

# The Geography of Consumption\*

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## Abstract

We provide the first cross-sectoral description of local consumption markets. Detailed credit card data show consumers have limited mobility and manage the spatial dimension of their transactions. In more frequently purchased sectors, expenditure declines faster with distance; further, the spatial distribution of transactions becomes more concentrated with income and less affected by travel cost shocks. We propose a simple theory of storability/durability of a sector's output as a new dimension affecting local consumption markets, and provide evidence that consumer mobility influences local employment, establishment density, and establishment size differentially across sectors. Our results have implications for the consequences of local shocks, place-based policies, and the geographic market definition in the assessment of horizontal mergers.

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# 1 Introduction

The equilibrium production and location decisions of many firms depend on the characteristics of local demand: in particular, the willingness of consumers to travel to buy goods and services. However, lack of direct evidence on consumer mobility has limited our ability to characterize the nature of local consumption markets. Industries involved in the delivery of final consumption, from apparel stores to gasoline stations to restaurants, account for almost 40% of employment in modern economies: therefore, consumer mobility has potentially far-reaching implications for a broad range of policy-relevant questions, including the impact of investment in transportation infrastructure, local labor demand shocks, local taxes, and other “place-based” policies.

In this paper, we provide the first large-scale description of the geographical dimension of different consumption markets, using more than 1.7 million credit card transactions by 70 thousand individual American consumers. We present evidence that consumers actively manage the spatial dimension of their purchases and introduce a simple framework motivating why consumers’ optimal inventory and travel policies may have implications for local equilibrium outcomes. We suggest durability/storability of a sector’s output as a new characteristic that affects consumers’ decisions and firms’ responses for a significant portion of economic activity. We propose the sector’s average frequency of transactions as a proxy for this new characteristic. Using a separate data source, we then present evidence that consumer’s mobility influences local employment, establishment density, and average establishment size differentially across sectors.

We start by exploring overall consumer mobility and find it very limited: agents typically source purchases from just a few of the many locations available to them. Moreover, as broadly documented for merchandise trade both at international and intranational levels, gravity is a first-order feature of the data. Comparing consumers’ behavior in their town of residence vs. outside (“at-home” vs. “out-of-home”), we find large drops in expenditure at very short distances: for the median sector, the expenditure in the average out-of-home location is only 34% of the expenditure in the home location. Comparing out-of-home expenditure at different distances, we find gravity present but milder with respect to other phenomena affected by spatial frictions: for the median sector, a 1% increase in distance decreases total expenditure by 0.4%, an elasticity substantially smaller than firm-to-firm intranational trade (-1.3%) or commuting flows (-4.4%).<sup>1</sup>

To understand the sources of the decline in expenditure with distance, we decompose total expenditure into contributions from 1) the total number of accounts (an “account” extensive margin), 2) the average number of transactions per account (a “frequency” extensive margin), and 3) the average value of a transaction (a “batch size” intensive margin). We analyze the spatial decay of each component separately and by sector. In all cases, extensive margins account for almost the totality of the declines. We find significant heterogeneity across industries in the overall impact of distance, that largely reflects the importance of the frequency margin. Moreover, we find stronger gravity in an industry correlated with a higher average frequency of transactions.

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<sup>1</sup>See for example Hillberry and Hummels (2007), and Monte, Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2018).

The correlation between gravity and frequency makes economic sense. If the cost of a person’s trip is independent from the volume purchased, differences in the durability (or storability) of goods and services plausibly produce differences in spatial purchasing patterns across sectors: when goods are less storable/durable, consumers will want to buy smaller batches per trip, and buy more frequently; since travel is expensive, however, they will also buy closer to home. We think of storability/durability as a general characteristic of the sector, capturing the length of time during which a good or service can deliver its utility flow. For perishable items this concept is intuitive: fruits, for example, will depreciate if not eaten quickly. For durable goods, this concept may reflect depreciation due to use: consumers can store shirts for future use, and those shirts can deliver a utility flow for longer periods of time. For services, we think of storability/durability in a more general sense: while a consumer cannot buy two haircuts and store one for future use, she also does not visit the hairdresser multiple times a day; a haircut will “depreciate” over time more or less slowly as other goods also do. While economists have long studied how exogenous characteristics of an industry (input-intensity or the weight-to-value ratio) have influenced trade patterns, most research has implicitly assumed a binary representation of durability/storability: goods are durable/storable and services are not; thus, goods are tradable and services are not. By examining expenditure patterns at a small geographical scale, we are able to uncover a more nuanced picture relative to the durability/storability of the good. Hereafter, when we refer to “storability” and “storage costs” for brevity, we keep this more general interpretation in mind.

The fact that expenditure declines faster with distance in sectors which are transacted more frequently is suggestive of an active consumer role in determining local outcomes. However, other supply-side characteristics, like sectoral variation in average fixed costs, might influence store density in equilibrium, thereby affecting both how far consumers have to travel and how frequently they do so. To provide more direct evidence about consumer choice, we turn to two analyses at the consumer-account level. First, we show that higher-income consumers tend to have relatively fewer out-of-home transactions in sectors which are purchased more frequently at the national level. These findings hold even when we control for residence and individual, unobserved, time-invariant characteristics. If, as we argue below, the average frequency of transactions is a proxy for the durability/storability of a sector, this finding suggests that high-income individuals choose to travel shorter distances for the same sector. Second, we compare the behavior of the same individual under two potentially different travel-cost regimes using exogenous variation induced by rainfall. We assemble daily precipitation data from thousands of weather stations across the United States to examine patterns of the spatial distribution of transactions across sectors on rainy vs. non-rainy days. If consumers don’t choose how far and how frequently to travel, then a change in travel costs common across sectors might impact the overall number of transactions, but would be less likely to affect their spatial distribution. Within a given consumer, however, we find that rain affects the spatial distribution of transactions relatively less in sectors where the average frequency of transactions is higher. Since the supply network is fixed in the two regimes, the difference is likely to come from an active choice of consumers, either via intertemporal substitution of trips, or via a choice of where to travel.

If consumers actively choose how far and how frequently to travel, and this choice is at least partially related to how storable/durable a sector’s output is, it is natural to expect that merchant employment

and location choices take those consumer decisions into account. We then examine whether the spatial distribution of economic activity is affected by consumers’ spatial choices in cross-sections of county data. First, we build a stylized model of shopping in space. Consumers are heterogeneous in travel costs, live on a point, consume a fixed quantity of a good per unit of time, and choose where to purchase it on a line. The good is consumed every instant at a constant rate, so consumers must hold an inventory to avoid infinitely frequent trips. Both travel and inventory holdings are expensive: hence, agents choose how frequently to buy the good, how much to buy per trip, and at which distance. For a given schedule describing price as a function of distance, consumer optimization delivers a spatial distribution of demand. Production can occur at any point on the line. Firms use land – a fixed factor – and labor. Perfect competition and free entry imply that at any location, the price is equal to the marginal cost of production, and all profits accrue to (absentee) landlords. A given price schedule implies a profit-maximizing spatial distribution of supply. The equilibrium price function makes supply and demand equal at every point, and determines a marginal plot of land where production no longer occurs.

Our simple model suggests that the frequency of transactions should be a proxy for storage costs, and generates a negative relation between gravity and frequency: when storability or durability is lower, consumers want to take more frequent trips, but want to travel closer to home; hence, expenditure in equilibrium declines faster in sectors where consumers take more frequent trips. If population increases, firms must proportionately increase output. Since travel is expensive, however, they have an incentive to limit the expansion of the marginal plot of land used, and increase output per plot of land instead. When storage costs are large, this incentive intensifies: in response to the same increase in population, employment grows faster and the average distance between consumers and output grows more slowly with higher storage costs.

We explore these ideas empirically using the average observed frequency of transactions as a simple proxy for storage costs. We use the underlying geological composition of a county<sup>2</sup> to circumvent the endogeneity problem arising from regressing county-sector outcomes on population within the county. We find that in sectors where storage costs are higher, local employment grows faster in response to (exogenous) differences in population; moreover, the differential growth in employment is driven by the addition of establishments at a faster rate (i.e., increase in density), while employment per establishment grows at a slower rate. Our stylized model does not have explicit predictions for store density vs. employee-store size; however, our empirical findings are consistent with a more geographically concentrated demand arising from the need to save on travel time, and supply responding with a relative reduction in the average distance between consumers and stores.

Our analysis shows that the purchasing technology available to optimizing consumers (the cost of a trip increasing in distance but fixed with respect to transaction size) interacts with heterogeneity in storage costs to generate measurable differences in local outcomes across sectors. These effects are potentially pervasive: final consumption accounted for around 70% of GDP in 2015 in the United States; the service industries involved in its delivery, from apparel stores, to restaurants and personal services providers,

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<sup>2</sup>See Burchfield, Overman, Puga and Turner (2006) and Duranton and Turner (2017), and our discussion in Section 5.

accounted for around 40% of employment, and almost one-fourth of total value added. Understanding the nature of spatial patterns of consumption is therefore essential for a wide spectrum of issues including the degree of spatial competition between firms; the determination of local and aggregate productivity and factors' income; the consequences of local labor demand shocks, local taxes and regulation; and the impact of investment in transportation infrastructure and of other "place-based" policies (Kline and Moretti, 2014). In this sense, our analysis relates to Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2010), who show that the microstructure of firms' transaction technology has aggregate consequences on the level of trade, and regulates the response of prices and import volumes to large devaluations. Further, our results provide information for the study of the liberalization of international trade and investment in services, since the number and location of establishments by firms in a foreign market depends, among other things, on how local the market for a particular service is. Our work is then related to Gervais and Jensen (2015), who develop a methodology for estimating trade costs for industries extending beyond manufacturing, using only production data.

While spatial analyses of the manufacturing sector abound, they carry limited information about final consumer behavior. The practical importance of direct sales from manufacturers to consumers is growing but still minor: for example, e-commerce sales (which include sales from a company's website and indirect sales from other distributors) account for only 6.4% of total retail sales in 2014, and only 0.9% in 2000, which is closer to our sample period, 2003 (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2015). Intranational surveys on goods' flows typically record firm-to-firm transactions only. The limited-but-growing literature on spatial consumption markets mostly focuses on specific industries. For the restaurant industry, Couture (2016) evaluates the extent to which consumers gain from increased density and finds that larger variety (rather than lower travel times) are the main driver of consumer valuation of higher density; Davis, Dingel, Monras and Morales (2018) discuss the relative impact of spatial vs. social friction in restaurant consumption. In the food distribution sector, Handbury, Rahkovsky and Schnell (2017) study the role of spatial access to healthy food supply in explaining differences in the quality of food intake across income groups, and argue that observed differences in access are most plausibly the result of optimal supply responses to differences in demand. Other industries that have been studied include gasoline (Houde, 2012) and movie theaters (Davis, 2006). Studies focusing on consumption across cities, with less focus on consumer mobility, include Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz (2000), who explore the increasing importance of cities as consumption centers, and Schiff (2015), who finds that larger and denser cities offer more restaurant variety.

Overall, we contribute to this literature by providing results which are comparable across industries, extending the set of industries for which we can assess consumer mobility, and exploiting cross-industry variation to argue that storability of a sector's output is effectively a determinant of gravity and of local outcomes. We do so by building on and extending the literature on spatial frictions (Anderson, 1979; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Eaton and Kortum, 2003; Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Hillberry and Hummels, 2008; Karádi and Koren, 2017). In related work, Mian and Sufi (2014) study the response of (tradeable and non-tradeable) employment across U.S. counties to household balance sheets' shocks during the Great Recession; we contribute to this line of research by emphasizing how employment in the long run responds to sectoral differences in consumer mobility.

Our results are also related to the literature on cross-border consumption behavior. For example, Chandra, Head, and Tappata (2014) find that consumers' trip count across the U.S.-Canada border respond to real exchange rate movements and distance to the border; they propose and estimate a simple model to rationalize those findings. Agarwal, Marwell and McGranahan (2017) show that consumers cross state lines in response to state tax holidays and permanently reallocate expenditure away from other goods. We generalize these findings on consumer mobility and emphasize travel and heterogeneous storage costs: this focus allows us to study the nature of cross-sectoral differences in the strength of gravity and its relationship to the frequency of transactions.

The retail sector is also subject of a growing literature. In an international context, Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2010) examine characteristics of wholesalers and retailers involved in international transactions, finding that they are significantly smaller compared to their "producer and consumer" counterparts. Jarmin, Klimek and Miranda (2005) and Hortaçsu and Syverson (2015) present some overall trends in the industry. The important role of the retail sector in price determination is emphasized by Nakamura (2008), who shows that a majority of retail-store price variation is attributable to retail chain-level shocks, while only a minor fraction to manufacturer or wholesaler-specific shocks. These findings emphasize the importance of understanding pricing (and demand) conditions at the retail level; while our data is lacking pricing information, we are contributing to the understanding of the nature of demand.

Our work is also relevant for the recent literature on e-commerce and on-line transactions: firms operating in this way are competing with brick-and-mortar stores precisely taking into account consumer travel costs. Aspects of on-line vs. off-line retail are analyzed in Ellison and Ellison (2009), who study the importance of taxes in determining sales of on-line versus traditional retailers; they find that geography still matters (consumers prefer to buy from home state or neighboring retailers after accounting for other factors), albeit the effect of proximity via shipping times is small. The importance of distance and the persistence of a home bias is also found in on-line auctions (Hortaçsu, Martínez-Jerez and Douglas 2009). Einav et al. (2017) use credit card transactions to quantify gains from e-commerce.

Finally, our results relate to the techniques and types of evidence on which the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rely in assessing the competitive consequences of horizontal mergers (DoJ, 2010). The definition of a market plays a central role in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the U.S. DoJ and FTC. Market definition, among other things, "helps specify the section of the country where the competitive concern arises" and allows "to identify market participants and measure market shares and market concentration" (DoJ 2010, p. 13). The market definition always has a geographic component.

Our evidence is in line with these Agencies' indication that the geographic dimension of a market should account for spatial frictions that impede customers' travel.

Further, we identify a particular sectoral characteristic, durability/storability, that interacts with consumers' mobility frictions to seemingly influence the spatial distribution of demand and the endogenous suppliers' geographical response. Therefore, our results may provide future insights into key components of the evaluation of potential mergers, like the identification of locations which are potential substitute to two merging firms' sales, the related construction of market shares, and the assessment of a consumers'

reaction to price increases.

Our findings also suggest that infrastructure and transportation policies, by modifying spatial frictions, may have heterogeneous consequences on current local competitive landscapes (Rossi-Hansberg, Sartre and Trachter, 2018), and on the desirability of future mergers.

We proceed by presenting cross-sectional evidence in Section 2. In Section 3, we turn to a consumer-level analysis and show how the spatial distribution of transactions responds to individual demographic characteristics and to rainfall shocks. Section 4 introduces a highly stylized model to describe local equilibrium implications of differences in sectoral storage costs. Section 5 leverages those intuitions and presents evidence that consumer behavior matters for local equilibrium outcomes; it also discusses some further implications of our results, as well as the robustness and limitations of our analysis. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 The Geography of Consumption

### 2.1 Data Description

We use a large proprietary dataset containing a sample of credit card transactions from a major financial institution. These transactions occurred roughly between March and October 2003. A transaction record contains, among other things, an exact date, an account ID, the amount spent, a Merchant Category Code (MCC – we will refer to it as a “sector”) and information (to be processed) on the location of the merchant. In addition to all distinct transactions, we have information on the account itself, including the associated ZIP code.<sup>3</sup> After cleaning the data, we have 1,722,873 transactions for 71,377 accounts (see Appendix A for a complete description of data cleaning and processing). The average transaction is 68 dollars, and total purchases amount to around \$116 million. Table 1 gives a breakdown by 21 broad categories. The largest categories in terms of observations are Gasoline Services, Food Stores, Miscellaneous Retail, and Eating and Drinking Places.<sup>4</sup>

In the remainder of this section we show that distance affects consumer mobility heterogeneously across sectors, and that this heterogeneity is associated with how frequently the typical consumer makes a purchase. In the following section, we will present evidence that this association is driven at least in part by individual-level behavior.

### 2.2 Consumers Visit Few Locations

We start our exploration by considering how far consumers travel across locations for purchases. A “location” in the data is identified at the level of Census incorporated place or county subdivision. In the raw data with all transactions – including those of tourists living in a city and spending in another, potentially very far place – we count expenditure flows between 17,535 unique locations (11,454 unique

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<sup>3</sup>The same original source data was used in Agarwal, Marwell, and McGranahan (2017).

<sup>4</sup>Table C.1 in the Appendix (page 57) shows summary statistics by state of purchase. The largest number of transactions are reported in New York, California, and Massachusetts.

Table 1: Summary of transaction amounts (in USD), by sector

Broad Category	Median	Mean	St. Dev.	Sum	N
Agricultural Services	83	136	212	1,307,616	9,615
Amusement, Rec. Serv.	45	89	169	1,771,086	19,897
Apparel	49	75	114	6,112,646	81,778
Auto Repair/Service/Parking	41	151	325	3,464,626	22,990
Auto and Truck Sales/Service/Parts	66	198	423	6,624,392	33,473
Building Mat./Hardware/Garden Supp.	42	101	258	9,658,412	95,568
Communications	53	91	122	559,201	6,113
Durable Goods	68	209	521	837,246	4,004
Eating and Drinking Places	26	39	73	8,770,958	227,715
Food Stores	30	46	59	12,116,604	265,828
Furniture, Home Furnishings, Equip.	60	194	430	10,853,963	55,917
Gasoline Services	19	22	31	6,934,785	312,670
General Merchandise Stores	43	67	122	13,963,544	207,866
Health Services	71	164	375	4,487,799	27,381
Hospitality	96	170	308	6,430,175	37,934
Misc. Retail	32	65	182	16,100,792	248,069
Misc. Services	95	316	703	1,870,560	5,919
Motion Pictures	14	19	44	272,948	14,048
NonDurable Goods	38	78	175	640,203	8,246
Other Vehicles Sales/Service/Parts	76	259	746	1,366,449	5,279
Personal Services	37	74	210	2,406,679	32,563
Total	30	68	188	116,550,684	1,722,873

residence and 14,962 unique sale locations). The data records transactions among 232,927 unique pairs. There are 7.4 transactions per pair, and the median pair has 1 transaction. Naturally, it is unrealistic to assume that very long distances reflect day-to-day consumption behavior: for example, only about 4.3 million potential location pairs (1.4% of all potential pairs) in our data have distance below 120 km.<sup>5</sup> Among those pairs, around 1.5 million transactions are recorded between only 120,783 pairs, or 2.8% of the possible pairs, with 12.3 transactions per pair on average, and 2 transactions for the median pair. Overall, the matrix of residence-sales location purchases is sparse.

To dig deeper into this low mobility, we focus in Table 2 on all transactions occurring within 120 km and construct a residence location–level dataset. For each residence, we compute the total number of locations visited by all consumers living in that residence, and the total number of locations in the data within 120 km. We also compute the average distance from the residence location to these locations. Table 2 shows summary statistics on the distribution of locations visited. The first row shows that consumers in the median residence visit only 7 distinct sales locations during the sample period (11.2 sales locations on

<sup>5</sup>Distance is always computed between the centroids of two locations using the Haversine formula. When looking at the impact of distance on flows below, we will also restrict our attention to transactions with distance up to 120km. Monte, Redding, and Rossi-Hansberg (2018) find this threshold to be one where gravity in home-to-work commuting flows has a change in slope, so it is a natural cutoff.



average). One might think that this low number is simply a consequence of the absence of close-by options, but this is not the case: the second row in the table shows that consumers living in the median residence have 192 sales locations within 120 km. The third row shows that there is indeed a large variation in the average distance of different residence locations relative to their shopping options. The overall fraction of available locations where purchases actually occur (fourth row) is very small.

