Contesting an International Trade Agreement

Matthew T. Cole†, California Polytechnic State University
James Lake‡, Southern Methodist University
Ben Zissimos§, University of Exeter Business School

December 30, 2017

Abstract

We develop a new theoretical framework of trade agreement (TA) formation, called a ‘parallel contest’, that emphasizes the political fight over TA ratification within countries. TA ratification is inherently uncertain in each country where anti- and pro-trade interest groups contest each other to influence their own governments’ ratification decision. Unlike prior literature, the protection embodied in negotiated TA tariffs reflects a balance between the liberalizing force of lobbying and inherently protectionist government preferences. Moreover, new international political externalities emerge that are not internalized by governments that just internalize terms of trade externalities.

*For useful comments and conversations about earlier drafts we thank Toke Aidt, Scott Baier, Rick Bond, Paola Conconi, Axel Dreher, Giovanni Facchini, Philipp Harms, Carsten Hefeker, Arye Hillman, Benjamin Ho, Dan Kovenock, Emanuel Ornelas, Alejandro Riaño, Ray Riezman, Joel Rodrigue, Kamal Saggi, Tim Salmon, and Bob Staiger, as well as seminar and conference participants at Cal Poly, ETH Zürich, Florida International University, Georgia Tech, Kings College London, London School of Economics, Indiana University, Southern Methodist University, University of Exeter, University of Nottingham, a European Trade Study Group meeting, INFER workshop, Silvaplana Workshop in Political Economy, KU Lueven Workshop on International Trade Agreements, SAET conference, UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications, Southern Economics Association conference, Midwest Trade meetings, and InsTED workshop.

†Department of Economics, California Polytechnic State University, CA 93407, USA. Email: mtcole@calpoly.edu.
‡Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275, USA. Email: jlake@smu.edu
§Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Exeter Business School, Streatham Campus, Exeter EX4 4ST, UK. Email: b.zissimos@exeter.ac.uk.
1 Introduction

Anecdotal evidence suggests that conflicting lobbying interests and inherent ratification uncertainty characterize international trade agreements (TAs). Multilateral TAs, the historical cornerstone of the TA landscape where countries negotiate non-discriminatory MFN tariffs, feature these characteristics. Despite the final text of the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations being essentially settled in December 1993, it was not signed until April 1994 and not ratified by the United States (US) Congress until December 1994. With about 12 months between completion of negotiations and ratification, Strange (2013, p.121) describes the conflicting lobbying interests between US small businesses, represented by the anti-trade ‘US Business and Industrial Council’, and major US corporations, represented by the pro-trade ‘Alliance for GATT Now’ (also, see Dam 2001, p.14). Even after the affirmative US House of Representatives vote on November 29th, 1994, media reports explicitly described the uncertain outcome in the Senate, citing statements by Senate leaders and last-minute cajoling of wavering Senators by President Clinton. These descriptions emphasize that conflicting lobbying interests and inherent ratification uncertainty characterize multilateral TAs.

Since the Uruguay Round, TAs between small groups of countries have proliferated, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) between 12 countries spanning North American and Asian-Pacific countries being a larger example. Known as Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) because members exchange (essentially) reciprocal tariff-free access while maintaining tariffs on non-members, negotiations center around non-tariff rules and the duration of product-specific tariff phase-out periods. Like multilateral TAs, substantial time elapses between the start of negotiations and implementation, with the literature suggesting 3-4 years and half of this time being the negotiations themselves. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that PTAs are characterized by conflicting lobbying interests and inherent ratification uncertainty.

The TPP illustrates the conflicting lobbying interests and inherent ratification uncertainty described above. Motivated by the prospect of increased export market access, various

---

1 Articulated in GATT Article I, non-discrimination is the fundamental principle of the world trading system whereby a country’s MFN (Most Favored Nation) tariff is imposed on imports from all other trade partners.
2 See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm
4 PTA formation allowed by GATT Article XXIV is the main exception to the non-discrimination principle. GATT Article XXIV only requires PTA members eliminate trade barriers on substantially all trade within a reasonable period of time. Despite this inherently vague language, Hakobyan et al. (2017) document that excluding products from eventually being tariff free is extremely rare for PTAs involving the US, EU or Japan.
US agricultural groups (e.g. National Pork Producers Council, National Chicken Council, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, American Farm Bureau and the National Corn Growers Association) and dairy producers (e.g. Land O’Lakes, Kraft-Heinz and the National Milk Producers Federation) lobbied in support of the TPP. Beneficiaries of tariff-free intermediate inputs provided further support (e.g. Nike, Walmart and the Outdoor Industry Association). Lobby group opposition in the US came from automakers (e.g. Ford and General Motors), based on the TPP not addressing currency manipulation issues, tobacco manufacturers (e.g. Phillip Morris and Altria), because the TPP excluded the tobacco industry from investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, labor unions (e.g. AFL-CIO, Teamsters and United Steelworkers) and environmental groups (e.g. Sierra Club). Against the backdrop of conflicting lobbying influences, the final TPP text was released in October 2015 yet, despite news reports optimistic over passage during the Obama-Trump transition period, the Trump administration abandoned the TPP in early 2017.

Rodrik (2008) and Baldwin (2016) both argue that conflicting lobbying interest is integral to the process of TA formation. Rodrik (2008, pp.233-234) describes this by saying “Traditionally, the agenda of multilateral trade negotiations has been shaped in response to a tug-of-war between exporters ... and import competing interests.” Baldwin (2016, pp.69-70) provides further motivation: “Domestic firms that compete with imports tend to like high domestic tariffs since these restrict imports, raise local prices, and thus boost their profits (or at least minimize their losses). Domestic firms that export, by contrast, dislike high tariffs as these reduce their exports and profits.”

Both Baldwin and Rodrik highlight the resulting political tension and contest-like setting. As Baldwin says: “These two sets of tariffs (domestic and foreign) are not intrinsically linked. ... But the two sets become linked during GATT/WTO rounds due to the reciprocity principle. That is, foreign tariffs will fall only if domestic tariffs also fall. This then sets up a political fight within each nation. Exporters - who care little about domestic tariffs per se - know they must fight import-competing firms in their own nation if they are to win lower tariffs abroad.” And as Rodrik says, the outcomes of TAs “are all the results of this political process.” (Emphasis in the original.) Importantly, this political process relies on the fact that the reciprocity principle links exporter interests in foreign tariff reductions to domestic tariff reductions. Although Baldwin and Rodrik refer to multilateral TA formation under the GATT/WTO, arguably the same driving force underpins PTA formation as well.

---

6Ratification uncertainty is not a characteristic particular to the TPP. The US House of Representatives vote on CAFTA-DR, a PTA between the US and Central America, lay on a knife edge before eventually passing by only two votes. Despite being signed in 2007, similar votes for individual US PTAs with Korea, Colombia and Panama appeared to be dead, but were later resuscitated by the Obama administration in 2010 and eventually passed by Congress in 2011.
In this paper, we develop a new theoretical framework to model TA formation, called a ‘parallel contest’, that puts at center stage the resulting political fight within each nation. We build on the existing economic contest literature, in which a single ‘decision maker’ decides a contest outcome while interested parties contest each other to influence this decision.\footnote{The (regular) contest literature, or ‘Tullock contest’ literature, starts with Tullock (1980) (see Van Long 2013 for a literature review). Skaperdas 1996 axiomatizes the basic ‘contest success function’.} When an interest group exerts more influence (e.g. firms spend more R&D resources in a patent race, or a lobby gives more political contributions) the decision maker’s decision moves in their favor probabilistically. Similarly in our TA setting, each national government decides on TA ratification while exporter and import-competing interest groups contest each other through contributions that, probabilistically, influence the ratification decision.\footnote{In the Appendix, we show that our results are robust to an ‘all-pay contest’ setting where the lobby group making the highest contribution sways their government’s TA ratification decision with certainty. Despite certainty over the government TA ratification decisions conditional on contributions, all-pay contests have the well known feature that equilibrium contribution strategies take the form of mixed strategies. Thus, ex-ante, TA ratification decisions remain uncertain.}

However, unlike ‘regular contests’, our TA setting features multiple decision makers. In our two-country model, each country has an anti-trade and pro-trade interest group. The two national governments decide over contests occurring in parallel in each country. Crucially, because TA implementation requires ratification by both countries, these parallel contests become intrinsically linked: the intensity of lobbying in one country depends on the probability of TA ratification in the other country.

Our framework is quite general. On the political economy side, our framework permits a standard set-up whereby each incumbent government cares about lobby contributions and national welfare. Additionally, our framework allows a broader class of government motivations encompassing, for example, tariff revenue or employment in the import-competing sector. On the international trade side, our framework admits a number of standard models of international trade: specific factors, oligopoly, and Melitz. A particular model can be used to microfound the strength of lobby support for, and opposition to, the TA. This choice also microfounds government motivations, such as national welfare, that influence government their ratification decisions.\footnote{One area where our framework sacrifices generality is over the number of interest groups, where we have only two. The state of the art in the prior literature allows multiple interest groups to be determined in equilibrium (Mitra 1999). Our framework could be extended similarly, but restricting attention to two interest groups sharpens our focus on our new parallel contest.}

Numerous insights emerge from modeling TA formation as a parallel contest. First, in the spirit of Rodrik (2008) and Baldwin (2016), the lobbying process drives trade liberalization. This contrasts with prior literature where consumer interests drive liberalization.\footnote{Key references in the prior literature include Mayer (1981), Dixit (1987), Grossman and Helpman (1995b) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999).} Indeed,
when lobbying influences have sufficient sway over government TA ratification decisions, the lobbying process delivers the most liberal TA possible as the equilibrium TA.\(^\text{11}\)

Given that lobbying drives trade liberalization, our framework suggests that observed real world protection levels stem from governments having inherently \textit{protectionist} preferences. That is, protection emerges as a balance between the liberalizing force of lobbying and inherently protectionist government preferences. In contrast, protection typically emerges in the prior literature as a balance between protectionist lobbying forces and inherent government preferences motivated by social welfare. Nevertheless, Conconi et al. (2014) present compelling empirical evidence that governments in general, and politicians in particular, have inherently protectionist preferences motivated by re-election motives. Further, Lake and Millimet (2016) show that PTA voting behavior by US House Representatives becomes less protectionist as their constituents receive more trade related redistribution, especially when the representative faces non-trivial re-election risk. These empirical findings are consistent with the predictions of our framework, even though they conflict with the natural predictions from models of the prior literature.

Our framework also allows the emergence of new international political externalities that operate outside the traditional terms-of-trade channel. The prior literature (discussed below) argues that international externalities travel through world prices. So, a TA that holds world prices constant enables governments to internalize these externalities. In our framework, for given world prices, each country is affected by a foreign country’s TA tariff because a lower foreign TA tariff increases the probability of foreign TA ratification. Our first international political externality emerges because an increase in the probability of foreign TA ratification intensifies lobbying competition at home, which increases home lobbying contributions. This is a positive externality of liberalization. Our second international political externality emerges because governments have inherent preferences over the degree of trade liberalization, and the expected degree of trade liberalization increases with the probability of foreign TA ratification. Given inherently protectionist government preferences, this is a negative externality of liberalization. Because these externalities operate for given world prices, our new political economy framework showcases new international political externalities that are not internalized by governments who just internalize their terms-of-trade externalities.

Our main contribution is to the strand of the literature that explores the purpose of trade agreements. This literature has three main theories: the ‘terms-of-trade’ theory, the ‘domestic commitment’ theory, and the ‘New Trade’ theory.\(^\text{12}\) Our paper relates closely to

\(^{11}\)In our framework, TA negotiations abide by a reciprocity rule, as described above by Baldwin (2016). And, in general, the reciprocity rule may not permit free trade.

\(^{12}\)See Maggi (2014) for a comprehensive review.
the terms-of-trade and domestic commitment theories.

Under the ‘terms-of-trade’ theory of TAs, developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999), governments have an incentive to manipulate their terms-of-trade in the absence of a TA. This manipulation creates an externality because each government fails to internalize the negative effect of its terms-of-trade improvement on other countries. In turn, governments cannot negotiate mutually beneficial tariff changes once their TA internalizes these terms-of-trade externalities. However, the political motivations that governments hold in our framework fall outside those considered by Bagwell and Staiger (1999). This explains why our new political economy framework can showcase new international political externalities that are not internalized by governments who just internalize their terms-of-trade externalities.

The domestic-commitment theory of TAs is most closely associated with Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007). The idea they explore is that a government derives rents from the interaction with lobbies in the short run, but this distorts the allocation of resources in the long-run and the government is not compensated for this long-run distortion. As a consequence, the government can benefit from committing to free trade ex-ante, thereby shutting down the lobbying process. Thus, the TA enables the government to escape from a domestic political externality.

Our paper shares two conceptual similarities with Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007). First, both papers develop a theory of TAs that combines terms-of-trade externalities and political externalities. However, unlike the domestic political externality considered by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007), our political externality is international. Second, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) emphasize that their domestic political externality only emerges because they explicitly model the political interaction between lobbies and the government. Similarly, in our framework, TA ratification uncertainty is not sufficient for the emergence of our international political externalities. Rather, they emerge because the extent of TA ratification uncertainty is endogenous and, hence, rely on our explicit modeling of the political process.

Like us, Hillman and Moser (1996) emphasize the role of international political externalities in motivating reciprocal liberalization. They assume a traditional two-sector specific factors model where governments maximize their “political support” that depends, in a reduced form manner, on the real income of the import-competing and export sectors. Since the real income of these sectors in one country depend on the other country’s trade policy, government incentives for reciprocal liberalization depend on the political support implica-

---

13 One key difference between Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) is that the latter augments the domestic commitment motive for TA formation with the terms-of-trade motivation.
tions of reciprocal liberalization. Nevertheless, the real incomes of sectors in one country only depend on another country’s tariff through the impact on the world price. Thus, the political preferences held by governments considered by Hillman and Moser (1996) fall in the class considered by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) who would thus view these as terms-of-trade externalities. This distinguishes the international political externalities of Hillman and Moser (1996) from those in our framework, which emerge for given terms-of-trade.  

Our paper contributes to a second strand of the TA literature that concerns the use of data to infer the extent that governments value factors other than lobbying. The traditional framework says protection emerges because of lobbying pressures and despite inherently welfare-minded government preferences. Thus, to rationalize relatively low real world tariffs, the existing empirical literature finds strongly welfare minded governments largely unswayed by lobbying pressures (see, e.g., Goldberg and Maggi 1999 and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000). Nevertheless, this literature has often acknowledged that “This finding sits poorly with casual observations” of anecdotal evidence regarding the pervasiveness of lobbying (Gawande et al. 2012, p116). Our framework offers a reconciling perspective given that protection emerges because of inherently protectionist government preferences and despite lobbying pressures. Specifically, relatively low tariffs in our framework suggest government negotiations over TA tariffs reflect strong lobbying pressures.

Our paper also contributes to a third strand of the TA literature, pioneered by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), that investigates empirical determinants of PTA formation. Our contribution lies in our framework predicting that the probability of TA ratification by a government depends on the strength of pro-trade lobby support relative to the strength of anti-trade lobby opposition. Thus, uncertainty always prevails (which contrasts markedly with prior literature) and in an intuitive manner that depends on the relative degree of interest group TA support. Further, tractable comparative statics regarding the likelihood of TA formation emerge in our framework given one can microfound the strength of lobby group support and opposition using a particular underlying model of trade. Ultimately, our framework can hopefully shed light on the empirical determinants of PTAs.

While our paper is the first we know of to motivate TA formation by ratification uncertainty, prior literature has emphasized the importance of trade policy uncertainty more generally. With exogenous trade policy before and after a TA, Handley (2014) and Handley and Limão (2015, 2017) show large increases in trade flows and, through lower prices, higher welfare via PTAs reducing trade policy uncertainty. Reduced policy uncertainty in

14Using a Mitra (1999) style Protection for Sale model with endogenous lobby formation, Krishna and Mitra (2005) show that unilateral liberalization by a large country has implications for the optimal tariff of a small country through changing the world price. But, unlike our international political externalities, the effect analyzed by Krishna and Mitra (2005) operates through the terms of trade.
these papers stem from WTO tariff bindings placing a cap on the maximum tariffs faced by importers when exporting to Australia, EU accession guaranteeing Portuguese firms access to the EU common market, and Chinese WTO accession guaranteeing non-discriminatory US market access to Chinese firms. Limão and Maggi (2015) analyze the optimal degree of TA uncertainty and, under risk neutrality, find a motive whereby countries negotiate a TA with higher uncertainty. In contrast to these papers, our paper highlights new international political externalities that emerge from the uncertain political process governing TA formation.

Finally, our new parallel-contest framework can contribute to the wider economics literature. TAs are one example of parallel contests. However, many real-world settings feature the possibility of beneficial collaboration between two or more entities, where interested parties within each entity contest each other when trying to influence the collaboration decision of the decision maker in their own entity. Naturally, moving ahead with collaboration requires mutual consent of all entities, which intrinsically links these ‘parallel’ contests. We discuss examples spanning international negotiations, as well as between-firm and within-firm situations in the concluding section.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model, formalizing the TA formation process. Section 3 investigates the contest framework where government TA ratification decisions only depend on lobbying contributions. Section 4 allows ratification decisions to depend on additional factors such as social welfare and highlights our international political externalities. Section 5 illustrates our results using the classic oligopoly and Melitz models of international trade and, using the specific factors model, makes sharp comparisons between the Protection for Sale menu auction framework of Grossman and Helpman (1995a,b) and our parallel contest framework. Section 6 concludes.

2 Model

2.1 Structure of a Trade Agreement

We model a two-country trade agreement (TA). The national governments in the Home and Foreign countries levy import tariffs $\tau$ and $\tau^*$ respectively. Prior to the TA, the ‘status

\[15\] Those familiar with the contest literature may recognize a similarity with the Colonel Blotto game. However, the Colonel Blotto game assumes the pro-collaboration (or anti-collaboration) agents across the parallel contests can perfectly coordinate and pool their resources, whereas we assume away the possibility of such coordination or pooling. Ultimately, the extent and importance of such coordination in the specific application should determine which end of the modeling spectrum one follows.

\[16\] For our general model, there is no need to specify whether tariffs are ad valorem or specific. In our consideration of specific trade models, we will make such specifications for analytical convenience.
quo tariffs’ $\tau_{SQ} = (\tau_{SQ}, \tau_{SQ}^*)$ are exogenously given (hereafter, the superscript * denotes Foreign variables). Through the TA, governments engage in reciprocal tariff liberalization to $\tau_{TA} = (\tau_{TA}, \tau_{TA}^*) \leq \tau_{SQ}$.

We assume $\tau_{TA}$ respects an exogenous ‘reciprocity rule’ that fixes the rate that $\tau_{TA}$ changes relative to $\tau_{TA}^*$. The literature suggests various possible interpretations. For Bagwell and Staiger (1999), it reflects a requirement that, measured at the status quo world prices, tariff liberalization induces equal changes in import volumes across countries. They show this is equivalent to tariff liberalization preserving the terms-of-trade prevailing at $\tau_{SQ}$ in a multi-sector model. Following their approach, we assume the reciprocity rule preserves equal changes in import volumes valued at status quo world prices. Specifically, we represent the reciprocity rule by the unit vector $u(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = (u_{\tau_{TA}}(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}), u_{\tau_{TA}}^*(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}))$, where $u_{\tau_{TA}}^*(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) / u_{\tau_{TA}}(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})$ gives the required rate at which $\tau_{TA}^*$ must change relative to $\tau_{TA}$. Given the status quo tariffs $\tau_{SQ}$ are in place before the TA, we suppress the dependence of $u(\cdot)$ on $\tau_{SQ}$ hereafter (and will often do so for other variables throughout the paper).

Given $\tau_{SQ}$, Figure 1 illustrates our approach through three examples. In Figure 1(a), the slope of the dashed curve is $u_{\tau_{TA}}(\tau_{TA})/u_{\tau_{TA}}(\tau_{TA}) = 1$ for all $\tau_{TA} \leq \tau_{SQ}$ and depicts, for example, two symmetric countries where reciprocity requires one-to-one reductions in $\tau_{TA}^*$ and $\tau_{TA}$ with the most liberal TA being free trade. In Figure 1(b), $u_{\tau_{TA}}^*(\tau_{TA}) / u_{\tau_{TA}}(\tau_{TA})$ is again constant for all $\tau_{TA} \leq \tau_{SQ}$ but depicts, for example, asymmetric countries whereby reciprocity requires larger reductions in $\tau_{TA}^*$ than $\tau_{TA}$. Here, tariff liberalization that respects reciprocity cannot lead to free trade for both countries. Figure 1(c) illustrates the possibility that $u_{\tau_{TA}}^*(\tau_{TA}) / u_{\tau_{TA}}(\tau_{TA})$ is not constant as the TA becomes more liberal. In any case, the most liberal TA entails at least one country levying a zero tariff.

