

Spatial dynamic models with intertemporal optimization: specification and estimation


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2019 AEA/ASSA Annual Meeting

January 2019

0. Preliminaries (What?)

- Regional policy interdependence



Public safety spending (per capita, 2015): county governments in NC

- ▶ public expenditure, tax rates, etc.
- Tool: spatial econometrics
- This research: **spatial econometric model specification-structural spatial econometric model**

0. Preliminaries

- Theoretical foundation \Rightarrow a game setting
 - ▶ n agents, an $n \times n$ spatial network matrix W_n (zero diagonals)
 - ▶ e.g., LQ payoff

$$u_i(Y_n) = \underbrace{\eta_i}_{=i\text{'s exo. char.}} y_i + \underbrace{\lambda_0}_{=\text{parameter}} \underbrace{y_i}_{i\text{-th row of } W_n} Y_n - \frac{1}{2} y_i^2$$

- ▶ complete information
- A spatial autoregressive (SAR) model : $Y_n = (y_1, \dots, y_n)'$ and $X_n = (x_1, \dots, x_n)'$

$$Y_n = \lambda_0 W_n Y_n + X_n \beta_0 + \mathcal{E}_n.$$

- ▶ exogenous characteristics? $\eta_n = (\eta_1, \dots, \eta_n)'$
- ▶ regression function: $\eta_n = X_n \beta_0 + \mathcal{E}_n$

1. Introduction (Why?)

Motivation

- Economic explanation of spatial/time dependencies from a spatial panel data set
- Considerations
 - ▶ a panel data set has id's \Rightarrow dynamics of individual actions
 - ★ e.g., agent=county government, its action=public safety spending
 - ▶ multi decision-making periods
 - ▶ rational economic agents \Rightarrow forward-looking agents' behaviors.

\Rightarrow Corresponding econometric model specification?

1. Introduction (Overview - How?)

1. A new model specification

- ▶ n agents, innate locations \Rightarrow spatial network W_n
- ▶ continuous type action, parametric LQ payoff for choices of agents' actions
- ▶ **conventional SDPD model: myopic behaviors**
- ▶ maximization of agent's lifetime payoff: stable economic environment \Rightarrow time-invariant optimal policy functions
 - ★ LQ value functions \Rightarrow a linear system \Rightarrow correlation structure

2. QML method, asymptotic properties, bias correction, Monte Carlo simulations

3. Case study: counties' public safety spending in NC

- ▶ agent=county government, action=its public safety spending
- ▶ two policy functions: (i) myopic (conventional) v.s (ii) forward-looking

2. A spatial dynamic game with intertemporal optimization

2.1 Literature review: spatial dynamic panel models and myopic choices

- Data environment

- ▶ panel data set : $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \underbrace{Y_{nt}}_{\text{dependent V. (action)}}, \underbrace{X_{nt}}_{\text{independent V.}} \end{array} \right\}_{t=0}^T$ and given W_n .

- SDPD model :

$$Y_{nt} = \lambda_0 W_n Y_{nt} + \gamma_0 Y_{n,t-1} + \rho_0 W_n Y_{n,t-1} + \boldsymbol{\eta}_{nt}. \quad (1)$$

- ▶ $\left(\begin{array}{c} \lambda_0, \gamma_0, \rho_0 \\ \text{current competition,} \\ \text{persistence, diffusion} \end{array} \right)$: main parameters
- ▶ $\boldsymbol{\eta}_{nt} = (\eta_{1t}, \dots, \eta_{nt})'$ at time t : observable + unobservable characteristics

2. A spatial dynamic game with intertemporal optimization

2.1 Literature review: spatial dynamic panel models and myopic choices

- Justification: agent i 's t^{th} -period payoff u_{it}

$$\eta_{it}y_{it} + \rho_0 y_{it} \underbrace{w_i \cdot Y_{n,t-1}}_{\text{=previous neighbors' actions}} + \lambda_0 y_{it} \underbrace{w_i \cdot Y_{nt}}_{\text{=current neighbors' actions}} \quad (2)$$
$$- c(y_{it}, y_{i,t-1})$$

where $w_i = i^{\text{th}}$ -row of W_n ,

$$\underbrace{c(y_{it}, y_{i,t-1})}_{\text{=cost}} = \underbrace{\frac{\gamma_0}{2} (y_{it} - y_{i,t-1})^2}_{\text{=adjustment cost}} + \underbrace{\frac{1 - \gamma_0}{2} y_{it}^2}_{\text{=cost of selecting } y_{it}}, \quad (0 < \gamma_0 < 1).$$

- ▶ η_{it} : exogenous characteristics, η_i^{iv} (innate) and η_{it}^v (time-variant)
- ▶ η_{it}^v : stationary first-order linear Markov process, exogenous

