# Earnings Gaps for Conspicuous Characteristics: Evidence from Indonesia* 

Nazmul Ahsan<br>Department of Economics<br>Saint Louis University<br>3674 Lindell Blvd<br>David-Shaughnessy Hall Room 346<br>Saint Louis, MO 63108<br>ahsanm@slu.edu<br>Inas Rashad Kelly ${ }^{\dagger}$<br>Department of Economics<br>Queens College of the City University of New York \& NBER<br>65-30 Kissena Boulevard PH 300<br>Flushing, NY 11367<br>inas.kelly@qc.cuny.edu

December 2017

## VERY PRELIMINARY - PLEASE DO NOT CITE

[^0]
# Earnings Gaps for Conspicuous Characteristics: Evidence from Indonesia 


#### Abstract

Recent research has begun to analyze the effects of height on earnings in Indonesia, a developing country with a large population. Little has been done on the potential effects of weight and general health status on earnings. Carefully accounting for selection into the workforce and the potential endogeneity of our health variables, we use a sample of individuals between the ages of 25 and 55 from the Indonesian Family Longitudinal Survey (IFLS) to identify this effect and conduct Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions to identify possible discrimination. We compare these results to those using less conspicuous health measures such as blood pressure, cholesterol, and chest pain. Endogeneity of our health measures is subsequently addressed using several econometric methodologies. Results suggest that overweight males in Indonesia earn an income premium, while underweight females are subject to an income penalty.


KEYWORDS: Earnings gaps, Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, Health in a Developing Country

JEL CLASS: I1

## I. INTRODUCTION

Discrimination can be prevalent in the labor market and can take different forms (statistical, overt, and so forth), particularly if it is the consumers who are discriminating. Discrimination occurs "when there are different earnings and employment opportunities across equally skilled workers employed in the same job because of workers' race, gender, national origin, sexual orientation, age, religion, 'beauty' etc" (Borjas 2012). In Becker's "taste discrimination" model, employers will act as if the cost of hiring, for example, visibly unhealthy workers (assuming here that health is uncorrelated with productivity or sick days) is ( $\mathrm{w}+\mathrm{d}$ ), where $w$ is wage (equal to the value of the marginal product of labor, or VMPL) and $d$ is a discrimination coefficient. The source of the prejudice could come from the employer, employee, or customer.

Hamermesh and Biddle's (1994) research on beauty in the labor market finds a beauty premium in the labor market that is mostly independent of occupation. Averett and Korenman (1996) confirm this finding using the body mass index (BMI) as a proxy for beauty. Mocan and Tekin (2010) find that being attractive reduces a young adult's propensity to engage in criminal activities. In line with Averett and Korenman, we focus on measures of health in identifying wage premiums.

Following Averett and Korenman, there have been several studies on the effect of obesity on labor market outcomes in the United States (among others, Sabia and Rees 2012; Han et al. 2011; Wada and Tekin 2010; Cawley et al. 2009), and Europe (Caliendo and Lee 2013; Bozoyan and Wolbring 2011; Lindeboom et al. 2010; Johansson et al. 2009; Atella et al. 2008; Greve 2008; Brunello and D'Hombres 2007; Paraponaris et al. 2005). Relatively little, however, has been done in developing countries, where cultural norms and laws protecting workers often
differ substantially. An example is Colchero and Bishai's (2012) paper, where they find that overweight women do not earn less than those of normal weight in the Philippines. Sohn (2015) finds that taller individuals in Indonesia earn more. Our study employs 1993-2014 data from the IFLS, with an initial focus on the more comprehensive health information available in 2007 (Wave 4 out of the five waves currently available).

## II. DATA

The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) is an on-going longitudinal survey in Indonesia. So far five waves were conducted in 1993, 1997, 2000, 2007 and 2015. The sampled population at the time of first wave represented 83 percent of the population living in the 13 out of 26 provinces. The map below, reproduced from the RAND website, identifies the 13 IFLS provinces in the IFLS.


About 22,000 individuals from 7,224 households were interviewed in the IFLS1 (the first wave). Both the number of respondents and households grew in the following waves, as new members joined the household through marriage or birth, and split in the households. The IFLS has been successful in tracking the households and its members which resulted in a very low attrition of the original sample. The re-contact rates in the second, third, fourth and fifth waves
are 94.4, $95.3,93.6$ and 92 percent respectively (Strauss et al. 2016). The low attrition feature makes the data particularly useful for the longitudinal study.

Another appealing feature of the IFLS is that it provides rich set of data on individual health, education, employment, marriage, and fertility outcomes-particularly useful for our study. Unfortunately, the availability of health measures differs across waves and age groups. For example, the information about cholesterol is only available for the fourth wave and for individuals who are 40 years and older in 2007. We use the fourth wave of the IFLS for our primary analysis, as it offers the most diverse set of health measures.

We analyze the effects of both conspicuous (weight, height), less conspicuous (general health status), and inconspicuous (blood pressure, cholesterol, chest pain) health measures on income and parse out explained and unexplained portions using Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions. We subsequently compare conspicuous and inconspicuous in a difference-in-differences (DD) framework and conduct several robustness checks. Finally, we employ all five waves of our panel data and run individual fixed effects models.

Other studies that have employed the IFLS in analyzing health include those by Witoelar et al. (2009), Sohn (2015), Kim (2015), Kim et al. (2017), and Sohn (2017).

