PENSION TREATMENT UNDER THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE

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Collateral Source Rule (CSR): Background

- Concept has been around since at least 1854 (U.S. Supreme Court-The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 152): Admiralty action in which damages awarded to plaintiff should not be reduced by insurance proceeds;
- Common collateral sources: Insurance (unemployment, medical, life), Social Security (regular and disability), Medicare, & pensions;
- Rationales for exclusion:
 - Such benefits may be viewed as part of employment contract, for which tortfeasor is not entitled to any credit;
 - Purpose is not to prevent plaintiff from being overcompensated, but rather to prevent tortfeasor from paying twice (if employer is source of funds, may deduct from award.
- Evidence of medical insurance payments to an insured plaintiff (esp. medmal) has been main exception to inadmissibility of collateral source income

How has CSR been applied to pensions?

- Exclusion of pension benefits as collateral source offset to earnings loss is well established in federal and many state court jurisdictions
- Limited discretion has been afforded lower courts on appeal by allowing selected information, e.g., statistical evidence on retirement patterns of railroad workers and incentives to retire early (FELA cases)
- Conflicting case law involves disability and survivor's pensions:
 - In CA (Rotolo, 2003), disability pension evidence was allowed as offset to lost regular pension but not to lost earnings; in NY (Oden, 1995) same allowance was made but limited to amount of lost regular pension, i.e., no offset to earnings; but in CA employment law case (Mize-Kurzman, 2012), "availability" of retirement pension was disallowed under CSR as no different than compensation from insurance policy;
 - In CA (McKinney, 2002), survivor's/widow's pension excluded, even though benefit came from same source as husband's earnings, as pension was considered "new benefit" in widow's name and excluded under CSR; but in DE (Sears, 2006), survivor's existing pension benefit was allowed as offset to decedent's potential future pension benefit; in FL (Russo, 2011), similar logic as Sears, with court ruling that death benefit from retirement plan was not "life insurance" within meaning of collateral source statute;
 - In CA (Lovett, 2004) discrimination case (employer didn't accommodate disability) where evidence of disability pension not allowed under CSR; but in First Circuit (Lussier,1995), court held "that it is within trial court's jurisdiction to tailor a front pay award to take account of collateral benefits in a discrimination case. But in MI (Hamlin, 1996), after agreeing with Lussier in principal, it said that allowing collateral pension benefits as an offset in a discrimination case should not be left to individual discretion of each district court.

Important Injury, Death, & Employment Law Cases Identified by CSR Subtopic & Grouped in Appendix

- <u>Subtopics</u>: EL (employment law); WD (wrongful death); and two types of PI (personal injury): PI-FELA and PI-Non-FELA
- Selected cases by grouping and subtopics:
 - Cases establishing CSR as prohibiting pensions of any type to offset lost earnings. 6 cases: EL=4; WD=1, PI-FELA=1;
 - Unsuccessful challenges to CSR as applied to pensions. 5 cases: EL=2; PI-FELA=2; WD=1;
 - Successful challenges to CSR as applied to pensions. 4 cases: 2=WD; 1=PI-Non-FELA; 1=EL;
 - Qualifications Involving Admissibility of Evidence Pertaining to Age of Retirement. 4 cases: all PI-FELA;
 - Qualifications Involving Admissibility of Evidence Not Pertaining to Age of Retirement. 4 cases: 3=PI-Non-FELA; 1=WD

Comparison of 2 Methods with Disability Pensions as Offsets to Lost Regular Pensions

- Rotolo/Oden method: Disability pension allowed to offset only lost future regular pension (not lost future earnings);
- Alternative method (used by some FE's):

(1) Calculate the regular pension earned by an injured plaintiff up to the date of injury as the disability pension basis;

(2) If lost pension has COLA, grow disability pension basis by a general inflation rate until an appropriate retirement age had the plaintiff not been injured, e.g., 65;

(3) Project the disability pension over time beginning from same uninjured expected retirement age as for the lost regular pension, with continued growth for both pensions at future inflation rates, if applicable. The annual net pension loss is obtained by deducting the disability pension from the lost regular pension over the period from the uninjured expected retirement age through life expectancy. Yearly net pension differences (regular less disability) are discounted back to present value.

(4) Since employee contributions via payroll deductions are usually required to obtain a regular pension, these contributions may be netted against lost future earnings. But if one just wants to compare net pension losses between Rotolo-Oden method and this Alternative method and ignore lost future earnings, the present value of these employee contributions would need to be counted as a reduction in the net pension loss.