Table 2: **Summary statistics across residence locations (transactions within 120km)**

variable	min	p10	p25	p50	p75	p90	max	mean	N
Sales locations visited	1	2	3	7	14	27	445	11.17	9,479
Sales locations available	2	66	112	192	338	646	1,115	271.82	9,479
Mean distance to sales locations	16.8	63.1	69.7	76.1	80.6	83.6	97.2	74.41	9,479
Share available locations visited	0	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.12	0.67	0.05	9,479

In Table 3, we ask what accounts for this low mobility. In column 1 of Table 3 we regress the log of number of sales locations visited on the log of number of sales locations available and find an elasticity of 0.55: overall, the number of visited locations grows at about half the pace of the available locations. Distance, on the other hand, has a stronger role: controlling for the number of available sales locations, a 1% increase in average distance to those locations is accompanied by a 2.4-2.6% decrease in the number of locations visited (columns 2 and 3).<sup>6</sup> These results suggest a central role of distance on consumer expenditure. We explore this aspect next.

Table 3: Locations available and locations visited

Dependent variable:	Log of number of sales locations visited		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Sales locations within 120km, log	0.548*** (0.010)		0.568*** (0.010)
Average distance to sales locations within 120km, log		-2.374*** (0.125)	-2.594*** (0.090)
Constant	-0.988*** (0.052)	12.096*** (0.539)	10.061*** (0.399)
$R^2$	0.22	0.09	0.32
$N$	9,479	9,479	9,479

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

<sup>6</sup>In Tables C.2 and C.3 of Appendix C.2 (page 56), we repeat this analysis using a sample of users with at least one transaction every two days. The fraction of locations visited has a similar distribution. In a regression analysis, distance has twice the impact of number of available locations on the total number of locations visited.

## 2.3 The Distance Traveled Varies by Sector

This first snapshot paints a picture where consumers have many options but choose to shop only in a limited number of locations, and a strong role is played by distance. How much, then, do people travel for their purchases?

The median transaction in the data occurs at about 9 km from home. There is large dispersion around this typical value: the first 25% of transactions occur within the same place, while the third quartile is around 30 km. A long right tail of high distances is likely due to account holders traveling outside town for work or tourism.<sup>7</sup> While these and other details are relegated to the Appendix, we show in Figure 1 select percentiles of the distances at which transactions occur, by sector.<sup>8</sup> The heterogeneity in distance traveled is very significant: moving from a sector at the 10th percentile to a sector at the 90th, the median distance traveled goes up by a factor of around 7. The patterns make sense overall: the median transaction occurs at 4 km for staple items like Food Stores, and around 12 km for Eating and Drinking Places; it is, however, above 20 km for Durable Goods and 33 km for Amusement and Recreational Services, which are likely purchased less frequently.<sup>9</sup>

Obviously, the distance traveled by consumers is a combination of their willingness to travel (as mediated by their optimal shopping behavior) and supply conditions like the density of producers. We will return to this distinction later. For now, we emphasize that the spatial dimension of consumer behavior is actively moving in the data: consumers visit just a few locations among the many available, but the typical distance traveled varies broadly across sectors. To understand more the local nature of different consumption markets, we need to explore further the determinants of the relation between total purchases and distance. We move to this task next.

## 2.4 Gravity in Consumer Expenditure

Gravity is an almost universal feature of spatial relationships. While a substantial amount of literature has documented the decay of goods' trade flows with distance at international and intranational levels, little is known about the spatial behavior of final consumers.<sup>10</sup> We fill this gap in two steps.

First, we document that gravity also holds for consumers' behavior.<sup>11</sup> We make full use of the information available in the data comparing 1) expenditure inside vs. outside one's place of residence, and 2)

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<sup>7</sup>Online transactions have been eliminated as much as possible. See the Data Processing section in the Appendix for more details.

<sup>8</sup>Tables C.4 and C.5, in pages 59 and 60 respectively, show percentiles in the distribution of transaction distances by sector in the raw data and weighted by value of the transaction. The typical dollar is spent farther than where the typical transaction occurs, as reflected in right-ward shifts in the value-weighted distributions.

<sup>9</sup>Interestingly, Davis (2006) finds that larger population within 10 miles increases demand to a movie theater, and that the geographical market of a theater extends for at most 15 miles around it: we find for the same industry that 75% of the transactions occur in fact within (around) 11 miles.

<sup>10</sup>International flows of goods are only measured at the country level, thus ignoring the travel dimension of consumers' purchases. Intranational flows of goods typically record firm-to-firm transactions.

<sup>11</sup>To our knowledge, the first formulation of a gravity law for final consumers was proposed by Reilly (1931): "Two cities attract retail trade from any intermediate city or town in the vicinity of the breaking point, approximately in direct proportion to the populations of the two cities and in inverse proportion to the square of the distance from these two cities to the intermediate town."




Figure 1: Distances traveled by sector (select percentiles)

the decline in expenditure across merchants at different distances from the residence location.

We then analyze the margins of this decline, decomposing the total decay into the number of accounts transacting (an extensive “accounts” margin), the number of transactions per account (a “frequency” margin), and the average expenditure per transaction (a “batch size” intensive margin).

### 2.4.1 Expenditure patterns display gravity

We start our exploration of gravity by investigating how quickly total expenditure decays with distance. A large empirical literature has documented that merchandise trade flows decay with distance both across countries (e.g., Disdier and Head 2008) and within countries (e.g., Hillberry and Hummels 2007). Since final consumers buy goods directly from producers in relatively few cases, our knowledge of gravity in final consumption is extremely limited. Moreover, virtually all the literature deals with merchandise shipments, ignoring the service sector altogether. Here, we fill these important gaps.

For a given sector, we denote with  $X_{hs}$  the total expenditure of accounts residing in location  $h$  on

merchants selling in location  $s$ . Except where noted otherwise, from now on we use transactions occurring at distances up to 120 km. We initially relate the expenditure  $X_{hs}$  to the distance between residence and merchant locations in two ways. First, we simply estimate the change in expenditure associated with shopping out of the home residence (“out-of-home”):

$$\log X_{hs} = \alpha + \gamma^{(h)} + \gamma^{(s)} + \eta \times \mathbf{1}_{(h \neq s)} + \varepsilon_{hs} \quad (1)$$

where  $\mathbf{1}_{(h \neq s)}$  is an indicator function assuming the value of 1 if  $h \neq s$  and zero otherwise; in this regression, the expenditure of residents on their home location,  $X_{hh}$ , is included. Second, we follow the gravity literature and estimate the impact of distance on trade flows with a regression of the form

$$\log X_{hs} = \alpha + \gamma^{(h)} + \gamma^{(s)} + \delta \log dist_{hs} + \varepsilon_{hs} \quad (2)$$

In this equation,  $\alpha$  is a constant, and  $dist_{hs}$  is the distance between the centroids of  $h$  and  $s$ ; this regression includes only pairs where  $h \neq s$ , since  $dist_{hh} = 0$ . In both equations,  $\alpha$  is a constant, and a set of origin and destination fixed effects,  $\gamma^{(h)}$  and  $\gamma^{(s)}$ , controls for unobserved differences in size, productivity and intensity of competition (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). These two approaches highlight complementary features of the data. The coefficient  $\eta$  in Equation (1) measures the expenditure drop associated with visiting the average out-of-home location; hence, it shows the importance of very short trips, for which, however, distance is poorly measured. The coefficient  $\delta$  in Equation (2) shows the elasticity of expenditure to distance considering only out-of-home expenditure flows, in which case distance can be measured.

We first estimate Equations (1) and (2) across all sectors. We find, unsurprisingly, very clear distance effects. Estimating (1), the expenditure in the average location out-of-home is about 8.8% of the average expenditure at home ( $\eta = -2.435$ , robust s.e. 0.021).<sup>12</sup> When we estimate (2), we find a slope of  $-1.051$  (robust s.e. of 0.006), in line with estimates in the trade literature.<sup>13</sup> A comparison of these two coefficients shows that a large decay already appears at very short distances.

These pooled estimates mask large differences across sectors. Table 4 shows the coefficients of  $\eta$  (column 1) and  $\delta$  (column 4) when we estimate Equations (1) and (2) by sector (all p-values are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors). Sectors in this table are ordered by the out-of-home dummy in column 1 (this ordering will be kept throughout the paper for ease of reference). The strong decay at short distances is pervasive across sectors. However, such decay is heterogeneous: in sectors like Food Stores, the expenditure in the average location out-of-home is around 9% of the expenditure at home; this fraction grows to 20% for Eating and Drinking Places, 38% for Personal Services, and at 91% for Durable Goods.

The impact of distance as measured by estimates of (2) is consistent with this picture: the correlation between the two sets of coefficients across sectors is 0.68. However the much smaller distance coefficients

<sup>12</sup>Using all data, we find  $\eta = -2.545$  (robust s.e. 0.0223).

<sup>13</sup>This slope is not particularly sensitive to changes in the cutoff. See Appendix C.4, page 58, for further discussion.

in these estimates are notable: for the typical sector, a 1% increase in distance is associated with a 0.41% decrease in expenditure, and almost all coefficients are below the benchmark value of approximately 1 for international trade. We conclude that most of the decline in expenditure happens at short distances as measured in (1), which we will focus on for much of the remaining analysis.

The final column of Table 4 reports, for each sector, the simple average of the number of purchases per account in the transaction data. We note for now the tendency of sectors with stronger gravity to be purchased more frequently. We will return to this in more detail after we have a better understanding of the margins of decay accounting for the expenditure drop over space.

Table 4: **Decline in expenditure**

Category	Out of Home			Gravity			Frequency of transactions
	coeff (1)	pv (2)	obs. (3)	coeff (4)	pv (5)	obs. (6)	
Food Stores	-2.23	0.00	22,649	-0.85	0.00	18,632	7.53
Gasoline Services	-2.08	0.00	39,666	-0.60	0.00	34,615	8.86
General Merchandise Stores	-1.78	0.00	26,837	-0.93	0.00	23,932	5.14
Misc. Retail	-1.70	0.00	34,052	-0.65	0.00	30,042	5.25
Eating and Drinking Places	-1.57	0.00	34,504	-0.56	0.00	31,022	5.93
Building Mat./Hardware/Garden Supp.	-1.40	0.00	14,185	-0.73	0.00	11,604	4.15
Auto Repair/Service/Parking	-1.25	0.00	4,414	-0.40	0.00	3,013	1.83
NonDurable Goods	-1.16	0.00	978	-0.65	0.00	758	1.68
Health Services	-1.12	0.00	5,134	-0.33	0.00	3,910	2.16
Apparel	-1.10	0.00	15,918	-0.53	0.00	14,066	2.91
Furniture, Home Furnishings, Equip.	-1.07	0.00	12,286	-0.57	0.00	10,734	2.33
Auto and Truck Sales/Service/Parts	-1.04	0.00	7,298	-0.33	0.00	5,508	1.98
Motion Pictures	-1.04	0.00	1,922	-0.34	0.00	1,248	2.16
Amusement, Rec. Serv.	-1.03	0.00	2,958	-0.23	0.00	2,329	2.03
Personal Services	-0.96	0.00	5,203	-0.31	0.00	3,760	2.46
Misc. Services	-0.92	0.06	220	0.91	0.02	116	1.57
Communications	-0.89	0.00	424	-0.41	0.01	263	1.36
Agricultural Services	-0.88	0.00	552	0.42	0.11	190	1.86
Other Vehicles Sales/Service/Parts	-0.68	0.41	257	-0.59	0.08	128	1.64
Hospitality	-0.64	0.01	1,392	-0.14	0.08	1,158	1.53
Durable Goods	-0.09	0.90	79	1.11	0.67	15	1.64

#### 2.4.2 Margins of adjustment

Why does expenditure decay with space? As distance increases, there may be fewer people traveling out-of-residence; moreover, those who are traveling may do so less frequently, or spend a different amount per transaction. These margins map into simple decompositions in the spirit of Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Hillberry and Hummels (2007). In any given sector, we express total expenditure of consumers in  $h$  falling on merchants in  $s$  as

$$X_{hs} = \underbrace{N_{hs}}_{\text{account margin}} \times \underbrace{\bar{x}_{hs}}_{\text{expenditure margin}} = \quad (3)$$

$$= \underbrace{N_{hs}}_{\text{account margin}} \times \underbrace{f_{hs}}_{\text{frequency margin}} \times \underbrace{\bar{x}_{hs}/f_{hs}}_{\text{batch size margin}} \quad (4)$$

Equation (3) says that as distance increases, expenditure can decrease either because the number of agents traveling decreases (the extensive “account” margin) or because agents spend less on average. In turn (4) suggests that lower expenditure per account on average can arise either because each transaction is smaller (the “batch size” margin) or because consumers transact less often (the “frequency” margin). When we re-estimate Equation (1) with the left side being each of these three terms, the coefficients on the out-of-home dummy add up to the overall coefficient  $\eta$  reported in column 1 of Table 4 (and similarly for Equation (2)).<sup>14</sup>

Figure 2 shows the results of this decomposition for (1). The length of each bar corresponds to column 1 in Table 4. We find two broad messages.

First, most of the decline in expenditure over space is due to fewer people traveling outside, or people taking less frequent trips. The blue bar measures the contribution of the “account” margin. For the typical sector, 72% of the drop in out-of-home expenditure is associated with fewer people traveling outside, rather than to people spending less on average for out-of-home transactions.<sup>15</sup> As a benchmark, Hillberry and Hummels (2007) find, for firm-to-firm shipments within U.S., that for short distances the extensive margin explains almost the totality of the decay.

The remaining part of each bar measures the decline due to lower average expenditure per account. The gray section indicates that the average expenditure per account drops outside of home almost exclusively because of the “frequency” margin: consumers spend less on average out-of-home because they choose to travel outside less frequently, not because they spend less per transaction. The drop in the average transaction value (the “batch size” margin) has a limited role in most cases. Tables C.8 and C.9 in the Appendix (p. 63) show that the combination of the “account” and “frequency” margins typically contributes 90%-95% of the decline in expenditure.

Second, Figure 2 suggests that a large part of the heterogeneity in gravity seems associated with heterogeneity in the frequency margin and dissociated from the “batch size” margin – i.e., the length of the bar varies because of variation in the gray section.<sup>16</sup> This is very apparent when we plot the out-of-home expenditure as a share of home expenditure  $\exp(\eta)$  (using column 1 in Table 4) against the average

<sup>14</sup>A further angle of this decomposition could relate to the Alchian and Allen (1964) conjecture: consumers should be willing to travel more for higher quality goods and services when travel costs do not vary with quality. Hence, there should be a positive relation between average value of a transaction and distance. Unfortunately, our data does not allow a precise measurement of unit values and hence cannot be used to speak to this conjecture. For related work on international trade, see Hummels and Skiba (2004).

<sup>15</sup>Tables C.6 and C.7, in the Appendix (p. 62), show the actual values of the “account” and “expenditure” margins with associated p-values for both Equations (1) and (2).

<sup>16</sup>A simple regression of the out-of-home dummy on each of the “account”, “frequency”, and “batch size” margin coefficients separately has  $R^2$  of 75%, 87%, and 7% respectively.




Figure 2: Margins in the out-of-home expenditure drop

number of transactions per account in the sector from the data. Figure 3 shows this relation for the sectors where the out-of-home dummy is statistically significant from zero at 10% level. A simple regression line through this data has a slope of  $-0.69$  (robust s.e.  $0.07$ ) and an  $R^2$  of  $0.86$ .<sup>17</sup> When customers choose more visits, gravity is more important. Note that since the average number of transactions has not been used directly to compute the out-of-home dummy, there is nothing mechanical about this empirical relation.

Our stylized model below will provide a possible explanation for this correlation, based on heterogeneity in the storability/durability of the sector. When storage costs are high, consumers want to reduce the average inventory held. To do so, they need to purchase smaller batches, but more frequently. Since travel is expensive, however, a higher frequency can only be optimal with reduced distances. Hence, across sectors, if storage costs are higher, the frequency of purchase should grow but the expenditure should decline faster with space. This behavior generates a negative correlation between the strength of gravity

<sup>17</sup>The figure excludes Durable Goods and Other Vehicles Sales/Service/Parts, an outlier. Using all estimates, the regression line would have a slope of  $-0.77$  (robust s.e.  $0.09$ ), with  $R^2 = 0.78$ . Figures C.2 and C.3 in the Appendix, starting at page 65, replicate this figure for all the sectors and for the impact of distance using eq. (2). We have also experimented with an alternative measure of frequency that gives more weight to users which spends more overall in the data, with very similar results.




Figure 3: Drop in expenditure out of home

and frequency of transactions, as present in Figure 3.

These results provide the first piece of (somewhat indirect) evidence that demand conditions may matter in determining local equilibrium outcomes. In sectors where storage costs are high, consumer demand declines faster with distance and demand is more spatially concentrated. Hence, suppliers should be willing to increase production in larger markets by conserving consumer travel time.

In the remainder of the paper, we develop these arguments in more detail. We first show that the cross-sectional relation in Figure 2 is not purely driven by unobserved heterogeneity in supply characteristics. We then develop a simple partial equilibrium model to clarify how consumers' purchasing behavior can impact local equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we present reduced-form evidence that the average frequency of transactions, a proxy for storage costs, is related to heterogeneity in employment and store density across sectors in a way that is consistent with the mechanism we have described.



### 3 Individual Level Responses

The analysis up to now has shown that consumers’ typical travel ranges are limited, expenditure declines with distance, and the combination of “account” and “frequency” margins are the main reasons for the decline. We have also shown that the strength of gravity varies by sector with the frequency of travel, which we interpret as related to sector-level characteristics like storability and durability.

While certainly suggestive, these facts by themselves do not show that the consumer is actively managing the spatial dimension of consumption, that is, how far to travel; some sector-level characteristics on the supply side may bring producers and consumers closer to each other, so that the observed distance traveled is shorter. One such characteristic could be the fixed costs of operating a store, which can in principle affect the density of stores in equilibrium. Suppose, for example, that food stores have a low fixed cost of operation, so they are more densely distributed over the territory than, say, apparel stores. Suppose now that consumers do not choose how far to shop, but simply buy whenever they are close enough to a store. If consumers are more likely to take short trips than long trips, then we would observe more frequent transactions in food stores than in apparel stores, everything else equal, since food stores are denser; as a consequence, gravity will also be stronger for food stores because expenditure will be closer to the consumer’s residence than for apparel stores. This mechanism would replicate the correlation in Figure 3 without consumers choosing how far to travel for their purchases.

To make progress on this issue, we exploit individual-level variation in our data. Since our data comprises a relatively short time span, we can assume that the supply network is fixed. In a first exercise, we show that after accounting for individual-level heterogeneity, the propensity of individuals to travel out-of-residence for different sectors varies systematically with individual-level characteristics like income: as we move from low- to high-purchase frequency sectors, richer individuals tend to have relatively fewer transactions out-of-residence. In a second exercise, we identify for each consumer two different travel costs’ regimes by recovering whether it was raining or not on the day of a particular transaction. We find that while rain makes a given consumer less likely to travel out-of-residence for his purchases on average, this effect is relatively more muted for frequently purchased sectors.

#### 3.1 The Role of Individual Characteristics

We are interested in whether the travel behavior of consumers in the same shopping environment varies across sectors with demographic characteristics. Since the number of transactions comes in integer values, a Poisson model is an appropriate starting point. In particular, we will estimate Poisson models where the mean number of out-of-residence transactions for individual  $i$  in sector  $s$ ,  $out_{i,s}$ , takes the form:

$$E [out_{i,s}|x_i, \bar{f}_s, \delta^i, \delta^s] = \exp \{ \alpha + \beta_0 \cdot n_{i,s} + \beta_1' \delta_i + \gamma_0 \cdot \delta^s + \gamma_1' (\bar{f}_s \cdot x_i) \} \quad (5)$$

In this expression,  $n_{i,s}$  is the total number of transactions for account  $i$  in sector  $s$ ;  $\delta^i$  and  $\delta^s$  are either individual  $i$  (sector  $s$ ) characteristics or individual (sector) dummies;  $x_i$  are individual characteristics;  $\bar{f}_s$  is the average frequency of transactions for sector  $s$  in the overall data. Since we are controlling for the

total number of transactions, we are effectively examining the response of the geographical composition of purchase to different covariates. Moreover, the spatial aggregation of the geographical units of aggregation play a more limited role since our dependent variable sums across all locations other than the residence location. Econometrically, our coefficients of interest are the interactions of demographic characteristics with the average frequency of transactions.