Throughout the paper, we will often want to describe how the value of a variable changes as the TA becomes more liberal through mutual reductions in $\tau_{TA}$ and $\tau_{TA}^*$ that respect the reciprocity rule $u(\tau_{TA})$. For a variable $x(\tau_{TA})$ and the standard notation $\nabla x = \left(\frac{\partial x(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}}, \frac{\partial x(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}^*}\right)$, we define

$$-\frac{\partial x(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \equiv -u(\tau_{TA}) \cdot \nabla x = -u_{\tau_{TA}}(\tau_{TA}) \frac{\partial x(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} - u_{\tau_{TA}}^*(\tau_{TA}) \frac{\partial x(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}^*}.$$ 

That is, $-\frac{\partial x(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}}$ describes the change in $x$ for a marginal increase in the degree of TA tariff liberalization that respects the reciprocity rule $u(\tau_{TA})$.

17For example, suppose reciprocity requires that $\tau_{TA}^*$ must be reduced four times as quickly as $\tau_{TA}$. Then $u(\tau_{TA}) = \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{17}}, \frac{4}{\sqrt{17}}\right)$, where Pythagoras’ theorem gives the length of the vector $(1, 4)$ as $17^{1/2}$ and dividing through by this factor ensures that $u(\tau_{TA})$ has unit length.
Given the TA structure just described, we analyze a three-stage game throughout the paper:

Stage 1. Given status quo tariffs $\tau_{SQ}$, governments announce TA tariffs $\tau_{TA} \leq \tau_{SQ}$ that respect the reciprocity rule $u(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})$.

Stage 2. In each country, an anti-trade lobby ($L_A$ or $L'_A$) and a pro-trade lobby ($L_T$ or $L'_T$) simultaneously make non-negative contributions to their own government.

Stage 3. Each government decides whether to ratify the TA according to a contest success function (defined by (1) below). If both governments ratify, the TA tariffs $\tau_{TA}$ are implemented. Otherwise, the status quo tariffs $\tau_{SQ}$ prevail.

In principle, the TA tariffs $\tau_{TA}$ emerge in Stage 1 through a bargaining process. However, apart from imposing that TA tariffs respect the reciprocity rule $u(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})$, we merely assume the bargaining process is efficient in that there are no TA tariffs $\tau'_{TA} \neq \tau_{TA}$ that increase the expected payoff of both governments.

Given the TA tariffs announced in Stage 1, local lobby groups can make contributions in Stage 2 to their own national government either in support or opposition of the TA. Focusing on Home, each lobby $L_i$, $i \in \{A, T\}$, has a valuation $v_i(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \geq 0$. These valuations represent the value of the TA going ahead for $L_T$ but the value of the TA not going ahead for $L_A$. Thus, $L_A$ contributes $l_A \geq 0$ in opposition of the TA while $L_T$ contributes $l_T \geq 0$ in support of the TA. At the same time, Foreign lobbies make contributions to the Foreign government. Note that, because lobbies make contributions before knowing whether the TA

---

18 The numeraire of a particular trade model that microfounds $v_i(\cdot)$ determines the units of measurement for $v_i(\cdot)$ and $l_i$. The contributions $l_i$ could also have the interpretation of effort and/or information provision with an appropriate modification to our baseline government payoff function. In this case, we could measure effort/information provision in units of labor and normalize units of effort so that one unit of effort equates to one unit of labor.
goes ahead, lobbies cannot condition their contributions on the TA ratification outcome.

After receiving lobbying contributions, each government simultaneously decides whether to ratify the TA in Stage 3. Here, a typical contest success function would say that the probability of TA ratification increases with the amount of pro-trade contributions $l_T$ relative to anti-trade contributions $l_A$. However, in addition to contributions, we assume ‘additional factors’ may enter the contest success function and, hence, the government’s ratification decision.

We capture these additional factors via $h(\tau, \tau^*)$. Following the trade literature, we let $a \geq 0$ capture the government’s valuation of these additional factors $h(\cdot)$ relative to contributions. Following the all-pay contest literature, $ah(\tau_{SQ}) \equiv ah_A(\tau_{SQ})$ and $ah(\tau_{TA}) \equiv ah_T(\tau_{TA})$ represent ‘head starts’ to, respectively, the anti-trade lobby and pro-trade lobbies. That is, $ah_A(\tau_{SQ})$ captures additional factors that boost the government’s payoff, and hence the chance of the government not ratifying the TA, when the status quo prevails. Similarly, $ah_T(\tau_{TA})$ captures additional factors that boost the government’s payoff, and hence the chance of the government ratifying the TA, upon implementation of the TA tariffs. Further, we say there are pro-trade head starts if $a\Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \equiv ah_T(\tau_{TA}) - ah_A(\tau_{SQ}) > 0$ and $-\frac{\partial h_T(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$ but there are anti-trade head starts if $a\Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) < 0$ and $-\frac{\partial h_T(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} < 0$.

The additional factors $h(\tau, \tau^*)$ could capture various government motivations including domestic employment, tariff revenue, firm profits, or national welfare. In the Melitz model, $h(\cdot)$ could represent a government preference for employment in smaller firms that only serve the domestic market, implying $h(\cdot)$ would be increasing in $\tau$. For a small country in a textbook neoclassical trade model, $h(\cdot)$ could represent tariff revenue or national welfare with the former initially increasing in $\tau$ and concave but the latter decreasing in $\tau$. Among large countries in a wide class of trade models with $h(\cdot)$ representing national welfare, $h(\cdot)$ would initially be increasing in $\tau$ and concave but would be decreasing in $\tau^*$ due to standard terms-of-trade effects. Nevertheless, in a wide class of trade models where $h(\tau_{TA})$ represents national welfare we would have $-\frac{\partial h(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$ given our reciprocity rule $u(\tau_{TA})$ because, absent terms-of-trade effects, mutual tariff liberalization generally increases national welfare via more efficient resource allocation.

Given the potential existence of these head starts, the government weighs the ‘augmented contribution’ $s_i = l_i + ah_i(\cdot)$ of each lobby $L_i$, $i \in \{A, T\}$, when deciding on TA ratification. Specifically, the Home government ratifies the TA with probability

$$p_T(s_A, s_T) = \frac{s_T^r}{s_A^r + s_T^r} \quad (1)$$

---

19 The government may have distributional or politically motivated concerns for a particular group and hence value their profits independently of contributions made out of profits.
where $r > 0$ is a sensitivity parameter. Here, $\rho_T$ is the probability of $L_T$ ‘winning’ the contest by successfully swaying the government to ratify the TA. Alternatively, $1 - \rho_T$ is the probability that $L_A$ ‘wins’ the contest by successfully swaying the government against ratifying the TA. For those unfamiliar with the contest literature, (1) is the contest success function (CSF) and we provide a microfoundation for this CSF in the Appendix. Moreover, our ‘augmented contributions’ corresponds to the ‘effective investments’ in Rai and Sarin (2009) who axiomatize a generalized CSF whereby effective investments encompass multiple types of investment.

The contest literature deals with two standard cases. First, the ‘simple Tullock contest’ assumes $r = 1$ so that $\rho_T$ only depends on the relative size of augmented contributions. An appealing property of this formulation is that the probability of lobbying success rises with a lobby’s augmented contribution without guaranteeing success. Second, the all-pay contest lets $r \to 1$, so that making the strictly highest contribution guarantees success: $\rho_T = 0$ if $s_A > s_T$ but $\rho_T = 1$ if $s_T > s_A$. Our analysis will first focus on the simple Tullock contest where only lobbying matters (i.e. $r = 1, a = 0$) before bringing in additional factors $h(\cdot)$ (i.e. $r = 1, a > 0$). We relegate the all-pay contest analysis to the Appendix.

Turning to expected payoffs, $L_A$’s expected payoff is

$$
(1 - \rho_T^*) v_A(\tau_{TA}) + \rho_T^* (1 - \rho_T) v_A(\tau_{TA}) - l_A
\equiv \mu_A + (1 - \rho_T) \tilde{v}_A(\tau_{TA}) - l_A
$$

where $\mu_A \equiv (1 - \rho_T^*) v_A(\tau_{TA})$ and $\tilde{v}_A(\tau_{TA}) \equiv \rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA})$. $L_A$’s payoff is $v_A(\tau_{TA})$ if the TA stalls but 0 if the TA goes ahead. Moreover, the TA stalls (i) with probability $1 - \rho_T^*$ because Foreign does not ratify the TA and (ii) with probability $\rho_T^* (1 - \rho_T)$ because Foreign ratifies the TA but Home does not ratify. Similarly, $L_T$’s expected payoff is

$$
(1 - \rho_T^*) \cdot 0 + \rho_T^* \rho_T v_T(\tau_{TA}) - l_T
\equiv \mu_T + \rho_T \tilde{v}_T(\tau_{TA}) - l_T
$$

where $\mu_T \equiv (1 - \rho_T^*) \cdot 0$ and $\tilde{v}_T(\tau_{TA}) \equiv \rho_T^* v_T(\tau_{TA})$. $L_T$’s payoff is 0 if the TA stalls but $v_T(\tau_{TA})$ if the TA goes ahead. Moreover, the TA goes ahead if and only if both govern-

\[\text{As we make explicit later, we assume that } \rho_T > 0 \text{ if } s_A = s_T = 0. \text{ This nests the typical assumption } \rho_T = \frac{1}{2} \text{ if } s_A = s_T = 0.\]

\[\text{The ‘general Tullock contest’ allows } 0 < r < \infty.\]

\[\text{Following the literature, an all-pay auction is one where each player’s ‘cost’ of bidding is simply the bid itself. An all-pay contest allows more general specifications for a player’s ‘cost’ of bidding, including the possibility that players have different head starts. Our model with } r \to \infty \text{ is an all-pay contest because of the head starts.}\]
ments ratify the TA which happens with probability $\rho_T$. Finally, the Home government’s expected payoff consists of two components,

$$G(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = l_A + l_T + a[\rho_T \rho^*_T h_T(\tau_{TA}) + (1 - \rho_T \rho^*_T) h_A(\tau_{SQ})]$$

(4)

First, prior to the TA ratification decision, $L_i$ makes contributions $l_i$. Second, the government’s valuation of the additional factors $h(\cdot)$ depends on whether the TA goes ahead. These expected payoffs display the parallel contest structure and its differences from the regular contest structure. Setting $\rho^*_T = 1$, Home’s ratification decision is pivotal because Foreign ratifies the TA with certainty. In turn, our contest structure collapses to a regular contest: Home country lobbies know their local contest is pivotal to whether the TA goes ahead. But, Home’s ratification decision may not be pivotal when $\rho^*_T < 1$ because Foreign may not ratify the TA. Two implications emerge given Foreign fails to ratify with probability $1 - \rho^*_T$. First, $L_A$’s expected payoff is $\mu_A = (1 - \rho^*_T) v_A(\tau_{TA}) > 0$ when, in the absence of head starts, it contributes nothing. Second, even conditional on Home ratifying the TA (which only happens with probability $\rho_T$), $L_T$’s expected payoff is only $\tilde{v}_T(\tau_{TA}) - l_T = \rho^*_T v_T(\tau_{TA}) - l_T$ and its realized payoff is, indeed, $-l_T$ if Foreign fails to ratify the TA. These dependencies across the parallel contests in Home and Foreign are not present in the prior contest literature and generate our ‘parallel contest’ structure.

The expected payoff functions presented above also reveal how standard solution techniques from the Tullock (and all-pay) contest literature apply in our parallel contest setting. First, Home lobby expected payoffs depend on the probability of ‘winning’ their Home contest multiplied by their ‘effective’ valuation $\tilde{v}_i(\tau_{TA}) = \rho^*_T v_i(\tau_{TA})$ that, in turn, depends on the probability of Home’s ratification decision being pivotal. Indeed, these novel ‘effective’ valuations provide the crucial link between our parallel contest setup and the standard contest (and all-pay contest) setup. In particular, Home lobbies perceive these effective valuations as exogenous because, when deciding on their contributions, they take other lobbies’ contributions as given (including Foreign lobby contributions). Hence, they take $\rho^*_T$ as given. Thus, the $(1 - \rho_T) \tilde{v}_A(\tau_{TA})$ and $\rho_T \tilde{v}_T(\tau_{TA})$ terms effectively mirror those found in prior literature. Second, the parallel nature of the contest implies Home’s ratification decision may not be pivotal and, thus, generates the $\mu_i$ terms. But, these are exogenous intercept shifters of the expected payoff functions. In turn, they do not affect lobby group preferences over strategy profiles. This implies that the preferences embodied in the expected payoff functions above mirror those of a standard Tullock (or all pay) contest with effective valuations.

---

23 If one interprets $l_i$ as $L_i$’s cost of effort/information provision, one may want to model government valuation of $l_i$ as $\kappa_i l_i$ where the parameter $\kappa_i$ transforms the lobby’s cost of effort/information provision into the government’s valuation of such action.
\[ \tilde{u}_i (\tau_{TA}) \] and, thus, standard solution techniques apply.

### 2.3 How TAs affect Interest Group Payoffs

Given the generality of our lobby group payoff structure, we impose some properties to help characterize the equilibrium. By definition, \( v_i (\tau_{TA} = \tau_{SQ}; \tau_{SQ}) = 0 \): absent tariff liberalization, \( L_T \) gains nothing and \( L_A \) loses nothing. However, we impose that tariff liberalization ‘polarizes’ the lobby groups. Specifically, focusing on Home lobbies,

\[
- \frac{\partial u_i (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \equiv -u (\tau_{TA}) \cdot \nabla v_i > 0 \text{ for } i \in \{A, T\} \tag{5}
\]

so that tariff liberalization respecting the reciprocity rule \( u (\tau_{TA}) \) generates stronger TA support by \( L_T \) and stronger TA opposition by \( L_A \). Thus, given our focus on tariffs, polarization of the lobby groups is maximized by the most liberal possible TA that respects \( u (\tau_{TA}) \).

In the Melitz model, relatively productive firms not only serve the domestic market but also export, while relatively unproductive firms only serve the domestic market. While Foreign liberalization increases export profits, Home liberalization hurts domestic profits. Thus, the nature of the reciprocity rule \( u (\tau_{TA}) \) matters for exporters by defining the relative magnitude of liberalization by Home versus Foreign. Nevertheless, intuitively, the most productive firms naturally constitute \( L_T \) and should profit more from a TA that involves more liberalization, \(- \frac{\partial u_T (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0\), under the reciprocity rule \( u (\tau_{TA}) \). Conversely, relatively unproductive exporters together with the low productivity firms that only serve the domestic market naturally constitute \( L_A \) and should suffer more from a TA that involves more liberalization, \(- \frac{\partial u_A (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0\). Further, this intuition can also apply for simple oligopoly models. Indeed, Section 5 shows how the reciprocity rule \( u (\tau_{TA}) \) ensures that reciprocal tariff liberalization polarizes \( L_A \) and \( L_T \) as defined by (5) in the Melitz and oligopoly models.

In the canonical textbook specific factors model, land is specific to agricultural production, capital is specific to manufacturing production, and labor is perfectly mobile. Suppose Home and Foreign are two small countries in a multi-country world, with Home (Foreign) having a comparative advantage in manufacturing (agriculture). Home capital owners profit from falling Home tariffs via the tariff-induced contraction of the import competing sector, which reallocates labor to manufacturing and increases returns to capital. Thus, capital owners naturally constitute \( L_T \) and \(- \frac{\partial u_T (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0\). Conversely, the reallocation of labor away from agriculture reduces returns to land, implying land owners naturally constitute \( L_A \) and \(- \frac{\partial u_A (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0\). Further, given Home and Foreign are small, \(- \frac{\partial u_i (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = 0\) for \( i \in \{A, T\} \). Thus, the TA polarizes the lobby groups regardless of the reciprocity rule \( u (\tau_{TA}) \).

Now suppose Home and Foreign are both large countries. Holding world prices fixed, the
qualitative impacts of tariff liberalization mirror those in the small country case. However, by reducing their terms-of-trade, tariff liberalization by Home partially reverses the labor market reallocation effects described above and, thus, partially offsets the polarizing impact on Home specific factor owners described above. But, assuming away the Metzler paradox, as is common in the literature, the qualitative impact of Home liberalization mirrors the small country case. Because Foreign tariff liberalization improves Home terms-of-trade, the labor reallocation effects follow those of Home tariff liberalization and, thus, reinforce the qualitative impact on Home specific factor incomes. Thus, the TA polarizes Home lobby groups for any reciprocity rule $u(\tau_{TA})$ that avoids the Metzler paradox.

3 Contesting a TA when Only Lobbying Matters

We now focus on how lobbying alone affects the TA contest (as described above, we use a simple Tullock contest whereby $r = 1$). To do this, we remove additional factors $h(\cdot)$ by imposing $a = 0$. In turn, we consider contributions $l_i$ rather than augmented contributions $l_i + ah_i(\cdot)$.

In Stage 3, no strategic interaction takes place. Given lobbying contributions, each government’s ratification decision is determined solely by its contest success function in (1):

$$\rho_T(l_A, l_T) = \begin{cases} \frac{l_A}{l_A + l_T} & \text{if } l_T > 0 \text{ or } l_A > 0 \\ \rho \in (0, 1) & \text{if } l_T = l_A = 0 \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

where $\rho$ is an exogenous, known and deterministic tie breaking rule.

In Stage 2, lobbies interact strategically. Focusing on Home lobbies, $L_A$ chooses $l_A$ to maximize its expected payoff (2) given the proposed TA tariffs $\tau_{TA}$ from Stage 1 and taking $l_T$ and $\rho_T^*$ as given. Analogously, $L_T$ chooses $l_T$ to maximize (3). The first order conditions (FOCs) are

$$\rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA}) \frac{1}{l_A + l_T} - \rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA}) l_A \frac{1}{(l_A + l_T)^2} - 1 = 0.$$  
$$\rho_T^* v_T(\tau_{TA}) l_A \frac{1}{(l_A + l_T)^2} - 1 = 0.$$  

Solving the FOCs given $\rho_T^*$ and $\tau_{TA}$ reveals that in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium

$$l_i = \hat{l}_i(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}) \equiv \rho_T^* \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \frac{v_j(\tau_{TA})}{v_i(\tau_{TA})}} \right) v(\tau_{TA}) \text{ for } i \in \{A, T\} \text{ and } j \neq i \quad (7)$$

14
where \( \bar{v}(\tau) \) denotes the harmonic mean of the valuations. An interesting tension emerges here between the ‘average’ valuation, captured by the harmonic mean \( \bar{v}(\tau) \), and the relative valuation of the opposing lobby, captured by \( \frac{v_i(\tau)}{v_j(\tau)} \). All else equal, contributions of both lobbies rise with the average valuation \( \bar{v}(\tau) \): high valuations amplify lobbying intensity. But, all else equal, a given lobby shades its contribution downwards as the relative valuation of the opposing lobby group rises.

In equilibrium, the parallel contest nature of our analysis emerges through the proportionality of Home lobby contributions to \( \rho_T^* \). If \( \rho_T^* = 1 \), Home’s TA ratification decision is pivotal and we have the well known solution in the contest literature. Conversely, \( \rho_T^* = 0 \) implies Home’s ratification decision is inconsequential because Home lobbies know Foreign will not ratify the TA and, in turn, Home lobbies will not contribute. Nevertheless, \( \tau_{TA} < \tau_{SQ} \) implies \( \rho_T^* > 0 \) and \( v_i(\tau) > 0 \) for \( i \in \{A,T\} \). Hence, (7) says Home lobby contributions are positive in equilibrium.

In Stage 1, governments set the TA tariffs \( \tau_{TA} \) anticipating the Stage 2 lobbying process and its Stage 3 TA ratification process. Given \( a = 0 \), governments are purely motivated by contributions and, given equilibrium lobby contributions in (7), equilibrium aggregate contributions are

\[
\hat{l}(\rho_T^*, \tau) = \hat{l}_A(\rho_T^*, \tau) + \hat{l}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau) = \rho_T^* \frac{1}{2} \bar{v}(\tau).
\]

In the aggregate, the relative valuation effects underlying each lobby’s individual contributions cancel out and leave aggregate lobbying proportional to the average valuation \( \bar{v}(\tau) \). Thus, aggregate contributions are increasing in each lobby’s valuation \( v_i(\tau) \). In turn, for a given \( \rho_T^* > 0 \), the polarization property implies aggregate contributions are maximized under the most liberal TA possible since trade liberalization strengthens both the support by \( L_T \) for the TA and the opposition by \( L_A \) against the TA. This suggests both governments have an incentive to propose the most liberal possible TA to maximize aggregate equilibrium lobbying contributions \( \hat{l}(\rho_T^*, \tau) \).

