Gambling Traps*

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Abstract

I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions be-
tween banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery
from crises. When banks’ investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form ex-
pectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on deposits according to their risk.
This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to
an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that
undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, high funding costs hinder the
accumulation of bank net worth and lead to a “gambling trap” with a persistent drop in
investment and output. I bring the model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis,
in the course of which under-capitalized banks in default-risky countries experienced an
increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The
model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in
Portugal in 2010-2016. Policy interventions face a trade-off between alleviating banks’
funding conditions and strengthening risk-taking incentives. Liquidity provision to banks
may perpetuate gambling traps when not targeted. Targeted interventions have the ca-
pacity to eliminate adverse equilibria.

Keywords: Risk-taking; Financial constraints; Banking crises; Sovereign debt crises
JEL codes: E44, F30, F34, G01, G21, G28, H63

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1 Introduction

Evidence from recent financial and sovereign debt crises shows that in response to higher aggregate risk, under-capitalized banks increase their exposure to aggregate risky assets and experience a rise in their funding costs. This leads to rising bank fragility and default risk, and raises two important questions. First, what are the circumstances and mechanism that drive banks to become excessively exposed to aggregate risk? Second, what is the role of bank funding costs? At the same time, this recent evidence challenges current theoretical models that typically abstract from bank funding costs, assuming that banks have access to deposits at the risk-free rate (see e.g. Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010).

In this paper, I propose a framework where deposits are assets priced according to their risk, and banks can optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios (which may lead to default in equilibrium) under limited liability. This creates strategic complementarities: high required deposit interest rates in anticipation of risk-taking behavior raise the costs of funding for banks and strengthen their incentives to take on more risk. Banks may then endogenously validate depositor expectations in equilibrium, raising the possibility of multiple equilibria.

I bring this theoretical model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, its transmission to economic activity and policy debates on interventions in support of the banking sector. In doing so, I bring forward two key empirical facts to motivate my model. In countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis, under-capitalized banks increased their exposure to sovereign risk by investing heavily in their own government’s debt. In these countries, there is also significant comovement between yield spreads on sovereign bonds and deposit interest rates.

I develop my analysis by specifying a dynamic small open economy model with households, firms, and a banking sector. Banks collect deposits from households and choose their portfolios of sovereign bonds and loans to firms; households lend to banks on terms that depend on bank solvency prospects; firms invest. The government issues default-risky bonds.

Modelling the equilibrium adjustment in bank risk-taking strategies in response to funding conditions has key macroeconomic and policy implications. The kernel intuition is that, when banks are well capitalized and/or market sentiment is “good”, the resulting banking equilibrium can be described as safe. In a “safe equilibrium” banks keep their holdings of government debt low, reducing their exposure to sovereign risk. Since banks are safe, depositors accept low interest rates. When banks’ portfolio exposures cannot be specified in a contract with depositors, however, another equilibrium may emerge depending on the conditions of the economy and the net worth of banks.¹ In this “gambling equilibrium”, depositors expect banks to have a high

¹Non-contractibility of portfolio exposures may arise due to (sufficiently) costly enforcement on behalf of depositors or information frictions such as opacity in bank balance sheets preventing depositors from observing bank portfolios in detail.
exposure to government debt and hence become risky. As depositors require a risk premium, banks find it optimal to gamble and buy risky sovereign debt.\(^2\) The possibility of multiple equilibria depends on bank capitalization: the problem plagues countries where the banking sector is under-capitalized.

In the gambling equilibrium, shocks to sovereign risk simultaneously raise bank funding costs and drive banks to increase their purchases of government debt at the expense of credit to firms. This has significant consequences on the macroeconomy as high bank funding costs hinder the recovery of bank net worth and may lead to a “gambling trap” characterized by a prolonged period of financial fragility and a persistent drop in output. Persistence here is endogenous, and absent in the safe equilibrium, where banks deleverage and all of the adjustment (in credit and output) is front-loaded and short-lived.

I bring the model to data by calibrating it to Portugal over 2010-2016 and simulating it under a series of sovereign risk shocks that emulate Portuguese sovereign bond yields. The simulation indicates that the Portuguese economy is vulnerable to multiple equilibria and shows that a gambling trap can account for dynamics of key macroeconomic and financial variables during the sovereign debt crisis.

The model naturally provides novel and important insights on central banks’ liquidity interventions in support of financial intermediaries. A key prerequisite for successful interventions is that they need to provide some risk-sharing with depositors — when official creditors take precedence over deposits, liquidity provision is completely ineffective. This is because depositors anticipate the dilution of their claims to bank revenues in the event of default and raise deposit rates accordingly. A second requirement is that interventions must be well-targeted. Non-targeted interventions that provide liquidity unconditionally face an adverse trade-off between their goal of alleviating banks’ funding conditions and strengthening their incentives to gamble. When bank net worth is low, non-targeted liquidity provision may perpetuate gambling traps as banks use the additional funding to increase their sovereign exposure. On the contrary, targeted interventions that provide liquidity conditional on bank leverage overcome the adverse trade-off and eliminate the gambling equilibrium.

These insights can be generalized to a wider set of policy instruments. On its own, deposit insurance faces the same trade-off as non-targeted interventions (with risk sharing), but it can be used in conjunction with a range of macroprudential instruments to achieve the same outcome as targeted liquidity provision. Namely, this outcome is implementable using regulatory constraints on bank liabilities or capital regulation with a positive risk-weight on domestic sovereign bond holdings.

\(^2\)Deposit insurance schemes typically guarantee deposits only up to a limit (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008). In real terms, depositor losses can take the form of suspension of convertibility and currency re-denomination as well as an explicit bail-in.
This paper lies at the intersections of the literatures on bank risk-taking and macroeconomic dynamics under financial frictions. The insight that limited liability and non-contractibility of investment decisions may lead to risk-shifting can be traced back to Jensen and Meckling (1976). In the context of banking, Kareken and Wallace (1978) show that deposit insurance and bailout guarantees strengthen risk-taking incentives. Keeley (1990) and Hellmann et al. (2000) among many others develop models where imperfect competition in the banking sector reduces risk-taking as rents associated with market power provide skin in the game.

This paper also proposes a model with imperfect competition in banking but focuses on the impact of bank funding costs on risk-taking incentives. Its contribution is to show that depositor expectations about bank risk-taking may become self-fulfilling such that banks pursue risk-shifting strategies even in the absence of moral hazard arising from government guarantees. Non-contractibility of bank portfolio exposures has a key role in undermining market discipline and bringing about this result. Because of this friction, banks may not reduce their funding costs by committing to a safe portfolio. Therefore, when depositors demand higher rates in anticipation of risk-taking, the resulting increase in bank funding costs drives banks to invest in risky assets with high yield. With sufficiently low bank net worth, depositor expectations become self-fulfilling and there are multiple equilibria.

A recent literature focuses on the impact of bank balance sheet constraints on macroeconomic dynamics. In this literature, banks channel funds from households to productive investment opportunities and face an occasionally binding constraint on their leverage. For example, in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), the balance sheet constraint prevents bank managers from diverting funds to themselves. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) consider a similar constraint in a highly non-linear environment with fire-sales. In the context of sovereign debt crises, Gennaioli et al. (2014) and Perez (2015) propose models where sovereign default tightens balance sheet constraints. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Bocola (2016) show that anticipation of sovereign default may also tighten these constraints.

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3See Carletti (2008) for an extensive review of the literature on bank competition and risk-taking.
4Rents from imperfect competition create charter value that moderates banks’ risk-taking incentives. When there is perfect competition in the banking sector, the combination of limited liability and non-contractibility of portfolio exposures always leads to a gambling equilibrium.
5When banks’ portfolio exposures are contractible, it is always optimal for banks to commit to a safe portfolio as by doing so they may reduce their funding costs to the risk-free rate.
6The multiplicity mechanism considered here differs from Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank-runs in that it pertains to banks’ ex-ante risk-taking decisions rather than ex-post withdrawals. Farhi and Tirole (2012) and Acharya et al. (2016) also propose models with multiplicity in bank risk-taking. In these studies, multiple equilibria arise due to strategic complementarities across banks as correlation in bank exposures makes it ex-post optimal for the government to provide support. This paper instead focuses on strategic complementarities between banks and depositors.
7Like Bocola (2016), I treat sovereign default risk as driven by some exogenous latent factor. Abstracting from the government’s default decision allows me to focus sharply on the properties of the novel mechanism my model is about.
A common feature of these studies is that constraints on bank balance sheets rule out banking default in equilibrium, thereby ensuring that banks have access to funds at the risk-free rate. As a result, adjustment in the banking sector takes place through the quantity of intermediation rather than bank funding costs and risk-taking: Following adverse shocks, the constraint tightens and banks are forced to deleverage. This leads to a decline in investment and output but also creates excess returns in intermediation that increase bank net worth, paving the way to a recovery.

The safe equilibrium in this paper features a similar adjustment mechanism. Most importantly, however, this paper proposes an alternative adjustment mechanism which may be present in countries with high aggregate risk and under-capitalized banking sectors. In the gambling equilibrium, banks respond to adverse shocks by increasing their risk-taking rather than deleveraging and experience a rise in their funding costs. High funding costs in turn hinder the recovery in bank net worth, leading to endogenously slow recovery from crises. Macroeconomic dynamics generated by this mechanism are consistent with recent evidence from the European sovereign debt crisis and quantitatively account for the adjustment of key macroeconomic and financial variables in Portugal to the debt crisis.8

This paper also draws from the literature on bank-sovereign linkages. Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) document the repatriation of sovereign debt to domestic banks at European countries hit by the debt crisis.9 To explain this, Broner et al. (2014) propose a model with creditor discrimination in favour of domestic banks during sovereign default episodes. Acharya et al. (2014a) and Livshits and Schoors (2009) develop models where anticipated bailouts and/or deposit insurance drive banks to risk-shift by purchasing risky domestic sovereign debt. De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016) and Ongena et al. (2016) provide evidence for moral suasion whereby governments in need of funding incentivize or coerce domestic banks to purchase their debt. Brunnermeier et al. (2016) and Farhi and Tirole (2017) analyze the macroeconomic consequences of bank-sovereign linkages.

This paper proposes an alternative mechanism for repatriation of risky sovereign debt: Sovereign default may plausibly coincide with macroeconomic losses for domestic banks such as a rise in non-performing loans or higher taxation by the defaulting government.10 Bank managers then have an incentive to gamble on domestic sovereign bonds because their payoff correlates with bank solvency prospects. Notably, this mechanism does not require any anticipated government support or favorable treatment during sovereign default, except for a lack

8Section 2 presents motivating evidence from the European sovereign debt crisis and Section 5.4 conducts a quantitative exercise with Portuguese data.
9See also Fact 1 in the next section.
10This mechanism only requires a positive correlation between default by the domestic government and bank losses in excess of haircuts on sovereign bond holdings. It works when these losses are a consequence of domestic sovereign default, as well as when they are a cause of it.
of regulation preventing banks from gambling on domestic sovereign debt.\footnote{Uhlig (2014) and Crosignani (2015) discuss the optimality of this from the government’s perspective. In the context of the euro area, sovereign bonds issued by EU member states carry zero risk-weight in capital regulation (Bank for International Settlements, 2013).} More generally, this paper shows that under-capitalized banks facing high funding costs may misallocate credit towards aggregate risky assets.

Finally, the multiplicity mechanism in this paper highlights the equilibrium-switching effects of policy interventions in addition to the within-equilibrium effects considered in the existing literature. For example, (non-targeted) liquidity provision may cause a switch to the gambling equilibrium, driving banks to increase their exposure to risky domestic sovereign debt. These results are consistent with recent empirical findings: Drechsler et al. (2016) find that lender of last resort loans taken by under-capitalized banks were used for purchases of risky sovereign debt. Crosignani et al. (2016) show that the longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) led to a rise in Portuguese banks’ holdings of risky domestic sovereign debt.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents motivating evidence from the European sovereign debt crisis. Section 3 demonstrates the mechanism behind multiple equilibria in a simple two period model. Section 4 presents the fully dynamic model. Section 5 describes the propagation of sovereign risk shocks and examines the fit of the model to Portuguese data. Section 6 conducts policy analysis. Section 7 concludes.

2 Motivating evidence

In this section, I present four key stylized facts about the European sovereign debt crisis. I focus on five countries that were hit by the crisis, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (periphery), and contrast them with Germany (core) as a benchmark.

Fact 1. In the periphery, the share of domestic sovereign debt held by the national banking system has sharply increased.

Figure 1 shows that spreads between sovereign bonds issued by the periphery countries and Germany (as a benchmark for safe assets) increased sharply after 2009. At the same time, there was an increase in the share of domestic government debt held by banks resident in these countries. In contrast, the share of German government debt held by German banks decreased.
Figure 1: Sovereign bond holdings and yield spreads

Note: Sovereign bond yields refer to bonds with 10 year maturity. Spreads are from German sovereign bond yields. Portuguese data on bond holdings is only available until 2012 and on an annual basis. All other data is quarterly. Source: OECD (MEI) and Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012).

Figure 2: Bank capitalization and sovereign exposures

Note: Sovereign bond exposure refers to the share of sovereign bonds within total assets. No data is available for Greek banks. High (low) capitalization refers to banks with a Tier 1 Capital ratio above (below) the median in 2009Q4. Source: Bloomberg, Bankscope and the European Banking Authority.
Fact 2. Under-capitalized banks in the periphery increased their exposure to domestic sovereign debt to a greater extent than well-capitalized banks in the periphery and German banks.

The first panel of Figure 2 shows a substantial increase in the domestic sovereign exposure of under-capitalized banks in the periphery relative to well-capitalized banks. This indicates a negative relationship between bank capitalization and the rise in exposure to domestic sovereign debt during the crisis in the periphery. The second panel shows that this relationship is not present in Germany, which was not hit by the sovereign debt crisis. In contrast to the periphery, domestic sovereign bond exposures of German banks with low capitalization decreased relative to their well-capitalized counterparts. Moreover, as shown in the last panel, exposures of German banks to risky sovereign debt issued by periphery countries remained low and nearly constant throughout the crisis.

Together, these findings lend support to the view that under-capitalized banks in the periphery were gambling on domestic sovereign bonds. Banks have incentives to do this for three reasons: First, they are protected by limited liability. If the government does not default ex-post, sovereign bonds pay a high return driven by the default-risk premium; if the government imposes a haircut on bond holders, banks are shielded from the full consequences of the default by limited liability. Second, domestic sovereign bonds are aggregate-risky making their return positively correlated with banks’ solvency prospects. During domestic default episodes, banks may anticipate macroeconomic costs that may hit their profits independently of their holdings of sovereign bonds. For example, default may lead to a deterioration in the value of illiquid assets, loss of access to foreign financing needed to roll over debt, and higher taxes. Third, domestic sovereign bonds may receive favorable treatment in regulation relative to other risky assets.

Aggregate risk is a key ingredient of this mechanism. Under the regulatory framework present in the euro area, sovereign bonds issued by all European Union member states carry zero risk-weight in capital regulation (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). Therefore, if limited liability and favorable regulatory treatment were the sole driving factors, undercapitalized German banks would also have an incentive to purchase periphery sovereign debt. This would lead to a negative relationship between bank capitalization and periphery exposure in Germany, which is not present in Figure 2. In a similar vein, if the increase in domestic sovereign bond holdings were driven by expectation of selective default in favour domestic banks, we would see a similar increase in domestic sovereign exposures of periphery banks at

\textsuperscript{12}Acharya and Steffen (2015) reach the same finding with a regression that controls for bank and country characteristics.
Figure 3: Bank lending

Note: Sovereign bond holdings are attained using data from EU-wide stress tests and transparency exercises. There is no data available for Greek banks. Domestic bank credit to private non-financial sector refers to financial resources provided to the private non-financial sector by domestic banks that establish a claim for repayment. Source: World Bank and the European Banking Authority.

different levels of capitalization. This is also not observed in Figure 2.\textsuperscript{13}

**Fact 3.** In the periphery, banks reduced their lending to the private non-financial sector while increasing their domestic sovereign bond holdings. At the same time, there was a rise in private borrowing costs.

Figure 3 shows that the increase in periphery banks’ domestic sovereign bonds holdings coincided with a decline in their credit to the private non-financial sector. Figure 4 indicates

\textsuperscript{13}The patterns in Figure 2 are compatible with moral suasion under the condition that risky governments can exert greater pressure on under-capitalized banks to purchase domestic sovereign debt. It is important to note that gambling and moral suasion are not mutually exclusive. In fact, these two channels may be complementary to the extent that the lack of regulation preventing banks from gambling on domestic sovereign bonds stems from moral suasion.
that interest rates on loans to non-financial corporations also increased at the peak of the debt crisis in 2011-2012. These patterns are consistent with the crowding out of bank lending by domestic sovereign bond purchases.\footnote{For further empirical evidence on the effects of the sovereign debt crisis on credit to the private sector, see Acharya et al. (2014b), Becker and Ivashina (2014), De Marco (2017) and Popov and Van Horen (2015).} In Germany, on the other hand, banks reduced their holdings of both domestic and periphery sovereign bonds, and increased their lending to the private sector. At the same time, there was an improvement in borrowing conditions faced by non-financial corporations in Germany.

**Fact 4.** There is substantial comovement between sovereign bond yield spreads and bank funding costs in the periphery.

Figure 5 plots bank CDS spreads and deposit interest rates against sovereign bond yield spreads and Table 1 reports the corresponding correlation coefficients. The CDS spreads comove
Figure 5: Bank funding costs

Note: The left axis represents deposit interest rates and the right axis represents bank CDS and sovereign bond yield spreads. Both axes are in basis points. Deposit interest rates refer to time deposits of all agreed maturities and amounts (new business). Bank CDS spreads refer to the implied CDS spread measure in Bloomberg. There is no available deposit interest rate data for Greece. Source: Bloomberg, ECB, OECD.

significantly with sovereign spreads in the periphery, consistent with the notion that solvency prospects of the government and the banking sector are intertwined. To a lesser extent, deposit interest rates also move with yield spreads, especially during the peak of the crisis in 2011-2012. A potential explanation for this is that depositors expect a decline in the real value of their deposits in the event that the banking sector and government are both in default.\textsuperscript{15}

In the next section, I present a simple two period model where gambling on domestic sovereign debt arises as an equilibrium outcome when banks are under-capitalized. In this gambling equilibrium, bank lending is crowded out by domestic sovereign bond purchases and bank funding costs comove with sovereign spreads, consistent with the stylized facts described

\textsuperscript{15}See Acharya et al. (2014a) and Alter and Schüler (2012) for further evidence. Acharya et al. (2014a) show that changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank-level determinants of credit spreads. Similarly, Alter and Schüler (2012) document that sovereign CDS spreads in euro area countries became an important determinant of market perceptions about resident banks’solvency prospects during the sovereign debt crisis.
# Table 1: Correlation with sovereign bond yield spreads over 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bank CDS spreads</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposit interest rates</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6: Timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period 1</th>
<th>Period 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Banks use their net worth and deposits collected from households to invest in</td>
<td>• Sovereign default in state with probability $P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. domestic sovereign bonds</td>
<td>• Default cost: fall in productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. loans to firms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- No sovereign default
  - Banks
    i. receive a high payoff from their assets
    ii. repay deposits fully

- Sovereign default
  - Banks
    i. receive a low payoff from their assets
    ii. solvent: repay deposits fully
    iii. insolvent: haircut on deposits

3  A two period model

I consider a stylized model of small open economy with three private agents: households, banks and firms, and a government issuing default-risky debt. Events unfold over two time periods (see Figure 6 for a graphical timeline). In the first period, banks collect deposits from households and use these funds, along with their own net worth, for domestic sovereign bonds purchases and working capital lending to firms, which in turn produce the consumption good.

In the second period, the government defaults if fundamentals turn out to be weak with (exogenous) probability $P$. Borensztein and Panizza (2009) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) find that sovereign defaults are often accompanied with banking crises while Yeyati and Panizza (2011) attribute a large portion of the output costs of default to anticipation effects that precede the default event. Motivated by this empirical evidence, I focus on financial interactions that take place under sovereign default risk and abstain from an explicit treatment of the processes here.
that drive governments to default on their debt, which may include a range of economic and political factors.\textsuperscript{16}

Sovereign default reduces the productivity of firms.\textsuperscript{17} As a result, banks receive a low return from their lending to firms during (domestic) sovereign default. This hits bank balance sheets independently of their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds but at the same time as the haircut on these bonds, therefore making domestic sovereign bonds aggregate risky.

Banks have limited liability. Therefore, banks become insolvent when they have insufficient funds to pay the promised return to their depositors and a haircut proportionate to their funding shortfall is imposed on deposits.\textsuperscript{18} Banks’ solvency prospects in the event of sovereign default depend on the strategy bank managers adopt in the first period. The “safe strategy” consists of investing in a precautionary manner that leaves banks solvent after sovereign default, whereas the “gambling strategy” leads to insolvency. Bank managers optimally follow the strategy that maximizes their expected payoff.

A key friction in the model is the non-contractibility of banks’ portfolio allocations. Specifically, households may not make their deposits contingent on banks’ exposures to domestic sovereign bonds.\textsuperscript{19} This may be due to information asymmetries which permit banks to obscure their portfolio exposures (e.g. through the use of shell corporations and complex financial instruments), or enforcement frictions that allow bank managers to change portfolio allocations ex-post. In either case, non-contractibility brings about strategic complementarities between the risk-taking decisions of bank managers and households’ expectations of bank insolvency risk. When households anticipate that banks follow a gambling strategy, their optimal deposit schedule changes in a manner that increases banks’ incentives to gamble. Household expectations about bank risk-taking may then become self-fulfilling.

Finally, it is convenient to describe the notation before I explain these activities in more detail. Table 2 provides a list of variables and parameters. Deposits, sovereign bonds, loans and safe assets are respectively labelled as $(d, b, l, d^s)$ and take the form of discount bonds with prices $(q, q^b, q^{l}, q^s)$.\textsuperscript{20} The recovery rates of $(d, b, l)$ under sovereign default are $(\theta, \theta^b, \theta^l)$. An underbar denotes variables at the state with sovereign default. Aggregate quantities are in the upper case while lower case variables pertain to an individual bank.

\textsuperscript{16}See also Broner et al. (2014), Bocola (2016) and Brunnermeier et al. (2016) for other studies which analyze the financial effects of sovereign default without explicitly modelling its causes.

\textsuperscript{17}For other studies which rely on output costs of default, see e.g. Cole and Kehoe (2000), Arellano (2008) and Aguiar et al. (2015).

\textsuperscript{18}The absence of risk-free assets among banks’ investment opportunities serves only to simplify the exposition. Their inclusion would be completely inconsequential in this set up as purchasing a safe asset is weakly dominated by a reduction in deposits by the same amount.

\textsuperscript{19}In other words, the contracting space between households and banks is limited to time deposits.

\textsuperscript{20}This serves to simplify the exposition without any actual impact on the model mechanisms.
3.1 Agents and their optimal strategies

3.1.1 Government

In the first period, the government issues discount bonds $b$ at a price $q^b$. Sovereign bonds are internationally traded and their marginal buyers are deep pocketed foreign investors. As such, they are priced at their expected return

$$q^b = (1 - P + P \theta^b) q^*$$

where $\theta^b \in (0, 1)$ is their recovery rate and $q^*$ is the price of an international safe asset $d^*$ with perfectly elastic supply.\(^{21}\)

\(^{21}\) $1/q^*$ can be interpreted as the interest rate set by the common central bank of a monetary union.
3.1.2 Firms

Firms are perfectly competitive. In order to produce the consumption good $Y$, they hire labor $H$ from households at a wage $w$ and borrow working capital $K = q^l L$ from the domestic banking sector. In the interest of a clear exposition, loans to firms take the form of discount bonds $L$ sold at a price $q^l$. Under a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, the representative firm’s profit maximization problem is

$$\max_{K,L,H,H} (1 - P) \left[ AK^\alpha H^{1-\alpha} - L - wH \right] + P \left[ AK^\alpha H^{1-\alpha} - \theta^l L - wH \right]$$

subject to (2), where $A$ is productivity and $\theta^l$ is the recovery rate of loans. Crucially, $(q^l, L, K)$ are not state contingent as firms borrow in advance. When the government defaults, loans become non-performing due to the productivity decline $A < A$ and banks claim the firm’s revenues net of salary payments such that

$$\theta^l = \frac{AK^\alpha H^{1-\alpha} - wH}{L}$$

Combining this with the first order conditions of the firm’s problem yields the expressions

$$w = (1 - \alpha) AK^\alpha$$
$$w = (1 - \alpha) AK^\alpha$$
$$q^l = \left( \frac{1}{\alpha A} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} L^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}}$$
$$\theta^l = \frac{A}{A}$$

where labor is supplied inelastically by households and normalized to $H = H = 1$. Of particular importance are the last two expressions, which respectively establish an upward-sloping loan supply schedule and pin down the recovery rate of loans.

Note that the outcome here is equivalent to the issuance of state-contingent debt by firms. Implicitly, this relies on the lack of information asymmetries between banks and firms, which can be motivated by relationship banking. This also makes it prohibitively costly for households and foreign entities to lend directly to firms. The domestic banking sector thus intermediates funds from households to firms.
3.1.3 Households

There is a unit continuum of risk neutral households with an initial endowment $E$. They save by purchasing risk-free assets $D^*$ at price $q^*$ or deposits $D$ from domestic banks at price $q$.\footnote{The assumption of risk neutrality only serves to attain a tractable expression for the deposit demand schedule. The results presented below retain their validity under risk aversion, which is introduced in section 4.} The representative household’s utility maximization problem can be described as follows

$$\max_{c_1, c_2, D, D^*} u(c_1) + \beta [(1 - P) u(c_2) + Pu(c_2)]$$

subject to the period budget constraints

$$c_1 + qD + q^*D^* = E$$
$$c_2 = D + D^* + w$$
$$c_2 = \theta D + D^* + w$$

where $\beta$ is the rate at which households discount future consumption and $\theta$ is the recovery rate of domestic bank deposits under sovereign default.\footnote{D\footnote{\footnotetext{The assumption of risk neutrality only serves to attain a tractable expression for the deposit demand schedule. The results presented below retain their validity under risk aversion, which is introduced in section 4.}} can be interpreted as deposits in a safe foreign bank or simply as a safe real asset. As there is a unit continuum of homogenous households, individual households’ deposits are identical to the aggregate quantities. I abuse notation by using the aggregate terms $(D, D^*)$ to describe the household’s problem.\footnote{\footnotetext{D can be interpreted as deposits in a safe foreign bank or simply as a safe real asset. As there is a unit continuum of homogenous households, individual households’ deposits are identical to the aggregate quantities. I abuse notation by using the aggregate terms $(D, D^*)$ to describe the household’s problem.}} \footnote{I set $\beta = q^*$ implicitly assuming that domestic and foreign households have identical preferences.}} This yields the first order condition

$$q = (1 - P + P\theta) q^*$$

(4)

which prices domestic deposits at their expected return relative to the safe asset. Observe that $q$ increases in the recovery rate $\theta$. I provide an expression for $\theta$ in the next section before deriving households’ optimal deposit demand schedule in Section 3.1.5.

3.1.4 Banks

The domestic banking sector is imperfectly competitive in the manner of Cournot, where each bank has a market share $v \in (0, 1]$\footnote{Imperfect competition creates charter value which reduces banks’ risk-taking incentives. With perfect competition, banks always find it optimal to gamble in this set up.}. The representative bank is risk neutral and finances its domestic sovereign bond purchases and lending to firms with deposits collected from households as well as its own net worth $n$. Its budget constraint can be written as

$$n + qd = q^b b + q^l l$$

(5)
where \( l = vL, d = vD \) represent lending and deposits per bank. Profits are contingent on sovereign default as follows

\[
\pi = l + b - d \quad \text{(6)}
\]
\[
\bar{\pi} = \max\{0, \theta^b l + \theta^b b - d\} \quad \text{(7)}
\]

where \( \bar{\pi} \) represents profits in the event of sovereign default. Banks make a strictly positive profit under strong fundamentals (\( \pi > 0 \)) but may become reliant on limited liability after sovereign default. This leads to insolvency, with losses passed on to depositors through a haircut on deposits. The recovery rate of deposits reflects the bank’s shortfall of funds\(^{27}\)

\[
\theta = \min\left\{1, \frac{\theta^b l + \theta^b b}{d}\right\} \quad \text{(8)}
\]

with \( \theta < 1 \) indicating that limited liability binds.

The representative bank chooses \((d, b, l)\) in order to maximize its expected payoff

\[
E[\pi] = (1 - P) \pi + P \bar{\pi}
\]

subject to the budget constraint. Choosing \((b, l)\) is equivalent to selecting the share of funds \( \gamma \in [0, 1] \) spent on domestic sovereign bonds purchases. Using (5), \((b, l)\) can be defined in terms of \( \gamma \) as

\[
b = \gamma \left(\frac{n + q d}{q^l}\right) \quad \text{(9)}
\]
\[
l = (1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{n + q d}{q^l}\right) \quad \text{(10)}
\]

It is convenient for the remainder of the text to express the recovery rate \( \theta \) in terms of sovereign exposure \( \gamma \)

\[
\theta = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{for } d \leq \bar{d}(\gamma) \\
\left(\gamma \frac{\theta^b}{q^l} + (1 - \gamma) \frac{\theta^b}{q^l}\right) \frac{n}{d} + q & \text{for } d > \bar{d}(\gamma)
\end{cases} \quad \text{(11)}
\]
\[
\bar{d}(\gamma) = \frac{\left(\gamma \frac{\theta^b}{q^l} + (1 - \gamma) \frac{\theta^b}{q^l}\right) n}{1 - q^* \left(\gamma \frac{\theta^b}{q^l} + (1 - \gamma) \frac{\theta^b}{q^l}\right)} \quad \text{(12)}
\]

where \( \bar{d}(\gamma) \) represents the threshold of deposits above which the bank becomes insolvent fol-

\(^{27}\)There is no deposit insurance or bailot guarantees in the baseline model. These are evaluated as policy interventions in Section 6.
lowing sovereign default.28

Recall from the previous section that the price of deposits $q$ increases in $\theta$. Under imperfect competition, banks internalize the effects of their actions on $\theta$ and hence $q$. As such, it is necessary to determine the household’s optimal deposit demand schedule in the next section before evaluating bank strategies in Section 3.1.6.

### 3.1.5 Deposit demand schedule

Combining (4) with (11) yields the household’s optimal deposit demand schedule contingent on sovereign exposure $\gamma$

$$q(\gamma, d) = \begin{cases} q^* & \text{for } d \leq \tilde{d}(\gamma) \\ q^* \frac{1-P+(1-\gamma)\frac{P}{q}}{1-q^*(\gamma\frac{P}{q}+(1-\gamma)\frac{P}{q})} & \text{for } d > \tilde{d}(\gamma) \end{cases}$$

(13)

where $\tilde{d}(\gamma)$ is defined by (12). The deposit demand schedule is downward sloping in the region $d > \tilde{d}(\gamma)$ and negatively related to $\gamma$ under the parameter restrictions

$$\frac{\alpha (1-P)}{\alpha (1-P) + v (1-\alpha)} > \frac{A}{A} > \frac{\alpha \theta^b}{\alpha + v (1-\alpha)}$$

(14)

When the first inequality is satisfied, low productivity in the state with sovereign default reduces the recovery rate from loans below the promised return on deposits. Therefore, banks become insolvent if their deposits exceed the threshold $\tilde{d}(\gamma)$ and households price deposits at a discount relative to the safe asset ($q < q^*$) in anticipation of a haircut ($\theta < 1$). Conversely, deposits are risk-free and priced on par with safe assets for $d \leq \tilde{d}(\gamma)$. The second inequality ensures that the rate of return from loans is higher than that of sovereign bonds. Consequently, a rise in sovereign exposure $\gamma$ leads to an inward shift in the deposit threshold $\tilde{d}(\gamma)$ and a decline in deposit prices $q$ throughout the region $d > \tilde{d}(\gamma)$. Figure 7 shows the effect of a rise in sovereign exposure from an arbitrary level $\gamma_s$ to $\gamma_g > \gamma_s$ on the deposit demand schedule.

In the next sections, I show that the model generates equilibrium outcomes similar to the empirical observations in Section 2, including repatriation of risky sovereign debt, crowding out of bank lending and comovement between bank and government funding costs. The parameter restrictions in (14) are crucial for attaining these results. When the first inequality is satisfied, macroeconomic costs of domestic government default constrain banks’ choice sets under ‘safe’ portfolio strategies consistent with solvency in the state with sovereign default, thereby creating incentives to gamble on (domestic) sovereign risk. The second inequality ensures that banks

---

28This can also be interpreted as a leverage threshold $d(\gamma)/n$. The claim that $\theta < 1$ for $d > \tilde{d}(\gamma)$ is valid under the parameter restrictions discussed in the next section.
gambling on sovereign risk increase their (domestic) sovereign bond holdings and experience a rise in their funding costs. More generally, the model provides a mechanism for gambling on aggregate risk and misallocation of credit towards aggregate risky assets. The parameter restrictions ensure that domestic sovereign bonds are aggregate risky in the sense that their return is correlated with bank solvency prospects.

Along with the parameter restrictions, a necessary assumption to attain the multiplicity results described below is that sovereign exposure $\gamma$ is non-contractible such that banks may not commit to a certain level of exposure. When $\gamma$ is contractible, bank managers internalize the negative relationship between their sovereign exposure and funding conditions. Lemma 1 shows that this imposes market discipline and deters banks from gambling on domestic sovereign bonds.

**Lemma 1** When households and banks can specify $\gamma$ in a contract for deposits, limited liability has no impact on banks’ optimal strategy.

**Proof.** See the Internet Appendix.  

When $\gamma$ is non-contractible, households form expectations on sovereign exposure, which I label as $\tilde{\gamma}$. Lacking commitment, banks take $\tilde{\gamma}$ as given and do not internalize the impact

---

29 In the context of the European debt crisis, this restriction does not require that all lending to firms is safer than sovereign bond purchases. It only implies that there exists some lending that is safer (such as lending to internationally diversified firms or firms in sectors insulated from sovereign risk). Bank managers gambling on sovereign risk may prefer sovereign bonds over lending to (more) risky firms because the former receive favourable regulatory treatment with zero risk-weight attached to them.

30 The Internet Appendix is available online at [https://sites.google.com/site/anlari](https://sites.google.com/site/anlari)
of their sovereign exposure on the deposit demand schedule \( q(\tilde{\gamma}, d) \) facing them. I elaborate further on the formation of household expectations in Section 3.1.7. This discussion builds upon optimal bank strategies, however, which necessitates their explanation in advance. In the meantime, both the deposit demand schedule and bank strategies described in the next section should be taken to be contingent on \( \tilde{\gamma} \).

3.1.6 Bank strategies

Limited liability creates a discontinuity in the representative bank’s optimal strategy such that it can be evaluated as a choice between two distinct strategies. Under a ‘safe strategy’ (labelled as ‘s’), the bank satisfies a solvency constraint

\[
d \leq \theta^b l + \theta^b b
\]

which ensures that it does not rely on limited liability after sovereign default. The ‘gambling strategy’ (labelled as ‘g’), on the other hand, results in the bank’s insolvency and the imposition of a haircut on deposits after sovereign default. In the first period, the representative bank adopts the strategy with the higher expected payoff while taking \( \tilde{\gamma} \) and other banks’ actions taken as given.

Gambling strategy When the bank follows the gambling strategy, it solves the optimization problem

\[
E[\pi_g] = \max_{d, \gamma \in [0,1]} (1 - P)(l + b - d)
\]

subject to the budget constraint (5). Since limited liability binds after sovereign default, the bank only internalizes the payoff in the state with strong fundamentals. It also internalizes the deposit demand and loan supply schedules

\[
q = q(\tilde{\gamma}, d)
\]

\[
q^l = \left( \frac{1}{\alpha A} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} (l + (1 - v) L)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}
\]

given by (13) and (3) due to imperfect competition.\(^{31}\) This yields the first order conditions

\[
q^b = (1 - \mu_d(\tilde{\gamma}, d)) q
\]

\[
q^l = (1 - \mu_l) q^b
\]

\(^{31}\) (17) differs slightly from (3) as it is from the perspective of an individual bank. \( L \) represents aggregate bank lending which is taken as given by the representative bank.
where $\mu_d(\gamma, d)$ and $\mu_l$ are the mark-ups the bank enjoys in the deposit and loan markets due to its market power.\textsuperscript{32} These conditions respectively pin down sovereign bond purchases and bank lending. Notably, the recovery rates $(\theta^b, \theta^l)$ do not feature in these conditions due to limited liability.

**Safe strategy** Under the safe strategy, the representative bank’s problem differs from its gambling counterpart in two respects. First, as the bank does not rely on limited liability, its objective function internalizes the payoff in both states of nature such that

$$E[\pi_s] = \max_{d, \gamma \in [0, 1]} \left(1 - P\right) (l + b) + P (\theta^l l + \theta^b b) - d$$

Second, this is subject to an occasionally binding solvency constraint given by (15) in addition to the budget constraint (5). The first order conditions for the safe strategy can then be written as

\begin{align*}
(\theta^l l + \theta^b b - d) \lambda &= 0 , \lambda \geq 0 , d \leq \theta^l l + \theta^b b & (20) \\
q^b \geq \frac{(1 - P + P \theta^b) + \lambda \theta^b}{1 + \lambda} (1 - \mu_d(\gamma, d)) q & (21) \\
q^l &= \frac{(1 - P + P \theta^l) + \lambda \theta^l}{1 + \lambda} (1 - \mu_l) (1 - \mu_d(\gamma, d)) q & (22)
\end{align*}

where $\lambda$ is the Lagrange multiplier for the solvency constraint and (20) is the corresponding complementary slackness condition.\textsuperscript{33} It follows from limited liability and the parameter restrictions in (14) that the bank collects less deposits and has lower sovereign exposure $\gamma_s < \gamma_g$ under the safe strategy. These differences are amplified when the solvency constraint binds with $\lambda > 0$.

### 3.1.7 Household sentiments

Finally, I close the model by characterizing household expectations on sovereign exposure $\tilde{\gamma}$.\textsuperscript{34} This is equivalent to forming expectations over the bank strategy since (18) and (21) establish a one-to-one mapping between bank strategies and sovereign exposure conditional on $(n, d)$. Figure 7 shows the deposit demand schedules associated with the expectation of safe and

\textsuperscript{32}See Appendix A for the definitions of mark-ups.

\textsuperscript{33}The weak inequality in (21) reflects an complementary slackness condition for an (implicit) non-negativity constraint $b \geq 0$ which never binds under the gambling strategy. Namely, banks may not find it optimal to hold any sovereign bonds since $q^b$ is fixed as explained in Section 3.1.1. I provide further details on the implications for the safe strategy in the Internet Appendix.

\textsuperscript{34}Recall from Section 3.1.5 that sovereign exposure $\gamma$ is non-contractible despite being a key determinant of the deposit demand schedule.
Households may infer the bank strategy from the level of deposits $d$ when it lies outside the range $(\dd (\gamma_g), \dd (\gamma_s))$. For $d \leq \dd (\gamma_g)$, banks remain solvent after sovereign default even when their exposure is at a high level $\gamma_g$ associated with the gambling strategy. As such, banks cannot pursue a gambling strategy when their deposits remain within this region. Similarly, $d > \dd (\gamma_s)$ is not consistent with a safe strategy since even the low exposure $\gamma_s$ under the safe strategy leads to insolvency when deposits exceed $\dd (\gamma_s)$.

In contrast, it is not possible to deduce the bank strategy within the region $d \in (\dd (\gamma_g), \dd (\gamma_s)]$. In this region, $\dd$ is instead determined by household sentiments such that good (bad) sentiments refer to the expectation of a safe (gambling) strategy. Figure 8 displays the deposit demand schedule under both sentiments. A shift to bad sentiments leads to a rise in expected sovereign exposure from $\gamma_s$ to $\gamma_g$, and hence a downward movement in the deposit demand schedule. In the next section, I describe rational expectations equilibria where sentiments may only exist when they are self-confirming in equilibrium.

### 3.2 Equilibrium

I solve for a rational expectations equilibrium which requires that all optimality conditions and constraints of banks, firms and households are satisfied, and household expectations on sovereign exposure $\dd$ are confirmed in the equilibrium.\(^{35}\) Section 3.2.1 characterizes the candidate equilibria. Section 3.2.2 describes the equilibrium regions and demonstrates the multiplicity mechanism. Finally, Section 3.2.3 briefly discusses gambling traps before moving on to the

\(^{35}\)I focus only on symmetric equilibria as solving for mixed equilibria would complicate the solution significantly without yielding any additional interesting insights. Note also that the candidate equilibria described here and the conditions under which they are valid would remain unchanged even when mixed equilibria are taken into account.
3.2.1 Candidate equilibria

Two candidate equilibria emerge under rational expectations: a ‘gambling equilibrium’ where household expectations of high exposure to domestic sovereign bonds in the banking sector are confirmed by banks’ adoption of a gambling strategy, and a ‘safe equilibrium’ where the opposite is true. With a slight abuse of notation, I use the labels ‘$g$’ and ‘$s$’ to refer to variables pertaining to the gambling and safe equilibria.

Gambling equilibrium In a gambling equilibrium, banks follow the first order conditions (18) and (19). Sovereign exposure $\gamma_g$, which must be consistent with household expectations $\bar{\gamma}$, is determined by combining (18) with the deposit demand schedule (13). This yields

$$\gamma_g \rightarrow 1$$

$$q_g = q^b$$

(23)

where the comovement between the value of deposits $q_g$ and sovereign bond prices $q^b$ is consistent with Fact 4 in Section 2. Note that the corner solution for $\gamma_g$ is due to the risk neutrality of households. In Section 4, I show that risk aversion leads to an interior solution while preserving the comovement property.

The second condition (19) pins down the price of loans and aggregate bank lending

$$q^l_g = (1 - \mu_l) q^b$$

$$L_g = (\alpha A)^{\frac{1}{1-\mu_l}} q^b \frac{n^{1-\mu_l}}{q^b}$$

(24)

(25)

and expected bank payoffs are given by

$$E[\pi_g] = (1 - P) \mu_l v L_g + \frac{n}{q^b}$$

(26)

where the first term reflects the mark-up from lending and the second term is the expected return on bank net worth. Figure 9 provides a graphical depiction of the gambling equilibrium, where the red line represents the bank’s optimal deposit supply schedule under a gambling
strateg and $E_g$ marks the equilibrium allocation.  

**Safe equilibrium** In a safe equilibrium, the deposit threshold $\bar{d}(\gamma_s)$ coincides with the solvency constraint (15) such that banks borrow at the risk-free price $q = q^*$. There are two possible cases of the safe equilibrium depending on bank net worth (see Figure 10).

The first case refers to the equilibrium under a slack solvency constraint ($\lambda = 0$). Since banks do not face binding constraints, or expect to rely on limited liability, they price assets at their expected return. This leads to an equilibrium price and aggregate quality of loans

$$q^l_s = \left(1 - P + P\theta^l\right) (1 - \mu_l) q^* \quad (27)$$

$$L_s = (\alpha A)^{\frac{1}{\gamma - \alpha}} q^l_s \gamma^\alpha \quad (28)$$

36Observe that the rate of change in the deposit supply schedule changes direction. This occurs at $q_g = q^l_s / [(1 - \mu_l) (1 - \mu_d (\gamma_s, d))]$. Until this point, the bank invests only in lending to firms. By virtue of diminishing returns to scale in the production function, $q^l$ increases at an increasing rate and so does the deposit supply schedule. Beyond this point, however, the bank invests additional funds in domestic sovereign bonds and the deposit supply schedule is guided by (18). The relationship between $\mu_d (\gamma_s, d)$ and $d$ then gives the schedule a positive, but decreasing rate of change that tends to zero at $q_g = q^l$. 

Figure 9: **Gambling equilibrium**
and makes banks indifferent to the amount of their sovereign bond holdings within a range

\[ b_s \in \left[ 0, \frac{n - (q_s^l - q^* \theta^l) v L_s}{q_b - q^* \theta^b} \right] \]  

(29)
as their valuation for \( b_s \) coincides with the market price \( q^b \). Consistent with this, there is also a range of admissible equilibrium values for \((d_s, \gamma_s)\) given by jointly solving for (5) and (9) and depicted with \( E_s \) in Figure 10. I pin down these variables by selecting the upper bound of (29) without loss of generality.\(^{37}\) Finally, banks’ expected payoff is given by

\[ E [\pi_s] = (1 - P + P \theta^l) \mu_s v L_s + \frac{n}{q^*} \]  

(30)
The first case takes place when bank net worth exceeds the boundary

\[ n_c \equiv (q_s^l - q^* \theta^l) v L_s \]where \( L_s \) is given by (28). In the second case, which takes place with net worth \( n < n_c \), the solvency constraint binds, creating a wedge \( \lambda > 0 \) between the demand and supply for deposits. Therefore, banks do not purchase any domestic sovereign bonds and the equilibrium quantity

\(^{37}\)The parameter regions under which the safe equilibrium with the selected \( b_s \) value exists fully encompasses that of safe equilibria with lower \( b_s \) values. In other words, whenever the safe equilibria with lower \( b_s \) values exist, so does the selected equilibrium, which is identical to them in all other aspects.
of loans is implicitly defined by
\[ q^* \theta^L_s = \left( \frac{L_s}{\alpha A} \right)^{\frac{1}{n}} - \frac{n}{v} \quad (31) \]

where a rise in bank net worth relaxes the solvency constraint and increases \( L_s \). The equilibrium price of loans and banks’ expected payoff are then given by
\[ q_s^l = \left( \frac{1}{\alpha A} \right)^{\frac{1}{n}} L_s^{\frac{1-a}{a}} \]
\[ E[\pi_s] = v (1 - P) (1 - \theta^l) L_s \quad (32) \]

Finally, it is worth discussing bank lending in the context of safe and gambling equilibria. Proposition 1 outlines the conditions under which a gambling equilibrium is associated with lower bank lending.

**Proposition 1** Bank lending is lower in a gambling equilibrium under the conditions
\[ \theta^l > \theta^b \]
\[ n > v \left( \frac{L_g}{\alpha A} \right)^{\frac{1}{n}} - q^* \theta^l v L_g \]

**Proof.** See the Internet Appendix. ■

The first condition pertains to crowding out effects. In a gambling equilibrium, sovereign default leaves banks insolvent. Because of limited liability, banks then cease to internalize asset payoffs during sovereign default. When \( \theta^l > \theta^b \), this leads to the crowding out of bank lending by domestic sovereign bond purchases and high bank funding costs.

In spite of this, bank lending is higher under the gambling equilibrium when net worth is below the level indicated by the second condition. In this case, banks reduce their lending below \( L_g \) in order to remain solvent after sovereign default. Observe that a rise in \( \theta^l \) relaxes the solvency constraint such that the second condition is satisfied at a wider range of net worth, while crowding out effects become stronger.

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38 With \( \lambda > 0 \), banks’ valuation of sovereign bonds falls short of their market price \( q^b \). Therefore, the corner constraint \( b_s \geq 0 \) binds and \((21)\) holds with an inequality.

39 See the Internet Appendix for a formal proof.
### 3.2.2 Equilibrium regions

There are three possible equilibrium outcomes to the model.\(^{40}\) First, there is a unique gambling equilibrium when banks follow a gambling strategy regardless of household sentiments. Second, there are multiple equilibria if banks adopt a safe strategy under good sentiments and a gambling strategy under bad sentiments such that both sentiments are self-confirming. Third, there is a unique safe equilibrium when banks follow a safe strategy regardless of sentiments. I denote the regions of bank net worth with these equilibrium outcomes as \(G\), \(M\) and \(S\) respectively.

**Proposition 2** Under the parameter restrictions given by (14), the mapping of equilibrium regions across net worth \(n\) is monotonic and given by

\[
\mathcal{E}(n) = \begin{cases} 
G & \text{if } n \leq n_c \\
M & \text{if } n < n < \bar{n} \\
S & \text{if } n > \bar{n}
\end{cases}
\] (33)

where \(n < n_c\) is implicitly defined by the expression

\[\bar{n} = \left(\frac{1}{v}\right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \left(1 - q^\ast \frac{(1 - P) \mu_i (q_g')^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} (A\alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} + \frac{n}{v}}{A\alpha q^\ast (1 - P) \left[1 - \theta^l + \mu_i \frac{1-v}{v}\right]} - \theta^l q^\ast (1 - P) \mu_i (q_g')^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} (A\alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \right) \left(1 - \theta^l + \mu_i \frac{1-v}{v}\right) \] (34)

and \(\bar{n}\) is given by

\[\bar{n} = \frac{(1 - P) q^\ast}{P} \left[(1 - P) + P\theta^l (1 - v) - (1 - P + P\theta^l)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \right] \left((1 - \mu_i) q^b \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} (\alpha A)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \mu_i \] (35)

under the sufficient conditions \(\alpha \in (0, \frac{1}{2}], v \in (0, \frac{1}{2}]\).

The non-emptiness of \(G\) and \(M\) depends on where \(\theta^l\) stands with respect to the boundary \(\theta^l\), defined implicitly by the expression

\[(1 - v) + v \frac{1 - \theta^l}{\mu_i} = \left(\frac{(1 - \mu_i) \left(1 - P + P\theta^l\right)}{\theta^l}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \] (36)

\(^{40}\)I determine equilibrium regions by evaluating whether banks have an incentive to deviate when households expectations and the behaviour of other banks are in line with a given equilibrium type. See the Internet Appendix for further details on deviation strategies and equilibrium selection.
For $\theta^l \geq \theta^l$, $\mathcal{G}$ is empty and $\mathcal{M}$ is non-empty. Otherwise, $\mathcal{G}$ is non-empty and a sufficient condition for $\mathcal{M}$ to be non-empty is

$$\frac{\theta^b}{\alpha + (1 - \alpha) v} > 1 - P + P\theta^b$$

(37)

**Proof.** See the Internet Appendix. \[\square\]

I use Figure 11 as an informal example to provide intuition about the multiplicity mechanism.\(^41\) Under good sentiments, the representative bank faces a deposit demand schedule consistent with expectations of low sovereign exposure $\gamma_s$. This permits the bank to satisfy its optimality conditions without reducing the price of its deposits below the risk-free price $q^*$ under a safe strategy. The bank then finds it optimal to adopt a safe strategy such that there is a safe equilibrium $E_s$ and good sentiments are confirmed. When there is a shift to bad sentiments, expectations of high sovereign exposure $\gamma_g$ lead to a downward pivot in the deposit demand schedule. Because of this deterioration in the bank’s borrowing conditions, the quantity and price of deposits fall to $E_{s|g}$ under the safe strategy, leading to a lower expected payoff. If the bank finds it optimal to deviate to a gambling strategy that leads to the equilibrium $E_g$, bad sentiments are also confirmed and there are multiple equilibria.

\(^41\)In the interest of brevity, I focus on a case where the solvency constraint remains slack. The multiplicity mechanism becomes even stronger when the solvency constraint binds as the shift to bad sentiments further tightens the constraint.
3.2.3 Gambling traps

Finally, I briefly provide intuition on mechanisms that lead to gambling traps. Proposition 3 shows that banks make lower profits in the gambling equilibrium (relative to the safe equilibrium) even in the state without sovereign default. This is particularly striking since the gamble on sovereign risk is successful in this state in the sense that banks collect high yields from sovereign bonds without a haircut.

**Proposition 3** For $\theta^l > \theta^b$, the gambling equilibrium leads to lower profits in the state with good fundamentals such that $\pi_g < \pi_s$.

**Proof.** See the Internet Appendix.

This finding is due to two reasons: First, high bank risk-taking is anticipated by depositors in the gambling equilibrium, leading to high funding costs that reduce profits $\pi_g$. Second, the solvency constraint acts as a coordination mechanism to increase mark-ups when it binds, leading to a reduction in bank lending and excess profits that raise bank profits $\pi_s$ in the safe equilibrium.

In the next section, I present a dynamic model where bank net worth is accumulated from retained profits. I show that the findings in Propositions 1-3 remain valid in this framework and may lead to slow recovery in bank net worth, an extended period of financial fragility, and an endogenously persistent decline in bank lending and output following adverse shocks. I refer to these episodes as gambling traps since they are characterized by the crowding out of bank lending in favour of a gamble on aggregate-risky domestic sovereign bonds as in the gambling equilibrium described in Section 3.2.1.

4 A dynamic model

In this section, I extend the two period model to a recursive-dynamic setting with risk averse households and sovereign risk shocks. Figure 12 shows the recursive timeline. The vector $S$ collects the value of aggregate state variables (to be defined explicitly below) in the current period and $S'$ denotes the state vector for the next period. Sovereign default is incorporated into the model as an absorbing state. In each period, the government defaults with probability $P(S)$. Once the government defaults, there is no more sovereign default risk in future periods and the model economy moves to a steady state $\overline{S}$ where the continuation values $(\overline{\nu}^h, \overline{\nu}^b)$ of banks and households depend on $S$.

In the interest of brevity, I only describe the aspects of the dynamic model that differ from Section 3.42 The remainder of the section is organized as follows: First, I describe the process

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42See Appendix B and the Internet Appendix for further details on the dynamic model.
for sovereign risk, the deposit demand schedule under risk aversion, and the bank’s recursive optimization problem. Second, I discuss the formulation of household sentiments, define the equilibrium concept and characterize the steady state after sovereign default. Finally, I provide a sketch of the algorithm used for the numerical solution.

4.1 Government and sovereign risk

As in Section 3.1.1, sovereign bonds are priced at their expected return by deep pocketed foreign investors. Instead of taking a constant value, however, the sovereign default probability \( P(S) \) is determined by a stochastic process. Let \( S \) denote the fiscal stress faced by the government. In each period, the government’s resolve to avoid default is given by an i.i.d. shock drawn from a standard logistic distribution. An event drawn from a standard logistic distribution, \( \varepsilon \), is such that the sovereign default probability is given by the logistic function

\[
P(S) = \frac{\exp (\Upsilon(S))}{1 + \exp (\Upsilon(S))}
\]  

Although domestic fundamentals such as government debt \( B \), output \( Y \) and sovereign exposure \( \gamma \) may easily be incorporated into \( \Upsilon(S) \) as determinants of sovereign risk, I abstain from these feedback channels by adopting a simple specification \( \Upsilon(S) = \delta \) where \( \delta \) follows the AR(1) process

\[
\delta' = \delta_{ss} + \rho_{\delta} (\delta - \delta_{ss}) + \sigma_{\delta} \varepsilon_{\delta}', \quad \varepsilon_{\delta}' \sim N(0,1)
\]

and \( \varepsilon_{\delta}' \) is a sovereign risk shock. My reasons for doing so are threefold. First, abstaining from these feedback channels permits me to isolate the transmission of sovereign risk to the real economy through strategic interactions between banks and depositors. These interactions constitute the main novelty of this paper, as opposed to feedback loops which have been studied...
extensively in previous literature (see e.g. Bi and Traum, 2012; Corsetti et al., 2013). Second, this is also computationally convenient since it reduces the number of state variables.

Third and most importantly, there are several opposing channels through which gambling on sovereign debt may affect sovereign default risk and there is no clear consensus on the direction and magnitude of the overall impact. On the one hand, gambling may increase fiscal stress since crowding out effects reduce economic activity and tax revenues, while higher risk-taking by banks increases contingent liabilities on the government. On the other hand, higher sovereign exposure in the domestic banking sector increases the (internal) costs of default and may provide a commitment device for the government to stay solvent. Domestic sovereign bond purchases by gambling banks may also reduce sovereign bond yields, thereby reducing the government’s vulnerability to rollover crises. Accounting for and quantifying these effects would require solving the government’s optimal default problem which is beyond this paper’s scope.

Moreover, empirical studies show that a substantial portion of the movements in sovereign risk premia during the European debt crisis were unrelated to country fundamentals (see e.g. Bahaj, 2014; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). In line with these findings, the shock process in (39) may be interpreted as reflecting non-fundamental factors such as contagion and potentially self-fulfilling sentiments in sovereign bond markets.

Finally, the law of motion for government debt is given by the government’s budget constraint

\[ q^b (S) B' = B + G (S) - T (S) \]

where \( T (S) \) is lump-sum taxation on households and \( G (S) \) is government spending. Since \( B \) has no effect on the non-government sector under this specification, the only restriction I place on the primary surplus \( G (S) - T (S) \) is that it follows a fiscal rule that precludes Ponzi games.

### 4.2 Deposit demand schedule

Households supply labor inelastically to firms and have risk averse preferences with their flow utility \( u (c) \) given by a standard CRRA specification. I relegate their recursive optimization problem to Appendix B and discuss the implications of risk aversion for the deposit demand

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43See Broner et al. (2014) and Acharya et al. (2014b) on crowding out effects and Acharya et al. (2014a) on contingent liabilities. Gennaioli et al. (2014) and Perez (2015) propose models where banks’ domestic sovereign bond holdings increase default costs and reduce government incentives to default. Crosignani (2015); Crosignani et al. (2016) analyze the effects of gambling on sovereign bond yields.
where $d'$ is deposits at bank level, $u_c(\cdot)$ is marginal utility and $(c, c')$ are respectively consumption in future states with and without sovereign default. The sovereign exposure anticipated by households is denoted by $\bar{\gamma}(n, S)$ and the deposit threshold $\bar{d}(n, S)$ is identical to its counterpart in Section 3.

Under risk aversion, the marginal utility wedge $\frac{u_c(c)}{u_c(c')}$ exceeds unity and increases in $d'$. Compared to the case with risk neutrality, this increases the curvature of the schedule in the risky region $d' > \bar{d}(n, S)$. As a result, there is an interior solution $\gamma_g \in (0, 1)$ for sovereign exposure under the gambling strategy.

### 4.3 Banks

Each bank is managed by a unit continuum of risk-neutral bankers. From a representative bank’s perspective, the timeline of events within a period is as follows: At the beginning of each period, the bank observes the realization of $S$ and collects deposits $d'$ from households at a price $q(d', n, S)$. It uses these deposits, along with its accumulated net worth $n$ to purchase domestic sovereign bonds $b$ and loans $l$ from firms at prices $q^b(S)$ and $q^l(l, S)$, thereby selecting its sovereign exposure.

Next, the bank learns whether the government is in default. The payoff from $(b, l)$ and hence the bank’s profits are contingent on the sovereign default realization

$$\pi = l + b - d'$$

and

$$\bar{\pi} = \max (\theta^b l + \theta^b b - d', 0)$$

such that the bank may be rendered insolvent by sovereign default. Bankers have limited liability, so when the bank becomes insolvent, all of its bankers exit the economy with zero payoff. When the bank is solvent, on the other hand, a randomly determined but constant portion $(1 - \psi)$ of its bankers exit and consume their share of the profits.\footnote{The number of banks, and the bankers that manage them are constant over time. Insolvent banks are replaced with a new bank that has zero net worth. Bankers that exit from solvent banks are replaced with new bankers which do not contribute to net worth.}

The remaining
profits are accumulated as net worth in the next period, according to the law of motion

\[ n' = \psi (\pi - \omega) \quad (43) \]

\[ n' = \psi (\bar{\pi} - \omega) \quad (44) \]

where \( \omega \) represents overhead costs.\(^{45}\)

As in the two-period model, the bank may pursue a ‘safe strategy’ where it satisfies an occasionally binding solvency constraint \( d' \leq \theta' l + \theta b \) and a ‘gambling strategy’ which leaves it reliant on limited liability in the event of sovereign default. I denote these with the subscripts \( s \) and \( g \). The representative bank’s problem can then be written as

\[
V^b (n; S) = \max \left\{ V^b_s (n; S) , V^b_g (n; S) \right\} ,
\]

\[
V^b_s (n; S) = \max_{d', \gamma \in [0,1]} \left\{ (1 - P (S)) \left( (1 - \psi) \pi + \psi \mathbb{E}_S \left[ V^b (n'; S') \right] \right) \right\} + P (S) \left( (1 - \psi) \bar{\pi} + \psi \mathbb{E}_S \left[ V^b (n'; S') \right] \right),
\]

\[
V^b_g (n; S) = \max_{d', \gamma \in [0,1]} \left\{ (1 - P (S)) \left( (1 - \psi) \pi + \psi \mathbb{E}_S \left[ V^b (n'; S') \right] \right) \right\}
\]

subject to (41)-(44) and

\[
q^b (S) b + q^l (l, S) l = q (d', n, S) d' + n
\]

\[
S' = \Gamma (S)
\]

for both strategies, as well as the solvency constraint for the safe strategy. \( \Gamma (S) \) is the law of motion for aggregate state variables, (46) represents the bank’s budget constraint and \( V^b (.) \) is the bank’s continuation value under sovereign default. Lemma 2 provides an expression for \( V^b (.) \).

**Lemma 2** The continuation value for solvent banks in the steady state \( \overline{S} \) is

\[
V^b (\overline{n}'; \overline{S}) = \bar{\pi}
\]

**Proof.** See the Internet Appendix. \( \blacksquare \)

\(^{45}\)The consumption of portion \((1 - \psi)\) of profits and overhead costs \( \omega \) serve to prevent the accumulation of infinite net worth by banks in the steady state after sovereign default. The former aspect is standard in dynamic financial models while the latter is necessitated by the excess profits banks make due to imperfect competition. Overhead costs are waived when \( \bar{\pi} < \omega \) so as to ensure that they never drive the bank into insolvency or affect the recovery rate \( \theta \) on deposits.
The bank’s first order conditions under the safe strategy are

\[
(\theta^l + \theta^b - d') \lambda (n, S) = 0, \quad \lambda (n, S) \geq 0, \quad d' \leq \theta^l + \theta^b
\] (48)

\[
q^b (S) \geq \frac{(1 - P (S)) \left(1 - \psi + \psi \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_S [V^b (n', S')]}{\partial \pi}\right) + (P (S) + \lambda (n, S)) \theta^b}{1 + \lambda (n, S)} (1 - \mu_d (d', n, S)) q (d', n, S)
\] (49)

\[
q^l (l, S) = \frac{(1 - P (S)) \left(1 - \psi + \psi \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_S [V^b (n', S')]}{\partial \pi}\right) + (P (S) + \lambda (n, S)) \theta^l}{1 + \lambda (n, S)} (1 - \mu_d (d', n, S)) q (d', n, S)
\] (50)

where \((\mu_l, \mu_d (d', n, S))\) are the mark-ups in the loan and deposit markets and \(\lambda (n, S)\) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the solvency constraint. The interpretation of these conditions is similar to their counterparts in Section 3.1.6. The two sets of FOCs differ only due to the term \(\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_S [V^b (n', S')]}{\partial \pi}\) which is the expected value of a marginal increase in profits in the state without sovereign default. In a two-period setting, this term is fixed at unity by the bank’s risk neutrality. In a dynamic environment, on the other hand, it depends on the marginal value of net worth in future state realizations \(S'\) via (43). Proposition 3 shows that the FOCs in Section 3.1.6 constitute a special case of the dynamic FOCs.

**Lemma 3** Let \(g\) be the subset of state realizations where the bank follows a gambling strategy. If for all possible future aggregate state realizations \(S'\), either \((n'; S') \in g\) or \((n'; S') \notin g\) and \(\lambda (n', S') = 0, q (d', n', S') = q^*,\) then

\[
\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_S [V^b (n', S')]}{\partial \pi} = 1
\]

Otherwise

\[
\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_S [V^b (n', S')]}{\partial \pi} > 1
\]

**Proof.** See the Internet Appendix.

The proposition states that the bank attaches a higher value to future net worth if there is a positive probability of visiting a future state realization where it follows a safe strategy with a binding solvency constraint and/or its deposits are priced as risky. This increase in the value attached to \(\pi\) relative to \(\pi\) increases the risk-taking incentives of the bank, leading to stronger incentives to adopt the gambling strategy.

In contrast, the FOCs under the gambling strategy are identical to their counterparts in
section 3.1.6.

\[ q_b(S) = (1 - \mu_d(d', n, S)) q(d', n, S) \]  
\[ q_l(l, S) = (1 - \mu_l) q^b(S) \]  

This is because the bank only internalizes its profits \( \pi \) in the absence of sovereign default due to limited liability. Since the relative valuation of \( (\pi, \pi) \) does not matter, the derivative \( \frac{\partial E_S[V_b(n', S)]}{\partial \pi} \) drops out of the gambling FOCs. In other words, when a bank follows the gambling strategy, its optimal set of actions are those that maximize \( \pi \) regardless of its time horizon. In Section 4.7, I show that this feature of the bank’s policy function can be used to alleviate the computational burden significantly.

### 4.4 Sentiments and sunspots

In this section, I describe how households formulate their expectations \( \hat{\gamma}(n, S) \) about a bank’s domestic sovereign bond exposure. As in the two period model, there is a unique mapping between bank strategies and sovereign exposure conditional on \( (n, S) \). Using (45), the optimality condition for the bank to adopt a gambling strategy can be written as

\[ V^b_g(n; S) \geq V^b_s(n; S) \]  

When this condition is satisfied, the bank’s optimal exposure \( \gamma_g \) is given by (51), (52). Otherwise, the bank adopts a safe strategy and its exposure \( \gamma_s \) is pinned down by (48)-(50).

Sentiments may become self-fulfilling due to the dependence of both sides of the inequality in (53) on expected sovereign exposure \( \hat{\gamma}(n, S) \). Accordingly, the state space for \( (n, S) \) can be segmented into three non-intersecting subsets: \( G \) denotes a subset where (53) is satisfied for \( \hat{\gamma}(n, S) = \{\gamma_g, \gamma_s\} \), \( S \) denotes a second subset where (53) is not satisfied for \( \hat{\gamma}(n, S) = \{\gamma_g, \gamma_s\} \) and \( M \) denotes a third subset where (53) is satisfied for \( \hat{\gamma}(n, S) = \gamma_g \) but not for \( \hat{\gamma}(n, S) = \gamma_s \). In the first two subsets \( \{G, S\} \), \( \gamma \) is uniquely determined regardless of \( \hat{\gamma}(n, S) \) while household sentiments become self-fulfilling when \( (n, S) \in M \).

I use sunspots to resolve the multiplicity in \( M \). Specifically, let \( \zeta \) be a random variable drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval at the beginning of each period and \( \tilde{\zeta} \in [0, 1] \) a constant threshold. When \( \zeta > \tilde{\zeta} \) household expectations coordinate on \( \hat{\gamma}(n, S) = \gamma_s \) consistent with the safe strategy (good sentiments). When \( \zeta \leq \tilde{\zeta} \), on the other hand, expectations coordinate on \( \hat{\gamma}(n, S) = \gamma_g \) in line with the gambling strategy (bad sentiments). To provide a formal definition for \( \hat{\gamma}(n, S) \), I segment \( M \) into two subsets \( M^+ \) and \( M^- \) which respectively
denote good and bad sentiments such that

\[ \tilde{\gamma}(n, S) = \begin{cases} 
\gamma_g & \text{if } (n, S) \in \{G, M^-\} \\
\gamma_s & \text{if } (n, S) \in \{S, M^+\} 
\end{cases} \]

Since \( \zeta \) is uniformly distributed on a unit interval, the probability of good and bad sentiments in the next period are simply given by \( (1 - \zeta) \) and \( \zeta \) respectively. While it is straightforward to introduce a more sophisticated specification for sunspots by replacing \( \zeta \) with an AR(1) shock process or a function of fundamentals, I adopt this simple specification as it allows me to isolate the role of sovereign risk and other relevant fundamentals in making household sentiments self-fulfilling in the first place. The subset \( M \) which provides a mapping of states with multiplicity is endogenously determined by the optimal strategies of households and banks, which in turn depend on these fundamentals.\(^{46}\)

### 4.5 Steady state after sovereign default

When the government defaults, sovereign bond holders receive a recovery rate \( \theta^b < 1 \). Productivity also declines to \( \underline{A} < A \) which leads to a reduction in wages and a partial payment from loans. If the banks followed a gambling strategy before sovereign default, they become insolvent such that households receive a recovery rate \( \theta \) from their deposits and the banking sector is replaced with a new set of banks with zero net worth. Otherwise, deposits are repaid fully and bank net worth is determined by (44).

In the following period, the economy immediately moves to a steady state \( \underline{S} \) where productivity recovers back to \( \underline{A} \) and there is no further sovereign default risk.\(^{47}\) In the absence of bank insolvency risk, domestic deposits become perfectly substitutable with risk-free assets

\(^{46}\)Global games constitutes an alternative approach to sunspots in resolving multiple equilibria that creates an endogenous relationship between economic fundamentals and equilibrium selection. This approach, however, is not implementable in the context of the multiplicity considered in this paper since the strategic complementary between banks and depositors takes place through a market mechanism that is capable of aggregating diverse beliefs. To see this, consider the introduction of a private signal to households about \( \tilde{\gamma}(n, S) \). Banks would then find it optimal to borrow solely from the household with the lowest \( \tilde{\gamma}(n, S) \) signal, which would effectively determine the price \( q(d', n, S) \) in deposit markets. The mode then collapses to a sunspot solution where the lowest \( \tilde{\gamma}(n, S) \) signal becomes the de facto sunspot.

\(^{47}\)The immediate recovery in productivity only serves to simplify the exposition. This can be replaced with any continuation path for productivity as long as there is perfect foresight about it.
such that $q = q^*$. The steady state price and quantity of loans is then given by

$$q^k = (1 - \mu_l) q^*$$
$$L = (\alpha A)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} (q^k)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

The following parameterization for $(\psi, \omega, q^*)$ is necessary to ensure this

$$\psi = q^* = \beta$$
$$\omega = v\mu_l L$$

The parameterization for $(\psi, \omega)$ ensures that bank net worth remains constant while equating the risk-free asset price to the household discount factor drives households to completely smooth their consumption after sovereign default.\(^{49}\)

### 4.6 Equilibrium

Let $S = [N, \delta, \zeta, \varkappa]$ be the aggregate state sector, where $N = n/v$ is aggregate bank net worth in equilibrium and $\varkappa = D + D^* + w(S) - T(S)$ is disposable household wealth. A recursive rational expectations equilibrium is given by value functions for households and banks $\{V^h, V^b\}$ and policy functions for households $\{c, D', D^{*t}\}$ and for banks $\{\gamma, d'\}$ such that, given prices $\{w, w^*, q^*\}$ and price schedules $\{q', q\}$: (i) households' and banks' value and policy functions solve their optimization problems; (ii) the market for domestic deposits clears, $D' = d'/v$ (iii) the market for loans clears $L(S) = l/v$; (iv) the government budget constraint is satisfied; (v) $\Gamma(.)$ and $\{G, M, S\}$ are consistent with agents' optimal strategies.\(^{50}\)

### 4.7 Numerical solution

The solution for the recursive equilibrium is attained using global numerical methods. In this section, I sketch the main steps in the algorithm and relegate the remaining details to the Technical Appendix.

Note that the decentralized, imperfectly competitive nature of banks requires the inclusion of individual bank net worth $n$ along with $S$ as a state variable. Specifically, although banks

\(^{48}\)There is no need take a stance on when and whether the government returns to sovereign bond markets as long as there is no further default risk. If the government is able to issue bonds, they are priced at $q^b = q^*$ and banks are indifferent to holding them.

\(^{49}\)Solving the household’s problem when $q^*$ differs from the discount factor $\beta$ is trivial but leads to a balanced growth path for consumption rather than a steady state value. I abstain from this since it leads to additional complication without providing any insights of interest.