Arguments that have been made for each method

• For Rotolo-Oden method:

- Quoting Rotolo court: Not fully accounting for disability pension would result in "triple compensation", i.e., lost income, lost regular pension benefits, & receipt of actual disability retirement benefits; an "inequitable result";
- Disability pensions are conceptually same as early retirement pensions, representing an "actuarial adjustment" by paying smaller amounts over a longer period. (However, this is not always the case);
- Simple & direct argument is that an FE would only ignore pension payments between incident date & likely retirement date if there were some legal requirement, e.g., case law or statute, or attorney's advice, to do so
- <u>For Alternative method described above</u>: Unlike under Rotolo, this method ignores any source of income not provided by the defendant that is replacing earnings during his working life (i.e., the disability pension that would be earned during the working life of the plaintiff is obviously replacing his lost earnings).

For comparison of both disability pension valuation methods, we use:

- Two different pension system models (Cases 1 and 2):
 - Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS)
 - Maryland's Reformed Contributory Benefit System as applied to new hires as of 7-1-2011, with "Ordinary Disability Retirement" benefits; (formula differs if accident while on duty).
 - In both models, we assume regular step rate increases but no promotions; and for simplicity, 2% annual COLAs and salary increases, with 3% discount rate
 - But important difference: Disabled FERS employees have lower "high-3" avg. salary and lower multiplier for yrs of svc; but for disabled MD employees w/ 5 yrs of creditable service, under "Ordinary Disability", no reduction to yrs of service or multiplier for retiring before age 65
- Three different sets of case facts (Cases a, b, and c):
 - Case a: Base Case No Injury, Normal Retirement;
 - Case b: Injured at 55 (on day of birthday); Disability Retirement with 30 years of service;
 - Case c: Injured at age 35 (on day of birthday); Disability Retirement with 10 years of service;