Table 5 shows the results of this estimation.<sup>18</sup> In all specifications, we cluster standard errors at the individual level to allow for correlation among observations pertaining to the same individual.<sup>19</sup> All the models include sector-fixed effects. Column (1) shows the baseline elements of our regression. The expected number of transactions out-of-residence in the sample period increases by 1.6 percentage points for an individual with one additional transaction;<sup>20</sup> a 10% higher income increases the number of transactions out-of-residence by 1.39% on average.<sup>21</sup> The consequences of a higher income are not surprising: while higher income individuals have a higher opportunity cost of time, they also likely have access to better means of transportation. Age of the individual per se does not seem to affect the frequency of transactions out-of-residence.

In the second column, we interact log age and log income with the average frequency of transaction in a sector. We find that higher-income individuals are relatively less likely to travel out-of-residence for more frequently purchased goods: fixing the total number of transactions, a 10% richer individual transacts 2% less out-of-residence for every one-point increase in the log-frequency of transactions. For example, the same movement from a low-frequency sector like Durable Goods (20th percentile of frequency, about 1.6 transactions in the sample on average), to a high-frequency sector like Miscellaneous Retail (80th percentile of frequency, about 5.3 transactions) reduces the number of transactions out-of-residence by  $2.02 \cdot \ln(5.3/1.6) = 2.42\%$  more for a 10% richer individual, compared to a poorer one. Age is still statistically insignificantly associated to our dependent variable and stays so throughout this table.<sup>22</sup>

The remaining two columns control for progressively more detailed sources of unobserved heterogeneity. In column (3), we introduce fixed-effects for the residence of the account-holder. This allows us to fix the shopping environment and in practice compare two individuals living in the same town. The last column uses individual-fixed effects: here, we control for all time-invariant individual characteristics (e.g.,

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<sup>18</sup>To ensure our results are a faithful representation of individual behavior, we limit the analysis to “frequent users,” i.e., users with at least 120 transactions in our sample. We further require these accounts to have valid (self-reported) income and age. These individual-level analyses are based on about 1,400 individual accounts. Since we have 21 sectors, our data comprises roughly 29 thousand observations.

<sup>19</sup>In other words, standard errors are immune to the equidispersion assumption in a strict Poisson maximum-likelihood estimation. In Appendix C.7 we report estimation results for a negative binomial model where overdispersion is explicitly taken into account, and discuss potential drawbacks of such an alternative.

<sup>20</sup>In these models, the total number of transactions appears in levels to keep all observations with zero transactions in the estimation sample.

<sup>21</sup>In models where the mean function is exponential and the dependent variable in levels, the coefficient on a regressor in levels is interpreted as a semi-elasticity and the coefficient on a regressor in logs as an elasticity.

<sup>22</sup>In all tables in Appendix C.7, we also control for interactions between economy-wide log average number of employees per store (a proxy for sector-level fixed costs) and log age and income to limit as much as possible the role of supply-side density. The pattern of significance for our interaction variables remains unchanged. The sector-level correlation between log average frequency and log average number of employees per store is 0.12 (pvalue 0.6).

Table 5: **The role of individual heterogeneity**

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Number of transactions out of residence			
Number of transactions	0.016*** (0.001)	0.016*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.001)	
Log age	-0.026 (0.059)	0.053 (0.108)	0.055 (0.125)	
Log income	0.139*** (0.029)	0.477*** (0.048)	0.368*** (0.058)	
Log age $\times$ log frequency of transactions		-0.045 (0.060)	-0.067 (0.055)	-0.043 (0.074)
Log income $\times$ log frequency of transactions		-0.202*** (0.029)	-0.202*** (0.024)	-0.276*** (0.031)
Observations	28,959	28,959	28,959	28,959
Sector fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Residence fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No
Individual fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes
Pseudo R-Square	.61	.61	.72	.64

Standard errors clustered at account level in parentheses.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

wealth, education, precise residence location, overall use of credit cards).<sup>23</sup> It is always the case that, controlling for the overall number of transactions, higher-income individuals transact relatively more locally for frequently purchased sectors.

These results show that differences in purchasing behavior are significantly associated with individual characteristics like income: high-income individuals tend to shop relatively more locally in sectors which are purchased more frequently. This is consistent with a situation where prices close to home are higher than farther away, particularly in sectors where storage costs are high, and high-income people are relatively more willing to incur these extra costs. In general, these results support the view that agents actively choose how far to travel for their purchases.

The findings in this section are based on the average behavior of individuals over time. In the next section, we examine the response of the average individual to differences in travel cost regimes arising from weather conditions.

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<sup>23</sup>While in general individual-level fixed effects may give rise to an incidental parameters problem, this is not the case for Poisson regressions (see for example Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).

### 3.2 The Effect of Rain

In this section, we exploit a different source of plausible variation in individual behavior: weather conditions on the day of the transaction. If individuals are not actively choosing how far to travel for their purchases, then bad weather might impact the overall number of transactions but not individuals' propensity to purchase out-of-residence. Again, we are only interested in the spatial distribution of transactions.

To pursue this line of analysis, we turn to daily data on rainfall precipitation from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, as described in Menne et al. (2012). For each centroid of a residence location in our data, we find the closest weather station among the roughly twelve thousand disseminated across the United States. In the transaction data, the median distance between a weather station and a residence is 7.3 km (mean 8 km). We use this daily data on rainfall to assign a weather status for each transaction: we create a transaction-level indicator variable that assumes the value of 1 if, during the transaction day, the associated weather station recorded rain in the residence location. During the sample period, 34% of transactions have a rain episode so defined. A concern could be that most of the variation in this indicator is geographically related, rather than occurring within residence locations over time. This is not the case. A regression of the weather status indicator variable on residence-location fixed effects and transaction-date fixed effects absorbs only 17% of the variation in the transaction level data, leaving ample residual variation to identify movements in the propensity of purchase outside of one's residence.

We then construct an extended dataset, starting from the analysis in the subsection above, where for each individual we count  $out_{i,s,r}$ , the number of transactions out-of-residence by sector during rainy ( $r = 1$ ) and non-rainy days ( $r = 0$ ). Our interest is to understand if, conditioning on the total number of transactions in a sector, visits to out-of-residence stores are systematically related to differences in travel conditions, and whether this relation is heterogeneous across sectors. In particular, in this section we estimate Poisson models where the mean number of out-of-residence transactions for individual  $i$  in sector  $s$  under rain conditions  $r$ ,  $out_{i,s,r}$ , takes the form:

$$E [out_{i,s,r} | x_i, \bar{f}_s, \delta^i, \delta^s, \delta^r] = \exp \{ \alpha + \beta_0 \cdot n_{i,s,r} + \beta'_1 \delta_i + \gamma_0 \cdot \delta^s + \gamma'_1 (\bar{f}_s \cdot x_i) + \eta_0 \cdot \delta^r + \eta_1 \cdot \delta^r \bar{f}_s \}$$

In this expression,  $n_{i,s,r}$  is the total number of transactions recorded for account  $i$  by sector  $s$  and weather status  $r$ ;  $\delta^r$  is a dummy equal to 1 for observations pertaining to rainy days and zero otherwise; and all the remaining notation follows Equation (5) above. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6, which broadly mimics the structure of Table 5 above. Again, all standard errors are clustered at individual level.

Column (1) reports the baseline model estimated without interactions, but including the dummy for transactions on rainy days. The dummy is negative and statistically significant: the average number of transactions out-of-residence on rainy days is  $\exp \{-0.314\} = 0.73$  times the number of transactions out-of-residence on non-rainy days, for a given total number of transactions of the account-holder (and given demographic characteristics): intuitively, transactions are relatively more local when it rains. Column (2) shows, however, that the degree to which transactions become more local varies by sector. The interaction

Table 6: **The effect of rain**

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Number of transactions out of residence				
Number of transactions	0.023*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.001)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.002)
Log age	-0.020 (0.066)	-0.019 (0.066)	0.079 (0.113)		
Log income	0.115*** (0.032)	0.115*** (0.032)	0.513*** (0.052)		
Rain dummy	-0.314*** (0.019)	-0.816*** (0.038)	-0.815*** (0.038)	-0.872*** (0.042)	-0.910*** (0.041)
Rain dummy $\times$ log frequency of transactions		0.302*** (0.026)	0.302*** (0.026)	0.376*** (0.034)	0.421*** (0.033)
Log age $\times$ log frequency of transactions			-0.055 (0.067)	-0.064 (0.055)	-0.062 (0.057)
Log income $\times$ log frequency of transactions			-0.237*** (0.036)	-0.212*** (0.025)	-0.202*** (0.025)
Observations	57,918	57,918	57,918	57,918	57,918
Sector fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Residence fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Individual fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Pseudo R-Square	.56	.56	.56	.67	.69

Standard errors clustered at account level in parentheses.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

between the rain dummy and the frequency of transactions is large, positive and statistically significant: for example, the out-of-residence transactions on rainy days decline to 51% of the value on non-rainy days for durable goods, but only to 73% for miscellaneous retail; for gasoline, the most frequently purchased, the same number is 85%. The prevalence of local trips changes differentially across sectors. Column (3) again introduces interactions of log age and income. The coefficient on the rain  $\times$  frequency does not change (up to rounding), and the coefficients for the interactions of income and age are very similar to those in Table 5 above.<sup>24</sup> Columns (4) and (5) add, progressively, residence- and account level fixed effects. As we do so, the heterogeneous impact of rain becomes stronger. In the most restrictive specification of column (5), for a given number of transactions, the frequency of out-of-residence transactions on rainy days declines to 50% of the value on non-rainy days for durable goods, but it is 81% of the non-rainy days value for miscellaneous retail and it is unchanged for gasoline.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup>This is simply a consequence that individual characteristics are uncorrelated with the rain indicator. In Appendix Table C.12, we further explore triple interactions between rain and frequency of transactions with log income and with log age. As in the main table, higher income makes transactions relatively more local in high frequency sectors; additionally, we find evidence that this effect is stronger during rainy days, i.e., the triple interaction with log income is negative.

<sup>25</sup>In Appendix Table C.13, we replicate the analysis in this section estimating a negative binomial model, again with very similar results.

Taken together, the results of this section indicate that, at the consumer level, the spatial distribution of transactions is an active margin of choice. Conditioning on the shopping environment that an agent has available, this distribution varies with individual characteristics. Moreover, when the same consumer is exposed to different travel costs regimes the spatial distribution of transactions varies differentially across sectors with the frequency of transactions, a measure that we associate to characteristics of storability or durability of the sector itself.

While this exercise points to an active role of consumers, it is not designed to identify any long-run causal effect: hence, we cannot use it to understand whether optimal consumer behavior has an overall impact on local equilibrium outcomes. We tackle this broader question in Section 5. Before doing that, we develop a more formal association between frequency of transactions and storability, formalize why storability can drive a negative association between gravity and the frequency of transactions, and develop a simple intuition for the relation between storage costs and equilibrium outcomes.

## 4 A Simple Model of Shopping

We observed in Section 3 that consumers actively manage the spatial distribution of their transactions. Are consumers' spatial consumption patterns important to local economic activity equilibrium? One way to answer this question is to study the impact of differences in local population size on local sectoral employment, as a function of demand-related sector characteristics. In this section, we present a highly stylized model that will help frame the discussion for the empirical analysis that follows. Our purpose here is not to provide a fully-estimable framework, but to highlight the key mechanisms that can drive heterogeneous employment responses to population increases. Hence, the model needs to abstract from the specifics of different sectors and focus on the moderating impact of a single sector characteristic, which we have called durability/storability.

Our framework is essentially the mirror-image of a monocentric city model: all agents live in a single place, and they choose where to shop. Since they want to consume at a constant rate over time, but travel is costly, an inventory problem emerges. We generalize ideas present in Oi (1992) – but dating back at least to Baumol (1952) – to a setting where consumers with heterogeneous travel costs choose 1) how far to travel for their purchases, 2) how frequently to do so, and 3) the purchase size per trip. A storage cost  $g$  will regulate the shape of the spatial distribution of demand for a given schedule describing the price as a function of distance. Profit-maximizing producers using a fixed factor (land) and labor will shape the spatial distribution of supply, again for a given price function. In equilibrium, a price function makes demand and supply identical point-wise and determines the marginal plot of land used.

### 4.1 Producers

There is one sector with productivity  $A$ . Producers operate in perfect competition and are potentially active in any location  $j \in [0, +\infty)$ . Each location  $j$  is endowed with a fixed amount of land  $\bar{D}$ . A firm

located in  $j$  uses land and labor  $L(j)$  to produce goods:

$$Q(j) = A\bar{D}^{1-\beta}L(j)^\beta \quad (6)$$

Firms located in  $j$  will choose labor to maximize profits:

$$\pi(j) = p(j)A\bar{D}^{1-\beta}L(j)^\beta - wL(j) - R(j)\bar{D}$$

where  $p(j)$  and  $R(j)$  are the output price and the rental rate of land at  $j$ ;  $w$  is the wage, which we assume fixed and determined in an outside sector. The optimal quantity of labor is given by

$$L(j) = \bar{D} \left( \frac{A_i\beta}{w} \right)^{1/(1-\beta)} p(j)^{1/(1-\beta)} \quad (7)$$

and output as a function of the price, that is, the supply curve at  $j$ , is given by

$$Q(j) = A^{1/(1-\beta)}\bar{D} \left( \frac{\beta}{w} \right)^{\beta/(1-\beta)} p(j)^{\beta/(1-\beta)} \quad (8)$$

Absentee landlords will rent their land to the highest price. Under free entry, positive profits in a location will bid up these land prices; in equilibrium, the price of land is

$$R(j) = \bar{R} \cdot p(j)^{1/(1-\beta)} \quad (9)$$

and profits are zero everywhere.<sup>26</sup>

## 4.2 Consumers

A measure  $N$  of consumers is heterogeneous in  $t$ , an increasing index of individual travel costs. All consumers (exogenously) live in location 0. Each agent wants to consume a fixed quantity  $\bar{q}$  of the good over one unit of time: in particular, in a fraction  $di$  of the unit time, the consumer eats a fixed quantity  $1 \times di$  of the good. The assumption of a fixed quantity consumed will allow us to emphasize the role of the price function  $p(j)$  in allocating consumers across distances.

A consumer with travel cost  $t$  wants to minimize the total cost of consuming  $\bar{q}$  units of the good per unit of time,  $c(t)$ .<sup>27</sup> In particular, the consumer takes as given  $p(j)$  and solves:

$$c(t) = \min_{j,z} p(j)\bar{q} + \kappa(j;t)\frac{\bar{q}}{z} + g\frac{z}{2} \quad (10)$$

In this expression,  $\kappa(j;t)$  is the cost per trip for a consumer  $t$  traveling to  $j$ , with  $\kappa(j;t) \geq 0$ ,  $\kappa_j > 0$ ,  $\kappa_t > 0$ ,  $\kappa_{jt} > 0$ . The consumer chooses the distance traveled  $j$  and how much to buy every trip (the

<sup>26</sup>In this equation,  $\bar{R} \equiv w^{-\beta/(1-\beta)}(1-\beta)\beta^{\beta/(1-\beta)}A^{1/(1-\beta)}$  is a constant independent of our parameters of interest.

<sup>27</sup>We can think of this as part of a more general problem where consumers have a (large enough) income spent on this sector and on an outside good left out of the analysis.

“batch size”)  $z$ . A batch size  $z$  implies average inventory holdings of  $z/2$ , and hence total inventory costs of  $gz/2$ ; a batch size  $z$  also implies  $\bar{q}/z$  trips per period (ignoring integer constraints) and hence  $\kappa(j; t) \bar{q}/z$  travel costs. For a given distance traveled  $j$ , the consumer balances inventory costs (increasing in  $z$ ) and travel costs (decreasing in  $z$ ). This is just the classic trade-off in optimal inventory models, and delivers an optimal batch size of

$$z(j; t) = \left( \frac{2\bar{q}\kappa(j; t)}{g} \right)^{1/2} \quad (11)$$

Consumers will buy more per trip when the travel costs are high (to economize on the number of trips) or when the storage costs are low (to take advantage of the durability of the good). Using this expression in (10), the cost minimization problem becomes

$$c(t) = \min_j p(j) \bar{q} + \kappa(j; t)^{1/2} (2\bar{q}g)^{1/2} \quad (12)$$

where  $\kappa(j; t)^{1/2} (2\bar{q}g)^{1/2}$  is the total travel and storage cost associated to a given distance  $j$  under the optimal batch policy. The optimal distance traveled will satisfy

$$\frac{1}{2} \kappa(j; t)^{-1/2} \kappa_j(j; t) (2\bar{q}g)^{1/2} = -p'(j) \bar{q} \quad (13)$$

A marginally longer trip makes consumers save  $-p'(j)$  per unit purchased;<sup>28</sup> however, consumers pay more in travel costs and inventory costs (since they optimally buy larger batches).

Note that a higher storage cost  $g$  lowers the optimal batch size (from (11)), increases the required number of trips  $\bar{q}/z$ , and so raises the marginal cost of distance in (13): naturally, consumers are willing to travel less for high storage cost/low durability items than for low storage costs/high durability ones, everything else equal.

### 4.3 Equilibrium price

We now solve for the equilibrium price function and the associated spatial distribution of production.<sup>29</sup> Since the price function will be the solution to a second order differential equation, we make three assumptions that allow for analytic results (and point out where they are helpful): we specialize the travel cost function to  $\kappa(j; t) = (jt)^2$ , we assume that  $t \sim Uniform[1, 2]$ , and set  $\beta = 1/2$  in the production function.

Our first assumption lets us write the first order condition for a consumer  $t$  as,

$$t = -p'(j) \left( \frac{\bar{q}}{2g} \right)^{1/2} \quad (14)$$

This equation explicitly assigns to each distance  $j$  a unique consumer type  $t(j)$  that chooses to travel there. For a given (monotonically decreasing and convex) price function  $p(j)$ , this equation also implicitly

<sup>28</sup>In equilibrium, price will in fact decrease over  $j$ .

<sup>29</sup>All necessary derivations in this subsection and the next are reported in Appendix B, p. 51.



assigns a unique location  $j(t)$  to any consumer type  $t$ , with  $j'(t) < 0$ . The economy is effectively solving an assignment problem where the equilibrium matching function  $j(t)$  determines a distance for any consumer type.

In equilibrium, demand of goods is equal to supply of goods in any location where consumers choose to travel. Using (14) and the distributional assumptions on  $t$ ,

$$\Pr \{j < \bar{J}\} = \Pr \left\{ t \geq -p'(j) \left( \frac{\bar{q}}{2g} \right)^{1/2} \right\} = 2 + p'(j) \left( \frac{\bar{q}}{2g} \right)^{1/2}$$

Hence, the density of those who travel to  $j$  is given by

$$n(j) \equiv p''(j) \left( \frac{\bar{q}}{2g} \right)^{1/2} \quad (15)$$

Since each of these agents demands  $\bar{q}$  units, and the population measure is  $N$ , quantity demanded at  $j$  is  $N\bar{q} \cdot n(j)$ . Equating this demand to supply (8), equilibrium in good  $i$ 's market in location  $j$  requires

$$p''(j) = \alpha^2 p(j), \text{ with } \alpha \equiv \alpha_0 \frac{g^{1/4}}{\bar{q}^{3/4} N^{1/2}}, \quad (16)$$

where  $\alpha_0$  depends on parameters.<sup>30</sup> This condition must hold for any location  $j$  where  $i$  is produced. Hence, (16) is a second order differential equation in the price function  $p(j)$ .