\(^{50}\)In the small open economy, the markets for goods and sovereign bonds are cleared through trade with the rest of the world. Therefore, there is no need to explicitly include the clearing conditions for these markets in the equilibrium definition.
are symmetric on the equilibrium path, determining their optimal strategy as per Section 4.3
requires considering off-equilibrium strategies (deviations) which lead to a different path of \( n \)
for the specific bank than the remainder of the banking sector. The bank’s value function
\( V^b(n;S) \) and the equilibrium regions \( \{G, M, S\} \) are thus defined over \((n, S)\).

Let \( X(S) = \{\gamma, d', c, D', D^\alpha\} \) collect the policy functions of banks and households in the
symmetric equilibrium with \( n = vN \), and \( E = \{G, M, S\} \) denote the equilibrium regions. The solution algorithm can then be sketched as follows

1. Begin with a set of guesses for \( \{E, \Gamma(S), X(S)\} \).
2. Formulate future expectations according to \( \{E, \Gamma(S), X(S)\} \). Then, use the deposit demand schedule in Section 4.2, first order conditions in Section 4.3, and the market clearing conditions in Section 4.6 to update \( \{\Gamma(S), X(S)\} \). Iterate until the solution for \( \{\Gamma(S), X(S)\} \) converges.
3. Guess the bank’s value function \( V^b(n;S) \).
4. Use the first order conditions in section (4.3), (53) and expectations formulated according to \( \{E, \Gamma(S), X(S)\} \) to update \( V^b(n;S) \). Iterate until the solution for \( V^b(n;S) \) converges.
5. Update \( E \) according to the solution to step 4. Repeat from step 2 until convergence.

I follow three distinct approaches to alleviate the curse of dimensionality that arises from solving the model globally. First, I use a piecewise cubic Hermite spline to interpolate \( \{\Gamma(S), X(S), V^b(n;S)\} \) between the pre-defined grid points. Second, I abstain from the household’s wealth accumulation process by letting lump-sum taxes \( T(S) \) adjust to ensure that

\[
\kappa = D + D^* + w(S) - T(S) = \bar{E}
\]

as long as the government remains solvent, where \( \bar{E} \) is a fixed wealth parameter. This does not affect households’ incentives to save since they take \( T(S) \) as given, but eliminates \( \kappa \) from the state vector, reducing the number of state variables to four. Third, I take advantage of a series of characteristics of the bank’s first order conditions to reduce the computational burden in steps 2 and 4 significantly. Specifically, the FOCs (48) and (50) indicate that the optimal choices \( \{\gamma_s, d'_s\} \) under a safe strategy are (i) independent of \( \{\Gamma(S), X(S), V^b(n;S)\} \) when \( \tilde{\gamma}(n, S) = \gamma_s \) (ii) independent of \( \{\Gamma(S), V^b(n, S)\} \) when \( \lambda(n, S) > 0 \). Similarly, the FOCs (51) and (52) indicate that the optimal choices \( \{\gamma_g, d'_g\} \) under a gambling strategy are independent of \( \{\Gamma(S), V^b(n, S)\} \). The relevant proofs are provided in the Technical Appendix.
Table 3: Calibration

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^b$</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>Sov. bond recovery rate</td>
<td>Cruces and Trebesch (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_{ss}$</td>
<td>-5.14</td>
<td>Fiscal stress (mean)</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_\delta$</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>Fiscal stress (persistence)</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_\delta^2$</td>
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<td>Fiscal stress (variance)</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
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<td>Discount factor</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{E}$</td>
<td>0.07E-9</td>
<td>Household wealth</td>
<td>OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
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<td>Coefficient of risk aversion</td>
<td>Thimme (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Cobb-Douglas parameter</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Productivity (no sov. default)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A_0$</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>Productivity (sov. default)</td>
<td>Hébert and Schreger (2016)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$v$</td>
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<td>Bank market share</td>
<td>ECB Statistical Data Warehouse</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\zeta$</td>
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<td>Probability of bad sentiments</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

5 Numerical results

This section provides numerical results from the dynamic model under a calibration that targets Portugal. It proceeds in four steps. Section 5.1 describes the calibration. Section 5.2 discusses the relationship between sovereign risk and the equilibrium regions. Section 5.3 demonstrates the propagation of sovereign risk shocks with the use of impulse response functions to a sovereign risk shock. Finally, in Section 5.4, I bring the model to data by comparing its fit to macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal over 2010-2016.

Among countries hit by the European sovereign debt crisis, I choose Portugal for two reasons. First, unlike Greece and Cyprus, Portugal did not impose capital controls on its banking sector. This is important as the mechanism for the rise in bank funding costs in the model relies on households’ ability to invest in a safe asset instead of domestic bank deposits. Second, the Portuguese economy did not undergo a major real estate bubble as in Ireland and Spain or face long-term economic stagnation like Italy. Therefore, the transmission mechanism captured by the model should be most prevalent in Portuguese data.

5.1 Calibration

The calibration targets Portugal over the crisis period of 2010-2016 with each period representing a quarter. Table 3 reports the calibrated parameters.

The recovery rate of sovereign bonds is set according to Cruces and Trebesch (2013). The calibration for the fiscal stress parameters ($\delta_{ss}, \rho_\delta, \sigma_\delta^2$) matches $q^b(S)/q^*$ to the yield spread
between Portuguese and German bonds (which act as a benchmark for the safe rate). Specifically, I use (1) and (38) to back out a time series of fiscal stress realizations \( \hat{\delta}_t \) from the spread data under the calibrated recovery rate. The calibration for \( (\delta_{ss}, \rho_{\delta}, \sigma_{\delta}^2) \) is then attained by fitting the AR(1) process given by (39) to \( \hat{\delta}_t \).

In the household sector, the discount factor is calibrated to \( \beta = 0.99^{1/4} \) and the wealth parameter targets data on household net worth from OECD. The calibration for the coefficient of risk aversion \( \sigma = 3 \) lies within the range given by recent empirical estimates (Thimme, 2016).

Regarding firms, I set the output elasticity of capital to the standard Cobb-Douglas value of \( \alpha = 1/3 \). In the absence of sovereign default, productivity is normalized to \( A = 1 \) such that \( A \) is equivalent to the recovery rate of loans \( \theta^l \). The calibration for \( A \) targets the recovery rate since sovereign default propagates through balance sheet costs to banks rather than the direct effects of productivity decline. Accordingly, I calibrate \( \theta^l = 0.90 \) in line with recent estimates on the effects of sovereign default on firm profitability (Hébert and Schreger, 2016).

The bank market share parameter \( v \) is calibrated to match the mark-up \( \mu_i \) in the loans market to the average interest margin on domestic bank lending to non-financial corporations during the pre-crisis period of 2003-2007. Finally, I calibrate the sunspot threshold to \( \zeta = 0.5 \) such that good and bad sentiments are equally likely.

### 5.2 Sovereign risk and equilibrium regions

I begin analyzing the numerical results by examining the implications of sovereign risk for the equilibrium regions. Figure 13 provides a mapping of the prevalent equilibrium type across a range of sovereign default probabilities \( P(S) \) and aggregate bank net worth \( N \). As with the two period model, equilibrium regions are ordered monotonically across net worth: First, the gambling equilibrium is unique when net worth falls short of a boundary \( N(S) \). Second, there is an intermediate multiplicity region \( N(S) \leq N \leq \bar{N}(S) \). Finally, the safe equilibrium is unique when net worth exceeds \( \bar{N}(S) \).

These boundaries are contingent on sovereign default risk. Only a safe equilibrium is possible

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51 I use bonds with a remaining maturity of 3 months due to the quarterly calibration of the model. While the standard benchmark for measuring sovereign default risk is the yield/CDS spreads on 10 year bonds, it is not possible to extract quarter-on-quarter default probabilities from these measures without imposing additional restrictions on the yield curve.

52 See the Technical Appendix for further details.

53 This implies a relatively high output cost of default compared to the previous literature. It is worth noting, however, that the calibration for \( \theta^l \) can be reconciled with lower output costs with the introduction of bankruptcy costs or real frictions that limit the ability of firms to decrease salary costs following sovereign default. Note also that, under the baseline calibration, the parameter restrictions in (14) are satisfied for a wide range of recovery rates \( \theta^l \in [0.59, 0.99] \). The qualitative results presented throughout the paper, including the non-emptiness of the multiple equilibria region, remain valid at all points within this range.

54 The relationship between the mark-up and the steady state price of loans is given by (54). I match this with pre-crisis interest rates in order to isolate the excess return due to market power.
when sovereign bonds are completely safe,\textsuperscript{55} but the emergence of sovereign risk creates a large region with a unique gambling equilibrium. Further increases in sovereign risk have a non-linear effect on banks’ incentives to gamble. As $P(S)$ rises, $\overline{N}(S)$ first increases, and then decreases while $N(S)$ decreases monotonically, leading to an expanding multiplicity region.

To understand these findings, consider the implications of sovereign risk for bank payoffs under each strategy. When a bank follows the gambling strategy, a rise in sovereign risk has two opposing effects on its profits. First, it increases sovereign bond yields which raises profits from gambling. Second, it leads to a rise in bank funding costs which reduces profits. Since households are risk averse, the latter effect dominates.

In contrast, the impact of sovereign risk on the safe strategy payoff is contingent on household sentiments. Recall that the bank’s solvency constraint coincides with its deposit threshold under good sentiments. This ensures that the bank borrows at the risk-free rate regardless of the sovereign default probability. As a result, the safe strategy payoff is largely independent of

\textsuperscript{55}This stems from the lack of other types of aggregate risk within the model environment. It can, however, be interpreted as the reduced form outcome of a richer environment with capital regulation based on risk-weighted assets. In this environment, capital requirements faced by a bank depend on the risk-weight attached to its portfolio. For assets with non-sovereign risk, positive risk weights align the bank’s incentives towards following a safe strategy. If sovereign bonds have zero risk-weight, then gambling is only possible in the presence of sovereign default risk. The preferential treatment for sovereign bonds described here approximately reflects the regulatory framework in the euro area (Bank for International Settlements, 2013).
When there are good sentiments.\footnote{To be precise, the payoff is independent of $P(S)$ when the solvency constraint is binding, which is the case at the boundary of net worth $\overline{N}(S)$. When the solvency constraint is slack, the expected payoff falls slightly as $P(S)$ increases due to a decline in bank lending.} Under bad sentiments, the deposit threshold is tighter than the solvency constraint due to the expectation of high sovereign exposure. Despite following a safe strategy, banks optimally breach the deposit threshold and households anticipate their insolvency under sovereign default. Therefore, as $P(S)$ increases, bank funding costs rise and safe strategy payoff decreases.

$\overline{N}(S)$ traces the levels of net worth where banks are indifferent between the two strategies under good sentiments. Since the payoff from gambling falls in $P(S)$ while that of adopting the safe strategy remains constant, $\overline{N}(S)$ declines sharply as sovereign risk increases. By the same logic, $\overline{N}(S)$ traces the points of indifference under bad sentiments where payoffs under both strategies decrease in $P(S)$. The non-monotonicity in $\overline{N}(S)$ stems from risk aversion. At low levels of $P(S)$, safe strategy payoffs decrease more rapidly such that $\overline{N}(S)$ increases in $P(S)$. As $P(S)$ rises, however, gambling profits decrease at a faster pace as the rise in bank funding costs becomes more prominent compared to higher sovereign bond yields, partially due to risk aversion. The peak of $\overline{N}(S)$ marks a turning point at which a rise in $P(S)$ makes the safe strategy relatively more profitable and $\overline{N}(S)$ falls in response to further increases in $P(S)$.

### 5.3 Propagation of sovereign risk shocks

I now evaluate the propagation of sovereign risk shocks. Figure 14 plots the response of key variables to an increase in fiscal stress by 1.5 standard deviations. The first panel indicates that the shock increases the probability of sovereign default by the next quarter from 0.6\% to 2.3\%.\footnote{Recall that the economy immediately moves to the steady state following sovereign default. The impulse responses in Figure 14 correspond to a timeline where, in each successive period, it is revealed that the government remains solvent.}

The second panel shows the evolution of aggregate bank net worth and the equilibrium regions. The shaded area represents the multiplicity region. Within this region, the prevalent equilibrium type is determined by household sentiments. Good sentiments (i.e. a high sunspot realization) lead to a safe equilibrium and bad sentiments result in a gambling equilibrium. The equilibrium is unique outside the multiplicity region with a safe equilibrium above it (and a gambling equilibrium below). For exposition’s sake, I consider an initial level of net worth that lies in this region and two specific sunspot scenarios. In the first scenario, sentiments come out to be good in each successive period such that there is always a safe equilibrium in the multiplicity region. In the second scenario, successive bad sentiments lead to a gambling equilibrium within the same region.

Under good sentiments, bank net worth increases rapidly and brings about an early exit
from the multiplicity region. With bad sentiments, on the other hand, bank net worth remains in the multiplicity region for a prolonged length of time. Since net worth is retained from bank profits, the implication is that profits are lower in the gambling equilibrium compared to the safe equilibrium. This finding is surprising since, in the absence of a sovereign default event, Figure 14 corresponds to a timeline where the gamble on domestic sovereign bonds is successful. In other words, banks make lower profits under the gambling equilibrium despite collecting high yields from their sovereign bond purchases.\(^{58}\)

As predicted in Section 3.2.3, the explanation lies in the impulse responses for bank funding costs and lending. The panels in the second row of Figure 14 show that the gambling equilibrium entails high leverage and exposure to domestic sovereign bonds. This creates the prospect of insolvency in the case of sovereign default, which in turn increases bank funding costs to the detriment of profits. In contrast, under the safe equilibrium, banks satisfy a solvency constraint that ensures their solvency following sovereign default. This leads to low leverage and sovereign bond exposure such that bank funding costs remain at the risk-free rate. Moreover, the solvency constraint binds in the multiplicity region, forcing banks to reduce their lending to firms and increasing loan interest rates (see Panel 3). Together with low funding costs, the excess returns created by the rise in loan interest rates explains the rapid rise in net worth under good

\(^{58}\)Recall that banks take household sentiments as given when deciding on their optimal strategies.
It is instructive to decompose the increase in loan interest rates, which is proportionate to the decline in bank lending and output. Figure 15 shows impulse responses for loan interest rates, aggregate bank lending and output under the same sovereign risk shock as Figure 14. In addition to the two scenarios above, it plots a third scenario with high initial net worth that leads to a unique safe equilibrium where the solvency constraint is slack.

