (or the second stage) in the Equation 2 (or 3).

24 According to Stock and Yogo (2002), the critical value for the weak instrument test based on 2SLS bias of the 5% significance level is 13.91 for parameters setting of 1 endogenous regressor, 3 instrumental variables, with desired maximal bias of IV estimator relative to OLS at 0.05.
1 of Table 4), which is much smaller than that obtained from the OLS regression (Column 1 of Table 3) – that is 36%. In Column (4), the specification includes both covariates of $\Delta \Phi_t$ and $\Delta (\bar{y}_t^{Govt} - y_t^{Govt})$ along with the fitted value of the USD asset demand ($\Delta \tilde{z}_{S,t}$), the $R^2$ rises marginally to 11% but both $\Delta \Phi_t$ and $\Delta (\bar{y}_t^{Govt} - y_t^{Govt})$ are insignificant. However, after Column (5) includes all other potential drivers (the one quarter lags of $\bar{D}$, $\Phi$, and $(\bar{y}^{Govt} - y_t^{Govt})$ at quarter $t - 1$), the $R^2$ rises to 36%, the point estimate on $\Delta \tilde{z}_{S,t}$ from 2SLS drops to around 41.8 (still almost two times as large as that from OLS), and $\Delta \Phi_t$ becomes marginally significant at the 10% level. As we discussed before, this specification is equivalent to include the AR (1) innovations of three factors discussed above. Our quantity measure of USD asset demand, captured by USD assets from non-U.S. banks, has more explanatory power on exchange rates in the form of AR (1) innovation from the 2SLS regression.

An interesting extension is to investigate the relationship between the U.S. Treasury premium, the LIBOR cross-currency basis, and the quantity of USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks using our IV strategy. This can add value to the discussion of the “safe asset demand channel” and the “financial intermediary channel” for the global USD cycle (Du, Im, and Schreger 2018; Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig 2018; and Du 2019). Both the LIBOR cross-currency basis, which equals the LIBOR CIP deviation, and the U.S. Treasury premium are measures of the “specialness” of USD assets relative to non-USD assets on a currency hedged basis. The key difference is that U.S. financial intermediaries represent key suppliers of USD denominated assets in the interbank market, while the U.S. Treasury is the ultimate supplier of U.S. Treasury securities in the U.S. Treasury market. As we discussed earlier, the “safe asset demand channel” is about shifters to the demand curve. The “financial intermediation channel” is about shifters to the supply curve. Using exogenous demand shifters from our IV strategy, we can identify the slopes of the supply curves for these two markets.

Table 5 only presents the results of the second stage, because the first stage results are very similar to that of the upper panel in Table 4. The specification of the second stage is given by\(^{25}\):

\[
\Delta \Phi_t = \alpha_1^2 + \beta_1^2 \Delta \tilde{z}_{S,t} + \beta_2^2 \Delta (\bar{y}_t^{Govt} - y_t^{Govt}) + \beta_3 \tilde{X}_t + \epsilon_t
\]

(4)

Where instead of using average quarterly changes in log nominal exchange rate as dependent variable, we investigate average quarterly changes of the U.S. Treasury premium (\(\Delta \Phi_t^{Treasury}\)) and average quarterly changes of the (-1)*LIBOR cross-currency basis (\(\Delta \Phi_t^{Libor}\)) in Columns (1) - (2) and Columns (3) - (4), respectively.\(^{26}\)

In the regressions of the U.S. Treasury premium (\(\Delta \Phi_t^{Treasury}\)), Column (1) shows that the 2SLS coefficient point estimate on the fitted value of the USD asset share ($\Delta \tilde{z}_{S,t}$) is positive and statistically significant during the full sample (2001q2-2017q4), and it remains significant and becomes even larger since the GFC (2010q1-2017q4) in Column (2). These results coincide with findings from Du, Im, and Schreger (2018), and Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018) that document the U.S. Treasury premium has been positive for a long time even before the GFC. Because the fitted value of the USD asset share ($\Delta \tilde{z}_{S,t}$) comes from

\(^{25}\) The quarterly changes in the U.S. Treasury premium (\(\Delta \Phi_t\)) is not entered as control, because it becomes the dependent variable here. For the similar reason, the average Treasury premium of substitute government bonds (\(\Delta \tilde{z}_{S,t}^{Govt}\)) is excluded from the instrumental variables.

\(^{26}\) According to Du, Tepper, and Verdelhan (2018), the LIBOR cross-currency basis between jurisdiction $j$ and the United States is equal to $x_{j,t} = -y_{j,t}^{Libor} - \Delta \tilde{z}_{S,t}^{Govt}$, where $y_{j,t}^{Libor}$ and $y_{j,t}^{Govt}$ denote 1-year interbank rate of jurisdiction $j$ and that of the United States, respectively, and $\rho_{j,t}$ is the one-year market-implied forward premium for hedging currency $j$ against the U.S. dollar. To make the notation consistent in the paper, the variable $\Phi_t^{Libor}$ denotes $(-1) \times x_{j,t}$ averaging over 16 jurisdictions.
exogeneous demand shifters, it suggests the supply curve in the U.S. Treasury market identified by our IV strategy is upward sloping for both the full sample episode and the post-GFC episode, though the slope is slightly larger for the latter but insignificant in difference. On the contrary, in the regressions of the (-1)* LIBOR cross-currency basis ($\Delta \Phi_{i,t}^{libor}$), Column (3) shows that the 2SLS coefficient point estimate on the fitted value of USD asset share ($\Delta D_{i,t}^x$) is not significantly different from zero during the full sample (2001q2-2017q4), however, it turns positive and statistically significant after the GFC (2010q1-2017q4) in Column (4). These results again echo the findings from Du, Tepper, and Verdelhan (2018) that CIP deviation has only become significantly negative since the GFC. In the LIBOR cross-currency swap market, we cannot reject that the supply curve is flat for the full sample episode, but we find that the supply curve becomes significantly upward-sloping in the post-GFC episode. These results suggest that U.S. financial intermediaries actively traded in the LIBOR cross-currency swap market and arbitraged away the CIP deviation pre-GFC, but they have had less balance sheet capacities to do so since the GFC. In contrast, the U.S. Treasury never exhibits active speculative trading behavior even if it has the balance sheet capacity to do so, which is because the U.S. Treasury acts according to fiscal mandates.

As far as we know, our paper is the first one to provide comprehensive empirical evidence to understand the premise that the “safe asset demand channel” and the “financial intermediation channel” play different roles in different markets. Our findings suggest that the “safe asset demand channel” is at play for both the U.S. LIBOR cross-currency swap market and the U.S. Treasury market (Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig 2018; Krishnamurthy and Lustig 2019). In addition, our findings suggest that the “financial intermediation channel” has started to play an important role in the U.S. LIBOR cross-currency swap market, because the global capital and liquidity requirements and specific regulations at the individual economy level may have tightened the supply of US dollar funding to non-U.S. banks since the GFC (Du, Tepper, and Verdelhan 2018; Iida, Kimura, and Sudo 2018). Our findings also suggest that the “financial intermediation channel” doesn’t play a critical role in the U.S. Treasury market, because the U.S. Treasury (as the ultimate supplier of U.S. government bonds) can but does not actively arbitrage away the U.S. Treasury premium when the demand for U.S. Treasury from non-U.S. banks is strong.