**Definition 1** *An equilibrium is a price function  $p(j)$  and a cutoff allocation of land  $j_{\max}$  such that a) producers maximize profits, b) the marginal land owner obtains zero rents, c) consumers optimally choose distance, and d) demand and supply of goods are the same at every point  $j$ .*

The generic solution to (16) is

$$p(j) = c_1 \exp \{ \alpha j \} + c_2 \exp \{ -\alpha j \} \quad (17)$$

Using (14), the distance  $j(t)$  chosen by any agent  $t$  implicitly solves

$$\left( \frac{2g}{\bar{q}} \right)^{1/2} \frac{t}{\alpha} = c_2 \exp \{ -\alpha j \} - c_1 \exp \{ \alpha j \} \quad (18)$$

We pin down the constants of integration using implications of our conjectured land allocation. In particular, since  $j(t)$  is decreasing, the person with the lowest travel cost ( $t = 1$ ) will travel the maximum distance,  $j_{\max} \equiv j(1)$ . We use this fact in (18). We also impose in (17) that, at  $j = j_{\max}$ , the price of the product will have to be zero (otherwise, rents  $R(j)$  would be positive, and some firms would have an incentive to enter slightly farther, paying zero rent). These steps give us two equations in the two

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<sup>30</sup>In particular,  $\alpha_0 \equiv 2^{-1/4} A (\bar{D}/w)^{1/2}$ . Our third assumption of  $\beta = 1/2$  allows us to write this differential equation as linear in  $p(j)$ .

unknown constants, and deliver

$$p(j) = \frac{1}{2^{1/2}\alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{1/4} g^{1/4} N^{1/2} \cdot [\exp\{\alpha(j_{\max} - j)\} - \exp\{-\alpha(j_{\max} - j)\}] \quad (19)$$

The value of  $j_{\max}$  is uniquely pinned down by imposing in (18) that the person with the highest travel cost travels as little as possible. The value  $j_{\max}$  is an implicit function of  $\alpha$ . However, we show that

$$j_{\max}(\alpha) : \frac{\alpha}{j_{\max}} \frac{dj_{\max}}{d\alpha} = -1 \quad (20)$$

Note that this implies that  $\alpha \cdot j_{\max}(\alpha)$  is constant with  $\alpha$ .

#### 4.4 Aggregate Implications

We now explore the equilibrium interactions between population size and storage costs. Note that output, employment and demand density in a location, (7), (8) and (15), are all functions of the price at the same location, for which we have an expression from (19)-(20).

We start from gravity. Expenditure at a given place  $j$  is given by

$$X(j) \equiv Nn(j) \cdot \bar{q}p(j) = \bar{x} \cdot p(j)^2$$

where the last equality uses (15) and (16).<sup>31</sup> It is easy to see that the price is decreasing in  $j$ : hence, expenditure decreases with distance and gravity holds. Similar to continuous types–labor market models of assignment (e.g. Sattinger, 1979; Costinot and Vogel, 2010; Monte, 2011), the model delivers a non-linear value of different locations that depends on the complementarity between  $j$  and  $t$ , and on the distribution of  $t$ .<sup>32</sup>

Not only does gravity hold, but it is steeper in sectors with high storage costs. Consider the simple slope  $[X(j_{\max}) - X(0)]/j_{\max} = -X(0)/j_{\max}$ . When  $g$  is higher, the marginal cost of distance for all consumers grows and the willingness to take long trips shrinks. This implies that the marginal plot of land is no longer viable, and  $j_{\max}$  falls.<sup>33</sup> Since output is still fixed at  $Nq$  but there is less land, more demand must be concentrated at shorter distances, in particular at  $j = 0$ , so that  $p(0)$  grows.<sup>34</sup> The average slope of the expenditure is then higher when  $g$  grows.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>31</sup>In this expression,  $\bar{x} = 2^{-1/2}\alpha_0^2$  is a function of parameters not involving  $g$  or  $N$ .

<sup>32</sup>A related setting is studied in Karádi and Koren (2017): they focus on the general equilibrium implications of sectoral location choice (our model is partial equilibrium in that we only study equilibrium in one product market), where, however, the impact of distance is modeled as a classic iceberg decay; hence, expenditure declines log-linearly with distance. In this sense, this framework is related to demand–side non-linear pricing models in international trade: for example, Fielor (2011) or Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011). See Sattinger (1993) for a discussion of the role of linear vs. non-linear pricing on income distribution in assignment models. Our framework also generates a non-constant distance elasticity; for an explanation of why the distance elasticity in international trade is constant and close to -1, see Chaney (2018).

<sup>33</sup>Recall that  $j_{\max}$  decreases with  $\alpha$ , and  $\alpha$  increases with  $g$ .

<sup>34</sup>Using (19), it's easy to see that  $p(0) \propto g^{1/4} [\exp\{\alpha j_{\max}\} - \exp\{-\alpha j_{\max}\}]$ , which increases with  $g$  since  $\alpha j_{\max}$  is constant.

<sup>35</sup>Since the equilibrium expenditure function has a varying elasticity over  $j$ , it is difficult to prove that the slope becomes steeper at every  $j$ . However, Lemma 2 shows that over  $j \in [0, j_{\max}]$  1) the unweighted average slope  $X'(j)$ , 2) the average slope  $X'(j)$  weighted by the number of agents  $n(j)$ , and 3) the average slope of  $X'(j)$  weighted by the expenditure at  $j$ ,

Higher storage costs also induce each consumer to buy more frequently. To see this, it is sufficient to consider the expression for the optimal batch size  $z$  in (11): as  $g$  grows, a consumer will reduce  $z$  for any distance traveled. She will also reduce the distance traveled  $j(t)$ , since the marginal cost of distance is higher. Hence,  $z$  unambiguously drops, and the frequency  $q/z$  unambiguously rises.<sup>36</sup> These arguments show that the model generates a negative relation between frequency and gravity as in Figure (3).

How does the spatial distribution of output and employment respond to a bigger population? We start by noting that if population  $N$  increases, total output  $N\bar{q}$  increases in the same proportion, by assumption of fixed  $q$ . The expansion in demand and production requires more inputs. The total amount of land used  $j_{\max}(\alpha)$  also increases, but more slowly than 1-for-1 (in particular, with elasticity 1/2). Hence, in response to an increase in market size, output density  $N\bar{q}/j_{\max}$  must grow: intuitively, since consumer travel is expensive, firms try to increase output per unit of land, not just total land used.

Given that the marginal plot of land used is farther away, the growth in population increases the average distance of output to consumers:

$$\frac{\int_0^{j_{\max}} jQ(j) dj}{Nq} \equiv \bar{d} \cdot \frac{N^{1/2}}{g^{1/4}}, \quad (21)$$

where  $\bar{d}$  depend on parameters others than  $g$  and  $N$ .<sup>37</sup> However, travel is more expensive for high storage-cost sectors: hence, the average distance increases less when  $g$  is higher.

Given that land per location is fixed, the increase in output density must be generated via changes in employment density. Using (7), total employment in the sector is given by

$$L_{eq} = \int_0^{j_{\max}} L(j) dj = \bar{L} \cdot g^{1/4} N^{3/2} \quad (22)$$

where  $\bar{L}$  depends on parameters.<sup>38</sup> This expression is intuitive. As population increases, employment must grow more than 1-for-1 to limit the increase in  $j_{\max}$  and economize on travel costs. This increase in employment is larger when storage is more expensive, that is when  $g$  is high, because the need to economize on travel is stronger. The assumption of perfectly elastic labor supply is not necessary for this result. For example, if we introduce a labor supply function of the form  $Nw^\varepsilon$  (that is, a labor supply that grows with population) then  $\varepsilon > 1$  is sufficient to preserve this intuition.

Since land used increases less than 1-for-1 with population, employment density also grows:

$$\frac{L_{eq}}{j_{\max}} = \bar{\ell} \cdot g^{1/2} N \quad (23)$$

where again,  $\bar{\ell}$  depends on parameters. Armed with these intuitions, we turn to an empirical exploration of consumer demand on local outcomes.

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$X(j)$ , all become more negative as  $g$  grows.

<sup>36</sup>See Lemma 3 on p. 54 for a proof.

<sup>37</sup>See Lemma 4 on p. 54 for a proof.

<sup>38</sup>See Lemma 5 on p. 55 for a proof of total employment and employment density below.

## 5 Consumers Demand and Local Equilibrium Outcomes

We have provided above an intuitive reason for why higher storage costs make demand more “local”: consumers would rather buy smaller batches and in more frequent trips; since travel is expensive, however, consumers will optimally choose to take shorter trips. Hence, in response to a larger local population, we might expect to see local employment in high storage-cost sectors grow relatively faster than employment in sectors with low storage costs: firms are trying to economize on consumer travel time by limiting the amount of distant land used, and to do so they must substitute with labor. In addition, if savings in travel time are at the root of this behavior, we might expect to see employment growth driven by a higher density of stores (that is, a reduced average distance between consumers and stores), rather than more employees per store.

In this section, we study the impact of differences in population on county–sector employment as a function of the sector’s average number of transactions, our simple proxy for storage costs. We emphasize that we see this exercise as guided by, but not strictly testing, our simple model. We use our stylized framework as an organizational device that lacks many of the general equilibrium feedbacks, but that can be useful in organizing our thinking around the consequences of consumer mobility. We see the forces we describe playing out in a long run equilibrium, after the entry-exit margin of new establishments has been allowed to adjust. Hence, our main empirical examination will leverage cross-sectional differences across space and sectors.

To explore the heterogeneous response of local sectoral outcomes to local population we estimate regressions of the form

$$\ln y_{sct} = \alpha + \beta \ln pop_{ct} + \gamma \ln freq_s \times \ln pop_{ct} + \eta_0 \ln i_{ct} + \eta_1 \ln size_c + FE + \varepsilon_{sct} \quad (24)$$

In this regression,  $s$  indexes MCC sectors,  $c$  indexes counties, and  $t$  denotes calendar year ( $t = 2007$  and  $1998$ ). The regressor  $\ln y_{sct}$  may assume three values. We first use log employment in  $s, c, t$ : to construct it, we have started from data in the relevant years from County Business Patterns, and have developed a correspondence between NAICS 6 digits and MCC codes. Always using County Business Pattern data, we also explore the response of the number of local establishments  $\ln y_{sct} = \ln n_{sct}$ , and employees per establishment  $\ln y_{sct} = \ln (emp_{sct}/n_{sct})$ ; the regressor  $\ln freq_s$  is the log average frequency of transactions in sector  $s$  across all accounts in the credit card data;  $\ln pop_{ct}$  and  $\ln i_{ct}$  are the county log population and average personal income per capita, from the County Economic Profile of the Bureau of Economic Analysis;  $\ln size_c$  is the county land area;  $FE$  is a set of fixed effects, varying across regressions (sector fixed effects are always included and absorb the regressor  $\ln freq_s$  in levels); and  $\varepsilon_{sct}$  is a stochastic unobserved term.

We start our empirical examination of Equation (24) with OLS estimates, and then turn to an instrumental variable approach. We conclude this section with several robustness checks and a discussion of the results.

## 5.1 OLS Estimates

Table 7 reports OLS estimates of Equation (24) jointly for 1998 and 2007. In the first two columns, the dependent variable is county-sector log employment; columns (3) and (4) use total number of establishments, and columns (5) and (6) use the average number of employees per establishment. Each group of two columns differ by the set of fixed effects used: columns (1), (3) and (5) use sector fixed effects and year fixed effects; columns (2), (4) and (6) allow for county-year and sector-year dummies, i.e., control for heterogeneous time trends within sectors and within counties. As expected, income and population enter positively. In all cases, however, as population grows, sectoral employment grows at a slower rate in sectors that are transacted more frequently. This slower growth occurs for about two thirds via smaller stores, and about one third via fewer stores in the county.

Table 7: **Local outcome responses (OLS estimates)**

Dependent variable:	county-sector log employment		county-sector log establishments		county-sector log employees per estab.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log land area	0.125*** (0.010)		0.122*** (0.007)		0.003 (0.006)	
Log income per capita	1.112*** (0.035)		0.934*** (0.025)		0.178*** (0.020)	
Log population	1.216*** (0.007)		0.918*** (0.005)		0.298*** (0.004)	
Log population $\times$ log frequency	-0.064*** (0.004)	-0.070*** (0.004)	-0.021*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.002)	-0.043*** (0.003)	-0.050*** (0.003)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
County-Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-square	0.84	0.88	0.89	0.92	0.52	0.58
$N$	121,336	121,333	121,336	121,333	121,336	121,333

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

A causal interpretation of OLS estimates is problematic for a number of reasons. For example, imagine that sectoral productivity increases in sectors where the frequency of transactions is high. This may attract population because of a lower cost of living, generate more demand across all sectors, and hence require more employment in sectors whose productivity did not grow. The presence of agglomeration externalities may also induce population and employment to agglomerate in particular places; as agglomeration occurs, land rents grow and this may impact asymmetrically different sectors. A within-county identification over time may further pick up differential speed of adjustments, both across sectors, and across the establishment vs. average establishment size margins.

Given the several potential equilibrium feedbacks in the data, it is hard to precisely pin down the sign of the OLS bias. However, we can examine the behavior of employment across counties with different initial characteristics. In particular, we group counties in 5 bins according to their initial population density in 1998. We then re-estimate columns (2), (4) and (6) in Table 7 progressively for the set of counties up to and including the  $q^{th}$  quintile. Figure 4 and 5 then plot the coefficient  $\gamma_q$  on the interaction between population and frequency across quintiles  $q$ . Figure 4 shows that in low density counties, a marginal increase in population is associated to larger employment in high frequency compared to low frequency sectors. As we move towards denser counties, the marginal effect becomes zero and then it reverses. Figure 5 shows the marginal effects on the two dimensions of number of establishments and establishment size: the reversal occurs via both margins.




Figure 4: Slope of interaction of population and frequency - total employment

Figures are very similar if one groups counties by initial population, rather than by initial county density. These facts suggest that an instrument able to move population or density can help controlling for some endogeneity.

## 5.2 Instrumental Variables Estimates

We are interested in identifying the causal effect of population on the differential employment growth across sectors. We then instrument county population with information on the underlying geological composition of the county. In particular, we follow ideas developed in Burchfield, Overman, Puga, and Turner (2006) and Duranton and Turner (2018) and instrument population with the county composition




Figure 5: Slope of interaction of population and frequency - margins of adjustment

of different types of aquifers on which its territory lays. An aquifer is an underground layer of water-bearing rock, and the composition of different types of aquifers allows for different degrees of population in a given unit of land.<sup>39</sup> More precisely, we follow Duranton and Turner (2018) and compute the fraction of land laying over consolidated and semiconsolidated aquifers and use those percentages as instruments for population; moreover, we instrument the interaction of population and frequency with the interaction of the same percentages with frequency.<sup>40</sup> In sum, we instrument 2 endogenous variables with 4 instruments. Since the instrument is time-invariant, it induces exogenous variation in population across counties over space but not within counties over time: hence, it is consistent with our approach of leveraging cross-sectional differences in a long run equilibrium.

The strategy results in a good first stage across all specifications. Across all tables (see for example the bottom two rows of Table 8) we report the Cragg-Donald (CD) Wald F-statistic for the strength of the first stage identification. This statistic can be evaluated against the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values for 2 endogenous variable with 4 instruments.

Column (1) shows that, after controlling for endogeneity, the sign on the interaction coefficient reverses: in 2007, when the population of a county is larger because of underlying geological reasons, the effect on employment is larger in a sector with high storage costs than in a sector with low storage costs.

<sup>39</sup>Burchfield, Overman, Puga, and Turner (2006) and Duranton and Turner (2017) use instruments based on this data as an exogenous shifter for density of population. We find that the percentage composition of a county area laying on top of different types of aquifers results in a good first stage to exogenously shift population.

<sup>40</sup>This geological information comes from the United States Geological Service, Principal Aquifers of the 48 Conterminous United States, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. We use standard geoprocessing software to compute the county composition.

Moving from the minimum to the maximum average frequency changes the growth in employment by 2.67 percent for a 10% increase in population, which corresponds to  $100 \cdot 0.267/\beta \approx 34\%$  of the baseline impact of population.<sup>41</sup> Column (2) and (3) show the same regression run in 1998 and for the stacked sample of two cross-sections with year fixed effects. Obviously, time trends may be operating differentially for different areas and sectors, and this may affect our estimates in the stacked regression. In column (4) and (5), we allow for heterogeneous time trends across sectors (both columns), and across U.S. states (column (4)) or commuting zones (column (5)). Our estimated coefficient becomes somewhat smaller, but stays significant. In the most restrictive specification, moving from the smallest to the largest frequency changes the employment response by 1.84% per 10% increase in population, or 15% of the baseline impact of population.<sup>42</sup> In all cases, the CD statistics are above the Stock-Yogo (2005) 5% significance critical values for a 5% maximal bias of the 2SLS estimate relative to the OLS (critical value 11.04).<sup>43</sup>

The regressions shown so far indicate that if storage costs are reasonably proxied by the observed frequency of transactions, consumers’ spatial choices have relevant consequences on economic outcomes: in response to larger population, all sectors want their output to grow; however, the desire to economize on distance is stronger (and hence the substitution of land with employment growth is greater) in sectors where storage costs are high. To investigate how this equilibrium impact comes about, we ask next how employment is increasing in the county. In practice, an increase in local sectoral employment may be generated entirely at the intensive margin, i.e., via more employees per store. If time savings are important, however, we might expect that demand in high storage cost sectors is served by a higher density of stores, i.e., via a lower average distance between consumers and stores. Our model does not have a specific prediction about this mechanism, but suggests that the average distance between consumers and output should be smaller (and grow less with population) in high- $g$  sectors (Equation (21)).

Table 9 and 10 show that indeed, the geographical concentration of stores grows relatively faster with population in high storage-cost relative to low storage-cost sectors. In particular, Table 9 replicates Table 8 but uses the log number of establishments in a given county-sector-time as a dependent variable. Estimates on the interaction coefficient are now two to three times larger and strongly significant. These results are consistent with a situation where, in response to a common increase in population, the increase in demand is more geographically concentrated for high storage costs goods and services, where people

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<sup>41</sup>The coefficient  $\beta$  on  $\ln pop_{ct}$  is influenced, in general, by all other general equilibrium effects coming through a larger market. Here and below, we compare the impact of the range in log frequency to  $\beta$  to give a broad sense of the magnitude, but such an effect should be interpreted with caution.

<sup>42</sup>In this most conservative specification, employment is predicted to grow between 12.4% and 13.2% for a 10% increase in population. The fact that sectoral employment increases faster than population is suggestive of home market effects mechanisms (e.g., Krugman, 1980). In our case, however, this effect is generated by the existence of a fixed cost of travel that does not vary with volume, and heterogeneous storage costs playing the role of “transportation” cost in new economic geography model: when storage costs are high, demand is concentrated, and firms locate closer to consumers (i.e., they become denser, thereby reducing the average distance to their customers). Our note of caution in the previous footnote still applies.

<sup>43</sup>An alternative way of assessing the threat of weak instruments is to compare 2SLS estimates to Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) ones. LIML has better small sample properties in presence of weak instruments, and large differences between 2SLS and LIML estimates may point to instrument weakness. We replicate in Appendix C.8 the main tables of this section and show that coefficients and standard errors are indeed very similar. In appendix C.9 we also replicate the main tables of the section using all six aquifer types reported in the U.S. Geological Service data.



