Rental Markets and the Effects of Credit Conditions on House Prices

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What Role Did Credit Play in the Housing Boom and Bust?

Divergent views in literature

- Faviliukis-Ludvigson-Van Nieuwerburgh; Justiniano-Primiceri-Tambalotti: Credit can explain essentially all of movement in prices.
- Kaplan-Mitman-Violante: Credit had virtually no effect on prices.
- ► Why?
 - Rental market key.
 - FLVN, JPT: Fixed homeownership rate. Prices move when demand changes.
 - KMV: Perfect arbitrage by deep-pocketed investors. When credit changes, renters buy from their landlord, prices pinned down by NPV of landlord rents.
- This Paper:
 - Model intermediate cases with imperfect arbitrage.
 - Calibrate model to match empirical impact of credit on price/rent, homeownership
 - Finding: credit conditions important, explain between 47% and 57% of price-rent rise.


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Outline

- Intuition: Modified Supply and Demand
- Empirics: Estimate Sensitivity
 - Data and Empirical Approach
 - Estimation Results
- Theory: Quantify Impact
 - Calibrated Model
 - Quantitative Results

Time Series: Price-Rent Ratio vs. Home Ownership Rate




National data. Price/Rent: Flow of Funds. Homeownership: Census.


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Rental Markets and Credit Conditions


Plot demand for owner-occupied housing against supply (willingness of landlords to sell).




Price-rent ratio and homeownership rate robust to changes in housing stock.




Credit expansion: demand for owner-occupied housing shifts right.




• Fixed supply (e.g., FLVN) \implies all adjustment through price-rent ratio.




▶ Perfect rental market (e.g., KMV) ⇒ all adjustment through homeownership rate.




- ▶ In this world, increase in price-rent requires separate shock to supply.
 - E.g., change in lender beliefs, lender credit conditions.



Alternative view: credit expansion + upward sloping supply (imperfect rental market).



- Any intermediate combination of upward sloping supply and supply shift also possible.
 - Need a way to **identify slope** of supply curve.



Data

- CBSA- and State-Level Panels 1990-2017
- Prices: CoreLogic Repeat Sale HPI (CBSA), FHFA (State)
- Rents: CBRE Economic Advisors Totoro-Wheaton Index (CBSA)
 - High-quality repeat sale rent index for multi-family (single family index behaves similarly).
 - Measures rent commanded by newly rented unit
- Homeownership Rate: Census Housing and Vacancy Survey
 - CBSA definitions change over time. Drop periods where definitions change.
 - State level HOR and price panel to have fixed HOR definitions.
- Credit: HMDA
 - Following Favara-Imbs, use no. of loans, dollar volume of originations, loan/income ratio (IRS).

Empirical Approach

Specification:

 $\Delta \log(\text{outcome}_{i,t}) = \xi_i + \psi_t + \beta \Delta \log(\text{credit}_{i,t}) + \gamma \Delta \log(\text{outcome}_{i,t-1}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}$

Problems:

- Credit is endogenous.
- Measurement error in credit: loan volume picks up refinancing.
- Instrument: Loutskina and Strahan (2015)
 - Idea: change in conforming loan limit has bigger bite in cities with more homes priced near CLL.
 - Instrument: interact fraction of originations within 5% of CLL at t 1 with % change in CLL.
 - Include triple interaction with Saiz elasticity as well for power.
 - Slightly weak instrument (*F* between 6 and 9), but 2SLS and LIML similar.
- Future work: augment with additional instruments.

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
Regression Results: Price-Rent Ratio

- ► CBSA-level IV regressions.
- Substantial increase in price-rent ratio.
- ► Homeownership response not significantly different from zero.

	$\Delta \log(\text{Price/Rent})$			$\Delta \log(\text{Homeownership Rate})$		
$\Delta \log(\text{# Loans})$	0.297** (0.114)			-0.004 (0.040)		
$\Delta \log(\text{Vol. Loans})$		0.229*** (0.067)			-0.004 (0.030)	
$\Delta \log(\text{Loan/Income})$			0.235** (0.078)			0.004 (0.031)
N	1404	1404	1346	1729	1729	1653


Impulse Response: Credit Shock

- CBSA level: price-rent ratio peaks at over 0.4 relative to 0.03 for HOR.
- State level (not shown): house prices peak at 0.6 relative to 0.1 for HOR.



Impulse Response: Credit Shock

- Conservative estimate: elasticity of PRR is 5x elasticity of HOR (likely higher).
- ▶ Use **5x ratio** as calibration target to pin down supply elasticity (lender heterogeneity).