However, the Home government must also consider how the chosen TA tariffs \( \tau_{TA} \) affect
the probability of Foreign ratification $\rho_T$. Thus, we now solve for $\rho_T$ and $\rho_T^*$. This not only helps further characterize aggregate contributions, $\hat{I}(\rho_T, \tau_{TA})$ and $\hat{I}^*(\rho_T, \tau_{TA})$, but also the equilibrium probability that the TA goes ahead. Noting that the equilibrium relative contributions by lobby groups match their relative valuations, $\frac{\nu_T(\tau_{TA})}{v_A(\tau_{TA})}$, the equilibrium TA ratification probabilities in Home and Foreign are

$$\hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) = \rho_T \left( \hat{I}_A(\rho_T, \tau_{TA}), \hat{I}_T(\rho_T, \tau_{TA}) \right) = \left[ 1 + \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right]^{-1} \quad (9)$$

$$\hat{\rho}_T^*(\tau_{TA}) = \rho_T^* \left( \hat{I}_A^*(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}), \hat{I}_T^*(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}) \right) = \left[ 1 + \frac{v_A^*(\tau_{TA})}{v_T^*(\tau_{TA})} \right]^{-1}. \quad (10)$$

In turn, the equilibrium probability that the TA goes ahead is

$$\hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) \hat{\rho}_T^*(\tau_{TA}) = \left[ 1 + \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right]^{-1} \cdot \left[ 1 + \frac{v_A^*(\tau_{TA})}{v_T^*(\tau_{TA})} \right]^{-1}.$$

Hence, anything that increases the relative valuations $\frac{\nu_T(\tau_{TA})}{v_A(\tau_{TA})}$ and/or $\frac{v_T^*(\tau_{TA})}{v_A(\tau_{TA})}$ also increases the probability that the TA goes ahead. Indeed, $\frac{v_T(\tau_{TA})}{v_A(\tau_{TA})}$ and $\frac{v_T^*(\tau_{TA})}{v_A(\tau_{TA})}$ are sufficient statistics for, respectively, the likelihood of Home and Foreign TA ratification.

Thus, to help characterize the equilibrium TA tariffs, we need some structure on how a more liberal TA affects relative valuations. We have already assumed that a more liberal TA polarizes lobby groups: $-\frac{\partial v_i(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$ for $i \in \{A, T\}$. We now say, given a reciprocity rule $u(\tau_{TA})$, that there is ‘pro-trade biased polarization’ from a more liberal TA if the relative valuation $\frac{\nu_T(\tau_{TA})}{v_A(\tau_{TA})}$ rises as the TA becomes more liberal:

$$-\frac{\partial u_T(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \equiv -u(\tau_{TA}) \cdot \nabla \frac{v_T}{v_A} > 0.$$

Naturally, the analogous definition applies to Foreign lobbies.

To what extent does pro-trade biased polarization hold in standard models of international trade? Our above discussion established that polarization holds in the Melitz, oligopoly, and specific factors models. In Section 5 we also show that pro-trade biased polarization holds in these same models. Intuitively, in the Melitz and oligopoly models, a more liberal TA delivers profits to the pro-trade high productivity export firms that exceed the losses suffered by the less productive remaining firms. Additionally, for the specific factors model, as trade liberalization reallocates labor, the value of the marginal product for the specific factor in the exporting sector rises faster than it falls in the import-competing sector. Thus, while one may view pro-trade biased polarization as a strong assumption, it actually
holds under a fairly general and well-defined set of conditions in (at least) three standard
models of international trade.

It should now be clear that the most liberal TA maximizes aggregate lobbying contribu-
tions received by each government. For Home, by polarizing the lobby groups, a more liberal
TA increases the average contribution $\bar{v}(\tau_{TA})$. In turn, conditional on $\rho^*_T$, the most liberal
TA maximizes aggregation lobbying contributions $\hat{l}(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA})$. Further, pro-trade biased po-
arization implies that a more liberal TA also increases the relative valuation $\frac{v^*_T(\tau_{TA})}{v^*_A(\tau_{TA})}$, which increases $\rho^*_T(\tau_{TA})$. Thus, all else equal, the most liberal TA maximizes $\rho^*_T$. Hence, the most liberal TA maximizes both $\bar{v}(\tau_{TA})$ and $\rho^*_T$ and, therefore, maximizes Home aggregate lob-
bying contributions $\hat{l}(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA})$. Proposition 1 describes this discussion where $\hat{\tau}_{TA}$ denotes the equilibrium TA tariffs.

**Proposition 1** Assume (i) $a = 0$, and (ii) a reciprocity rule $u(\tau_{TA})$ that ensures a more liberal TA polarizes the lobby groups and generates pro-trade biased polarization. In equilib-
rium, (i) the Home and Foreign governments propose the most liberal TA possible, implying
at least one country proposes free trade and (ii) the equilibrium probability of TA formation is

$$\hat{\rho}_T(\hat{\tau}_{TA}) \hat{\rho}^*_T(\hat{\tau}_{TA}) = 1 + \frac{\hat{l}_A(\rho^*_T, \hat{\tau}_{TA})}{\hat{l}_T(\rho^*_T, \hat{\tau}_{TA})} \cdot \left[ 1 + \frac{\hat{l}_A(\rho_T, \hat{\tau}_{TA})}{\hat{l}_T(\rho_T, \hat{\tau}_{TA})} \right]^{-1} \cdot \left[ 1 + \frac{v^*_T(\hat{\tau}_{TA})}{v^*_A(\hat{\tau}_{TA})} \right]^{-1} \cdot \left[ 1 + \frac{v^*_T(\hat{\tau}_{TA})}{v^*_A(\hat{\tau}_{TA})} \right]^{-1}.$$

Proposition 1 highlights an important insight of our framework. The lobbying process
itself can drive governments to propose the most liberal TA possible: even without regard
to consumer interests (i.e. $a = 0$), governments can propose the most liberal TA possible.
In contrast, consumer interests tend to drive trade liberalization in the prior literature.
For example, free trade emerges in an ‘organized sector’ in Grossman and Helpman (1994)
only if the consumer interests of all agents in the economy are represented by organized
lobbies. The idea that the lobbying process itself as opposed to consumer interests drives
trade liberalization squares well with a common theme in the popular press that corporate
pro-trade lobbying drives government decisions over TAs.

Proposition 1 also highlights that the relative valuation of the pro-trade lobby drives
the likelihood of TA formation. Relative contributions of lobby groups match their relative
valuations, $l^*_T(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}) = \frac{v^*_T(\tau_{TA})}{v^*_A(\tau_{TA})}$, and the probability of TA formation is increasing in the
relative valuation of the pro-trade lobby in each country. Thus, changes in relative valuations
impact the intensive margin of lobbying and, in turn, the probability of TA formation.
4 Bringing in Additional Factors

While we have shown that lobbying acts as a liberalizing force in driving the most liberal TA as the equilibrium TA, we ignored additional factors beyond lobbying that motivate governments. We now consider governments motivated by such additional factors. Formally, $a > 0$ now allows the head starts to enter each government’s payoff function. Conceptually, we focus on understanding the circumstances where the most liberal TA is not the equilibrium TA and, in turn, the tensions underlying such a TA.

In Stage 3, a government’s TA ratification decision now balances contributions and head starts, where the pro-trade head start $ah_T (\tau_{TA})$ depends on TA tariffs and the anti-trade head start $ah_A (\tau_{SQ})$ depends on status quo tariffs. Using (1), the probability of Home TA ratification now depends on the relative magnitude of augmented contributions $s_i = l_i + ah_i$:

$$
\rho_T (s_A, s_T) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{1 + \frac{s_T}{s_T}} & \text{for all } l_T \geq 0 \text{ and } l_A \geq 0 
\end{cases}.
$$

In Stage 2, head starts introduce lobby participation constraints. Using lobby group expected payoffs in (2)-(3), and given $\rho^*_T$ and $\tau_{TA}$, equilibrium contributions are

$$
\hat{l}_A (\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = \rho^*_T \frac{1}{2 \left( 1 + \frac{\nu_T (\tau_{TA})}{\nu_A (\tau_{TA})} \right)} \hat{v} (\tau_{TA}) - ah_A (\tau_{SQ})
$$

$$
\hat{l}_T (\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}) = \rho^*_T \frac{1}{2 \left( 1 + \frac{\nu_A (\tau_{TA})}{\nu_T (\tau_{TA})} \right)} \hat{v} (\tau_{TA}) - ah_T (\tau_{TA}).
$$

Three observations stand out. First, comparing (13)-(14) with (7), head starts simply induce lobbies to drop their contributions by the amount of the head start. That is, head starts create what we call ‘lobbying leakage’. Second, contributions are decreasing in head starts, which creates participation constraints. For comparability with the case where $a = 0$, we assume $a$ is sufficiently small to ensure positive contributions. Third, like our earlier analysis, the relative valuation $\frac{\nu_T (\tau_{TA})}{\nu_A (\tau_{TA})}$ remains a sufficient statistic for Home TA ratification:

$$
\hat{\rho}_T (\tau_{TA}) = \rho_T \left( \hat{l}_A (\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) , \hat{l}_T (\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) , h_T (\tau_{TA}) , h_A (\tau_{SQ}) \right)
$$

Intuitively, head starts leave the equilibrium TA ratification probability unchanged because $\frac{\hat{\nu}_T (\tau_{TA})}{\hat{\nu}_A (\tau_{TA})}$...
lobbying leakages exactly offset the head starts that now enter augmented contributions $s_i$.

In Stage 1, government payoffs from TA tariffs $\tau_{TA}$ now depend on lobbying contributions and head starts $ah_i(\cdot)$. Indeed, equilibrium aggregate lobbying contributions are now

$$
\hat i (\rho^*_T; \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = \hat i_a (\rho^*_T; \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) + \hat i_T (\rho^*_T; \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})
= \hat i_0 (\rho^*_T; \tau_{TA}) - a [h_A (\tau_{SQ}) + h_T (\tau_{TA})]
$$

(15)

where $\hat i_0 (\rho^*_T; \tau_{TA}) \equiv \hat i (\rho^*_T; \tau_{TA}; a = 0)$ is given by (8). Thus, as expected from our above discussion, lobbying leakage reduces aggregate contributions by the head starts.

In turn, noting $h_A (\tau_{SQ})$ is independent of $\tau_{TA}$, the Home government’s expected payoff from the TA tariffs $\tau_{TA}$ is

$$
G (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = \hat i (\hat \rho^*_T (\tau_{TA}), \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) + a \mathbb{E} [h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})]
= \hat i_0 (\hat \rho^*_T (\tau_{TA}); \tau_{TA}) - \Phi (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) - ah_A (\tau_{SQ})
$$

(16)

where $a \mathbb{E} [h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})] \equiv a [\hat \rho_T (\tau_{TA}) \hat \rho^*_T (\tau_{TA}) h_T (\tau_{TA}) + (1 - \hat \rho_T (\tau_{TA}) \hat \rho^*_T (\tau_{TA})) h_A (\tau_{SQ})]$ > 0 is the expected head start. Moreover, remembering $\Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \equiv h_T (\tau_{TA}) - h_A (\tau_{SQ})$,

$$
\Phi (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \equiv a [1 - \hat \rho_T (\tau_{TA}) \hat \rho^*_T (\tau_{TA})] \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})
$$

(17)

combines two effects. First, $\Phi (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})$ contains the “lobbying leakage” from the pro-trade lobby given by $\hat i_T (\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) - \hat i_T (\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; a = 0) = -ah_T (\tau_{TA})$. Second, $\Phi (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})$ contains the expected head start $a \mathbb{E} [h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})]$. Thus, $\Phi (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})$ mediates the impact of TA tariffs on the government’s expected payoff via the head starts.

Specifically, the impact of more liberal TA tariffs on the Home government’s expected payoff is

$$
- \frac{\partial G (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = - \frac{\partial \hat i_0 (\hat \rho^*_T (\tau_{TA}), \tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} + \frac{\partial \Phi (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\partial \tau_{TA}}.
$$

(18)

Our earlier analysis established that a more liberal TA increases aggregate lobbying in the absence of head starts, $-\frac{\partial \hat i (\cdot; a = 0)}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$. Thus, given $\Phi (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})$ is proportional to $a$, the results of Proposition 1 hold for sufficiently small $a > 0$ because $-\frac{\partial G (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$ holds for sufficiently small $a > 0$. To analyze the more general case when $a$ is not sufficiently small, we now proceed by imposing more structure on the impact of TA tariffs on head starts.

$^{27}$We state, and prove, this formally as Proposition 2 in Appendix A.
4.1 Pro-trade and Anti-trade head starts

In general, the impact of more liberal TA tariffs $\tau_{TA}$ on the Home government’s expected payoff depends, via (18), on the impact on aggregate lobbying contributions $\hat{l}_0 (\rho_T, \tau_{TA})$ and the impact on $\Phi(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})$. However, given the most liberal TA maximizes aggregate lobbying contributions $\hat{l}_0 (\rho_T, \tau_{TA})$ in the absence of head starts, a necessary condition for something other than the most liberal TA to emerge as the equilibrium TA is $-\frac{\partial \Phi (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$ when evaluated at the most liberal TA.

As described above, $\Phi (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})$ consists of lobbying leakage by the pro-trade lobby and the government’s expected head start. How do more liberal TA tariffs impact lobbying leakage by the pro-trade lobby? The answer depends on the nature of head starts. First, consider pro-trade head starts: $a \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) > 0$ and $-\frac{\partial h_T(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$. That is, the pro-trade lobby enjoys a higher head start than the anti-trade lobby and a more liberal TA increases the pro-trade lobby’s head start (as in, e.g., the standard trade model). Then, $-\frac{\partial h_T(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$ implies a higher head start for the pro-trade lobby which reduces the government’s expected payoff through higher lobbying leakage. Second, consider anti-trade head starts: $a \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) < 0$ and $-\frac{\partial h_T(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} < 0$. That is, the anti-trade lobby enjoys higher head starts than the pro-trade lobby and a more liberal TA increases this net head start. Then, $-\frac{\partial h_T(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} < 0$ implies a lower head start for the pro-trade lobby which increases the government’s expected payoff through lower lobbying leakage. Thus, from the perspective of the lobbying leakage effect, more liberal TA tariffs decrease (increase) the government’s expected payoff under pro-trade (anti-trade) head starts.

The lobbying leakage effects work through changing the head starts $ah_A (\tau_{SQ})$ and $ah_T (\tau_{TA})$. But, for given head starts, how do more liberal TA tariffs impact the government’s expected head start $a E[h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})]$? Regardless of pro-trade or anti-trade head starts, a more liberal TA increases the probability of TA implementation via pro-trade biased polarization: $-\frac{\partial^2 \phi (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$. Thus, a more liberal TA increases the likelihood of realizing $h_T (\tau_{TA})$ and decreases the likelihood of realizing $h_A (\tau_{SQ})$. In the case of pro-trade head starts, i.e. $h_T (\tau_{TA}) > h_A (\tau_{SQ})$, the expected head start and, in turn, the government’s expected payoff increase. However, in the case of anti-trade head starts, i.e. $h_T (\tau_{TA}) < h_A (\tau_{SQ})$, the expected head start and, in turn, the government’s expected payoff fall. Thus, from the perspective of the expected head start, more liberal TA tariffs increase (decrease) the government’s expected payoff under pro-trade (anti-trade) head starts.

Important implications emerge from the different tensions underlying the impact of more liberal TA tariffs across the anti-trade and pro-trade head start cases. Specifically, our framework suggests two alternative explanations for the fact that real world TAs are characterized
by positive tariffs. One explanation revolves around pro-trade head starts and lobbying leakage. On one hand, aggregate lobbying contributions absent lobbying leakage and the pro-trade head starts themselves both push towards further liberalization. But, on the other hand, lobbying leakage pushes towards protection because the pro-trade lobby shades their contributions as the TA becomes more liberal given their understanding of the government’s inherent desire for liberalization. Thus, one explanation provided by our framework for observing positive tariffs as the outcome of real world TAs is the lobbying leakage effect. That is, governments set positive tariffs because more liberal TA tariffs would depress pro-trade lobby contributions by enough to outweigh the liberalizing forces of lower TA tariffs on aggregate lobby contributions and the pro-trade head start.

Our framework has a second, and perhaps more plausible, explanation for observing positive tariffs as the outcome of real world TAs. This revolves around the inherently protectionist government preferences of anti-trade head starts. On one hand, aggregate lobbying contributions, both those absent lobbying leakage and the lobbying leakage itself, push towards further liberalization, because a more liberal TA shrinks the extent that the pro-trade lobby shades their contributions given the inherent government preference for protection. On the other hand, the anti-trade head start itself pushes towards protection. Thus, inherently protectionist government preferences represent an alternative, and perhaps more plausible, rationale for the fact that we observe positive tariffs in real world TAs.

As we explained in the Introduction, the idea that protectionism emerges as a balance between the liberalizing force of lobbying and the protectionist force of inherent government preferences stands in stark contrast to the typical view of the TA literature where the opposite is true. Nevertheless, consistent with the idea of inherent government preferences for protection is the recent empirical work of Conconi et al. (2014) who find compelling evidence that electoral motivations underpin politicians’ protectionist preferences. Additionally, Lake and Millimet (2016) find that, empirically, trade-related redistribution towards a politician’s constituents can mitigate this inherent protectionist tendency. Thus, our alternative perspective squares with recent empirical evidence.

4.2 International Political Externalities

The fundamental observation of Bagwell and Staiger (1999) is that, in a two country world, the sole purpose of a TA is to internalize terms-of-trade externalities. Intuitively, despite a large class of political motivations governments may hold, one country is completely unaffected by the other country’s tariff if world prices remain unchanged. That is, governments have nothing else to negotiate about once their TA internalizes terms-of-trade externalities.
However, the political motivations that governments hold in our framework fall outside those considered by Bagwell and Staiger (1999). As we can now see from the foregoing analysis, for given world prices, Home is affected by Foreign’s tariff in our framework because Foreign’s tariff changes Foreign’s local prices and, in turn, the probability of Foreign TA ratification. Changes in the probability of Foreign TA ratification impact Home through Home aggregate lobbying contributions and the Home government’s expected head start. Thus, our new political economy framework showcases new international political externalities that are not internalized by governments who just internalize their terms-of-trade externalities.

To investigate this issue, we recast our analysis with anti-trade head starts (i.e. our preferred explanation for an equilibrium TA with protection) in the general framework of Bagwell and Staiger (1999). This framework features two countries and two goods but imposes little further structure on technology, consumer preferences or government preferences. Specifically, Home imports good $x$ and Foreign imports good $y$. Further, dropping the TA subscripts hereafter, Home’s local relative price is

$$p_x = p_w(x, \tau)$$

where Home (Foreign) imposes an ad valorem tariff $\tau$ and $p_w$ is the world relative price. Analogously, Foreign’s local relative price is

$$p_y = \frac{p_w}{1 + \tau}$$

Note that $p_w(\frac{1}{1+\tau})$ represents Foreign (Home) terms-of-trade. Where relevant, we hereafter focus on the Home country and leave implicit that the analogous concept applies for the Foreign country.

Balanced trade between Home and Foreign delivers the equilibrium world relative price $p^w(\tau, \tau^*)$. Behind this balanced trade condition, increasing opportunity costs govern production with Home production of good $i$ given by $Q_i(p)$ such that the marginal rate of transformation equals $p$. Further, consumers view goods as normal goods, with Home demand for good $i$ given by $D_i(p, R)$, where $R(p, p^w)$ is Home tariff revenue measured in terms of the local export good at local prices. Assuming away the Lerner Paradox,

$$\frac{\partial p^w(\tau, \tau^*)}{\partial \tau} < \frac{\partial p^w(\tau, \tau^*)}{\partial \tau^*}$$

so each country’s tariff improves their terms-of-trade. Assuming away the Metzler Paradox,

$$\frac{dp^w(\tau, \tau^*)}{d\tau} > \frac{dp^w(\tau^*, \tau)}{d\tau^*}$$

so that each country’s tariff increases the relative price of its imported good.

Bagwell and Staiger (1999) consider a large class of government preferences. Specifically, they consider the class of preferences where the Home government’s payoff $G(p, p^w)$ can be re-written as $G(p, p^w) = G(p, \tau^*, p^w(\tau, \tau^*))$. This includes, but is not limited to, the case where $G(\cdot)$ represents national welfare. For example, $G(\cdot)$ could represent the setup in Grossman and Helpman (1995b) featuring a specific factors model and a government who cares about both national welfare and, through a menu auction, lobbying contributions. As a fairly unrestrictive condition, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) impose that each country benefits from increases in their own terms-of-trade:

$$\frac{\partial G(p, p^w)}{\partial p} < \frac{\partial G^*(p^*, p^w)}{\partial p^w}$$

Crucially, notice that the preferences of each government do not depend on the local relative price in the other
country and, in turn, only depend on the other country’s tariff through its impact on the world relative price.