Table 8: **Local employment and frequency of purchase**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:		county-sector log employment			
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log population	0.773*** (0.095)	0.905*** (0.071)	0.835*** (0.080)	0.820*** (0.123)	1.225*** (0.084)
Log population $\times$ log frequency	0.142*** (0.048)	0.104** (0.042)	0.124*** (0.043)	0.114*** (0.042)	0.098*** (0.038)
Log income per capita	1.614*** (0.140)	1.601*** (0.136)	1.622*** (0.134)	1.766*** (0.295)	1.016*** (0.202)
Log land area	0.104*** (0.012)	0.136*** (0.011)	0.120*** (0.011)	0.183*** (0.034)	-0.024 (0.043)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.82	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.85
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	205.05	223.19	435.95	233.1	346.08

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

desire frequent transactions and shorter trips; the supply side then responds by increasing employment via a relatively denser presence of stores. The most conservative estimates imply that the highest storage-cost sector has a 2.72% larger number of stores relative to the lowest storage-cost sectors, when population increases 10% (about 33% of the baseline impact of population). Table 10 shows that, if anything, stores become relatively smaller on average: using estimates in column (5), the size of the average store in the highest storage cost sector grows 0.9% slower relative to the lowest storage cost sector, when population grows 10% (about -21% of the baseline impact of the population). In particular, the lack of net employment response in 1998 is due to a relative increase in the number of stores that is almost completely offset by a relative decrease in the number of employees per store.

Taken together, these results paint a picture consistent with the importance of spatial consumption patterns for local economic outcomes. In sectors with high storage costs, consumers are more willing to trade off larger batches with frequent trips, but to do so they choose to travel shorter distances. In areas with a larger population, firms in high storage-cost sectors face then a relatively stronger incentive to increase production by economizing on land; hence, employment increases relatively more. Moreover, these differences manifest themselves in a denser network of local suppliers, which reduces the average

Table 9: **Number of establishments and frequency of purchase**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	county-sector log number of establishments				
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log population	0.492*** (0.079)	0.606*** (0.057)	0.546*** (0.066)	0.560*** (0.092)	0.814*** (0.059)
Log population $\times$ log frequency	0.180*** (0.040)	0.152*** (0.036)	0.167*** (0.037)	0.155*** (0.035)	0.145*** (0.032)
Log income per capita	1.440*** (0.117)	1.372*** (0.101)	1.418*** (0.106)	1.435*** (0.215)	0.939*** (0.133)
Log land area	0.100*** (0.011)	0.135*** (0.008)	0.118*** (0.009)	0.160*** (0.026)	0.035 (0.029)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.86	0.88	0.87	0.87	0.90
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	205.05	223.19	435.95	233.1	346.08

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

distance between consumers and shops.

Our results can be related to the classic proximity–concentration tradeoff in foreign direct investment (FDI) (see for example Horstmann and Markusen, 1992; Brainard, 1997). In those theories, firms choose whether to serve a foreign market via exports or the opening of a new establishment. We cast a parallel whereby firms in a city can choose whether to serve customers in a neighboring city by expecting them to travel (“export”) or opening a new establishment close to them (“FDI”): in sectors with high storage costs, demand is more localized and the “FDI” option becomes more attractive. In this sense, our results also contribute to the literature on establishment location.

Finally, our results are reminiscent of intuitions that can be traced back to Von Thunen’s model of rural land use.<sup>44</sup> In his theory, a central city is surrounded by (concentric circles of) rural land with different possible uses: the transportation costs to the central market and perishability of different agricultural products determine how far from the city different products are produced: more perishable products like dairy (which may have higher storage costs) should be the ones produced closer to the market.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup>See for example Von Thunen (1966) for his 1826 model. Karádi and Koren (2017) explore a more modern version of the same argument.

<sup>45</sup>For an empirical test of the Von Thunen model, see for example Fafchamps and Shilpi (2003) about Nepal.

Table 10: **Number of employees per establishment and frequency of purchase**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	county-sector log number of employees per establishment				
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log population	0.281*** (0.041)	0.299*** (0.036)	0.288*** (0.035)	0.260*** (0.054)	0.411*** (0.047)
Log population $\times$ log frequency	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.048** (0.025)	-0.043** (0.022)	-0.040* (0.022)	-0.047** (0.021)
Log land area	0.004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.023 (0.015)	-0.058** (0.026)
Log income per capita	0.174*** (0.059)	0.229*** (0.064)	0.204*** (0.058)	0.331*** (0.127)	0.077 (0.117)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.51	0.53	0.52	0.52	0.54
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	205.05	223.19	435.95	233.1	346.08

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

### 5.3 Robustness

In this section we explore some further robustness checks, discuss some implications of our results, and identify some possible shortcomings of our analysis.

**Likely pure consumers.** A potential concern with our results is that in the data, an increase in population generates both an increase in consumers and an increase in employable workers. The increase in workers, by changing labor supply and hence wages, might affect the incentive of firms to expand; one might further imagine that the expansion is correlated with sectoral characteristics that are in turn correlated with the frequency of transactions. In this case, one could measure a positive interaction between frequency of transactions and population for reasons unrelated to consumer behavior.

To address this concern, we construct a measure of “likely pure consumers”, that is, population that lives in the county but is not employed anywhere. This includes for example young and retired residents, and working-age population out of the labor force. We then re-run our analysis in Tables 8-10 only exploiting variation due to differences in non-working residents.

There are two advantages of using this measure. First, by construction, changes in likely pure consumers are less likely to affect employment via labor supply, and more via changes in demand for products. Second, since by construction they do not work, their consumption is not driven by possible co-location of

workplace and consumption choices. The disadvantage of using this measure is that workers are consumers too, and hence the empirical analysis misses this chunk of the demand.

Table 11 reports the results for the overall employment response. We note first that the baseline level for likely pure consumers is about 3 to 8 log-points lower than the population level: this suggests that indeed focusing on increases in non-working population reduces the significance of equilibrium effects via labor supply. We further find that the differential response of employment as a function of frequency is still positive when we focus on likely pure consumers. Moreover, the slopes of this interaction are between 1.1 and 2.8 log-points larger than the corresponding specifications in Table 8 above. Comparing the response of number of establishments (Table 11) and employees per establishment (Table 13) to the baseline Tables 9 and 10, we find that most of the increase in the interaction term comes from the establishment margin: in other words, when we approximate pure consumers, the importance of the density of stores grows. These findings are consistent with the view that consumer mobility contributes to shape sector-level differences in local equilibrium outcomes in terms of employment and its composition.

Table 11: **Local employment and frequency of purchase:  
Likely pure consumers (L.p.c.)**

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log likely pure consumers	0.695*** (0.099)	0.822*** (0.076)	0.754*** (0.085)	0.834*** (0.125)	1.202*** (0.085)
Log likely pure consumers $\times$ log frequency	0.161*** (0.048)	0.132*** (0.044)	0.148*** (0.044)	0.125*** (0.042)	0.112*** (0.038)
Log income per capita	2.032*** (0.132)	2.111*** (0.127)	2.081*** (0.126)	2.007*** (0.269)	1.397*** (0.189)
Log land area	0.105*** (0.014)	0.132*** (0.012)	0.119*** (0.012)	0.175*** (0.035)	-0.017 (0.045)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.80	0.83	0.81	0.83	0.85
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	225.95	238.1	472.98	224.19	357.08

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Commuting-Adjusted Population.** It is natural to think that commuting may affect spatial

Table 12: **Number of establishments and frequency of purchase:  
Likely pure consumers (L.p.c.)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	county-sector log number of establishments				
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log likely pure consumers	0.426*** (0.083)	0.529*** (0.062)	0.475*** (0.071)	0.553*** (0.095)	0.787*** (0.060)
Log likely pure consumers $\times$ log frequency	0.200*** (0.041)	0.188*** (0.039)	0.195*** (0.039)	0.173*** (0.036)	0.166*** (0.033)
Log income per capita	1.750*** (0.110)	1.757*** (0.095)	1.762*** (0.100)	1.637*** (0.199)	1.215*** (0.127)
Log land area	0.101*** (0.012)	0.131*** (0.009)	0.117*** (0.010)	0.156*** (0.026)	0.039 (0.030)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.84	0.87	0.85	0.87	0.90
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	225.95	238.1	472.98	224.19	357.08

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

spending patterns. Workers may make some of their purchases near their workplace or along the commuting path. Moreover, households overall may become more familiar with shopping options next to the workplace locations of some of their members. We try to address data limitations along this dimension by constructing a measure of commuting-adjusted population. In particular, we multiply the county population by the share of residents who work in the same county from Monte et al. (2018). Although imperfect, this measure has the advantage of capturing better the heterogeneity across counties in the degree of local expenditure arising from deeper knowledge of local environment, or joint work-shopping decisions. On the other hand, this measure has the disadvantage of introducing a stronger feedback via labor supply linkages.

Table 14 reports the results for the total employment response. We again start by noting the effect on the baseline employment, which is now around 13 to 20 log points larger in almost all specifications. These findings support our intuition that the commuting-adjusted population measure captures to a larger degree variation induced by home-workplace commuting within counties, and their related labor-supply equilibrium effects.<sup>46</sup> The differential response of employment as a function of frequency is again positive

<sup>46</sup>A further natural consequence of giving a greater weight to employment-related considerations is that our instrumenting strategy becomes somewhat less appropriate, which is reflected in generally lower Sanderson-Windermeijer conditional F-

Table 13: **Number of employees per establishment and frequency of purchase:  
Likely pure consumers (L.p.c.)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	county-sector log employees per establishment				
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log likely pure consumers	0.269*** (0.040)	0.293*** (0.035)	0.279*** (0.033)	0.281*** (0.054)	0.415*** (0.046)
Log likely pure consumers $\times$ log frequency	-0.039 (0.024)	-0.055** (0.024)	-0.047** (0.021)	-0.048** (0.021)	-0.053*** (0.020)
Log land area	0.005 (0.006)	0.000 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.019 (0.015)	-0.057** (0.026)
Log income per capita	0.282*** (0.050)	0.354*** (0.056)	0.319*** (0.050)	0.370*** (0.115)	0.182* (0.106)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.50	0.53	0.52	0.52	0.54
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	225.95	238.1	472.98	224.19	357.08

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

and larger than the corresponding baseline specifications in Table 8 by 2 to 4 log points. This increase is now generated by even denser but smaller stores (Tables 14) and employees per establishment (Table 16) with respect to the baseline.

**Fixed costs.** In Tables 8-10, we have argued that an exogenous increase in population tends to generate a demand that is more geographically concentrated for high storage-cost sectors than low storage-cost ones. Heterogeneous fixed costs across industries, however, may also affect the density of establishments and hence confound our estimates. Similar to storage costs, direct observations of fixed costs are hard to obtain. However, a reasonable proxy is the economy-wide ratio of total employment to total establishments in a sector-year, i.e., the average establishment size. If fixed costs are high, increasing returns to scale are more important, and we should expect a higher employees-to-establishment ratio. In what follows, we will refer to this ratio simply as “fixed costs”.

As we have noted in footnote 22, the correlation between log average frequency of transactions and log fixed costs across sectors is only 0.12, and statistically indistinguishable from zero: hence, it is not empirically true that low fixed cost sectors are those where transactions are more frequent. However, as a reasonable first way to control for this potential issue, we have used sector fixed effects rather than the

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statistics. These results should then be interpreted with some caution in mind.

Table 14: **Local employment and frequency of purchase:  
Commuting-Adjusted Population (C.a.p.)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:				county-sector log employment	
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log commuting-adjusted Population	0.900*** (0.108)	1.024*** (0.086)	0.958*** (0.092)	1.108*** (0.115)	1.027*** (0.085)
Log commuting-adjusted population $\times$ log frequency	0.199** (0.082)	0.143** (0.071)	0.172** (0.073)	0.135** (0.067)	0.145** (0.068)
Log income per capita	1.089*** (0.118)	1.029*** (0.115)	1.071*** (0.111)	0.774*** (0.247)	0.983*** (0.155)
Log land area	-0.099*** (0.011)	-0.091*** (0.012)	-0.094*** (0.011)	-0.108*** (0.039)	-0.086** (0.036)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.84	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.86
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	84.43	84.22	169.16	113.12	168.14

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

frequency of transactions in levels in all regressions in these tables: those fixed effects absorb any factor varying at the industry level, including the true measure of fixed costs.

As a second response, we can directly interact sector-level proxies for fixed costs with population in a set of extended regressions. This new interaction variable is again instrumented with the interaction between fixed costs and county geological composition; the level of fixed costs is again absorbed by the sector-year fixed effects. If fixed costs are driving the results via their effect on local density, we should expect the interaction of population with log frequency to lose significance.

Table 17 replicates the most conservative specifications in columns (5) and (6) for Tables 8-10: all the other columns behave similarly. Columns (1) and (2) replicate Table 8, where the dependent variable is employment. The coefficient on the interaction between frequency and population stays positive and of very similar magnitude. Moreover, in response to larger population, sectoral employment does not seem to change differentially as a function of fixed costs. The remaining 4 columns look at the margins of these changes: columns (3) and (4) replicate columns (5) and (6) of Table 9, where the dependent variable is the log number of establishments; columns (5) and (6) replicate the last two columns of Table 10, which consider employees per store. We find that controlling for fixed costs tilt these interactions slightly towards zero; the interaction with fixed costs are not estimated to be significant per se.

Overall, we read these results as further evidence that consumers' mobility impacts local economic outcomes.

Table 15: **Number of establishments and frequency of purchase:  
Commuting-Adjusted Population (C.a.p.)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	county-sector log number of establishments				
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log commuting-adjusted Population	0.548*** (0.099)	0.663*** (0.078)	0.603*** (0.085)	0.734*** (0.088)	0.639*** (0.075)
Log commuting-adjusted population $\times$ log frequency	0.256*** (0.077)	0.213*** (0.070)	0.235*** (0.072)	0.201*** (0.064)	0.210*** (0.066)
Log income per capita	1.061*** (0.090)	0.946*** (0.075)	1.013*** (0.078)	0.722*** (0.161)	0.917*** (0.117)
Log land area	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.008)	-0.041*** (0.007)	-0.056** (0.026)	-0.011 (0.027)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.88	0.89	0.89	0.90	0.90
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	84.43	84.22	169.16	113.12	168.14

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Selection into method of payment.** It has been documented (see for example Wang and Wolman, 2016) that transactions of smaller dollar size tend to be executed with cash, rather than with other means. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to control for this choice. In unreported results, we find that the average transaction value increases slightly with distance, controlling for consumer characteristics; hence, short trips are less likely to be reported in our data. On the one hand, this selection will make gravity appear less important than it actually is, since we are removing expenditure that occurs close-by; this effect will, in fact, be stronger in sectors where the average distance traveled is shorter, i.e., in sectors with a high frequency of transactions. Via this first channel, the relation between gravity and frequency documented in Figure 3 should be steeper than we measure. On the other hand, this selection will also remove more of the short trips (which are of higher frequency) than the longer trips (which are of low frequency). Via this second channel, the relation should be flatter than we measure. The fact that these two forces tend to compensate each other makes it hard to offer clear predictions on the net effect of these unobservable choices, and hence our results in the first two sections should be interpreted with this limitation in mind.

**Trip chaining.** It is natural to think that one way in which consumers optimize their shopping behavior is to make a number of possibly unrelated purchases on a single trip to a commercial area. For example, Shoag and Veuger (2017) document positive externalities of “big-box” stores on neighboring



Table 16: **Number of employees per establishment and frequency of purchase: Commuting-Adjusted Population (C.a.p.)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	county-sector log number of employees per establishment				
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log commuting-adjusted Population	0.352*** (0.059)	0.361*** (0.052)	0.355*** (0.049)	0.374*** (0.074)	0.388*** (0.047)
Log commuting-adjusted population $\times$ log frequency	-0.057 (0.039)	-0.070* (0.040)	-0.063* (0.034)	-0.066* (0.035)	-0.065* (0.034)
Log land area	-0.051*** (0.008)	-0.055*** (0.008)	-0.053*** (0.008)	-0.052** (0.026)	-0.076*** (0.025)
Log income per capita	0.029 (0.076)	0.083 (0.074)	0.058 (0.071)	0.052 (0.161)	0.066 (0.105)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.51	0.54	0.53	0.53	0.55
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	84.43	84.22	169.16	113.12	168.14

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

businesses via the increased local foot traffic. Our data is unfortunately too coarse to speak to that aspect: out of all account-transaction dates in our data, only 25% have more than one transaction per day, and less than 1% have at least 5 transactions; of the cases in which there is more than one transaction, 80% are multiple transactions occurring in the same broad sector. How would our results be impacted if this was the predominant behavior of consumers? Suppose that consumers always travel to one mall and buy food every trip, but apparel every four trips. In that case, we would expect to see no relation between gravity and the frequency of transactions, since the frequency of purchase differs, while the distance stays constant. More importantly, the frequency of transactions in the credit card data would less likely predict heterogeneity in the impact of population on density. The fact that we see at least some impact is indicative that trip chaining is not the only relevant feature of the data.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>47</sup>Shopping centers accounted for around 28% of total consumer expenditure in 2005, the latest year available (see Table 1061, Section 22, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012; and Consumer Expenditures in 2005, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, report 998). A shopping center is “a group of architecturally unified commercial establishments built on a site that is planned, developed, owned, and managed as an operating unit related in its location, size, and type of shops to the trade area that the unit serves.”

Table 17: **Local outcome responses controlling for fixed costs**

Dependent variable:	county-sector log employment		county-sector log establishments		county-sector log employees per estab.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log population	0.709*** (0.128)	1.120*** (0.117)	0.493*** (0.132)	0.758*** (0.099)	0.216** (0.085)
Log population $\times$ log frequency	0.113*** (0.042)	0.097** (0.038)	0.151*** (0.034)	0.141*** (0.031)	-0.038* (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Log population $\times$ log fixed costs	0.044 (0.030)	0.042 (0.030)	0.026 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)	0.017 (0.033)	0.019 (0.034)
Log land area	0.183*** (0.034)	-0.024 (0.043)	0.161*** (0.026)	0.036 (0.029)	0.023 (0.015)	-0.060** (0.026)
Log income per capita	1.765*** (0.294)	1.012*** (0.202)	1.440*** (0.216)	0.943*** (0.133)	0.324*** (0.125)	0.069 (0.118)
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-square	0.83	0.85	0.87	0.90	0.53	0.54
$N$	121,336	121,336	121,336	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	155.19	230.38	155.19	230.38	155.19	230.38

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ 

## 6 Conclusion

Using detailed geographical information from more than 1.7 million credit card transactions by individual consumers, we document several stylized facts regarding the geography of consumption. We find considerable heterogeneity across industries in the overall impact of distance and in the importance of extensive margins. We identify a new sector characteristic that contributes to determine consumer spatial behavior – the storability/durability of the product or service. Differences in gravity across industries are correlated with the frequency of transactions, a proxy for storability/durability. This relationship suggests that consumers actively choose the spatial margin of their purchases considering the storability/durability of a sector’s output, and an analysis of individual-level behavior further supports this view: sectors which are more frequently purchased tend to be transacted more locally by richer individuals, and their spatial distribution of transactions tends to be less sensitive to rain episodes.

We finally present evidence consistent with consumer mobility having implications for local equilibrium economic outcomes like employment, store density and store size. In response to larger population, sectors with high storage costs have a larger increase in local employment density, which comes from increases in the number of establishments operating locally, rather than from increases in the size of the establishment. These findings are compatible with a simple theoretical framework where merchants are aware of consumers’ desire to economize on travel time, and hence substitute land with labor at a

faster rate for high storage-cost sectors in response to higher demand. They appear robust to measures that capture variation in likely consumers only and variation in consumption patterns partially driven by commuting flows.