## III. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY

Inputs in a typical earnings function include both human capital (Mincer 1958) and health capital. Individuals have an incentive to invest in their health, which can be viewed as both an investment good and a consumption good (Grossman 1972). Our empirical methodology begins with the following specification for predicting income:
(1) $\quad \operatorname{Ln}(\text { Real Income })_{i t}=\alpha_{0}+\alpha_{1}$ Health $_{i t}+\alpha_{2} X_{i t}+\mu_{i}+\varepsilon_{\text {lit }}$

Where $X$ is a vector of individual-level variables pertaining to age, education, marital status; $\mu_{i}$ represent individual fixed effects used in panel data models, and $\varepsilon_{l i t}$ is an error term. The health variable of interest is one of the following: underweight (dichotomous variable $=1$ if individual has a body mass index less than $18.5 \mathrm{~kg} / \mathrm{m}^{2}$ ), overweight ( $=1$ if individual has a body mass index greater than or equal to $25 \mathrm{~kg} / \mathrm{m}^{2}$ ), height above average ${ }^{3}$ ( $=1$ if individual's height is above the average in the sample for that individual's gender), high blood pressure ( $=1$ if diastolic blood pressure $>=90 \mathrm{~mm} \mathrm{Hg}$ or systolic blood pressure $>=140 \mathrm{~mm} \mathrm{Hg}$ ), high cholesterol ( $=1$ if total cholesterol greater than or equal to $240 \mathrm{mg} / \mathrm{dL}$, asked of individuals 40 years of age and older), chest pain ( $=1$ if pain on left side of chest, only asked of individuals 50 years of age and older), and good health ( $=1$ if the individual is reported as being in excellent, very good, good, or above average health, as evaluated by a nurse). The above specification is employed for our panel data analyses (preliminary results of which are in Appendix Table 2), yet we begin with Wave 4 (2007), which contains more comprehensive information on our health variables. (In particular, information on cholesterol is only available in Wave 4.) We start by estimating OLS and Heckman (1976) selection models.

Endogeneity can arise in this context due to reverse causality (structural endogeneity) or unobserved heterogeneity (statistical endogeneity). One can apply the occupational crowding hypothesis, which usually refers to the segregation of women into occupations where the return on investment is lower (Borjas 2012), to this context. In other words, individuals in Indonesia who are underweight, for example, may select into occupations with a lower rate of return. Accounting for this type of selection and endogeneity is what we attempt to do next.

[^1]The following methods are employed as robustness checks: (1) difference-in-differences (DD) estimation, (2) stepwise estimation, in which covariates are gradually added to the baseline model, (3) propensity score matching, (4) instrumental variables (employing internal instruments à la Lewbel 2012), and (5) individual fixed effects models, which address unobserved heterogeneity but have the potential to eliminate much variation.

## Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Heckman Selection

We begin by running simple OLS models predicting income. In order to account for selection into the labor force, two-step Heckman (1976) selection models are also run, where variables pertaining to age, religion, and marital status are used to predict work status. (Unpaid workers are coded as zero since they are not working for pay.) Results for these models are shown in Table 2.

## Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition

For our decomposition (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973), we have (Wagstaff et al. 2007):

$$
y^{\text {healthy }}-y^{\text {unhealthy }}=\Delta x \beta^{\text {unhealthy }}+\Delta \beta x^{\text {unhealth } y}+\Delta x \Delta \beta
$$

Observed change $=\Delta$ endowments $(E)+\Delta$ coefficients $(C)+\Delta i n t e r a c t i o n ~(C E)$
The observed change in income is due to differences in endowments (E), differences in coefficients (C), and their interaction (CE). If we pool C and CE, we have:

$$
y^{\text {healthy }}-y^{\text {unhealthy }}=\Delta x \beta^{\text {unhealthy }}+\Delta \beta x^{\text {healthy }}
$$

$$
\text { Observed change }=E+(C+C E) \text { (in our model, }=\text { "unexplained") }
$$

This can be seen in the following figure:


We should be cautious in interpreting the unexplained portion as discrimination since factors determining wages such as quality of education and motivation are not controlled for. That being said, if there is discrimination prior to entrance into the labor market that affects these factors, then the discrimination interpretation may be the accurate one. Results for the OaxacaBlinder models are shown in Table 3.

## Difference-in-Differences

In our difference-in-differences (DD) estimation, we compare groups with the same inconspicuous characteristics (high blood pressure, high cholesterol, chest pain) who have differing conspicuous characteristics (underweight, overweight, height above average). We assume that, conditional on conspicuous health characteristics, inconspicuous health characteristics have no significant effect on the outcome. This is confirmed by the insignificance of the coefficients on the inconspicuous health characteristics in these models. We have the following equation:

|  | Coefficient | Difference within groups | Difference-indifferences |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Underweight=0, <br> High blood pressure $=0$ | $\beta_{0}$ | $\left(\beta_{0}+\beta_{2}\right)-\beta_{0}=\beta_{2}$ |  |
| Underweight=0, High blood pressure=1 | $\beta_{0}+\beta_{2}$ |  | $\left(\beta_{2}+\beta_{3}\right)-\beta_{2}=\beta_{3}$ |
| Underweight=1, High blood pressure $=0$ | $\beta_{0}+\beta_{1}$ | $\begin{gathered} \left(\beta_{0}+\beta_{1}+\beta_{2}+\beta_{3}\right)-\left(\beta_{0}+\beta_{1}\right) \\ =\beta_{2}+\beta_{3} \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Underweight=1, High blood pressure=1 | $\beta_{0}+\beta_{1}+\beta_{2}+\beta_{3}$ |  |  |

Results for these models are shown in columns 1-3 of Table 4.

## Stepwise Estimation

To test the sensitivity of the coefficient on health, gradually adding covariates is an appropriate empirical strategy. Should the inclusion of individual characteristics substantially reduce the relationship between health and labor market outcomes, we can infer that these characteristics may be driving the observed correlations. Three steps are estimated: (1) health only, (2) health + a limited set of covariates, and (3) health + an extended set of covariates. Results for these models are shown in columns 4-6 of Table 4.