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Model Overview

- Endowment economy, endogenous investment in housing stock.
- Realistic mortgages: long term, fixed-rate, prepayable.
 - Loan-to-value (LTV) and payment-to-income (PTI) limits at origination only.
- ▶ Three types: borrowers (*B*), landlords (*L*), savers (*S*).
 - Borrowers: consume owned and rented housing, borrow in mortgages ($\beta_B < \beta_S$).
 - Landlords: risk-neutral, own housing to rent to borrowers (full model: can also borrow).
 - Savers: finance borrower mortgages (full model: landlord mortgages too).
- ► Key modeling contribution: **borrower and landlord heterogeneity**.

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- Key modeling contribution: **borrower and landlord heterogeneity**.
 - Without any heterogeneity, 0% or 100% home ownership.
 - How heterogeneity falls on borrowers vs. landlords determines slope of demand vs. supply.

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- ► Three types: borrowers (*B*), landlords (*L*), savers (*S*).
- Key modeling contribution: **borrower and landlord heterogeneity**.
 - Model as het. ownership benefits/costs (h = housing services, H = owned housing):

$$\begin{split} V^B_{i,t} &= \log(c^B_{i,t}) + \xi_B \log(h^B_{i,t}) + \omega^B_{i,t} H^B_{i,t}, \qquad \qquad \omega^B_i \sim \Gamma^B_{\omega} \\ V^L_{i,t} &= c^L_{i,t} + \omega^L_{i,t} H^L_{i,t}, \qquad \qquad \omega^L_i \sim \Gamma^L_{\omega} \end{split}$$

- ω_i^B stands in for life cycle, preferences, ability to come up with down payment, etc.
- ω_i^L stands in for suitability of renting (urban multifamily vs. rural detached).

Model Solution

• Key optimality conditions (ignore landlord credit for today):

$$p_{t}^{\text{Demand}} = \underbrace{\left(1 - C_{t}\right)^{-1}}_{\text{credit conditions}} E_{t} \left\{ \Lambda_{t+1}^{B} \left[\underbrace{\bar{\omega}_{t}^{B} + \text{rent}_{t}}_{\text{housing services}} + \underbrace{\left(1 - \delta - (1 - \rho_{t+1})C_{t+1}\right)p_{t+1}}_{\text{continuation value}} \right] \right\}$$


$$p_{t}^{\text{Supply}} = E_{t} \left\{ \Lambda_{t+1}^{L} \left[\underbrace{\bar{\omega}_{t}^{L} + \text{rent}_{t}}_{\text{housing services}} + \underbrace{\left(1 - \delta\right)p_{t+1}}_{\text{continuation value}} \right] \right\}$$
At equilibrium, $(\bar{\omega}_{t}^{B}, \bar{\omega}_{t}^{L})$ ensure $p_{t}^{\text{Demand}} = p_{t}^{\text{Supply}}$ and $H_{t}^{B} + H_{t}^{L} = \bar{H}_{t}$, where

$$H_t^B = \left(1 - \Gamma_\omega^B(\bar{\omega}_t^B)
ight)\bar{H}_t, \qquad H_t^L = \left(1 - \Gamma_\omega^L(\bar{\omega}_t^L)
ight)\bar{H}_t$$

• Key parameter is dispersion of Γ^L_{ω} distribution (more dispersed \implies more inelastic supply).


Calibration: Supply Elasticity

- Model change in CLL as shock to real mortgage spreads for borrowers.
- Choose dispersion of Γ^L_{ω} to ensure 5x larger price-rent vs. homeownership response.
 - Requires substantial deviation from frictionless rental markets with no landlord heterogeneity.




Credit Expansion Experiment

- Credit expansion: increase max LTV ratio from 85% to 99%, max PTI ratio from 36% to 65%.
- Start in 1998 Q1, surprise reversal in 2007 Q1, compute nonlinear perfect foresight paths.




Credit Expansion Experiment

- ▶ Benchmark: credit explains 47% of peak price-rent increase, 58% of peak LTI increase.
- ▶ Perfect rental markets: credit explains 0% of price-rent, only 28% of peak LTI increase.



Boom Counterfactuals: Benchmark Model


- Add observed fall in interest rates, then set house price expectations (expected rental growth) to explain entire boom in price-rent ratio and credit growth.
 - Fall in landlord discount rates, mortgage rates, credit limits in bust.
- Now removing credit expansion kills 57% of boom in price-rent ratios, 74% of boom in LTI.



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Boom Counterfactuals: Benchmark Model

- Why does order credit is added/removed matter?
 - Loose credit amplifies low rate + expectation effects on demand.
- Takeaway: credit changes played important role in the boom for both debt and house prices.



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Conclusion

- What role did credit play in the housing boom and bust?
- Empirical results:
 - 5x or larger elasticity for price-rent ratio than homeownership rate along supply curve.
 - Next steps: more instruments, expanded evidence.
- Quantitative model calibrated to match empirical findings (landlord supply elasticity):
 - Allows us to consider cases between fixed homeownership rate and perfect arbitrage.
 - Main finding: credit conditions explain 47 57% of price-rent growth during boom.
 - Next steps: investigate role of landlord credit, improve model fit.