Relative to the structure in [Bagwell and Staiger (1999)], the key observation in our framework is that each government’s preferences depend on the local relative price in the other country. Thus, government preferences in our framework are given by

\[ G(\tau, \tau^*) = G(p, p^w, p^*) \]

and

\[ G^*(\tau^*, \tau) = G^*(p^*, p^w, p). \]

In turn, Foreign’s tariff \( \tau^* \) imposes externalities on Home not only via Home’s terms-of-trade \( \frac{1}{p^c} \) but also, for given terms-of-trade, via Foreign’s local relative price \( p^*(\tau^*, p^w) \). The broad intuition is straightforward: Foreign tariffs impact the probability of Foreign TA ratification and, for given terms-of-trade, this impacts the degree of lobbying in Home (given by (15)) and also the expected head start (i.e. \( aE[h(TA, SQ)] \)) for the Home government.

More specifically, there are two particular international political externalities in our framework that extend beyond terms-of-trade externalities. Letting \( \tau = (\tau, \tau^*) \), our Home government preferences (given by (16)) can be written as

\[ G(\tau, \tau^*) = \hat{l}_0(\hat{\rho}^*_T(\tau), \tau) - a [1 - \hat{\rho}_T(\tau) \hat{\rho}^*_T(\tau)] \Delta h(\tau) \]

\[ = G \left( \hat{l}_0(p, p^w, p^*), \hat{\rho}^*_T(p^*, p^w), \hat{\rho}_T(p, p^w), \Delta h(p, p^w) \right) \]

\[ = G(p, p^w, p^*). \]

These two externalities can be seen, holding \( p^w \) fixed, from

\[ - \frac{\partial G(\tau, \tau^*)}{\partial \tau^*} \bigg|_{p^w} = - \frac{\partial G(\tau, \tau^*)}{\partial \hat{l}_0(\tau)} \frac{\partial \hat{l}_0(\tau)}{\partial \hat{\rho}^*_T(\tau)} \frac{\partial \hat{\rho}^*_T(\tau)}{\partial \hat{\rho}_T(\tau)} \frac{\partial \hat{\rho}_T(\tau)}{\partial \Delta h(\tau)} - \frac{\partial G(\tau, \tau^*)}{\partial \hat{\rho}^*_T(\tau)} \frac{\partial \hat{\rho}^*_T(\tau)}{\partial \rho^*_T(\tau)} \frac{\partial \rho^*_T(\tau)}{\partial \rho_T(\tau)} \frac{\partial \rho_T(\tau)}{\partial \Delta h(\tau)} \frac{\partial \Delta h(\tau)}{\partial \tau^*}. \]

Foreign liberalization imposes externalities on Home through the Foreign TA ratification probability. The first term on the right hand side says this happens by changing the relative strength of Foreign interest group TA support. Specifically, pro-trade biased polarization implies Foreign tariff liberalization increases the probability of Foreign TA ratification. In turn, by increasing the likelihood that Home’s TA ratification decision is pivotal for TA implementation, the higher \( \rho^*_T(\tau) \) intensifies Home lobbying competition and contributions rise. Thus, by this “aggregate contributions externality” Foreign tariff liberalization imposes a positive externality on Home.

The second term on the right hand side says Foreign liberalization also imposes an externality on the Home government by decreasing its expected net head start. As discussed above, Foreign liberalization increases the probability of Foreign TA ratification. Note that

\[ \frac{\partial G(\tau, \tau^*)}{\partial \rho_T(\tau)} \bigg|_{\rho_T(\tau)} = \rho^*_T(\tau) \Delta h(\tau) < 0. \]

That is, holding Home lobbying contributions \( l_0(\tau) \) fixed, the
higher probability of TA implementation increases the probability of the Home government realizing $h_T(\cdot)$ and decreases the probability of realizing $h_A(\cdot)$. Thus, given $h_A(\cdot) > h_T(\cdot)$ by anti-trade head starts, the Home government’s expected net head start falls. Thus, this “expected net head start externality” says Foreign tariff liberalization imposes a negative externality on Home. Given the aggregate contribution and expected net head start externalities have opposite signs, the sign of our net international political externality is ambiguous.

To reach their fundamental observation that the sole purpose of a TA is internalizing terms-of-trade externalities, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) proceed in two steps. First, they define politically efficient tariffs as those chosen by the individual governments when each acts as if they ignore the impact of their tariff on their terms-of-trade. That is, the politically efficient tariffs embody each country internalizing the negative terms-of-trade externality it imposes on the other country. Second, they show the politically efficient tariffs are also efficient in the sense that no other set of tariffs make both governments better off. Therefore, there is no scope for mutually beneficial tariff changes once a TA internalizes the terms-of-trade externalities.

Figure 2 illustrates their formal argument. In general, the slope of the Home ($\bar{G}_{RS}$) and Foreign ($G_{BS}^*$) government iso-payoff curves are, respectively,

$$\frac{d\tau}{d\tau^*}|_{dG=0} = -\frac{\partial G^*(\cdot) / \partial \tau^*}{\partial G^*(\cdot) / \partial \tau} = -\frac{\partial p^w / \partial \tau^*}{\partial p^w / \partial \tau} \left[ \frac{\tau G_p + G_{p^w}}{\lambda G_p + G_{p^w}} \right] > 0 \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{d\tau}{d\tau^*}|_{dG^*=0} = -\frac{\partial G^*(\cdot) / \partial \tau^*}{\partial G^*(\cdot) / \partial \tau} = -\frac{\partial p^w / \partial \tau^*}{\partial p^w / \partial \tau} \left[ \frac{1}{\lambda} G_p^* + G_{p^w}^* \right] > 0 \quad (21)$$

where the subscripts on $G$ and $G^*$ indicate partial derivatives, $\lambda \equiv \frac{\partial p^w / \partial \tau}{\partial p / \partial \tau} < 0$ and $\lambda^* \equiv \frac{\partial p^w / \partial \tau^*}{\partial p / \partial \tau^*} < 0$. Moreover, the EE locus is the locus of efficient tariffs whereby the iso-payoff curves are tangent. The key step in Bagwell and Staiger’s logic is that when each government acts as if it ignores the impact of its tariff on its terms on trade then the resulting “politically efficient” tariffs must satisfy $G_p = G_{p^w}^* = 0$.

This delivers the fundamental result, illustrated by Figure 2, that the politically efficient tariffs are efficient because the iso-payoff curves are tangent at the politically efficient tariffs $\tau_{PE} = (\tau_{PE}, \tau_{PE}^*)$:

$$\frac{d\tau}{d\tau^*}|_{dG=0} = \frac{d\tau}{d\tau^*}|_{dG^*=0} = -\frac{\partial p^w / \partial \tau^*}{\partial p^w / \partial \tau}. \quad (22)$$

\footnote{Note that Home’s FOC for its individually optimal tariff is $G_p \frac{dp}{d\tau} + G_{p^w} \frac{dp^w}{d\tau} = G_p \cdot (p^w + \tau \frac{dp^w}{d\tau}) + G_{p^w} \frac{dp^w}{d\tau} = 0$. If Home acts as if it ignores the impact of its tariff on its terms of trade, then it acts as if $\frac{dp^w}{d\tau} = 0$. In this case, the FOC reduces to $G_p \cdot p^w = 0$ and, in turn, $G_p = 0$ given $p^w \neq 0$.}
Hence, governments cannot negotiate mutually beneficial tariff changes once the TA internalizes their terms-of-trade externalities.

Given our government preferences \( G (p, p^w, p^*) \) and \( G^* (p^*, p^w, p) \), the slopes of the Home (\( G \)) and Foreign (\( G^* \)) government iso-payoff curves are, respectively,

\[
\frac{d\tau}{d\tau^*} \bigg|_{dG=0} = -\frac{\partial G (\cdot)}{\partial \tau^*} = -\frac{\partial p^w}{\partial \tau^*} \left( \frac{\tau G_p + G^*_p + \frac{1}{\tau^*} G_{p^w} + \frac{1}{\tau^*} G^*_p}{\frac{1}{\tau^*} G_p + G^*_p + \frac{1}{\tau^*} G^*_p} \right)
\]

(23)

\[
\frac{d\tau}{d\tau^*} \bigg|_{dG^*=0} = -\frac{\partial G^* (\cdot)}{\partial \tau^*} = -\frac{\partial p^w}{\partial \tau^*} \left( \frac{\frac{1}{\tau^*} G^*_p + G^*_p + \frac{1}{\tau^*} G^*_p}{\frac{1}{\tau^*} G_p + G^*_p + \frac{1}{\tau^*} G^*_p} \right).
\]

(24)

Naturally, these slopes reduce to those in (20)-(21) when \( G_p = G^*_p = 0 \), so the international political economy externalities that we introduce in our framework disappear. If each government acts as if it ignores the impact of its tariff on its terms on trade in the presence of these international political externalities (i.e. \( G_p \neq 0, G^*_p \neq 0 \)), the resulting “politically efficient” tariffs must again satisfy \( G_p = G^*_p = 0 \).

Note that Home’s FOC for its individually optimal tariff is

\[
G_p \frac{dp}{d\tau} + G_p^w \frac{dp^w}{d\tau} + G^*_p \frac{dp^*}{d\tau} = G_p \cdot \left( \frac{p^w + \frac{\partial p^w}{\partial \tau} + \frac{1}{\tau^*} \frac{\partial p^w}{\partial \tau}}{\frac{1}{\tau^*} G_p + G^*_p + \frac{1}{\tau^*} G^*_p} \right) = 0.
\]

If Home acts as if it ignores the impact of its tariff on its terms of trade, then it acts as if \( \frac{\partial p^w}{\partial \tau^*} = 0 \). In this case, the FOC reduces to \( G_p \cdot p^w = 0 \) and, in turn, \( G_p = 0 \) given \( p^w \neq 0 \).
Indeed, contrary to the fundamental observation in Bagwell and Staiger (1999), we can now show that the politically efficient tariffs are inefficient.

Figure 3: Politically efficient and efficient tariffs in presence of international political externalities

In seeing why the politically efficient tariffs are inefficient, we can also see whether the efficient TA in our framework embodies more or less liberalization than that embodied by the politically efficient tariffs $\tau_{PE}$ whereby governments just internalize the terms-of-trade externalities.\(^{30}\) Above, we described that the net sign of our international political externalities is ambiguous. Thus, first suppose that liberalization by one country imposes a net positive externality on the other country, i.e. $G_P > 0$ and $G_p^* < 0$. Then, using (25)-(26),

\[
0 < d\tau/d\tau^*|_{dG^*=0} < \frac{d\rho^w / d\tau^*}{d\rho^w / d\tau} < d\tau/d\tau^*|_{dG=0}.
\]

Thus, as illustrated by Figure 3(a), relative to the efficient outcome absent our international political externalities, Home’s iso-payoff curve has

\[^{30}\text{We ignore the knife edge case where the aggregate contribution externality and expected net head start externality exactly offset one another, and leave a net zero international political externality. In this knife edge case, the classic result of Bagwell and Staiger (1999) again applies: the sole purpose of a TA is internalizing terms of trade externalities.}\]
steepered and Foreign’s iso-payoff curve has flattened. In turn, the politically efficient tariffs $\tau_{PE}$ no longer lie on the efficiency locus $EE$. Indeed, Figure 3(a) also shows that, starting at $\tau_{PE}$, our international political externalities imply the efficient TA embodies more liberalization than when governments just internalize terms-of-trade externalities.

However, when our international political externalities are, on net, negative then the efficient TA embodies less liberalization than the politically efficient tariffs. Formally, the net negative international political externality implies $G_{p}^{r} < 0$ and $G_{p}^{*} > 0$ so that, using (25)-(26), $0 < \frac{d\tau}{dG}|_{G=0} < -\frac{\partial w^r}{\partial p^r} / \partial \tau^* < \frac{d\tau}{dG}|_{G^*=0}$. Thus, relative to the efficient outcome in the absence of our international political externalities, Home’s iso-payoff curve has flattened and Foreign’s iso-payoff curve has steepened. Figure 3(b) shows the politically efficient tariffs are again inefficient. Further, Figure 3(b) also shows our international political externalities imply that, starting at $\tau_{PE}$, the efficient TA embodies less liberalization than when governments just internalize terms-of-trade externalities.

Given our international political externalities are new to the literature, we should emphasize an important point: uncertainty over Foreign TA ratification is not sufficient to generate our international political externalities. Rather, these externalities emerge because uncertainty over Foreign TA ratification is endogenous and depends on Foreign trade policy. Formally, this can be seen via (19) where the Foreign tariff $\tau^*$ impacts the Home government’s expected payoff through changing the Foreign TA ratification probability $\rho_T^r$. Thus, the emergence of our international political externalities stems from our explicit modeling of the political process governing TA formation.

5 Examples with particular underlying trade models

5.1 Partial equilibrium specific factors model

To concretely illustrate and relate our results to existing literature, we now explore two and three-country versions of the simple and stylized specific factors model from Grossman and Helpman (1995a). The Protection for Sale framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995a,b) presents a specific factors model whose features have permeated the subsequent trade policy literature: utility is (i) quasi-linear in non-numeraire goods produced using sector-specific factors and labor and (ii) linear in a numeraire good that is freely traded and produced one-for-one with labor. This setup eliminates substitution effects between non-numeraire goods and implies the numeraire good absorbs all income effects. Moreover, production of the numeraire good pins wages to 1 (with appropriate normalization for units of labor), making labor income independent of trade policy. Thus,
effectively, a general equilibrium setup becomes a partial equilibrium setup.

Grossman and Helpman (1995a) simplify further. They impose (i) inelastic domestic supply and (ii) linear demand for non-numeraire goods resulting from quadratic utility for non-numeraire goods. In a two-country world, the essential structure (see the Appendix for further details) is two non-numeraire goods where Home and Foreign have comparative advantage in different goods. Further, (i) each country has endowments \(e\) \((d)\) of their comparative advantage (disadvantage) good and (ii) the intercepts on each country’s linear inverse demand curves are \(\alpha\) \((\theta)\) for their comparative advantage (disadvantage) good. Like earlier, we assume governments only negotiate over import policies rather than export policies. While Grossman and Helpman do not make this restriction, we describe below why it is without loss of generality. Additionally, we assume tariffs are specific.

In a two-country world, negotiating a TA over trade liberalization serves a clear purpose in Grossman and Helpman (1995b). Given the menu auction framework, the Home government chooses their status quo tariff \(\tau_{SQ}^{GH}\) to maximize \(G^{GH} = PS(\tau_{SQ}^{GH}) + aW(\tau_{SQ}^{GH})\) where \(PS(\cdot)\) denotes producer surplus (of both sectors) and \(W(\cdot)\) denotes national welfare. Under a TA, the unique Pareto efficient outcome is given by the symmetric TA tariff \(\tau_{TA}^{GH}\) that maximizes the joint payoff \(G^{GH} + G^{TA}\). Thus,

\[
\begin{align*}
\tau_{SQ}^{GH} &= \frac{1}{3} \left[ (\theta - \alpha) + (e - d) + \frac{2d}{a} \right] = \frac{1}{3} \left[ (\theta - \alpha) + (e - d) - \frac{d}{a} \right] + \frac{d}{a} \\
\tau_{TA}^{GH} &= \frac{d}{a} - \frac{e}{a}
\end{align*}
\]

The status quo tariff \(\tau_{SQ}^{GH}\) combines a terms-of-trade effect and a politics effect with the politics effect dissipating with the welfare mindedness of governments as governed by \(a\). Imposing \(d > e\), the TA tariff \(\tau_{TA}^{GH} > 0\) just combines the politics effects and, in doing so, removes the terms-of-trade effect from \(\tau_{SQ}^{GH}\). That is, the sole purpose of the TA is removing the negative externality associated with the terms-of-trade effect. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) emphasize this point in a much broader class of economic environments and government preferences that embeds Grossman and Helpman (1995b) as an example.

While a TA cannot eliminate the politics component of the status quo tariffs in a

---

31As mentioned earlier, the assumption of ad valorem of specific tariff is irrelevant for our general model.

32In general, the terms of trade effect is the inverse export supply elasticity (in absolute value). In our linear setup, it is merely equilibrium Foreign exports of \(\frac{1}{2} [(e + \theta) - (\alpha + d) - \tau_{SQ}^{GH}]\). Hence, \(\tau_{SQ}^{GH} > 0\) given positive foreign exports.

33Here, the TA also brings in the Foreign politics effect but that would show up as part of a status quo Foreign export subsidy if we also allowed export policy.
menu auction, a TA eliminates these effects in our framework. Noting that \( v_T(\tau_{T_A}) = \frac{1}{2} e (\tau_{SQ} - \tau_{TA}) \) and \( v_A(\tau_{T_A}) = \frac{1}{2} d (\tau_{SQ} - \tau_{TA}) \), our polarization property holds \((-\frac{\partial v_i(\tau_{T_A})}{\partial \tau_{T_A}}) > 0 \) for \( i \in \{A, T\} \) and our pro-trade biased polarization property holds \((-\frac{\partial v_T(\tau_{T_A})}{\partial \tau_{T_A}}) / \frac{\partial v_A(\tau_{T_A})}{\partial \tau_{T_A}} = 0 \). Thus, Proposition 2 implies that, for sufficiently small \( a \), free trade is the equilibrium TA.\(^{34}\)

The greater degree of liberalization that emerges in our framework stems from our new international political externalities. As we discussed above, \((19)\) shows the presence of an “aggregate contributions externality” whereby, for given terms-of-trade, a lower Foreign tariff confers a positive externality on Home. This positive externality of liberalization arises because the higher probability of Foreign TA ratification increases the intensity of Home lobbying and, in turn, aggregate Home lobbying contributions. \((19)\) also shows the presence of an “expected net head start externality”. In Section \(4.2\), this was a negative externality of liberalization because governments had anti-trade head starts. But, with the pro-trade head starts of national welfare in the current discussion, this is another positive externality of liberalization whereby the higher probability of Foreign TA ratification increases the probability of realizing national welfare evaluated at the TA tariffs. Together, these international political externalities create positive externalities of liberalization and generate greater liberalization than a standard model without these externalities.

By extending the above example to a three-country setting, we now illustrate how our results differ from a menu-auction over a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Perhaps the most prominent exception to the overarching non-discrimination principle in the GATT/WTO is that bilateral FTA members can engage in reciprocal bilateral tariff reductions if they completely eliminate their bilateral tariffs. Formally, we now consider three non-numeraire goods where each country has an endowment \( e \) of its comparative advantage good and endowments \( d \) of its two comparative disadvantage goods (each country has a different comparative advantage good).

To focus attention on the differences between the menu auction framework and our contest framework, let \( a = 0 \) so that governments simply maximize lobby welfare. In our simple symmetric economic environment, the FTA-induced change in lobby welfare is the change in producer surplus \( \frac{1}{3} \tau_{SQ} (e - 2d) \). Thus, governments oppose the FTA in a menu auction framework when \( d > \frac{1}{2} e \).\(^{35}\) Faced with the choice of preserving the status quo tariffs or proposing a bilateral FTA with zero bilateral tariffs in our contest framework, Proposition

\(^{34}\)If \( a \) is large enough, the equilibrium TA can shift from having a symmetric TA tariff of \( \tau_{T_A} = 0 \) to \( \tau_{T_A} = \frac{2d}{a} \left( \frac{e}{a + d} \right)^2 \). This shift not only requires \( a \) large enough but also \( \tau_{T_A} \leq \tau_{SQ} \) and \( l_i \geq 0 \) for \( i \in \{A, T\} \).

\(^{35}\)Note that this condition is weaker than the condition required for a tariff to maximize the three-country joint government payoff.
\(\text{implies a pair of governments propose the bilateral FTA when } a \text{ is sufficiently small and our polarization and pro-trade biased polarization properties hold. Indeed, they hold given }
\)
\[v_T(\tau_{TA}) = \frac{1}{3}e\tau_{SQ}, \quad v_A(\tau_{TA}) = \frac{2}{3}d\tau_{SQ}, \quad \text{and } \frac{v_T(\tau_{TA})}{v_A(\tau_{TA})} = \frac{1}{2}e.d.\]
\(\text{Thus, we have a concrete example where lobby pressure leads governments to not form the FTA in a menu auction setting (like Grossman and Helpman \citeyear{1995a}) but governments propose FTA formation in our contest framework. Given head starts play no role because } a = 0, \text{ the intuition described above regarding the aggregate contribution externality drives this result.}\)

### 5.2 Oligopoly model

Intra-industry conflicts over trade liberalization could naturally emerge. To this end, we now illustrate how our contest framework differs from the menu auction framework using a simple oligopoly model (we relegate a detailed presentation to the Appendix).

Two symmetric countries each have two firms. They apply symmetric status quo specific tariffs \(\tau_{SQ} = (\tau_{SQ}, \tau_{SQ} = \tau_{SQ})\) with \(\tau_{SQ} < \tau\) where \(\tau > \tau\) would prohibit trade. In each country, one firm has zero marginal cost (i.e. \(c = 0\)) and the other has constant marginal cost \(c = \tilde{c} > 0\). Exporting requires a fixed cost \(f_X > 0\); thus, in equilibrium, inefficient firms may only serve their domestic market. A linear inverse demand curve, with an intercept normalized to 1, governs demand for the oligopolistic good. We make the standard assumptions outlined in Section 5.1 that reduces a general equilibrium to a partial equilibrium setup.

The fixed export cost \(f_X\) generates intra-industry conflict over trade liberalization. Once \(f_X\) exceeds a threshold \(f_X(c)\), exporting is unprofitable for the inefficient firms for all \(\tau \leq \tau_{SQ}\). Thus, as Figure 4(a) shows, liberalization hurts the inefficient domestic firm via increased competition in the domestic market with the efficient Foreign firm: \(-\frac{\partial \pi(\tilde{c})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} < 0\) where \(\pi(c)\) denotes profits of a Home firm. In turn, the inefficient firm constitutes \(L_A\) and, fixing \(\tau_{SQ}\), Figure 4(b) shows that \(-\frac{\partial v_A(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} < 0\). Unlike the inefficient firm, trade liberalization benefits the efficient firm via higher export profits. However, as Figure 4(a) shows, the convexity of \(\pi(0)\) implies that a sufficiently high \(\tau_{SQ}\) actually requires a sufficiently liberal \(\tau_{TA}\) for the benefit of higher exports profits to outweigh lost domestic profits. In turn, the efficient firm constitutes \(L_T\) when the benefit of additional Foreign market access outweighs lost domestic profits. In this case, \(v_T(\tau_{TA}) > 0\) and, as Figure 4(b) shows, \(-\frac{\partial v_T(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0\). Thus, once \(v_T(\tau_{TA}) > 0\), our polarization property holds and, in turn, Figure 4(c) illustrates that our pro-trade biased polarization property also holds.

Given the polarization and pro-trade biased polarization properties hold, our earlier results apply. In particular, the TA that maximizes aggregate contributions within each country is free trade. So, this is the equilibrium TA when governments only care about con-
tributions. In particular, this holds for any $\tau_{SQ}$. What would the equilibrium TA look like in a menu auction noting that, in the equilibrium of a menu auction, governments simply maximize lobby welfare when $a = 0$? To highlight differences with our results, focus on $\tau_{SQ} > \tilde{\tau}$ so that any liberalization reduces aggregate profits of domestic firms (see Figure 4(a)). Thus, in a setup like Grossman and Helpman (1995b) where negotiation is over the TA tariffs given the TA is going ahead, liberalization would not arise in equilibrium. Further, in a setup like Grossman and Helpman (1995b) where negotiation is over whether to form a TA that involves zero tariffs, the TA would fail. Thus, the oligopoly setup clearly illustrates the different implications stemming from the menu auction setting versus the contest setting. As described in the previous section, these differences stem from our new international political externalities.

5.3 Melitz model

We now illustrate our framework in a symmetric two-country Melitz model, focusing on the essential structure in the Home country (the Appendix contains a more formal presentation).

A representative agent obtains per-period utility $U = \omega \ln (X) + Y$. Here, $\omega$ parameterizes expenditure on the composite differentiated good $X = (\int_{i \in \Omega} x(i)^{\theta} di)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$ that aggregates over a set $\Omega$ of possible varieties with an elasticity of substitution $\varepsilon = \frac{1}{1-\theta} > 1$ where $\theta \in (0, 1)$. In contrast, $Y$ is a freely traded homogenous good produced one-to-one using labor.

Sector $X$ firms face three forms of fixed costs. First, firms pay a one time market entry fixed cost $f_E$. Once paid, firm $i$ draws a constant marginal cost $c_i$ (labor is the only input) from the Pareto distribution $G(c) = \left( \frac{c}{c_U} \right)^k$ with $0 < c < c_U$ and shape parameter $k > (\varepsilon - 1)$. Thus, a competitive fringe of potential entrants awaits favorable market conditions to make entry profitable. Second, after observing $c_i$, firm $i$ decides whether to produce knowing production incurs a per-period fixed cost $f_D$. Thus, in response to adverse changes
in market conditions, relatively unproductive firms exit the market. Third, firm $i$ pays an additional fixed cost $f_X = \gamma f_D$ if it serves the Foreign market. Because $\gamma > 1$, any firm that produces will serve the domestic market and only the most productive firms export. Summarizing, the three key parameters in the model are (i) the elasticity of substitution between differentiated varieties $\varepsilon = \frac{1}{1-\theta} > 1$, (ii) $\gamma = \frac{f_X}{f_D}$, capturing the additional cost of exporting relative to domestic production and (iii) the Pareto shape parameter $k$, governing the dispersion of firm productivity.

5.3.1 Equilibrium and lobbying

Zero profit conditions and a free entry condition allow closing the model and the Pareto distribution for marginal cost allows closed form solutions. Conditional on a set of firms having paid the fixed market entry cost $f_E$, zero profit conditions pin down the marginal cost cutoffs that define firm production choices. Given the status quo ad valorem tariffs $\tau_{SQ}$, (i) firms with $c_i \leq c_{X,SQ}$ serve the domestic market and export, (ii) firms with $c_i \in (c_{X,SQ}, c_{D,SQ}]$ only serve the domestic market, and (iii) firms with $c_i > c_{D,SQ}$ exit without producing. Importantly, these zero profit conditions are zero ‘operating’ profit which do not take into account the fixed market entry cost $f_E$. The free entry condition determines the mass of firms $N_{E,SQ}$ that enter and force a potential entrant’s expected operating profit to equal the fixed market entry cost $f_E$. The Appendix presents derivations and closed form solutions for $c_{X,SQ}$, $c_{D,SQ}$ and $N_{E,SQ}$ and the associated profits for the different types of firms.

Upon implementation of the TA tariffs $\tau_{TA}$, we can solve for new marginal cost cutoffs $c_{X,TA}$ and $c_{D,TA}$. In doing so, one must take a stand on how the mass of firms, $N_E$, adjusts. First, one could take a ‘short-run’ view that holds $N_{E,SQ}$ fixed\(^\text{36}\) Second, one could take a ‘long-run’ view that allows $N_E$ to adjust given the new market conditions. In this latter case, we assume that only the mass of firms $N_{E,SQ}$ lobby over the TA. To do otherwise would allow the seemingly unrealistic possibility that ‘potential’ firms, i.e. those who are not yet producing anything, lobby over the TA. Having solved for the endogenous marginal cost cutoffs, as well as other endogenous variables, we again obtain closed form solutions for the profits of the different types of firms.

To define lobby group valuations, let $\bar{c}$ denote the threshold marginal cost for a firm indifferent between the TA tariffs $\tau_{TA}$ and the status quo tariffs $\tau_{SQ}$. Further, let $\pi(c, (\tau, \tau^*))$ denote a firm’s operating profit with marginal cost $c$ and tariffs $(\tau, \tau^*)$. Then, $L_A$ ($L_T$)

\(^{36}\)Holding $N_E$ fixed in the ‘short-run’ is similar to Eaton and Kortum (2005), Chaney (2008), Do and Levchenko (2009) and Arkolakis et al. (2012).
constitutes firms with marginal cost above (below) \( \bar{c} \) and their valuations are

\[
v_A = N_E \int_{\bar{c}}^{c_D, SQ} \left( \pi (c, \tau_{SQ}) - \pi (c, \tau_{TA}) \right) dG(c)
\]

\[
v_T = N_E \int_{0}^{\bar{c}} \left( \pi (c, \tau_{TA}) - \pi (c, \tau_{SQ}) \right) dG(c).
\]

(27)

(28)

To ensure that \( v_T (\tau_{TA}) > v_A (\tau_{TA}) \), we impose \( \tau_{SQ} < \frac{k}{k-\theta} \).

Given this assumption, we numerically investigate the properties imposed in our earlier analysis: (i) a more liberal TA polarizes the lobby groups, \( -\partial v_i (\tau_{TA}) / \partial \tau_{TA} > 0 \) for \( i \in \{ A, T \} \), and (ii) a more liberal TA generates pro-trade biased polarization: \( -\partial v_T (\tau_{TA}) / v_A (\tau_{TA}) / \partial \tau_{TA} \geq 0 \). In the ‘long-run’, these properties hold without any restrictions. In the short-run case, the former property fails for the anti-trade lobby as the equilibrium mass of non-exporting firms vanishes. Intuitively, we need a non-trivial mass of ‘import-competing’ firms for a more liberal TA to strengthen the anti-trade lobby’s TA opposition. Thus, this condition appears rather unrestrictive. Given this condition, Proposition 2 implies that the equilibrium TA is free trade in the symmetric Melitz model as long as \( a \) is sufficiently small and TA tariffs respect the reciprocity rule \( u (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \).

5.3.2 Comparative statics

While free trade is the equilibrium TA, the probability of TA ratification depends on the relative valuations \( \frac{v_T (\tau_{TA})}{v_A (\tau_{TA})} \) in Home and \( \frac{v_T (\tau_{TA})}{v_A (\tau_{TA})} \) in Foreign. Thus, we can investigate how the model’s parameters affect the probability of TA formation.

For the ‘short-run’ cases, we can numerically show that (i) \( d \frac{v_T (\tau_{TA})}{v_A (\tau_{TA})} / d\gamma < 0 \), so that larger barriers to exporting decrease the probability of TA formation, (ii) \( d \frac{v_T (\tau_{TA})}{v_A (\tau_{TA})} / dk < 0 \), so that more dispersion in firm productivity decreases the probability of TA formation, and (iii) \( d \frac{v_T (\tau_{TA})}{v_A (\tau_{TA})} / d\varepsilon > 0 \), so that a higher willingness to substitute between varieties increases the probability of TA formation. Intuitively, we can think of these results working through the marginal cost cutoff for an exporter relative to a non-exporter and, in turn, the composition of firms across the anti-trade and pro-trade lobbies. Larger barriers for becoming an

---

37 Note, the reciprocity rule of equal changes in imports requires symmetric tariff reductions.

38 Indeed, free entry implies aggregate profits are fixed and thus \( v_T (\cdot) = v_A (\cdot) \) and \( -\partial v_T (\tau_{TA}) / v_A (\tau_{TA}) / \partial \tau_{TA} = 0 \).

39 In general, the anti-trade lobby in the Melitz model consists of low productivity exporting firms and non-exporting firms. The latter set of firms constitutes what one would normally think of as ‘import-competing’ firms.

40 For the ‘long-run’ cases, \( \frac{v_T (\tau_{TA})}{v_A (\tau_{TA})} = 1 \) and is independent of the parameters.

41 This relative cutoff is \( \frac{N_X}{N_D} = \left( \frac{\bar{x}_{TD}}{\bar{x}_{TD}} \right)^k \) and the relative mass of exporter to non-exporter firms is \( \frac{N_X}{N_D} = \left( \frac{\bar{x}_{TD}}{\bar{x}_{TD}} \right)^k \).
exporter (i.e. higher \( \gamma \)) make it tougher to be an exporter, thereby shifting firm composition towards non-exporters and lowering \( \frac{\nu_T(\tau_{TA})}{\nu_A(\tau_{TA})} \). A higher \( k \) skews firm composition towards low productivity firms, making it tougher to be an exporter and lowering \( \frac{\nu_T(\tau_{TA})}{\nu_A(\tau_{TA})} \). With consumers more willing to substitute between varieties (i.e. higher \( \varepsilon \)), markups fall which disproportionately hurts low productivity firms and induces exit. In turn, firm composition shifts towards high productivity export firms and raises \( \frac{\nu_T(\tau_{TA})}{\nu_A(\tau_{TA})} \). These comparative statics illustrate how one could start thinking about taking our framework to the data.

6 Conclusion

Once governments sign a TA, the ratification process in each country is often lengthy and uncertain. Illustrative examples include the TPP, US FTAs with Korea and Central America and the 1994 Uruguay Round. Motivated by these stylized facts, we develop a new two-country political economy framework with two key features. First, pro-trade and anti-trade interest groups make contributions to influence their own government’s subsequent ratification decision. Second, these interest groups recognize that the TA’s ultimate fate depends on the uncertain ratification decisions of both governments. The former feature distinguishes our contest framework from the standard approach in the trade and political economy literature where the ratification process is ignored and interest groups condition their contributions on their government’s policy decision. The latter feature distinguishes our framework from the prior contest literature by linking the outcome in one contest to the outcome in a different ‘parallel’ contest and gives rise to the new class of contests that we call ‘parallel contests’.

Regarding the level of negotiated TA tariffs, the key new insight is that the lobbying process itself drives governments towards proposing the most liberal TA possible. In turn, our framework suggests that inherent government protectionist tendencies, perhaps driven by electoral motivations as in Conconi et al. (2014), drive real world protection levels. While our view of lobbying echoes the typical non-academic view that corporate lobbying drives liberal trade policy, our view contrasts starkly with the typical view in the literature that real world protection levels balance protectionist lobbying forces against inherent government desires for national welfare improving liberalization. Nevertheless, in doing so, our alternative perspective suggests that the relatively low tariff levels observed across many countries reflects governments that place relatively large value on lobbying contributions. This offers a reconciling perspective on the empirical ‘puzzle’ whereby matching data with the benchmark Protection for Sale framework requires governments have, arguably, implausibly high degrees of welfare-mindedness.
Our explicit modeling of the political process surrounding TA formation allows the emergence of novel international political externalities that operate outside the traditional terms-of-trade channel. These externalities emerge because the probability of TA ratification depends endogenously on trade policy and lobbying intensity, and hence aggregate lobbying contributions, in each country depend on the probability of TA ratification in the other country. Thus, governments who just internalize terms-of-trade externalities will not internalize our international political externalities.

Our framework also opens the door to future research directions. Our framework predicts that the probability of TA formation increases in the strength of pro-trade interest group support relative to the strength of anti-trade interest group opposition. Given the empirical economic determinants of FTA literature spawned by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), this property can drive empirical investigation through the lens of a microfounded political economy model of FTA formation. Another useful property of our framework is that, as we show in the all-pay contest setup of the Appendix, one can make predictions about the extensive margin of lobbying: namely, the extent to which interest groups refrain from making contributions. Again, this prediction lends itself naturally to empirical investigation.

Adding more countries to our framework represents another direction for future research. In our TA context, a TA with more countries would polarize the anti-trade and pro-trade lobbies further by increasing the export market access gained and increasing the degree of import competition. All else equal, this would increase lobbying contributions. However, on the other hand, by decreasing the likelihood of each country’s TA ratification decision being pivotal, adding more countries would reduce lobbying contributions. Our framework can analyze the balance between these tensions. These tensions could also be present in an international environmental agreement like the Kyoto Protocol. Unlike our TA context, implementation of the Kyoto Protocol only required a two-thirds majority rather than unanimity, thereby creating large free riding incentives. Despite being implemented, the US, the largest CO₂ emitter, did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Our framework is well suited to analyze these free riding issues in international negotiations.

Indeed, our parallel contest framework has broad applicability. International agreements over the environment and safety (e.g. the The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) share the basic features of our setup: local interest groups contest each other to influence their government’s ratification decision knowing implementation of the agreement requires mutual ratification. A between-firm example is the collaboration between British Aerospace, MBB of West Germany, and Aeritalia of Italy to produce the Panavia Tornado fighter jet. One could imagine within-firm divergent views over the balance between collaboration among Europe’s best military aircraft producers and concerns over proprietary knowledge and/or
national security. A within-firm example is the collaboration of architectural and engineering departments of the London-based firm Arup who built The Shard. One could imagine tension within each department arising from some agents wanting to abandon The Shard in favor of other projects, yet moving ahead with The Shard requires agreement of both department heads. Interest groups contesting to influence their own decision maker and collaboration requiring approval of both decision makers ties these examples into a ‘parallel contest’.

Our framework also invites reflection on the extent of possible coordination between groups in different entities whose interests are aligned (e.g. pro-collaboration groups across firms or across departments within a firm). Our parallel contest insights inform the nature of strategic interaction between such groups who cannot perfectly coordinate whereas the well-known Colonel Blotto game does so in an environment of perfect coordination. However, an ideal framework would allow flexibility in the degree of imperfect coordination. For example, in a between-firm collaboration setting, interest groups of one firm may not be able to lobby the other firm’s decision maker but could perhaps undertake actions that make it easier for their aligned interest group in the other firm to lobby their own decision maker. An interesting question becomes whether, as the scope for ‘cross-subsidization’ rises, the predictions move from those of a parallel contest towards those of the Colonel Blotto game.

Appendix

A Proofs from main text

Proof of Proposition

\( G(\tau_{TA};\tau_{SQ}) = \hat{l}(\hat{\rho}^*(\tau_{TA}), \tau_{TA}) = \hat{\rho}^*(\tau_{TA}) \frac{1}{2} \bar{v}(\tau_{TA}) \)

given \( a = 0 \) and (6)-(8). Two observations establish the proposition. First, \( \hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) = \left[1 + \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})}\right]^{-1} \) follows from (6)-(8) and, by analogy, \( \hat{\rho}^*_T(\tau_{TA}) = \left[1 + \frac{\bar{v}^*_A(\tau_{TA})}{\bar{v}^*_T(\tau_{TA})}\right]^{-1} \). Thus, the pro-trade biased polarization property implies \( \hat{\rho}^*_T(\tau_{TA}) \) is maximized by the most liberal \( \tau_{TA} \) satisfying \( u(\tau_{TA}) \). Second, the polarization property implies \( \bar{v}(\tau_{TA}) = \left[\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} + \frac{1}{v_A(\tau_{TA})}\right)\right]^{-1} \) is maximized by the most liberal \( \tau_{TA} \) satisfying \( u(\tau_{TA}) \). Thus, \( G(\tau_{TA};\tau_{SQ}) \) and, by analogy, \( G^*(\tau_{TA};\tau_{SQ}) \) are maximized by the most liberal \( \tau_{TA} \) satisfying \( u(\tau_{TA}) \). In turn, the restriction of no import subsidies implies free trade in at least one country.
Proof of Proposition 2

**Proposition 2** Assume a reciprocity rule \( u(TA) \) that ensures a more liberal TA polarizes the lobby groups and generates pro-trade biased polarization. For sufficiently small \( a > 0 \), (i) the Home and Foreign governments propose the most liberal TA possible, implying at least one country adopts free trade, and (ii) the equilibrium probability of TA formation is again given by (14).

**Proof.** Focusing on the Home country without loss of generality, (16) says \(- \frac{\partial G(TA;\tau_{SQ})}{\partial TA} = - \frac{\partial (\rho_{l TA}(TA),\tau_{TA}\alpha=0)}{\partial TA} + a \frac{\partial \Phi(TA;\tau_{SQ})}{\partial TA}\) where (17) defines \( \Phi(TA;\tau_{SQ}) \). The proof of Proposition 1 establishes \(- \frac{\partial (\rho_{l TA}(TA),\tau_{TA}\alpha=0)}{\partial TA} > 0 \) for all \( TA \leq \tau_{SQ} \) such that \( TA \) satisfies \( u(TA) \). Thus, \( G(TA;\tau_{SQ}) \) is maximized by the most liberal TA satisfying \( u(TA) \) for sufficiently small \( a > 0 \) if \( \lim_{a \to 0} \frac{\partial \Phi(TA;\tau_{SQ})}{\partial TA} \neq \infty \). Note that

\[
\frac{\partial \Phi(\cdot)}{\partial TA} = -\Delta h(\cdot) \left[ \frac{\partial \hat{\rho}^*(TA)}{\partial TA} \hat{T} + \frac{\partial \hat{\rho}^*(TA)}{\partial TA} \right] - a \frac{\partial \hat{T}(\cdot; a = 0)}{\partial TA} \hat{T}(\cdot) - a \frac{\partial h^*(\cdot; a = 0)}{\partial TA} \hat{h}(\cdot)
\]

where \( \hat{l}_i(\cdot; a = 0) \), \( \hat{l}_i^*(\cdot; a = 0) \), \( h_i(\cdot) \), \( h_i^*(\cdot) \) \( \in \mathbb{R} \) for \( i \in \{ A, T \} \) and independent of \( a \). Further, \( \hat{l}_i(\cdot) \), \( \hat{l}_i^*(\cdot) \) \( > 0 \) for \( i \in \{ A, T \} \) and for any \( a \geq 0 \). Combined with \( \frac{\partial h_i(\cdot; a = 0)}{\partial TA} \), \( \frac{\partial h_i^*(\cdot; a = 0)}{\partial TA} \), \( \frac{\partial \hat{T}(\cdot)}{\partial TA} \), \( \frac{\partial \hat{h}(\cdot)}{\partial TA} \in \mathbb{R} \). In turn, \( \lim_{a \to 0} \frac{\partial \Phi(\cdot)}{\partial TA} = 0 \). Hence, for sufficiently small \( a > 0 \), \( G(TA;\tau_{SQ}) \) is maximized by the most liberal TA satisfying \( u(TA) \). The restriction of no import subsidies implies free trade in at least one country.

Finally, substituting (13)-(14) into (12), and remembering \( s_i = l_i + a h_i \), establishes \( \hat{\rho}_T(TA) = \left[ 1 + \frac{\nu_A(TA)}{\nu_T(TA)} \right]^{-1} \) and, by analogy, \( \hat{\rho}_T^*(TA) = \left[ 1 + \frac{\nu_A(TA)}{\nu_T^*(TA)} \right]^{-1} \).
B Microfounded Contest Success Function

B.1 Typical discrete choice setup

An agent needs to choose between two alternatives. The utility from choice $i = 1, 2$ is given by

$$u_i = x_i + \varepsilon_i.$$ 

The random disturbances $\varepsilon_i$ follow the Type I Extreme Value distribution (i.e. Gumbel distribution)

$$\varepsilon_i \overset{iid}{\sim} EV (\mu, \sigma)$$

where $\mu \in \mathbb{R}$ is the location parameter, $\sigma > 0$ is a scale parameter and $\mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_i) = \mu + \sigma \gamma$ where $\gamma$ is Euler’s constant. So, $\varepsilon_i$ is a mean zero disturbance as long as $\sigma = -\frac{\mu}{\gamma}$.

The agent chooses alternative 1 if and only if $u_1 > u_2$. Thus, the probability that the agent chooses alternative 1 is

$$\Pr(u_1 > u_2) = \Pr(x_1 + \varepsilon_1 > x_2 + \varepsilon_2)$$

$$= \Pr(x_1 - x_2 > \varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_1)$$

$$= \frac{\exp(x_1)}{\exp(x_1) + \exp(x_2)}.$$

B.2 Contest application

Suppose that, given $l_A$ and $l_T$, the government ratifies the TA if and only if $\bar{G}_T > \bar{G}_A$ where

$$\bar{G}_T = \ln(l_T) + \varepsilon_T$$

$$\bar{G}_A = \ln(l_A) + \varepsilon_A$$

with

$$\varepsilon_i \overset{iid}{\sim} EV (\mu, \sigma) \text{ for } i = A, T.$$

Note that, given the government has already received the lobbying contributions, the only logical reason why the government departs from a choice rule of $\varepsilon_T \leq \varepsilon_A$ is because of some unmodelled repeated interaction between the government and the lobbies. In any case, the $\varepsilon$ disturbances capture randomness in the way that the government values contributions from each lobby (e.g. the extent to which media reporting paints trade in a positive or negative

---

42The Extreme Value distribution is actually $GEV (\mu, \sigma, \xi)$ with various parameter restrictions generating Type I (i.e. Gumbel), Type II (i.e. Fréchet) and Type III (Weibull) Extreme Value distributions. The restriction for Gumbel is $\xi = 0$. 

---

38
Thus,

\[ \rho_T = \Pr \left( \tilde{G}_T > \tilde{G}_A \right) \]

\[ = \Pr \left( \ln (l_T) - \ln (l_A) > \varepsilon_A - \varepsilon_T \right) \]

\[ = \frac{\exp(\ln (l_T))}{\exp(\ln (l_T)) + \exp(\ln (l_A))} \]

\[ = \frac{l_T}{l_T + l_A}. \]

In turn, the lobbying outcomes in stage 2 of our baseline analysis are unchanged in this microfounded setup because the functional form of \( \rho_T \) is unchanged.

This setup can be generalized to the case where \( a > 0 \). Now let

\[ \tilde{G}_T = \ln (s_T) + \varepsilon_T \]

\[ \tilde{G}_A = \ln (s_A) + \varepsilon_A \]

so that

\[ \rho_T = \Pr \left( \tilde{G}_T > \tilde{G}_A \right) \]

\[ = \frac{s_T}{s_T + s_A}. \]

Again, the lobbying outcomes in stage 2 of our baseline analysis with \( a > 0 \) are unchanged in this microfounded setup because the functional form of \( \rho_T \) is unchanged.

Now consider stage 1. The government’s expected payoff is

\[ \mathbb{E}(G) = \rho_T \rho_T^* \mathbb{E}(G_T) + (1 - \rho_T \rho_T^*) \mathbb{E}(G_A) \]

where

\[ G_T = \ln (l_T + l_A + ah_T) + \varepsilon_T \]

\[ G_A = \ln (l_T + l_A + ah_A) + \varepsilon_A. \]

When \( a = 0 \), this reduces to

\[ \mathbb{E}(G) = \ln (l_T + l_A) \]

which is merely a monotonic transformation of \( \mathbb{E}(G) = l_T + l_A \) in our baseline analysis. Hence, the optimal TA tariffs are unchanged from our baseline analysis with \( a = 0 \).
When \( a > 0 \), things are not so straightforward. Now,

\[
\mathbb{E}(G) = \rho_T \ln (l_T + l_A + ah_T) + (1 - \rho_T) \ln (l_T + l_A + ah_A) \quad (30)
\]

\[
\neq \ln (l_T + l_A) + \rho_T \ln (ah_T) + (1 - \rho_T) \ln (ah_A). \quad (31)
\]

The forces we identified in the main text remain but the way they trade off is somewhat different. Following the approach in (30) rather than the approach we actually follow in (31) would sacrifice comparability of our model with the prior literature.

C. The Extensive Margin of a TA Contest

In our Tullock contest setting, i.e. \( r = 1 \), only the intensive margin of lobbying appeared. However, moving to an all-pay contest by letting \( r \to \infty \) introduces the extensive margin of lobbying because interest groups may refrain from making contributions in equilibrium. Letting \( r \to \infty \) and using (1):

\[
\rho_T = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } s_T < s_A \\
1 & \text{if } s_T > s_A \\
\rho \in (0, 1) & \text{if } s_T = s_A
\end{cases}
\]

We now investigate various forms of our parallel all-pay contest.

The ‘all-pay contest’ literature builds on the ‘all-pay auction’ literature by generalizing the cost function of a bid/contribution beyond the bid/contribution itself. Hillman and Samet (1987), Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996) pioneered the all-pay auction literature to model rent-seeking and lobbying activities. For example, Hillman (2013) argues unilateral trade policy can be viewed as an all-pay auction. Siegel (2009, 2010, 2014) develops the theory of all-pay contests by allowing the cost of contributions to vary across players. This generalization allows some players to have a ‘head start’ over others.

C.1 All pay auctions: no head starts

In the absence of head starts, \( s_i = l_i \), the all pay contest reduces to an all pay auction and their equilibrium characterization was developed by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996). As described in the main text, the standard solution techniques and theorems used therein apply in our parallel contest because the preferences underlying the expected payoff functions are identical to those in a standard all pay auction where the exogenous valuations are given by our exogenous ‘effective’ valuations \( \tilde{v}_i(T-T_A) \).
As is well known in the literature, the standard all pay auction has no pure strategy equilibrium. Intuitively, given the deterministic nature of the Home government’s TA ratification decision, Home lobbies only want to contribute if they are successful in swaying the Home government’s ratification decision. That is, fixing the positive probability of Foreign ratification, each Home lobby prefers not contributing rather than making a contribution arbitrarily lower than the other lobby because any such contribution does not sway the Home government’s ratification decision. However, in turn, the lobby that succeeds in swaying the government’s decision will make an arbitrarily small contribution. The lack of a pure strategy equilibrium now becomes clear because the so-called ‘unsuccessful’ lobby benefits from becoming the ‘successful’ lobby through a contribution slightly above the arbitrarily small contribution of the other lobby. As a result, the Nash equilibrium of the all pay auction is a mixed strategy equilibrium where lobbies randomize uniformly over an interval.

Because these randomization strategies depend on the valuation structure, we now build our discussion around the valuation structure.

C.1.1 Homogenous valuations: \( v_T(T_A) = v_A(T_A) \)

In Stage 2, each lobby randomizes its contributions uniformly over \([0, \tilde{v}(T_A)]\) or, equivalently, over \([0, \rho^T v(T_A)]\) where \( v(T_A) = v_T(T_A) = v_A(T_A) \). While no lobby benefits from contributing above their effective valuation \( \tilde{v}(T_A) \), lobby competition forces the upper bound of their contribution to \( \tilde{v}(T_A) \). Moreover, two observations imply each lobby’s lower bound contribution is zero. First, the lobbies must have equal lower bound contributions because otherwise the lobby with the larger lower bound could benefit by reducing their lower bound. Second, given equal lower bound contributions, a lobby’s lower bound contribution never sways the government’s ratification decision and hence the lower bound must be zero. Thus, ultimately, the interval \([0, \tilde{v}(T_A)]\) characterizes the intensive margin of lobbying. Moreover, given the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, the extensive margin plays no role in equilibrium. Formally, letting \( \alpha_i \) denote the probability that \( l_i = 0 \), we have \( \hat{\alpha}_A = \hat{\alpha}_T = 0 \) in equilibrium.

In Stage 1, government incentives for setting TA tariffs match those described earlier. Given the absence of head starts, the Home government’s expected payoff is merely the expected equilibrium aggregate lobbying contributions \( \mathbb{E}\left[ l(\hat{\rho}_T(\cdot), T_A) \right] = \hat{\rho}_T(\cdot) v(T_A) \).

But, the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium implies \( \hat{\rho}_T(\cdot) = \hat{\rho}_T^*(\cdot) = \frac{1}{2} \) and, in turn, \( \mathbb{E}\left[ l(\hat{\rho}_T(\cdot), T_A) \right] = \frac{1}{2} v(T_A) \). Thus, we only need the assumption that trade liberalization polarizes lobby groups to ensure that the most liberal TA possible maximizes lobbying contributions received by governments. Intuitively, because homogeneous valuations pins down \( \frac{v_T(T_A)}{v_A(T_A)} \) as constant, we no longer need the pro-trade biased polarization assumption that we
needed in the Tullock contest setting. Thus, we see that our results in Propositions 1 - 2 of the main text are robust to the all pay auction homogenous valuation setting.

C.1.2 Heterogenous valuations: 

Without loss of generality, we now assume \( v_T(\tau_{TA}) > v_A(\tau_{TA}) \). This heterogeneity assumption is consistent with our polarization and pro-trade biased polarization properties whereby a more liberal TA increases \( v_T(\tau_{TA}), v_A(\tau_{TA}) \) and also \( \frac{v_T(\tau_{TA})}{v_A(\tau_{TA})} \).

In Stage 2, both lobbies randomize their contributions uniformly over \([0, \tilde{v}_A(\tau_{TA})]\) or, equivalently, over \([0, \rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA})]\). As the low valuation lobby, \( L_A \) never contributes above its effective valuation \( \rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA}) \). Thus, despite its higher effective valuation, \( L_T \) never benefits from bidding above \( L_A \)'s effective valuation when trying to sway the government’s ratification decision. The same logic from the homogeneous valuations case implies each lobby’s lower bound contribution remains zero. Thus, the interval \([0, \rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA})]\) characterizes the intensive margin of lobbying.

The symmetric lobbying strategies at the intensive margin combined with the asymmetric lobby valuations generate an extensive margin of lobbying. Intuitively, as the low valuation lobby, \( L_A \) refrains from lobbying and more so as the relative valuation of the pro-trade lobby rises. Specifically, \( \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}) = 1 - \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \) while \( \hat{\alpha}_T = 0 \). Combining this extensive lobbying margin with the intensive lobbying margin where the government ratifies the TA with probability \( \frac{1}{2} \) conditional on both lobbies contributing, the unconditional probability of Home ratification is

\[
\hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) = \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}) + [1 - \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA})] \frac{1}{2} = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})}.
\]

(32)

In Stage 1, this extensive margin of lobbying has an important impact on government preferences over TA tariffs. Expected equilibrium aggregate contributions are

\[
\mathbb{E}\left[\hat{l}(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA})\right] = \frac{1}{2} \rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA}) \left[1 + \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})}\right].
\]

(33)

Like earlier, these contributions are proportional to \( \rho_T^* \). But, unlike earlier, the proportionality with respect to \( v_A(\tau_{TA}) \) now reflects the common upper bound on valuations. In any case, our polarization and pro-trade biased polarization properties ensure the most liberal TA maximizes both of these components. But, the square bracketed term says, all else equal, contributions are decreasing in \( \frac{v_T(\tau_{TA})}{v_A(\tau_{TA})} \). Thus, here, pro-trade biased polarization says a more liberal TA hurts the government’s expected payoff by increasing the probability that \( L_T \) refrains from contributing. That is, the extensive margin of lobbying introduced by the
heterogeneous valuations all pay auction interferes with the processes that would otherwise lead to the most liberal possible TA.

Nevertheless, in reasonable situations, the impact of a more liberal TA increasing the probability of Foreign TA ratification via pro-trade biased polarization outweighs the impact of a more liberal TA reducing the probability of $L_T$ refraining from contributing. Specifically, letting $\nu(\tau_{TA}) \equiv \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} < 1$ and $\nu^*(\tau_{TA}) \equiv \frac{v_A^*(\tau_{TA})}{v_T^*(\tau_{TA})} < 1$,

\[ -\frac{\partial}{\partial \tau_{TA}} f(\nu(\tau_{TA}), \nu^*(\tau_{TA})) = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial \nu^*(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} [1 + \nu(\tau_{TA})] - \frac{1 - \frac{1}{2} \nu^*(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \nu^*(\tau_{TA})} > 0 \]

With symmetric countries, this condition merely reduces to $\nu^*(\tau_{TA}) = \nu(\tau_{TA}) > \frac{1}{2}$. An analogous condition for the Foreign country’s TA ratification decision is $f(\nu(\tau_{TA}), \nu^*(\tau_{TA})) = \frac{2 - \nu(\tau_{TA})}{1 + \nu(\tau_{TA})} < \frac{\partial \nu(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \nu^*(\tau_{TA})}$. Thus, $\frac{\partial \nu(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \nu^*(\tau_{TA})} \in (f(\cdot), f^*(\cdot))$ is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for a more liberal TA to increase lobbying contributions in the Home and Foreign countries, and hence for the most liberal TA to be the equilibrium TA. This sufficient condition can fail among symmetric countries when lobbies within a country are widely asymmetric ($\nu^*(\tau_{TA}) = \nu(\tau_{TA}) < \frac{1}{2}$) or among widely asymmetric countries. Proposition 3 summarizes our discussion.

**Proposition 3** Assume $r \to \infty$ and a reciprocity rule $u(\tau_{TA})$ that ensures a more liberal TA polarizes the lobby groups and generates pro-trade biased polarization. Further, for heterogeneous valuations, assume $\frac{\partial \nu(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \nu^*(\tau_{TA})} \in (f(\cdot), f^*(\cdot))$ where $f(\cdot)$ is defined by (34). Then, in equilibrium, (i) the extensive margin of lobbying is given by $\hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}) = 1 - \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})}$ and $\hat{\alpha}_T = 0$, (ii) aggregate expected lobbying contributions are $\frac{1}{2} \hat{\beta}_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA}) \left[ 1 + \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right]$ and $\hat{\beta}_T = 0$, (iii) the probability of TA formation is $\hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) \hat{\rho}_T^*(\tau_{TA}) = \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right] \cdot \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A^*(\tau_{TA})}{v_T^*(\tau_{TA})} \right]$, and (iv) the Home and Foreign governments propose the most liberal TA possible, denoted $\hat{\tau}_{TA}$, implying at least one country adopts free trade.

**Proof.** First, consider the homogenous valuations case of $v_A(\tau_{TA}) = v_T(\tau_{TA}) \equiv v(\tau_{TA})$, and $v_A^*(\tau_{TA}) = v_T^*(\tau_{TA}) \equiv v^*(\tau_{TA})$:

(i) Follows from Theorem 1 in Baye et al. (1996), noting that homogeneous valuations imply $\hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}) = 1 - \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} = 0$.

(ii) Given homogenous valuations, $E \left[ \hat{L}(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}) \right] = \frac{1}{2} \hat{\beta}_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA}) \left[ 1 + \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right] = \hat{\beta}_T^* v(\tau_{TA})$.

By Theorem 1 in Baye et al. (1996) and (i) above, $\hat{L}_i(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}) \sim [0, \hat{v}(\tau_{TA})]$ for $i \in
\{A, T\} where \( \tilde{\nu}(\tau_{TA}) = \rho^*_T v(\tau_{TA}) \). Thus, \( \mathbb{E}[\hat{l}_i(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA})] = \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\nu}(\tau_{TA}) = \frac{1}{2} \rho^*_T v(\tau_{TA}) \) for \( i \in \{A, T\} \). In turn, \( \mathbb{E}[\hat{l}_i(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA})] = \tilde{\nu}(\tau_{TA}) = \rho^*_T v(\tau_{TA}) \).

(iii) Given homogenous valuations, \( \hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) \hat{\rho}^*(\tau_{TA}) = \left[ 1 - \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{2 v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right] \left[ 1 - \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{2 v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right] = \frac{1}{4} \).

Further, \( \hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) = \Pr(l_T > l_A) = \frac{1}{2} \) and, analogously, \( \hat{\rho}^*_T(\tau_{TA}) = \Pr(l^*_T > l^*_A) = \frac{1}{2} \) because \( \hat{l}_i(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}) \sim [0, \tilde{\nu}(\tau_{TA})] \) and \( \hat{l}^*_i(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}) \sim [0, \tilde{\nu}^*(\tau_{TA})] \) for \( i \in \{A, T\} \).

(iv) Focusing on the Home country without loss of generality, \( G(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = \mathbb{E}[\hat{l}(\hat{\rho}^*_T(\tau_{TA}); \tau_{TA})] = \rho^*_T(\tau_{TA}) v(\tau_{TA}) \) given \( a = 0 \). Because \( \hat{\rho}^*_T(\tau_{TA}) \) is independent of \( \tau_{TA} \), the polarization property implies \( G(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) is maximized by the most liberal TA that satisfies \( u(\tau_{TA}) \). The restriction of no import subsidies implies free trade in at least one country.

Second, consider heterogeneous valuations:

(i) Follows from Theorem 3 in Baye et al. (1996).

(ii) By Theorem 3 in Baye et al. (1996), \( \hat{l}_T(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}) \sim [0, \tilde{\nu}_A(\tau_{TA})] = [0, \rho^*_T v_A(\tau_{TA})] \) while \( \hat{l}_A(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}) \sim [0, \tilde{\nu}_A(\tau_{TA})] = [0, \rho^*_T v_A(\tau_{TA})] \) with probability \( \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}) \) and \( \hat{l}_A(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}) = 0 \) with probability \( 1 - \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}) \). In turn, \( \mathbb{E}[\hat{l}(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA})] = \frac{1}{2} \rho^*_T v_A(\tau_{TA}) + (1 - \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA})) \frac{1}{2} \rho^*_T v_A(\tau_{TA}) = \frac{1}{2} \rho^*_T v_A(\tau_{TA}) \left[ 1 + \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right] \).

(iii) Note the common support when \( L_A \) and \( L_T \) lobby and that ratification requires \( l_T > 0 \). Thus, \( \hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) = \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA})(1 - \hat{\alpha}_T) + \frac{1}{2} (1 - \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}))(1 - \hat{\alpha}_T) \). In turn, \( \hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) = \left( 1 - \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \). And, analogously, \( \hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \).