## Propensity Score Analysis

Propensity score matching may be used to determine the average effect of the treatment (measures of health status) on the treated. The assumption that the effect of unobservable characteristics on the propensity score is the same as that of observable characteristics is made. This is estimated as:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\tau \equiv E\left\{I_{1}-I_{0} \mid H=1\right\} \\
=E\left\{E\left\{I_{1}-I_{0} \mid H=1, p(W)\right\}\right\} \\
=E\left\{E\left\{I_{1} \mid H=1, p(W)\right\}-E\left\{I_{0}|H=0, p(W)| H=1\right\},\right.
\end{gathered}
$$

Where $\tau$ is the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT), $H$ is a binary variable representing health status, $I$ represents real income, and $W$ is a vector of pretreatment characteristics. The propensity score, $p(W)$, is defined as the probability of being in good health given pretreatment characteristics $(W)$. These covariates satisfy the balancing property in all bloacks. Mahalanobis matching is employed (Leuven and Sianesi 2003; Mahalanobis 1936). ${ }^{4}$ Note that the propensity score matching approach assumes that there is no other confounding factor after many covariates are controlled for (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), a strong assumption. These results should therefore be interpreted in conjunction with several estimation strategies, such as the ones employed in this paper. Results for these models are shown in column 7 of Table 4.

## Instrumental Variables

Lewbel (2012) has devised a technique whereby internal instruments are generated when external instruments are weak or unavailable. In this context, it is difficult to find external instruments that pass the necessary tests. The technique put forth by Lewbel (2012) relies on higher order variation as reflected by the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error term of the first-stage equation, which is tested using a Breusch-Pagan (1979) test. The Lewbel IV procedure uses the deviations from the means of the independent variables multiplied by the predicted residuals from the first-stage regression as instrumental variables. In other words, it

[^2]employs $(X-\bar{X}) * \varepsilon_{1 i d t}$ as identifying instruments, where $X$ is a vector of all independent variables or a subset of them and $\varepsilon_{1}$ is the predicted residual from the first-stage (health status) regression. Researchers that have successfully used this technique find the Lewbel IV results to be more plausible than ones using questionable external instruments (Sabia 2007; Kelly and Markowitz 2009; Belfield and Kelly 2012; Kelly forthcoming). In this context, the variability in health status among certain groups can be greater than that in other groups. As a result, the heteroskedasticity that arises due to these differences provides a source of identification that can capture an unobserved inclination toward being healthy. Results for these models are shown in column 8 of Table 4.

## IV. RESULTS

We begin our analysis using the 2007 IFLS data (Wave 4), which has the most comprehensive information for our variables of interest. In the Appendix, we include results using all five available waves. ${ }^{5}$ Table 1 shows weighted summary statistics. Although a slightly higher percentage of males is underweight ( $10.4 \%$ versus $8.4 \%$ of females), substantially more females are overweight ( $38.6 \%$ versus $20.7 \%$ of males). For less conspicuous health characteristics, approximately $25 \%$ of the sample has high blood pressure, $15 \%$ has high cholesterol, and $12 \%$ has experienced chest pain. Approximately $70 \%$ of individuals in the sample are in "above average" health, as evaluated by a nurse. This is unsurprising given that the sample consists of individuals 25 to 55 years of age who are working for pay. Most individuals in the sample are married (86\%) and Muslim (93\%).

[^3]Results from OLS models and models accounting for selection are reported in Table 2. These models control for age, religion, education, marital status, type of worker (self-employed, government worker, or private worker), and health insurance status. Panel A reveals that underweight males and females earn less than their fuller counterparts, a finding that contrasts with that found in most developed countries but which is in line with cultural differences in weight perception (CITE). In particular, males on average earn 18.56-19.84\% less, and females earn 21.94-25.06\% less, holding other factors constant. In a similar vein, overweight individuals earn more, with males earning 33.53-34.94\% more on average and females earning a lower premium of 12.45-15.73\%. In line with Sohn's (2015) findings, we see in Panel C of Table 2 that taller individuals also earn a wage premium.

Turning to less conspicuous health characteristics, we find in Table 2 that high blood pressure has a positive effect on wages for males but not females, suggesting that there may be unaccounted for unobserved heterogeneity. Similar effects can be found for both high cholesterol and good health but not for chest pain. Tests for differences in coefficients between OLS and selection models suggest that accounting for selection into the labor force is appropriate.

Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results are shown in Tables 3a and 3b for conspicuous and inconspicuous characteristics, respectively. Preferred models that account for selection are shown in Columns (2) and (4) for males and females, respectively. The largest predicted income difference can be seen for overweight males, who earn $57.06 \%$ more than males who are not overweight (Table 3a, Panel B). Moreover, (34.94/57.06 =) $61.23 \%$ of this difference is
unexplained, ${ }^{6}$ possibly suggesting that males who are not overweight are unfairly penalized. Overweight females earn a much lower premium of $18.91 \%$, with $(12.45 / 18.91=) 65.84 \%$ of this difference unexplained (Table 3a, Panel A). Underweight individuals face an income penalty, earning $29.39 \%$ and $33.33 \%$ less for males and females, respectively. A large portion of this $(25.06 / 33.33=) 75.19 \%$ is unexplained for females in particular. While taller individuals earn more, a smaller percentage of this difference is unexplained when compared to weight.

Interestingly, males with high blood pressure earn $20.67 \%$ more (Table 3b, Panel A) - a surprising result - whereas females with high blood pressure earn $12.22 \%$ less. It is therefore unsurprising that most of this difference is unexplained for males yet explained for females. The unexplained portion continues to be significant for males for high cholesterol and good health status, but not for females. The unexplained portion for chest pain is insignificant and relatively low in magnitude for both genders.

## V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Turning to Tables 4 a and 4 b for males and females, respectively, the most consistent findings once the endogeneity of the conspicuous health variable is addressed using various econometric methodologies are as follows: Overweight males earn significantly 11.22-57.45\% more (Table 4a, Panel B, columns 1, 4-8), while underweight females earn significantly 21.0632.84\% less (Table 4b, Panel A, columns 1, 4-8). The difference-in-differences models suggest that high blood pressure is the most appropriate comparison group. Results from individual fixed effects models using all waves (Appendix Table 2) confirm these results.

## VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

[^4]In this paper, we decompose differences in earned income for a sample of 25-55 year olds in Indonesia in order to see if individuals who are visibly healthy earn a wage premium. Results were somewhat striking. We find that individuals who are overweight consistently earn a wage premium that is not necessarily explained, pointing to possible discrimination against underweight individuals and those of normal weight. These results survive several robustness checks.

## REFERENCES

Atella V, Pace N, Vuri D. Are employers discriminating with respect to weight? European Evidence using Quantile Regression. Econ Hum Biol. 2008 Dec;6(3):305-29.

Averett, Susan, \& Sanders Korenman, 1996. The Economic Reality of the Beauty Myth, Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 31(2), pages 304-330.

Belfield, Clive; Kelly, Inas Rashad. The Benefits of Breastfeeding Across the Early Years of Childhood. Journal of Human Capital, 6(3): 251-277, Fall 2012.

Blinder, A. S. 1973. Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates. The Journal of Human Resources 8: 436-455.

Borjas, George. Labor Market Discrimination. Chapter 9, Labor Economics. McGraw-Hill Education; $6^{\text {th }}$ edition (January 23, 2012).

Bozoyan C, Wolbring T. Fat, muscles, and wages. Econ Hum Biol. 2011 Dec;9(4):356-63.
Breusch, Trevor S., and Adrian R. Pagan. 1979. A Simple Test for Heteroscedasticity and Random Coefficient Variation. Econometrica 47 (5): 1287-94.

Brunello G, D'Hombres B. Does body weight affect wages? Evidence from Europe. Econ Hum Biol. 2007 Mar;5(1):1-19.

Caliendo M, Lee WS. Fat chance! Obesity and the transition from unemployment to employment. Econ Hum Biol. 2013 Mar; 11(2):121-33.

Cawley J, Han E, Norton EC. Obesity and labor market outcomes among legal immigrants to the United States from developing countries. Econ Hum Biol. 2009 Jul;7(2):153-64.

Colchero MA, Bishai D. Weight and earnings among childbearing women in Metropolitan Cebu, Philippines (1983-2002). Econ Hum Biol. 2012 Jul;10(3):256-63.

Colchero, A. Caballero, B, and Bishai, D. (2008) "The effect of income and occupation on body mass index among women in the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Surveys (19832002)" Social Science and Medicine. May;66(9):1967-78

Freedman, David S; Hannah G Lawman; Asheley C Skinner; Lisa C McGuire; David B Allison; and Cynthia L Ogden. Validity of the WHO cutoffs for biologically implausible values of weight, height, and BMI in children and adolescents in NHANES from 1999 through 2012. Am J Clin Nutr 2015;102:1000-6.

Greve J. Obesity and labor market outcomes in Denmark. Econ Hum Biol. 2008 Dec;6(3):35062.

Hamermesh, Daniel S.; Biddle, Jeff E. American Economic Review, vol 84, Dec. 1994, pp 11741194.

Han E, Norton EC, Powell LM. Direct and indirect effects of body weight on adult wages. Econ Hum Biol. 2011 Dec;9(4):381-92.

Heckman, J. 1976. The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample selection, and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models. Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 5: 475-492.

Johansson E, Böckerman P, Kiiskinen U, Heliövaara M. Obesity and labour market success in Finland: the difference between having a high BMI and being fat. Econ Hum Biol. 2009 Mar;7(1):36-45.

Kelly, Inas R. The Shock of Falling Among Older Americans. The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, Forthcoming.

Kelly, Inas Rashad, and Sara Markowitz. 2009. Incentives in Obesity and Health Insurance. Inquiry 46 (4): 418-32.
Kim, Younoh. The dynamics of health and its determinants among the elderly in developing countries, Economics and Human Biology 19 (2015) 1-12.
Kim, Younoh; Scott Knowles; James Manley; Vlad Radoias. Long-run health consequences of air pollution: Evidence from Indonesia's forest fires of 1997, Economics and Human Biology 26 (2017) 186-198.
Leuven E, and B. Sianesi. (2003). PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis and propensity score matching, common support graphing, and covariate imbalance testing. URL: http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html.

Lewbel, Arthur. 2012. Using Heteroscedasticity to Identify and Estimate Mismeasured and Endogenous Regressor Models. J. Bus. and Econ. Statis. 30(1): 67-80.

Lindeboom M, Lundborg P, van der Klaauw B. Assessing the impact of obesity on labor market outcomes. Econ Hum Biol. 2010 Dec;8(3):309-19.

Mahalanobis, Prasanta Chandra (1936). On the generalised distance in statistics. Proceedings of the National Institute of Sciences of India. 2 (1): 49-55.

Mincer, Jacob (1958). "Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution". Journal of Political Economy. 66 (4): 281-302. doi:10.1086/258055.

Mocan, Naci and Erdal Tekin. "Ugly Criminals." The Review of Economics and Statistics 92, 1 (2010): 15-30.

Oaxaca, R. 1973. Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets. International Economic Review 14: 693-709.

Paraponaris A, Saliba B, Ventelou B. Obesity, weight status and employability: empirical evidence from a French national survey. Econ Hum Biol. 2005 Jul;3(2):241-58.

Rosenbaum, P. R. and Rubin, D.B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1), pp. 41-55.
Sabia JJ, Rees DI. Body weight and wages: evidence from Add Health. Econ Hum Biol. 2012 Jan; 10(1):14-9.

Sabia, Joseph J. 2007. The Effect of Body Weight on Adolescent Academic Performance. Southern Econ. J. 73 (4): 871-900.
Sohn, Kitae. Gender Discrimination in Earnings in Indonesia: A Fuller Picture. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2015: 95-121.

Sohn, Kitae. The Association between Height and Hypertension in Indonesia. Economics \& Human Biology, Volume 27, Part A, November 2017, Pages 74-83.