Overall, our novel IV strategy helps identify the causal relationship between the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks and the USD exchange rate, correcting the downward bias of the OLS estimator. Further, it sheds new light on the “safe asset demand channel” and the “financial intermediation channel”.

V. Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing

In addition to the strong contemporaneous causal relationship, we turn to asset pricing in the cross-section. In this section, we find that different loadings on the average USD asset demand of non-U.S. banks help to explain currency excess returns in the cross section. Our results suggest that average global demand of USD safe assets from non-U.S. banks acts as a risk factor in pricing currency excess returns.

The risk factor of global USD asset demand is defined as the cross-sectional average of annualized quarterly changes in the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks across 16 economies. The log currency excess return of currency $j$ corresponds to a long position in Treasury bonds of economy $j$ funded by borrowing in U.S. dollars:
To estimate the factor price and the loading betas, we use a two-stage Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression. We conduct this analysis both at the individual-currency level and at the currency-portfolio level provided by Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011). In the first stage, we run a time-series regression of the currency excess returns on a constant and global USD asset demand changes as pricing factor to estimate betas. The betas for individual currencies (currency portfolios) are presented in Figure 3 below.

\[
R_{j,t} = y_{j,t-1} + \Delta s_{j,t} - y_{s,t-1}
\]

From the left panel of Figure 3, we can find the loadings on global USD asset demand are negative and significant at the 5% level or above. It suggests that higher interest rate currencies (e.g., BRL and ZAR) have higher loadings (in absolute term) than lower interest rate currencies (e.g., JPY and GBP) on average. The currency portfolios from Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011) are ranked from low to high interest rate – portfolio 1 contains currencies with the lowest interest rate, while portfolio 5 contains currencies with the highest interest rate. In the right panel, we also find higher interest rate currency portfolios tend to have higher loadings in general.

In the second stage, we examine the cross-sectional relationship between the magnitude of exposure to USD asset demand and the average size of excess returns. To visualize this cross-sectional relationship, Figure 4 plots the average currency excess returns against the corresponding USD demand betas for individual currencies (in the left panel), and for currency portfolios (in the right panel), respectively. We can see a strongly negative correlation between the average excess returns and the USD demand betas with a bivariate correlation equal to -58% for the individual currencies and -76% for the currency portfolios.

From the left panel in Figure 4, we can see that investing in high interest rate currencies (e.g. BRL and ZAR) gives U.S. investors on average higher excess returns than investing in low interest currencies (e.g. JPY and GBP). At the same time, high interest rate currencies have larger negative loadings on the global average USD asset demand factor than low interest rate currencies. This suggests that the demand of USD assets of non-U.S. banks is a global risk factor on the FX market. High interest rate currencies have higher systematic loadings on the USD demand factor (a more negative USD asset demand beta), which require higher on average excess returns to compensate this exposure to USD asset demand risk. On the contrary, low interest rate currencies provide a hedge against USD asset demand risk.

The right panel for carry-trade portfolios ranked by interest rate demonstrates an even stronger relationship. This finding relates to the discussion of “currency crashes” by Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009). It also coincides with the conclusion of Clarida, Davis, and Pedersen (2009) and Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2012) that the ex post returns for high interest rate currencies are low during times of high volatility. High interest rate currencies are risky because they have poor

27 As Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) suggested, we drop the last currency portfolio, which consists of currencies with very high inflation.
28 We should admit the cross-sectional differences cannot be fully explained by the differences in the interest rates (e.g. INR, SGD in the left panel; currency portfolio 1 in the right panel).
29 Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007 and 2011) find the excess returns on carry trade strategy cannot be explained by traditional risk factors such as growth rate of real consumption, the market return, the term structure spread, and the Ted spread, etc.
payoffs when a measure of global volatility is high, which coincides with strong demand for USD
denominated safe assets.

The cross-sectional relationship discussed above has some linkages with the cross-sectional relationship
between the broad U.S. dollar index and the LIBOR cross-currency basis. Avdjiev, Du, Koch, and Shin (2019)
find currencies with more systematic exposures to the broad U.S. index have higher excess returns from
CIP trade. When the global USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks rises, the U.S. dollar exchange rate
tends to appreciate. As a result, the currencies with more exposures to the USD asset demand risk tend
to have higher expected excess returns from CIP trade.

Our finding is consistent with recent exchange rate theories based on capital flows in imperfect financial
markets that links global imbalances with currency premia (Gourinchas and Rey 2007; Corte, Riddiough,
and Sarno 2016). These theories suggest net debtor countries (usually high interest rate countries) offer
currency risk premia to compensate investors willing to finance negative external imbalances because
their currencies depreciate in bad times, which are times of large negative shocks to risk-bearing capacity
and global risk aversion inducing safe demand for USD assets.

In summary, our findings suggest that the average USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks acts as a global
risk factor that is priced in the cross section of currency excess returns. The currencies with more
systematic exposures to the USD asset demand risk factor tend to have higher expected returns to
compensate risks of “currency crashes” in bad times, which are times coincides with strong demand for
safe USD assets.

VI. Predictability

In this section, we focus on the performance of the USD asset share from non-U.S. banks (a quantity
measure) in forecasting exchange rates. In the literature, it is well known that some FX market quantities
like order flow are associated with contemporaneous returns (e.g., Evans and Lyons 2002), however, it is
less known whether predictive information is contained.30

To begin with, we illustrate the predictive power using a simple vector autoregression (VAR). The impulse
response functions (IPFs) from the VAR are shown in Figure 5. In the left panel, we find that the
contemporaneous appreciation in the U.S. dollar exchange rate in response to positive shocks in USD asset
share is nearly entirely undone after five years. One of the economic interpretations is overshooting due
to time varying risk premia, where demand for USD assets of non-U.S. banks drives up the U.S. dollar
contemporaneously by compressing risk premia, but this contemporaneous impact gets reversed over 1-
5 years as risk premia normalize. Lilley, Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger (2019) also find that the U.S.
purchase of foreign bonds is associated with risk premia after the GFC.

An alternative explanation is that the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks could capture a dimension of
investor sentiment that is not captured by other macro fundamentals. For example, López-Salido, Stein,

30 A few papers show that FX order flow contains information about future currency returns, but they tend to disagree on the source of this
predictive power (e.g., Evans and Lyons 2005; Froot and Ramadorai 2005; Rime, Sarno, and Sojli 2010). However, Sager and Taylor (2008) fails to
find robust predictive power of exchange rates by order flow, using commercially available order flow data.
and Zakrajšek (2017) and Brandão-Marques, Chen, Raddatz, Vandenbussche, and Xie (2019) document some risk metrics in credit markets can help to predict reversals of financial conditions and corporate spreads. In addition, this can also reflect the extraordinary ability of non-U.S. banks to process fundamental information, especially for the local market. For example, Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling, Schrimpf (2016) find that customer types vary massively in terms of their predictive ability – the flows by long-term demand-side investment managers have the strongest predictive power for exchange rates, while flows originated from the other groups only predict transitory changes in exchange rates. However, fully disentangling the extent to which the relationship between USD asset share of non-U.S. banks and the U.S. dollar exchange rate by any of these dimensions is beyond the scope of this paper.

In the middle panel, we find that the U.S. Treasury premium drives up the U.S. dollar contemporaneously and the induced momentum effect is short-lived for another quarter, then it depreciates over the next one-to-five-year period. This result is consistent with findings from Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018). In the right panel, we find the U.S. dollar appreciates in response to positive shocks to interest differentials (home – U.S.) in the first two years, then it wanes down over the next three-year period.31

A. In-sample forecasting

As suggested by the theoretical models by Engel and Wu (2018) and Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018), a strong USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks today means that today’s dollar exchange rate appreciates, thus lowering the expected future returns from owning USD safe assets and inducing a subsequent depreciation in the future.32 In particular, we run the following regression:

$$\Delta s_{jt}^h = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 D_{j,t} + \beta_2 \Phi_{j,t} + \beta_3 \left( y_{jt}^{govt} - y_{jt}^{Govt} \right) + \epsilon_{t+h}$$

(6)

where the dependent variable $\Delta s_{jt}^h$ is the annualized change in the log nominal exchange rate of USD vis-à-vis currency $j$, an increase of which means that the USD appreciates against currency $j$ over the horizon of $[t, t + h]$. The variable $D_{j,t}$ denotes the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks from economy $j$ at end of quarter $t$. The variable $\Phi_{j,t}$ denotes the U.S. Treasury premium vis-à-vis economy $j$ at the end of quarter $t$. The variable $\left( y_{jt}^{govt} - y_{jt}^{Govt} \right)$ denotes the interest differential between 1-year Treasury securities of economy $j$ and that of the U.S. Treasury at end of quarter $t$. We run this regression using quarterly data as before, but vary by horizons from one-quarter, one-year, two-year, three-year, to five-year.

Table 6 reports our forecasting results of the U.S. dollar exchange rates against a basket of 16 currencies. The USD asset share doesn’t help predict the U.S. dollar exchange rate at the short end but has very strong predictive power over the longer horizon. This suggests time variation in exchange rate risk premia. In particular, it reflects the stationary but persistent deviation from the uncovered interest parity that Duarte and Stockman (2005) and Engel (2014 and 2016) have documented. The coefficient point estimates on the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks $(D_{j,t})$ start from -0.27 (not significant) at the one-quarter horizon, 31

31 The same relationship is found in papers investigating the impact of monetary policy on Emerging Markets exchange rates (see, for example, Kohlscheen 2014; Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Vegh 2016; Hofmann, Shim, and Shin 2017). However, for non-USD G10 currencies, we find the U.S. dollar depreciates in response to positive shocks in interest differentials (home – U.S.) in the two quarters, then it wanes down over the next four-year period. These results coincide with the models presented by Engel (2016) and Valchev (forthcoming) that UIP violates in the short-run and reverses in the longer horizon. To better understand different implications for G10 countries and emerging markets with respect to UIP puzzle is beyond the scope of this paper, but relevant results on non-USD G10 currencies can be provided upon request.

32 Engel and Wu (2018) and Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018) use a widening of U.S. Treasury premium to capture excessive demand for USD safe assets. In this paper, we directly use USD assets share of non-U.S. banks to capture it.

33 The conclusion of the results is robust if we control $\Delta \Phi_{j,t}$ and $\Phi_{j,t-1}$, as Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018).
and then stabilizes to a level between 2.02 and 2.75 per annum from one-year to five-year horizon at 5% significance level or above. This means that a positive shock to USD asset share by one-standard deviation (0.33% from Table 1) is contemporaneously correlated with an appreciation of the U.S dollar by 8.1% (Column 5 of Table 3) per annum in that year on average, but it is expected to depreciate by 0.67% (Column 5 of Table 6) per annum over the next five years on average to wane down the overshooting.

As Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018), we also find the induced momentum effect from the U.S. Treasury premium ($\Phi_t$) is short-lived and the coefficient point estimate switches sign over the long run, although it is only statistically significant at the two-year horizon.

The Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) suggests the coefficient before interest differential equals to 1. However, numerous empirical studies consistently reject the UIP condition (see Engel 1996; Sarno 2005). This is the case if we only include non-U.S. G10 economies in our sample. However, the interest differential ($y_t^{Govt} - y_t^{Govt}$), which is a proxy for the risk premium of carry trade excess returns, positively and significantly forecasts the U.S. dollar exchange rate appreciation for one-year, two-year, and five-year horizons at 10% significance level or above. At short horizon, all these variables don’t help predict the dynamics of the U.S. dollar exchange rate, where the one-quarter ahead $R^2$ is as low as 6%. Gradually, these regressors jointly account for more variation in the moves of exchange rate at longer horizon – the $R^2$ increases to 20% at the one-year horizon and strikingly reaches 67% at the five-year horizon.

In Table 7, we report our forecasting regression results of bilateral exchange rate over the five-year horizon. For better comparison, a simple univariate regression is used here:

$$\Delta s_{jt, 20} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 D_{jt,t} + \epsilon_{t+20}$$

(7)

In Panel A, the regressor is $D_{jt,t}$, that is the individual USD asset share of non-U.S. banks in economy $j$ at end of quarter $t$. The forecasting results of the bilateral exchange rate confirms our finding: the USD asset share from each economy predicts the U.S. dollar exchange rate at the 5% significance level or above for 10 out of 16 currencies. In Panel B, the regressor is $D_{st,t}$, that is the cross-sectional average of USD asset shares over 16 economies at end of quarter $t$. The forecasting power is even stronger – it helps predict the bilateral exchange rate at the 5% significance level or above for all 16 currencies in our sample. The point estimates on $D_{st,t}$ vary from as low as 0.59% per annum (for MXN) to as high as 5.46% per annum (for MYR). While, the $R^2$ varies from 10% (for MXN) to 69% (for MYR), which is on-average higher than that of Panel A using the USD asset share from individual economies as regressors. These results suggest that it is the common, global component in the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks that forecasts the U.S. dollar exchange rate against individual currencies.

Taken together, these results strongly suggest that exchange rate movements are associated with time varying risk premia, which covary with the demand for USD denominated safe assets by non-U.S. banks. The overshooting of Sections IV and VI.A. suggests that demand for USD assets leads to a sharp contemporaneous appreciation of the USD, which is reverted slowly over time. In addition, the results of

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This univariate estimate is not reported, where the coefficient point estimates of interest rate differential are -0.6, -0.8, and -0.4 non-U.S. G10 jurisdictions at horizons of 1-quarter, 1-year and 2-year.
cross-sectional asset pricing in Section V points to a coherent intermediary asset pricing story. The scarcity of safe USD assets is driven to an important extent by risk-taking capacity of non-U.S. banks, which enters the pricing kernel of these marginal investors on the FX market, thus driving time varying USD risk premia. We next turn to the out-of-sample exercise, where we show that the strong predictability holds even out of sample, thus, undermining one of the cornerstones of the exchange rate literature (Meese and Rogoff, 1983).

B. Out-of-sample forecasting

In this subsection, we turn to the out-of-sample forecasting performance following the tradition established by Meese and Rogoff (1983). We find our forecasting model to significantly outperform the random walk prediction.

We consider an out-of-sample forecasting exercise with a period of $K$ quarters to obtain in-sample coefficient point estimates and a period of $P$ quarters to evaluate the model’s performance out of sample. We denote the end of the model evaluation as quarter $T$. To estimate model parameters, we regress the annualized change of the U.S. dollar exchange rate (over an $h$-quarter horizon) only on the USD asset share to obtain in-sample estimates of the model parameters within a window spanning $K$ quarters:

$$\Delta s_{j,t}^h = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 D_j,s_t + \epsilon_{t+h}$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Where, $t \in [T - P - K, T - P]$. We then use the estimated coefficients $\hat{\alpha}_1$ and $\hat{\beta}_1$, and the realized observation of the USD asset share to forecast the exchange rate change in the next period:

$$\Delta s_{j,T-P+1}^h = \hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\beta}_1 D_j,s_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

The model’s forecast error is the difference between the realized exchange rate change and the model-implied forecast:

$$error_{j,T-P+1}^h = \Delta s_{j,T-P+1}^h - \Delta s_{j,T-P+1}^\hat{}$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

We repeat this procedure for $P$ times using a rolling regression approach until we have an out-of-sample forecast for all quarters in the period between quarters $T - P$ to $T$. We compute the mean-square-error (MSE) of our forecasting model and compare it against that of the random walk benchmark. First, we adopt the out-of-sample (OOS) statistic from Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) based on $MSE_r - MSE_u$ to evaluate performance of the alternative model. Because the random walk benchmark is nested in the “unrestricted” specification, we can evaluate its performance using the inference procedure by Clark and West (2006) to adjust difference in mean squared errors: $MSE_r - (MSE_u - Adj.)$, which accounts for the small-sample forecast bias.

Table 8 presents the out-of-sample forecasting performance of our exchange rate forecast model for the five-year horizon ($h = 20$).\(^{35}\) In Panel A, the Diebold-Mariano difference in MSEs and the OOS-T statistic

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\(^{35}\) We set $P = round(T/2)$ and $K = T - P$ as our baseline. $T$ ($K$ and $P$) is varying by currency – the longest $T$ covers 67 quarters from 2001q1 to 2017q4. Alternatively, we set $P = round(T + 2/3)$, and the results are robust. Relevant robust results can be provided upon request.
are reported. In Column (1), we report the result that uses the cross-sectional average series over 16 currencies. We find our forecast model outperforms the benchmark random walk model at the 1% significance level.

In Columns (2) to (17), we repeat this exercise for individual economy. We find that our forecasting model outperforms the benchmark random model for 11 out of 16 currencies at the 10% significance level or above. In Panel B, the Clark-West adjusted difference in MSEs and the C-W statistic are reported. Similarly, our forecasting model outperforms the benchmark random walk model at the 1% significance level for the U.S. dollar exchange rate against a basket of 16 currencies in Column (1). More strikingly, our forecasting model outperforms the benchmark model in 15 out of 16 currencies at 10% significance level or above after adjusting for the small-sample forecast bias from Columns (2) to (17). To our knowledge, the strength of this out-of-sample forecasting power from a quantity variable is unprecedented in the literature on exchange rates.

VI. Robustness

In this section, we turn to the robustness of our analyses on the forecastability of exchange rate. We compare the forecasting performance of our model with 9 exchange rate forecasting models discussed in the literature since the 1970s. More specifically, we compare the forecasting performance of augmented versions that include the USD asset share as an additional predictor in existing model discussed in the literature.

Guided by the excellent survey of exchange rate predictability in Rossi (2013), the models we consider for the horse race include: (1) the UIP model; (2) the monetary model with flexible prices (“Frankel-Bilson” model); (3) the monetary model with sticky prices (the “Dornbusch-Frankel” model); (4) the model with productivity differentials ( the “Balassa-Samuelson” model); (5) the Taylor rule model; and (6) the net foreign asset model (the “Gourinchas-Rey” model). In addition, we take into account of the most recent development in exchange rate forecast including: (7) the dollar liquidity model suggested by Adrian, Etula,

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36 As suggested by Clark and West (2006), the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard error are estimated to compute the OOS-T statistics and C-W statistics. They are obtained from a regression of squared error loss differential (with adjustment) on a constant. The corresponding 90%, 95%, and 99% critical values are 0.780, 1.111, and 1.784 (using \( k_2 = 1 \) and \( \pi = 0.2 \)) obtained from Table 1 in McCracken (2007).

37 Taking into account the global component of the USD asset share, we use the cross-sectional average of the USD asset share over 16 jurisdictions as predictor. If we use the USD asset share of individual jurisdiction, we find our forecast model outperforms benchmark models in 11 out of 16 currencies at the 10% significance level or above.
and Shin (2010); (8) the Treasury premium model suggested by Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018); and (9) the U.S. foreign bond flow model suggested by Lilley, Neiman, Maggiori, and Schreger (2019).

Table 9 compares the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the augmented exchange rate forecasting model by adding the USD asset share as an additional predictor to existing model against each existing model stated above. The Diebold-Mariano difference in MSEs and the OOS-T statistic are reported for each comparison. We find the $MSE_{existing} - MSE_{augmented}$ is positive across all models and that the OOS-T statistic is significant at the 10% level or above across all 9 comparisons. This suggests that including the USD asset share as an additional predictor improves the performance of out-of-sample forecasting for each of the exchange rate models discussed above.

![Insert Table 9 Here]

In summary, our findings suggest that the average USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks measured by the cross-sectional average of USD asset share from non-U.S. banks across 16 economies helps to improve the forecasting performance of 9 existing exchange rate models discussed in the literature since the 1970s. Clearly, exchange rates are deviating significantly from the random walk benchmark as a function of the USD asset demand share of non-U.S. banks, thus pointing strongly towards exchange rate overshooting as a function of time varying intermediary risk premia.

### VIII. Implications for the Literature

We summarize our paper’s key implications for four strands of the literature.

First, our paper contributes to the literature on the United States’ special role as the provider of world safe assets (e.g., Gourinchas and Rey 2007; Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot 2010; Farhi and Maggiori 2018). Maggiori (2017) shows a model with a simple asymmetry in global risk sharing and heterogeneity in financial development can rationalize the economic role of the U.S. in the global financial architecture. As financial intermediaries in the U.S. are better able to deal with funding problems following negative shocks, the United States consumes more relative to the rest of the world (RoW) and runs a trade deficit based on higher financial income that it earns as compensation for greater risks it takes. On the contrary, the financial intermediaries in the RoW accumulate precautionary long positions in USD safer assets in order to insulate their capitals from negative shocks. When bad time hits, capital losses on the external portfolio of the U.S. lead to a wealth transfer to the RoW. Naturally, the U.S. dollar emerges as the reserve currency because it appreciates during bad times, thus USD denominated assets represent global safe assets by providing a good hedge. Our paper supports this theory by providing empirical evidence that the financial intermediaries from the ROW pay a counter-cyclical safety premium to hold USD denominated safe assets. In addition, we demonstrate that demand for USD safe assets from financial intermediaries of the RoW increases strongly following negative shocks because of flight to safety, and the U.S. dollar exchange rate appreciates contemporaneously, thus lowering the investors’ expected future return from owning U.S. safe assets.

