What Forms of Representation do American Workers Want? 
Understanding How Workers Think About Labor Organization

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Abstract

Recent evidence documents an increased interest among American workers in joining a union. At the same time there is revived debate among labor scholars, union leaders, politicians, and activists over the forms of labor representation best suited to meet the needs of the contemporary workforce. Yet little is known about what contemporary workers have to say about these debates. This paper uses a conjoint survey experiment fielded on a nationally representative sample of over 4,000 employees to explore the forms of representation workers want and are willing to support through dues. The authors compare interest in organizational forms that mirror the contemporary debates underway over alternative forms of labor representation. The results show that while workers value collective bargaining, they would be even more willing to join and financially support organizations currently unavailable under U.S. law and practice. The authors use these results to draw implications for the labor movement, worker advocacy groups, and the future of labor law.

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Introduction
The long-term decline in union representation in the United States has recently sparked broad ranging debates over whether and how this decline might be reversed. These discussions are happening in academia (e.g. Andrias 2016; Dimick 2012; Harvard Labor and Work Life Program 2019; Kochan 2011), think tanks (e.g. Andrias and Rogers 2018; Madland 2016; Rolf 2018), across the labor movement (e.g. AFL-CIO 2019; Olen 2019), and among the candidates running for president in the 2020 election (e.g. Greenhouse 2019). As one longtime labor policy expert put it, “for the first time we see really robust agendas in labor and employment policy that are about unions and also about really high labor standards” (quoted in Scheiber 2019). Moreover, these debates encompass models of labor organization that go well beyond the forms of representation anticipated and protected under prevailing labor law, including proposals for sectoral or regional wage setting or bargaining, union-provided portable benefits, and worker representation on corporate boards of directors.

The renewed energy around ambitious labor law reform coincides with an increase in public support for the labor movement and interest from non-union workers in joining a union. Overall approval of labor unions has returned to recent historical highs (Gallup 2019). Meanwhile, the share of non-union workers who say they would vote for a union has increased substantially from about a third of nonunion workers in 1979 and 1995 to nearly half of nonunion workers in 2018 (Kochan et al. 2019). Importantly, interest among workers has grown most for those in industries and groups with traditionally low union membership: low-paid service industries, professional occupations, and higher earning workers.

Missing from the conversation, however, is evidence of how the renewed public interest in unions might translate into reform proposals. We know little, for instance, about the specific forms of representation contemporary workers want and would be willing to support. We address
this question of how American workers think about joining and supporting unions and labor organizations using a conjoint experiment embedded in a large-scale, nationally representative survey of over 4,000 employed American workers (e.g. Hainmueller et al. 2014). Our conjoint design asked workers to evaluate different sets of labor organizations, randomly varying a number of characteristics of those organizations, including membership rules, dues structure, scope of collective bargaining, legal representation on behalf of workers, input to management, selective benefits, use of strikes, and political advocacy. The attributes were chosen to reflect the different models of unions currently under debate in the United States (Greenhouse 2019; Olen 2019), as well as models of unionism present in other advanced economies (e.g. Ebbinghaus 2002; Martin and Swank 2012; Thelen 2001).

Importantly, the conjoint methodology enables us to draw direct comparisons of these attributes’ effects on the same outcomes and scales (Hainmueller et al. 2014). We queried workers both about their choice between various organizations, as well as the maximum amount in dues respondents would be willing to pay to join these hypothetical organizations. This study represents, as far as we gather, the largest and most rigorous experimental analysis ever conducted on worker preferences for labor representation—including traditional unions, alternative labor organizations, and unions that might emerge from a reformed American labor law regime. Of course, our results speak to respondents’ stated preferences for labor organizations, not their revealed behaviors. But this sort of survey-based examination is necessary to explore U.S. workers’ preferences for workplace representation that go beyond what is currently legally permissible (see also Hainmueller et al 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015 on external validity of conjoint analysis).
Overall, our findings indicate a broad consensus across workers in the structure of preferences for labor representation. When thinking about joining and supporting labor organizations, workers value some features of traditional labor unions—like collective bargaining—along with features that are not currently supported under U.S. labor law, like social welfare benefit provision and formal representation on corporate boards of directors. This, in turn, has important implications for the strategic directions labor unions and worker advocates may wish to pursue and for changes in labor law that would allow a broader range of options for worker voice and representation to be tested in practice.

Our results also speak to debates over public opinion in an era of political polarization. In spite of very strong political party and interest group polarization on labor politics (McCarty et al. 2006), our findings indicate that the workplace is one domain where Democrats and Republicans share remarkably similar preferences (cf. Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, but see Fiorina and Abrams 2008). This suggests that workers generally think about workplace representation as being separate from party politics—with the important exceptions of strikes and lobbying or campaign involvements. Those were both areas in which Republican and, to a lesser extent, Independent workers were skeptical of labor activities, which in turn suggests potential limits on unions’ role in politics unless unions can successfully convince their more conservative members of the value of these activities (cf. Ahlquist and Levi 2013; see also Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019 for such an example in the context of recent teacher strikes in conservative states).

Together, our findings help to situate the individual-level preferences of American workers within the political and economic institutions that structure American labor and employment relations. In particular, we highlight how U.S. institutions and laws enable, but more often constrain, labor representation in comparison to peer democracies.
Alternative Models for Worker Representation

For the most part, existing theories help us to understand when we might see workers supporting workplace collective representation in general (e.g. Bakke, 1945; Kochan, 1979; Clark and Wilson 1961; Moe 1988; Olson 1965), but they do not shed much light onto the specific forms of unions that workers would be willing to support (but see Ahlquist and Levi 2013; Levi et al. 2009; Lipset et al. 1956; McAlevey 2016; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2002; Voss and Sherman 2000 for scholarship documenting variation in union forms, especially union democracy). Notably, there is little theory or research that speaks to the full set of attributes that might matter to workers as they decide whether to join a labor organization despite the fact that worker representation can take many forms. Which forms do workers most value? And how do workers weigh features of labor organizations against one another?

To answer this question, we start with understanding one’s decision to vote for a union as one would consider purchasing a service. This has been a common approach taken in industrial relations to model union status (Pencavel 1971), votes in NLRB elections (Farber and Saks 1980; Maranto and Fiorito 1987), and stated preferences on unions (Freeman and Rogers 1999). The underlying logic of this approach implicitly adapts a rational choice framework; workers vote to join a union when the benefits of the union outweigh costs (see Farber 1983). Benefits of unionization entail the advantage of various job quality aspects of union employment as compared to otherwise equivalent nonunion jobs. Most often, studies of union vote or determination focus on pecuniary benefits such as the union wage premium or workers’ own characteristics (Farber and Saks 1980), but there has been work done in studying the effects of the characteristics of affiliated unions (Mananto and Fiorito 1987) as well as features of labor representation that workers prefer (Freeman and Rogers 1999). Unlike past research, we are interested in understanding how workers compare individual components of labor organizations
with one another. Furthermore, we posit that fundamental shifts to the economy, labor market, and employment relations environment along with the concurrent ossification of labor law have likely shifted what little understanding we had of what workers want out of labor representation.