(iv) Given (33) combined with the polarization property and (34), we have \( -\frac{\partial G(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0 \) and \( -\frac{\partial G^*(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0 \) for all \( \tau_{TA} \leq \tau_{SQ} \). Thus, the most liberal TA satisfying \( u(\tau_{TA}) \) maximizes \( G(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) and \( G^*(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \). The restriction of no import subsidies implies free trade in at least one country.

\[\Box\]

C.2 All pay contests: head starts

When lobby groups have head starts, the government’s ratification decision in Stage 3 depends on the augmented contributions \( s_i = l_i + ah_i(\cdot) \). Effectively, head starts subsidize the cost of augmented contributions \( s_i \) (the cost is merely \( l_i \)) and distinguish the all pay contest from an all pay auction. Drawing on novel techniques developed by Siegel (2009).
of Home ratification remains tantalantly, the adjustment at the intensive margin perfectly reflects these effects: the probability this contribution rises, and the associated payoff falls, by via a contribution that guarantees Home ratification. But, given the anti-trade head start, for the highest payoffs that lobbies can guarantee themselves. For $L_A$, as in the absence of head starts, this zero payoff comes by not contributing. For $L_T$, as in the absence of head starts with $\rho_T v_T (\tau_{TA}) > \rho_T v_A (\tau_{TA})$, this payoff still comes via a contribution that guarantees Home ratification. But, given the anti-trade head start, this contribution rises, and the associated payoff falls, by $-\Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) > 0$. Importantly, the adjustment at the intensive margin perfectly reflects these effects: the probability of Home ratification remains $\frac{1}{2}$ with $L_A$’s expected contributions remaining unchanged but $L_T$’s expected contributions rising by $-\Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) > 0$. Thus anti-trade head starts impact the intensive margin but not the extensive margin so that, in turn, TA ratification probabilities (in Stage 3) and the equilibrium TA (in Stage 1) mirror our earlier analysis.

Second, consider the impact of pro-trade head starts $a \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) > 0$ in Stage 2. At the intensive margin, as the low valuation lobby facing a net head start disadvantage, $L_A$ adjusts its lower bound upward to compete with $L_T$’s zero contribution and, thus, randomizes over $[a \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}), \rho_T v_A]$. Further, because of its head start advantage, $L_T$ adjusts its upper bound downwards to compete against $L_A$’s highest contribution and, thus, randomizes over $[0, \rho_T v_A - a \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})]$. For the impact at the extensive margin, notice that the increase in $L_A$’s expected contribution implies that, absent any adjustment at the extensive margin, it would benefit from not contributing and ensuring a zero payoff. The required adjustments at the extensive margin imply $\hat{\alpha}_A (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = 1 - \frac{v_A (\tau_{TA})}{v_T (\tau_{TA})} \left[ 1 - \frac{a \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\rho_T v_A (\tau_{TA})} \right]$ and $\hat{\alpha}_T (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = \frac{a \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\rho_T v_A (\tau_{TA})}$ so that these adjustments rise with the size of the pro-trade head start $a \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})$. Proposition 4 summarizes this discussion.

**Proposition 4** Assume $r \to \infty$ and a reciprocity rule $u (\tau_{TA})$ that ensures a more liberal TA polarizes the lobby groups and generates pro-trade biased polarization. Further, assume $\frac{\partial v (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} / \frac{\partial v (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \in (f (\cdot), f^* (\cdot))$ where $f (\cdot)$ is defined by (34). Then, in equilibrium,

---

[43]This latter assumption implies $L_A$ is the ‘marginal’ lobby in Siegel’s terminology.
(i) the extensive margin of lobbying is given by 
\[ \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}) = 1 - \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \text{ and } \hat{\alpha}_T(\tau_{TA}) = 0 \]
when \( a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) < 0 \) but 
\[ \hat{\alpha}_A(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = 1 - \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \left[ 1 - \frac{a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\rho^*_T v_A(\tau_{TA})} \right] \]
and
\[ \hat{\alpha}_T(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = \frac{a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\rho^*_T v_A(\tau_{TA})} \] when \( a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) > 0; \)

(ii) expected aggregate contributions differ from those when \( a = 0 \) by \( a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}); \)

(iii) the probability of Home TA ratification (and analogously for Foreign) is 
\[ \hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \] when \( a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) < 0 \) but \( \hat{\rho}_T(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\rho^*_T v_A(\tau_{TA})} \right)^2 \right] \)
when \( a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) > 0; \)

(iv) for sufficiently small \( a > 0 \), the Home and Foreign governments propose the most liberal TA possible, denoted \( \hat{\tau}_{TA} \), implying that at least one country adopts free trade.

**Proof.** First, consider the anti-trade head start case, \( a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) < 0. \)

(i) Follows from the algorithm in [Siegel (2014)].

(ii) Following the algorithm in [Siegel (2014)], 
\[ \hat{l}_T(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \sim [-a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})], \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}) \]
where \( \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}) = \rho^*_T v_A(\tau_{TA}) \) while \( \hat{l}_A(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \sim [0, \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA})] \)
with probability \( \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}) \) and \( \hat{l}_A(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = 0 \) with probability \( 1 - \hat{\alpha}_A(\rho^*_T) \). Thus,
\[ \mathbb{E} \left[ \hat{l}(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \right] = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \rho^*_T v_A(\tau_{TA}) - 2a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \right] + (1 - \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA})) \frac{1}{2} \rho^*_T v_A \]
\[ = \frac{1}{2} \rho^*_T v_A(\tau_{TA}) \left[ 1 + \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right] - a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}). \]

(iii) When lobbying with positive probability, (i) above establishes that \( \hat{l}_A(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) and \( \hat{l}_T(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) have common support and, hence, so do \( \hat{s}_A(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) and \( \hat{s}_T(\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \). Thus, \( \hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) = \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA}) [1 - \hat{\alpha}_T(\tau_{TA})] + \frac{1}{2} [1 - \hat{\alpha}_A(\tau_{TA})] [1 - \hat{\alpha}_T(\tau_{TA})] \) given \( \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) < 0 \) and that ratification requires \( l_T > 0 \). In turn,
\[ \hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA}) = \left( 1 - \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})}. \]

(iv) Given (ii) above, equations [(16)-(18)] apply as in the main text. Focusing on the Home country’s perspective without loss of generality and combining \( \frac{\partial \hat{\rho}_T(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \), \( \frac{\partial \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \) \( \in \mathbb{R} \) and independent of \( a \) with the logic from the proof of Proposition 2(iii), we have \( \lim_{a \to 0} \frac{\partial \Phi(\cdot)}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \in \mathbb{R} \). In turn, \( \lim_{a \to 0} \frac{\partial \Phi(\cdot)}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = 0. \) Further, note that \( -\frac{\partial (\rho^*_T(\tau_{TA}), \tau_{TA}; a = 0)}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0 \).
0 for all \( \tau_{TA} \leq \tau_{SQ} \) such that \( \tau_{TA} \) satisfies \( u(\tau_{TA}) \). Thus, for sufficiently small \( a > 0 \), \( G(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) and \( G^*(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) are maximized by the most liberal TA satisfying \( u(\tau_{TA}) \), denoted \( \tau_{TA}^* \), when \( \frac{\partial u(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = \frac{\partial u^*(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \in (f(\cdot), f^*(\cdot)) \). The restriction of no import subsidies implies free trade in at least one country.

Second, consider the pro-trade head start case, \( a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) > 0 \).

(i) Follows from the algorithm in Siegel (2014).

(ii) Following the algorithm in Siegel (2014), \( \hat{\rho}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \sim [0, \tilde{v}_A(\tau_{TA}) - a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})] \)
where \( \tilde{v}_A(\tau_{TA}) = \rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA}) \) with probability \( 1 - \hat{\alpha}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) and \( \hat{\rho}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = 0 \) with probability \( \hat{\alpha}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) while \( \hat{\rho}_A(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \sim [a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})] \) \( \tilde{v}_A(\tau_{TA}) \) with probability \( \hat{\alpha}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) and \( \hat{\rho}_A(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = 0 \) with probability \( 1 - \hat{\alpha}_T(\cdot) \).

Thus,
\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \hat{l}(\cdot) \right] = \frac{1}{2} [\rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA}) - 2a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})] + [1 - \hat{\alpha}_A(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})] \frac{1}{2} \rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA})
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2} \rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA}) \left[ 1 + \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{v_T(\tau_{TA})} \right] - a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}).
\]

(iii) Given \( \hat{l}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) and \( \hat{l}_A(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) when lobbying with positive probability from (ii) above,
\[
\hat{s}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \sim [ah_T(\tau_{TA}) + \rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA}) + ah_A(\tau_{SQ})], \text{ and}
\]
\[
\hat{s}_A(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \sim [ah_T(\tau_{TA}) + \rho_T^* v_A + ah_A(\tau_{SQ})]
\]
have common support. Thus, \( \hat{\rho}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = \hat{\alpha}_A(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) [1 - \hat{\alpha}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})] + \frac{1}{2} [1 - \hat{\alpha}_A(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})] [1 - \hat{\alpha}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})] \) given \( \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) > 0 \) and that ratification requires \( l_T > 0 \). In turn,
\[
\hat{\rho}_T(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = 1 - \frac{v_A(\tau_{TA})}{2 v_T(\tau_{TA})} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{a \Delta h(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\rho_T^* v_A(\tau_{TA})} \right)^2 \right]
\]
\[
\hat{\rho}_A(\rho_T^*, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = 1 - \frac{v_A^*(\tau_{TA})}{2 v_T^*(\tau_{TA})} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{a \Delta h^*(\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\rho_T^* v_A^*(\tau_{TA})} \right)^2 \right].
\]

(iv) Given (ii) above, equations (16)-(18) apply as in the main text. Here, we focus on the Home country’s perspective without loss of generality. Given \( \hat{\rho}_T^*(\rho_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \), then
\( \hat{\rho}_T (\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) is an implicit function. Thus, letting

\[
f(\cdot) = \hat{\rho}_T (\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) - 1 + \frac{1}{2} v_A (\tau_{TA}) \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{a \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\hat{\rho}_T^* (\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) v_A (\tau_{TA})} \right)^2 \right],
\]

we have

\[
\frac{\partial f(\cdot)}{\partial \rho_T} = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A (\tau_{TA})}{v_T (\tau_{TA})} \frac{v_A^* (\tau_{TA})}{v_A (\tau_{TA})} \left( \frac{a \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{v_A (\tau_{TA})} \right)^2 \left( \frac{a \Delta h^* (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{v_A^* (\tau_{TA})} \right)^2 \frac{1}{\hat{\rho}_T^* (\cdot)^4 \hat{\rho}_T (\cdot)^3}
\]

and, given \( \lim_{a \to 0} \hat{\rho}_T (\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) = \lim_{a \to 0} \hat{\rho}_T (\rho^*_T, \tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) > 0 \), we have \( \lim_{a \to 0} \frac{\partial f(\cdot)}{\partial \rho_T} = 1 \). Further,

\[
\frac{\partial f(\cdot)}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A (\tau_{TA})}{v_T (\tau_{TA})} \frac{v_A^* (\tau_{TA})}{v_A (\tau_{TA})} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{a \Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})}{\hat{\rho}_T^* (\cdot) v_A (\tau_{TA})} \right)^2 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \frac{v_A (\tau_{TA})}{v_T (\tau_{TA})} \frac{v_A^* (\tau_{TA})}{v_A (\tau_{TA})} \left( \frac{a}{\hat{\rho}_T^* (\cdot)} \right)^2 \frac{\partial [\Delta h (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ})/v_T (\tau_{TA})]}{\partial \tau_{TA}}
\]

where \( \lim_{a \to 0} \frac{\partial f(\cdot)}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial [v_A (\tau_{TA})/v_T (\tau_{TA})]}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \). Thus, by the implicit function theorem,

\[
\frac{\partial \rho_T}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = -\frac{\partial f(\cdot)/\partial \tau_{TA}}{\partial f(\cdot)/\partial \rho_T} = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial [v_A (\tau_{TA})]}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \frac{\partial [v_A (\tau_{TA})]}{\partial \rho_T},
\]

where \( \lim_{a \to 0} \frac{\partial f(\cdot)}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = 0 \) and \( \lim_{a \to 0} a \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = 0 \). Further, note that \( -\frac{\partial \Phi (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{TA}; a=0)}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0 \) for all \( \tau_{TA} \leq \tau_{SQ} \) such that \( \tau_{TA} \) satisfies \( u (\tau_{TA}) \). Hence, for sufficiently small \( a > 0 \), \( G (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) and, by analogous logic, \( G^* (\tau_{TA}; \tau_{SQ}) \) are maximized by the most liberal TA satisfying \( u (\tau_{TA}) \), denoted \( \tilde{\tau}_{TA} \), when \( \frac{\partial u (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \bigg|_{\tau_{TA}=\tilde{\tau}_{TA}} \in (f (\cdot), f^* (\cdot)) \). The restriction of no import subsidies implies free trade in at least one country.

\[ \blacksquare \]

### D Examples of particular underlying trade models

In this section, we illustrate how the generality of our contest framework allows for a variety of popular trade models, including general equilibrium and partial equilibrium specific factors models, the oligopoly model and the Melitz model.
D.1 Specific Factors Models

D.1.1 General equilibrium model

Consider two sectors, $X$ and $Y$, produced using labor and a specific factor $\bar{K}_X$ and $\bar{K}_Y$ respectively. Formally, $X = F (L_X, \bar{K}_X)$ and $Y = G (L_Y, \bar{K}_Y)$ subject to the full employment condition $L = L_X + L_Y$ where (i) $F_L > 0$ and $G_L > 0$, (ii) $F_{LL} < 0$ and $G_{LL} < 0$ and (iii) $F_{KL} > 0$ and $G_{KL} > 0$ with the subscripts $K$ and $L$ denoting partial derivatives.

Profit maximization by firms gives the following equilibrium factor price conditions:

$$w_X = p_X F_L, \quad r_X = p_X F_K, \quad w_Y = p_Y G_L$$

and $r_Y = p_Y G_K$ where the subscripts $X$ and $Y$ denote the sector. Labor mobility also implies wage equalization, so without loss of generality, suppose the Home country imports good $Y$. Then, for any variable $Y$, the sector. Labor mobility also implies wage equalization, so $w_X = w_Y$ and, in turn, $h (p_X, p_Y, L_X) \equiv p_X F_L (L_X, \bar{K}_X) - p_Y G_L (L - L_X, \bar{K}_Y) = 0$. Thus,

$$\frac{\partial L_X}{\partial p_X} = - \frac{\partial h/\partial p_X}{\partial h/\partial L_X} = - \frac{F_L}{p_X F_{LL} + p_Y G_{LL}} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial L_X}{\partial p_Y} = - \frac{\partial h/\partial p_Y}{\partial h/\partial L_X} = \frac{G_L}{p_X F_{LL} + p_Y G_{LL}} < 0.$$

What are the impacts of tariffs on real factor incomes for the specific factors? Without loss of generality, suppose the Home country imports good $X$. Then, assuming the Home country is small, the local price is $p_X = p_X^* + \tau$ where $p_X^*$ is the world price of good $X$ and $\tau$ is the specific tariff. Then, for any variable $z$, we have $\frac{dz}{d\tau} = \frac{dz}{dp_X} \frac{dp_X}{d\tau} = \frac{dz}{dp_X}$. In turn, we have:

$$\begin{align*}
\frac{d\gamma_X}{dp_X} &= F_{KL} \frac{\partial L_X}{\partial p_X} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{d\gamma_Y}{dp_X} = \frac{dF_K}{dp_X} \frac{p_X}{p_Y} + F_K \frac{1}{p_Y} > 0 \quad (35) \\
\frac{d\gamma_Y}{dp_X} &= G_{KL} \frac{\partial L_Y}{\partial p_X} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{d\gamma_X}{dp_X} = \frac{dG_K}{dp_X} \frac{p_Y}{p_X} - G_K \frac{1}{p_X p_Y} < 0. \quad (36)
\end{align*}$$

Note, these results hold for any marginal tariff reduction. Hence, consider a tariff reduction from $\tau_0$ to $\tau_1$. And, without loss of generality given (35)-(36), let the exportable good $Y$ be the numeraire and choose its units of measurement so that $p_Y^* = 1$. Then, the real income changes associated with a TA are $v_T = \bar{K}_Y \cdot (r_Y (\tau_1) - r_Y (\tau_0)) > 0$ and $v_A = \bar{K}_X \cdot (r_X (\tau_0) - r_X (\tau_1)) > 0$. Finally, fixing $\tau_0$, $v_T$ and $v_A$ are decreasing in $\tau_1$ which establishes our polarization property.

Note that, in the limit as $\tau_1 - \tau_0$ gets arbitrarily small, we have (letting good $Y$ be the numeraire) $v_T = -\bar{K}_Y \frac{\partial G_K}{\partial p_X} > 0$ and $v_A = \bar{K}_X \frac{\partial (p_X F_K)}{\partial p_X} > 0$. For our pro-trade biased
polarization property, we want to show $\frac{\partial \nu_T}{\partial p_X} < 0$:

$$\frac{\partial \nu_T}{\partial p_X} \propto \frac{\partial v_A}{\partial p_X} - \frac{\partial v_A}{\partial p_X} v_T < 0$$

$$\Rightarrow -K_Y \frac{\partial^2 G_K}{\partial p_X^2} \frac{\partial (p_X F_K)}{\partial p_X} + \frac{\partial^2 (p_X F_K)}{\partial p_X^2} \cdot -K_Y \frac{\partial G_K}{\partial p_X} < 0$$

$$\Rightarrow - \frac{\partial G_K}{\partial p_X} \left[ \frac{\partial^2 G_K}{\partial p_X^2} \right]^{-1} > - \frac{\partial (p_X F_K)}{\partial p_X} \left[ \frac{\partial^2 (p_X F_K)}{\partial p_X^2} \right]^{-1} .$$

(37)

Note that, given $v_T$ and $v_A$ are both positive and decreasing in $p_X$, both sides of (37) are positive. Thus, pro-trade biased polarization requires that, as the tariff decreases and labor shifts into the comparative advantage sector $Y$ then $VMP\dot{K}_Y = p_Y G_K$ increases at a faster rate than the rate at which $VMP\dot{K}_X = p_X F_K$ falls. Put simply, the free trade production point cannot get too close to the corner of the PPF.

D.1.2 Two country partial equilibrium model

Each country $i$ has a ‘comparative advantage’ good $Z = I$ with an endowment $e_i^Z = e > 0$ and a ‘comparative disadvantage’ in any good $Z \neq I$ with an endowment $e_i^Z = d > 0$. Demand curves in each country $i$ are $q_i^e = \alpha - \frac{p_i}{d}$ and, for $Z \neq I$, $q_i^Z = \theta - \frac{p_i}{d}$. No-arbitrage conditions link equilibrium cross-country local prices of each good and balanced trade determines equilibrium local prices. In turn, country i’s national welfare $W_i(\cdot)$ is then given by the sum of consumer surplus $CS_i(\cdot)$, producer surplus of the export and import-competing sectors $PS^{X}_i(\cdot)$ and $PS^{M}_i(\cdot)$, and tariff revenue $TR_i(\cdot)$. With two countries $z = i, j$ and two goods $Z = I, J$ we have

$$CS_i(\cdot) = \frac{1}{8} [ (\theta - \alpha) + (e + d) - \tau_{ij} ]^2 + \frac{1}{8} [ (\alpha - \theta) + (e + d) - \tau_{ij} ]^2 ;$$

$$PS^{X}_i(\cdot) = \frac{1}{2} e \left[ (\alpha + \theta) - (e + d) - \tau_{ij} \right],$$

$$PS^{M}_i(\cdot) = \frac{1}{2} d \left[ (\alpha + \theta) - (e + d) + \tau_{ij} \right]$$

$$TR_i(\cdot) = \tau_{ij} \left[ (\theta - \alpha) + (e - d) - \tau_{ij} \right]$$

and analogously for country $j$. In turn, $v_T = PS^{X}_i (\tau_{TA}, \cdot) - PS^{X}_i (\tau_{SQ}, \cdot) = \frac{1}{2} e (\tau_{SQ} - \tau_{TA})$ and $v_A = PS^{M}_i (\tau_{SQ}, \cdot) - PS^{M}_i (\tau_{TA}, \cdot) = \frac{1}{2} d (\tau_{SQ} - \tau_{TA})$.

In a symmetric Protection for Sale setting, $\tau_{SQ}$ maximizes $G_i (\tau_{SQ}, \cdot) = PS^{I}_i (\tau_{SQ}, \cdot) + PS^{I}_i (\tau_{SQ}, \cdot) + a W_i (\tau_{SQ}, \cdot)$ while $\tau_{TA}$ maximizes $G_i (\tau_{TA}, \cdot) + G_j (\tau_{TA}, \cdot)$. This yields $\tau_{SQ}^{GH} = \frac{1}{3} [ (\theta - \alpha) + (e - d) - \frac{d}{a} ] + \frac{d}{a}$ and $\tau_{TA}^{GH} = \frac{d - e}{a}$. Because of our linear structure, the terms-of-
trade effect, i.e. the inverse export supply elasticity faced by the importer, is merely equal to the level of imports: \( \tau_{TOT}^{GH} = \frac{1}{3} \left[ (\theta - \alpha) + (e - d) - \frac{d}{a} \right] \). Thus, \( \tau_{TA}^{GH} \) eliminates \( \tau_{TOT}^{GH} \) and just combines the politics effects of Home \( \frac{d}{a} \) and Foreign \(-\frac{\epsilon}{a}\).