38 Traditional international macroeconomics models predict that a transfer of wealth from the United States to the RoW during bad times results in a U.S. dollar depreciation in the absence of trade costs and in the presence of home-bias in consumption, which was first highlighted in the classic Keynes and Ohlin debate on the “transfer problem”. In Maggiori (2017)’s setup, however, RoW relative export costs increase when RoW financial intermediaries lose capital and decrease the availability of credit to RoW exporters, which leads to a shift in demand towards goods produced in the United States at bad times, and therefore induces appreciation in U.S. dollar. In a relevant study, Ivashina, Stein, and Scharfstein (2015) present a model and show evidence that USD lending by Eurozone banks fell during Eurozone sovereign crisis and firms who were more reliant on Eurozone banks before crisis had a more difficult time borrowing.
Second, our paper sheds light on the large literature on the “exchange rate disconnect puzzle”. Rossi (2013) gives an excellent review of exchange rate predictability especially for models before the first decade of the 21st century. Our paper is directly related to recent developments in this area from two perspectives. On the one hand, foreign investors’ demand for safety, empirically captured by the Treasury premium, is linked to movements in exchange rates (e.g., Engel and Wu 2018; Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig 2018). On the other hand, FX market quantities, like order flows, can help understand currency returns (e.g., Evans and Lyons 2002, 2005; Froot and Ramadorai 2005; Rime, Sarno, and Sojli 2010). Lilley, Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger (2019) use security-level data on U.S. portfolios and demonstrate that the reconnect of U.S. foreign bond purchases to exchange rates is largely driven by investment in USD-denominated assets. Our paper links these two directions together and finds that a quantity-based measure can capture the foreign safe asset demand, especially for the marginal investors. Furthermore, we use a novel instrumental variable approach to identify a causal relationship between safe asset demand from non-U.S. banks and the U.S. dollar exchange rate. Last but not least, our paper documents the demand for safety in USD assets from non-U.S. banks is associated with time-varying currency risk premia, thus it not only helps account for contemporaneous changes in exchange rates, but also helps predict exchange rate dynamics over the longer horizon both in sample and out of sample.

Third, our paper also contributes to the literature on the twin sisters of “the global financial cycle” and “the global USD cycle”. In an early version of Avdjiev, Du, Koch, and Shin (2019), they present a global banking model with a VaR constraint and show that a stronger USD coincides with a higher shadow cost of banks’ balance sheet capacity, so it can price the cross-section of CIP deviations and is associated with lower growth of cross-border bank lending denominated in the USD. Valchev (forthcoming) provides an open-economy model to relate the quantity of U.S. Treasury bonds outstanding to the U.S. Treasury premium, to the return of the U.S. dollar, and to the failure of CIP, jointly. Our paper adopts an instrumental variable approach and establishes a causal relationship between USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks, the U.S. dollar exchange rate, the U.S. Treasury premium, and the LIBOR CIP deviation. As far as we know, our paper is the first one that provides empirical evidence that balance sheet constraints of non-U.S. financial intermediaries play a critical role in the U.S. interbank market but not in the U.S. Treasury market by identifying different slopes of supply curves from both markets, respectively. In other words, we differentiate the importance of the “safe asset demand” channel from the “financial intermediation channel” in these two markets, which has been a premise in the literature (e.g., Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig 2018; Du 2019; and Krishnamurthy and Lustig 2019).

Fourthly, our paper also sheds light on the theory of intermediary asset pricing (e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009; He and Krishnamurthy 2012, 2013; Adrian and Shin 2014; Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014). Adrian, Etula, Shin (2010) provide a theoretical foundation for a funding liquidity channel in a global banking model and show that USD funding liquidity forecasts exchange rates because of its association with time-varying risk premia. Our paper focuses on the other side of the mirror – the USD denominated assets of non-U.S. banks rather than the USD denominated liabilities of the U.S. banking sector. As the marginal investors in the FX market especially for the local currency (by regarding USD as numéraire), our paper demonstrates non-U.S. banks’ leverage significantly accounts for the changes in their demand for

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39 Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018) present an asset pricing model which suggests higher safe asset demand from foreign investors, captured by the U.S. Treasury premium, coincides with an immediate appreciation and a subsequent depreciation of the U.S. dollar exchange rate, and they find this phenomenon is only relevant for the United States, pointing to a special role of the U.S. as the world’s provider of safe assets and to a special role of USD dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Similarly, Engel and Wu (2018) present a New Keynesian model, but find contradicting empirical results that this phenomenon is not only a US-specific phenomenon. It suggests a sovereign’s debt is safer on a relative basis but not merely on an absolute basis (He, Krishnamurthy, and Milbradt 2019).
USD denominated assets. It suggests exchange rate fluctuations are associated with the USD asset demand from non-U.S. banks, which is a function of non-U.S. banks’ balance sheet capacity. Furthermore, we contribute to cross-sectional asset pricing theory by finding evidence that average USD asset shares of non-U.S. banks can help explain the variation in currency excess returns.

IX. Conclusion

In this paper, we construct a measure of USD asset demand, the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks, to explain exchange rate movements. First, we use this variable to explain contemporaneous exchange rate movements. Second, we establish a causal relationship between the USD asset demand, the U.S. dollar exchange rate, the U.S. Treasury premium, and the LIBOR cross-currency basis. We distinguish the “safe asset demand channel” from the “financial intermediation channel” with our instrumental variable strategy. Third, we find that the USD asset demand of non-U.S. banks at the global level can help explain currency excess returns in the cross section. Fourth, the USD asset demand variable helps forecast exchange rates both in-sample and out-of-sample. For all of these four empirical exercises, we obtain statistically highly significant and economically large results. More importantly, the four empirical results taken together point to a coherent economic mechanism that significantly advances the exchange rate literature.

We find that the demand for the USD by non-U.S. banks drives up the value of the U.S. dollar contemporaneously with high statistical significance and in an economically large magnitude. This appreciation of the U.S. dollar reverts over the next five years. The reversal of the currency value leads to strong forecastability in exchange rates – a positive shock to the USD asset share by one-standard deviation (around 0.33 percent from Table 1) is associated with appreciation of the USD by 8.1 percent per annum on average in that same year (Column (4) of Table 3), and forecasts a depreciation of the USD by an average of 0.67 percent per annum over the next five years (Column (5) of Table 6). Importantly, the forecasting $R^2$s are very large, with in sample $R^2$s of 36 percent at the two-year horizon and 67 percent at the five-year horizon. This is an overshooting result in the spirit of Dornbusch (1976): a USD asset demand shock by non-U.S. banks drives up the dollar contemporaneously via a compression of the risk premia, and that compression then reverts over the coming five years. The economic interpretation is one relying on USD asset scarcity that is driven largely by non-U.S. banks as the marginal investor on the FX market, especially for local currencies.

The in-sample forecasting results are strongly suggestive of a risk premium mechanism. Time varying FX risk premia are related to the demand of USD denominated safe assets from non-U.S. banks in a systematic fashion, thus creating forcastability of the exchange rate. Indeed, in the cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions, we find that currencies and carry-trade portfolios earn significant excess returns with respect to higher loadings on the global USD asset demand factor. Put differently, the price of risk of the USD asset demand factor is negative, and relatively high interest rate currencies (or high carry portfolios) have more negative exposure to the USD asset demand factor, thus earning a positive and large excess return on average.

Importantly, the strength of the out-of-sample forecasting power from a quantity variable is unprecedented in the literature on exchange rates. We clearly reject the random walk hypothesis, thus again confirming that a time varying risk premium embedded in the USD asset demand of non-U.S. banks is the lead explanation for our findings. Importantly, we significantly improve relative to 9 traditional
exchange rate forecasting models that have been presented in the literature since the 1970s, suggesting that our USD asset demand channel in forecasting exchange rates is very robust.