2. A spatial dynamic game with intertemporal optimization

2.2. Intertemporal choices

- Lifetime problem:

- ▶ time-discounting factor: $\delta \in [0, 1)$
- ▶ complete information setting up to $t \Rightarrow E_t(\cdot)$ is defined.
- ▶ agent i 's t^{th} -period problem: given $(Y_{n,t-1}, \eta_{nt})$, maximizes

$$u_i(y_{it}, Y_{-i,t}, Y_{n,t-1}, \eta_{it}) + \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \delta^s E_t \left(u_i \left(Y_{n,t+s}, Y_{n,t+s-1}, \eta_{i,t+s} \right) \right) \quad (3)$$

by selecting y_{it} .

- ▶ stable economic environment

2. A spatial dynamic game with intertemporal optimization

2.3. Nash equilibrium characterization

- The stable system of NE is

$$Y_{nt}^* = (\lambda_0 W_n + \delta Q_n^*) Y_{nt}^* + (\gamma_0 I_n + \rho_0 W_n) Y_{n,t-1} + (I_n + \delta L_n^* \Pi_n) \eta_{nt}. \quad (4)$$

- ▶ δ : prespecified parameter
- ▶ Q_n^* and L_n^* : functions of parameters and W_n
- ▶ Π_n : nuisance parameters for η_{nt} ($E_t \eta_{n,t+1} = \Pi_n \eta_{nt}$)
- ▶ $\lambda_0 W_n Y_{nt}^*$: contemporaneous spatial effect
- ▶ $\gamma_0 Y_{n,t-1}$: dynamic effect
- ▶ $\rho_0 W_n Y_{n,t-1}$: spatial-past time effect
- ▶ $\delta Q_n^* Y_{nt}^*$: additional expected spatial-future time effect
- ▶ $\delta L_n^* \Pi_n \eta_{nt}$: expected future exogenous effect

3. Econometric model

- An econometric model based on Eq. (4)?

⇒ Econometric model

$$Y_{nt} = (\lambda_0 W_n + \delta Q_n^*) Y_{nt} + (\gamma_0 I_n + \rho_0 W_n) Y_{n,t-1} \quad (5)$$
$$+ \underbrace{(I_n + \delta L_n^* \Pi_n) X_{nt} \beta_0}_{\text{regression func}} + \underbrace{\mathbf{c}_{n0} + \alpha_{t,0} I_n}_{\text{ind./time eff.}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{E}_{nt}}_{\text{disturbance}}$$

- Main parameters: $\theta_0 = (\lambda_0, \gamma_0, \rho_0, \beta_0', \sigma_{\epsilon,0}^2)'$ where $\text{Var}(\mathcal{E}_{nt}) = \sigma_{\epsilon,0}^2 I_n$.
- Estimation framework: large n and T , increasing domain asymptotics
 - ▶ spatial filter: $R_n = I_n - \lambda_0 W_n - \delta Q_n^*$
 - ▶ difficulty: how to get Q_n^* and L_n^* ?

4. Estimation

4.1 Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation

- The concentrated log-likelihood function with nT observations:

$$\ln L_{nT,c}(\theta) = c - \frac{nT}{2} \ln \sigma_\epsilon^2 + T \ln |R_n(\theta_1)| - \frac{1}{2\sigma_\epsilon^2} \sum_{t=1}^T \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{nt}'(\theta) J_n \tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{nt}(\theta) \quad (6)$$

where

$$\tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{nt}(\theta) = R_n(\theta_1) \tilde{Y}_{nt} - (\gamma I_n + \rho W_n) \tilde{Y}_{n,t-1}^{(-)} - (I_n + \delta L_n^*(\theta_1) \Pi_n) \tilde{X}_{nt} \beta$$

with $\tilde{Y}_{nt} = Y_{nt} - \bar{Y}_{nT}$, $\tilde{Y}_{n,t-1}^{(-)} = Y_{n,t-1} - \bar{Y}_{nT,-1}$, and $\tilde{X}_{nt} = X_{nt} - \bar{X}_{nT}$, and $J_n = I_n - \frac{1}{n} I_n I_n'$.

- ▶ $R_n(\theta_1)$ and $L_n^*(\theta_1)$: additional parts evaluated at $\theta_1 = (\lambda, \gamma, \rho)$

- The QMLE, $\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT} \equiv \arg \max_{\theta \in \Theta} \ln L_{nT,c}(\theta)$.