Strauss, J., Witoelar, F., \& Sikoki, B. (2016). The Fifth Wave of the Indonesia Family Life Survey: Overview and Field Report.

Wada R, Tekin E. Body composition and wages. Econ Hum Biol. 2010 Jul;8(2):242-54.
Wagstaff, Adam; Lindelow, Magnus; O’Donnell, Owen. Chapter 12: Explaining Differences between Groups: Oaxaca Decomposition. In Analyzing Health Equity Using Household Survey Data: A Guide to Techniques and Their Implementation. World Bank Publications; 1st edition (August 15, 2007). Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAH/Resources/Publications/4598431195594469249/HealthEquityCh12.pdf.

Witoelar, Firman and Strauss, John and Sikoki, Bondan, Socioeconomic Success and Health in Later Life: Evidence from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (September 15, 2009). RAND Working Paper No. WR- 704. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1677456 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 1677456

Table 1
Weighted Means, IFLS Wave 4 (2007)

|  | Mean <br> (StDev) | Mean <br> (StDev) | Mean <br> (StDev) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| Depiable | Pooled | Males | Females |
| Real income (in thousands of | 5009.401 <br> Rupiah) | 7006.866 | 1470.031 |


| Health Variables |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Conspicuous |  |  |  |
| Underweight | 0.098 | 0.104 | 0.084 |
|  | $(0.297)$ | $(0.306)$ | $(0.278)$ |
| Overweight | 0.271 | 0.207 | 0.386 |
|  | $(0.445)$ | $(0.405)$ | $(0.487)$ |
| Height above average | 0.533 | 0.533 | 0.531 |
|  | $(0.499)$ | $(0.499)$ | $(0.499)$ |
| Inconspicuous |  |  |  |
| High blood pressure | 0.245 | 0.235 | 0.263 |
|  | $(0.430)$ | $(0.424)$ | $(0.440)$ |
| High cholesterol | 0.147 | 0.125 | 0.187 |
|  | $(0.354)$ | $(0.331)$ | $(0.390)$ |
| Chest pain | 0.123 | 0.118 | 0.133 |
|  | $(0.328)$ | $(0.323)$ | $(0.340)$ |
| Grey area |  |  |  |
| Good health | 0.697 | 0.719 | 0.664 |
|  | $(0.460)$ | $(0.449)$ | $(0.473)$ |


| Demographic Characteristics |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Male | 0.639 | 1.000 | 0.000 |
|  | $(0.480)$ | $(0.000)$ | $(0.000)$ |
| Age | 39.814 | 39.660 | 40.139 |
|  | $(8.652)$ | $(8.743)$ | $(8.460)$ |
| Muslim | 0.931 | 0.933 | 0.925 |
|  | $(0.254)$ | $(0.250)$ | $(0.263)$ |
| Christian | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.049 |
|  | $(0.208)$ | $(0.206)$ | $(0.216)$ |
| Hindu | 0.022 | 0.021 | 0.025 |
|  | $(0.147)$ | $(0.143)$ | $(0.155)$ |
| Other religion | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.001 |
|  | $(0.040)$ | $(0.041)$ | $(0.037)$ |
| Less than primary school | 0.250 | 0.220 | 0.302 |
|  | $(0.433)$ | $(0.414)$ | $(0.459)$ |
| Primary school | 0.236 | 0.231 | 0.244 |
|  | $(0.425)$ | $(0.422)$ | $(0.429)$ |
|  | 17 |  |  |


| Some middle school | 0.029 | 0.031 | 0.023 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(0.167)$ | $(0.175)$ | $(0.151)$ |
| Middle school | 0.341 | 0.380 | 0.271 |
|  | $(0.474)$ | $(0.485)$ | $(0.444)$ |
| Some secondary school | 0.017 | 0.021 | 0.011 |
|  | $(0.131)$ | $(0.144)$ | $(0.103)$ |
| Secondary school | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
|  | $(0.067)$ | $(0.069)$ | $(0.068)$ |
| Some college | 0.051 | 0.043 | 0.067 |
|  | $(0.220)$ | $(0.202)$ | $(0.249)$ |
| College plus | 0.071 | 0.069 | 0.078 |
|  | $(0.258)$ | $(0.253)$ | $(0.268)$ |
| Single | 0.064 | 0.067 | 0.060 |
|  | $(0.245)$ | $(0.250)$ | $(0.237)$ |
| Married | 0.863 | 0.906 | 0.786 |
|  | $(0.344)$ | $(0.292)$ | $(0.411)$ |
| Divorced | 0.035 | 0.018 | 0.066 |
|  | $(0.184)$ | $(0.132)$ | $(0.249)$ |
| Widowed | 0.038 | 0.009 | 0.088 |
|  | $(0.190)$ | $(0.094)$ | $(0.284)$ |
| Self-employed | 0.465 | 0.458 | 0.483 |
|  | $(0.499)$ | $(0.498)$ | $(0.500)$ |
| Government worker | 0.094 | 0.092 | 0.096 |
|  | $(0.292)$ | $(0.290)$ | $(0.295)$ |
| Private worker | 0.441 | 0.450 | 0.421 |
|  | $(0.497)$ | $(0.498)$ | $(0.494)$ |
| Health insurance | 0.298 | 0.287 | 0.318 |
|  | $(0.457)$ | $(0.452)$ | $(0.466)$ |

Notes: Sample size is 12,056 . Sample consists of individuals between the ages of 25 and 55 working for pay.