References


FIGURE 1. USD INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS vs. FOREIGN POSITIONS

Cross-border positions of non-U.S. banks
Local positions of non-U.S. banks in foreign currency (i.e., USD) outside the United States
Non-U.S. banks' branches
Non-U.S. banks' subsidiaries

International Positions (①+②)
Operations in the U.S. (③+④)

Foreign Positions (①+②+③+④)

Notes: ① corresponds to the U.S. dollar cross-border claims; ② refers to U.S. dollar local positions outside the U.S. (i.e., U.S. dollar is the foreign currency of the economy); ③ and ④ refer to the local positions in U.S. dollar in the U.S for non-U.S. banks' branches and subsidiaries. ① and ② are constructed based on the BIS unpublished free and restricted database of Locational Banking Statistics (LBS) on nationality basis. Due to data limitations, ③ is constructed through a bottom-up aggregation based on nationality of balance sheet information available in FFIEC 002 Regulatory Filings. Similarly, ④ is constructed using data from the Call Report Filings (FFIEC 031/041) of non-U.S.-owned subsidiaries, obtained via the S&P Global Market Intelligence platform. The underlying assumption is that the operations of non-U.S. banks in the U.S. are dominated by USD-denominated claims and liabilities.

FIGURE 2. U.S. DOLLAR ASSET SHARE AND EXCHANGE RATE

Notes: The figure plots the annualized quarterly changes in log nominal exchange rate and quarterly changes in U.S. dollar asset share of non-U.S. banks over time. All series are cross-sectional averages over non-U.S. G10 currencies and valued at quarter end. An increase in the exchange rate means the U.S. dollar appreciates against a basket of non-U.S. G10 currencies. The contemporaneous correlation between the quarterly changes in U.S. dollar exchange rate and quarterly changes in U.S. dollar asset share of non-U.S. banks is 58% over time. In the non-USD G10 currencies sample, the USD is excluded as the numéraire and NZD is excluded because of data availability for the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The sample period is from 2001q2 to 2017q4.
FIGURE 3. USD ASSET DEMAND LOADING

Notes: This figure reports the coefficient point estimates of $\Delta D_{t,k}$ in the following regression specification: $R_{j,t} = \alpha_j + \beta_j \Delta D_{t,k} + \epsilon_{j,t}$, where $R_{j,t}$ is the currency excess return of individual currency $j$ from investing in 1-year government bonds in jurisdiction $j$ and shorting 1-year U.S. Treasury Bill at end of quarter $t$ (in the left Panel), or stands for that of currency portfolio (in the right Panel). $\Delta D_{t,k}$ is the average quarterly changes in the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks across 16 jurisdictions at end of quarter $t$. The blue dots indicate the coefficient point estimates of $\beta_j$ for individual currencies (in the left panel) and for currency portfolios (in the right panel), respectively. The blue bars indicate 95% confidence interval bands. The excess returns of currency portfolios are from Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011). As Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) suggest, we drop the last currency portfolio, which consists of currencies with very high inflation. The sample period is from 2001q2 to 2017q4.

FIGURE 4. CURRENCY EXCESS RETURNS AND USD ASSET DEMAND BETAS

Notes: The vertical axis in the left panel shows the average excess return of currency $j$ average over time, defined as investing in 1-year government bonds in jurisdiction $j$ from shorting the 1-year U.S. Treasury, while the horizontal axis indicates the regression beta of running a quarterly regression of currency excess returns on average changes in the USD asset demand of non-U.S. banks for 16 currencies. The vertical axis in the right panel shows the average excess return of currency portfolios over time, while the horizontal axis indicates the regression beta of running quarterly regression of currency excess returns on average changes in USD assets demand of non-U.S. banks for 5 currency portfolios from Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011). As Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), we drop the last currency portfolio, which consists of currencies with very high inflation. The sample period is from 2001q2 to 2017q4.
FIGURE 5. IMPULSE RESPONSES FROM A VAR

Notes: This figure presents impulse responses from a four-variable VAR in the USD asset share, the U.S. Treasury premium, the interest rate differential (home – U.S.), and the exchange rate. All series are cross-sectional average over 16 economies and valued at quarter end. An increase in the exchange rate means that the U.S. dollar appreciates against a basket of 16 currencies. The left panel presents the exchange rate response to a USD-asset-share shock. The middle panel shows the exchange rate response to a U.S. Treasury premium shock. The right panel shows the exchange rate response to an interest rate differential shock. The VAR is estimated in levels and the shocks are identified using a Cholesky decomposition with the following ordering: exchange rate, U.S. Treasury premium, interest rate differential, USD assets share. Red dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals and blue solid lines represent impulse response function. The sample period is from 2001q2 to 2017q4.

TABLE 1—SAMPLE COVERAGE AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Euro Area</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Average</th>
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</thead>
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<td>mean</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.43</td>
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<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_s_t [%]</td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>14.61</td>
<td>27.80</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>7.90</td>
<td>5.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Φ_t [%]</td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(y_t - y_S_t) [%]</td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>9.65</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Obs.</td>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table describes the sample of 16 economies (based on nationalities of ultimate owners of reporting non-U.S. banks) used in this paper. It also presents the summary statistics of key variables. Columns (1) - (16) report by economies, and Column (17) reports the cross-sectional average over all 16 economies. In the upper (lower) panel, we report the summary statistics in levels (first differences) for key variables, including the log nominal exchange rate per U.S. dollar (s_t); the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks (D_s_t); the U.S. Treasury premium (Φ_t); home – U.S. government bond yield differential (y_t − y_S_t). All series are valued at quarter end. The longest sample covers 2001q1 to 2017q4 for the upper panel and 2001q2 to 2017q4 for the lower panel.
TABLE 2—CORRELATION BETWEEN EXCHANGE RATE AND DETERMINANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Panel A: Correlation with Contemporaneous Changes</th>
<th></th>
<th>Panel B: Correlation with Future Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\Delta s_t$</td>
<td>$\Delta D_{St}$</td>
<td>$\Delta \Phi_t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta s_t$</td>
<td>1.00***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta D_{St}$</td>
<td>0.58***</td>
<td>1.00***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \Phi_t$</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>1.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta(y_t-y_{St})$</td>
<td>-0.32***</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes: The upper panel shows the contemporaneous correlations between annualized quarterly changes in the log nominal exchange rate ($\Delta s_t$) and quarterly changes in selected determinants. The lower panel shows the correlations between annualized future changes in the log nominal exchange rate between $t$ and $t+12$ quarters ahead ($\Delta s_{12}$) and selected determinants. The variable $D_{St}$ denotes the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks. The variable $\Phi$ denotes the U.S. Treasury premium. The variable $(y_t-y_{St})$ denotes home – U.S. government bond yield differentials. All series are cross-sectional averages over non-USD G10 currencies and valued at quarter end. The USD is excluded as the numéraire, and NZD is excluded because of data availability for the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The sample period is from 2001q2 to 2017q4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 3—USD ASSETS SHARE AND EXCHANGE RATES

Notes: The table reports the OLS regression results for the contemporaneous relationship between the U.S. dollar exchange rate and the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks, with specification: \( \Delta s_t = \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta D_{t-4} + \beta_2 \Delta \Phi_{t-1} + \beta_3 \Delta (y_{t-4}^\text{Gour} - y_{t-4}^\text{Gour}) + \beta_4 X_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \), where the dependent variable \( \Delta s_t \) is the annualized quarterly change in the log nominal exchange rate of the USD vis-à-vis currency \( J \), an increase of which means the USD appreciates against currency \( J \) between quarters \( t-1 \) and \( t \). The variable \( \Delta D_{t-4} \) denotes quarterly changes in the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks from economy \( j \) between quarters \( t-4 \) and \( t-1 \). The variable \( \Delta \Phi_{t-1} \) denotes quarterly changes in the U.S. Treasury premium vis-à-vis economy \( j \) between quarters \( t-1 \) and \( t \). The variable \( \Delta (y_{t-4}^\text{Gour} - y_{t-4}^\text{Gour}) \) denotes the quarterly changes in the interest differential of economy \( j \) over the United States between quarters \( t-4 \) and \( t-1 \). Finally, \( X_{t-1} \) is a vector of control variables including \( D_{t-4}, \Phi_{t-4}, \) and \( (y_{t-4}^\text{Gour} - y_{t-4}^\text{Gour}) \).