| Table 2: FERS Retirement Pension; Rotolo/Oden Method and Alternative Method of Applying Disability Pension Offset: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|---|-------------|-----------|---|-----------|----------|---|------------------------|---------------|-------------|---------|---------------|--|
| Case 1a v. 1b - Lost Regular Retirement Pension (1a), Offset with Disability Pension, Retire at 55 w/ 30 Years of Service (1b) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Rotolo-Oden Method of Disability Pension Offset | | | | | | | Alternative Method of Disability Pension Offset | | | | | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | |
| | Injured | njured at 55: Case 1a vs. Case 1b PV from Disability Date | | | Altern. Method: Offset Reg. Pens. w/ Earned | | | | PV from Exp. Ret. Date | | | | | |
| | | | | | 784,660 | 1,116,608 | Pens. to | o Disab. Date, | Grow @ COL | A; net @ Ret. | 832,571 | 770,128 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | PV Emp Cont | (1) | Regular | |
| | | Case 1a | Case 1b | | | | | Case 1a | Case 1b | | (47,911) | | pension | |
| | | Lost Reg. | | | PV Lost Reg. | PV Gain | | Lost Reg. | | | PV Lost | PV Gain | earned to | |
| Age @ | Yrs to | Pens. Less | Gain Disab. | | Pens. Less | Disab. | Yrs to | Pens. Less | Gain Disab. | | Regular | Disab. | disability | |
| Beg yr | disc | Contrib. | Pension | Disc Fctr | Contrib. | Pension | disc | Contrib. | Pension | Disc Fctr | pension | Pension | date | |
| 55 | 1 | (5,154) | 33,782 | 0.97087 | (5,004) | 32,798 | 1 | | | 0.97087 | - | - | 33,782 | |
| 56 | 2 | (5,257) | 34,458 | 0.94260 | (4,956) | 32,480 | 2 | | | 0.94260 | - | - | 34,458 | |
| 57 | 3 | (5,362) | 35,147 | 0.91514 | (4,907) | 32,165 | 3 | | | 0.91514 | - | - | 35,147 | |
| 58 | 4 | (5,470) | 35,850 | 0.88849 | (4,860) | 31,852 | 4 | | | 0.88849 | - | - | 35,850 | |
| 59 | 5 | (5,579) | 36,567 | 0.86261 | (4,813) | 31,543 | 5 | | | 0.86261 | - | - | 36,567 | |
| 60 | 6 | (5,691) | 37,299 | 0.83748 | (4,766) | 31,237 | 6 | | | 0.83748 | - | - | 37,299 | |
| 61 | 7 | (5,805) | 38,045 | 0.81309 | (4,720) | 30,934 | 7 | | | 0.81309 | - | - | 38,045 | |
| 62 | 8 | (5,921) | 52,646 | 0.78941 | (4,674) | 41,559 | 8 | | | 0.78941 | - | - | 52,646 | |
| 63 | 9 | (6,039) | 53,699 | 0.76642 | (4,628) | 41,156 | 9 | | | 0.76642 | - | - | 53,699 | |
| 64 | 10 | (6,160) | 54,773 | 0.74409 | (4,583) | 40,756 | 10 | | | 0.74409 | - | - | 54,773 | |
| 65 | 11 | 60,398 | 55,868 | 0.72242 | 43,633 | 40,360 | 11 | 60,398 | 55,868 | 0.72242 | 43,633 | 40,360 | <u>55,868</u> | |
| 66 | 12 | 61,606 | 56,986 | 0.70138 | 43,209 | 39,969 | 12 | 61,606 | 56,986 | 0.70138 | 43,209 | 39,969 | 56,986 | |
| 67 | 13 | 62,838 | 58,125 | 0.68095 | 42,790 | 39,581 | 13 | 62,838 | 58,125 | 0.68095 | 42,790 | 39,581 | 58,125 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 83 | 29 | 86,264 | 79,794 | 0.42435 | 36,606 | 33,860 | 29 | 86,264 | 79,794 | 0.42435 | 36,606 | 33,860 | 79,794 | |
| 84 | 30 | 87,989 | 81,390 | 0.41199 | 36,250 | 33,531 | 30 | 87,989 | 81,390 | 0.41199 | 36,250 | 33,531 | 81,390 | |
| 85 | 31 | 89,749 | 83,017 | 0.39999 | 35,898 | 33,206 | 31 | 89,749 | 83,017 | 0.39999 | 35,898 | 33,206 | 83,017 | |
| (1) In Al | (1) In Alternative method, one way to reflect required employee contributions while working is to net them against lost future earnings. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| Case | se Za V. 2b - Lost Regular Retir t Pension (Za), Offset with O | | | | | | | rainary Disab. Pension, Retire at 55 W/ 30 Years of Service (2b) | | | | | |
|-----------|---|-----------------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------------|-----------|----------|--|-------------|---------------|------------------------|--------------|---------------|
| | Rotolo-Oden Method of Disability Pension Offset | | | | | | | Alternative Method of Disability Pension Offset | | | | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
| | Injured | njured at 55: Case 2a vs. Case 2b | | | PV from Disability Date | | Altern. | Altern. Method: Offset Reg. Pens. w/ Earned | | | PV from Exp. Ret. Date | | |
| | | | | | 1,277,031 | 2,129,231 | Pens. to | Disab. Date, | Grow @ COLA | A; net @ Ret. | 1,370,883 | 1,370,883 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | PV Emp Cont | t (1) | Regular |
| | | Case 2a | Case 2b | | | | | Case 2a | Case 2b | | (93,852) | | pension |
| | | Lost Reg. | | | PV Lost Reg. | PV Gain | | Lost Reg. | | | PV Lost | PV Gain | earned to |
| Age @ | Yrs to | Pens. Less | Gain Disab. | | Pens. Less | Disab. | Yrs to | Pens. Less | Gain Disab. | | Regular | Disab. | disability |
| Beg yr | disc | Contrib. | Pension | Disc Fctr | Contrib. | Pension | disc | Contrib. | Pension | Disc Fctr | pension | Pension | date |
| 55 | 1 | (10,097) | 81,583 | 0.97087 | (9,803) | 79,207 | 1 | | | 0.97087 | - | - | 81,583 |
| 56 | 2 | (10,299) | 83,215 | 0.94260 | (9,707) | 78,438 | 2 | 2 | | 0.94260 | - | - | 83,215 |
| 57 | 3 | (10,505) | 84,879 | 0.91514 | (9,613) | 77,677 | 3 | | | 0.91514 | - | - | 84,879 |
| 58 | 4 | (10,715) | 86,577 | 0.88849 | (9,520) | 76,923 | 4 | Ļ | | 0.88849 | - | - | 86,577 |
| 59 | 5 | (10,929) | 88,309 | 0.86261 | (9,427) | 76,176 | 5 | | | 0.86261 | - | - | 88,309 |
| 60 | 6 | (11,148) | 90,075 | 0.83748 | (9,336) | 75,436 | 6 | ; | | 0.83748 | - | - | 90,075 |
| 61 | 7 | (11,371) | 91,876 | 0.81309 | (9,245) | 74,704 | 7 | , | | 0.81309 | - | - | 91,876 |
| 62 | 8 | (11,598) | 93,714 | 0.78941 | (9,156) | 73,978 | 8 | | | 0.78941 | - | - | 93,714 |
| 63 | 9 | (11,830) | 95,588 | 0.76642 | (9,067) | 73,260 | 9 |) | | 0.76642 | - | - | 95,588 |
| 64 | 10 | (12,066) | 97,500 | 0.74409 | (8,979) | 72,549 | 10 |) | | 0.74409 | - | - | 97,500 |
| 65 | 11 | 99,450 | 99,450 | 0.72242 | 71,845 | 71,845 | 11 | . <u>99,450</u> | 99,450 | 0.72242 | 71,845 | 71,845 | <u>99,450</u> |
| 66 | 12 | 101,439 | 101,439 | 0.70138 | 71,147 | 71,147 | 12 | 101,439 | 101,439 | 0.70138 | 71,147 | 71,147 | 101,439 |
| 67 | 13 | 103,468 | 103,468 | 0.68095 | 70,456 | 70,456 | 13 | 103,468 | 103,468 | 0.68095 | 70,456 | 70,456 | 103,468 |
| " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | п |
| 83 | 29 | 142,039 | 142,039 | 0.42435 | 60,274 | 60,274 | 29 | 142,039 | 142,039 | 0.42435 | 60,274 | 60,274 | 142,039 |
| 84 | 30 | 144,879 | 144,879 | 0.41199 | 59,688 | 59,688 | 30 | 144,879 | 144,879 | 0.41199 | 59,688 | 59,688 | 144,879 |
| 85 | 31 | 147,777 | 147,777 | 0.39999 | 59,109 | 59,109 | 31 | . 147,777 | 147,777 | 0.39999 | 59,109 | 59,109 | 147,777 |
| (1) In Al | 1) In Alternative method, one way to reflect required employee contributions while working is to net them against lost future earnings. | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 4: MD Ordinary Disab. Pension; Rotolo/Oden Method and Alternative Method of Applying Disability Pension Offset: Case 2a v. 2b - Lost Regular Retir't Pension (2a). Offset with Ordinary Disab. Pension. Retire at 55 w/ 30 Years of Service (2b)