Table 2
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Income Ordinary Least Squares and Heckman Selection, Wave 4

| VARIABLES | OLS | SELECTION | OLS | SELECTION |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Males |  | Females |  |
| Underweight | $\begin{gathered} -0.1856^{* * *} \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1984^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2194^{* * *} \\ (0.051) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2506^{* * *} \\ (0.051) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 7,658 | 7,658 | 4,289 | 4,289 |
| ChiSq for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 8.337 |  | 9.245 |
| PVal for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 0.004 |  | 0.002 |
| Overweight | $\begin{gathered} 0.3353^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.3494^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1245^{* * *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1573^{* * *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 7,658 | 7,658 | 4,289 | 4,289 |
| ChiSq for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 8.980 |  | 24.970 |
| PVal for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 0.003 |  | 0.000 |
| Height above average | $\begin{gathered} 0.1710^{* * *} \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1554^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1232^{* * *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1067^{* * *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 7,664 | 7,664 | 4,296 | 4,296 |
| ChiSq for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 17.760 |  | 10.370 |
| PVal for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 0.000 |  | 0.001 |
| High blood pressure | $\begin{gathered} 0.1261^{* * *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1561^{* * *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0483 \\ & (0.038) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0078 \\ & (0.036) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations | 7,697 | 7,697 | 4,288 | 4,288 |
| ChiSq for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 21.260 |  | 23.480 |
| PVal for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 0.000 |  | 0.000 |
| High cholesterol | $\begin{gathered} 0.1622^{* * *} \\ (0.054) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1695^{* * *} \\ (0.054) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1132^{*} \\ & (0.058) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0919 \\ & (0.058) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations | 2,912 | 2,912 | 1,819 | 1,819 |
| ChiSq for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 1.228 |  | 4.997 |
| PVal for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 0.268 |  | 0.0254 |
| Chest pain | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0265 \\ & (0.053) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0248 \\ & (0.054) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0455 \\ & (0.063) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0440 \\ & (0.062) \end{aligned}$ |


| Observations | 3,003 | 3,003 | 1,875 | 1,875 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ChiSq for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 0.081 |  | 0.046 |
| PVal for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 0.776 |  | 0.830 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Good health | $0.0530^{* *}$ | $0.0525^{* *}$ | 0.0251 | 0.0274 |
|  | $(0.024)$ | $(0.024)$ | $(0.032)$ | $(0.032)$ |
| Observations |  |  |  | 4,313 |
| ChiSq for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman | 7,725 | 7,725 | 4,313 |  |
| PVal for Difference Bet OLS and Heckman |  | 0.024 |  | 0.220 |

Notes: Models include controls for age, age squared, religion, education, marital status, selfemployed, government worker, private worker, and health insurance. For Heckman selection models, the selection equation employs controls for age, religion, and marital status. High cholesterol is only asked of individuals 40 years of age and older. Chest pain is only asked of individuals 50 years of age and older. Robust standard errors, accounting for clustering at the household level, are reported in parentheses. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05$, * $\mathrm{p}<0.1$.

Table 3a
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Income
Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions, Conspicuous Characteristics

| VARIABLES | OAXACA | OAXACA <br> SELECTION | OAXACA | OAXACA <br> SELECTION |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Males |  | Females |  |
| Panel A: Underweight |  |  |  |  |
| Prediction_1 | $\begin{gathered} 7.2520^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.2520^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8044^{* * *} \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8044^{* * *} \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ |
| Prediction_2 | $\begin{gathered} 6.9581^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.9581^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.4711^{* * *} \\ (0.055) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.4711^{* * *} \\ (0.055) \end{gathered}$ |
| Difference | $\begin{gathered} 0.2939 * * * \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.2939 * * * \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.3333^{* * *} \\ (0.058) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.3333^{* * *} \\ (0.058) \end{gathered}$ |
| Explained | $\begin{gathered} 0.1082^{* * *} \\ (0.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0955^{* * *} \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1139^{* * *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0827 * * * \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ |
| Unexplained | $\begin{gathered} 0.1856^{* * *} \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1984^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.2194^{* * *} \\ (0.051) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.2506^{* * *} \\ (0.050) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 7,658 | 7,658 | 4,289 | 4,289 |
| Panel B: Overweight |  |  |  |  |
| Prediction_1 | $\begin{gathered} 7.1003^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.1003^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.7051^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.7051^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ |
| Prediction_2 | $\begin{gathered} 7.6709^{* * *} \\ (0.026) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.6709^{* * *} \\ (0.026) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8942^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8942^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ |
| Difference | $\begin{gathered} -0.5706^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.5706^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1891^{* * *} \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1891^{* * *} \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ |
| Explained | $\begin{gathered} -0.2352^{* * *} \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2211^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0645^{* * *} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0318^{*} \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ |
| Unexplained | $\begin{gathered} -0.3353^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.3494^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1245^{* * *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1573^{* * *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 7,658 | 7,658 | 4,289 | 4,289 |
| Panel C: Height above average |  |  |  |  |
| Prediction_1 | $\begin{gathered} 7.0620^{* * *} \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.0620^{* * *} \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.6353^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.6353^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ |
| Prediction_2 | $\begin{gathered} 7.3464^{* * *} \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.3464^{* * *} \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8913^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8913^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ |
| Difference | $\begin{gathered} -0.2843^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2843^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2560^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2560^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ |
| Explained | $\begin{gathered} -0.1133^{* * *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1289 * * * \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1328^{* * *} \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1493^{* * *} \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ |
| Unexplained | $\begin{gathered} -0.1710^{* * *} \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1554^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1232^{* * *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1067^{* * *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 7,664 | 7,664 | 4,296 | 4,296 |

Notes: Models include controls for age, age squared, religion, education, marital status, selfemployed, government worker, private worker, and health insurance. For Heckman selection models, the selection equation employs controls for age, religion, and marital status. Robust standard errors, accounting for clustering at the household level, are reported in parentheses. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$.