Globalization and technological advances, combined with shifts in employer strategies, have changed the labor market in fundamental ways that might affect workers’ preferences for labor organizations—and especially the specific benefits and services they offer. In a more precarious labor market (Kallenberg 2013), workers may be particularly interested in how labor organizations can smooth their transitions across employers or jobs, especially if their existing job is vulnerable to international competition or automation. This has led some to argue that unions will need to shift from focusing on representing workers in a given job to providing labor market services and benefits that move with workers across jobs throughout their careers similar to the services unions in a number of European countries provide through “Ghent” systems (Dimick 2012; Kochan 2005; Rolf 2018). Relatedly, scholars have argued that the firm-based labor regime in the United States fragments union power and increases employer opposition to unionization (e.g. Andrias 2016). As a result, reformers have called for sectoral or regional-based bargaining to strengthen union power (Andrias and Rogers 2018; Madland 2019; Rolf 2018).

Another variation in union forms is in the degree to which labor organization representatives are involved in a firm’s decision-making. Traditional U.S. unions have concentrated on collective bargaining over select compensation and work conditions issues but typically abstained from seeking influence on strategic business decisions or from fostering more informal workplace level participation processes aimed at improving productivity or other aspects of day-to-day operations. Union leaders believed that such involvement would endanger
the independence on which they depended for effective collective bargaining (Kochan et al. 1986; though it also reflects the evolution of labor law, Pope 2008).

Yet, Kochan et al. (1986) have argued that unions’ absence from the long-term strategy level of industrial relations activity carries significant costs. For one, it leaves unions to negotiate over the consequences of employers’ decisions rather than the decisions themselves. For another, unions’ absence from workplace improvement efforts alienates members (or potential members) who wanted greater input in firm practices, especially on the shop floor (Kochan et al. 2019). As concerns over these strategic and workplace issues have increased, so too have calls for unions and workplace governance systems to adopt forms of representation more commonly found in Europe such as works councils and formal representation on corporate boards (e.g. Andrias and Rogers 2018; Madland 2016; Yglesias 2018).

A final dimension in union form relates to participation in politics. Past work has drawn a sharp distinction between social movement and business or economistic unionism (e.g. Robinson 1993). In the former, unions engage in politics as a means of promoting a broader solidaristic vision of the political economy, prioritizing a cohesive political ideology and continuous political mobilization, often through a representative political party. By comparison, the latter downplays the importance of politics, adopting a more pragmatic approach of “helping friends and punishing enemies” and focusing on policies that strengthen unions’ abilities to bargain collectively with employers for more generous wages and benefits and better working conditions. While no country or union fits perfectly into this typology, the American labor movement generally falls closer to the economistic or business union model (e.g. Eidlin 2018), though some have recently called for unions to embrace a more explicitly social movement orientation to regain political power (e.g. McAlevey 2016).
In sum, existing literatures in labor relations and labor law underscore substantial differences between American unions and those in other advanced democracies and thus invite the question of how U.S. employees think about these differences in union models. Accordingly, we seek to explore how workers think about different approaches to workplace representation, collapsing the variation we described above across union forms into four ideal types. These ideal-type models each emphasize different aspects of labor representation, and imply very different costs, benefits, and potential appeals to workers. These models include:

- A traditional, employer-centered model of private-sector union representation, emphasizing formal collective bargaining at the level of an individual workplace or enterprise, limited to certain occupations within organizations, mandatory dues for members, limited supplemental benefits and services, relatively limited input to management, and the use of strikes and direct mobilization if needed. This is the core of the private-sector model of unionism spelled out in the 1935 National Labor Relations Act. While some private-sector unions go beyond this model—for instance, offering more robust job training and placement opportunities or social welfare benefits—we are interested in testing the baseline model envisioned by the New Deal-era framers of U.S. labor law that represents the typical American union.

2 The relevant statute governing private-sector unions states that “The [National Labor Relations] Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof…."

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• An individual services model lacking formal collective bargaining rights but offering a broad array of benefits to workers, including labor market services (like job search help and training for current and future positions), social welfare benefits (including portable health insurance and retirement benefits, as well as unemployment insurance), and legal representation both in the workplace and for common civil law issues, like housing or immigration. This model corresponds to the approach pursued by various new alt-labor organizations operating outside of labor law, as well as recent proposals for U.S. unions to consider providing more social welfare benefits in order to attract new members (e.g. Dimick 2012; Fine 2005; Rolf 2018). Currently U.S. labor organizations are substantially limited in their ability to offer comprehensive health insurance and retirement benefits and are not involved in the direct administration of unemployment benefits.

• A participation and voice model that stresses increased worker representation within their firms or organizations, including informal participation and input to management, joint committees of workers and managers to address shop floor issues, and worker representation on organization boards of directors. This model corresponds to longstanding proposals to improve worker voice on the job (e.g. Kochan et al. 1986), as well as new legislative proposals to change corporate governance requirements to build in formal representation of workers into management decisions (e.g. Andrias and Rogers 2018; Yglesias 2018). Again, some of these features are possible under current U.S. labor law (such as informal participation and input to management) but others (like enterprise-wide joint worker-
management committees or councils and worker representation on corporate boards of directors) are neither required nor protected by the National Labor Relations Act.

- A political mobilization model, in which worker organizations would prioritize policy lobbying and electoral campaigning over workplace activities, especially broad-scale, continuous political recruitment that would bring unions closer to a social movement orientation. This is the model that the AFL-CIO has sought to implement with the creation of Working America in 2003, a mass membership organization of non-union members who nevertheless seek to elect pro-labor candidates and pass policies benefiting working-class Americans.³ This is also a model pursued by the recent Fight for Fifteen movement, in which non-union workers used protests, rallies, and lobbying efforts to push for higher state and local minimum wages as well as paid sick and family leave policies. Several legal scholars, like Kate Andrias and Benjamin Sachs, have called for more politically-oriented efforts like these (Andrias 2016; Sachs 2013).

Methods

One approach to understanding workers’ preferences for labor representation is to compare union members with non-members. But membership is not necessarily a reliable indicator for a worker’s views on labor organization as not all workers who desire union representation are able to get it—and this is especially true today (e.g. Kochan et al. 2019). Most empirical work on union preferences therefore studies voting behavior from union elections or

³ See: https://www.workingamerica.org/about.
surveys that ask workers how they would vote if a certification election was held at their workplace.

The former strategy carries the advantage of studying actual worker behavior, whereas the latter necessarily relies on workers’ stated preferences, which may or may not translate into action. However, studies of voting behavior often fall short because they fail to account for the selection process by which organizing drives reach the point of an election. And even among those campaign drives that successfully collect enough initial interest with card collection, very few efforts ever reach successful first contracts (Ferguson 2008). This means that studies of union election voting behavior are representative only of workers in regions, industries, and occupations with sufficient union interest and labor organizing capacity. Just as importantly, studies of union certification elections necessarily hold constant the form and features of the labor organization workers are selecting. We cannot know whether unions with different characteristics—for instance, portable social benefits, more input into corporate decision-making, or legal supports—might change the distribution of worker support. This limits the ability of union certification elections to shed light on ongoing discussions around labor law reform.

To overcome these limitations of past research on union election voting behavior, we employ a conjoint experiment approach in a nationally representative survey of the U.S. workforce. The conjoint experimental approach allows us to manipulate the features provided by hypothetical labor organizations and test how these features affect respondents’ willingness to join or pay dues to each organization (Hainmueller et al. 2014). We can thus recover the relative weight that respondents place on each of these characteristics of labor organizations on a
common set of outcomes. This method also elicits union preferences from a more representative set of workers beyond just those who manage to make it to the point of certification elections.

**Data: The Worker Organization Study**

To understand how workers think about these alternative approaches to workplace representation, we commissioned an original nationally representative survey of 4,203 employed, non-executive American workers from the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago using their AmeriSpeak panel in the fall of 2018. AmeriSpeak uses area probability sampling as the basis for an equal-probability sample of U.S. households, on which it administers online surveys to an ongoing panel of respondents.

4 The survey screened out respondents who reported being an “owner, member of the owner’s family, or part of upper-level management – that is, executives who make key decisions for your organization or company and oversee all operations”. This meant that some respondents still reported that they supervised others or fit into “Management” occupations. Our results are substantially similar with or without respondents reporting supervisory duties or management occupations.

5 NORC invited 17,124 panelists to participate in the Worker Organization Study, resulting in 5,661 screening interviews and 4,673 panelists eligible for interviews. Panelists were offered the equivalent of $4 for completing the survey, which increased to $10 at the end of the survey to ensure completion. NORC computed statistical weights to match the estimates of the non-managerial, employed population from the Current Population Survey. Appendix 1 summarizes the AmeriSpeak methodology in more detail.
Our survey—the Worker Organization Study—probed respondents’ current employment situation (including information about their job and employer), as well as their union status and perceptions of the labor movement. Following those questions, we then administered a conjoint choice analysis, in which we presented respondents with four pairs of hypothetical labor organizations and asked respondents to indicate which organization they would join (“Which of these organizations would you be more likely to join?”) and how much respondents would be willing to pay in dues to both organizations (“Assuming you had a pre-tax annual salary of $50,000, or about $4,200 per month, select the amount below that you would be willing to pay PER MONTH in dues to belong to each labor organization.”). For the second question, we offered respondent five options, including $0 (0% of salary) per month, $40 per month (1%), $100 (2.5%) per month, $200 (5%) per month, or $400 (10%) per month. Importantly, to ensure that respondents were considering these organizations on their own terms, we began the conjoint choice exercise with the following introduction: “For the next few minutes, we are going to ask you about hypothetical labor organizations that you might join in your workplace. These are organizations that would represent employees in your company or organization and are not necessarily unions.”

By randomizing the characteristics of the hypothetical labor organizations we presented to respondents, we are able to identify the causal effect of these characteristics on how workers evaluate the organizations—and thus make important headway over existing observational

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6 See Appendix 2 for a complete copy of our survey instrument.

7 We wanted respondents to have relatively equal footing with their baseline income for this question, one for which dues would not be an onerous expense nor would they be trivial.
research on worker preferences for unions and labor representation (Hainmueller et al. 2014; cf. Farber and Saks 1980; Freeman and Rogers 2006). The order in which characteristics were presented remained fixed across tasks to reduce the cognitive burden on respondents, following the advice we received from NORC based on interviews and survey pre-testing.

We examined the causal effects of nine different characteristics of labor organizations, which we selected to reflect the different strategies or models of representation summarized above that are under debate and being used to varying degrees by unions and emerging “alt-labor” groups. These characteristics included rules about who can join the organization; how dues are charged; whether the organization engages in collective bargaining with employers over compensation, hours, and working conditions; whether the organization provides extra services and benefits, like portable health insurance coverage or unemployment insurance; whether the organization provides legal help and representation; whether the organization engages in political activities, such as election campaigning or lobbying; whether the organization participates in management through board representation, organization-wide committees, or informal workplace participation groups; and whether the organization uses threats of strikes or direct action by workers.

Table 1 summarizes the levels of each of these characteristics that we randomized and presented to respondents in the conjoint exercise (see Appendix 2 for an example of a task presented to respondents) In all, these features touch on aspects of unions as they currently exist in the United States (for instance, traditional dues collection, firm-based collective bargaining, and limited input into management decisions), aspects of alt-labor organizations, like worker centers (including no collective bargaining rights, limited dues collection, and political advocacy and direct action), and features of labor organizations that exist in other countries but not
currently in the United States (such as union-provided portable health and retirement benefits, unemployment insurance, regional or sectoral collective bargaining, or representation on company boards). We will look at each characteristic individually and then examine selective combinations that reflect the models described above and debates over the future of unions and worker representation.

**Table 1: Description of Labor Organization Characteristics Tested in Conjoint Experiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute description</th>
<th>Level description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who can join</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers in your business or organization can join</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers in your business or organization can join and you can keep receiving membership services and benefits after you leave your job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers in your occupation at your workplace can join</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers in your occupation can join and you can keep receiving membership services and benefits if you change employers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All workers required to pay dues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers required to pay dues only if they receive benefits from the organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dues are voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation with your employer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does not negotiate with employer over compensation, hours, or working conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiates with employer over compensation, hours, and working conditions for all workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiates with employer over compensation, hours, and working conditions only for dues-paying members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiates to raise wages and working conditions for all workers in your region and industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra services/benefits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does not offer any extra benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provides health insurance and retirement savings accounts to workers in between jobs or if workers do not have access to them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provides extra unemployment insurance benefits to workers who lose their jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offers training to keep your skills up to date as technologies change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How you do your work</td>
<td>Offers training for skills needed for other jobs you might want</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offers help finding and applying for new jobs (like help finding openings, comparing pay, and writing a resume)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offers discounts on many products and services you might buy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not get involved in how you and your coworkers do your work or in improving how your organization does its work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offers you and your coworkers opportunities to work with management to recommend improvements in how you and your organization does work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Legal help and representation          | Does not deal with legal issues governing worker rights |
|                                        | Offers information on what workers' rights are according to employer policy and labor law |
|                                        | Offers legal representation to ensure that the organization upholds all workers’ rights |
|                                        | Offers legal representation to workers with individual workplace problems, like harassment or discrimination |
|                                        | Offers legal representation to workers with common non-workplace legal problems, like housing |

| Political activities                   | Not involved in elections or lobbying |
|                                        | Campaigns for pro-worker politicians |
|                                        | Campaigns for policies related to the workplace like family leave and the minimum wage |

| Input to management                    | Does not advise top management on how the organization should operate, including how to use technology or opening and closing plants, stores, or facilities |
|                                        | Advises top management on how the organization should operate, including how to use technology or opening and closing plants, stores, or facilities |
|                                        | Represents workers in joint committee with top management to decide how the organization should operate, including how to use technology or opening and closing plants, stores, or facilities |
Formally represents workers on your organization’s board of directors to have a voice in how the organization should operate, including how to use technology or opening and closing plants, stores, or facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of Strikes</th>
<th>Never uses the threat of a strike or direct mobilization by workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uses the threat of a strike or direct mobilization by workers if needed</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Although we tested more features than are typically fielded on candidate choice conjoint experiments (e.g. Carnes and Lupu 2016; Teele et al. 2018), recent research suggests a stability of causal estimates even within the range of attributes that we study (Bansak et al. 2017). Moreover, while pre-testing of the survey indicated that the instrument was more cognitively demanding than typical survey experiments, the respondents in those trials still meaningfully evaluated the attributes and organizations we presented to them.\(^8\) Lastly, we examined free response items asking respondents why they made the choices they did and found results broadly consistent with those from the closed item outcomes (see Appendix 6).

For the purposes of our analysis, we followed the recommendation of Hainmueller et al. (2014) and treated each organization evaluated by respondents as a distinct observation, resulting in a maximum of 33,624 cases (4,203 respondents * 4 rating tasks * 2 organizations in each task). We then estimated ordinary least squares regression models for both the “join” binary outcome, as well as the five-point dues scale, though our results are not dependent on this

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\(^8\) This pre-testing included a 100-person trial on Amazon MTurk, a 2,000-respondent survey fielded by Survey Sampling International, and cognitive focus groups convened by NORC.
decision (see Appendices 4 and 5). We applied NORC’s survey weights and clustered standard errors by respondent.