In our setting, \( \tau_S = \frac{d}{a} \) is exogenous while \( \tau_{TA} \) maximizes \( G_i (\tau_{TA}, \cdot) + G_j (\tau_{TA}, \cdot) \) where, for the Home country, \( G_i (\tau_{TA}, \cdot) = \hat{I}_T (\hat{\rho}_T^s (\tau_{TA}), \tau_{TA}, \cdot) + \hat{I}_A (\hat{\rho}_T^s (\tau_{TA}), \tau_{TA}, \cdot) + aW_i (\tau_{TA}, \cdot). \) Note that our polarization and pro-trade biased polarization properties hold: \( -\frac{\partial v_T (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0 \), \( -\frac{\partial v_A (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0 \) and \( -\frac{\partial v_T (\tau_{TA})/v_A (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = 0 \). Thus, Proposition 2 implies \( \tau_{TA} = 0 \).

D.1.3 Three country partial equilibrium model

The setup is the same as the two country case except we now have three countries \( z = i, j, k \) and three goods \( Z = I, J, K \). In turn,

\[
CS_i (\cdot) = \frac{1}{18} \left[ 2 (\alpha - \theta) + (e + 2d) + (\tau_{ji} + \tau_{ki}) \right]^2 + \frac{1}{18} \sum_{h \neq i, k} \left[ (\theta - \alpha) + (e + 2d) - (2\tau_{ih} - \tau_{h,i}) \right]^2,
\]

\[
PS^X_i (\cdot) = \frac{1}{3} e \left[ (2\theta + \alpha) - (e + 2d) - (\tau_{ji} + \tau_{ki}) \right],
\]

\[
PS^M_i (\cdot) = \frac{1}{3} d \sum_{h \neq i, k} \left[ (2\theta + \alpha) - (e + 2d) + (2\tau_{ih} - \tau_{h,i}) \right],
\]

\[
TR_i (\cdot) = \sum_{h \neq i, k} \tau_{ih} \left[ (\theta - \alpha) + (e - d) + (\tau_{ih} - 2\tau_{ih'}) \right],
\]

and analogously for countries \( j \) and \( k \). Letting \( \tau_S \) denote the global tariff vector before the FTA and \( \tau_{FTA} \) denote the global tariff vector in the presence of an FTA between countries \( i \) and \( j \) which now forces \( \tau_{ij} = \tau_{ji} = 0 \), we have \( v_T = PS^X_i (\tau_{FTA}, \cdot) - PS^X_i (\tau_S, \cdot) = \frac{1}{3} e \tau_S \) and \( v_A = PS^M_i (\tau_{FTA}, \cdot) - PS^M_i (\tau_S, \cdot) = \frac{2}{3} d \tau_S \).

With \( a = 0 \) in a Protection for Sale setting, \( G_i (\cdot) = PS^X_i (\cdot) + PS^M_i (\cdot) \) and an FTA forms if and only if \( G_i (\tau_{FTA}, \cdot) - G_i (\tau_S, \cdot) = \frac{1}{3} \tau_S (e - 2d) > 0 \). Thus, an FTA does not form if \( d > \frac{1}{2} e \).

With \( a = 0 \) in our setting, the polarization and pro-trade biased polarization properties hold: \( -\frac{\partial v_T}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0 \), \( -\frac{\partial v_A}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0 \) and \( -\frac{\partial v_T/v_A}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = 0 \). Thus, Proposition 2 implies that, in this three country world, countries \( i \) and \( j \) would propose a bilateral TA with zero bilateral tariffs. This is precisely an FTA between countries \( i \) and \( j \).
D.2 Oligopoly Model

We assume two symmetric countries where country 1 (2) is the Home (Foreign) country. Two firms exist in each country: firm 1 has marginal cost $c = \bar{c} > 0$ and firm 0 has zero marginal cost (i.e. $c = 0$). A firm incurs a fixed cost of exporting $f_X \geq 0$ so that inefficient firms can be "domestic only" firms in equilibrium. Each country imposes the common TA tariff $\tau_{TA}$ and has a linear inverse demand function with intercept $\alpha$.

Let $x_i(c)$ denote the sales of a Home country firm in country $i \in \{1, 2\}$ and $x_i^*(c)$ denote the sales of a Foreign country firm in country $i$. Assume inefficient firms do not export. Then, local sales by Home country firms are (i) $x_1(0) > 0$ and (ii) $x_1(\bar{c}) > 0$ if $\tau_{TA} > 3\bar{c} - \alpha$ which holds if $\bar{c} < \frac{1}{3}\alpha$. And, export sales of the efficient Foreign firm are $x_1^*(0) > 0$ if $\tau_{TA} < \frac{\alpha + \bar{c}}{3}$. Taking these equilibrium quantities as given, the inefficient Foreign firm does not export if $\pi_1^*(\bar{c}) = x_1^*(\bar{c}) = 0$ for all $\tau_{TA}$ if and only if $\bar{c} < \frac{1}{3}\alpha$ which is the condition required for, regardless of $\tau_{TA}$, strictly positive local sales by inefficient firms. Whether efficient firms are pro-trade depends on $\tau_{TA}$: $\frac{\partial \pi(0)}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$ if and only if $\tau_{TA} > \frac{\alpha + \bar{c}}{5}$ so that efficient firms suffer from small tariff cuts when $\tau_{TA} > \frac{\alpha + \bar{c}}{5}$ but benefit from marginal tariff cuts when $\tau_{TA} < \frac{\alpha + \bar{c}}{5}$. Specifically, efficient firms are pro-trade, i.e. $v_T(0; \tau_{TA}, \tau_{SQ}) > 0$, if and only $\tau_{TA} < \tau_{SQ} - \frac{\alpha + \bar{c}}{5}$. Thus, our polarization properties hold for a well defined area of the parameter space. And, noting that conditions above required $\bar{c} < \frac{1}{3}\alpha$, our pro-trade biased polarization property also holds: $-\frac{\partial \nu_T(0; \tau_{TA}, \tau_{SQ})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = \frac{8(3\alpha - 7\bar{c})}{(\tau_{SQ} + \tau_{TA} + 2\alpha - 6\bar{c})^2} > 0$. Hence, Proposition 2 applies.

D.3 Melitz Model

Within-period utility of the representative agent in Home is given by

$$U = \omega \ln (X) + Y \tag{38}$$

where

$$X = \left( \int_{i \in \Omega} x(i, \tau)^\theta \, d\tau \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$$
aggregates over a set \( \Omega \) of varieties (potentially) available to the consumer with an elasticity of substitution \( \varepsilon = 1/(1 - \theta) \) where \( 0 < \theta < 1 \). Demand for each variety in Home is

\[
\begin{align*}
    x(i, \tau) &= \begin{cases} 
        \frac{p(i) - \varepsilon \omega}{P(\tau)^{1-\varepsilon}} & \text{for domestic firm } i \\
        \tau^{-\varepsilon} \frac{p(i) - \varepsilon \omega}{P(\tau)^{1-\varepsilon}} & \text{for Foreign firm } i
    \end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

where \( p(i) \) is the producer price charged by a monopolistically competitive firm selling variety \( i \) in Home and \( P(\tau)^{1-\varepsilon} \) is the aggregate consumer price index in Home for a symmetric tariff \( \tau \) imposed by Home and Foreign. An analogous set of equations holds for the Foreign country where, by assumption, \( \omega^* = \omega \).

Firms considering entry to sector \( X \) face a one time sunk market entry cost \( f_E \) (measured in units of labor). If paid, the firm draws a constant marginal cost \( c \) from the Pareto distribution with shape parameter \( k > \varepsilon - 1 \):

\[
G(c) = \left( \frac{c}{c_U} \right)^k \quad \text{for } 0 < c < c_U
\]

where \( c_i \) will denote firm \( i \)'s marginal cost draw. Once observed, a firm decides whether to undertake production. Upon production, it incurs an additional fixed cost \( f_D \) paid each period. Additionally, it incurs an additional per-period fixed cost \( f_X = \gamma f_D > f_D \) if it serves the Foreign market. Production exhibits constant returns to scale with labor as the only input.

The decisions of whether to produce and export depend on the associated profits. Given the wage of 1, the per-period operating profit of firm \( i \) in the domestic market is

\[
\pi_D(i, \tau) = \left[ \frac{(p(i) - c_i) \omega}{P(\tau)^{1-\varepsilon}} \right] p(i)^{-\varepsilon} - f_D.
\]

In turn, given profit maximization implies a constant markup over marginal cost, \( p(i) = \frac{c_i}{\theta} \):

\[
\pi_D(i, \tau) = c_i^{1-\varepsilon} B - f_D \quad \text{where} \quad B = \frac{1}{\varepsilon \theta^{1-\varepsilon}} \left( \frac{\omega}{P(\tau)^{1-\varepsilon}} \right). \tag{39}
\]

In addition to the fixed cost \( \gamma f_D \) of exporting, firms also faces a symmetric ad valorem tariff across countries \( \tau > 1 \). As is common in the literature for tractability, we assume governments consume the numeraire with tariff revenue. Thus, given profit maximization implies a constant markup over marginal cost, \( p(i) = \frac{\omega}{\theta} \), operating profit from exporting for
a Home firm is
\[ \pi_X (i, \tau) = \tau^{-\varepsilon} c_1^{1-\varepsilon} B^* - \gamma f_D \]
where
\[ B^* = \frac{1}{\varepsilon \theta^{1-\varepsilon}} \left( \frac{\omega}{\mathcal{P}^*(\tau)^{1-\varepsilon}} \right). \]  
(40)

D.3.1 Equilibrium

Status Quo  Letting \( SQ \) denote the status quo, a firm with marginal cost \( c_{D, SQ} \) is indifferent between supplying the domestic market and exiting. Further, a firm with marginal cost \( c_{X, SQ} \) is indifferent between exporting and only supplying the domestic market. Using equations (39) and (40), \( c_{D, SQ} \) and \( c_{X, SQ} \) are defined by

\[ f_D = \frac{\omega}{\varepsilon} \left[ \frac{c_{D, SQ}}{\theta \mathcal{P}_{SQ} (\tau_{SQ})} \right]^{1-\varepsilon} \]  
(41)

\[ \gamma f_D = \frac{\omega}{\tau_{SQ}^{1-\varepsilon}} \left[ \frac{\tau_{SQ} c_{X, SQ}}{\theta \mathcal{P}_{SQ} (\tau_{SQ})} \right]^{1-\varepsilon}. \]  
(42)

Free entry implies an entrepreneur takes a marginal cost draw if the expected present value of operating profits exceeds the sunk entry cost \( f_E \). We assume firms fully discount expected period 2 profits so that current period expected profits determine their entry decision. The zero-operating profit and free entry conditions close the model. The zero-operating profit conditions pin down \( c_{D, SQ} \) and \( c_{X, SQ} \) and the free entry condition pins down the mass of firms \( N_E \) taking a marginal cost draw from the Pareto distribution:

\[ N_E = \left[ \frac{\gamma^{\psi_f} \tau_{SQ}^{\frac{k}{\psi}} + 1}{\gamma^{\psi_f} \tau_{SQ}^{\frac{k}{\psi}} + \tau_{SQ}} \right] \left( \frac{\theta \omega}{k f_E} \right) \]  
(43)

\[ c_{D, SQ} = \left( \gamma^{\psi_f+1} \tau_{SQ}^{\frac{k}{\psi}} \right)^{\frac{1}{k}} c_{X, SQ} \]  
(44)

\[ c_{X, SQ} = \left( \frac{1}{\gamma^{\psi_f} \tau_{SQ}^{\frac{k}{\psi}} + 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{k}} \psi f_E \]  
(45)

where
\[ \psi \equiv \frac{k - (\varepsilon - 1)}{\varepsilon - 1} > 0. \]

Given symmetric countries, \( c_{D, SQ} = c_{D, SQ}^* \) and \( c_{X, SQ} = c_{X, SQ}^* \).

44 This assumption does not affect the qualitative results, but affects the number of firms taking a draw, \( N_E \).
Finally, in the status quo, ex post aggregate per period operating profits are

$$\Pi_{SQ} = N_E f_E$$
$$= \left[ \frac{\gamma^\psi \tau_{SQ}^b + 1}{\gamma^\psi \tau_{SQ}^b + \tau_{SQ}} \right] \frac{\theta \omega}{k}$$ \hspace{1cm} (46)$$

and tariff revenue is

$$TR_{SQ} = \left[ \frac{\tau_{SQ} - 1}{\gamma^\psi \tau_{SQ}^b + \tau_{SQ}} \right] \omega.$$ \hspace{1cm} (47)$$

**Proposed TA** Using the same methods as above and noting that $N_E$ is fixed, we have new marginal cost cutoffs given a symmetric TA tariff across countries $\tau_{TA}$:

$$c_{D,TA} = \left( \gamma^\psi \tau_{TA}^b \right)^{\frac{1}{k}} c_{X,TA}$$ \hspace{1cm} (48)$$

$$c_{X,TA} = \left[ \left( \frac{\gamma^\psi \tau_{SQ}^b + \tau_{SQ}}{\gamma^\psi \tau_{TA}^b + \tau_{TA}} \right) \left( \frac{1}{\gamma^\psi \tau_{SQ}^b + 1} \right) \psi f_E \gamma f_D \right]^{\frac{1}{k}} c_U.$$ \hspace{1cm} (49)$$

Additionally, a firm with marginal cost $\bar{c}$ is indifferent between the status quo and the TA:

$$\pi_{TA}(\bar{c}, \tau_{TA}) = \pi_{SQ}(\bar{c}, \tau_{SQ}) \text{ if and only if } \bar{c} = \left( \lambda \tau_{SQ}^b \right) c_{X,SQ}$$ \hspace{1cm} (50)$$

where

$$\lambda = \left[ (1 + \tau_{TA}^{-\varepsilon}) \Omega^{\varepsilon-1} - 1 \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}}, \text{ and}$$ \hspace{1cm} (51)$$

$$\Omega \equiv \left( \frac{\gamma^\psi \tau_{SQ}^b + \tau_{SQ}}{\gamma^\psi \tau_{TA}^b + \tau_{TA}} \right)^{\frac{1}{k}} \left( \frac{\tau_{TA}}{\tau_{SQ}} \right)^{\frac{1}{b}}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (52)$$

Finally, aggregate operating profits and tariff revenue are

$$\Pi_{TA} = \left[ \frac{\gamma^\psi \tau_{TA}^b + 1}{\gamma^\psi \tau_{TA}^b + \tau_{TA}} \right] \left( \frac{\theta \omega}{k} \right)$$ \hspace{1cm} (53)$$

$$TR_{TA} = \left[ \frac{\tau_{TA} - 1}{\gamma^\psi \tau_{TA}^b + \tau_{TA}} \right] \omega.$$ \hspace{1cm} (54)
D.3.2 Lobbying, Strategies and Comparative Statics

Given the status quo and TA equilibrium, the value to $L_A$ of maintaining status quo is

$$v_A (\tau_{TA}) = N_E \int_{\hat{c}}^{c_{D,SQ}} [\pi_{SQ} (c, \tau_{SQ}) - \pi_{TA} (c, \tau_{TA})] dG (c), \quad (55)$$

and the value to $L_T$ of the TA being adopted is

$$v_T (\tau_{TA}) = N_E \int_{0}^{\hat{c}} [\pi_{TA} (c, \tau_{TA}) - \pi_{SQ} (c, \tau_{SQ})] dG (c). \quad (56)$$

Note that

$$v_T (\tau_{TA}) - v_A (\tau_{TA}) = \Pi_{TA} - \Pi_{SQ} = \frac{\theta}{k} (TR_{SQ} - TR_{TA}). \quad (57)$$

Given the concavity of tariff revenue in $\tau_{TA}$, we assume $\tau_{SQ}$ is below the tariff revenue maximizing tariff (a sufficient condition is $\tau_{SQ} \leq \frac{k}{k-\theta}$) so that $\tau_{TA} < \tau_{SQ}$ implies $TR_{SQ} > TR_{TA}$ and hence $v_T (\tau_{TA}) > v_A (\tau_{TA})$.

We now confirm our properties regarding the impact of $\tau_{TA}$ on valuations.

**Remark 1** In our symmetric Melitz model with symmetric trade liberalization, a more liberal TA polarizes lobby groups, $-\frac{\partial v_T (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$, and $-\frac{\partial v_A (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$ when $\gamma$ is sufficiently large.

**Proof.** Differentiating (55) and (56) with respect to $\tau_{TA}$ yields:

$$-\frac{\partial v_T (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = -N_E \left[ \int_{0}^{\hat{c}} \left( \frac{\partial \pi_X (c; \tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} + \frac{\partial \pi_D (c; \tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \right) dG (c) \right]$$

$$-\frac{\partial v_A (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = N_E \left[ \int_{\hat{c}}^{c_{X,TA}} \left( \frac{\partial \pi_X (c; \tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} + \frac{\partial \pi_D (c; \tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \right) dG (c) + \int_{c_{X,TA}}^{c_{D,TA}} \frac{\partial \pi_D (c; \tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} dG (c) \right].$$

While $-\frac{\partial v_T (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$ trivially reflects export profits increasing in Foreign tariff liberalization, offsetting effects underlie $-\frac{\partial v_A (\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}}$. On one hand, $L_A$ consists of some purely domestic firms and $-\frac{\partial \pi_X (c; \tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} < 0$. On the other hand, $L_A$ also consists of some ex post exporting firms and $-\frac{\partial \pi_X (c; \tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$. However the effect from purely domestic firms always dominates for a sufficiently high $\gamma$. To see this is the case, note that we can rewrite

$$-\frac{\partial v_A}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = -\frac{\theta}{k} \left[ \frac{\partial \delta}{\partial \tau_{TA}} TR_{SQ} + \frac{\partial TR_{TA}}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \right]$$
where $\delta \equiv \frac{\tau_{SQ}^{k} \lambda^{-1}}{\tau_{SQ} - 1}$. And, using (54),

$$
\lim_{\gamma \to \infty} \frac{\partial v_A}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = -\theta \frac{k}{\lambda} \left[ TR_{SQ} \lim_{\gamma \to \infty} \frac{\partial \delta}{\partial \tau_{TA}} + \frac{1}{TR_{TA}} \lim_{\gamma \to \infty} \frac{\partial TR_{TA}}{\partial \tau_{TA}} \right] TR_{TA} \\
= \left[ \frac{k - \theta}{k(\tau_{TA} - 1)} \right] \cdot \lim_{\gamma \to \infty} TR_{TA} = 0.
$$

Furthermore, (i) for very low values of $\gamma$ and as $\tau_{TA}$ approaches free trade we can see that

$$
\lim_{\gamma \to 1, \tau_{TA} \to 1} \frac{\partial v_A(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} = -\frac{\theta}{k} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\lambda}{\Omega} \right)^{k-(\varepsilon-1)} \right] \frac{\omega}{2} < 0,
$$

and (ii) $-\frac{\partial v_A(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$ for all values of $\gamma$ when $\tau_{TA}$ lies in a sufficiently small neighborhood around $\tau_{SQ}$. ■

We can further verify through numerical analysis that pro-trade biased polarization holds.

**Remark 2** In our symmetric Melitz model with symmetric trade liberalization, a more liberal TA generates pro-trade biased polarization, $-\frac{\partial v_T(\tau_{TA})/\partial v_A(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \tau_{TA}} > 0$.

**Proof.** By numerical grid search. ■

Given Remarks 1 and 2 we can apply our general results to conclude that governments will propose free trade.

**Proposition 5** Consider our symmetric Melitz model with symmetric trade liberalization and a sufficiently high $\gamma$. Then, for sufficiently small $a$, governments propose free trade, i.e. $\tau_{TA} = 0$, in the Tullock contest setting ($r = 1$) and the all pay contest setting ($r \to \infty$).

**Proof.** This follows directly from Results 1 and 2 and Propositions 1 - 2 and 3 - 4. ■

Finally, we perform comparative statics on $\frac{v_T(\tau_{TA})}{v_A(\tau_{TA})}$.

**Proposition 6** With symmetric countries and a common TA tariff $\tau_{TA}$ below the tariff revenue maximizing tariff, the following comparative static results hold: $\frac{\partial v_T(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \gamma} < 0$, $\frac{\partial v_A(\tau_{TA})}{\partial \gamma} > 0$, and $\frac{\partial v_T(\tau_{TA})}{\partial k} < 0$.

**Proof.** Note that $\frac{v_T(\tau_{TA})}{v_A(\tau_{TA})} = \frac{\theta}{k} \left[ \frac{\delta TR(\tau_{SQ})}{(\delta-1)TR(\tau_{SQ}) + TR(\tau_{TA})} \right]$ where $\delta = \frac{\tau_{SQ}^{k} \lambda^{-1}}{\tau_{SQ} - 1}$. We establish the proof by numerical grid search. ■
References