Table 3b
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Income
Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions, Less Conspicuous Characteristics

| VARIABLES | OAXACA | OAXACA SELECTION | OAXACA | OAXACA SELECTION |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Males |  | Females |  |
| Panel A: High blood pressure |  |  |  |  |
| Prediction_1 | $\begin{gathered} 7.1743^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.1743^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8025^{* * *} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8025^{* * *} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ |
| Prediction_2 | $\begin{gathered} 7.3810^{* * *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.3810^{* * *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.6804^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.6804^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ |
| Difference | $\begin{gathered} -0.2067^{* * *} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2067^{* * *} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1222^{* * *} \\ (0.040) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1222^{* * *} \\ (0.040) \end{gathered}$ |
| Explained | $\begin{gathered} -0.0806^{* * *} \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0506^{* * *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0738^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1299^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ |
| Unexplained | $\begin{gathered} -0.1261^{* * *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1561^{* * *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0483 \\ & (0.038) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0078 \\ & (0.036) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations | 7,697 | 7,697 | 4,288 | 4,288 |
| Panel B: High cholesterol |  |  |  |  |
| Prediction_1 | $\begin{gathered} 7.2122^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.2122^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.7372^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.7372^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ |
| Prediction_2 | $\begin{gathered} 7.5326 * * * \\ (0.057) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.5326 * * * \\ (0.057) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8865^{* * *} \\ (0.063) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8865^{* * *} \\ (0.063) \end{gathered}$ |
| Difference | $\begin{gathered} -0.3204^{* * *} \\ (0.061) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.3204^{* * *} \\ (0.061) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1492^{* *} \\ (0.069) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1492^{* *} \\ (0.069) \end{gathered}$ |
| Explained | $\begin{gathered} -0.1582^{* * *} \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1509^{* * *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0361 \\ & (0.040) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0574 \\ (0.039) \end{gathered}$ |
| Unexplained | $\begin{gathered} -0.1622^{* * *} \\ (0.054) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1695^{* * *} \\ (0.054) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1132^{*} \\ (0.058) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0919 \\ & (0.058) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations | 2,912 | 2,912 | 1,819 | 1,819 |
| Panel C: Chest pain |  |  |  |  |
| Prediction_1 | $\begin{gathered} 7.2629^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.2629^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8008^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.8008^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ |
| Prediction_2 | $\begin{gathered} 7.2182^{* * *} \\ (0.058) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.2182^{* * *} \\ (0.058) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.6592^{* * *} \\ (0.069) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.6592^{* * *} \\ (0.069) \end{gathered}$ |
| Difference | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0447 \\ & (0.061) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0447 \\ & (0.061) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1416^{*} \\ & (0.074) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1416^{*} \\ & (0.074) \end{aligned}$ |
| Explained | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0181 \\ & (0.030) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0199 \\ & (0.030) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0961^{* *} \\ (0.039) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0975^{* *} \\ (0.039) \end{gathered}$ |
| Unexplained | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0265 \\ & (0.053) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0248 \\ & (0.054) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0455 \\ & (0.062) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0440 \\ & (0.062) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations | 3,003 | 3,003 | 1,875 | 1,875 |

## Panel D: Good health

| Prediction_1 | 7.1186*** | 7.1186*** | $6.6797^{* * *}$ | $6.6797^{* * *}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(0.022)$ | $(0.022)$ | $(0.030)$ | $(0.030)$ |
| Prediction_2 | $7.2575^{* * *}$ | $7.2575^{* * *}$ | $6.8205^{* * *}$ | $6.8205^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.015)$ | $(0.015)$ | $(0.022)$ | $(0.022)$ |
| Difference | $-0.1388^{* * *}$ | $-0.1388^{* * *}$ | $-0.1408^{* * *}$ | $-0.1408^{* * *}$ |
|  | $00.026)$ | $(0.026)$ | $(0.037)$ | $(0.037)$ |
| Explained | $-0.0859^{* * *}$ | $-0.0864^{* * *}$ | $-0.1157^{* * *}$ | $-0.1134^{* * *}$ |
|  | $0.012)$ | $(0.012)$ | $(0.020)$ | $(0.019)$ |
| Unexplained | $-0.0530^{* *}$ | $-0.0525^{* *}$ | -0.0251 | -0.0274 |
|  | $10.024)$ | $(0.024)$ | $(0.032)$ | $(0.032)$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 7,725 | 7,725 | 4,313 | 4,313 |

Notes: Models include controls for age, age squared, religion, education, marital status, selfemployed, government worker, private worker, and health insurance. For Heckman selection models, the selection equation employs controls for age, religion, and marital status. High cholesterol is only asked of individuals 40 years of age and older. Chest pain is only asked of individuals 50 years of age and older. Robust standard errors, accounting for clustering at the household level, are reported in parentheses. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05$, * $\mathrm{p}<0.1$.

Table 4a
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Income Robustness Checks, Males

| VARIABLES | DD <br> Health <br> *High blood press | DD <br> Health <br> *High cholesterol | DD <br> Health *Chest pain | STEP1 <br> Health Only | STEP2 <br> Limited | STEP3 <br> Extended | PSCORE | Lewbel IV |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Underweight | $\begin{gathered} -0.1674^{* * *} \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2489 * * * \\ (0.062) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2549 * * * \\ (0.064) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2938^{* * *} \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.2735^{* * *} \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1856^{* * *} \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.2022 \\ & (0.159) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0351 \\ & (0.070) \end{aligned}$ |
| High blood press/chol/chest <br> Interaction | $\begin{gathered} 0.1165^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \\ -0.0452 \\ (0.126) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1399^{* *} \\ (0.056) \\ 0.1192 \\ (0.227) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0344 \\ & (0.057) \\ & -0.0416 \\ & (0.160) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations <br> F-stat <br> Overid pval | 7,633 | 2,889 | 2,933 | 7,662 | 7,662 | 7,658 | 7,646 | $\begin{aligned} & 7,658 \\ & 172.3 \\ & 0.466 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| Overweight | $\begin{gathered} 0.2832^{* * *} \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.4193^{* * *} \\ (0.045) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.3844^{* * *} \\ (0.044) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5714^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5585^{* * *} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.3353^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5745 * * * \\ (0.142) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.2990^{* * *} \\ (0.088) \end{gathered}$ |
| High blood press/chol/chest <br> Interaction | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0320 \\ & (0.033) \\ & 0.1122^{*} \\ & (0.059) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1440^{* *} \\ (0.064) \\ -0.1057 \\ (0.115) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0703 \\ & (0.062) \\ & 0.1566 \\ & (0.114) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations <br> F-stat <br> Overid pval | 7,633 | 2,889 | 2,933 | 7,662 | 7,662 | 7,658 | 7,662 | $\begin{gathered} 7,658 \\ 50.72 \\ 0.000963 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Height above average | $\begin{gathered} 0.1652^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1555^{* * *} \\ (0.039) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1748^{* * *} \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.2849 * * * \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.2993^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1710^{* * *} \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.3793^{* *} \\ (0.154) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.5698 \\ & (0.422) \end{aligned}$ |
| High blood press/chol/chest | $\begin{gathered} 0.1104^{* * *} \\ (0.040) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1552^{* *} \\ (0.071) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0218 \\ & (0.070) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interaction | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0212 \\ & (0.053) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0078 \\ & (0.108) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1129 \\ & (0.110) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations <br> F-stat <br> Overid pval | 7,637 | 2,892 | 2,936 | 7,668 | 7,668 | 7,664 | 7,668 | $\begin{aligned} & 7,664 \\ & 1.849 \\ & 0.693 \end{aligned}$ |