Results
How Do American Workers Think about Labor Representation?

How did workers think about the various organizations that we presented to them? Figure 1 presents our main results for the “join” outcome, which graphs the difference in the probability that a worker would join a labor organization for each of the features we tested in the conjoint experiment (i.e., the graph plots average marginal causal effects). The horizontal spikes around the estimates indicate 95% confidence intervals, and the characteristics below the labels on the left indicate the base (excluded) categories against which the average marginal causal effect estimates are computed. So, for instance, the first coefficient plotted in Figure 1 for the “Workers in Org Join and Keep Mem” characteristic indicates that workers were about 3 percentage points more likely to want to join a labor organization where they could enroll if they were employed at a particular business and they could keep their membership after they left that employer, compared to a labor organization where they could enroll if they were employed at a particular business but could not keep their membership if they lost or changed their job.

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9 Results presented in Appendix 3 review robustness checks to our conjoint analysis following the advice in Hainmueller et al. (2014).
Figure 1: Average Marginal Causal Effects of Labor Organizations on Likelihood of Joining

In Figure 1 we present results for our full survey sample. (In later sections we discuss how some of these effects differ by subgroups, especially partisanship.) Beginning with the first characteristic of the experiment, involving rules about which workers could join each organization, we can see that compared to the status quo in traditional unions (where workers can only join if they are employed at a particular business and cannot keep their membership if they change jobs), respondents were more enthusiastic about models where they could keep their membership if they changed or left their jobs.

Other options that expanded union membership beyond a specific firm to all workers in a particular occupation—for instance, the model pursued by alt-labor groups focusing on specific classes of workers like the Taxi Workers Alliance, the Day Laborers Network, or the National
Domestic Workers Alliance—were slightly less popular relative to the traditional, firm-based model among workers as a whole.

Moving on to dues, we found large differences in the appeal of labor organizations depending on whether they pursued the traditional union model of mandatory dues for all members compared to either fee for service or voluntary dues approaches. Both of those alternatives, more common among alt-labor organizations, had average marginal causal effects nearly ten percentage points above the conventional mandatory dues approach to financing unions. Still, as we will see, the drawbacks of mandatory dues collection for workers can be overcome with an appropriate package of other, offsetting organizational characteristics.

More striking were the variations in worker preferences depending on the presence or absence of collective bargaining, which we described to respondents as “negotiating with employers over compensation, hours, or working conditions.” For this characteristic of labor organizations—the lynchpin of conventional U.S. unions—we provided four different alternatives, including no collective bargaining at all (as is the case among alt-labor organizations that operate outside of the labor law framework), collective bargaining on behalf of all workers in a particular employer (the American, firm-centered model of bargaining present under status quo labor law), collective bargaining for only dues-payers of a labor organization (often termed minority unionism), and lastly, collective bargaining that spans across all employers in a particular region or industry (approximating the Western European model of regional or sectoral bargaining and many proposals for labor law reform in the United States; e.g. Barenberg 2015; Madland 2016).

Compared to no collective bargaining at all, our respondents strongly favored labor organizations that had the legal right to negotiate with employers over wages, benefits, and
working conditions. All three of the alternative collective bargaining scenarios we described were over 12 percentage points more appealing to workers than the option of no bargaining rights at all. These results suggest a significant disadvantage in the popular appeal of alt-labor organizations that do not formally bargain with employers. They also indicate significant worker support for sectoral bargaining proposals—though the absence of sectoral collective bargaining is not apparently a drawback to workers when compared to the conventional, firm-based bargaining model.

The next set of characteristics contains the most significant predictors of workers’ attitudes towards labor organizations and revolve around the benefits and services that these organizations can offer directly to workers aside from collective bargaining or negotiations with management. These benefits also capture the sort of selective incentives that Olson and some labor experts have argued would be important for attracting voluntary worker support for collective organizations like trade unions (Dimick 2012; Olson 1965). Compared to the baseline of no such selective benefits or services, workers found all of the options we provided very appealing. The most appealing benefit involved the provision of portable health insurance and retirement savings coverage to workers who lacked access to such plans from their employer and that workers could continue using even if they switched employers. The presence of these portable social welfare benefits raised the probability that a worker would join an organization by over 16 percentage points, the largest effect we identified across all organizational characteristics. Under current law, American unions are substantially limited from offering such portable health insurance and retirement benefits on their own, though some do through multiemployer plans (known as Taft-Hartley plans). In addition, some alt-labor organizations, most prominently the Freelancers Guild and the National Domestic Workers Alliance, offer
similar portable benefits to workers who would otherwise lack stable coverage because of the nature of their jobs.

Another popular service involved the provision of unemployment benefits, which increased the probability of a worker joining an organization by 12 percentage points relative to no benefits at all. This suggests that freeing unions up to offer such jobless benefit coverage—or even building unions into the provision of the benefits directly, as is done in many Western European countries (Western 1997)—would substantially increase the appeal of unions to rank-and-file workers (Dimick 2012).10

The following bundle of benefits referred to training (either for workers’ current jobs or future jobs) and job search help. These benefits were valued (around 12 percentage points above no benefits) but were all less popular than health insurance and retirement benefits (the differences were all statistically significant at $p<0.01$). The final selective benefit we consider is the provision of discounts on “many products and services”, which raised the likelihood of joining unions by around eight percentage points (compared to no benefits at all) but was also substantially less appealing than health insurance and retirement coverage ($p<0.01$). This is a common union benefit offered through the AFL-CIO’s “UnionPlus” discount program.11

10 Only about a quarter of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements near union’s historic peak of strength in 1963-4 had access to supplemental union unemployment benefits and these only applied to temporary layoffs from one’s current employer (Kittner 1964, 19). Given union’s decline since then the current share of workers with access to supplemental benefits is likely much lower today.

After benefits was a set of characteristics that directly probed the ways that labor organizations can provide democratic representation and voice into workers’ job routines, describing whether an organization “offers…opportunities to work with management to recommend improvements in how you and your organization does work.” This kind of voice is something that traditional unions that have collective bargaining rights can offer—but do not often do in practice. Indeed, Kochan et al. (2019) find that many current union members still report large voice gaps when it comes to giving workers input into how they do their jobs. Our conjoint experimental results suggest that this kind of voice is appealing to workers, increasing the probability of joining an organization by about five percentage points relative to the absence of such negotiation, and making it an important predictor but not as substantial as collective bargaining or several of the social benefits we described above.

Another bundle of characteristics we describe involve labor organizations’ input into management decisions, including informal advising to top management, representing workers in joint committees with management, and formal representation on employer boards of directors, the most expansive proposal of “co-determination” present in some Western European countries like Germany. All three of these proposals increased workers’ likelihood of joining labor organizations, though the magnitudes (three to four percentage points) were smaller than for many of the other features we have explored above.

Legal assistance and representation formed the next bundle of characteristics we examined, and compared to the absence of any legal help workers found various forms of legal representation and assistance appealing, on the order of about five to six percentage points. Workers generally found legal information less appealing than formal representation. Traditional American unions typically offer workplace legal representation as part of their standard services,
as do many alt-labor organizations like worker centers. But unlike traditional unions and more like alt-labor organizations, workers also indicated that they found non-workplace legal representation valuable as well—that is, legal representation for common civil issues like housing or immigration. This suggests that alt-labor organizations’ strategy of helping workers with non-workplace issues might be an important way to attract membership in the absence of other formal functions of unions.