Compared to the (risk-free) steady state, interest rates on loans increase and bank lending declines even in the high net worth case. This constitutes an ‘efficient’ decline in bank lending in view of the risk of lower productivity and returns under sovereign default. In the good sentiments scenario, bank lending initially declines significantly below this efficient level due to the deleveraging process described above, but returns back from the second period onwards as net worth increases. In the bad sentiments scenario, on the other hand, bank lending is crowded out by domestic sovereign bond purchases. Initially, this leads to a relatively mild, but still significant decline below the efficient level compared to the good sentiments case, with crowding out effects accounting for roughly 75% of the total decline in bank lending (and output). The decline is persistent, however, due to the slow increase in bank net worth.

These scenarios highlight two alternative paths of adjustment to adverse shocks. Under the safe equilibrium, the financial soundness of the banking sector is preserved by aggressive deleveraging and there is a sharp but short-lived recession. Moreover, bank funding costs remain at the risk-free rate as banks remain solvent even in the event of sovereign default. In contrast, under bad sentiments, the economy becomes stuck in a gambling trap characterized by a banking sector with high domestic sovereign bond exposure and persistent crowding out of bank lending. There is also considerable financial fragility due to the sovereign-bank nexus: If the government defaults at any point before the exit from the multiplicity region, this causes a banking crisis. As such, bank funding costs become highly correlated with sovereign bond
5.4 Comparison with Portuguese data

This section compares the model’s fit to Portuguese data. The quantitative exercise is conducted by simulating the model economy under a series of sovereign risk shocks $\epsilon_s^t$ that exactly match $q^b(S)^{-1}$ to quarterly Portuguese sovereign bond yields over 2010Q1-2016Q1. I also calibrate initial bank net worth to match the Tier 1 capital of the Portuguese banking sector in 2009, while the remaining parameters are calibrated as in Section 5.1.

Figure 16 contrasts the simulated series under good and bad sentiments (which are persistent as in the previous section) with data on the Portuguese economy. The first panel displays the sovereign default probabilities implied by the match with Portuguese sovereign bond yields. The probability of government default by the next quarter peaks at 2.78% in the final quarter of 2011.

The second panel shows the simulated series for bank net worth and the multiplicity region which evolves according to changes in sovereign default probabilities as explained in Section
5.2. The simulation places the Portuguese economy in the region with a unique gambling equilibrium in 2010Q1, after which it enters the multiplicity region. Thereafter, bank net worth follows different paths under good and bad sentiments. As in the previous section, good sentiments result in a safe equilibrium and a rapid increase in net worth that moves the economy into the region with a unique safe equilibrium. In contrast, bad sentiments lead to a gambling trap with stagnating net worth such that the economy remains in the multiplicity region.

The model has partial success in emulating changes in loan interest rates. The third panel shows that the simulated series under bad sentiments captures the initial increase in loan interest rates but overshoots at the peak of the sovereign debt crisis in 2011-2012. The simulated series under good sentiments indicates a large increase in interest rates in 2011 that is not reflected in the data. This is due to the binding solvency constraint which leads to a significant decline in bank lending as in the previous section.

The model’s main success is in replicating the evolution of bank funding costs. As shown in the fourth panel, the simulated series under bad sentiments provides a close match to deposit interest rates in Portugal. Both of these series correlate highly with sovereign default probabilities. Under good sentiments, on the other hand, interest rates remain at the risk-free rate from 2010Q2 onwards. The fifth panel compares the simulated series for bank leverage with the leverage ratio of the Portuguese banking sector.\textsuperscript{59} The simulated series under bad sentiments somewhat overshoots its counterpart in data, but captures the slow decline in bank leverage over the crisis period.

The final panel contrasts the share of funds spent on domestic sovereign bond purchases. The series under bad sentiments reflects the gradual increase in the exposure to domestic sovereign debt, but indicates a higher exposure than is observed in the data. This is not surprising as the available data accounts only for direct exposure via sovereign bond holdings, whereas a bank’s actual exposure also includes indirect exposure through holdings of assets with correlated risk, such as government bonds of other risky European countries and securities issued by banks with a high exposure to these. The simulation under good sentiments indicates a large drop in exposure which is not present in the data. Overall, the gambling equilibrium, which is consistent with bad sentiments, has more success in replicating Portuguese data than the scenario with good sentiments.

6 Policy analysis

This section evaluates policy interventions aimed at strengthening the banking sector and re-invigorating bank lending. It is clear from the numerical results in Section 5 that both of these

\textsuperscript{59}Although the latter contains non-depository liabilities which are not directly present in the model, the nature of deposits as a choice variable captures the optimal leverage decision of banks.
aims can be achieved with a capital injection to the banking sector that directly increases bank net worth $N$. However, this requires a significant transfer of resources at a time when the government is cash-struck.

Instead, I focus on unconventional interventions that can be implemented by the central bank. Section 6.1 considers (non-targeted) liquidity provision to the banking sector, which is comparable to the ECB’s longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) in the model environment. Section 6.2 proposes an alternative measure, targeted liquidity provision, where the central bank provides liquidity conditional on bank leverage. Finally, Section 6.3 generalizes the findings from the previous sections to provide insights for deposit insurance and a range of macroprudential policies.

6.1 Liquidity provision

I incorporate liquidity provision into the model by allowing each bank to issue debt $d^c \leq \tilde{d}^c$ to the central bank at a risk-free price $q^c$.\footnote{I abstain from collateral requirements on debt issued to the central bank. Collateral requirements do not preclude the form of gambling considered here as long as domestic sovereign debt is eligible as collateral. This is the case with LTROs due to the suspension of collateral eligibility requirements for sovereign debt issued by distressed euro area countries (European Central Bank, 2012). In this context, placing a haircut on sovereign debt pledged as collateral is equivalent to a reduction in $d^c$.} It is instructive to first evaluate this intervention in the two period model before transitioning to a dynamic setting. With access to central bank liquidity, the representative bank’s budget constraint and profits become

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi &= \max \{0, l + b - d - d^c\} \\
\pi^c &= \max \{0, \theta l + \theta^b b - d - d^c\}
\end{align*}
\]

The effects of central bank liquidity hinge on whether it transfers bank insolvency risk from depositors to the central bank.

**Liquidity provision without risk transfer** Consider first the case without risk transfer such that liabilities to the central bank are senior to deposits. In the event that the bank becomes insolvent, debt repayments to the central bank take priority over deposits. Therefore, the central bank is secured from losses at the expense of diluting depositors’ claim to bank revenues.\footnote{This is true unless the liquidity provided by the central bank exceeds total bank revenues under sovereign default. The restriction $d^c \leq \frac{\theta^b}{1 - \theta^b} b$ is sufficient to preclude this.}

The dilution of deposits proves to be crucial in undermining this form of intervention. It creates a negative relationship between central bank liquidity $d^c$ extended to the bank and the
recovery rate of deposits $\theta$. The deposit demand schedule then becomes

$$ q^c (\tilde{\gamma}, d, d^c) = \begin{cases} 
q^* & \text{for } d + d^c \leq \tilde{d} (\tilde{\gamma}) \\
1-P+(1-\tilde{\gamma})\left( \frac{n+q^*d^c}{q} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{\tilde{\gamma}^d}{\tilde{\gamma}^d} + \frac{1}{q} \right) & \text{for } d + d^c > \tilde{d} (\tilde{\gamma}) 
\end{cases} \tag{55} $$

where $\tilde{d} (\tilde{\gamma})$ remains unchanged. When the parameter restrictions in (14) are satisfied, a rise in $d^c$ leads to an inward shift in the deposit demand schedule. Using (13) and (55), it is easy to show that overall bank funding conditions are independent of $d^c$ such that

$$ q^c (\tilde{\gamma}, d, d^c) d + d^c = q (\tilde{\gamma}, d) d \quad \forall \ d^c \leq \tilde{d}^c $$

where $q (\tilde{\gamma}, d)$ is the deposit demand schedule in the absence of liquidity provision. This indicates that the fall in $q^c (\tilde{\gamma}, d, d^c)$ due to dilution exactly offsets the gains from cheap liquidity. Consequently, liquidity provision is completely ineffective without a risk transfer to the central bank.

**Liquidity provision with risk transfer**  Now consider an alternative case where the repayment of deposits takes priority over obligations to the central bank. This constitutes an implicit transfer of bank insolvency risk from depositors to the central bank as $\theta$ increases at the expense of potential central bank losses. As a result, the deposit demand schedule shifts out in response to a rise in $d^c$ as shown in the expressions

$$ q^c (\tilde{\gamma}, d, d^c) = \begin{cases} 
q^* & \text{for } d \leq \tilde{d}^c (\tilde{\gamma}, d^c) \\
1-P+(1-\tilde{\gamma})\left( \frac{n+q^*d^c}{q} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{\tilde{\gamma}^d}{\tilde{\gamma}^d} + \frac{1}{q} \right) & \text{for } d > \tilde{d}^c (\tilde{\gamma}, d^c) 
\end{cases} \tag{56} $$

To evaluate the implications on bank strategies, consider first the case under good sentiments. Under a safe strategy, liquidity provision has no effect since banks borrow at the risk-free rate and do not take advantage of the risk transfer. In contrast, under the gambling strategy banks find it optimal to use the maximum amount $\tilde{d}^c$ of central bank liquidity and the first order conditions (18)-(19) remain the same. Therefore, banks do not change their lending to firms in response to liquidity provision. Instead, they take advantage of the outward shift in the deposit demand schedule to increase their deposits and domestic sovereign bond purchases until their borrowing costs return to their pre-intervention level. In other words, the risk transfer provides banks with an opportunity to leverage more and increase their gamble
on domestic sovereign bonds at the expense of the central bank.

Accordingly, Proposition 4 shows that liquidity provision (with risk transfer) may backfire by eliminating the safe equilibrium. The first part of the proposition shows that when banks have access to central bank liquidity in excess of an upper bound $\tilde{d}^c$, they find it optimal to gamble even when the solvency constraint is slack. Gambling then becomes the unique equilibrium regardless of bank net worth. The second part shows that even for $\tilde{d}^c \leq \tilde{d}^c$, the intervention shifts up the boundary of net worth $n$ below which there is a unique gambling equilibrium.

**Proposition 4** The gambling equilibrium is unique for all $n$ when

$$\tilde{d}^c > \tilde{d}^c \equiv \frac{\mu_l (\alpha A (q_d^t)^{\alpha})}{P} \left( 1 - P + vP\theta^t \right) \left( \frac{1 - P + P\theta^t}{1 - P + P\theta^t} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} - (1 - P)$$

When $\tilde{d}^c \leq \tilde{d}^c$, the gambling equilibrium is unique for $n \leq n$ where $n$ is implicitly defined by the expression

$$n = \left( \frac{1}{v} \right)^{1 - \alpha} \left( \frac{1}{A\alpha} \frac{q^* (1 - P) \mu_l (q_d^t)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} (A\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} + n + q^* \tilde{d}^c}{q^* (1 - P) \left( 1 - \theta^t + \mu_l \frac{1 - v}{v} \right)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}$$

and

$$\frac{\partial n}{\partial \tilde{d}^c} > 0$$

**Proof.** See the Internet Appendix.

Figure 17 demonstrates the case under bad sentiments. On the one hand, liquidity provision increases the expected payoff from the safe strategy by reducing bank funding costs. On the other hand, it also increases the payoff from gambling as explained above. Therefore, the two period model is ambiguous as to whether the multiplicity region expands to higher levels of net worth in response to liquidity provision. To analyze this, I conduct a policy experiment based on an extension of the dynamic model in Section 4. Specifically, I extend the dynamic model to include liquidity provision (with risk transfer) as a pre-determined state variable $\tilde{d}^c$. For $T$ periods, this variable follows a pre-determined path $\{\tilde{d}^c_t\}_{t=0}^T$ before returning to zero permanently. I opt for this set up for two reasons. First, in the absence of debt with long-term maturity, giving banks the option to rollover their debt for $T$ periods approximates the

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62The changes in the deposit demand schedule and the bank’s problem are similar to the two period model. I relegate the relevant expressions to Appendix C in the interest of brevity. As the steady state after sovereign default is independent of $\tilde{d}^c$, there is no need to take a stance on the evolution of $d_i^s$ following sovereign default.
Figure 17: **Liquidity provision with risk transfer**

Note: The deposit demand schedule is attained by combining (56) with (23). The deposit supply curve stems from the combination of (3), (21), (22) and (56). Only the case with a slack solvency constraint is considered.

maturity structure of the LTROs.\textsuperscript{63} Second, this set up allows for the solution of the extended model by iterating backwards from the end date $T$. This makes the additional computational burden from including the policy intervention negligible.\textsuperscript{64}

Figure 18 plots the impulse responses to the same sovereign risk shock as in Section 5.3.\textsuperscript{65} The first panel shows that the multiplicity region shifts upwards and expands significantly due to liquidity provision. This perpetuates the gambling trap under good sentiments, while the

\textsuperscript{63}The LTROs had a 3 year maturity with an early repayment option after 1 year (European Central Bank, 2011). In the context of the model, exercising the early repayment option is equivalent to choosing $d_t = 0$ for the remaining periods. Although this does not exactly correspond to the single window for repayment in LTROs, it emerges as a result that banks either strictly prefer to take the maximum amount of funding in each period or are indifferent to the amount of central bank liquidity they receive. Therefore, the frequency and timing of the early repayment option has no impact on the numerical results.

\textsuperscript{64}When the policy expires at $T + 1$, the extended model becomes identical to the baseline model. Therefore, future expectations at $T$ for $\{E_{T+1}, \Gamma_{T+1}(S), X_{T+1}(S), V_{T+1}^T(n, S)\}$ can be attained by taking expectations according to the solution to the baseline model. The solution to the model at period $T$ is then attained by using the steps in Section 4.7. Instead of iterating until convergence, the solution $\{E_T, \Gamma_T(S), X_T(S), V_T^T(n, S)\}$ is used to take expectations for $T - 1$. This process is repeated until $t = 0$.

\textsuperscript{65}I calibrate $T = 12$ in line with LTROs and set $\tilde{d}_t = \tilde{d} < \tilde{d}$. The remaining parameters follow the baseline calibration in Section 5.1.
The economy remains in the multiplicity region even after the deleveraging process under good sentiments. The remaining panels highlight the changes in the gambling equilibrium under the policy intervention. As in the two period model, banks respond to liquidity provision by increasing their sovereign exposure until their funding costs return to their pre-intervention level. Leverage initially increases due to the rise in borrowing by banks (both from the central bank and depositors) but falls below the baseline level over time as the risk transfer increases bank profits, leading to a slightly faster increase in net worth.