Our results are subject to a number of caveats that arise from the limited nature of our data and from the attempt to bring under a unified logic consumption markets that are potentially quite different. On the other hand, our findings describe broad patterns of consumer behavior for a large portion of economic activity in modern economies. Taken together, they suggest the importance of storability/durability to consumer behavior, and that consumer mobility may play an important role in the formation of local equilibrium outcomes. Hence, it may be fruitful to incorporate these margins in future analyses of the consequence of local shocks and place-based policies. Our results also provide important information for the study of the liberalization of international trade and investment in services: entry and location decisions of foreign firm establishments in a local market will be shaped, among other things, by the different degrees of localization of their product's market.

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# Web Appendix for “The Geography of Consumption” (Not for Publication)

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## A Data Processing

### A.1 Merchant codes

The transaction data classifies merchants using the MCC classification. Classifications of merchants come at a “broad” and “narrow” level. We exclude narrow merchant categories that either refer to a transaction which can be executed without involving physical movement of a provider or a customer, or those that are of commercial, rather than private, nature. These categories broadly include items like airlines, cruise lines, direct marketers, online marketers, insurance, financial institutions, business services, political organizations, and other codes reserved for cash advances and balance transfers. The result is a classification of 27 broad categories.

### A.2 Transaction data

The raw transaction data comes from U.S. credit card statements issued between March and October, 2003. Some earlier transactions still appear in the file as the date in which they are recorded, which may not necessarily be the date of the transaction. There are originally 3,530,027 records in the data for 134,008 unique accounts. Each record comes from a line in an individual credit card statement. A record contains the account number, transaction date and post date, amount and type of the transaction, the original merchant category code (MCC), and string information on the merchant name and location. After merging this data with the merchant codes above, 1,247,438 transactions are dropped. Of these dropped observations, around 1.1 million records are related to 1) cash advances, interest, late fees, account adjustments, balance transfers, card payments and similar activities not generated by actual purchases; 2) direct marketers and telemarketers, 3) unknown merchants. We also exclude transactions relating to educational services (where the account-holder likely pays for somebody else), and transportation services and vehicle rentals, where location of transaction and location of service use are different. We further keep only records that are actual purchases (“transaction type” code equal to 253) originating on or after February 1, 2003. This leaves us with 2,156,978 transactions from 80,087 accounts.

### A.3 Account data

The account data for the months of March to October 2003 originally comprises 2,272,825 records for 249,032 accounts. Among other things, each line contains the record date (year and month) for the entry, the account number, a person ID, the date of birth and gender of the account holder, an external status



code, a reported income, a 5 digit ZIP code and the state of residence. Different lines for the same account may be present in the account data because of various events that affect the account (the end of the billing cycle or updates to the month end balance, for example). 28,928 observations appear to be of inactive cards (no information for state, ZIP code, and date of birth), so we drop them. Towards matching the account information with the transaction data, we start by keeping unique combinations of account number, date of birth, state, ZIP code and record date. We find 4 accounts for which the date of birth of the account holder changes, and we make that information consistent by picking the oldest date of birth. After this adjustment, almost all records are unique within account number-event date. We drop three accounts, where the same set of several ZIP codes are reported for each record date, making it difficult to find a residence location. This processing leaves us with 1,746,667 account number-event date records for 239,369 unique accounts. This step tells us the residence location of an account whenever an account event occurs. Next, we reconstruct where the account holder resided for each of the transactions described above.

#### **A.4 Matching transactions and account data**

We match the transaction and account data to assign a location of residence to each purchase. For a given account, we match the month of the transaction in the first file to the event month in the account data, if possible. For those observations where this is not possible, we match the closest account information that precedes the transaction; when this second option is not feasible, we match it with the earliest information following the transaction. The matching process leaves us with 2,138,575 transactions matched from 78,418 unique accounts. Out of the totality of matched transactions, only 151,725 did not find the exact event month in the account information: 142,520 records among these come from transactions in February 2003, which are then matched with information in March.

#### **A.5 Extracting merchant location name**

The data provides us with a full merchant name string (including usually merchant name, location/phone number and state) and a merchant name string. Here we explain how we extract the potential city and state names of each transaction.

We first extract the merchant state. The state of the merchant is typically located at the end of the full merchant name. We extract the last two characters of the merchant name string if the last three start with a space. Only 1,588 transactions do not meet this requirement: in most cases, the last two letters still represent a state (or a foreign country), but we won't be able to rule out false positives. We match these states with a list of U.S. states and country abbreviations to verify that we have extracted U.S. states. We match only 52% of the 1,588 thousand problematic observations, and more than 98% of the other transactions. Keeping only transactions where a U.S. state could be identified leaves us with 2,106,552 observations.

To identify the set of observations we might match with a location name, we start by extracting a potential location name. To do so, we remove from the full merchant name string the merchant name

that the data provides (from the left of the string) and the state we have extracted (from the right of the string). This procedure generates 7,777 observations with an empty potential location name.

We then mark transactions of common online providers<sup>48</sup> and find the words "Online", "On Line", ".com", ".net" in 100,265 observations. We mark observations where the final part of the string before the state is a phone number – these are typically online stores – and find 188,316 of them. We are left with 1,901,658 transactions that may contain city names, 90% of those for which a state name could be found, for 73,385 unique accounts. Note that the largest contributor to the drop in observations is transactions with a phone number rather than a location at the end of the merchant name. We will attempt to match this list of location names with a list of U.S. city and place names from the U.S. Census. Before turning to the different steps in that match, we will discuss briefly how we recover the list of cities.

## A.6 List of cities and places in the United States

We construct a list of city names and states from the year 2000 U.S. Census Gazetteer List of Places and the year 2000 U.S. Census list of County Subdivisions. The List of Places contains incorporated places and unincorporated Census Designated Places (CDP); it excludes towns in the New England states, New York, and Wisconsin, and boroughs in New York (treated as Minor Civil Divisions, or MCDs). The list of County Subdivisions contains, among other things, MCDs (called for example townships, parishes, districts), and Census County Divisions. Both lists contain, among other things, population in 2000 and latitude and longitude of the location.

While FIPS codes are unique, our match to merchants will be on a location name. Hence it may happen that within the list, we have more than one record with the same name (for example, we may have “Mountain View city” and “Mountain View, CDP”). In those cases, we attribute to a name the coordinates with the highest population in 2000.<sup>49</sup>

## A.7 Finding location names in the transactions data and computing distances

We attempt to find the name of a city in four passes. First, we match the location name and state identified above with the list of U.S. Places. We immediately find a match for 1,454,166 out of the 1,901,658 we intend to match, 76% of our observations. Out of the 447,492 transaction with no match, 122,737 have names and states that match the MCD list. We assign "match quality" equal to 10 to those transactions matched at this first pass. We have 324,755 transactions with no location information (about 17% of the transactions) that we cannot match exactly.

In several instances, the name of a city in the transaction data is truncated from the original. The second pass of the match involves matching truncated versions of city names from the U.S. Census to location names in the transaction data. We assign “match quality” equal to 9 to those cases where the

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<sup>48</sup>We identify Paypal, QVC, AOL, Shutterfly, MUI Movies Unlimited, Amazon, Microsoft, Expedia, Untd.com, Ebay, and Netflix.

<sup>49</sup>An alternative could have been to compute the average longitude and latitude of all the occurrences, weighted by population. However, we would still need a unique FIPS code identifier, since accounts will be associated to place codes, not names. This difference makes the approach infeasible.

name of a location in the transaction data, of length  $n$ , matches the first  $n$  characters of a city name. We further assign “match quality” equal to 8 where, for a location name of length  $n$ , there is a match in the first  $n - 1$  characters. Obviously, it can happen that one city in the transaction data can be matched to more than one city in the Census list. We only keep cases where the match is either unique or there are two matches. We solve the two-matches case as follows: if the match is to a Census place and to a minor civil division, we keep the coordinates of the Census place; otherwise, we take the place with the highest population and downgrade the “match quality” by 1. With the second pass, we are able to recover 114,056 observations.

In other instances, some locations may not be matched because of extra spaces or special characters (e.g., “St. Louis” vs. “St Louis”). In the third pass, we “standardize” the name of the remaining unmatched locations by removing all spaces, commas, full stops, and dashes both in the transaction and in the Census files. We assign “match quality” equal to 9 to these observations. With this process, we recover additional 20,796 observations, bringing the number of matched transactions to 1,711,755.

Finally, we identify the remaining unmatched locations with at least one thousand transactions and fix those matches by hand. There are 44 of these instances. We recover 31,664 observations more (also assigned “match quality” equal to 10), bringing the total to 1,743,419 matched transactions, or 91.7% of the transactions we intended to match. For these matched transactions we can attribute a latitude and longitude of the merchant.

The account data provides ZIP code information for each account. We match these ZIP codes against Census Places and (if we don’t find a match) MCD lists using concordances for the year 2000 provided by the census. For the few cases in which we cannot find a correspondence, we use analogous ZIP-places and ZIP-MCD concordances for the year 2010. In some cases, a ZIP code may span two or more geographical units: we keep in that case the unit that accounts for the highest fraction of population of the ZIP code. We then have analogous geographies for account and merchant sides, and can compute the bilateral distance between the centroid of the account and shopping locations for each transaction.

The process of matching ZIP codes to geographical areas leads to a small loss in observations. Our working sample has 1,722,873 transactions (90.6% of the transactions we intended to match) and 71,377 accounts. In our classification, 92.2% of observations have match quality equal to 10, and 7.2% have match quality 9, leaving less than 1% of observations with quality 8 (0.61%) and 7 (0.01%).

## **B Theoretical derivations**

### **B.1 Equilibrium Price**

To pin down the constants of integration, we use implications of our conjectured land allocation. In particular, since  $j(t)$  is decreasing, the person with the lowest travel cost,  $t = 1$ , will travel the maximum distance,  $j_{\max} \equiv j(1)$ . At that distance, the price of the product will have to be zero (otherwise, some firms would have an incentive to enter slightly farther).

Using (17), it follows that

$$-c_1 \exp \{\alpha j_{\max}\} = c_2 \exp \{-\alpha j_{\max}\} \quad (\text{B.1})$$

Using the same information in the implicit function for the distance traveled, when  $t = 1 \implies j(1) = j_{\max}$ , and hence,

$$\left(\frac{2g}{\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \frac{1}{\alpha} = c_2 \exp \{-\alpha j_{\max}\} - c_1 \exp \{\alpha j_{\max}\} \quad (\text{B.2})$$

We can substitute (B.1) in the last equation to obtain,

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{2g}{\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \frac{1}{\alpha} &= c_2 \exp \{-\alpha j_{\max}\} + c_1 \exp \{-\alpha j_{\max}\} \\ c_2 &= \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{2g}{\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \frac{1}{\alpha} \exp \{\alpha j_{\max}\} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.3})$$

and hence

$$c_1 = -\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{2g}{\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \frac{1}{\alpha} \exp \{-\alpha j_{\max}\}$$

We can then rewrite the price function as

$$\begin{aligned} p(j) &= -\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{2g}{\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \frac{1}{\alpha} \exp \{-\alpha j_{\max}\} \exp \{\alpha j\} + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{2g}{\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \frac{1}{\alpha} \exp \{\alpha j_{\max}\} \exp \{-\alpha j\} = \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{2g}{\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \frac{1}{\alpha} [\exp \{\alpha (j_{\max} - j)\} - \exp \{-\alpha (j_{\max} - j)\}] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.4})$$

and the implicit equation for distance,

$$t = \frac{1}{2} \exp \{\alpha (j_{\max} - j)\} + \exp \{-\alpha (j_{\max} - j)\} \quad (\text{B.5})$$

The individual with the highest  $t$  travels as close as possible, i.e.,  $t = 2 \implies j(2) = 0$ . Imposing this in the equation for distance traveled, the value of  $j_{\max}$  is then implicitly defined by

$$4 - \exp \{\alpha j_{\max}\} = \exp \{-\alpha j_{\max}\}$$

For  $j_{\max} \geq 0$ , the LHS starts at 3, is decreasing and concave, and crosses zero once; the RHS starts at 1, is decreasing and convex, and never crosses zero. Hence, there is a unique solution  $j_{\max}(\alpha)$ . Totally differentiating this equation with respect to  $j_{\max}$  and  $\alpha$ ,

$$\frac{dj_{\max}}{d\alpha} = -\frac{j_{\max}}{\alpha} < 0$$

This implies that less land is used if  $\alpha$  is higher, and also that the elasticity of  $j_{\max}$  to  $\alpha$  is  $-1$ , i.e., the product  $\alpha \cdot j_{\max}(\alpha)$  is a constant independent of  $\alpha$ .

## B.2 Aggregate Implications

**Lemma 2** . *The average slope of the expenditure function  $X(j)$  between  $j \in [0, j_{\max}]$  (unweighted, weighted by the number of agents  $n(j)$ , and weighted by total expenditure  $X(j)$ ) grows more negative when  $g$  is higher.*

**Proof.** Recall from (19) that

$$p(j) = \frac{1}{2^{1/2}\alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{-1/4} g^{1/4} N^{1/2} \cdot [\exp\{\alpha(j_{\max} - j)\} - \exp\{-\alpha(j_{\max} - j)\}], \text{ with } \bar{p} \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{2}{\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2}$$

Differentiating with respect to  $j$ , we have

$$p'(j) = - \left(\frac{g}{2\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \cdot [\exp\{\alpha(j_{\max} - j)\} + \exp\{-\alpha(j_{\max} - j)\}]$$

The expenditure function  $X(j)$  has slope

$$X'(j) = 2\bar{x} \cdot p(j) p'(j)$$

The average unweighted slope over  $j \in [0, j_{\max}]$  is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{j_{\max}} \int_0^{j_{\max}} X'(j) dj &= \frac{2\bar{x}}{j_{\max}} \int_0^{j_{\max}} p(j) p'(j) dj = - \left(\frac{g}{2\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{1/2}\alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{-1/4} g^{1/4} N^{1/2}\right) \cdot 2\bar{x} \frac{2 \sinh[\alpha \cdot j_{\max}]^2}{\alpha \cdot j_{\max}} = \\ &= - \frac{2 \sinh[\alpha \cdot j_{\max}]^2}{\alpha \cdot j_{\max}} \frac{\bar{x}}{\alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{-1/4} g^{3/4} N^{1/2} \end{aligned}$$

which is more negative when  $g$  is higher. The agents density-weighted average slope is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{j_{\max}} \int_0^{j_{\max}} n(j) X'(j) dj &= \frac{2\bar{x}}{j_{\max}} \int_0^{j_{\max}} n(j) p(j) p'(j) dj = \frac{2\bar{x}}{j_{\max}} \int_0^{j_{\max}} n(j) p(j) p'(j) dj \\ &= \frac{2\bar{x}}{j_{\max}} \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{2g}\right)^{1/2} \alpha^2 \int_0^{j_{\max}} p(j)^2 p'(j) dj = \frac{2\bar{x}}{j_{\max}} \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{2g}\right)^{1/2} \alpha^2 \int_0^{j_{\max}} p(j)^2 p'(j) dj = \\ &= - \left(\frac{g}{2\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \frac{2\bar{x}}{j_{\max}} \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{2g}\right)^{1/2} \alpha^2 \left(\frac{1}{2^{1/2}\alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{-1/4} g^{1/4} N^{1/2}\right)^2 \frac{8 \sinh[\alpha \cdot j_{\max}]^3}{3\alpha} = \\ &= - \frac{8 \sinh[\alpha \cdot j_{\max}]^3}{3\alpha \cdot j_{\max}} \bar{x} \left(\frac{\alpha_0 g^{1/4}}{N^{1/2} \bar{q}^{3/4}}\right)^2 \left(\frac{1}{2^{1/2}\alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{-1/4} g^{1/4} N^{1/2}\right)^2 = \\ &= - \frac{4 \sinh[\alpha \cdot j_{\max}]^3}{3\alpha \cdot j_{\max}} \bar{x} \frac{g}{\bar{q}} \end{aligned}$$

which is more negative when  $g$  is higher. The expenditure-weighted average slope is

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{1}{j_{\max}} \int_0^{j_{\max}} X(j) X'(j) dj = \frac{2\bar{x}^2}{j_{\max}} \int_0^{j_{\max}} p(j)^2 p'(j) dj = \\
& = -\frac{2\bar{x}^2}{j_{\max}} \left(\frac{g}{2\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \left(\frac{1}{2^{1/2}\alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{1/4} g^{1/4} N^{1/2}\right)^2 \frac{8 \sinh[\alpha \cdot j_{\max}]^3}{3\alpha} = \\
& = -\frac{\alpha_0^2}{2^{1/2}} \frac{4 \sinh[\alpha \cdot j_{\max}]^3}{3\alpha \cdot j_{\max}} \cdot Ng
\end{aligned}$$

which is again more negative if  $g$  is higher. ■

**Lemma 3** . *The frequency of trips increases with  $g$  for each individual.*

**Proof.** Since the frequency of trips is  $\bar{q}/z$ , we consider the behavior of the batch size. We show that agents buy smaller batches as  $g$  grows, implying they travel more frequently. From (11) and using the functional form assumptions, the batch size is

$$\tilde{z}(t; j) \equiv z(j(t; g), t) = \left(\frac{2\bar{q} \cdot tj(t; g)}{g}\right)^{1/2}$$

where we have evaluated the batch at the optimal distance for agent  $t$ ,  $j(t)$ , and we have made the dependence of the travel function on the parameter  $g$  explicit. As  $g$  grows, the optimal batch for given distance  $j(t; g)$  shrinks via the denominator. Also, the optimal distance traveled  $j(t; g)$  falls with  $g$  for every agent. To see this, recall that  $j(t)$  is implicitly defined by (B.5). Totally differentiating with respect to  $j$  and  $t$ ,

$$dt = -\left(\frac{\bar{q}}{2g}\right)^{1/2} p''(j) dj \implies \frac{dj}{dt} = -\left(\frac{2g}{\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \frac{1}{p''(j)} \implies j'(t) = -\left(\frac{2}{\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \frac{N}{\alpha_0^2 p(j(t))}$$

where we have used  $p''(j) = \alpha^2 p(j)$  from (16) and the definition of  $\alpha$ . Differentiating with respect to  $t$ , one can verify that  $j(t)$  is always convex:

$$j''(t) = +\left(\frac{2}{\bar{q}}\right)^{1/2} \frac{N}{\alpha_0^2 p(j)^2} p'(j) j'(t) > 0$$

since  $p' < 0$  and  $j' < 0$ . Consider the function  $j(t; g)$  in the space  $(t, j)$ , for two values  $g_1 < g_2$ . Since  $j_{\max}$  is decreasing in  $g$ ,  $j(1; g_1) > j(1; g_2)$ , that is,  $j(t; g)$  starts at a lower value when  $g$  is higher. Since both curves are always decreasing convex,  $j(1; g_1) > j(1; g_2)$  implies that they will cross at most once in  $t \in [1, 2]$ . However, for both values of  $g$ ,  $j(2; g) = 0$ ; hence, they cannot cross before, and  $j(t; g_1) > j(t; g_2) \forall t \in [1, 2)$ . For any agent  $t$ , the distance traveled decreases with  $g$  and so the batch size falls. This implies that the frequency of trips increases for every agent. ■

**Lemma 4** . The average distance at which output is produced is

$$\frac{\int_0^{j_{\max}} jQ(j) dj}{N\bar{q}} = \bar{d} \cdot \frac{N^{1/2}}{g^{1/4}}$$