Unlike the results we have described so far, political activities were the first set of labor attributes we explored in which a feature reduced workers’ likelihood of joining. Compared to an organization that did nothing in politics, a labor organization that we described as campaigning for pro-worker politicians in elections was less likely to be selected by workers. Electorally-active organizations were about three percentage points less likely to be chosen than non-active ones. By comparison, there was no penalty for organizations that lobbied for pro-worker policies. This result suggests an important tension for labor organizations in the United States: particularly in the current environment where unions face substantial retrenchment of legal rights, unions need to build political power to restore those rights and expand their clout (Hertel-Fernandez 2019). Yet the activities that are necessary for rebuilding labor’s political power may require electoral involvements that are unpopular with some workers, especially when it comes to elections as opposed to legislative lobbying.

Lastly, we provided information about whether or not an organization used threats of strikes or direct action by workers, another central component of the labor movement—albeit one that has become substantially less common over time as labor’s clout has declined (Burns 2011; Rosenfeld 2006). Here too we found a somewhat paradoxical result. Strikes and direct action are generally thought of as being the fundamental source of labor’s strength (e.g., Burns
2011; Gourevitch 2018; Lichtenstein 2002)—yet workers, on average, find the prospect of strike threats to be unappealing as they are considering whether or not to join a labor organization, reducing their likelihood of joining by about three percentage points.\textsuperscript{12} As we will see, this reflects substantial heterogeneity by workers’ political views.

**Figure 2: Average Marginal Causal Effects of Labor Organizations on Maximum Dues Willing to Pay**

![Figure 2](image)

Figure 2 plots the second outcome from our survey instrument, examining the average marginal causal effect of each characteristic on the maximum amount workers indicated that they would be willing to pay in dues. (Recall that the scale for this item ran from one to five, representing $0 in dues per month to $400 per month.) The results encouragingly parallel those

\textsuperscript{12} See Appendix 7 for an analysis of open-ended responses where we find further evidence for respondents’ dislike of strike actions.
from our other outcome, indicating that workers were more likely to pay higher dues to the same organizations that they were more likely to want to join. In Appendix 5 we show that our results are very similar if we recode this variable into a binary outcome, capturing if a respondent is willing to pay any dues at all to a labor organization. Like the “join” outcome, Figure 2 documents that workers were most willing to pay more in dues to organizations that provide collective bargaining (especially sectoral bargaining), that offer valuable selective benefits, especially health insurance and retirement plans and unemployment insurance, that provide legal representation or help, and that advise top management.

Three other findings stand out in comparison to the earlier outcome that merit discussion. First, unlike with the join outcome, we find that workers’ willingness to pay for labor representation is generally unrelated to both membership rules about who can join as well as (perhaps surprisingly) the dues structure. Despite workers’ tendency to favor joining organizations with fee for service or voluntary dues, respondents were no more likely to say that they would pay more in dues to labor organizations that lacked mandatory dues payments. This suggests that conditional on attracting members, labor organizations may have more scope to change dues structures without alienating workers. Second, when it comes to willingness to pay, workers are on the whole less enthusiastic about supporting organizations that either campaign in elections or that lobby for policy change, further underscoring the tension that unions may face in trying to maximize their membership and revenue while also building political clout (on average, workers preferred joining an organization that engaged in neither political activity by about 3 percentage points, \( p<0.05 \)). Lastly, while workers were skeptical of strike threats in their membership decisions, they did not appear to penalize labor organizations that made use of direct action when considering the maximum amount of dues they would be willing to pay.
Conditional on joining a labor organization, workers appear willing to support striking organizations with their dues.

**Similarities and Variations Across Sub-Groups**

While the results so far have assessed the effects of individual organizational characteristics on worker preferences averaging over all respondents we surveyed, our relatively large sample allows us to consider how different subgroups of respondents might react differently to the same attributes. In general, what was notable about our findings is just how similar they were across respondents with very different demographic characteristics whom we might have expected to evaluate labor organizations very differently (e.g., Freeman and Rogers 2006; Kochan et al. 2019; see also Abramson et al. 2019).

There were, however, several important exceptions to this consistency in preferences (see also Appendix 6)—though even these differences were typically modest. Workers with less education, especially with a high school degree or less, tended to be more eager to join labor organizations that offered health insurance and retirement benefits coverage and job search help. These lower-educated workers also found training for their current job less appealing than more highly-educated workers. And more highly educated workers were much more favorable towards collaborating with management on work routines, preferred less legal representation, were more favorable towards political involvements and found the threat of strikes to be much more of a negative compared to workers with less education. Figure 3 compares the average marginal causal effects for workers with a high school degree or less, some college, or college or more.

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13 Note that we fielded the demographic questions before the conjoint exercise, alleviating concerns that answers to these questions were affected by the conjoint characteristics.
(importantly our results are also consistent when examining differences in marginal means as well; see Leeper et al. 2018).

Figure 3: Average Marginal Causal Effects of Labor Organizations on Likelihood of Joining, by Worker Education

Which labor organization would you join? (0/1)

By Education

- HS or Less
- Some College
- College or More
Next, we probed whether workers’ preferences for voice and representation varied by the level of voice they reported at their current jobs. We created subgroups based on the following item, which asked respondents “How much direct involvement and influence do you personally have in the following areas of your job?” The areas included safety, compensation and opportunities for advancement, and deciding how to do work, and for each area workers could indicate that they had “a lot of influence”, “some influence”, “only a little influence”, “no influence at all”, or that the area was “not applicable”. Discarding the non-applicable respondents, we averaged each respondent’s answers to this item, assigning higher values on a one through four scale to workers who said that they had more influence on the job. The average influence across respondents was 2.3 out of 4. We then divided respondents in those above and below the average level of influence. Workers who reported below-average levels of voice on the
job were more supportive of collective bargaining, more supportive of working with management, more supportive of legal representation (especially for individual representation), and more supportive of the use of strike threats (or at least, not negative towards the use of strikes). See Figure 4 for a subgroup analysis by workers’ self-reported workplace voice.

Last, we break the results out by workers’ self-reported partisan attachments. Labor policy is one of the areas that in which clear ideological separation in Congress occurred earliest and fastest (McCarty et al. 2006), and at both the national and state levels, Democrats have tended to pursue policies bolstering union rights while Republicans have sought to diminish the power of organized labor (e.g. Anzia and Moe 2016). Given that degree of political party polarization, we might well expect big differences in how Republican and Democratic workers think about labor representation (cf. Lenz 2012). Yet this is not what we observe in Figure 5, which breaks workers out by their self-reported partisan affiliation. Republicans and

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14 Another dimension along which labor representation preferences might differ significantly is the degree to which respondents have had belonged to unions, whether it be as past or current members, because it takes individuals actually experiencing certain functions of unions to properly value them (Gomez and Gunderson 2004). Analyzing the effects along this dimension, we find that workers who have experienced unions are less responsive to fee-for-service or voluntary dues, more supportive of strikes, and more interested in having input into work routines compared to those workers without union experience, suggesting that firsthand experience with unions is important in evaluating these features positively.

15 98% of respondents provided a valid response to the partisan ID question. 33% of respondents identified as Republicans, 23% as Independents, and 44% as Democrats.
Democrats shared very similar preferences for the organizational features they valued. The two significant exceptions to this stability were around political involvements and strikes, with Democrats much more supportive than Republicans of labor organizations that engaged in both sets of activities. The effect is asymmetric, however, with Republican workers being much more skeptical of the use of strikes than Democrats were supportive. While strikes were a major negative for Republicans, the threat of workplace mobilization as at best a neutral characteristic for Democrats. These differences notwithstanding, the overall lesson appears to be one of partisan unity, not division: regardless of party, workers share largely similar underlying preferences for labor organization and representation on features like collective bargaining, social benefits, training, and membership rules.