In Columns (1) to (7), we perform regressions by using cross-sectional average series across 16 economies, within which Columns (1) to (5) uses the full sample, and Columns (6) and (7) only use pre-GFC and post-GFC episodes, respectively. In Columns (1) – (7), all series are cross-sectional averages over 16 currencies and valued at quarter end. In Columns (8) – (23), we perform regressions by currencies. All specifications include a constant that is not reported in the table. The Newey-West heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The full sample period is from 2001q2 to 2017q4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Cross-sectional Average</th>
<th>Dependent variable = ( \Delta s_t ) (Annualized %)</th>
<th>Bilateral Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>Pre-GFC</td>
<td>Post-GFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta D_t ) [%]</td>
<td>27.24***</td>
<td>25.03***</td>
<td>27.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.05)</td>
<td>(4.61)</td>
<td>(5.15)</td>
<td>(4.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \Phi_t ) [%]</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>12.17*</td>
<td>20.43***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.76)</td>
<td>(4.13)</td>
<td>(3.44)</td>
<td>(8.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Controls | N | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| \( R^2 \) | 0.36 | 0.38 | 0.36 | 0.40 | 0.50 | 0.53 | 0.61 | 0.59 | 0.73 | 0.50 | 0.43 | 0.60 | 0.35 | 0.26 | 0.55 | 0.52 | 0.18 | 0.57 | 0.32 | 0.51 | 0.08 | 0.48 | 0.29 |
TABLE 4—TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES: USD ASSET SHARE AND EXCHANGE RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>The first stage: Dependent variable = $\Delta D_{it} [%]$</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \Phi^{sub}_t [%]$</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.74**</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.73*</td>
<td>-0.79*</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \text{Sovereign CDS}^{sub}_t [bps]$</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \text{Leverage}_t [%]$</td>
<td>2.98***</td>
<td>2.65***</td>
<td>3.06***</td>
<td>2.67***</td>
<td>2.63***</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak IV: Stock-Yogo $F$ Statistics</td>
<td>15.59**</td>
<td>18.58**</td>
<td>24.61**</td>
<td>27.87**</td>
<td>32.38**</td>
<td>(5.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>(9.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>(5.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regressors</td>
<td>The second stage: Dependent variable = $\Delta s_i$ [Annualized %]</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitted $\Delta D_{it} [%]$</td>
<td>51.54***</td>
<td>51.55***</td>
<td>51.74***</td>
<td>50.28***</td>
<td>41.76***</td>
<td>(41.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \Phi_i [%]$</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>12.56*</td>
<td>(9.54)</td>
<td>(9.55)</td>
<td>(9.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta (y_{it}-y_{it}) [%]$</td>
<td>-3.18</td>
<td>-3.42</td>
<td>-2.98</td>
<td>(5.18)</td>
<td>(5.19)</td>
<td>(5.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>N N N N Y</td>
<td>N N N N Y</td>
<td>N N N N Y</td>
<td>N N N N Y</td>
<td>N N N N Y</td>
<td>(9.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>(5.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogeneity: Durbin-Wu-Hausman $F$ Statistics</td>
<td>8.18***</td>
<td>3.60*</td>
<td>8.72***</td>
<td>3.73*</td>
<td>3.10*</td>
<td>(3.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overidentification: Sargan $\chi^2$ Statistics</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>(3.73)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports the 2SLS regression results for the contemporaneous relationship between the U.S. dollar exchange rate and the USD assets share of non-U.S. banks. The upper panel summarizes the regression results for the first stage: $\Delta D_{it} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \Delta \Phi^{sub}_t + \beta_2 \Delta \text{Sovereign CDS}^{sub}_t + \beta_3 \Delta \text{Leverage}_t + \beta_4 \chi + \epsilon_t$, where the variable $\Delta D_{it}$ denotes average quarterly changes in USD asset share of non-U.S. banks; $\Delta \Phi^{sub}_t$ denotes the average quarterly changes in Treasury premium of substitute government bonds; $\Delta \text{Sovereign CDS}^{sub}_t$ denotes the average quarterly changes in sovereign CDS spread of substitute government bonds; $\Delta \text{Leverage}_t$ denotes the average quarterly changes of the log leverage ratio of non-U.S. banks, orthogonalized to U.S. bank leverage; Finally, $\chi$ is a vector of control variables, including $\Delta \text{Sovereign CDS}^{sub}_t$, $\Delta \Phi^{sub}_t$, and $\Delta \text{Leverage}_t$, where the variable $\Delta D_{it}$ denotes fitted value of average quarterly changes in USD assets share of non-U.S. banks obtained from the first stage. Other variables are defined the same way as those in Table 3. The constants are not reported in the table for both stages. For testing for weak instrumental variables, $F$-statistics are reported. According to Stock and Yogo (2002), the critical value for the weak instrument test based on 2SLS bias of 5% significant level is 13.51 for parameters setting with 1 endogenous regressor, 3 instrumental variables, with the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS at 0.05. For endogeneity, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman $F$ statistics are reported. For overidentifying restriction, the Sargan $\chi^2$ statistic is reported. All series are cross-sectional averages over 16 currencies and valued at quarter end. The Newey-West heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The sample period is from 2001q2 to 2017q4.
TABLE 5—USD ASSET SHARE, U.S. TREASURY PREMIUM, and CROSS-CURRENCY BASIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Sample periods</th>
<th>The Second Stage Results</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>∆Φ_{Treasury} _t</td>
<td>∆Φ_{Libor} _t</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Post-GFC</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Post-GFC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitted ΔD_{st} [%]</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.58**</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table summarizes the second-stage results of the 2SLS regression of the U.S. Treasury premium on the USD asset share in Columns (1) to (2), and of the (-1)* cross-currency basis on USD asset share in Columns (3) and (4) with the specification: \( \Delta \Phi_{st} = \alpha_s + \beta_s \Delta D_{st} + \beta_{st} \Delta (\bar{y}_{t}^{cov} - \bar{y}_{t}) + \beta X_{st} + \epsilon_{st} \), where \( \Delta \Phi_{st} \) is the average quarterly changes in U.S. Treasury premium in Columns (1) and (2), or average quarterly changes in (-1)*cross-currency basis in Columns (3) and (4), respectively. The variable \( \Delta D_{st} \) denotes the fitted value of average quarterly changes in USD asset share of non-U.S. banks obtained from the first stage. Other variables are defined as the same as those in Table 3. All specifications include a constant that is not reported in the table. All series are cross-sectional averages over 16 currencies and valued at quarter end. The Newey-West heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The sample period is from 2001q2 to 2017q4.
TABLE 6—FORECASTING EXCHANGE RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>h = 1</td>
<td>h = 4</td>
<td>h = 8</td>
<td>h = 12</td>
<td>h = 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ds [%]</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-2.22**</td>
<td>-2.75***</td>
<td>-2.54***</td>
<td>-2.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Φt [%]</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>-4.34</td>
<td>-5.16**</td>
<td>-1.67</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.56)</td>
<td>(3.72)</td>
<td>(2.37)</td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(y – τ) [%]</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.69**</td>
<td>1.74**</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.92)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N          | 67       | 64       | 60       | 56       | 48       |
| R²         | 0.06     | 0.20     | 0.36     | 0.45     | 0.67     |