**Proof.** Using the expression for output (8),

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\int_0^{j_{\max}} jQ(j) dj}{N\bar{q}} &= \frac{A^2}{2} \left( \frac{\bar{D}}{w} \right) \frac{1}{N\bar{q}} \int_0^{j_{\max}} jp(j) dj = \\ &= \frac{A^2}{2} \left( \frac{\bar{D}}{w} \right) \frac{1}{N\bar{q}} \frac{1}{2^{1/2}\alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{1/4} g^{1/4} N^{1/2} \cdot \frac{2[\sinh(\alpha j_{\max}) - \alpha j_{\max}]}{\alpha^2} = \\ &= \frac{A^2}{2} \left( \frac{\bar{D}}{w} \right) \frac{1}{N\bar{q}} \frac{1}{2^{1/2}\alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{1/4} g^{1/4} N^{1/2} \left( N^{1/2} \bar{q}^{3/4} \right)^2 \cdot \frac{2[\sinh(\alpha j_{\max}) - \alpha j_{\max}]}{(\alpha_0 g^{1/4})^2} = \\ &= \frac{[\sinh(\alpha j_{\max}) - \alpha j_{\max}]}{\alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{3/4} g^{-1/4} N^{1/2} = \bar{d} \cdot \frac{\bar{q}^{3/4} N^{1/2}}{g^{1/4}} \end{aligned}$$

■

**Lemma 5** . The equilibrium total employment is

$$L_{eq} = \bar{L} \cdot g^{1/4} N^{3/2}$$

and employment density is

$$\frac{L_{eq}}{j_{\max}} = \bar{\ell} \cdot g^{1/2} N$$

**Proof.** Using the expression for labor demand (7) and  $\beta = 1/2$

$$\begin{aligned} L_{eq} &\equiv \int_0^{j_{\max}} L(j) dj = \bar{D} \left( \frac{1}{2} \frac{A}{w} \right)^2 \int_0^{j_{\max}} p(j)^2 dj = \\ &= \bar{D} \left( \frac{1}{2} \frac{A}{w} \right)^2 \left( \frac{1}{2^{1/2}\alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{1/4} g^{1/4} N^{1/2} \right)^2 \left[ \frac{\sinh(2\alpha j_{\max})}{\alpha} - 2j_{\max} \right] = \\ &= \bar{D} \left( \frac{1}{2} \frac{A}{w} \right)^2 [\sinh(2\alpha j_{\max}) - 2j_{\max}\alpha] \left( \frac{1}{2^{1/2}\alpha_0} \right)^2 \frac{q^{5/4} g^{1/4} N^{3/2}}{2^{-1/4} A (\bar{D}/w)^{1/2}} = \\ &= \frac{\sinh(2\alpha j_{\max}) - 2j_{\max}\alpha}{2^{3/2} A \bar{D}^{1/2} w^{1/2}} \cdot q^{5/4} g^{1/4} N^{3/2} = \\ &= \bar{L} \cdot q^{5/4} g^{1/4} N^{3/2} \end{aligned}$$

with  $\bar{L} \equiv \frac{\sinh(2\alpha j_{\max}) - 2j_{\max}\alpha}{2^{3/2} A \bar{D}^{1/2} w^{1/2}}$ . Note that  $\bar{L}$  does not vary with  $g$  or  $N$  since  $\alpha j_{\max}$  is constant with

$\alpha$ . Similarly, employment density is

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{L_{eq}}{j_{\max}} &= \frac{1}{j_{\max}} \bar{D} \left( \frac{1}{2} \frac{A}{w} \right)^2 \left( \frac{1}{2^{1/2} \alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{1/4} g^{1/4} N^{1/2} \right)^2 \left[ \frac{\sinh(2\alpha j_{\max})}{\alpha} - 2j_{\max} \right] = \\
&= \bar{D} \left( \frac{1}{2} \frac{A}{w} \right)^2 \left( \frac{1}{2^{1/2} \alpha_0} \cdot \bar{q}^{1/4} g^{1/4} N^{1/2} \right)^2 \left[ \frac{\sinh(2\alpha j_{\max})}{\alpha j_{\max}} - 2 \right] = \\
&= \bar{D} \left( \frac{1}{2} \frac{A}{w} \right)^2 \left( \frac{1}{2^{1/2} \alpha_0} \right)^2 \left[ \frac{\sinh(2\alpha j_{\max})}{\alpha j_{\max}} - 2 \right] \bar{q}^{1/2} g^{1/2} N = \\
&= \bar{\ell} \cdot \bar{q}^{1/2} g^{1/2} N
\end{aligned}$$

where  $\bar{\ell} \equiv \bar{D} \left( \frac{1}{2} \frac{A}{w} \right)^2 \left( \frac{1}{2^{1/2} \alpha_0} \right)^2 \left[ \frac{\sinh(2\alpha j_{\max})}{\alpha j_{\max}} - 2 \right]$ . ■

## C Additional Empirical Results

### C.1 Summary Statistics by state

Table C.1 shows summary statistics on our main dataset by state of transaction.

### C.2 Frequent users

Here we focus on consumers with at least 120 transactions in the sample (that is, around 2 transactions per day from March to October). We term this “frequent users” (FUs) sample, and use it to show that the limited mobility of consumers described above does not depend on including low frequency usage. Our FUs sample contains 1,955 accounts, conducting around 377 thousand transactions over the sample period. They reside in 1,399 locations and shop in 6,149 of them; there are a total of 21,650 origin-destination combinations over which we observe transactions.

Table C.2 shows summary statistics for this sample. Consumers in the median residence visit only 13 distinct sales locations overall during the sample period (15.5 sales location on average). Both values are higher than in the complete data; however, these consumers also live in places with richer options: the median residence records 241 sales locations within 120 km (compared to 192 for the whole data). Hence, the median residence sees consumers shop in 5% of the available locations (the mean is 6%), very comparable to the values in the general data (4% and 7% respectively).

Table C.3 replicates Table 3 in the sample of frequent users. The role of distance is twice as high as the role of locations available. The distance elasticity is closer to conventional levels also found in the trade literature.

### C.3 Percentiles of distances traveled

These Tables show summary statistics on the percentiles of distances traveled by consumers by sector. Table C.4 refers to percentiles in the unweighted distribution. Table C.5 shows the same percentiles weighting each transaction with the correspondent purchase value.



Table C.1: Summary of transaction amounts (in USD), by U.S. State of purchase

State	Median	Mean	St. Dev.	Sum	N
AK	32	69	132	122,111	1,774
AL	28	63	171	1,057,448	16,905
AR	29	62	154	536,710	8,654
AZ	28	69	230	1,768,032	25,681
CA	30	72	207	10,504,912	146,418
CO	26	60	179	1,655,955	27,636
CT	31	68	178	4,047,578	59,444
DC	26	64	163	249,546	3,917
DE	30	72	216	482,253	6,680
FL	30	70	212	7,143,974	102,526
GA	27	63	181	2,621,643	41,767
HI	33	78	205	405,416	5,196
IA	28	60	167	795,665	13,366
ID	29	64	158	298,824	4,671
IL	30	68	181	4,647,933	68,574
IN	29	63	161	2,168,487	34,338
KS	29	62	183	966,213	15,656
KY	29	63	192	1,088,033	17,216
LA	29	61	140	1,151,874	18,865
MA	31	67	166	10,239,352	152,870
MD	28	67	185	2,404,395	35,802
ME	32	70	168	1,161,195	16,553
MI	30	66	166	3,146,431	48,022
MN	29	67	172	1,720,008	25,707
MO	29	65	184	1,859,377	28,612
MS	30	65	186	502,186	7,688
MT	33	65	130	283,635	4,358
NC	28	65	180	2,414,488	37,408
ND	29	63	142	209,849	3,337
NE	30	67	191	519,324	7,707
NH	32	80	274	1,819,532	22,853
NJ	31	71	202	7,149,537	100,840
NM	28	63	193	478,979	7,576
NV	40	90	229	1,169,957	13,033
NY	33	75	194	11,053,563	147,574
OH	29	65	168	3,707,650	57,383
OK	29	65	171	841,117	12,910
OR	28	63	186	1,237,409	19,743
PA	30	67	174	4,719,180	70,287
RI	31	68	167	1,105,141	16,292
SC	28	67	216	1,200,522	17,927
SD	34	73	216	241,186	3,323
TN	29	65	164	1,703,392	26,318
TX	26	61	182	5,919,181	97,279
UT	26	65	238	581,595	8,983
VA	28	65	192	2,881,000	44,257
VT	30	70	166	312,755	4,464
WA	26	64	190	1,481,652	23,134
WI	30	67	209	2,224,750	33,065
WV	31	67	172	384,579	5,741
WY	30	65	161	165,159	2,543
Total	30	68	188	116,550,684	1,722,873

Table C.2: **Summary statistics across residence locations (Frequent Users)**

variable	min	p10	p25	p50	p75	p90	max	mean	N
Sales locations visited	1	6	9	13	20	27	129	15.47	1,399
Sales locations available	8	90	151	241	526	848	1,110	357.47	1,399
Mean distance to sales locations	21.1	59.1	64.9	71.1	76.8	81	95	70.43	1,399
Share available locations visited	0	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.13	0.46	0.06	1,399

Table C.3: Locations available and locations visited

Dependent variable:	Log of number of sales locations visited		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Sales locations within 120km, log	0.443*** (0.017)		0.464*** (0.017)
Average distance to sales locations within 120km, log		-0.619*** (0.164)	-1.014*** (0.118)
Constant	0.081 (0.095)	5.169*** (0.699)	4.272*** (0.502)
$R^2$	0.33	0.02	0.37
$N$	1,399	1,399	1,399

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

#### C.4 Gravity over all distances

In Figure C.1, we estimate Equation (2) including origin-destination pairs at progressively longer distances. Specifically, we split all the  $(h, s)$  pairs in 20 quantiles of distances, and estimate it using only the first group, then only the first two, and so on, up to the whole set of observations. Figure C.1 shows the coefficient on log distance. As one can see, changes of around +/- 30% in the 120 km cutoff (from 80 km to 160 km) only imply a variation in the gravity coefficient of around 0.1: hence, around our cutoff distance, the overall gravity slope is not particularly sensitive to the specific cutoff value. Different sectors are more or less represented at different distances (see also Tables C.4 and C.5), implying that the coefficient  $\delta$  varies.

#### C.5 Margins decomposition

Tables C.6 shows the actual values of the account and expenditure margin with associated p-values for the margins decomposition associated with Equation (1); Table C.7 shows the actual values of the account

Table C.4: Distribution of transaction distances (in km), by sector

	p10	p25	p50	p75	p90	p99	max	mean
Agricultural Services	0	0	5.6	14.6	28.7	1,514.1	6,372.1	50.1
Amusement, Rec. Serv.	0	7.9	33.3	327.1	1,600.3	4,130	8,237.4	454.1
Apparel	0	4.7	15.6	52.1	364.7	3,825.3	8,253.1	201.1
Auto Repair/Service/Parking	0	0	7.9	24	78	2,315.3	7,937.3	94.7
Auto and Truck Sales/Service/Parts	0	0	8.3	21	58.6	2,119	7,775.3	88.8
Building Mat./Hardware/Garden Supp.	0	0	7.6	18.2	40.6	1,491.7	7,868.1	49.6
Communications	0	6.5	24.3	684.8	2,018	3,944.5	8,134.9	551.1
Durable Goods	0	5.8	22	162.2	1,652.5	3,946.5	7,115	420.9
Eating and Drinking Places	0	0	12.6	50.4	496.4	3,739.5	8,254.8	217.1
Food Stores	0	0	4.2	15.3	53.8	2,409.1	8,218	93.8
Furniture, Home Furnishings, Equip.	0	1.9	11.2	26.3	132.8	3,277.2	8,243.6	135.9
Gasoline Services	0	0	8.9	34.6	275	2,274.3	8,233.3	126.8
General Merchandise Stores	0	0	8.7	20.8	61.3	2,001.5	8,223.9	87.3
Health Services	0	0	8.6	20.3	46.3	2,231.3	7,969.9	83.9
Hospitality	51.3	162.8	366.8	1,011.1	2,257.8	4,158.5	8,253.1	801.8
Misc. Retail	0	0	8.6	29.6	353.9	3,729.5	8,223.9	192.6
Misc. Services	0	2.2	15.8	67.8	1,131.8	3,905.3	7,765.3	302.3
Motion Pictures	0	0	5.7	16.6	63.6	3,756.9	7,884.2	125.3
NonDurable Goods	0	0	8.2	22	143.7	3,421.9	7,768.4	145
Other Vehicles Sales/Service/Parts	0	6.6	20.1	55	505.9	3,017.7	7,879.4	190.8
Personal Services	0	0	6.7	20	135.1	3,332.5	8,251.4	132.3
Total	0	0	9	29.4	276.8	3,249.4	8,254.8	157.4

Table C.5: Value-Weighted Distribution of transaction distances (in km), by sector

	p10	p25	p50	p75	p90	p99	max	mean
Agricultural Services	0	0	6.7	16.8	36.3	1,348.7	6,372.1	52
Amusement, Rec. Serv.	0	8.2	37.3	419.5	1,752.7	4,290.5	8,237.4	530.3
Apparel	0	5.3	16.8	56.1	438.5	3,864.5	8,253.1	222.1
Auto Repair/Service/Parking	0	0	7.5	20.3	65.2	2,080.8	7,937.3	86.9
Auto and Truck Sales/Service/Parts	0	0	11.7	27.8	113.3	2,246.5	7,775.3	105.8
Building Mat./Hardware/Garden Supp.	0	0	9.9	23.4	54.2	1,572.5	7,868.1	56.2
Communications	0	4.5	14.7	113.6	1,522	3,818.2	8,134.9	367.8
Durable Goods	0	10.5	30.6	198.1	1,864.6	4,017.6	7,115	454.7
Eating and Drinking Places	0	1	15.4	79.3	711.2	3,940.4	8,254.8	264.2
Food Stores	0	0	5.2	16.9	55	2,374.7	8,218	91.8
Furniture, Home Furnishings, Equip.	0	4.6	13.1	30.6	129.2	2,966.2	8,243.6	129.6
Gasoline Services	0	0	9.7	39.6	320.1	2,247.8	8,233.3	133.9
General Merchandise Stores	0	0	9.9	23.1	77.2	2,547.3	8,223.9	104
Health Services	0	0	9.8	24.9	75.7	2,686.1	7,969.9	112.3
Hospitality	59.6	179.2	434.1	1,320.3	2,664.2	4,331.4	8,253.1	949.2
Misc. Retail	0	0	13	49.7	703.8	3,911.7	8,223.9	254.7
Misc. Services	0	5.3	17.1	54.7	666.7	3,964.9	7,765.3	238
Motion Pictures	0	0	7.3	22.2	222.7	3,960.8	7,884.2	181.4
NonDurable Goods	0	3	11.2	34.1	742.2	3,942.2	7,768.4	249.6
Other Vehicles Sales/Service/Parts	0	9.1	23.1	64.9	936.9	3,139	7,879.4	244.7
Personal Services	0	0	10.9	37.5	529.8	3,856.4	8,251.4	217.2
Total	0	0	12.3	40.5	434.7	3,709.5	8,254.8	205.3




Figure C.1: Gravity in Expenditure

and expenditure margin with associated p-values associated with Equation (2).

Tables C.8 and C.9 show the composition of frequency and batch size margin into the overall expenditure margin. They also show the share of the frequency margin in the expenditure margin, and the overall role of frequency and account margins in the total decline of expenditure with distance.

## C.6 Gravity and the frequency of transactions

These figures show further robustness on the relation between gravity and the frequency of transactions. Figure C.2 shows the correspondent of Figure 3 using all coefficients, not just the ones significantly different from zero; one can clearly note the outlier “Durable Goods” in the top-left part of the graph. Figure C.3 uses the strength of gravity as measured by regression (2) using all estimated slopes. We have also experimented with an alternative measure of frequency that gives more weight to users that spend more overall, with essentially identical results.

## C.7 More individual-level analyses

In this subsection we report robustness exercises on our individual level analysis. Table C.10 extends Table 5 in the main text, adding the economy-wide average number of employees per store for different sectors

Table C.6: **Expenditure out of home place**

Category	Overall		Accounts Margin		Expenditure Margin		Share Accounts Margin	Obs.
	coeff	pv	coeff	pv	coeff	pv		
Food Stores	-2.23	0.00	-1.12	0.00	-1.11	0.00	0.50	22,649
Gasoline Services	-2.08	0.00	-0.97	0.00	-1.11	0.00	0.47	39,666
General Merchandise Stores	-1.78	0.00	-1.08	0.00	-0.71	0.00	0.60	26,837
Misc. Retail	-1.70	0.00	-1.07	0.00	-0.63	0.00	0.63	34,052
Eating and Drinking Places	-1.57	0.00	-0.93	0.00	-0.64	0.00	0.59	34,504
Building Mat./Hardware/Garden Supp.	-1.40	0.00	-0.87	0.00	-0.53	0.00	0.62	14,185
Auto Repair/Service/Parking	-1.25	0.00	-0.88	0.00	-0.38	0.00	0.70	4,414
NonDurable Goods	-1.16	0.00	-1.05	0.00	-0.11	0.45	0.91	978
Health Services	-1.12	0.00	-0.77	0.00	-0.35	0.00	0.68	5,134
Apparel	-1.10	0.00	-0.83	0.00	-0.27	0.00	0.75	15,918
Furniture, Home Furnishings, Equip.	-1.07	0.00	-0.85	0.00	-0.23	0.00	0.79	12,286
Auto and Truck Sales/Service/Parts	-1.04	0.00	-0.81	0.00	-0.23	0.00	0.78	7,298
Motion Pictures	-1.04	0.00	-0.85	0.00	-0.18	0.01	0.82	1,922
Amusement, Rec. Serv.	-1.03	0.00	-0.66	0.00	-0.37	0.00	0.64	2,958
Personal Services	-0.96	0.00	-0.89	0.00	-0.07	0.12	0.93	5,203
Misc. Services	-0.92	0.06	-0.63	0.00	-0.29	0.52	0.69	220
Communications	-0.89	0.00	-0.61	0.00	-0.28	0.04	0.69	424
Agricultural Services	-0.88	0.00	-0.66	0.00	-0.21	0.10	0.75	552
Other Vehicles Sales/Service/Parts	-0.68	0.41	-0.71	0.00	0.03	0.97	1.04	257
Hospitality	-0.64	0.01	-0.49	0.00	-0.15	0.40	0.76	1,392
Durable Goods	-0.09	0.90	-0.27	0.04	0.18	0.76	3.15	79

Table C.7: **Gravity in expenditure**

Category	Overall		Accounts Margin		Expenditure Margin		Share Accounts Margin	Obs.
	coeff	pv	coeff	pv	coeff	pv		
Food Stores	-0.85	0.00	-0.36	0.00	-0.49	0.00	0.42	18,632
Gasoline Services	-0.60	0.00	-0.25	0.00	-0.35	0.00	0.41	34,615
General Merchandise Stores	-0.93	0.00	-0.50	0.00	-0.43	0.00	0.54	23,932
Misc. Retail	-0.65	0.00	-0.40	0.00	-0.25	0.00	0.61	30,042
Eating and Drinking Places	-0.56	0.00	-0.31	0.00	-0.25	0.00	0.55	31,022
Building Mat./Hardware/Garden Supp.	-0.73	0.00	-0.39	0.00	-0.34	0.00	0.53	11,604
Auto Repair/Service/Parking	-0.40	0.00	-0.23	0.00	-0.16	0.00	0.59	3,013
NonDurable Goods	-0.65	0.00	-0.40	0.00	-0.24	0.01	0.62	758
Health Services	-0.33	0.00	-0.25	0.00	-0.09	0.08	0.74	3,910
Apparel	-0.53	0.00	-0.36	0.00	-0.17	0.00	0.67	14,066
Furniture, Home Furnishings, Equip.	-0.57	0.00	-0.40	0.00	-0.17	0.00	0.70	10,734
Auto and Truck Sales/Service/Parts	-0.33	0.00	-0.26	0.00	-0.07	0.08	0.79	5,508
Motion Pictures	-0.34	0.00	-0.28	0.00	-0.07	0.22	0.80	1,248
Amusement, Rec. Serv.	-0.23	0.00	-0.10	0.00	-0.13	0.00	0.44	2,329
Personal Services	-0.31	0.00	-0.27	0.00	-0.04	0.27	0.86	3,760
Misc. Services	0.91	0.02	-0.11	0.06	1.02	0.01	-0.12	116
Communications	-0.41	0.01	-0.26	0.00	-0.15	0.21	0.63	263
Agricultural Services	0.42	0.11	-0.12	0.21	0.54	0.03	-0.28	190
Other Vehicles Sales/Service/Parts	-0.59	0.08	-0.07	0.17	-0.51	0.10	0.13	128
Hospitality	-0.14	0.08	-0.08	0.00	-0.06	0.39	0.55	1,158
Durable Goods	1.11	0.67	0.00		1.11	0.67	0.00	15