Figure 5: Average Marginal Causal Effects of Labor Organizations on Likelihood of Joining, by Partisan Affiliation

Which labor organization would you join? (0/1)

- Membership Rules (Workers in Org Join)
- Fees (All Workers Pay Fees)
- Collective Bargaining (No CB)
- Benefits (No Extra Benefits)
- Input into Work Routines (No Input)
- Legal Help (No Legal Help)
- Political Activities (No Political Activities)
- Negotiation with Management (No Negotiation)
- Direct Mobilization (No Strike Threat)
- Workers in Org Join and Keep Mem
- Workers in Occ Join and Keep Mem
- Fee for Service Voluntary Dues
- CB for All Workers CB for Dues Payers
- CB for Region/Ind
- Health and Retirement Benefits
- Unemployment Benefits
- Training for Other Jobs
- Job Search Help
- Discounts
- Works with Management
- Information
- Legal Representation, Org
- Legal Representation, Ind/Workplace
- Legal Representation, Ind Non-Workplace
- Campaigns for Pro-Worker Politicians
- Campaigns for Pro-Worker Policies
- Represents Workers in Joint Committees
- Formally Represents on Board
- Uses Strike Threat

By Party
Combinations of Organizational Features

While we have focused so far on the independent contribution of each organizational characteristic on workers’ attitudes and preferences, it is also helpful to consider bundles of such attributes together. We can do this by examining workers’ predicted willingness to join labor organizations or their willingness to pay dues based on the characteristics of the hypothetical organizations using the coefficients displayed in Figures 1 and 2. Figures 6 and 7 plot the willingness to join and pay dues, respectively, for organizations at different percentiles of the predicted outcomes distribution as well as the characteristics associated with those organizations. Collectively, these plots highlight how the willingness to join or pay dues rises as organizations offer a combination of services and worker participation in management along with collective bargaining.

Figure 6: Predicted Willingness to Join Labor Organizations and their Associated Characteristics, by Percentile

Note: Lines reflect 95% confidence intervals. Because the question was forced choice, the baseline probability of joining an organization is indicated at 0.5.
Returning to the four different approaches to worker representation that we introduced earlier, we identified strong support for two of these models: those focused on providing workers with new or expanded social benefits and training opportunities (the *individual services* approaches) and those emphasizing increased worker voice in management decisions (the *worker voice* approach). By comparison, workers were much less enthusiastic about the *traditional, employer-based union model* that lacked additional services or voice in management decisions, as well as a *political advocacy and mobilization* approach that prioritized political mobilization without collective bargaining or workplace benefits. We saw the highest support for organizations that combined popular components of these different models, especially collective bargaining, benefits and services, and input in management decisions.
Caveats and Implications for Future Research

Our analysis has a number of important strengths as the first large-scale study of the structure of worker preferences for new workplace representation. The conjoint design allows us to isolate the causal effect of each characteristic we examine on workers’ prospective behavior. Moreover, the nationally representative sample we employ permits us to draw inferences for the relevant population: all employed American workers. Nevertheless, we recognize the limits of our conclusions and propose additional work to tackle these challenges.

Perhaps most importantly, many workers have likely not thought seriously about workplace organizations before, so these preferences ought to be interpreted as expressions of the general public in the absence of concerted informational or organizing campaigns and in the context of the specific choices we presented them with. Further work ought to explore how these estimates might change if workers experienced the sort of “deep canvassing” that can change individuals’ attitudes, even on controversial and salient issues (Broockman and Kalla 2016) and that is often part of a well-run union organizing effort (McAlevey 2016). This is especially true for convincing workers to support union political involvement and strikes (e.g. Fantasia 1988) or to commit to acts of solidarity for others (Ahlquist and Levi 2013). Additionally, while our results shed light on what features might work to convince the marginal worker to join an existing organization more can be done to understand how potentially interested workers might organize such labor organizations in the first place.

A somewhat related concern is that respondents, lacking prior experience with unions or labor organizations, responded to our exercises at random. This should downwardly bias our estimates, making our results a conservative test of the effects of union attributes on preferences. Moreover, the consistency of preferences for most labor organization characteristics across very different workers further suggests that our respondents were thinking about the exercises in a
similar manner. And, as we show in Appendix 6, responses to an open text item that queried workers why they chose the organizations to join that they did revealed relatively consistent patterns to the closed-option outcomes. The most common concepts invoked by respondents in their text included benefits, dues, and strikes, and especially legal representation and health insurance coverage. This reassured us that workers were responding thoughtfully and meaningfully to the hypothetical organizations we presented to them.

Nevertheless, follow-up work might use our survey-based results to explore workers’ perceptions in more detail, perhaps through focus groups, deliberative discussions, or interviews. One particularly interesting avenue for future work is understanding where workers’ preferences for labor organizations come from—for instance, from family experiences, education, firsthand experiences in the labor market, or political orientations (e.g. Barling et al. 1991).16

Lastly, it is important to recognize that our results ultimately only speak to workers’ stated preferences on a survey and not to actual decisions to join or fund a labor organization. Unfortunately, the restrictive nature of American labor law—itself a central motivation of this paper—prevents researchers from exploring whether workers would actually join organizations that hold many of the features we test in this paper (cf. Hertel-Fernandez and Porter 2019). For instance, it is very difficult to construct a labor organization engaging in sectoral or regional bargaining under current U.S. labor law. Still, creative researchers might use our survey-based

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16 For instance, we found that having a family member who has been in a union makes one more supportive of collective bargaining and a traditional dues structure. We also came across interesting anecdotes in open-ended responses such as “I mainly chose because was against strikes and my father used to have to strike with teamsters and it was always a sad time.”
research to examine how some of the organizational features we have tested change behavioral outcomes among workers (cf. Hainmueller et al. 2015; for a related employment context, see Mas and Pallais 2017).

**Understanding the Implications of Worker Preferences for Workplace Representation**

In this paper, we employed a conjoint survey experiment to identify the causal effect of key labor organization features on workers’ willingness to join or financially support such organizations. These features together represent a variety of labor organizations in the United States and other advanced democracies. Overall, our results make clear that the primary function of the traditional American union, collective bargaining, continues to be highly valued by potential members. Still, other benefits and services, such as the provision of health insurance, retirement benefits, unemployment benefits, and labor market training, are also highly valued by all workers. Workers were also supportive of organizations offering legal representation and input to their work routines and into management decisions.

These results reinforce the value of bringing theories and evidence from comparative political economy, labor law, and industrial relations into American debates about the structure of labor markets and labor policy reform. Our results show American workers would support means of achieving industrial democracy at their workplaces that are modeled after those found in systems that provide co-determination, works councils, and more informal engagement in workplace decision-making. They also would value having unions provide labor market services throughout their careers as do unions in “Ghent” systems found in several European countries. This in turn is consistent with a growing number of labor law and policy scholars (e.g. Andrias 2016; Finkin 2011; Kochan 2011; Sachs 2010) who suggest that American labor law forces
unions to conform to a model that is poorly matched to the present economy and workforce with its firm-based organizing and bargaining and the limited influence the law grants unions over corporate practices. The findings we present in this paper suggest another reason that labor law is restricting growth of the labor movement: it currently limits unions from providing many of the benefits and services that workers value outside of those jointly negotiated and administered in collective bargaining relationships.