| Table 1: | Summ | nary of | Results | Under Different Net Pensic | on Loss Methods | | | | | |
|--|---------|---------|-----------|---|--|---------------|----------------|--|--|--|
| (PV of Lost Regular Pension Less Gain from Disability Pension Under Each Method) | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | ESTIMATED NET PENSION LOSS UNDER BOTH METHODS | | | | | | |
| | | | | Rotolo-Oden Method (1) | lethod (2) | | | | | |
| Retirement | Age at | Years | | | | Employee | Alternative | | | |
| & Disability | Time of | of | Results | Losses begin w/ Disability Date; then | Losses begin @ Expected | Contributions | Method | | | |
| Plan | Injury | Service | shown in: | discounted to (PV) | Retirement Date; then disc to PV | (PV) | "Effective PV" | | | |
| | | | | -\$331,949 (= \$784,660 - \$1,116,608) | | | | | | |
| FERS | 55 | 30 | Table 2 | Net pension loss=0, can't be negative | \$62,443 (= \$832,571 - \$770,128) | -\$47,911 | \$14,532 | | | |
| | | | | \$-240,763 (= \$385,610 - \$626,373) | | | | | | |
| FERS | 35 | 10 | Table 3 | Net pension loss=0, can't be negative | \$76,067 (= \$474,803 - \$398,736) | -\$89,193 | -\$13,126 | | | |
| State/MD | | | | -\$852,200 (= \$1,277,031 - \$2,129,231) | | | | | | |
| (3) | 55 | 30 | Table 4 | Net pension loss=0, can't be negative | \$0 (= \$1,370,883 - \$1,370,883) | -\$93,852 | -\$93,852 | | | |
| State/MD | | | | -\$1,125,279 (= \$610,936 - \$1,736,215) | | | | | | |
| (3) | 35 | 10 | Table 5 | Net pension loss=0, can't be negative | \$168,586 (= \$781,796 - \$613,210) | -\$170,860 | -\$2,274 | | | |

Conclusions/Observations About CSR & Pensions

- CSRs applied to pensions is quite variable, with limited or non-existent case law apparently in many jurisdictions;
- For PI, more favorable methods to defense were in Rotolo and Oden cases (CA and NY): disability pensions at least fully offset lost regular pensions but not lost earnings. However, the <u>effective net pension loss</u> of applying Rotolo/Oden vs. Alternative methods will depend on many factors, not least how pension premiums are accounted for;
- For WD, diametrically different case laws have addressed survivor's/widow's pensions:
 - > When viewed as "new benefit", survivor's pensions excluded (McKinney, CA);
 - When viewed as result of retirement plan and not life insurance, survivor's pensions allowed as evidence (Russo, FL) or as appropriate offset to the decedent spouse's potential future pension benefit (Sears, DE), in which Rotolo case was cited;
- For EL, mixed results in terms of trial court discretion
 - > Disability pension not allowed (Lovett, CA),
 - Disability pension allowed under trial court's discretion (Lussier, First Circuit) although excluded on procedural grounds; then again allowed in principal citing Lussier but overruled as not appropriate for each district court to have such discretion (Hamlin, MI).
- Bottom line: In absence of explicit court guidance in a jurisdiction, FEs and their attorneys may apply their own discretion on how to address pensions under CSR