Table C.8: **Expenditure out of home place: number of transactions and average expenditure**

Category	Expenditure margin		Batch size margin		Frequency margin		Share of Frequency margin	Share of Account+Frequency margins	Obs.
	coeff	pv	coeff	pv	coeff	pv			
Food Stores	-1.11	0.00	-0.18	0.00	-0.93	0.00	0.84	0.92	22,649
Gasoline Services	-1.11	0.00	-0.09	0.00	-1.02	0.00	0.92	0.96	39,666
General Merchandise Stores	-0.71	0.00	-0.06	0.00	-0.65	0.00	0.91	0.97	26,837
Misc. Retail	-0.63	0.00	0.05	0.00	-0.68	0.00	1.08	1.03	34,052
Eating and Drinking Places	-0.64	0.00	0.02	0.05	-0.66	0.00	1.04	1.02	34,504
Building Mat./Hardware/Garden Supp.	-0.53	0.00	-0.02	0.48	-0.51	0.00	0.96	0.99	14,185
Auto Repair/Service/Parking	-0.38	0.00	-0.21	0.00	-0.16	0.00	0.43	0.83	4,414
NonDurable Goods	-0.11	0.45	0.02	0.88	-0.13	0.04	1.17	1.02	978
Health Services	-0.35	0.00	-0.17	0.00	-0.18	0.00	0.52	0.85	5,134
Apparel	-0.27	0.00	-0.01	0.54	-0.26	0.00	0.95	0.99	15,918
Furniture, Home Furnishings, Equip.	-0.23	0.00	-0.01	0.88	-0.22	0.00	0.97	0.99	12,286
Auto and Truck Sales/Service/Parts	-0.23	0.00	-0.01	0.85	-0.22	0.00	0.96	0.99	7,298
Motion Pictures	-0.18	0.01	0.02	0.72	-0.20	0.00	1.10	1.02	1,922
Amusement, Rec. Serv.	-0.37	0.00	-0.19	0.01	-0.18	0.00	0.48	0.81	2,958
Personal Services	-0.07	0.12	0.16	0.00	-0.23	0.00	3.31	1.17	5,203
Misc. Services	-0.29	0.52	-0.20	0.64	-0.09	0.37	0.32	0.79	220
Communications	-0.28	0.04	-0.17	0.25	-0.11	0.09	0.38	0.81	424
Agricultural Services	-0.21	0.10	0.01	0.94	-0.22	0.00	1.04	1.01	552
Other Vehicles Sales/Service/Parts	0.03	0.97	0.27	0.71	-0.24	0.28	-7.96	1.39	257
Hospitality	-0.15	0.40	-0.04	0.81	-0.11	0.11	0.75	0.94	1,392
Durable Goods	0.18	0.76	0.02	0.97	0.17	0.50	0.91	1.19	79

(a proxy for sector-level fixed costs) and its interactions with log age and log income. The interaction between log frequency of transactions with log income and age are little affected both in magnitude and in significance.

A well-known property of the Poisson model is equidispersion: if the mean of the Poisson random variable  $y_i$  for individual  $i$  is  $E[y_i] \equiv \lambda_i = \exp\{\beta'x_i\}$ , then  $V[y_i] = \exp\{\beta'x_i\}$  as well. This is potentially problematic since count data tend to be overdispersed. Without correction, a strict estimate of the Poisson model will tend to underestimate the standard errors of our coefficients.<sup>50</sup> One possible correction to this problem is to simply estimate the Poisson regression allowing more flexible specifications for the standard errors: a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation is still consistent under correct specification of the conditional mean. This is the route we choose in the main text. An alternative is to explicitly model overdispersion. Here, we use a Negative Binomial model where  $E[y_i] \equiv \lambda_i$ , but  $V[y_i] = \lambda_i + \alpha\lambda_i^2$ , with  $\alpha$  being an additional overdispersion parameter to be estimated. An attractive feature of this model is that the overdispersion is allowed to vary at individual level, since  $V[y_i]/E[y_i] = 1 + \alpha\lambda_i$ ; on the other hand, the Negative Binomial model is less robust to mis-specifications in density,<sup>51</sup> and potentially suffers from the incidental parameter problem, making it difficult to account for individual level heterogeneity<sup>52</sup>. For these reasons, we focus on Poisson in the main text, and report in Table C.11 below the results of the Negative Binomial model.

Table C.12 extends Table 6 in the main text, introducing the economy-wide average number of employees per store for different sectors, and its interactions with log age and log income. Column (7),

<sup>50</sup>The discussion here follows Cameron and Trivedi (2005).

<sup>51</sup>See again Cameron and Trivedi (2005), section 20.4.1.

<sup>52</sup>Allison and Waterman (2002) find in simulation studies that the incidental parameter problem may not be very severe.

Table C.9: Gravity in expenditure: number of transactions and average expenditure

Category	Expenditure margin		Batch size margin		Frequency margin		Share of Frequency margin	Share of of Account+Frequency margins	Obs.
	coeff	pv	coeff	pv	coeff	pv			
Food Stores	-0.49	0.00	-0.13	0.00	-0.36	0.00	0.73	0.84	18,632
Gasoline Services	-0.35	0.00	-0.04	0.00	-0.31	0.00	0.89	0.93	34,615
General Merchandise Stores	-0.43	0.00	-0.09	0.00	-0.33	0.00	0.78	0.90	23,932
Misc. Retail	-0.25	0.00	-0.01	0.16	-0.24	0.00	0.95	0.98	30,042
Eating and Drinking Places	-0.25	0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.23	0.00	0.90	0.96	31,022
Building Mat./Hardware/Garden Supp.	-0.34	0.00	-0.07	0.00	-0.27	0.00	0.80	0.91	11,604
Auto Repair/Service/Parking	-0.16	0.00	-0.09	0.07	-0.07	0.00	0.44	0.77	3,013
NonDurable Goods	-0.24	0.01	-0.09	0.23	-0.15	0.00	0.62	0.86	758
Health Services	-0.09	0.08	0.03	0.56	-0.11	0.00	1.30	1.08	3,910
Apparel	-0.17	0.00	-0.02	0.12	-0.16	0.00	0.90	0.97	14,066
Furniture, Home Furnishings, Equip.	-0.17	0.00	-0.04	0.06	-0.13	0.00	0.77	0.93	10,734
Auto and Truck Sales/Service/Parts	-0.07	0.08	0.02	0.53	-0.09	0.00	1.33	1.07	5,508
Motion Pictures	-0.07	0.22	0.02	0.72	-0.08	0.03	1.23	1.05	1,248
Amusement, Rec. Serv.	-0.13	0.00	-0.04	0.28	-0.08	0.00	0.66	0.81	2,329
Personal Services	-0.04	0.27	0.08	0.02	-0.12	0.00	2.84	1.25	3,760
Misc. Services	1.02	0.01	1.13	0.00	-0.11	0.18	-0.11	-0.24	116
Communications	-0.15	0.21	-0.24	0.05	0.09	0.15	-0.61	0.40	263
Agricultural Services	0.54	0.03	0.68	0.01	-0.15	0.35	-0.27	-0.63	190
Other Vehicles Sales/Service/Parts	-0.51	0.10	-0.51	0.10	-0.00	0.98	0.01	0.13	128
Hospitality	-0.06	0.39	-0.05	0.41	-0.01	0.72	0.18	0.63	1,158
Durable Goods	1.11	0.67	0.96	0.73	0.15	0.79	0.14	0.14	15

additionally, replicates column (6) introducing triple interactions between rain, log frequency, and log income (or log age); and rain, log number of employees per store, and log income (or log age). Table C.13 replicates Table C.12 estimating a Negative Binomial model.

## C.8 Limited-Information Maximum Likelihood

As an alternative check on the strength of our instrumentation strategy, we estimate the main tables in our analysis via Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), rather than Two-Stages Least Squares (2SLS). LIML estimators are known to have better small sample properties with weak instruments. Swings in the coefficients or much larger standard errors as compared to 2SLS would be an indication of a potentially weak instrument.

Table C.14-C.16 report the corresponding LIML estimates of Tables 8-10. Coefficients are broadly in line, and standard errors essentially unchanged. These findings further help alleviate potential concerns about weak instruments.

## C.9 Full Set of Aquifer Composition

In this subsection, we use the full set of 6 types of aquifers rather than just consolidated and semiconsolidated aquifers as instruments for population in Table 8-10. Tables C.17-C.19 report the results. The






Figure C.2: Drop in expenditure out of home (all coefficients)

Cragg-Donald statistics become a little weaker and the coefficients become smaller and towards the OLS result; the patterns of significance are broadly preserved.




Figure C.3: Gravity and frequency of transactions (all slopes)

Table C.10: **The role of individual heterogeneity (extended regression)**

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Number of transactions out of residence			
Number of transactions	0.016*** (0.001)	0.016*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.001)
Log age	-0.026 (0.059)	-0.395** (0.159)	-0.345** (0.162)	
Log income	0.139*** (0.029)	0.589*** (0.070)	0.490*** (0.067)	
Log age $\times$ log frequency of transactions		-0.027 (0.061)	-0.057 (0.055)	-0.052 (0.057)
Log income $\times$ log frequency of transactions		-0.203*** (0.029)	-0.203*** (0.024)	-0.192*** (0.025)
Log age $\times$ log of employees per store		0.155*** (0.040)	0.141*** (0.031)	0.115*** (0.030)
Log income $\times$ log of employees per store		-0.040** (0.019)	-0.045*** (0.014)	-0.051*** (0.013)
Observations	28,959	28,959	28,959	28,959
Sector fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Residence fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No
Individual fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes
Pseudo R-Square	.61	.61	.72	.74

Standard errors clustered at account level in parentheses.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Table C.11: **The role of individual heterogeneity (extended negative binomial regression)**

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Number of transactions out of residence			
Number of transactions	0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.043*** (0.001)	0.042*** (0.001)
Log age	-0.061 (0.055)	-0.176 (0.128)	-0.103 (0.139)	
Log income	0.210*** (0.025)	0.483*** (0.057)	0.435*** (0.062)	
Log age × log frequency of transactions		-0.146*** (0.053)	-0.132** (0.054)	-0.154*** (0.054)
Log income × log frequency of transactions		-0.143*** (0.023)	-0.156*** (0.022)	-0.165*** (0.022)
Log age × log of employees per store		0.113*** (0.036)	0.135*** (0.035)	0.145*** (0.035)
Log income × log of employees per store		-0.039** (0.016)	-0.055*** (0.016)	-0.051*** (0.016)
Observations	28,959	28,959	28,959	28,959
Overdispersion	1.22	1.21	.69	.61
Sector fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Residence fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No
Individual fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes
Pseudo R-Square	.18	.18	.23	.24

Standard errors clustered at account level in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table C.12: The effect of rain (extended poisson regression)

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of transactions out of residence					
Number of transactions	0.023*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.001)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.002)
Log age	-0.020 (0.066)	-0.019 (0.066)	-0.487*** (0.185)	-0.405** (0.167)		
Log income	0.115*** (0.032)	0.115*** (0.032)	0.651*** (0.089)	0.508*** (0.068)		
Rain dummy	-0.314*** (0.019)	-0.954*** (0.055)	-0.948*** (0.054)	-0.951*** (0.050)	-0.980*** (0.048)	-1.292 (0.881)
Rain dummy × log frequency of transactions		0.308*** (0.026)	0.308*** (0.026)	0.379*** (0.034)	0.424*** (0.033)	0.560 (0.354)
Rain dummy × log of employees per store		0.047*** (0.013)	0.046*** (0.012)	0.028*** (0.009)	0.024** (0.010)	0.089 (0.205)
Log age × log frequency of transactions			-0.032 (0.069)	-0.051 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.058)	-0.088 (0.068)
Log income × log frequency of transactions			-0.239*** (0.037)	-0.212*** (0.025)	-0.204*** (0.025)	-0.187*** (0.028)
Log age × log of employees per store			0.195*** (0.048)	0.171*** (0.033)	0.145*** (0.032)	0.139*** (0.038)
Log income × log of employees per store			-0.050** (0.022)	-0.043*** (0.014)	-0.048*** (0.014)	-0.044*** (0.015)
Rain dummy × log income						0.108* (0.062)
Rain dummy × log age						-0.243 (0.166)
Rain × log income × log frequency of transactions						-0.047* (0.027)
Rain × log age × log frequency of transactions						0.105 (0.072)
Rain × log income × log of employees per store						-0.011 (0.014)
Rain × log age × log of employees per store						0.017 (0.039)
Observations	57,918	57,918	57,918	57,918	57,918	57,918
Sector fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Residence fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Individual fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-Square	.56	.56	.56	.67	.69	.69

Standard errors clustered at account level in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table C.13: The effect of rain (extended negative binomial regression)

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Number of transactions out of residence					
Number of transactions	0.088*** (0.002)	0.090*** (0.002)	0.089*** (0.002)	0.074*** (0.001)	0.072*** (0.001)	0.072*** (0.001)
Log age	-0.075 (0.054)	-0.076 (0.054)	-0.257*** (0.120)	-0.169 (0.132)		
Log income	0.194*** (0.025)	0.193*** (0.025)	0.500*** (0.053)	0.437*** (0.059)		
Rain dummy	-0.206*** (0.011)	-0.823*** (0.039)	-0.826*** (0.039)	-0.863*** (0.039)	-0.870*** (0.039)	-0.484 (0.743)
Rain dummy × log frequency of transactions		0.493*** (0.018)	0.492*** (0.018)	0.468*** (0.018)	0.466*** (0.017)	0.542* (0.321)
Rain dummy × log of employees per store		-0.003 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)	-0.179 (0.188)
Log age × log frequency of transactions			-0.115** (0.050)	-0.110** (0.051)	-0.124** (0.051)	-0.167*** (0.058)
Log income × log frequency of transactions			-0.149*** (0.021)	-0.160*** (0.021)	-0.166*** (0.021)	-0.149*** (0.025)
Log age × log of employees per store			0.126*** (0.030)	0.139*** (0.031)	0.143*** (0.031)	0.092*** (0.035)
Log income × log of employees per store			-0.045*** (0.013)	-0.057*** (0.014)	-0.054*** (0.014)	-0.045*** (0.015)
Rain dummy × log income						0.122** (0.058)
Rain dummy × log age						-0.470*** (0.139)
Rain × log income × log frequency of transactions						-0.042 (0.026)
Rain × log age × log frequency of transactions						0.106* (0.060)
Rain × log income × log of employees per store						-0.021 (0.015)
Rain × log age × log of employees per store						0.112*** (0.036)
Observations	57,918	57,918	57,918	57,918	57,918	57,918
Overdispersion	1.12	1.1	1.09	.58	.52	.52
Sector fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Residence fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Individual fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-Square	.21	.21	.21	.26	.27	.27

Standard errors clustered at account level in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table C.14: **Local employment and frequency of purchase: LIML estimator**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	county-sector log employment				
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log population	0.749*** (0.103)	0.902*** (0.072)	0.826*** (0.083)	0.812*** (0.126)	1.223*** (0.085)
Log population × log frequency	0.155*** (0.052)	0.105** (0.043)	0.129*** (0.044)	0.117*** (0.043)	0.100*** (0.039)
Log income per capita	1.641*** (0.149)	1.604*** (0.137)	1.632*** (0.137)	1.783*** (0.303)	1.016*** (0.205)
Log land area	0.103*** (0.013)	0.136*** (0.011)	0.120*** (0.011)	0.185*** (0.035)	-0.024 (0.044)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.81	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.85
N	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C.15: **Number of establishments and frequency of purchase: LIML estimator**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	county-sector log number of establishments				
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log population	0.441*** (0.096)	0.591*** (0.061)	0.520*** (0.074)	0.528*** (0.106)	0.797*** (0.065)
Log population × log frequency	0.206*** (0.049)	0.163*** (0.039)	0.183*** (0.042)	0.165*** (0.039)	0.157*** (0.036)
Log income per capita	1.498*** (0.135)	1.385*** (0.104)	1.446*** (0.114)	1.499*** (0.246)	0.953*** (0.145)
Log land area	0.098*** (0.012)	0.135*** (0.008)	0.118*** (0.009)	0.166*** (0.029)	0.038 (0.031)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.85	0.88	0.86	0.87	0.90
N	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C.16: **Number of employees per establishment and frequency of purchase: LIML estimator**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	county-sector log number of employees per establishment				
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log population	0.281*** (0.042)	0.299*** (0.036)	0.288*** (0.035)	0.259*** (0.055)	0.411*** (0.047)
Log population $\times$ log frequency	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.048* (0.025)	-0.043** (0.022)	-0.040* (0.022)	-0.047** (0.021)
Log land area	0.004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.024 (0.015)	-0.059** (0.026)
Log income per capita	0.174*** (0.059)	0.229*** (0.064)	0.204*** (0.058)	0.335*** (0.130)	0.076 (0.118)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.51	0.53	0.52	0.52	0.54
<i>N</i>	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C.17: **Local employment and frequency of purchase**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:		county-sector log employment			
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log population	0.975*** (0.045)	1.017*** (0.043)	0.985*** (0.043)	0.981*** (0.066)	1.226*** (0.060)
Log population $\times$ log frequency	0.057** (0.025)	0.037 (0.024)	0.048** (0.023)	0.046** (0.023)	0.042* (0.022)
Log income per capita	1.347*** (0.077)	1.463*** (0.094)	1.423*** (0.083)	1.494*** (0.170)	1.165*** (0.153)
Log land area	0.111*** (0.010)	0.135*** (0.010)	0.122*** (0.010)	0.157*** (0.023)	0.008 (0.034)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.86
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	168.11	156.3	323.75	175.28	192.93

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



Table C.18: **Number of establishments and frequency of purchase**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	county-sector log number of establishments				
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log population	0.676*** (0.034)	0.684*** (0.033)	0.669*** (0.033)	0.690*** (0.048)	0.844*** (0.041)
Log population $\times$ log frequency	0.097*** (0.018)	0.093*** (0.019)	0.097*** (0.018)	0.089*** (0.017)	0.088*** (0.017)
Log income per capita	1.208*** (0.059)	1.315*** (0.070)	1.278*** (0.063)	1.242*** (0.123)	1.013*** (0.103)
Log land area	0.106*** (0.008)	0.134*** (0.008)	0.119*** (0.008)	0.142*** (0.017)	0.051** (0.023)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.89	0.90
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	168.11	156.3	323.75	175.28	192.93

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C.19: **Number of employees per establishment and frequency of purchase**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	county-sector log number of employees per establishment				
Sample years :	07	98	98,07	98,07	98,07
Log population	0.299*** (0.024)	0.333*** (0.024)	0.316*** (0.022)	0.290*** (0.033)	0.382*** (0.034)
Log population $\times$ log frequency	-0.040** (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.016)	-0.048*** (0.014)	-0.043*** (0.014)	-0.046*** (0.014)
Log land area	0.005 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.016 (0.012)	-0.043** (0.019)
Log income per capita	0.139*** (0.039)	0.148*** (0.050)	0.145*** (0.042)	0.252*** (0.083)	0.152* (0.087)
Sector Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sector-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Commuting Zone-Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-square	0.51	0.53	0.52	0.53	0.54
$N$	60,413	60,923	121,336	121,336	121,336
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	168.11	156.3	323.75	175.28	192.93

Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$