Labor law may not be the only obstacle to further union growth, however. So too are some workers’ preferences against labor organizations that use strike threats and engage in election campaigns. Despite the fact that both of these strategies have historically been central to union economic and political power (Greenstone 1969; Lichtenstein 2002; Schlozman 2015), workers, on average, were skeptical of joining and financially supporting organizations that deployed these two tactics (at least in the abstract, and especially without prior union experience). This was especially true for workers who self-identify as Republicans. Although our analysis of organizational bundles indicates that neither characteristic entirely rules out broad-based worker support, it does underscore the difficulty of building large membership associations dedicated to both representing workers’ narrow workplace concerns and engaging in broader movement politics when workers have little prior experience with unions (but see Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019 for an example of how conservative workers might become more interested in strikes by experiencing them firsthand).

These results lastly speak to the strategic options facing labor movement and worker advocacy organizations and leaders. The strong support for collective bargaining, participating in management decision making, and individual services suggests American workers want a mix of what both existing unions and emerging advocacy and alt-labor groups have to offer. This
implies that both groups should see the other as complements, not substitutes or competitors, in efforts to rebuild worker voice, bargaining power, and representation in America. Indeed, coordinated efforts between existing unions and emerging advocacy groups appear to have a better chance of broadening and expanding the number of workers represented and perhaps redefining the definition and identity of the American labor movement. Coordinated strategies, combined with changes in labor law that allow new options for representation, expand the range of employees protected under labor law, and eliminate restrictions on the issues open to worker/union input and negotiations, could usher in an era of experimentation, evaluation, and learning that reshape the fundamental features of American labor and employment relations and better align labor law with what workers want.

Works Cited


Supplementary Materials for “How U.S. Workers Think About Workplace Democracy: The Structure of Individual Worker Preferences for Labor Representation”

For online publication only
“How U.S. Workers Think About Workplace Democracy:
The Structure of Individual Worker Preferences for Labor Representation”

Supplementary Materials Table of Contents

1. Details of AmeriSpeak survey methodology
2. Complete survey instrument
3. Robustness of conjoint instrument
4. Use of logistic regression instead of OLS
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Appendix 1: NORC AmeriSpeak Survey Methodology

Below, we append information on the survey methodology employed by NORC with its AmeriSpeak probability-based online research panel:

Funded and operated by NORC at the University of Chicago, AmeriSpeak is a probability-based panel designed to be representative of the US household population. Randomly selected US households are sampled with a known, non-zero probability of selection from the NORC National Frame and address-based sample, and then contacted by US mail, telephone interviewers, overnight express mailers, and field interviewers (face to face). AmeriSpeak panelists participate in NORC studies or studies conducted by NORC on behalf of NORC’s clients.

In 2017, the AmeriSpeak Panel expanded to 27,000 households and will expand to 30,000 households in 2018. The AmeriSpeak Panel includes sample support for surveys of various segments through AmeriSpeak Latino, AmeriSpeak Teen, and AmeriSpeak Young Adult (which includes an oversample of African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians age 18-34). AmeriSpeak also supports large-sample size surveys and surveys of low-incidence populations through AmeriSpeak Calibration, which combines probability-based AmeriSpeak and non-probability online samples using calibrating statistical weights derived from AmeriSpeak.

A general population sample was selected from NORC’s AmeriSpeak Panel for this study. Survey respondents who indicated they are not an owner or part of upper-level management meet the screening criteria and we able to participate in the full survey.

For the first re-ask effort, NORC sampled all those who initially selected temporary help employee, contract employee, independent contractor, or on-call worker.

The sample for a specific study is selected from the AmeriSpeak Panel using sampling strata based on age, race/Hispanic ethnicity, education, and gender (48 sampling strata in total). The size of the selected sample per sampling stratum is determined by the population distribution for each stratum. In addition, sample selection takes into account expected differential survey completion rates by demographic groups so that the set of panel members with a completed interview for a study is a representative sample of the target population. If panel household has one more than one active adult panel member, only one adult in the household is eligible for selection (random within-household sampling). Panelists selected for an AmeriSpeak study earlier in the business week are not eligible for sample selection until the following business week.
Appendix 2: Complete survey instrument

For a copy of the complete survey instrument, please review the following URL: [https://www.dropbox.com/s/78t5z1zdtuszs4t/Survey%20Instrument.pdf](https://www.dropbox.com/s/78t5z1zdtuszs4t/Survey%20Instrument.pdf)

See below for an example of a task presented to respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor organization 1</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Labor organization 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers in your business or organization can join</td>
<td><strong>Who can join</strong></td>
<td>Workers in your occupation can join and you can keep receiving membership services and benefits if you change employers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All workers required to pay dues</td>
<td><strong>Dues</strong></td>
<td>Dues are voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not negotiate with employer over compensation, hours, or working conditions</td>
<td><strong>Negotiation with your employer</strong></td>
<td>Negotiates with employer over compensation, hours, and working conditions for all workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not offer any extra benefits</td>
<td><strong>Extra services/benefits</strong></td>
<td>Provides extra unemployment insurance benefits to workers who lose their jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not get involved in how you and your coworkers do your work or in organizational improvement efforts</td>
<td><strong>How you do your work</strong></td>
<td>Offers you and your coworkers opportunities to work with management to recommend improvements in how you work and in organizational practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not deal with legal issues governing worker rights</td>
<td><strong>Legal help and representation</strong></td>
<td>Offers legal representation to ensure that the company upholds all workers’ rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not involved in elections or lobbying</td>
<td><strong>Political activities</strong></td>
<td>Not involved in elections or lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formally represents workers on your organization’s board of directors to have a voice in how the organization should operate, including how to use technology or opening and closing plants, stores, or facilities</td>
<td><strong>Input to management</strong></td>
<td>Does not consult with management on how the company should operate, including how to use technology or opening and closing plants, stores, or facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never uses the threat of a strike or direct mobilization by workers</td>
<td><strong>Use of Strikes</strong></td>
<td>Uses the threat of a strike or direct mobilization by workers if needed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Robustness of conjoint instrument

Below, we follow best practices in the implementation of conjoint analysis (Hainmueller et al. 2014) and check for carryover effects (in which earlier tasks might have affected later tasks), profile order effects (in which the order of the profiles within a particular comparison might have affected the estimates), and attribute order effects (in which the order of the attributes presented to the respondents might have affected respondents’ answers).

To address the concern of carryover effects, we subsetted our analysis to only the first task completed by respondents. Our results are very similar to those presented pooling all tasks together, reassuring us that there were not large differences in estimates across tasks. See Figure 1 for the “join” outcome. In results not shown we also reached similar conclusions interacting each attribute with dummies for each task number.

Appendix Figure 1: Average Marginal Causal Effects of Labor Organizations on Likelihood of Joining, First Task versus Others

Which labor organization would you join? (0/1), by Task 1 (ref: Tasks 2-4)

We perform a similar robustness check for the profile order (left or right), examining whether our results in the overall sample hold if we subset our data only to organizations shown on the left or the right. We generally recover similar results regardless of profile order, which we demonstrate in Figure 2. In results not shown we also reached similar conclusions interacting each attribute with dummies for profile ordering.
Appendix Figure 2: Average Marginal Causal Effects of Labor Organizations on Likelihood of Joining, By Profile Ordering

Which labor organization would you join? (0/1)

- Membership Rules: Workers in Org, Join and Keep Mem
- Dues: Fee for Service, Voluntary Dues
- Collective Bargaining: CB for All Workers, CB for Dues Payers, CB for Region/Ind
- Benefits: Health and Retirement Benefits, Unemployment Benefits, Training for Current Job, Training for Other Jobs, Job Search Help, Discounts
- Input into Work Routines: Works with Management, Information
- Legal Help: Legal Representation, Org, Legal Representation, Ind, Non-Workplace
- Political Activities: Campaigns for Pro-Worker Politicians, Campaigns for Pro-Worker Policies
- Negotiation with Management: Represents Workers in Joint Committees, Formally Represents on Board
- Direct Mobilization: Uses Strike Threat

By profile order

Because of the relative cognitive complexity of the conjoint tasks we were presenting to respondents (both in terms of the amount of information in the conjoint as well as the fact that many workers have not given much thought to workplace representation), we opted not to randomize the attribute ordering on the advice of the NORC survey methodologists. We therefore do not address the issue of attribute ordering.
Appendix 4: Use of logistic regression instead of OLS

Below in Figure 3, we report our main results using the “join” outcome using a logistic regression instead of a binary OLS model. The substantive results are very similar to those using the binary OLS models reported in the main text.