Notes: Models include controls for age, age squared, religion, education, marital status, selfemployed, government worker, private worker, and health insurance. For Heckman
selection models, the selection equation employs controls for age, religion, and marital status. High cholesterol is only asked of individuals 40 years of age and older. Chest pain is only asked of individuals 50 years of age and older. Robust standard errors, accounting for clustering at the household level, are reported in parentheses. Standard errors in propensity score models are bootstrapped. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$.

Table 4b
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Income Robustness Checks, Females


Notes: Models include controls for age, age squared, religion, education, marital status, selfemployed, government worker, private worker, and health insurance. High cholesterol is only asked of individuals 40 years of age and older. Chest pain is only asked of individuals 50 years of age and older. Robust standard errors, accounting for clustering at the household level, are reported in parentheses. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$.

## Appendix Table 1

Weighted Means for Health Variables, IFLS, All Waves

## Mean

(StDev)

| Underweight | 0.10 |
| :--- | :---: |
|  | $(0.31)$ |
| Overweight | 0.22 |
|  | $(0.42)$ |
| Height above |  |
| average | 0.49 |
|  | $(0.50)$ |
| High blood pressure | 0.59 |
|  | $(0.49)$ |
| High cholesterol | 0.13 |
|  | $(0.34)$ |
| Chest pain | 0.15 |
|  | $(0.36)$ |
| Good health | 0.77 |
|  | $(0.42)$ |

Notes: Sample for all waves (person-year observations) is 18,432 . Waves included: Wave 1 (1993), Wave 2 (1997), Wave 3 (2000), Wave 4 (2007), and Wave 5 (2014).

## Appendix Table 2

Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Income Panel Regressions (Individual Fixed Effects Models), All Waves

|  | (1) | (2) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| VARIABLES | Males | Females |
| Underweight | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0536 \\ & (0.034) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1423^{* * *} \\ (0.048) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations <br> Number of pid | $\begin{aligned} & 26,364 \\ & 14,015 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16,199 \\ 9,812 \end{gathered}$ |
| Overweight | $\begin{gathered} 0.1326 * * * \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0432 \\ & (0.030) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations <br> Number of pid | $\begin{aligned} & 26,364 \\ & 14,015 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16,199 \\ 9,812 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Height above average | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0050 \\ & (0.032) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0231 \\ & (0.044) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations <br> Number of pid | $\begin{aligned} & 26,410 \\ & 14,029 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16,232 \\ 9,831 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| High blood pressure | $\begin{gathered} 0.0879 * * * \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0492^{*} \\ & (0.026) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations <br> Number of pid | $\begin{aligned} & 26,402 \\ & 14,013 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16,150 \\ 9,788 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Chest pain | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0220 \\ & (0.058) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.1488^{*} \\ (0.077) \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations <br> Number of pid | $\begin{aligned} & 8,121 \\ & 6,325 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 5,130 \\ & 4,166 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| Good health | $\begin{gathered} 0.0530^{* *} \\ (0.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0259 \\ & (0.023) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations <br> Number of pid | $\begin{aligned} & 26,491 \\ & 14,049 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16,261 \\ 9,840 \end{gathered}$ |

Notes: Models include controls for age, age squared, religion, education, marital status, selfemployed, government worker, private worker, and health insurance. Chest pain is only asked of individuals 50 years of age and older. Questions on cholesterol are only asked in

Wave 4 and therefore not included. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Waves included: Wave 2 (1997), Wave 3 (2000), Wave 4 (2007), and Wave 5 (2014). Wave 1 (1993) is also included for underweight, overweight, and height above average variables. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$.


[^0]:    * We thank seminar participants at the 2017 New York State Economics Association conference for their comments. All errors are our own.
    ${ }^{\dagger}$ Corresponding author.

[^1]:    ${ }^{3}$ Height values over six standard deviations from the mean were deemed unrealistic and changed to missing (Freedman et al. 2015).

[^2]:    ${ }^{4}$ Results are not sensitive to the choice of matching method and are robust to other methods such as Kernel (with alternative bandwidths) and radius matching.

[^3]:    ${ }^{5}$ Since we are parsing out potential discrimination across individuals and wish to include time-invariant characteristics in order to avoid omitted variables bias, Oaxaca decomposition is not deemed suitable for fixed effects panel data analyses. (See, for example, discussions at: http://detachers.tistory.com/m/entry/Oaxaca-Decomposition-problem-when-panel-data-is-used and http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/econ351/Oaxaca1.PDF.)

[^4]:    ${ }^{6}$ Note that the unexplained portion in the pooled Oaxaca models is simply the negative of the coefficient on the health variable shown in Table 2.