4. Estimation

4.1 Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation

- Estimation procedure:
 - ▶ outer loop: search over different parameter value θ .
 - ★ demanding part: evaluating $\ln |R_n(\theta_1)|$
 - ▶ inner loop: For θ , we compute $R_n(\theta_1)$ (i.e., $Q_n^*(\theta_1)$) and $L_n^*(\theta_1)$ (=main components of value functions). \Rightarrow compute $\ln L_{nT,c}(\theta)$.
 - ★ we do not need to compute all components in V_i 's.

Theorem (Consistency)

Under some regularity conditions, $\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT} \xrightarrow{P} \theta_0$.

4. Estimation

4.1 Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation

Theorem (Asymptotic normality)

$$\begin{aligned} & \sqrt{nT} (\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT} - \theta_0) + \sqrt{\frac{n}{T}} \Sigma_{\theta_0,nT}^{-1} \underbrace{a_{n,1}(\theta_0)}_{\text{from estimating } \mathbf{c}_{n0}} \\ & + \sqrt{\frac{T}{n}} \Sigma_{\theta_0,nT}^{-1} \underbrace{a_{n,2}(\theta_0)}_{\text{from estimating } \alpha_{t,0}} + O_p \left(\max \left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{T^3}}, \sqrt{\frac{T}{n^3}}, \sqrt{\frac{1}{T}} \right) \right) \\ & \xrightarrow{d} N \left(0, \Sigma_{\theta_0}^{-1} \Omega_{\theta_0} \Sigma_{\theta_0}^{-1} \right). \end{aligned}$$

$$\Omega_{\theta_0,nT} = E \left(\frac{1}{nT} \frac{\partial \ln L_{nT,c}^{(u)}(\theta_0)}{\partial \theta} \frac{\partial \ln L_{nT,c}^{(u)}(\theta_0)}{\partial \theta'} \right), \quad \Omega_{\theta_0} = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \Omega_{\theta_0,nT},$$

$$\Sigma_{\theta_0,nT} = -E \left(\frac{1}{nT} \frac{\partial^2 \ln L_{nT,c}(\theta_0)}{\partial \theta \partial \theta'} \right) \text{ and } \Sigma_{\theta_0} = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \Sigma_{\theta_0,nT}.$$

4. Estimation

4.1 Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation

- Bias correction of $\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}$:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}^c &= \hat{\theta}_{ml,nT} - \frac{1}{T} \left[-\Sigma_{\theta,nT}^{-1} \mathbf{a}_{n,1}(\theta) \right] \Big|_{\theta=\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}} \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{n} \left[-\Sigma_{\theta,nT}^{-1} \mathbf{a}_{n,2}(\theta) \right] \Big|_{\theta=\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}}.\end{aligned}$$

Corollary

Regularity conditions and $\frac{n}{T^3} \rightarrow 0$ and $\frac{T}{n^3} \rightarrow 0$,

$$\sqrt{nT} \left(\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}^c - \theta_0 \right) \xrightarrow{d} N \left(0, \Sigma_{\theta_0}^{-1} \Omega_{\theta_0} \Sigma_{\theta_0}^{-1} \right).$$

5. Simulations

- Overall performance of $\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}$ and $\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}^c$ / comparison with $\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}^S$ and $\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}^{S,c}$ (= the QMLEs from the conventional SDPD model (Lee & Yu (2010)))
 - ▶ $\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}^c$ performs better than $\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}$.
 - ▶ **crucial misspecification errors** of $\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}^S$ and $\hat{\theta}_{ml,nT}^{S,c}$

6. Application

- Public safety spending among counties in NC
- Two types of optimal reaction functions
 - (i) conventional SDPD model: myopic agent model ($\delta = 0$)
 - (ii) our model: forward-looking agent model
 - ▶ $\delta = 0.9704$ (\Leftarrow average annual long-run interest rates in the sampling periods)

6. Application

- Selected model via the sample log-likelihood

	Myopic	Forward-looking
Total revenue	0.1023*** [0.0054]	0.1239*** [0.0066]
Neighbor's total revenue	-0.052*** [0.0158]	-0.0667*** [0.0191]
λ	0.0142 [0.0657]	0.0058 [0.0845]
γ	0.3937*** [0.0251]	0.5081*** [0.065]
ρ	0.0705 [0.0784]	0.1726* [0.0984]
Sample log-likelihood	-2712.9	-2712.5

- * indicates 10% level of significance and *** indicates 1% level of significance.
- Dollar amounts are real per capita values adjusted by the GDPD.
- Sample log-likelihood is a good measure to capture the true model (\Leftarrow simulation study)

7. Conclusion

- Summary

- ▶ Spatial dynamic panel data model with the forward-looking agent assumption
- ▶ QML estimation method, asymptotic properties, bias correction
- ▶ application: policy interdependence of counties' public safety spending in NC