Overall, it appears that when liquidity provision transfers insolvency risk from depositors to the central bank, it backfires not only by eliminating the safe equilibrium at low levels of net worth, but also by expanding multiplicity to higher levels of net worth. When combined with the irrelevance of liquidity provision–sans–risk transfer, this leads to the conclusion that the equilibrium outcome cannot be improved through the indiscriminate provision of liquidity to the banking sector. This negative result stems from the inability of non-targeted interventions to distinguish between banking strategies, which in turn leads to a trade-off between alleviating funding conditions under the safe strategy and strengthening incentives to gamble. In the next section, I propose a targeted intervention that overcomes this trade-off.

\[\text{Equation}\]

66The impulse responses under good sentiments, and those for loan interest rates are excluded as they remain identical to the baseline case in Figure 14.
6.2 Targeted liquidity provision

Under targeted liquidity provision, the central bank offers a liquidity schedule $\tilde{d}^c (d, n)$ conditional on deposits and bank net worth. By offering a liquidity schedule

$$\tilde{d}^c (n, d) = \left( \frac{q^c q^p}{q^p q^c} - \frac{p^c}{p^r} \right) q^d l^a + \frac{p^c}{q^r} n - d$$

which overlaps with the solvency constraint under good sentiments, the central bank can completely insulate the banking sector from shifts in depositor sentiments. By design, the schedule has no impact on banks' funding conditions under good sentiments. When there is a shift to bad sentiments, however, it provides banks with low cost liquidity in a manner that artificially recreates the funding conditions under good sentiments. It then follows directly from equilibrium conditions that bad sentiments cease to be self-fulfilling throughout the multiplicity region. The intervention remains off-equilibrium when it is successful, since banks are indifferent between central bank and deposit funding in the safe equilibrium.

The conditionalities on $(n, d)$ are crucial for the success of the intervention. By placing an upper bound on participating banks' leverage, these conditionalities ensure that banks do not find it optimal to take up central bank liquidity under the gambling strategy. This overcomes the trade-off faced by non-targeted liquidity provision, allowing the intervention to improve banks' funding conditions under the safe strategy without increasing incentives to gamble.

Note that the results from Section 6.1 with regard to the irrelevance of liquidity provision without a risk transfer remain valid. Therefore, at least in principle, the targeted intervention requires that the central bank becomes exposed to bank insolvency risk. In practice, however, the central bank never faces losses under targeted liquidity provision. This is not just due to the fact that successful interventions are off-equilibrium. Even when the liquidity schedule is offered in the region with a unique gambling equilibrium such that the intervention fails, conditionalities ensure that banks do not take up central bank liquidity in a gambling equilibrium. The role of the conditionalities is thus twofold. First, they drive a wedge between the safe and gambling strategies and allow the central bank to make the former more attractive, thereby eliminating multiplicity in favour of the safe equilibrium. Second, they ensure that the central bank is not subject to losses even when the intervention is unsuccessful.

Finally, note that the central bank does not need to make liquidity support contingent on the sovereign exposure $\gamma$. This raises the question as to why the central bank is capable of carrying out this intervention while the households do not. The answer lies in the ability of the central bank to internalize the equilibrium-switching effects of the intervention. In contrast, for atomistic households that take sentiments as given, (57) is sub-optimal to the deposit demand schedule. In other words, targeted liquidity provision resolves a coordination problem between
banks and depositors.\textsuperscript{67}

### 6.3 Deposit insurance and macroprudential regulation

Finally, I generalize the above findings to a wider set of policy instruments. To begin with, consider deposit insurance in the form of a limited amount of funds $F/v$ dedicated to increasing the recovery rate $\theta$ of deposits, which can then be written as

$$
\theta = \min \left\{ 1, \left( \frac{\theta^b}{d} + (1 - \tilde{\gamma}) \frac{\theta^b}{d} \right) \left( \frac{n}{d} + q \right) + \frac{F}{d} \right\}
$$

This leads to the following deposit demand schedule

$$
q^F (\tilde{\gamma}, d, F) = \begin{cases} 
q^* & \text{for } d \leq \tilde{d}^F (\tilde{\gamma}, F) \\
q^* \frac{1 - P + P(\frac{q^b}{d} + (1 - \tilde{\gamma}) \frac{q^b}{d}) n + F}{1 - q^* \left( \frac{q^b}{d} + (1 - \tilde{\gamma}) \frac{q^b}{d} \right)} & \text{for } d > \tilde{d}^F (\tilde{\gamma}, F)
\end{cases}
$$

which indicates that deposit insurance leads to an outward shift in the deposit demand schedule. Proposition 5 shows that, on its own, deposit insurance backfires in the same manner as non-targeted liquidity provision with risk transfer.

**Proposition 5** For any arbitrary $\varepsilon \geq 0$

$$
q^F (\tilde{\gamma}, d, \varepsilon) d = q^F (\tilde{\gamma}, d, \varepsilon) d + q^* \varepsilon
$$

**Proof.** See the Internet Appendix. □

As before, the negative result stems from the trade-off between alleviating funding conditions and strengthening incentives to gamble. This trade-off can be overcome with the use of macroprudential regulation. Specifically, the combination of deposit insurance with a regulatory constraint on bank liabilities can lead to the same outcome as targeted liquidity provision. This is achieved by dedicating sufficient funds to deposit insurance to offset the effects of a shift

\textsuperscript{67}Note that targeted liquidity provision differs from the targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) implemented by the ECB in that the latter provide liquidity conditional on bank lending. In the setting here, liquidity provision conditional on $l$ does not affect incentives to gamble since banks have the ability to further increase their leverage to purchase sovereign bonds after satisfying the lending conditionality. Therefore, it is largely similar to non-targeted liquidity provision, with the addition that it may lead to a rise in bank lending in the gambling equilibrium when sufficient liquidity is provided along with a risk transfer.
to bad sentiments on the deposit demand schedule

\[ F = \left( \frac{\theta_i}{q_{s}} - \frac{\theta^b}{q^b} \right) q^b l_s \]

and imposing a regulatory constraint that overlaps with the solvency constraint in the safe equilibrium

\[ d \leq \frac{F + \theta^e n}{1 - \theta^e q^e} \]

Finally, note that the same outcome can be achieved with alternative forms of macroprudential regulation. For example, the liability constraint above is interchangeable with a constraint on asset holdings or capital requirements in a richer environment with equity issuance, provided that there is a positive risk-weight attached to domestic sovereign bond holdings.

7 Conclusion

This paper proposes a dynamic general equilibrium model with optimizing banks and depositors to analyze macroeconomic adjustment to financial and debt crises and draw insights for policy design. Two important findings emerge as a consequence. First, non-contractibility of banks’ portfolio exposures leads to strategic complementarities between banks and depositors as depositors demand a return on deposits according to their expectations on bank risk-taking, and banks determine their risk-taking strategy according to their funding costs. This raises the possibility of multiple equilibria, where a safe equilibrium is characterized by low risk-taking and funding costs, and a gambling equilibrium is associated with bank insolvency risk and high funding costs.

Second, macroeconomic adjustment to crises differs substantially between the two equilibria. In a safe equilibrium, deleveraging by banks preserves the financial soundness of the banking sector at the expense of a sharp, brief recession. In a gambling equilibrium, banks respond to crises by increasing their exposure to aggregate risk. This leads to a rise in bank funding costs and the crowding out of bank lending to the private sector. The economy may then become stuck in a gambling trap with a prolonged period of financial fragility and a persistent drop in investment and output. Simulations of the model indicate that a gambling trap accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal over the sovereign debt crisis. More generally, the model’s implications are also consistent with stylized facts from the European sovereign debt crisis.

The model can also be used as a framework for policy analysis. As a novel insight, it indicates that a key prerequisite for successful liquidity interventions by central banks is that they
provide some risk-sharing with depositors. Otherwise, liquidity interventions are completely ineffective as depositors raise bank funding costs in anticipation of the dilution of their claims to bank revenues. A second insight pertains to the targeting of interventions. Non-targeted interventions that provide liquidity (and risk sharing) unconditionally may eliminate the safe equilibrium and perpetuate gambling traps. This is because these interventions face a trade-off between alleviating funding constraints and strengthening incentives to gamble. It is possible to overcome this trade-off with a targeted intervention that provides liquidity conditional on bank leverage.

Finally, it is important to stress that the mechanisms considered in this paper can be interpreted in a broader context than a sovereign debt crisis. Incentives to gamble are strong whenever an asset’s payoff is highly correlated to a bank’s own insolvency risk. This would be the case, for example, with aggregate risky assets or illiquid assets that the bank has a large pre-existing exposure to. Self-fulfilling sentiments may then arise for creditors which are not covered by government guarantees, especially when regulation is perceived to be insufficiently strict to prevent gambling. Nevertheless, these mechanisms are particularly strong in the case of domestic sovereign bonds due to the triple coincidence of high correlation between sovereign default risk and aggregate risk, zero risk-weight in regulation for domestic sovereign bonds and concerns about the credibility of government guarantees during a sovereign default episode.
References


8 Appendix

A Definitions for mark-ups

The mark-ups \( \mu_d(\gamma, d) \) and \( \mu_l \) are defined as follows:

\[
\mu_d(\gamma, d) \equiv - \frac{\partial q(\gamma, d)}{\partial d} \frac{d}{q} \quad \text{for } d \leq \bar{d}(\gamma) \\
\frac{P\left(\frac{\gamma}{\gamma_d} + (1-\gamma)\frac{\gamma_d}{\gamma_d}\right)}{1-P+P\left(\frac{\gamma}{\gamma_d} + (1-\gamma)\frac{\gamma_d}{\gamma_d}\right)} \quad \text{for } d > \bar{d}(\gamma)
\]

(59)

\[
\mu_l \equiv \frac{v(1-\alpha)}{\alpha + v(1-\alpha)}
\]

(60)

Observe that there is no deposit market mark-up in the safe region of the deposit demand schedule. This is because banks face a horizontal deposit demand schedule in this region as their deposits become perfectly substitutable with safe assets.

B Household’s recursive problem

The representative household’s problem can be written as

\[
v^h(D, D^*; S) = \max_{c,D',D^*,S'} \left\{ u(c) + \beta (1 - P(S)) \mathbb{E}_S \left[ v^h(D', D'^*; S') \right] \right. \\
\left. + \beta P(S) v^h(D', D'^*; S') \right\}
\]

subject to

\[
c + qD' + q^*D'^* = D + D^* - T(S) + w(S)
\]

\[
S' = \Gamma(S)
\]

(61)

where \( \Gamma(.) \) is the law of motion for the aggregate state variables and \( v^h(.) \) represents the household’s continuation value under sovereign default. Lemma 4 provides an expression for \( v^h(.) \).

**Lemma 4** The continuation value for households in the steady state \( S \) is

\[
v^h(D', D'^*; S) = \frac{1}{1-\beta} u(\xi),
\]

\[
\xi = (1-q^*) \left( \theta D' + D'^* + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{A}{A} L(S) \right) + q^* w - T
\]

where \( w \) is given by

\[
w = (1-\alpha) AK^\alpha
\]
Proof. Provided in the Internet Appendix.

Observe that consumption $c$ in the steady state is positively related to household wealth after sovereign default, which is increasing in the recovery rate $\theta$ of domestic deposits. Using the above expressions, the first order conditions for risk-free assets $D^*$ and domestic bank deposits $D$ can be written as

$$q^* = \frac{\beta (1 - P(S)) u_c (c') + P(S) u_c (c)}{u_c (c)}$$
$$q = \frac{\beta (1 - P(S)) u_c (c') + P(S) \theta u_c (c)}{u_c (c)}$$

where $u_c(.)$ is marginal utility. As in Section 3.1.5, the recovery rate anticipated by households depends on household expectations about the bank’s domestic sovereign bond exposure $\tilde{\gamma} (n, S)$.

$$\theta = \min \left\{ 1, \left( \tilde{\gamma} (n, S) \frac{\theta^b}{q^b(S)} + (1 - \tilde{\gamma} (n, S)) \frac{\theta^l}{q^l(S)} \right) \left( \frac{n}{d^l} + q \right) \right\}$$

The deposit demand schedule is attained by combining this expression with the household’s first order conditions.

C Liquidity Provision

In periods $t \leq T$, the model is characterized by the following equilibrium relationships

$$d_t(n, S) = \frac{\tilde{\gamma} (n, S) \frac{\theta^b}{q^b(S)} + (1 - \tilde{\gamma} (n, S)) \frac{\theta^l}{q^l(S)}}{1 - q^*(\tilde{\gamma} (n, S) \frac{\theta^b}{q^b(S)} + (1 - \tilde{\gamma} (n, S)) \frac{\theta^l}{q^l(S)})} \left( n + q^*d_t \right)$$

$q (d', n, S) = \begin{cases} \frac{q^*}{1 - P(S) + P(S) \frac{u_c(c')}{u_c(c)} \left( \gamma \theta^b \frac{\theta^b}{q^b(S)} + (1 - \gamma \theta^b) \frac{\theta^l}{q^l(S)} \right)} \left( n + q^*d_t \right) & \text{for } d' \leq \tilde{d} (n, S) \\ \frac{1 - q^* P(S) \frac{u_c(c')}{u_c(c)} \left( \gamma \theta^b \frac{\theta^b}{q^b(S)} + (1 - \gamma \theta^b) \frac{\theta^l}{q^l(S)} \right)}{q^b(S) \frac{u_c(c')}{u_c(c)} \left( \gamma \theta^b \frac{\theta^b}{q^b(S)} + (1 - \gamma \theta^b) \frac{\theta^l}{q^l(S)} \right)} & \text{for } d' > \tilde{d} (n, S) \end{cases}$

$$\pi = l + b - d' - d_t$$

$$\pi = \max (\theta^l l + \theta^b b - d' - d_t, 0)$$

$$d' + d_t \leq \theta^l l + \theta^b b$$

$$V^b_t (n; S) = \max \left\{ V^b_{s,t} (n; S), V^b_{g,t} (n; S) \right\}$$

$$V^b_{s,t} (n; S) = \max_{d', d_t \leq d_t; \gamma [0,1]} \left\{ (1 - P(S)) \left[ (1 - \psi) \pi + \psi E_S \left[ V^b_{t+1} (n'; S') \right] \right] + P(S) \left[ (1 - \psi) \tilde{\pi} + \psi V^b_{t+1} (n'; S) \right] \right\}$$

$$V^b_{g,t} (n; S) = \max_{d', d_t \leq d_t; \gamma [0,1]} \left\{ (1 - P(S)) \left[ (1 - \psi) \pi + \psi E_S \left[ V^b_{t+1} (n'; S') \right] \right] \right\}$$