Notes: This table reports OLS results for in-sample forecasts of annualized percentage changes in the U.S. dollar exchange rates against a basket of 16 currencies at the one-quarter, one-year, two-year, three-year and five-year horizons. The specification is: \( \Delta s_{j,t}^* = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 D_{j,t} + \beta_2 \Phi_{j,t} + \beta_3 (y_{j,t}^{Gove} - y_{j,t}^{Goer}) + \epsilon_{t+h} \), where \( \Delta s_{j,t}^* \) is the annualized future change in the log of nominal exchange rate of the USD vis-à-vis currency \( j \) in economy \( k \) over the horizon \([t, t+h]\), an increase of which means that the USD appreciates against currency \( j \) over the period \([t, t+h]\). The variable \( D_{j,t} \) denotes the USD asset share by non-U.S. banks from economy \( k \) at end of quarter \( t \). The variable \( \Phi_{j,t} \) denotes the U.S. Treasury premium vis-à-vis economy \( k \) at end of quarter \( t \). The variable \( (y_{j,t}^{Gove} - y_{j,t}^{Goer}) \) denotes the interest differential at end of quarter \( t \). We run this regression using quarterly data as before but vary the horizons ahead from one-quarter \((h = 1)\), one-year \((h = 4)\), two-years \((h = 8)\), three-years \((h = 12)\), to five-years \((h = 20)\). All series are cross-sectional averages over 16 currencies and valued at quarter end. All specifications include a constant (not reported). The Newey-West heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The sample period is 2001q2 to 2017q4.

TABLE 7—FORECASTING DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES AGAINST INDIVIDUAL CURRENCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUD</td>
<td>BRL</td>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ds [%]</td>
<td>-1.58***</td>
<td>-4.55***</td>
<td>0.67*</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
<td>-1.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.07***</td>
<td>1.92***</td>
<td>-3.39***</td>
<td>-0.77***</td>
<td>-2.33***</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.33</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>(1)</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUD</td>
<td>BRL</td>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ds [%]</td>
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<td>-3.94***</td>
<td>-2.63***</td>
<td>-1.33**</td>
<td>-2.78***</td>
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<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
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<td>-2.01***</td>
<td>-1.56***</td>
<td>-1.69***</td>
<td>-0.59**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.54***</td>
<td>-3.16***</td>
<td>-2.60***</td>
<td>-0.88***</td>
<td>-2.99***</td>
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<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
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<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.82</td>
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<tr>
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<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.48</td>
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Notes: This table reports OLS regression results for in-sample forecasts of annualized percentage changes in the bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate at the five-year horizon. The univariate regression specification is: \( \Delta s_{j,t}^{20} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 D_{j,t} + \epsilon_{t+20} \), where \( \Delta s_{j,t}^{20} \) is the annualized change in the log bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate against currency \( j \) in economy \( k \) over the horizon \([t, t+20]\), an increase of which means USD appreciates against currency \( j \). The variable \( D_{j,t} \) denotes USD asset share of non-U.S. banks from economy \( k \) at end of quarter \( t \). In Panel A, the regressor is the USD asset share of non-U.S. banks from individual economy. In Panel B, the regressor is the cross-sectional average over the 16 currencies. All specifications include a constant (not reported). The Newey-West heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The sample period is 2001q2 to 2017q4.
Notes: This table investigates the out-of-sample forecastability of the U.S. dollar exchange rates at the five-year horizon. We compare the forecasting performance of a model using the USD assets share as predictor against a benchmark random walk model. To estimate model parameters, we regress the annualized percentage changes in the U.S. dollar exchange rate on the USD asset share to provide in-sample estimates in the period of \([T - P - K, T - P]\) with the specification: \(\Delta s_t^{20} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 D_{st} + \epsilon_{t+20}\), where \(\Delta s_t^{20}\) is the annualized percentage change in the U.S. dollar exchange rate against currency \(j\) between quarters \(t\) and \(t+20\), increases of which means that the USD appreciates against currency \(j\) over the horizon \([t, t + 20]\). The variable \(D_{st}\) is the cross-sectional average of the USD assets share of non-U.S. banks over 16 economies at quarter \(t\). The estimated coefficients and the realized observations of the USD asset share are used to forecast the exchange rate change in the next period. We repeat this procedure \(P\) times using a rolling regression approach until we have an out-of-sample forecast for all quarters in the period between \(T - P\) to \(T\). We compute the mean-square-error (MSE) of our forecasting model and compare it against that of the random walk benchmark. Panel A reports the Diebold-Mariano difference in MSEs and the OOS-T statistic. Panel B reports the Clark-West adjusted difference in MSEs and the C-W statistic. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are estimated to compute the OOS-T statistics and C-W statistics (Clark and West 2006). The corresponding 90%, 95%, and 99% critical values are 0.780, 1.111, and 1.784 (using \(k_2 = 1\) and \(\pi = 0.2\) obtained from Table 1 in McCracken (2007). In Column (1), the U.S. dollar exchange rate against the cross-sectional average of the USD assets share is used. From Columns (2) – Column (17), the U.S. dollar exchange rate against individual currency is used. All series are valued at quarter end. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The sample period is 2001q2 to 2017q4.

### TABLE 9—ROBUSTNESS OF OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECASTABILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Models</th>
<th>MSEexisting – MSEaugmented</th>
<th>OOS-T statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) UIP model</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>2.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Monetary model with flexible prices (Frankel-Bilson model)</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.84*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Monetary model with sticky prices (Dornbusch-Frankel model)</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Productivity differentials model (Balassa-Samuelson model)</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>2.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Taylor rule model</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>3.85***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Net foreign asset model (Gourichas-Rey model)</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>2.61***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) U.S. dollar liquidity model (Adrian-Etula-Shin model)</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>2.41***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) U.S. Treasury premium model (Jiang-Krishnamurthy-Lustig model)</td>
<td>10.84</td>
<td>3.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) U.S. foreign bond flow model (Lilley-Neiman-Maggiori-Schreger model)</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>3.19***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table investigates the robustness of the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the USD asset share in predicting U.S. dollar exchange rates against a basket of 16 currencies at the 5-year horizon. We compare the performance of 9 existing exchange rate models against augmented versions including the USD asset share as an additional predictor. Each row represents one performance comparison between the augmented model and the existing model. We report the Diebold-Mariano difference in MSEs and the OOS-T statistics. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are estimated to compute the OOS-T statistics (Clark and West 2006). The corresponding 90%, 95%, and 99% critical values are 0.780, 1.111, and 1.784 (using \(k_2 = 1\) and \(\pi = 0.2\) obtained from Table 1 in McCracken (2007). All series are the cross-sectional average over 16 currencies and valued at quarter end. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The sample period is 2001q2 to 2017q4.