Appendix Figure 3: Average Marginal Causal Effects of Labor Organizations on Likelihood of Joining, Logistic Regression

Which labor organization would you join? (0/1)

- Membership Rules
  - Workers in Org Join and Keep Mem
  - Workers in Occ Join and Keep Mem
- Dues
  - Fee for Service
  - Voluntary Dues
- Collective Bargaining
  - CB for All Workers
  - CB for Dues Payers
  - CB for Region/Ind
- Benefits
  - Health and Retirement Benefits
  - Unemployment Benefits
  - Training for Current Job
  - Job Search Help
  - Discounts
- Input into Work Routines
  - Works with Management
  - Information
- Legal Help
  - Legal Representation, Org
  - Legal Representation, Ind Non-Workplace
  - Legal Representation, Ind Workplace
- Political Activities
  - Campaigns for Pro-Worker Politicians
  - Campaigns for Pro-Worker Policies
- Negotiation with Management
  - Advises Top Management
  - Represents Workers in Joint Committees
  - Formally Represents on Board
- Direct Mobilization
  - Uses Strike Threat

Logistic Regression Coefficient
Appendix 5: Alternative specification of dues outcome

Below in Figure 4, we report an alternative specification of the dues outcome that recodes the variable to 0 (does not want to pay any dues) or 1 (reports wanting to pay at least some dues). In all 36% of respondents said that they did not want to pay any dues. Again, the results are very similar to those reported in the main text.

Appendix Figure 4: Average Marginal Causal Effects of Labor Organizations on Willingness to Pay Any Dues
Appendix 6: Text analysis of free-response items

As reported in the main text, we analyzed a free response item following the completion of each task that asked respondents “In a few words, please explain why you selected Labor Organization [1 or 2] as the one you'd be most likely to join.” Of the 14,941 potential responses, 12,092 (81 percent) written responses were reported. While those who are more educated or are not undecided about how they would vote on a union (i.e. would vote for a union or vote against a union) respond at higher rates, variation in response rates is quite modest across several relevant characteristics of individuals (see Figure 10).

Appendix Figure 10: Share of Eligible Responses That Provided Open-Ended Response, By Worker Demographics

First, we analyze this data quantitatively. We pooled all these responses together, removed punctuation, removed common stop words (using the tm R package), and then stemmed the remaining words. We then examined the most frequent uni-grams, bi-grams, and tri-grams. We plot the results for uni-grams in Figure 11, which indicate that respondents most frequently referred to the benefits offered by labor organizations when making their decisions, affirming the results from the conjoint analysis.
Next, we conduct a more qualitative review of the open-ended responses. Respondents most often used this space to list out the specific characteristics they preferred, offer a broad characterization or feeling they got from either organization, or comment on the survey instrument. In reading through these open-response items, we pull out a few specific themes that we see as elucidating the thought processes of respondents as they approached the conjoint tasks and how some of these comments reflect the respondents’ concerns or understanding of specific characteristics of the conjoint experiment. We quote some of these responses that capture some of these general responses.
Consistent with the results in Figure 11, many respondents explicitly called out the characteristics of benefits, strikes, or dues as the primary determinants of their choice of which organization they would join. Many simply cited their selected organization’s additional or more preferred benefits. On the negative side, we found respondents writing that they wanted to avoid any threat of strike or imposition of dues, reflecting the negative effect of strikes and positive effects of optional or pay-for-service policies seen in Figure 1. For some, these components of the organizations were coercive, extractive, and therefore seen in a negative light. For others, strikes were undesirable because of their industry or the nature of their work. Many respondents from the health care industry, for instance, reported being uncomfortable or against striking when it could negatively affect patients.

_I find strikes to be an abuse of power. If you're unhappy at work, negotiate or quit._

_No one should be forced to pay unions who take those dues and give them to left wing nut job politicians_

Other respondents actually expressed vocal support for the use of strikes and dues, mostly citing their ability to generate leverage and power for labor organizations:

_Union power is strike power. How can you enforce an [sic] collective bargaining without the threat of action? The threat of boredom? I don’t want my orgs to strike but I want them to be ready to_

_Requiring all members to pay dues makes the organization stronger._

Political activity by labor organizations, another characteristic with overall negative effects on one’s likelihood to join unions, had similar divide on responses to the overall proposition that the labor organizations engaged in any kind of political activity. Those against it saw it as corruptive, coercive, and partisan to liberal policies or politicians:

_I don't like that if you're in a labor union your union tries to tell you how to vote._

Among those for political activity by their labor organizations spoke of their power to be a force for change but many also appeared wary of supporting politicians instead of lobbying for specific policies because politicians couldn’t necessarily be held accountable to their platforms.

_I just want unions to be tough and political._

_Family leave and minimum wage being advocated for already by the union would mean more to me than a "pro-worker" politician, who may or may not keep his/her word._
Respondents offered more general statements that spoke to their overall feelings toward standard union practices. The potential for pay standardization, perhaps embodied by the various collective bargaining characteristics, raised concerns to individuals about hurting any sense of meritocracy:

*I believe in right to work, meritocracy over supporting a complacent seniority based system.*

*More options to be determine by the worker less over-arching one size fits all rules*

Relatedly, workers did appear to recognize and support those labor organizations that cared about their members and help out individuals, often through providing voice/representation options or expanding their exit options (i.e. training, job search assistance):

*This organization seems better and in the long run and more focused on helping the individual throughout their life, not just the job.*

*The workers/employee have more hands on and say so of what is going on within the organization*

*Offers training to keep your skills up to date as technologies change*

Many respondents, including those who were in favor of unions or undecided on unions, appeared to favor more cooperative organizations compared to confrontational tactics.

*I like that it works for the union member, without putting pressure on them to go against their company*

*Union shares goal as executives to develop a profitable company with a positive culture where employees are appreciated/compensated fairly (within reason).*

Yet, still some respondents expressed a desire for their labor organizations to act as counterweights to employers’ power and abuse:

*Because 90% of today's organization don't care about the work that the employees do on a day to day as long as the employee makes the sale. They fell [sic] that they can pay nickels and dimes and everything is okay, not caring about the employee has*

*I believe a union should act as a watchdog, setting rules and making sure the employer is following the rules. Labor union #2 fit that criteria better than #1.*
Finally, we did observe a handful of respondents expressing frustration in the open responses of their final task or otherwise indicate their unwillingness to genuinely weigh their choices. Considering our results are fairly congruent with the comments made by different groupings of individuals (e.g. pro- versus anti-union), we believe these cases of random choosing are limited.

*Sick of picking, don't care either way*

*I'm anti union, so I picked a random one*