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Old and Modern Wars: New Considerations

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 7, 2018 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM

Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Meeting Room 305
Hosted By: Peace Science Society International & American Economic Association
  • Chair: Solomon W. Polachek, State University of New York-Binghamton

Winter is Coming: The Long-run Effects of Climate Change on Conflict, 1400-1900

Murat Iyigun
,
University of Colorado-Boulder
Nathan Nunn
,
Harvard University
Nancy Qian
,
Northwestern University

Abstract

This paper investigates the long-run effects of climate change on conflict by examining cooling from 1400-1900 CE, a period that includes most of the Little Ice Age. We construct a geo-referenced and digitized database of conflicts in Europe, North Africa, and the Near East from 1400-1900, which we merge with historical temperature data. We first show that during this time, cooling is associated with increased conflict. Then, turning to the dynamics of cooling, we allow the effects of cooling over a fifty-year period to depend on the extent of cooling during the preceding fifty-year period. We find that the effect of cooling on conflict is significantly larger if the same location experienced cooling during the preceding period. We interpret this as evidence that the adverse effect of climate change intensifies with its duration.

War, Migration and the Origins of the Thai Sex Industry

Abel Brodeur
,
University of Ottawa
Warn N. Lekfuangfu
,
University College London
Yanos Zylberberg
,
University of Bristol

Abstract

This paper analyzes the determinants behind the spatial distribution of the sex industry in Thailand. We relate the development of the sex industry to an early temporary demand shock, i.e., U.S. military presence during the Vietnam War. Comparing the surroundings of Thai military bases used by the U.S. army to districts close to unused Thai bases, we find that there are currently 5 times more commercial sex workers in districts near former U.S. bases. The development of the sex industry is also explained by a high price elasticity of supply due to female migration from regions affected by an agricultural crisis. Finally, we study a consequence induced by the large numbers of sex workers in few red-light districts: the HIV outbreak in the early 1990s.

Cyber Attacks: Preliminary Evidence From the Bank of Italy's Business Surveys

Claudia Biancotti
,
Bank of Italy

Abstract

This paper presents preliminary evidence on cyber risk in the Italian private sector based on the Bank of Italy’s annual surveys of Italian industrial and service firms. The information collected, albeit only covering the incidence of cyber attacks and some aspects of security governance, is the first of its kind for Italy. The results are striking: even though a mere 1.5 per cent of businesses do not deploy any cybersecurity measures, 30.3 per cent – corresponding to 35.6 per cent of total employees – report at least some damage from a cyber attack between September 2015 and September 2016. Once data are corrected to account for unwillingness to report or inability to detect attacks on the part of some respondents, these figures climb to 45.2 and 56 per cent respectively, with large, high-tech and internationally exposed businesses faring worse than average. The economy-wide risk level is likely to be higher still; the financial sector, healthcare, education and social care are excluded from the sample, but they are known from other sources to be particularly appealing to attackers. Further research is needed on the correlation between firm-level vulnerability and investment in cyber defence, and on the cost of cyber breaches.

No Kin In The Game? Moral Hazard and War in the United States Congress

Nathaniel Hilger
,
Brown University
Eoin McGuirk
,
Yale University
Nicholas Miller
,
Brown University

Abstract

Why do costly wars occur? We exploit a natural experiment to examine one popular but previously untested hypothesis: that leaders who order war stand to reap the benefits without fully internalizing the costs. We test this moral hazard theory of conflict by analyzing the roll call votes of US congresspeople over the four conscription-era wars in the 20th century: World War I, World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. By comparing the voting behavior of those who have sons exposed to the draft against those who have daughters of comparable age, we can determine whether or not political agency problems cause violent conflict. We find that, conditional on legislator fixed effects and total number of children, those who have sons of draft age are around 10-15% less likely to vote to enact or expand conscription than those in the control group. The results identify an important cause of political violence, while also highlighting the role of private incentives in public office.
Discussant(s)
Carmen Carrion Flores
,
State University of New York-Binghamton
Carlos Seiglie
,
Rutgers University
Phanindra Wunnava
,
Middlebury College and IZA
Charles Anderton
,
College of the Holy Cross
JEL Classifications
  • F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
  • I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty