Data Abundance and Asset Price Informativeness

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Abstract

Information processing filters out the noise in raw data but it takes time. Hence, filtered signals are available only with a lag relative to unfiltered signals. As the cost of raw data declines, unfiltered signals become cheaper to produce and more investors trade on them. As a result, asset prices reflect unfiltered signals more quickly. This effect decreases the value of processing information unless unfiltered signals are very noisy. Thus, a decline in the cost of raw data can trigger a decline in the number of investors trading on filtered signals and, for this reason, the informativeness of asset prices in the long run.

KEYWORDS: Asset Price Informativeness, Big Data, Information Processing, Markets for Information, Contrarian and momentum trading.

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Increasingly, there is a new technological race in which hedge funds and other well-heeled investors armed with big data analytics analyze millions of twitter messages and other non-traditional information sources to buy and sell stocks faster than smaller investors can hit “retweet.”

in “How investors are using social media to make money,” Fortune, December 7, 2015.

1 Introduction

Improvements in information technologies change how information is produced and disseminated in financial markets. In particular, they enable investors to obtain huge amount of data at lower cost.\(^1\) For instance, investors can now easily get on-line access to companies reports, economic reports, or other investors’ opinions (expressed on social medias) to assess the value of a stock.\(^2\) Similarly, traditional data vendors like Reuters, Bloomberg, or new entrants like iSentium, Dataminr or Eagle Alpha use so-called news analytics softwares to extract signals from the huge flow of unstructured data (news reports, press releases, stock market announcements, tweets, satellite images etc.) and then sell these signals to investors who feed them into their trading algorithms.\(^3\)

How does this evolution affect the informativeness of asset prices? This question is important because ultimately price informativeness affects firms’ real decisions (see Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) for a survey). Given the existing literature, economists’ prior should be that the decline in the cost of accessing information is beneficial for asset price informativeness. Indeed, models with endogenous information acquisition predicts that asset price informativeness increases when information acquisition costs decline, either because more investors buy information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) or because investors acquire more precise signals (Verrechia (1982)).

However, existing models of information acquisition commingle the moments at which investors access to information and process it. Yet, in reality, filtering out noise from a signal takes time. In this paper, we show that, due to this delay, a decline in the cost

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\(^1\)For instance, at the turn of the millenium, the cost of sending one trillion bits was already only $0.17 (versus $150,000 in 1970); see “The new paradigm”, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1999.

\(^2\)For instance, websites such as StockTwits or Seeking Alphas allow investors to comment on stocks, share investment ideas, and provide, in real time, raw financial information pulled off other social medias. For evidence that information exchanged on social medias contains value relevant information, see Chen et al.(2014).

\(^3\)For popular press articles on this evolution, see, for instance, “Rise of the news-reading machines” (Financial Times, January 26, 2010), “How investors are using social medias to make money” (Fortune, December 7, 2015), “Investors mine big data for cutting hedge strategies” (Financial Times, March 30, 2016) or “Big data is a big mess for hedge funds hunting signals” (Bloomberg, November 22, 2016).
of accessing information can in fact *reduce* the long run informativeness of asset prices about fundamentals. Indeed, cheaper access to raw data increases the number of investors trading on very imprecise information. This effect makes prices more informative in the short run but it can undermine traders’ incentive to process information further. As a result, asset prices are less informative in the long run.

In our model, speculators can buy, from information sellers, “raw” (i.e., unfiltered) signals and “processed” (i.e., filtered) signals about the payoff of a risky asset. When they receive their signal, they can trade on it with risk neutral market makers and liquidity traders (as in Kyle (1985)). The raw signal is correct (reveals the asset payoff) with probability $\theta$ or is just noise with probability $(1-\theta)$. Thus, $\theta$ characterizes the reliability of the raw signal. The true nature of the signal (information/noise) can only be discovered after filtering out the noise from raw data, which requires some time. To account for this delay, we assume that the processed signal is available with a lag relative to the raw signal. Specifically, the raw signal is available in period 1 while the processed signal is available in period 2, only. Thus, speculators who buy the processed signal trade with a delay relative to speculators who buy the raw signal.

Following Veldkamp (2006a,b), we assume that the cost of producing a signal is fixed but, once produced, the signal can be replicated for free so the marginal cost of providing information to an extra user is zero. We allow the cost of producing the raw and the processed signals to be different, so that we can study the effects of decreasing the cost of producing the raw signal, holding constant the cost of the processed signal. Furthermore, markets for information are competitive: (i) raw and processed signals are sold at competitive prices (i.e., information sellers make zero profits) and (ii) speculators’ profits from trading on each type of signal net of the price paid to information sellers are zero. In this set-up, we analyze how a decline in the cost of producing the raw signal affects equilibrium outcomes, in particular the equilibrium demand for each type of signal (i.e., the number of speculators buying this signal) and the informational content of the asset price in the short run (period 1) and the long run (period 2).

We first show that a decrease in the cost of producing the raw signal can *increase* or *reduce* the demand for the processed signal in equilibrium. Indeed, a decrease in this cost

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4The raw signal does not need to be literally interpreted as being completely unprocessed information. For instance, a buy or sell recommendation of a stock based on linguistic analysis of discussions on social medias about this stock relies on some automated information processing. However, such information processing is not as deep as that performed by financial analysts or investment advisors who spend time in evaluating firms business models, analyzing accounting statements, and building up evaluation models to determine the fundamental value of an asset (see, for instance, Chapters 7 and 8 in Pedersen (2015) for a description of the process for discovering information about stocks in some hedge funds).
raises the number of speculators who trade on the raw signal and therefore the likelihood that the price of the asset reflects this signal before speculators receive the processed signal. In other words, a reduction in the cost of producing the raw signal makes the price in the short run more informative about the raw signal. This has an ambiguous effect on the expected profit from trading on the processed signal. On the one hand, it increases this profit when the raw signal is just noise because speculators who receive the processed signal can then correct the noise in prices. On the other hand, it decreases this profit when the raw signal is indeed informative because the informational advantage of speculators who receive the processed signal, relative to the market maker, is then smaller.

In equilibrium (i.e., accounting for the adjustment in the price of each signal to variations in demands), the former effect can dominate if the raw signal is sufficiently unreliable (i.e., $\theta < 1 - (\sqrt{2})^{-1}$) while otherwise the latter effect always dominates. In this case, a decrease in the cost of the raw signal reduces the demand for this signal in equilibrium. When the cost of the raw signal becomes small enough, this crowding out effect can be so strong that it leads to a discontinuous drop in the equilibrium demand for the processed signal, from a strictly positive value to zero. At this point, the market for the processed signal ceases to exist.

We then study the implications of these effects for the informativeness of the equilibrium price at each date about the asset payoff. Other things equal, a reduction in the cost of the raw (resp., processed) signal improves price informativeness in the short run (resp., long run), as usual in models of trading with endogenous information acquisition.

More interestingly, a reduction in the cost of the raw signal can lead to less informative prices in the long run. This happens when a reduction in this cost leads to a decline in the demand for the processed signal. Indeed, this decline reduces the likelihood that the processed signal will be reflected into the price at date 2. In particular, when the cost of the raw signal is nil, long run price informativeness is always smaller than if speculators could only buy the processed signal, even if the cost of this signal gets arbitrarily small (but remains strictly positive). Thus, a decline in the cost of the raw signal can make

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5 There is at least as much information available in period 2 than in period 1 and strictly more if, in equilibrium, some speculators buy the processed signal. Thus, the informativeness of the price in period 2 is higher than in period 1. Yet, when the cost of the raw signal declines, the former can decrease, even though the latter increases.

6 Brunnermeier (2005) considers a model of trading in a stock with two trading rounds. In the first trading round, there is information leakage: one investor receives a noisy signal about a public news released just before the second trading round. Brunnermeier (2005) shows that the informativeness of the stock price in the second trading round is smaller than in the absence of information leakage. At first glance, this result looks similar to ours. However, the mechanisms in Brunnermeier (2005) and in our
prices more informative in the short run and yet, paradoxically, less informative in the long run.

This implication of the model is consistent with Weller (2016) who finds empirically a negative association between the activity of algorithmic traders (a class of traders who is likely to trade on relatively raw signals) and the informativeness of prices about future earnings. It also offers a possible interpretation of the empirical findings in Bai, Phillipon, and Savov (2015). For the entire universe of U.S. stocks, they find (see their Figure A.3) that stock price informativeness has been declining over time (they obtain the opposite conclusion for stocks in the S&P500 index). They attribute this evolution to change in the characteristics of firms that do not belong to the S&P500 index. Our model suggests that the reduction in the cost of raw information might be another explanatory factor for this evolution.

Our model has additional testable implications for the trade patterns of various types of investors. First the model predicts that the correlation between the order flow (the difference between their sales and buys) of speculators trading on the raw signal and that of speculators trading on the processed signal should decline (and could even become negative) when the cost of the raw signal decreases. The reason is that speculators receiving the processed signal trade in a direction opposite to that of speculators who trade on the raw signal when the price reflects the raw signal in the short run and this signal is noise. This event is more likely when more speculators trade on the raw signal, i.e., when the cost of raw information is small. For this reason, when the cost of the raw signal declines, sales (resp., buys) by speculators who trade on the raw signal are more likely to be followed by buys (resp. sales) from speculators who trade on the processed signal.

Second, the order flow from speculators who trade on the processed signal and past returns are correlated. This correlation is negative when the raw signal is unreliable \((\theta \leq \frac{1}{2})\) and positive otherwise. Thus, in equilibrium, speculators who trade on the processed signal behave either like contrarian traders (they trade against past returns) or momentum traders (they trade in the same direction as past returns). Intuitively, the price impact of the order flow from speculators trading on the raw signal is more likely

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\[^{7}\]This prediction is non standard. Indeed, standard models of informed trading (e.g., Kyle (1985)) predicts a zero correlation between the trades of informed investors at a given date and lagged returns (see Boulatov, Livdan and Hendershott (2012), Proposition 1, for instance.)
to be due to noise when the reliability of the raw signal, $\theta$, decreases. Hence, short run price changes are more likely to be subsequently corrected by speculators receiving the processed signal when $\theta$ is low enough. The model also implies that, in absolute value, the covariance between past returns and the order flow from speculators who trade on the processed signal should be inversely related to the cost of the raw signal.

Last, the direction of the order flow from speculators who trade on the raw signal is positively correlated with future returns (from period 1 to period 2 in the model). However, this correlation becomes weaker when the cost of producing the raw signal declines. Indeed, this decline increases the demand for the raw signal and therefore the likelihood that the first period price fully reflects this signal. When this happens, speculators who receive the processed signal can profitably trade only on the component of this signal that is orthogonal to the raw signal. As a result, the order flow from speculators trading on the raw signal has less predictive power for the order flow from speculators trading on the processed signal and therefore the second period return.

All our predictions are about the effects of a decrease in the cost of raw information. Empiricists could test them by using shocks to the cost of accessing raw financial data. For instance, in 2009, the SEC mandated that financial statements be filed with a new language (the so called EXtensible Business Reporting Language) on the ground that it would lower the cost of accessing data for smaller investors. The implementation of this new rule or other shocks of the same nature could therefore be used to test some of our predictions.

Our paper contributes to the literature on costly information acquisition in financial markets and information markets (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Verrechia (1982), Admati and Pfleiderer (1986), Veldkamp (2006a,b), Cespa (2008), or Lee (2013); see Veldkamp (2011) for a survey). Some models (e.g., Verrechia (1982) or Peress (2010))

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8This is not due to serial correlation in returns. In our model, the price of the asset at each date is equal to its expected value conditional on all available public information, i.e., the history of trades as in Kyle (1985). Hence, returns are serially uncorrelated in our model.

9See SEC (2009). In particular on page 129, the SEC notes that: “If [XBLR] serves to lower the data aggregation costs as expected, then it is further expected that smaller investors will have greater access to financial data than before. In particular, many investors that had neither the time nor financial resources to procure broadly aggregated financial data prior to interactive data will have lower cost access than before interactive data. Lower data aggregation costs will allow investors to either aggregate the data on their own, or purchase it at a lower cost than what would be required prior to interactive data. Hence, smaller investors will have fewer informational barriers that separate them from larger investors with greater financial resources.”

10Interestingly, data vendors such as Dow Jones screen SEC filings by firms and release information contained in these filings through specialized services (e.g., Dow Jones Corporate Filing Alert). Thus, reduction in the cost of accessing these filings for data vendors are like reduction in the cost of producing raw information in our model.
have considered the possibility for informed investors to pay a cost to obtain more precise information. This cost can be interpreted as a cost of processing information. However, in these models, all investors trade simultaneously. In this case, a reduction in the cost of information leads investors to buy more precise information and make stock prices more informative (see Verrechia (1982), Corollary 4). In contrast, in our model, time is required to obtain information of greater precision. In this case, our analysis shows that a decline in the cost of raw information can reduce the value of processed information and therefore the demand for this type of information. As a result, price informativeness is reduced in the long run.

In Lee (2013), investors can buy signals on one of two independent fundamentals (factors) for an asset. In his model, a decrease in the cost of acquiring information one one fundamental can increase or reduce the number of investors buying information on the other fundamental. Our finding that a stronger demand for the raw signal can reduce or increase the demand for the processed signal has a similar flavor. However, the mechanisms and information structures in Lee (2013) and our model are very different. In Lee (2013), all informed investors trade simultaneously and interdependence in the demands for each type of signals arise from the fact that trades by one type of informed trader affects (negatively) liquidity for the other type and (positively) the ability of the other type to conceal his trades. In our model, these effects cannot play out because speculators trade on the raw and the processed signals at different dates.

As in Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) and Hirshleifer et al. (1994), our model features “early” (those who trade on the raw signal) and “late” (those who trade on the processed signal) informed investors. In contrast to these models, however, investors can endogenously choose to trade early or late in our model and this choice determines the reliability of their information (late investors receive more reliable information). For this reason, the implications of our model are distinct from those in existing models with realy and late informed investors. For instance, in Hirshleifer et al.(1994), the trades of early and late informed investors are always positively correlated (see their Proposition 2) while, instead, they can be negatively correlated in our model. Moreover, in Hirshleifer et al.(1994), the trades of late informed investors are not correlated with past returns.

\[11\] In Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002), risk averse investors can choose to receive information at dates 1 or 2. However, the precision of investors’ signals is the same at both dates. In contrast, in our model, investors who process information are better informed than investors who just trade on raw information.

\[12\] In Froot et al.(1992), there exist equilibria in which a fraction of speculators trade on noise. However, there is no possibility for traders to correct price changes due to such trades. In contrast, in our model, speculators correct price changes due to noise, after receiving the processed signal.
(see their Proposition 3) while they are in our model.

The next section describes the model. Section 3 derives equilibrium prices at dates 1 and 2, taking the demands for raw and processed information as given. Section 4 endogenizes these demands. Section 5 derives the implications of the model for (a) asset price informativeness and (ii) price and trade patterns. Section 7 concludes. Proofs of the main results are in the appendix. Additional material is available in the on-line appendix on the authors’ website.

2 Model

We consider the market for a risky asset. Figure 1 describes the timing of actions and events. There are four periods ($t \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$). The payoff of the asset, $V$, is realized at date $t = 3$ and can be equal to 0 or 1 with equal probabilities. Trades take place at dates $t = 1$ and $t = 2$ among three types of market participants: (i) a continuum of liquidity traders, (ii) a continuum of risk neutral speculators, and (iii) a competitive and risk neutral market-maker. We denote by $\bar{\alpha}$ the mass of speculators relative to the mass of liquidity traders (which we normalize to one).

![Figure 1: Timing](image-url)

Just before date 1, some new, noisy, information about the payoff of the asset becomes
privately available to information sellers. There are two types of information sellers: (i) "raw information" sellers and (ii) "processed information" sellers. Raw information sellers release a signal \( \tilde{s} \) at date 1 to speculators who have subscribed to their services at date 0 (see below), such that:

\[
\tilde{s} = \tilde{u} \times \tilde{V} + (1 - \tilde{u}) \times \tilde{\epsilon},
\]

where \( \tilde{u} \) and \( \tilde{\epsilon} \) can take the values 0 or 1. Specifically, \( \tilde{u} = 1 \) with probability \( \theta \) (and therefore \( \tilde{u} = 0 \) with probability \( (1 - \theta) \)) while \( \tilde{\epsilon} = 1 \) with probability \( 1/2 \). Moreover, \( \tilde{\epsilon} \), \( \tilde{V} \), and \( \tilde{u} \) are independent. Thus, with probability \( \theta \), the signal sold by raw information sellers reveals \( V \) and with probability \( (1 - \theta) \), it is just noise.

In contrast, processed information sellers filter out the noise from the information available at date 1, i.e., process this information (e.g., by accumulating more information or by analyzing its implications for the asset value in more detail). Formally, they learn \( u \) and disseminate the signal \((s, u)\) to speculators who have subscribed to their services. Importantly, information processing takes time. Specifically, it requires one period after the arrival of the new information about the asset. Thus, processed information sellers can release the signal \((s, u)\) at date 2 only. We say that the processed signal confirms the raw signal if \( u = 1 \) and invalidates it if \( u = 0 \).

We refer to \( s \) as the “raw signal” and to \((s, u)\) as the “processed signal.” For the problem to be interesting, we assume that \( 0 < \theta < 1 \) so that the raw signal is informative but less reliable than the processed signal. The raw signal does not need to be construed as completely unprocessed news. For instance, firms (e.g., Reuters, Bloomberg, Dataminr, Thinknum, Orbital Insights etc.) selling signals extracted from social medias (twitter etc.), companies reports or satellite imagery use algorithms to process their raw source of information to some extent. This processing is faster but not as deep as that performed by securities analysts or investment advisors who take the time to accumulate more information (e.g., by meeting firms’ managers, forecast future cash flows, compute discount rates etc.) in order to sharpen the accuracy of their signals.

We denote the cost of producing the raw signal by \( C_r \) and the cost of producing the processed signal by \( C_p \). Moreover, we denote by \( F_r \) and \( F_p \) the fees charged, respectively, by raw information sellers and processed information sellers to their subscribers.

**Speculators.** Speculators decide to buy or not signals at date \( t = 0 \). Each speculator can decide to buy both types of signals, only one type, or no signal at all. As explained in Section 4, they make their decision to maximize their expected profit of trading on each signal net of the fee paid to obtain the signal. We denote the mass of speculators
buying the raw signal by \( \alpha_1 \) and the mass of speculators buying the processed signal by \( \alpha_2 \), with \( \alpha_j \leq \bar{\alpha} \). If all speculators find optimal to buy both signals then \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \bar{\alpha} \).

As in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), we assume that each speculator can only buy or sell a fixed number of shares—normalized to one—using market orders (i.e., orders that are non contingent on the contemporaneous execution price). If he decides to trade a speculator will optimally submit an order of the maximum size (one share) because he is risk neutral and too small to individually affect the equilibrium price. We denote by \( x_{it} \in \{-1, 0, 1\} \), the market order submitted by speculator \( i \) trading at date \( t \), with \( x_{it} = 0 \) if speculator \( i \) chooses not to trade and \( x_{it} = -1 \) (resp., +1) if he sells (resp., buys) the asset. We focus on equilibria in pure strategies in which all speculators play the same strategy at a given date (symmetric equilibria). Moreover, we assume that speculators who only buy the raw signal trade at date 1 only. Henceforth, we drop index \( i \) when referring to the strategy of a speculator since, at a given date \( t \), all speculators follow the same strategy.

**Liquidity Traders.** At each date \( t \), liquidity traders buy or sell one share of the asset for exogenous reasons. Their aggregate demand at date \( t \), denoted \( \tilde{l}_t \), has a uniform distribution (denoted \( \phi(\cdot) \)) on \([-1, 1]\) and \( \tilde{l}_1 \) is independent from \( \tilde{l}_2 \). As usual, liquidity traders ensure that the order flow at date \( t \) is not necessarily fully revealing and thereby allows speculators to obtain trading profits in equilibrium (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)).

**The market-maker.** At date \( t \), the market-maker absorbs the net demand from liquidity traders and speculators at this date (the “order flow”) at a price, \( p_t \), equal to the expected payoff of the asset conditional on his information. As the market-maker does not observe \( \tilde{s} \) and \( \tilde{u} \) until \( t = 3 \), the price at date \( t \) only depends on the order flow history until this date (as in Kyle (1985)). Formally, let \( f_t \) be the order flow at date \( t \):

\[
 f_t = \tilde{l}_t + \int_0^{\alpha_t} x_{it} \, di. \tag{2}
\]

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13In a previous version of the paper, we considered the case in which each speculator could buy only one type of signal. In this case, \( \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 \leq \bar{\alpha} \). Results in this case are identical to those obtained when we allow each speculator to buy both signals.

14This restriction is innocuous because there are no other equilibria than symmetric equilibria in pure strategies when speculators’ expected profits, gross of the price paid for the signal, are strictly positive. This condition is necessarily satisfied in equilibrium when the price of a signal is strictly positive because no speculator would buy a signal if his gross expected trading profit is zero.

15This assumption simplifies the exposition and the derivation of the equilibrium. It is innocuous when the price at date 1 reveals the raw signal since retrading on this signal cannot be optimal. If the price at date 1 does not reveal the raw signal, retrading on this signal at date 2 might be optimal. Allowing this possibility however makes the analysis of the equilibrium at date 2 more complex without adding insights. A trader who buys both the processed and the raw signals can trade at both dates. In reality, traders taking positions on raw signals only are likely to face more stringent position limits than those who refine their signals by also acquiring processed signals.
The asset price at date $t$ is:

$$p_t = \mathbb{E}[\hat{V}|\Omega_t] = \Pr[\hat{V} = 1|\Omega_t],$$

where $\Omega_t$ is the market-maker’s information set at date $t$ ($\Omega_1 = \{f_1\}$ and $\Omega_2 = \{f_2, f_1\}$).

At date 0, the asset price is $p_0 = \mathbb{E}(V) = 1/2$. The highest and smallest possible realizations of the order flow at date $t$ are $f_t^{\max} = (1 + \alpha_t)$ (all investors are buyers at date $t$) and $f_t^{\min} = -(1 + \alpha_t)$ (all investors are sellers at date $t$).

We solve for the equilibrium of the model backward. That is, in the next section, we present speculators’ optimal trading strategies and equilibrium prices at dates 1 and 2, for given values of $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$. This allows us to compute the ex-ante (date 0) expected profits from trading on each type of signal. Armed with this result, we derive the equilibrium of the market for information at date 0 in Section 4, that is, we derive the equilibrium fees ($F_r$ and $F_p$) charged by information sellers and the equilibrium demand (i.e., $\alpha_1^*$ and $\alpha_2^*$) for each type of signal.

### 3 Equilibrium Trading Strategies and Prices

Let $\mu(s)$ be expected payoff of the asset at date 1 conditional on signal $s \in \{0, 1\}$. We have:

$$\mu(s) = \mathbb{E}[V|\tilde{s} = s] = \Pr[V = 1|\tilde{s} = s].$$

Hence:

$$\mu(1) = \frac{1 + \theta}{2} > \frac{1}{2} \quad \text{and} \quad \mu(0) = \frac{1 - \theta}{2} < \frac{1}{2}.$$

At date 1, the only source of information available to speculators who buy information from raw information sellers is $s$. Thus, we denote their trading strategy by $x_1(s)$ and their expected profit per capita conditional on the realization of the raw signal is:

$$\pi_1(\alpha_1, s) = x_1(s)(\mu(s) - \mathbb{E}[p_1|\tilde{s} = s]).$$

The next proposition provides the equilibrium of the market for the risky asset at date 1 and the ex-ante (date 0) expected trading profit for speculators who buy the raw signal.

**Proposition 1.** Let $\omega(x, \alpha_1) = \frac{\phi(x-\alpha_1)}{\phi(x-\alpha_1)+\phi(x+\alpha_1)}$. The equilibrium at date 1 is as follows:

1. Speculators receiving the raw signal buy the asset if $s = 1$ and sell it if $s = 0$
\[(x_1(0) = -1 \text{ and } x_1(1) = 1). \text{ Other speculators do not trade.}\]

2. The asset price is:

\[p^*_1(f_1) = \Pr[\tilde{V} = 1|\tilde{f}_1 = f_1] = \omega(f_1, \alpha_1)\mu(1) + (1 - \omega(f_1, \alpha_1))\mu(0), \quad (4)\]

for \(f_1 \in [f_1^{\min}, f_1^{\max}]\).

3. Thus, the ex-ante expected profit from trading on the raw signal is:

\[\bar{\pi}_1(\alpha_1) = E(\pi_1(\alpha_1, s)) = \frac{\theta}{2} \max\{1 - \alpha_1, 0\}. \quad (5)\]

Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the proposition, using the fact that the density of liquidity traders’ aggregate order, \(\phi(.)\), is uniform.

In Panel A, we show the equilibrium distribution of the aggregate order flow at date 1 for each realization of \(s\), given speculators’ trading strategy at this date. In Panel B, we show the equilibrium price of the asset for each realization of the order flow at date 1. When \(s = 0\), speculators who receive the raw signal sell the asset. Thus, their aggregate order is \(-\alpha_1\) and the largest possible realization of the order flow in this case is \((1 - \alpha_1)\) (when liquidity traders’ aggregate order is equal to 1). Thus, when the order flow at date 1 exceeds \((1 - \alpha_1)\), the market maker infers that \(s = 1\) and sets a price equal to \(\mu(1)\) (see Panel B in Figure 2). Symmetrically, if the order flow at date 1 is smaller than \(-\alpha_1\), the market maker infers that \(s = 0\) and sets a price equal to \(p_1 = \mu(0)\). Intermediate realizations of the order flow at date 1 (those in \([-1 + \alpha_1, 1 - \alpha_1]\)) have the same likelihood whether \(s = 1\) or \(s = 0\). Thus, they provide no information to the market maker and, for these realizations, the market maker sets a price equal to the ex-ante expected value of the asset, 1/2.

In sum, the order flow at date 1, \(\tilde{f}_1\), is either completely uninformative about the raw signal, \(s\), or fully revealing. In the former case, the return from date 0 to date 1, denoted \(r_1 = (p_1 - p_0)\), is zero. Otherwise this return is strictly positive if \(s = 1\) and strictly negative if \(s = 0\). Thus, the probability of a price movement at date 1 is given by the probability that the order flow is fully revealing, i.e., \(Min\{\alpha_1, 1\}\). This probability increases with the mass of speculators buying the raw signal, \(\alpha_1\), because, as their mass increases, their aggregate order size becomes larger relative to that of liquidity traders. Thus, speculators trading on the raw signal account for a larger fraction of the total order flow, which therefore becomes more informative. As a result, the price at date 1 becomes
Figure 2: Equilibrium at date 1

Panel A shows the distribution of the order flow at date 1. Panel B shows the equilibrium price at date 1 for each possible realization of the order flow.

(A) Distribution of the Order Flow at Date 1

(B) Equilibrium Price at Date 1

more responsive to trades at this date.

At $t = 2$, speculators who have purchased processed information receive the signal $(s, u)$, and observe $p_1$. Hence, we denote their trading strategy by $x_2(s, u, p_1)$ and their expected trading profit (per capita) is:

$$
\pi_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, s, u, p_1) = x_2(s, u, p_1)(E[V|u, s] - E[p_2|u, s, p_1]).
$$

In the rest of the paper, we denote by $\pi_2^c(\alpha_2)$ and $\pi_2^{nc}(\alpha_2)$, the expected profit of a
speculator who buys the processed signal conditional on (i) a change in the price at date 1 (i.e., \( p_1 \neq 1/2 \)) and (ii) no change in the price at date 1 (i.e., \( p_1 = p_0 = 1/2 \)), respectively.

**Proposition 2.** The equilibrium at date \( t = 2 \) is as follows:

1. Speculators receiving the processed signal \((s, 0)\) buy one share if the price in the first period is smaller than \(1/2\) (i.e., \( x_2(s, 0, p_1) = 1\) if \( p_1 < 1/2 \)); sell one share if the price in the first period is greater than \(1/2\) (i.e., \( x_2(s, 0, p_1) = -1\) if \( p_1 > 1/2 \)); and do not trade otherwise (i.e., \( x_2(s, 0, 1/2) = 0 \)). If instead they receive the signal \((s, 1)\), they buy one share if \( s = 1 \) (i.e., \( x_2(1, 1, p_1) = 1\)) and sell one share if \( s = 0 \) (i.e., \( x_2(0, 1, p_1) = -1 \)). Speculators who do not receive the processed signal do not trade at date 2.

2. If \( p_1 = \mu(1) = \frac{1+\theta}{2} \) then the asset price at date 2 is:

\[
p_2^*(f_2) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{2} & \text{if } f_2 \in [f_2^{min}, -1 + \alpha_2], \\
\frac{1+\theta}{2} & \text{if } f_2 \in [-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2], \\
1 & \text{if } f_2 \in [1 - \alpha_2, f_2^{max}].
\end{cases}
\]

3. If \( p_1 = \mu(0) = \frac{1-\theta}{2} \) then the asset price at date 2 is:

\[
p_2^*(f_2) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } f_2 \in [f_2^{min}, -1], \\
\frac{1-\theta}{2} & \text{if } f_2 \in [-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2], \\
\frac{1}{2} & \text{if } f_2 \in [1 - \alpha_2, f_2^{max}].
\end{cases}
\]

4. If \( p_1 = \frac{1}{2} \) then the asset price at date 2 is:

\[
p_2^*(f_2) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } f_2 \in [f_2^{min}, -1], \\
\frac{1-\theta}{2} & \text{if } f_2 \in [-1, \text{\text{Min}}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}], \\
\frac{1}{2} & \text{if } f_2 \in \text{\text{Max}}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}], \frac{1}{2}, \text{\text{min}}, \text{\text{max}}], \\
1 & \text{if } f_2 \in [1, f_2^{max}].
\end{cases}
\]

5. The ex-ante expected profit of speculators who buy the processed signal, \( \pi_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) \equiv \)
The trading decision of speculators who receive the processed signal at date 2 depends on whether \( u = 1 \) or \( u = 0 \). When \( u = 1 \), the processed signal confirms the raw signal \( s \). Thus, speculators trade on the processed signal as they trade on the raw signal, i.e., they buy the asset if \( s = 1 \) (the asset payoff is high) and sell it if \( s = 0 \) (the asset payoff is zero). Thus, conditional on \( u = 1 \), speculators’ trading decision at date 2 is independent from the price of the asset at the end of the first period.

In contrast, when \( u = 0 \), the processed signal invalidates the raw signal and speculators receiving the processed signal expect the payoff of the asset to be \( 1/2 \). Their trading decision is then determined by the latest price of the asset, i.e., \( p_1 \). If \( p_1 > 1/2 \), they optimally sell the asset because they expect that, on average, their sell orders will execute at a price greater than their valuation for the asset (1/2). Symmetrically, if \( p_1 < 1/2 \), they optimally buy the asset. Finally, if \( p_1 = 1/2 \) and \( u = 0 \), not trading is weakly dominant for speculators who receive the processed signal because they expect their order to execute at a price equal to their valuation for the asset, i.e., \( 1/2 \).

Panel A of Figure 3 shows the possible equilibrium path paths when \( s = 1 \) (the case in which \( s = 0 \) is symmetric) and the transition probabilities from the price obtained at date 1 to the price at date 2, assuming that \( \alpha_1 \leq 1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \leq 1 \).\(^{15}\) The unconditional probability of a given price path in equilibrium is obtained by multiplying the conditional likelihood of this path by \( 1/2 \) because \( s = 1 \) or \( s = 0 \) with equal probabilities. Panel B shows the distribution of the aggregate order flow at date 2 when \( p_1 = 1/2 \), conditional on each realization of the processed signal. As we shall see shortly, it is useful to understand

\[ E[\pi_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, s, u, p_1)], \text{ is:} \]

\[ \bar{\pi}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = \alpha_1 \pi_2^c(\alpha_2) + (1 - \alpha_1) \pi_2^{nc}(\alpha_2), \quad (6) \]

where \( \pi_2^c(\alpha_2) = \max\{\theta(1 - \theta)(1 - \alpha_2), 0\} \) and

\[ \pi_2^{nc}(\alpha_2) = \begin{cases} \frac{\theta}{2(2 - \theta)}(2 - \theta - \alpha_2) & \text{if } \alpha_2 \leq 1 \\ \frac{\theta}{2 - \theta}(2 - \alpha_2) & \text{if } 1 < \alpha_2 \leq 1, \\ 0 & \text{if } \alpha_2 > 2, \end{cases} \quad (7) \]

\(^{16}\)The reason is that, in this case, speculators expect (i) liquidity traders’ aggregate demand for the asset to be zero on average and (ii) other speculators’ demand for the asset to be zero as well. Hence, a speculator expects the price at date 2 to be identical to the price at date 1 because his demand is negligible compared to speculators’ aggregate demand.

\(^{17}\)Transition probabilities are different when \( \alpha_2 > 1 \), which may happen in equilibrium; see next section.
Figure 3: Equilibrium at date 1

Panel A shows the possible equilibrium paths when $s = 1$. Panel B shows the distribution of the order flow at date 2 for each possible realization of the processed signal when $p_1 = p_0 = 1/2$.

(A) Equilibrium price dynamics when $s=1$

(B) Equilibrium Distribution of the Order Flow at Date 2

the distribution of equilibrium prices at date 2 when $p_1 = 1/2$.

When $s = 1$, speculators who receive the raw signal buy the asset at date 1 and, with probability $\alpha_1$, the market maker infers from the order flow that $s = 1$ and sets a price equal to $p_1 = \mu(1) = \frac{1+\theta}{2} > p_0$. In this case, after trading at date 1, the only remaining source of uncertainty for the market maker is about $u$. At date 2, with probability $\theta$,
the processed signal confirms the raw signal (i.e., \((s, u) = (1, 1)\)). Hence, speculators who receive this signal also buy the asset and, with probability \(\alpha_2\), their demand is so strong that the market maker infers that \(V = 1\). Hence, the price goes up at date 2 relative to the price at date 1. The overall unconditional probability of two consecutive up movements in the price is therefore \((\theta \alpha_1 \alpha_2)/2\). Alternatively, with probability \((1 - \theta)\), the processed signal invalidates the raw signal (i.e., \((s, u) = (1, 0)\)). Hence, speculators sell the asset in period 2 because, given their information, it is overpriced. In this case, with probability \(\alpha_2\), their supply is strong enough to push the price back to its initial level and they in fact correct the noise injected by speculators at date 1 into prices. Thus, the unconditional probability of an up price movement followed by a down movement is \(((1 - \theta) \alpha_1 \alpha_2)/2\). Finally, in either case, there is a probability \((1 - \alpha_2)\) that the order flow at date 2 is uninformative. In this case, the price at date 2 is equal to the price at date 1.

When \(s = 1\) and the market maker does not learn \(s\) from trades at date 1, his inference problem at date 2 is more complex since he then knows neither \(s\), nor \(u\). This explains why the set of possible realizations for the equilibrium price at date 2 is richer when there is no price change at date 1. For instance, suppose that the market observes a realization of the aggregate order flow at date 2 in the interval \([-1, -1 + \alpha_2]\). As panel B of Figure 3 shows, this realization is consistent with three possible realizations of the processed signal \((1, 0), (0, 0), \) or \((0, 1)\). Moreover, for these realizations of the processed signal, all realizations of the aggregate order flow in the interval \([-1, -1 + \alpha_2]\) are equally likely, and therefore they provides no information at all about which signal has been realized. This leads the market maker to set a price equal to \(p_2 = E(v \mid (s, u) \in \{(1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 1)\}) = (1 - \theta)/(2 - \theta)\). This explains why, even though \(s = 1\), the price might decrease from date 1 to date 2 when it has not changed at date 1.

The expected profit from trading on a given signal (raw or processed) decreases with the number of speculators buying this signal (that is, \(\frac{\partial \pi_1(\alpha_1)}{\partial \alpha_1} \leq 0\) and \(\frac{\partial \pi_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)}{\partial \alpha_2} \leq 0\)). Indeed, as more speculators trade on a signal, the order flow (or price) becomes more informative about this signal and, as a result, expected profit from trading on this signal drops. For instance, when \(\alpha_1\) increases, the expected profit of trading on raw information declines because, as explained previously, the likelihood that the order flow reveals speculators’ signal at date 1 becomes higher. This substitution effect is standard in models of informed trading (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) or Kyle (1985)).

\[\text{When the demand for a given signal exceeds a threshold, speculators trading on this signal makes zero expected trading profits. For instance, when } \alpha_1 \geq 1, \text{ the expected profit from trading on the raw signal is zero.}\]
More surprisingly, the next corollary shows that investors trading on the processed signal can in fact benefit from a more informative price at date 1. That is, for some parameter values, their expected profit is higher when the market maker learns the raw signal at date 1 (and adjusts his price accordingly) than when he does not. Let denote 
\[ \hat{\alpha}_2(\theta) = \frac{(1-2\theta)(2-\theta)}{2(2-3\theta+\theta^2)-1}. \]
Observe that \( \hat{\alpha}_2(\theta) > 0 \) iff \( \theta < 1/2 \) and that \( \hat{\alpha}_2(\theta) \) goes to \( 2/3 \) as \( \theta \) goes to zero.

**Corollary 1.** The expected profit from trading on the processed signal is larger when the market maker learns the raw signal (the order flow is fully revealing) at date 1 than when he does not (i.e., \( \pi_2^c(\alpha_2) > \pi_2^{nc}(\alpha_2) \)) when \( \alpha_2 < \hat{\alpha}_2(\theta) \) and \( \theta \leq 1/2 \). Otherwise it is smaller.

The intuition for this finding is as follows. Suppose that the price reflects the raw signal at the end of period 1. If this signal is valid then speculators receiving the processed signal obtain a smaller expected profit than if the price had not changed. Indeed, the price has partially adjusted in the direction of the value of the asset, which reduces the return on trading of the processed signal. This is a standard mechanism in models of information acquisition. However, the logic is reversed if the raw signal is noise. Indeed, if the price at date 1 reflects the raw signal, speculators receiving the processed signal can make a profit by correcting the noise in the price, either by selling the asset if the price increased in the last period or buying it if the price decreased. This profit opportunity does not exist if the price has not changed at date 1. For this reason, if the raw signal is noise, speculators receiving the processed signal are better off when the price reflects the raw signal at date 1 than when it does not. If the likelihood that the signal is noise is large enough (\( \theta \leq 1/2 \)) and competition among speculators receiving the processed signal is not too intense (\( \alpha_2 < \hat{\alpha}_2(\theta) \)) then this second effect dominates and, on average, speculators obtain a larger profit when the first period price reflects the raw signal than when it does not.

The previous result implies that an increase in the demand for the raw signal can have a positive effect on the expected profit of speculators who received the processed signal. This effect again is non standard. Indeed, in standard models of trading with

---

signal, \( s \), is nil because the mass of speculators trading on signal is so large relative to the mass of liquidity traders that the order flow at date 1 is always fully revealing (the interval \([-1 + \alpha_1, 1 - \alpha_1]\) is empty). For a similar reason, the expected profit from trading on the processed signal, \((s,u)\), is zero when the mass of speculators trading on the processed signal is twice the mass of liquidity traders, i.e., when \( \alpha_2 \geq 2 \). The trading strategy that exploits the processed signal has a larger “capacity” (break even for a larger number of speculators) because it is more difficult for market makers to infer information about the processed signal from the order flow.
asymmetric information, the expected profit of informed investors usually decrease with the mass of informed investors. In contrast, in our setting, an increase in the mass of raw information speculators can in fact result in larger expected profits for speculators who receive the processed signal.

To see this, observe that the marginal effect of an increase in the demand for the raw signal on the unconditional expected profit of trading on the processed signal (given by eq. (6)) is:

$$\frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)}{\partial \alpha_1} = \pi_c^2(\alpha_2) - \pi_{nc}^2(\alpha_2).$$

(8)

Thus, if $\pi_c^2(\alpha_2) > \pi_{nc}^2(\alpha_2)$, an increase in the demand for the raw signal ($\alpha_1$) increases the unconditional expected profit of trading on the processed signal. Intuitively, it raises the likelihood that the price will reflect the raw signal in the first period. This is beneficial for speculators who trade on the processed signal if their expected profit is higher conditional on change in price in the first period (the price reflects the raw signal) than conditional on no change in price, that is, if $\alpha_2 < \hat{\alpha}_2(\theta)$ and $\theta \leq 1/2$. The next corollary follows.

**Corollary 2.** The expected profit from trading on the processed signal, $\bar{\pi}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$, increases with the demand for the raw signal, $\alpha_1$, if and only if $\alpha_2 < \hat{\alpha}_2(\theta)$ and $\theta \leq 1/2$.

In sum, an increase in the demand for the raw signal ($\alpha_1$) can either strengthen or lower the value of the processed signal (i.e., the expected profit from trading on this signal). Thus, an increase in the equilibrium demand for the raw signal could either increase or reduce the demand for the processed signal. To study this issue, we analyze the equilibrium in the markets for the raw and the processed information in the next section.
An increase in the demand for the raw signal reduces the value of the processed signal.

Figure 4: This figure plots the curve that represents the function $\hat{\alpha}_2(\theta)$ and shows the sets of values of $\theta$ and $\alpha_2$ for which a marginal increase in the demand for the raw signal ($\alpha_1$) increases or decreases the value of the processed signal for speculators (Corollary 2).

4 Equilibrium in the Market for Information

In this section, we derive the fees charged by information sellers and the resulting equilibrium demands ($\alpha_2^*$ and $\alpha_1^*$) for each type of signal. Several authors have observed that the cost of discovering information has a large fixed cost component and a negligible marginal cost of reproduction and therefore dissemination (see, for instance, Shapiro and Varian (1999) or Veldkamp (2011), Chapter 8 and references therein). For instance, Shapiro and Varian (1999) write (on page 21): “Information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce [...]. This cost structure leads to substantial economies of scale.” Thus, as in Veldkamp (2006a,b), we assume that information sellers bear a fixed cost to produce their signal (denoted $C_p$ for the seller of the processed signal and $C_r$ for seller of the raw signal) and zero cost to distribute it. For instance, $C_r$ represents the cost of collecting raw data and designing an algorithm to extract the raw signal $s$ from these data. This cost is independent from the number of buyers of the raw signal and the marginal cost of distributing the signal to an extra buyer is zero.\footnote{Consider a firm like iSentium (see http://www.iSENTIUM.com/) that specializes in selling investment signals extracted from social medias, like tweeter. For this firm, the total cost of producing a signal will comprise the cost of subscribing to the complete Twitter stream ($\$30,000$ a month; see “How investors are using social medias to make money”, Fortune, December 2015)) and developing algorithms.
As in Veldkamp (2006a,b), we also assume that markets for information are competitive and perfectly contestable. This means that, in equilibrium, the buyers and the seller of a given signal make zero expected profits. We first derive the equilibrium in the market for the processed signal, holding the demand for the raw signal ($\alpha_1$) fixed. This is without loss of generality because the equilibrium value of $\alpha_1$ is independent of the equilibrium value of $\alpha_2$ (while the reverse is not true; see below). Thus, $\alpha_1$ can be treated as a parameter in the analysis of the equilibrium of the market for the processed signal.

From the viewpoint of each speculator, the cost of the processed signal is the fee charged by seller of this processed signal, $F_p$. Each speculator takes this fee as given and views it as constant per speculator. Let $\pi_2^{net}(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, F_p) = \pi_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) - F_p$ be the expected profit from trading on the processed signal in equilibrium net of the fee paid to obtain this signal. Moreover, let $\Pi_{seller}^2(\alpha_2, F_p) = \alpha_2 \times F_p - C_p$ be the expected profit of the seller of processed information. Finally let $(F^e_p, \alpha^e_2)$ be the equilibrium fee and the equilibrium demand for the processed signal. We say that the market for the processed signal is active if $\alpha^e_2 > 0$.

If the market for the processed signal is active, in a competitive equilibrium, the demand for the processed signal and the fee charged for this signal must be such that the speculators buying the processed signal and the seller of this signal just break even. That is, $(F^e_p, \alpha^e_2)$ solve:

Zero profit for speculators: $\pi_2^{net}(\alpha_1, \alpha^e_2, F^e_p) = \pi_2(\alpha_1, \alpha^e_2) - F^e_p = 0$. \hspace{1cm} (9)

and

Zero profit for the information seller: $\Pi_{seller}^2(\alpha^e_2, F^e_p) = \alpha^e_2 \times F^e_p - C_p = 0$. \hspace{1cm} (10)

Condition (9) implies that, at equilibrium, a speculator who does not buy the processed signal is not strictly better off doing so while a speculator buying it is not strictly worse off doing so (taking other speculators’ decisions and the fee for information as given). Obviously, if these conditions were not satisfied, then $\alpha^e_2$ would not be the equilibrium demand for the processed signal since either additional speculators would buy the signal or some buyers of the signal would prefer not to buy it. Condition (10) is necessary to preclude profitable entry by another seller of the processed signal. It is
to extract signals from this stream. These costs do not depend on the number of subscribers and correspond to $C_r$ in our model. iSentium charges a fee of 15,000 per month to each subscriber buying its signals. This corresponds to the fee $F_r$ in our model.
also sufficient to preclude such entry if $F^e_p$ is the smallest possible fee among all possible equilibrium fees. Thus, when there are multiple solutions $(F^e_p, \alpha^e_2)$ to eq.(9) and (10), we select the one with the smallest fee, since other fees could profitably be undercut by another information seller.

When the market for the processed signal is active, Condition (9) implies that the aggregate net expected profit (denoted $\pi^{net,a}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha^e_2)$) of speculators buying the processed signal is zero. Thus, using eq.(11), we deduce that $\alpha^e_2$ is an interior equilibrium if and only if it solves:

$$\pi^{net,a}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha^e_2) = \alpha^e_2 \pi^{net}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha^e_2, F^e_p) = \pi^{gloss,a}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha^e_2) - C_p = 0,$$

(11)

where $\pi^{gloss,a}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = \alpha_2 \pi^{a}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$ denotes the equilibrium aggregate gross expected profit for speculators trading on the processed signal, for a given value of $\alpha_1$. Condition (11) is equivalent to:

$$\pi^{gloss,a}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha^e_2) = C_p.$$

(12)

Thus, when the market for the processed signal is active, the equilibrium demand for this signal is such that the aggregate gross expected profit of speculators buying this signal is equal to its production cost.

![Figure 5](image_url)

**Figure 5:** This figure represents speculators’ aggregate gross expected profit from trading on the processed signal as a function of the demand for this signal, $\alpha_2$.

Speculators’ aggregate gross expected profit, $\pi^{gloss,a}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$, is hump-shaped in the demand for the processed signal, $\alpha_2$, holding $\alpha_1$ fixed (see Figure 5). We denote by $\alpha^{max}_2(\alpha_1, \theta)$ the demand for the processed signal that maximizes the aggregate gross
expected trading profit from trading on this signal. Using eq. (6), we obtain:

\[ \alpha_2^{\text{max}}(\alpha_1, \theta) = \frac{(2 - \theta)(1 - (2\theta - 1)\alpha_1)}{2(1 + (2(2 - \theta)(1 - \theta) - 1)\alpha_1)}, \]

which is always less than 1. We deduce from eq. (6) that the maximum aggregate gross expected trading profit from trading on the processed signal, denoted \( C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1) \), is:

\[ C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1) \equiv \pi_{\text{gross,a}}^{\alpha_2, \alpha_2^{\text{max}}}(\alpha_1, \alpha_2^{\text{max}}) = \frac{\theta(1 - (2\theta - 1)\alpha_1)\alpha_2^{\text{max}}}{4}. \]

First, consider the case in which \( C_p < C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1) \), as assumed in Figure 5. For \( \alpha_2 \in [\alpha_2^{\text{max}}, 2] \), speculators’ aggregate gross expected profit decreases in \( \alpha_2 \) from \( C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1) \) to zero. Thus, there is a unique \( \alpha_2^* \in (\alpha_2^{\text{max}}, 2) \) solving eq. (12) for \( 0 < C_p < C_{\text{max}} \). In general, as Figure 5 shows, there is another value of \( \alpha_2 \), denoted \( \alpha_2^{**} \), solving eq. (12). This value is necessarily on the increasing segment of speculators’ aggregate gross expected profit (see Figure 5) since \( \alpha_2^* \) is the unique solution on the decreasing segment, as we just explained. Thus, \( \alpha_2^{**} < \alpha_2^{\text{max}} < \alpha_2^* \).

Therefore, either \( \alpha_2^e = \alpha_2^* \) or \( \alpha_2^e = \alpha_2^{**} \) when the market for processed information is active. In the former case, the zero expected profit condition for the information seller imposes \( F_2^e = C_p/\alpha_2^* \) while in the latter it imposes \( F_2^e = C_p/\alpha_2^{**} \). Thus, the information seller’s fee is smaller in the first case since \( \alpha_2^{**} < \alpha_2^* \). Thus, the unique competitive equilibrium of the market for processed information is \( (\alpha_2^e, F_2^e) = (\alpha_2^*, C_p/\alpha_2^*) \). Of course, this equilibrium can be reached only if the mass of speculators, \( \bar{\alpha} \), is larger than \( \alpha_2^* \), which is always the case when \( \bar{\alpha} \geq 2 \) since \( \alpha_2^* < 2 \). Henceforth, we therefore assume that \( \bar{\alpha} \geq 2 \). We show in the on-line appendix that the main findings are unchanged when \( \bar{\alpha} < 2 \).

Now consider the case in which \( C_p \geq C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1) \). In this case, eq. (12) has no solution because, for any \( \alpha_2 \), the gross aggregate profit from trading on the processed signal is smaller than \( C_p \) (see Figure 5). Thus, there is no fee for the processed signal at which transactions between the buyers and the seller of the processed signal are mutually profitable. Consequently, when \( C_p \geq C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1) \), the market for the processed signal is inactive, i.e., \( \alpha_2^e = 0 \).

The next lemma summarizes the previous discussion by providing the closed form solution for the equilibrium demand for the processed signal, \( \alpha_2^e \), and the corresponding fee charged by the seller of this signal.

**Lemma 1.** Let \( C_{\text{min}}(\theta, \alpha_1) = \frac{\eta(1-\theta)(1-\alpha_1)}{2(2-\theta)} \). The competitive equilibrium of the market for
the processed signal is unique.

1. If \( C_p < C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1) \), the equilibrium demand for the processed signal is:

\[
\alpha^e_2(\theta, \alpha_1, C_p) = \begin{cases} 
\alpha^\text{max}_2(\theta, \alpha_1) \left(1 + \sqrt{1 - \frac{C_p}{C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1)}}\right) & \text{if } C_{\text{min}}(\theta, \alpha_1) \leq C_p \leq C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1), \\
1 + \sqrt{1 - \frac{C_p}{C_{\text{min}}(\theta, \alpha_1)}} & \text{if } 0 \leq C_p < C_{\text{min}}(\theta, \alpha_1),
\end{cases}
\]

and the equilibrium fee for the processed signal is \( F^e_p = \frac{C_p}{\alpha^e_2} \).

2. If \( C_p > C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1) \), there is no fee at which the seller and the buyers of the processed signal can trade in a mutually beneficial way. Thus, the processed signal is not produced in equilibrium and therefore \( \alpha^e_2 = 0 \).

Not surprisingly, as the fixed cost of producing the processed signal declines (starting from \( C_{\text{max}} \)), the fee charged by the seller of the processed signal falls and, therefore, the mass of speculators buying this signal increases (\( \frac{\partial \alpha^e_2}{\partial C_p} \geq 0 \); see Figure 5).

The next proposition provides the equilibrium of the market for the raw signal. As the derivation of this equilibrium is similar and simpler than that of the equilibrium of the market for the processed signal, we relegate the proof of Lemma 2 to the on-line appendix for brevity.

**Lemma 2.** The competitive equilibrium of the market for the raw signal is unique.

1. If \( C_r < \frac{\theta}{8} \), the equilibrium demand for the raw signal is:

\[
\alpha^e_1(\theta, C_r) = \frac{1}{2} + \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} - \frac{2C_r}{\theta}} \tag{15}
\]

and the equilibrium price of the raw signal is \( F^e_r = \frac{C_r}{\alpha^e_1} \).

2. If \( C_r \geq \frac{\theta}{8} \), there is no fee at which the seller and the buyers of the raw signal can trade in a mutually beneficial way. Thus, the raw signal is not produced in equilibrium and therefore \( \alpha^e_1 = 0 \).

Thus, in equilibrium, the demand for the raw signal, \( \alpha^e_1 \), increases when the cost of producing this signal decreases. Through this channel, a decrease in the cost of producing the raw signal, \( C_r \), has also an effect on the equilibrium demand for the processed signal since the latter is influenced by the demand for the raw signal (see Corollary 2). The next corollary analyzes this effect. Let \( \tilde{C}_r(\theta) = \frac{\theta}{2} \left( \frac{1}{4} - \max \left( \frac{(1-\theta)^2+\theta^2}{(1-2\theta)(2(1-\theta)(2-\theta)-1)} - \frac{1}{2}, 0 \right) \right) \) and \( \tilde{C}_p(\theta) = \frac{\theta(1-\theta)^2(2-\theta)(1-2\theta)}{(2(1-\theta)(2-\theta)-1)^2} \).
Proposition 3. 1. For $\theta > \frac{\sqrt{2}-1}{\sqrt{2}}$, a decrease in the cost of producing the raw signal reduces the equilibrium demand for the processed signal ($\frac{\partial \alpha_2}{\partial C_r} > 0$).

2. For $\theta \leq \frac{\sqrt{2}-1}{\sqrt{2}}$, a decrease in the cost of the raw signal increases the equilibrium demand for the processed signal (i.e., $\frac{\partial \alpha_2}{\partial C_r} < 0$) if $C_r < \bar{C}_r(\theta)$ and $C_p > \bar{C}_p(\theta)$. Otherwise, a decrease in the cost of the raw signal reduces the equilibrium demand for the processed signal.

As shown in Corollary 2, an increase in the demand for the raw signal can either reduce or increase the gross expected profit from trading on the processed signal. It increases this profit if and only if $\alpha_2^e < \hat{\alpha}_2(\theta)$ (see Corollary 2). In the proof of Proposition 3, we show that this condition is equivalent to $\theta \leq \frac{\sqrt{2}-1}{\sqrt{2}}$, $C_r < \bar{C}_r(\theta)$, and $C_p > \bar{C}_p(\theta)$. In this case, a decrease in the cost of the raw signal triggers, directly, an increase in the equilibrium demand for the raw signal and thereby, indirectly, an increase in the expected profit from trading on the processed signal, holding the demand for this signal constant. As a result, the demand for the processed signal increases.

Otherwise (e.g., when $\theta > \frac{\sqrt{2}-1}{\sqrt{2}}$), an increase in the demand for the raw signal undermines the expected gross profit from trading on the processed signal. Consequently, in this case, the demand for the processed signal declines when the cost of the raw signal decreases. Figure 6 illustrates this point by showing the equilibrium demand for the processed signal for two different levels (high and low) of the cost of producing the raw signal.
Figure 6: This figure represents speculators’ aggregate profit from trading on the processed signal as a function of the demand for this signal for two different values of the cost of producing the raw signal: (i) high, in which case the equilibrium demand for the raw signal is denoted by $\alpha_{1,\text{high}}$ and (ii) low, in which case the equilibrium demand for the raw signal is denoted by $\alpha_{1,\text{low}}$. The corresponding equilibrium demands for the processed signal in each case are, respectively, $\alpha_2^*(\alpha_{1,\text{high}})$ and $\alpha_2^*(\alpha_{1,\text{low}})$.

As the next corollary shows, this effect can lead to a complete breakdown in the market for the processed signal (a discontinuous drop to zero of the demand for this signal), even though this market would exist in the absence of a market for the raw signal.

**Proposition 4.** Suppose $\theta > \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}}$ and $\frac{\theta(1-\theta)}{4} < C_p < \frac{\theta(2-\theta)}{8}$. There exists a threshold $\hat{C}_r(\theta, C_p)$ (defined in the proof of the proposition) such that if $C_r \geq \hat{C}_r$, $\alpha_2^* \geq \bar{\alpha}_2^{\max} > 0$ while if $C_r < \hat{C}_r$, $\alpha_2^* = 0$.

Thus, the demand for the processed signal discontinuously drops to zero when $C_r$ passes below $\hat{C}_r(\theta, C_p)$. Indeed, as the cost of producing the raw signal declines, more speculators choose to buy this signal, which reduces the expected return from trading on the processed signal when $\theta > \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}}$. If the cost of producing the raw signal is just equal to the threshold $\hat{C}_r$, the largest possible value for the gross expected trading profit of speculators trading on the processed signal is just equal to the cost of producing this signal, $C_p$. At this point, any further decrease in the cost of the raw signal implies that the aggregate gross expected trading profit for speculators trading on the processed signal is smaller than the cost of producing this signal. Thus, there is no price at which the sellers and buyers of the processed signal can find profitable to trade together. Hence, the market for the process signal is not viable when $C_r < \hat{C}_r(\theta, C_p)$ and therefore ceases to exist.
Figure 7 illustrates this result. As the cost of producing the raw signal, $C_r$ declines, the demand for this signal increases in equilibrium (dotted line) while the demand for the processed signal declines (plain line). At $C_r = \hat{C}_r \approx 0.06$, the demand for the processed signal discontinuously drops from $\alpha_2^* \approx 0.6$ to zero.

Figure 7: Equilibrium demands for the raw signal (red dotted line) and the processed signal (blue thick line) as a function of the cost of raw information $C_r$ (X-axis), with $\theta = 0.75$ and $C_p = 0.06$

5 Implications

5.1 Price Informativeness

We now study how a change in the cost of producing the raw signal affects price informativeness. In the absence of informed trading at dates 1 and 2 ($\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 0$), the asset price at each date is constant ($p_0 = p_1 = p_2 = 1/2$) and is therefore completely uninformative about the asset payoff. In this benchmark case, the average squared pricing error (the difference between the asset payoff and its price) is therefore $E[(\tilde{V} - p_0)^2] = 1/4$ at dates 1 and 2. We measure price informativeness at date $t$, denoted $\mathcal{E}_t(C_r, C_p)$, by the difference between the average pricing error in the benchmark case (completely uninformative prices) and the average pricing error at date $t$ in equilibrium, i.e., by:

$$\mathcal{E}_t(C_r, C_p) = \frac{1}{4} - E[(\tilde{V} - p_t^*)^2]$$

(16)

The more informative is the price at date $t$ in equilibrium, the higher is $\mathcal{E}_t(C_r, C_p)$. The highest possible value for $\mathcal{E}_t(C_r, C_p)$ is obtained if the price at date $t$ is fully informative ($p_t = V$) and is therefore equal to $1/4$. The smallest possible value is equal to zero and is
obtained when the price at date \( t \) is uninformative.\(^{20}\) Thus, \( \mathcal{E}_t(C_r, C_p) \) belongs to \([0, 1/4] \).

We refer to \( \mathcal{E}_1(C_r, C_p) \) as price informativeness in the short run and to \( \mathcal{E}_2(C_r, C_p) \) as price informativeness in the long run where the notion of short and long run are defined relative to the moment at which new raw information becomes available. Intuitively, long run price informativeness is at least equal to short run price informativeness because the market maker has at least as much information at date 2 than he has at date 1 (\( \Omega_1 \subset \Omega_2 \)). It is strictly higher (i.e., \( \mathcal{E}_2(C_r, C_p) > \mathcal{E}_1(C_r, C_p) \)) when \( \alpha_2^e > 0 \) because trades at date 2 contain new information if some speculators trade on the processed signal. Otherwise, if \( \alpha_2^e = 0 \), long run price informativeness is equal to short run price informativeness because \( p_2^* = p_1^* \) with certainty.

The next corollary studies how a change in the cost of producing the processed signal \( (C_p) \) affects price informativeness in equilibrium (i.e., accounting for the effects of a change in this cost on fees and demands for the processed and the raw signals).

**Corollary 3.** A reduction in the cost of the processed signal has no effect on short run price informativeness \( (\frac{\partial \mathcal{E}_1(C_r, C_p)}{\partial C_p} = 0) \) while it (weakly) increases long run price informativeness \( (\frac{\partial \mathcal{E}_2(C_r, C_p)}{\partial C_p} \leq 0 \)).

A decrease in the cost of producing the processed signal raises the demand for the processed signal in equilibrium and therefore leads to more informative prices at date 2. This effect is standard in models with endogenous information acquisition (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)): when the cost of information production falls, the demand for information increases and prices become more informative.

Our main new result regarding price informativeness is that this logic does not necessarily apply when one considers a decline in the cost of producing the raw signal \( (C_r) \). Indeed, even though a decline in this cost improves price informativeness in the short run, it can impair long run price informativeness.

**Proposition 5.** A reduction in the cost of the raw signal (weakly) increases short run price informativeness \( (\frac{\partial \mathcal{E}_1(C_r, C_p)}{\partial C_r} \leq 0) \). However, its effect on long run price informativeness is ambiguous. Specifically, suppose that (i) \( \theta > \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}} \) or (ii) \( \theta \leq \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}} \) and (ii.a) \( C_r > \tilde{C}_r(\theta) \), or (ii.b) \( C_p < \tilde{C}_p(\theta) \). In these cases, a reduction in the cost of producing the raw signal reduces long run price informativeness when (a) \( C_p \leq C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1^e) \) or (b) \( C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1^e) \leq C_p \leq C_{\max}(\theta, \alpha_1^e) \) and \( \Upsilon(\alpha_1^e, \alpha_2^e, \theta, C_p) > 0 \) (a function defined in the

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\(^{20}\)As As \( p_t = E[V|\Omega_t] \), we have \( E[(\tilde{V} - p_t^*)^2] = E[Var(V|\Omega_t)] \). Thus, \( \mathcal{E}_t(C_r, C_p) = Var(V) - E[Var(V|\Omega_t)] \). Hence, price informativeness at date \( t \) is higher when, on average, the price at this date provides a more accurate signal of the asset payoff.
proof of the proposition). Otherwise it increases long run price informativeness when \( C_p \geq C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha^*_1) \).

Short run price informativeness increases when the cost of producing the raw signal declines because it leads more speculators to buy this signal. As the raw signal is not always noise (\( \theta > 0 \), as otherwise no investor buys the raw signal), the increase in the mass of speculators trading on the raw signal makes the asset price more informative at date 1. However, when (i) \( \theta > \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}} \) or (ii) \( \theta \leq \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}} \) and (ii.a) \( C_r > \bar{C}_r(\theta) \), or (ii.b) \( C_p < \bar{C}_p(\theta) \), this effect triggers a drop in the demand for the processed signal because it reduces the expected profit from trading on this signal (see Corollary 3 and Figure 7). This indirect effect of a reduction in the cost of the raw signal tends to decrease long run price informativeness.

This second effect dominates for a large range of parameter values. That is, in many cases, a reduction in the cost of the raw signal leads to a drop in long run price informativeness (a drop in \( E_2(C_r, C_p) \)), despite its positive effect on short run price informativeness. Figure 8 illustrates this finding by showing the evolution of \( E_1(C_r, C_p) \) and \( E_2(C_r, C_p) \) as a function of the cost of raw information, \( C_r \), for specific parameter values.

\[ \begin{array}{c}
0.00 & 0.02 & 0.04 & 0.06 & 0.08 & 0.10 & 0.12 \\
0.00 & 0.05 & 0.10 & 0.15 \\
\end{array} \]

**Figure 8:** Price informativeness in the short run (red dotted line) and the long run (blue thick line) as a function of the cost of raw information \( C_r \) (X-axis), with \( \theta = 0.75 \) and \( C_p = 0.06 \)

When the cost of raw information, \( C_r \), is large, there is no trading on raw information \( (\alpha^*_1 = 0) \) and the demand for the processed signal is relatively high. As the cost of the raw signal declines, the demand for this signal starts increasing and consequently the demand for the processed signal, \( \alpha^*_2 \), decreases (see Figure 7). Short run price informativeness increases but long run price informativeness declines (see Figure 8). When \( C_r = \bar{C}_r \simeq 0.06 \), the gross aggregate expected profit from trading on the processed signal is just equal
to the cost of producing this signal. At this point, if \( C_r \) decreases further, the demand for the processed signal discontinuously drops to zero (as implied by Corollary 4) and long run price informativeness drops discontinuously as well and becomes just equal to short run price informativeness. As \( C_r \) keeps declining, the demand for the raw signal increases. Hence, short run price informativeness improves and long run price informativeness does as well. Indeed, short run and long run price informativeness are now equal because there is no further investment in discovering the payoff of the asset after date 1.

Interestingly, even if \( C_r = 0 \) (i.e., \( \alpha_e^1 = 1 \)), price informativeness at date 2 is smaller than when the cost of producing the raw signal is so high \( (C_r \geq \frac{\theta}{8}) \) that there is no demand for the raw signal \( (\alpha_e^1 = 0) \). For instance, for the parameter values considered in Figure 8, \( \mathcal{E}_2(0, C_p) = 0.14 \) while \( \mathcal{E}_2(C_r, C_p) = 0.17 \) for \( C_r \geq \frac{\theta}{8} \). The next proposition shows that this conclusion holds more generally.

Proposition 6. When \( 0 < C_p \leq \frac{\theta(2-\theta)(1-(2\theta-1)^2)}{8} \), long run price informativeness is always smaller when the raw signal is free \( (C_r = 0) \) than when it is so costly that no investor buys it in equilibrium \( (C_r > \frac{\theta}{8}) \).

Arguably, progress in information technologies have reduced both the cost of accessing raw data and information processing costs. However, as Proposition 6 shows, this evolution does not imply that long run price informativeness should improve. Indeed, for any level of the cost of producing the processed signal, if \( \theta < 1 \), there is always a sufficiently low value of the cost of producing the raw signal such that long run price informativeness is smaller than if there were no trading on the raw signal.

Parts 1 and 3 of Proposition 5 hold for all parameter values. Part 2 requires the conditions on parameters that are stated in the proposition. When these conditions do not hold then a reduction in the cost of producing the raw signal improves long run price informativeness because it raises the expected trading profit from trading on the processed signal and thereby the demand for this signal (see Corollary 3).

The arrival of public news in financial markets (e.g., earnings announcements) offer trading opportunities for speculators because news often need to be interpreted and processed (see, for instance, Engelberg et al. (2012) for supporting evidence). One way to test our predictions is therefore to consider the evolution price informativeness after news arrival for a firm. For instance, suppose public news arrives about the asset just before date 1. The prior distribution of \( V \) represents market participants’ beliefs about the payoff

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\[^{21}\text{This follows from Proposition 6 and the continuity of } \mathcal{E}_2(C_r, C_p) \text{ in } C_r \text{ for } C_r \text{ sufficiently close to zero. The condition } \theta < 1 \text{ is required because for } \theta = 1, \text{ the condition on } C_p \text{ in Proposition 5 can never be satisfied.} \]
of the asset just after the arrival of this news. The raw signal $s$ can then be interpreted as a signal distributed by information sellers such as Thomson-Reuters or Ravenpack using news analytics to extract information from the news while $(s, u)$ would be signal produced by buy-side securities analysts after carefully analyzing the implications of the news for a firm. Using this interpretation of the timing of events in our model, one could test its implications for price informativeness (and other implications developed in the next section) by considering the effect of a decline in the cost of producing the raw signal (e.g., due to lower access costs to raw data) on the informativeness of stock prices at various dates after news arrival about, say, future earnings (a proxy for $V$). The model predicts that a decline in the cost of raw information should make prices more informative shortly after news arrival (say, one day; $t = 1$ in the model) and those at dates further away from the news (say, one week; $t = 2$ in the model) less informative.

One problem with this approach is that one must take a stand on what are short and long run prices. One way to circumvent this empirical issue is to measure the effect of a reduction in the cost of raw information on the average price observed over some period of time, after the arrival of news. For instance, consider the average price over periods 1 and 2 in our model: $ar{p}^* = \frac{p_1^* + p_2^*}{2}$. The informativeness of the average price is measured by:

$$E_{average}(C_r, C_p) = \frac{1}{4} - E[(\tilde{V} - \bar{p}^*)^2]$$

Using the fact that $(V - p_2^*)$ is orthogonal to $(p_2^* - p_1^*)$, we obtain after some algebra that

$$E_{average}(C_r, C_p) = 0.75 \times E_2(C_r, C_p) + 0.25 \times E_1(C_r, C_p).$$

Thus, as one could expect, the informativeness of the average price over periods 1 and 2 is a weighted average of long run price informativeness and short run price informativeness. Long run price informativeness counts relatively more than short run price informativeness since it receives a weight of $75\%$.

A decline in the cost of raw information improves short run price informativeness but it can reduce long run price informativeness. Hence, eq.(18) implies that this decline should have a non monotonic effect on the informativeness of the average price over a given period of time. Specifically, numerical simulations show that as $C_r$ declines, the informativeness of the average price first increases (the positive effect on short run price

\[\text{Indeed, we have } E[(\tilde{V} - \bar{p}^*)^2] = E[(\tilde{V} - p_2^*)^2] + 0.25E[(p_2^* - p_1^*)^2] \text{ because } (V - p_2^*) \text{ is orthogonal to } p_2^* - p_1^*. \text{ Moreover, for the same reason, we also have } E[(V - p_1^*)^2] = E[(V - p_2^*)^2] + E[(p_2^* - p_1^*)^2]. \text{ Hence, } E[(p_2^* - p_1^*)^2] = E[(\tilde{V} - p_1^*)^2] - E[(V - p_2^*)^2]. \text{ We deduce that } E[(\tilde{V} - \bar{p}^*)^2] = 0.75E[(V - p_2^*)^2] + 0.25E[(V - p_1^*)^2], \text{ which yields eq.(18).}\]
informativeness dominates the negative effect on long run price informativeness) and then decreases (the negative effect on long run price informativeness dominates). Figure 9 illustrates this pattern for specific parameter values (the informativeness of the average price is given by the green dotted line). It also shows that the informativeness of the average price when $C_r = 0$ is strictly smaller than the informativeness of the average price when $C_r$ is so large that no speculator chooses to buy raw information, as implied by Proposition 6.

**Figure 9:** Price informativeness at date $t = 1$ (red dotted line), at date $t = 2$ (blue thick line), and Informativeness of the average price (green dotted line) as a function of the cost of raw information $C_r$ (X-axis), with $\theta = 0.68$ and $C_p = 0.066$.

### 5.2 Price and Trade Patterns

In this section, we analyze in more detail the return and trade patterns induced by speculators’ equilibrium behavior. Our goal is to derive the predictions of our model for the effects of a decrease in the cost of raw information on the relationships between (i) the trades of speculators at different dates, (ii) past returns and the trades of speculators trading on the processed signal, (iii) future returns and the trades of speculators trading on the raw signal. These predictions could be tested with data on trades by each type of speculators. For instance, discretionary long-short equity hedge funds rely on fundamental analysis of stocks to decide whether to buy or sell them while other hedge funds (or trading desks within these funds) specialize in trading on very high frequency signals (see Pedersen (2015), Chapters 7 and 9). The former trade on processed signals while the latter trade on the raw signal according to our terminology.

**Corollary 4.** *In equilibrium, the covariance between the trades of speculators trading on*
the raw signal \((x_1)\) and the trades of speculators trading on the processed signal \((x_2)\) is:

\[
\text{Cov}(x_1, x_2) = \begin{cases} 
\theta - (1 - \theta)\alpha^*_1(\theta, C_r) & \text{if } C_r < \frac{\theta}{8} \text{ and } C_p < C_{max}(\theta, \alpha^*_1(\theta, C_r)), \\
0 & \text{if } C_r > \frac{\theta}{8} \text{ or } C_p > C_{max}(\theta, \alpha^*_1(\theta, C_r)),
\end{cases}
\]

This covariance declines when the cost of the raw signal declines and becomes negative if \(\theta < \frac{1}{2}\) and \(C_r < \frac{\theta^2(2\theta - 1)}{2(1 - \theta)}\).

Figure 10, Panel A, illustrates Corollary 4. It plots the covariance between trades of speculators at dates 1 and 2 against the reliability of the raw signal, \(\theta\), for various values of the cost of producing this signal. This covariance is zero when this cost is so large relative to the reliability of information, \(\theta\), that no speculator buys the raw signal \((C_r > \frac{\theta}{8})\) or so small that no speculator buys the processed signal \((C_p > C_{max}(\theta, \alpha^*_1(\theta, C_r)))\), which happens for \(\theta\) large enough, holding \(C_r\) constant. For intermediate values of \(\theta\), the covariance increases with \(\theta\) and can be positive or negative. Moreover, holding \(\theta\) fixed, it decreases as the cost of the raw signal declines.

The intuition for Corollary 4 is as follows. The processed and the raw signals command trades in the same direction if the raw signal is valid, i.e., when \(u = 1\). Instead, when the raw signal is noise, speculators trade on the raw and the processed signals in opposite directions when the price at date 1 reflects the raw signal. Indeed, in this case, speculators who trade on the processed signal correct the noise injected in prices by those trading on the raw signal. Holding \(\theta\) constant, the probability of the latter event is low when the cost of raw information is large because the mass of speculators trading on the raw signal is too small to move prices. Hence, for sufficiently high values of \(C_r\), speculators who trade on the raw and the processed signals often trade in the same direction and therefore \(\text{Cov}(x_1, x_2) > 0\). As the cost of raw information declines, the likelihood that speculators who trade on the raw signal move prices is higher because more speculators trade on this signal. This effect raises the likelihood that speculators who trade on the processed signal trade in a direction opposite to that of speculators who trade on the raw signal. For this reason, as the cost of raw information declines, the covariance between the trades of speculators trading at dates 1 and 2 becomes weaker and can even become negative if the raw signal is sufficiently unreliable (i.e., if \(\theta < 1/2\)).
Figure 10: Panel A shows the covariance between speculators’ trades at dates 1 and 2 \((\text{Cov}(x_1, x_2))\) as a function of \(\theta\). Panel B shows the covariance between the return at date 1 and speculators’ trades at date 2 as a function of \(\theta\). Panel C shows the covariance between speculators’ trades at date 1 and the return at date 2 as a function of \(\theta\). In each case, various values of \(C_r\) are considered: \(C_r = 0.1\) (dotted lines), \(C_r = 0.05\) (dashed lines), \(C_r = 0.01\) (thick lines). In all cases \(C_p = 0.02\).

Corollary 5. In equilibrium, the covariance between the first period return \((r_1 = p_1 - p_0)\) and the trade of speculators who trade on the processed signal is:

\[
\text{Cov}(x_1, x_2) = \begin{cases} 
\theta(2\theta - 1)\alpha_1^e & \text{if } C_r < \frac{\theta}{8} \text{ and } C_p < C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1^e(\theta, C_r)), \\
0 & \text{if } C_r > \frac{\theta}{8} \text{ or } C_p > C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1^e(\theta, C_r)).
\end{cases}
\]

Hence, the trades of speculators who trade on the processed signal are negatively correlated with the first period return if and only if \(\theta < \frac{1}{2}\). Furthermore, a decline in the cost of the raw signal, \(C_r\), raises the absolute value of the covariance between their trade and the first period return.

Figure 10 (Panel B) illustrates this result. Conditional on a price change at date 1, the likelihood that speculators trade against this change after receiving the processed signal increases with the likelihood, \((1 - \theta)\), that the raw signal is noise. This explains why, for \(\theta < \frac{1}{2}\), \(\text{Cov}(r_1, x_2) < 0\). Thus, speculators who trade on the processed signal behave like momentum traders when \(\theta > \frac{1}{2}\) (the direction of their trades is positively related to the lagged return) and contrarian traders (the direction of their trades is negatively related...
to lagged return) when $\theta < \frac{1}{2}$. Moreover, holding $\theta$ constant, the relationship between past returns and their trades becomes stronger when the cost of producing the raw signal declines. Indeed, this decline triggers an increase in the demand for the raw signal and therefore the likelihood that the price at date 1 will adjust to reflect the raw signal.

**Corollary 6.** In equilibrium, the covariance between the trade of speculators who receive the raw signal and the second period return, $r_2 = p_2^* - p_1^*$, is positive and equal to:

$$
\text{Cov}(x_1, r_2) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{when } C_p > C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*), \\
\frac{\theta(1-\alpha_1^*)\alpha_2^*}{2(2-\theta)} & \text{when } C_{\text{min}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*) \leq C_p \leq C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*), \\
\frac{\theta(1-\alpha_1^*)(1-(1-\theta)(1-\alpha_2^*))}{2(2-\theta)} & \text{when } C_p \leq C_{\text{min}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*). 
\end{cases}
$$

(19)

This covariance decreases when the cost of the raw signal declines if (i) $\theta > \frac{\sqrt{2}-1}{\sqrt{2}}$ or (ii) $\theta \leq \frac{\sqrt{2}-1}{\sqrt{2}}$ and $C_p \geq \bar{C}_r(\theta)$, or (iii) $\theta \leq \frac{\sqrt{2}-1}{\sqrt{2}}$ and $C_p \leq \bar{C}_p(\theta)$. In contrast, it always increases when the cost of the processed signal declines.

When the cost of raw signal declines, the demand for this signal increases and it becomes increasingly likely that the price at the end of the first period reveals $s$. In this case, speculators receiving the processed signal in the second period can only trade on the component of their signal that is orthogonal to the raw signal (i.e., the innovation in the expectation of the asset payoff due to the observation of $u$). This effect lowers the covariance between the trade of speculators in the first period and the second period return (see Figure 10, Panel C) because the latter is increasingly determined by factors independent from the raw signal (the realization of $u$ and liquidity traders’ orders in the second period).

In contrast, a decline in the cost of processed information has the opposite effect: it strengthens the covariance between speculators’ trade in the first period and the second period return. The reason is that this decrease raises the mass of speculators trading on the processed signal and thereby the likelihood that the return in the second period reveals their information. As this information is correlated with the raw signal $s$, the predictive power of the trade of speculators using the raw signal for future returns increases.
6 Extension: Price Contingent Information Acquisition

In our baseline model, investors decide to acquire each type of signal at date 0. In the on-line appendix, we also analyze the case in which speculators can make their decision to acquire the processed signal contingent on the price realized at date 1 for the asset and the seller of the processed signal can charge a fee contingent on this price. In equilibrium, the demand and the fee for the processed signal varies according to the price realized at date 1 since the expected profit from trading on the processed signal is different when the asset price at date 1 reflects the raw signal and when it does not (Corollary 1). We show that our conclusions regarding the effect of a decrease in the cost of producing the raw signal on (i) asset price informativeness and (ii) the relationships between returns and order flows still hold in this case. In fact, the negative effect of a reduction in the cost of raw information on asset price informativeness holds for a broader set of parameters.

7 Conclusion

The sharp decrease in the cost of accessing and manipulating vast amount of raw data has lowered the cost of producing unfiltered (raw) signals about asset payoffs. Thus, the price of unfiltered signals goes down and more investors buy these signals to trade on them. As a result, asset prices become more informative about unfiltered signals. In this paper we have shown that this evolution can either strengthen or weaken the incentive to produce filtered signals (i.e., to process information to filter out the noise from raw data). Indeed, when unfiltered signals turn out to be just noise, investors who can distinguish fundamentals from noise make profits by correcting the noise injected in prices by those trading on unfiltered signals. However, when unfiltered signals are indeed informative, the return on information processing is lower. The reason is that information processing takes time and therefore asset prices partially reflect the information contained in filtered signals before these signals become available. The first effect makes filtered signals more valuable while the second make them less valuable.

We find that the second effect dominates when unfiltered signals are not too unreliable. In this case, a decline in the cost of producing unfiltered signals leads to a drop in the demand for filtered signals and eventually a drop in the informativeness of prices about asset payoffs. The model also predicts that a decline in the cost of producing unfiltered
signals should affect correlations between (i) the trades of speculators trading on filtered signals and those trading on unfiltered signals, (ii) the trades of speculators trading on filtered signals and past returns, and (iii) the trades of speculators trading on unfiltered signals and future returns.

Future research could test these implications by considering technological changes that reduce the cost of access to raw information. We believe that recent improvements in technologies to disseminate information in digital form offer many opportunities in this respect.

Our analysis in this paper is silent on the welfare effects of a drop in the cost of producing unfiltered signals. In our model, trading is a zero sum game and therefore information has no social value. In this setting, the total fixed cost of producing signals is a deadweight loss. Thus, a reduction in the cost of producing unfiltered signals is welfare improving since it reduces the total fixed cost of information production, both directly and indirectly by possibly crowding out the incentive to invest in the production of filtered signals. However, a more complete analysis should account for possible social gains of more informative prices. In particular, a growing literature (see Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) for a survey) suggests that firms learn information from asset prices and use this information to make more efficient investment decisions. Noisier prices lead therefore to less efficient investment decisions (see Dessaint et al.(2016)). In this case, the reduction in the total cost of information production (due to lower costs of accessing raw data) should be balanced with the costs of less efficient decisions for firms due to less informative asset prices. A detailed welfare analysis of this type is an interesting venue for future research.
Appendix A

Proof of Proposition 1

Step 1: Stock price at date 1. The equilibrium price at date 1 satisfies (see eq. (3)):

\[ p_1^* (f_1) = Pr[V = 1|\hat{f}_1 = f_1] = \frac{Pr[\hat{f}_1 = f_1|V = 1]Pr[V = 1]}{Pr[\hat{f}_1 = f_1]} . \tag{20} \]

Speculators buy the asset at date 1 when they observe \( s = 1 \). Hence, conditional on \( V = 1 \), aggregate speculators’ demand at date 1 is \( \alpha_1 \) with probability \((1+\theta)/2\) and \(-\alpha_1\) with probability \((1-\theta)/2\). Thus:

\[ Pr[\hat{f}_1 = f_1|V = 1] = \left( \frac{1 + \theta}{2} \right) \phi(f_1 - \alpha_1) + \frac{1 - \theta}{2} \phi(f_1 + \alpha_1). \tag{21} \]

Furthermore, by symmetry:

\[ Pr[\hat{f}_1 = f_1|V = 1] = \frac{1}{2} \phi(f_1 - \alpha_1) + \frac{1}{2} \phi(f_1 + \alpha_1). \tag{22} \]

Substituting (21) and (22) in (20) and using the fact that \( Pr[V = 1] = 1/2 \), we obtain eq. (4).

Step 2: Speculators’ trading strategy at date 1. For a given trade \( x_1 \), a speculator’s expected profit when he observes signal \( s \) is:

\[ \pi_1(\alpha, s) = x_1(\mu(s) - E[p_1|s]). \]

As \( p_1^* (f_1) = E[V|\hat{f}_1] \) and the market-maker’s information set at date 1 is coarser than speculators’ information set, we have:

\[ \mu(0) \leq p_1^* \leq \mu(1), \]

with a strict inequality when \( f_1 \in [-1 + \alpha_1, 1 - \alpha_1] \) because in this case the order flow at date 1 contains no information (all realizations of the order flow in this interval are equally likely conditional on \( V = 0 \) or \( V = 1 \)). Therefore:

\[ \mu(0) < E[p_1^*|s] < \mu(1), \]

38
when $\alpha_1 < 1$. Thus, in this case, it is a strictly dominant strategy for a speculator to buy the asset when $s = 1$ and sell it when $s = 0$. It follows that the equilibrium at date 1 is unique when $\alpha_1 < 1$. When $\alpha_1 \geq 1$, $[-1 + \alpha_1, 1 - \alpha_1]$ is an empty set and $p_1^*(f_1) = \mu(s)$ for all values of $f_1$. Hence, a speculator obtains a zero expected profit for all $x_1$ whether $s = 1$ or $s = 0$.

Buying the asset when $s = 1$ and selling the asset when $s = 0$ is then weakly dominant.

Step 3: The expected profit of trading on the raw signal. Suppose that $s = 1$, so that speculators’ valuation for the asset after receiving the raw signal is $\mu(1)$. Given their equilibrium strategy, speculators’ aggregate demand at date 1 is then $\alpha_1$. Thus, the aggregate demand for the asset at date 1 is above the threshold $-1 + \alpha_1$. Accordingly, the price at date 1 is either $1/2$ if $f_1 \in [-1 + \alpha_1, 1 - \alpha_1]$ or $\mu(1)$ if $f_1 \geq 1 - \alpha_1$. In the former case, speculators earn a zero expected profit on the raw signal while in the later case, their expected profit is $\mu(1) - 1/2 = \theta/2$. Now we have:

$$Pr(f_1 \in [-1 + \alpha_1, 1 - \alpha_1] \mid s = 1) = Pr(l_1 \in [-1, 1 - 2\alpha_1]) = Max\{1 - \alpha_1, 0\}.$$ 

Thus, conditional on $s = 1$, speculators’ expected profit is $\frac{\theta}{2} Max\{1 - \alpha_1, 0\}$. By symmetry, this is also the case when $s = -1$. Thus, $\bar{\pi}_1(\alpha_1) = \frac{\theta}{2} Max\{1 - \alpha_1, 0\}$.

Proof of Proposition 2

Step 1. Asset price at date 2. We first derive the equilibrium asset price when speculators behave as described in part 1 of Proposition 2.

Case 1. Suppose first that $p_1 = \mu(1)$. In this case, the market maker knows that $s = 1$. Hence, the remaining uncertainty is about $u$. If $u = 1$, speculators who receive the processed signal buy the asset at date 2 and, therefore, their total demand for the asset belongs to $[-1 + \alpha_2, f_2^{max}]$. If $u = 0$, these speculators sell the asset since $p_1 > 1/2$ and therefore their total demand for the asset belongs to $[f_2^{min}, 1 - \alpha_2]$. For $\alpha_2 \leq 1$, we have $1 - \alpha_2 > -1 + \alpha_2$. Thus, if $f_2 \in [f_2^{min}, -1 + \alpha_2]$, market makers infer that $u = 0$ and set $p_2^* = E(V \mid s = 1, u = 0) = 1/2$. Symmetrically if $f_2 \in [1 - \alpha_2, f_2^{max}]$, they infer that $u = 1$ and they set $p_2^* = E(V \mid s = 1, u = 1) = 1$. Intermediate realizations of $f_2$ (those in $[-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2]$) are equally likely when $u = 1$ or when $u = 0$. Thus, they convey no information on $u$. Hence, for these realizations: $p_2^* = E(V \mid s = 1) = \mu(1)$. For $\alpha_2 > 1$, the reasoning is unchanged but the intermediate case
never occurs. This yields Part 2 of the proposition.

**Case 2.** When \( p_1 = \mu(0) \), the reasoning is symmetric to that followed when \( p_1 = \mu(0) \) (Case 1). Part 3 of the proposition follows.

**Case 3.** Now consider the case in which \( p_1 = 1/2 \). In this case, the market outcome at date 1 conveys no information to the market maker. Thus, from his viewpoint, there are three possible states at date 2: \( \{u = 1, s = 1\} \), \( \{u = 0\} \), and \( \{u = 1, s = -1\} \). Given speculators’ trading strategy at date 2, the corresponding total demand for the asset at date 2 has the following support: \([-1 + \alpha_2, f_2^{\text{max}}]\) if \( \{u = 1, s = 1\} \), \([-1, 1]\) if \( \{u = 0\} \), and \([f_2^{\text{min}}, 1 - \alpha_2]\) if \( \{u = 1, s = -1\} \).

Thus, if \( f_2 > 1 \), the market maker infers that \( \{u = 1, s = 1\} \) and if \( f_2 < -1 \), he infers that \( \{u = 1, s = 0\} \). Hence, in the first case \( p_2^* = 1 \) and in the second case \( p_2^* = 0 \). Now, consider intermediate realizations for \( f_2 \), i.e., \( f_2 \in [-1, 1] \). First, suppose \( f_2 \in [-1, \text{Min}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}] \). Such a realization is possible only if \( u = 0 \) or if \( \{u = 1, s = 1\} \). Thus, in this case:

\[
p_2^* = Pr[u = 0|f_2 \in [-1, \text{Min}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}] \times \frac{1}{2}.
\]

Now,

\[
Pr[u = 0|f_2 \in [-1, \text{Min}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}]] = \frac{Pr[f_2 \in [-1, \text{Min}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}]|u = 0](1 - \theta)}{Pr[f_2 \in [-1, \text{Min}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}]} ,
\]

that is

\[
Pr[u = 0|f_2 \in [-1, \text{Min}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}]] = \frac{2(1 - \theta)}{2 - \theta}.
\]

Thus, for \( f_2 \in [-1, \text{Min}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}] \), \( p_2^* = \frac{(1 - \theta)}{2 - \theta} \). The case, in which \( f_2 \in [\text{Max}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}, 1] \) is symmetric: such a realization of the order flow is possible only if \( u = 0 \) or if \( \{u = 1, s = 1\} \). Thus, in this case,

\[
p_2^* = Pr[u = 1, s = 1|f_2 \in [\text{Max}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}, 1]] + Pr[u = 0|f_2 \in [\text{Max}\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}, 1]] \times \frac{1}{2}.
\]

Using the fact that deep information speculators buy if \( \{u = 1, s = 1\} \) and stay put if \( u = 0 \) (since we are in the case in which \( p_1^* = 1/2 \)), we deduce from eq.\( (23) \):

\[
p_2^* = \frac{1}{2 - \theta}.
\]
Finally, realizations of $f_2 \in [\min\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}, \max\{-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2\}]$ are equally likely in each possible state when $p_1 = 1/2$. Thus, observations of $f_2$ in this range are uninformative and the equilibrium price in this case is $p_2^* = 1/2$. This achieves the proof of Part 4 of the proposition.

**Step 2. Speculators’ trading strategy at date 2.** Let $\mu(u, s)$ be the expected payoff of the asset conditional on the processed signal $(u, s)$. This is the valuation of the asset for the speculators who receive the processed signal at date 2. Suppose $p_1^* = \mu(1)$ first. In this case $s = 1$ and either $\mu(1, 1) = 1$ or $\mu(0, 1) = 1/2$. Moreover, in this case, the equilibrium price of the asset at date 2 is such that:

$$\mu(0, 1) \leq p_2^* \leq \mu(1, 1),$$

with a strict inequality when $f_2 \in [-1 + \alpha_2, 1]$. This interval is never empty for $\alpha_2 \leq 2$. Thus, we can proceed exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1 to show that it is a dominant strategy for speculators receiving the processed signal to (i) buy the asset if their expectation of the value of the asset is $\mu(1, 1)$ and $p_1 = \mu(1)$ and (ii) sell the asset if their expectation of the value of the asset is $\mu(0, 1)$ and $p_1 = \mu(1)$.

Now suppose that $p_1^* = \mu(0)$. In this case, a similar reasoning implies that it is a dominant strategy for the speculators receiving the processed signal to (i) sell the asset if their expectation of the value of the asset is $\mu(1, 0)$ and (ii) buy the asset if their expectation of the value of the asset is $\mu(0, 1)$.

Now consider the case in which $p_1^* = 1/2$ and $u = 1$. In this case, we have:

$$\mu(1, 0) \leq p_2^* \leq \mu(1, 1),$$

with a strict inequality for some realizations of $f_2$. Thus, again, we conclude that it is a dominant strategy for speculators receiving the processed signal to (i) sell the asset if their expectation of the value of the asset is $\mu(1, 0)$ and (ii) buy the asset if their expectation of the value of the asset is $\mu(1, 1)$.

The remaining case is the case in which $p_1^* = 1/2$ and $u = 0$. In this case, a speculator who receive the processed signal expects other speculators to stay put in equilibrium. Suppose that one speculator deviates from this strategy by trading $x_2$ shares in $[-1, 1]$. His effect on
aggregate demand is infinitesimal. Hence, he expects \( f_2 = l_2 \) and therefore he expect \( f_2 \) to be uniformly distributed on \([-1, 1]\). Therefore, using the expression for \( p_2^* \) when \( p_1^* = 1/2 \), the speculator expects to trade at:

\[
E(p_2^* \mid p_1 = 1/2, f_2 \in [-1, 1]) = 1/2 - \frac{\theta \left( \min \{1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2 \} + \max \{1 - \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha_2 \} \right)}{4(2 - \theta)} = 1/2.
\]

As the speculator expects the payoff to be \( \mu(0, 0) = 1/2 \), his expected profit is therefore \( x_2(\mu(0, 0)) - E(p_2^* \mid p_1 = 1/2, f_2 \in [-1, 1]) = 0 \). Thus, the deviation yields a zero expected profit and therefore not trading is weakly dominant for the speculator when \( p_1^* = 1/2 \) and \( u = 0 \).

In sum we have shown that the trading strategy described in Part 1 of Proposition 2 is optimal for a speculator who receives the processed signal, if he expects other traders to follow this strategy and if prices at date 2 are given as in Parts 2, 3, and 4 of Proposition 2.

**Step 3. Expected profit from trading on the processed signal.**

**Case 1:** \( p_1 = \mu(1) \). In this case, a speculator receiving the processed signal buys the asset if \( u = 1 \) and sells it if \( u = 0 \). Thus, he makes a profit if and only if \( p_2^* = p_1^* = \mu(1) \), i.e., if \( f_2 \in [-1 + \alpha_2, 1 - \alpha - 2] \). The likelihood of this event is \( \max \{1 - \alpha_2, 0\} \) whether \( u = 1 \) or \( u = 0 \). Thus, the expected profit of a deep information speculator if \( p_1^* = \mu(1) \) is:

\[
\pi_2^*(\alpha_2) = \max \{1 - \alpha_2, 0\} \left( \theta \times (1 - \mu(1)) + (1 - \theta) \times (\mu(1) - 1/2) \right) = \max \{1 - \alpha_2, 0\} \theta (1 - \theta)
\]

**Case 2:** \( p_1^* = \mu(0) \). The case is symmetric to Case 1 and a speculator receiving the processed signal also earns an expected profit equal to \( \pi_2^*(\alpha_2) \).

**Case 3:** \( p_1^* = 1/2 \). In this case a speculator trades the asset only if \( u = 1 \). Suppose first that \( s = 1 \). Using Parts 2, 3, and 4 of Proposition 2, Table 1 gives the probability of each possible realization for the equilibrium price at date 2 conditional on \( \{u, s, p_1\} = \{1, 1, 1/2\} \) and the associated profit for speculator who receives the processed signal (taking into account that speculators buy the asset at date 2 if \( u = s = 1 \)).

We deduce that if \( \{u, s, p_1\} = \{1, 1, 1/2\} \), the expected profit of as speculator who receives
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equilibrium price at date 2: $p^*_2$</th>
<th>Prob if $\alpha_2 \leq 1$</th>
<th>Prob if $1 &lt; \alpha_2 \leq 2$</th>
<th>Speculator’s profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1-n}{2-n}$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{2-n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>$1 - \alpha_2$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{2-n}$</td>
<td>$\alpha_2$</td>
<td>$\frac{(2-\alpha_2)}{2}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{2-\theta}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$\alpha_2$</td>
<td>$\alpha_2$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The processed signal is:

$$\pi_{nc}^2(\alpha_2) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\theta}{2(2-\theta)} (2 - \theta - \alpha_2) & \text{if } \alpha_2 \leq 1 \\
\frac{\theta}{2} \frac{(1-\theta)}{2} (2 - \alpha_2) & \text{if } 1 < \alpha_2 \leq 1, \\
0 & \text{if } \alpha_2 > 2,
\end{cases}$$

(24)

The case in which $u = 1$, $s = 0$, and $p_1 = 1/2$ is symmetric and therefore yields the same expected profit for a deep information speculator. Thus, when $p^*_1 = 1/2$, the expected profit for a speculator who receives the processed signal is given by $\pi_{nc}^2(\alpha_2)$.

Cases 1 and 2 happen with probability $\alpha_1/2$ each while Case 3 happens with probability $(1 - \alpha_1)$. We deduce that if $\alpha_2 \leq 1$, the expected profit of a speculator receiving the processed signal is as given by eq.(6).

Proof of Corollary 1: Using the expressions for $\pi_{nc}^2(\alpha_2)$ and $\pi_2^*(\alpha_2)$ in Proposition 2, it is direct to show that $\pi_{nc}^2(\alpha_2) < \pi_2^*(\alpha_2)$ iff $\alpha_2 < \hat{\alpha}_2(\theta)$ and $\theta \leq 1/2$.

Proof of Corollary 2: It follows directly from Corollary 1 and eq. (8).

Proof of Lemma 1: As explained in the text, $\alpha_*^2 = 0$ when $C_p \geq C_{max}$ and $\alpha_*^2 \in (\alpha_{2max}, 2)$ when $0 < C_p < C_{max}$. Let $C_{min}(\theta, \alpha_1)$ be the value of $C_p$ such that $\alpha_*^2 = 1$. Thus, $C_{min}$ solves $\pi_2^{gross,a}(\alpha_1, 1) = C_{min}$. Using eq. (6) and the definition of $\pi_2^{gross,a}(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$, we deduce that $C_{min}(\theta, \alpha_1) = \frac{\theta}{2} \frac{(1-\theta)(1-\alpha_1)}{2(2-\theta)}$. As $\pi_2^{gross,a}(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$ decreases continuously in both $\alpha_2$ for $\alpha_2 \in (\alpha_{2max}, 2)$ and $C_p$, we deduce that $\alpha_*^2 \leq 1$ for $C_p > C_{min}$ (case 1) and $\alpha_*^2 \geq 1$ for $C_p \leq C_{min}$ (case 2).
In Case 1, using eq. (6) and eq. (12), we deduce that \( \alpha^*_2 \) solves:

\[
\alpha^*_2 \bar{\pi}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha^*_2) - C_p = \frac{\theta}{2} \alpha_2 \left[ 1 - (2\theta - 1)\alpha_1 - \left( \frac{1}{2 - \theta} + \left( 2(1 - \theta) - \frac{1}{2 - \theta} \right) \alpha_1 \right) \alpha_2 \right] - C_p = 0.
\]

(25)

This equation has two roots in \( \alpha_2 \) but only one is larger than \( \alpha^{\text{max}}_2 \), as required in equilibrium. This root is:

\[
\alpha^*_2 = \alpha^{\text{max}}_2(\theta, \alpha_1) \left( 1 + \sqrt{1 - \frac{C_p}{C^{\text{max}}_\alpha(\theta, \alpha_1)}} \right).
\]

In Case 2 (\( C_p \leq C_{\text{min}} \)), \( \alpha^*_2 \geq 1 \). Thus, using eq. (6) and eq. (12), we deduce that \( \alpha^*_2 \) solves:

\[
\alpha^*_2 \bar{\pi}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha^*_2) - C_p = \frac{\theta}{2} \left[ \frac{1 - \theta}{2 - \theta} (1 - \alpha_1)(2 - \alpha_2) - C_p \right] = 0.
\]

(26)

This equation again has two roots in \( \alpha_2 \) but only one is larger than 1 (as required). This root is:

\[
\alpha^*_2 = 1 + \sqrt{1 - \frac{C_p}{C_{\text{min}}(\theta, \alpha_1)}}.
\]

Proof of Proposition 3. As \( C_r \) affects \( \alpha^*_2 \) only through its effect on \( \alpha^*_1 \), we have:

\[
\frac{\partial \alpha^*_2}{\partial C_r} = \left( \frac{\partial \alpha^*_2}{\partial \alpha^*_1} \right) \left( \frac{\partial \alpha^*_1}{\partial C_r} \right).
\]

(27)

It is immediate from Lemma 2 that \( \frac{\partial \alpha^*_1}{\partial C_r} \leq 0 \). Thus, eq. (27) implies that \( \frac{\partial \alpha^*_2}{\partial C_r} \geq 0 \) iff \( \frac{\partial \alpha^*_1}{\partial \alpha^*_1} < 0 \).

Thus, in the rest of this proof, we sign \( \frac{\partial \alpha^*_2}{\partial \alpha^*_1} \).

Remember that for \( C_p < C^{\text{max}}_\alpha, \alpha^*_2 > \alpha^{\text{max}}_2 \) and \( \alpha^*_2 \) solves:

\[
\bar{\pi}_2^{\text{gross}, a}(\alpha_1, \alpha^*_2) = C_p.
\]

Thus, using the implicit function theorem and the definition of \( \bar{\pi}_2^{\text{net}, a}(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, C_p) \), we have

\[
\frac{\partial \alpha^*_2}{\partial \alpha_1} = -\frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_2} \left[ \alpha_2 \bar{\pi}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) \right]_{\alpha_2 = \alpha^*_2}.
\]

(28)

As \( \alpha^*_2 > \alpha^{\text{max}}_2 \), we have \( \frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_2} \left[ \alpha_2 \bar{\pi}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) \right]_{\alpha_2 = \alpha^*_2} < 0 \). We deduce from eq. (28) that \( \frac{\partial \alpha^*_2}{\partial \alpha_1} > 0 \) iff \( \frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_1} \left[ \alpha_2 \bar{\pi}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) \right]_{\alpha_2 = \alpha^*_2} < 0 \).

Case 1: \( 1/2 < \theta \) or \( C_p < C_{\text{min}}(\theta, \alpha_1) \). If \( \theta > 1/2 \), we deduce from Corollary 2 that the expected profit of a speculator who trades on the processed signal, \( \bar{\pi}_2 \), decreases with \( \alpha_1 \). If
$C_p < C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1)$, we deduce from Proposition 1 that $\alpha_2^* > 1$. Therefore, using Corollary 2 again, $\bar{\pi}_2$, decreases with $\alpha_1$. Hence, for $\theta > 1/2$ or $C_p < C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1)$, we have:

$$\frac{\partial [\alpha_2 \bar{\pi}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2^*)]}{\partial \alpha_1} < 0.$$  

We deduce that if $\theta > 1/2$ or $C_p < C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1)$ then $\frac{\partial \alpha_2^*}{\partial \alpha_1} < 0$ and therefore $\frac{\partial \alpha_2^*}{\partial C_p} > 0$.

**Case 2:** $\theta < 1/2$ and $C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1) < C_p < C_{\max}(\theta, \alpha_1)$. Using Corollary 2 we deduce that the expected profit of a speculator who trades on the processed signal, $\bar{\pi}_2$, increases with $\alpha_1$ iff $\alpha_2^*(\alpha_1) < \hat{\alpha}_2(\theta)$. Thus, if this condition is satisfied then $\frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_1} [\alpha_2 \bar{\pi}_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)]_{\alpha_2=\alpha_2^*} < 0$ and therefore $\frac{\partial \alpha_2^*}{\partial \alpha_1} > 0$. Thus, in this case, $\frac{\partial \alpha_2^*}{\partial C_p} > 0$. The rest of the proof consists in showing that the conditions (i) $\theta < \sqrt{\frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}}}$, (ii) $C_r < \hat{C}_r(\theta)$, and (iii) $C_p > \hat{C}_r(\theta)$ are necessary and sufficient for $\alpha_2^*(\alpha_1) < \hat{\alpha}_2(\theta)$. For brevity, we provide the proof of this result in the on-line appendix. As $\sqrt{\frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}}} < 1/2$, the proposition follows.

**Proof of Proposition 4.** When $\theta > \sqrt{\frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}}}$, we show in the on-line appendix that $C_{\max}(\theta, \alpha_1)$ decreases with $\alpha_1$. Moreover, using eq.(14), we obtain $C_{\max}(\theta, 1) = \frac{\theta(1-\theta)}{4}$ and $C_{\max}(\theta, 0) = \frac{\theta(2-\theta)}{8}$. Thus, for each $C_p \in [\frac{\theta(1-\theta)}{4}, \frac{\theta(2-\theta)}{8}]$, there exists a unique $\alpha_1^*(\theta, C_p)$ such that:

$$C_p = C_{\max}(\theta, \alpha_1^*).$$

Moreover, for $\alpha_1^* > \alpha_1^c$, $C_p < C_{\max}(\theta, \alpha_1^c)$ while for $\alpha_1^* < \alpha_1^c$, $C_p > C_{\max}(\theta, \alpha_1^c)$. We deduce from Lemma 1 that for $\alpha_1^* > \alpha_1^c$, $\alpha_2^*(\theta, \alpha_1^*) > \alpha_2^{\max}$ while for $\alpha_1^* < \alpha_1^c$, $\alpha_2^*(\theta, \alpha_1^*) = 0$. The corollary follows by defining $\hat{C}_r$ as the value of $C_r$ such that $\alpha_1^*(\theta, \hat{C}_r) = \alpha_1^c(\theta, C_p)$.

**Proof of Corollary 3.** Using Proposition 1 (or Figure ??), we obtain that:

$$\mathcal{E}_1(C_r, C_p) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } C_r \geq \frac{\theta}{8}, \\ \frac{\alpha_1^c(\theta, C_p)}{4} \theta^2 & \text{if } C_r \leq \frac{\theta}{8}, \end{cases}$$

and

45
\[
\mathcal{E}_2(C_r, C_p) = \begin{cases} 
E_1(C_r, C_p) & \text{if } C_p \geq C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*), \\
\frac{\theta}{4} \left[1 - (1 - \alpha_1^* (1 - \frac{\alpha_2^*}{2 - \alpha_2^*}))(1 - \theta)\alpha_1^*(1 - \alpha_2^*)\right] & \text{if } C_{\text{min}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*) \leq C_p \leq C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*), \\
\frac{\theta}{4} \left[1 - (1 - \frac{\theta(1-\theta)}{2-\theta} \alpha_1^*)(2 - \alpha_2^*)\right] & \text{if } C_p \leq C_{\text{min}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*),
\end{cases}
\]

(30)

where to simplify notations we have omitted the arguments of functions \(\alpha_2^*\) and \(\alpha_1^*\). As \(\alpha_1^*\) does not depend on the cost of the processed signal, we deduce from eq.(29) that price informativeness at date 1 is not affected by a change in \(C_p\).

As explained in the text, \(\mathcal{E}_2(C_r, C_p) \leq \mathcal{E}_1(C_r, C_p)\) and this inequality is strict if \(\alpha_2^* > 0\), i.e., if \(C_p < C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*)\). In this range of value for \(C_p\), it is immediate from eq.(30) that price informativeness at date 2 increases with \(\alpha_2^*\). As \(\alpha_2^*\) declines when \(C_p\) decreases, we deduce that price informativeness at date 2 increases when \(C_p\) declines for \(C_p < C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*)\). For \(C_p > C_{\text{max}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*)\), price informativeness at date 2 is equal to price informativeness at date 1 and therefore independent of \(C_p\).

**Proof of Proposition 5**

**Part 1: Effect of \(C_r\) on short run price informativeness.** We know from Proposition 2 that \(\alpha_1^*\) weakly increases when \(C_r\) increases. Hence, we deduce from eq.(29) that \(\mathcal{E}_1(C_r, C_p)\) weakly decreases when \(C_r\) decreases.

**Part 2: Effect of \(C_r\) on long run price informativeness.** We consider three different cases depending on the value of \(C_p\).

**Case 1.** Consider first the case in which \(C_p < C_{\text{min}}(\theta, \alpha_1^*)\). In this case, \(\alpha_2^* \geq 1\) (Proposition 1). Using eq.(6) and eq.(30), we have:

\[
\mathcal{E}_2^*(C_r, C_p) = \frac{\theta}{4} - \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\pi}_2(\alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*),
\]

(31)

where we omit the arguments of functions \(\alpha_1^*\) and \(\alpha_2^*\) to simplify notations. Now, as \(\alpha_2^* > 0\), in equilibrium, \(\alpha_2^* \tilde{\pi}_2^* = C_p\) (see eq.11). Thus, we deduce from (31) that:

\[
\mathcal{E}_2^* = \frac{\theta}{4} - \frac{1}{2} \frac{C_p}{\alpha_2^*}.
\]

(32)
As \( C_p < C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1^*) \), we deduce from the analysis of Case 1 in the proof of Proposition 3 that \( \alpha_1^* \) decreases when \( C_r \) decreases. Hence, from eq.(32), we deduce that if \( C_p < C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1^*) \) then \( \mathcal{E}_2^*(C_r, C_p) \) decreases when \( C_r \) decreases.

**Case 2.** Now consider the case in which \( C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1^*) < C_p < C_{\max}(\theta, \alpha_1^*) \). In this case, \( 0 < \alpha_2^* \leq 1 \) (Proposition 1). Using eq.(6) and eq.(30), we have:

\[
\mathcal{E}_2^*(C_r, C_p) = \frac{\theta}{4} - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{C_p}{\alpha_2^*} - \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)}{2} \alpha_1^*(1 - \alpha_2^*) \right),
\]

(33)

where we again omit the arguments of functions \( \alpha_1^* \) and \( \alpha_2^* \) to simplify notations. As \( \alpha_2^* > 0 \), in equilibrium, \( \alpha_2^* \pi_2^* = C_p \) (see eq.(11)). Thus, we can rewrite eq.(33) as:

\[
\mathcal{E}_2^*(C_r, C_p) = -\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{C_p}{\alpha_2^*} - \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)}{2} \alpha_1^*(1 - \alpha_2^*) \right),
\]

(34)

Using the fact that \( C_r \) affects \( \alpha_2^* \) only through its effect on \( \alpha_1^* \), we deduce from eq.(33) that:

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{E}_2^*(C_r, C_p)}{\partial C_r} = \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial C_r} \right) \left( \frac{\partial \alpha_2^*}{\partial \alpha_1^*} \right) \left( \frac{C_p}{\alpha_2^*} - \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)}{2} \alpha_1^*(1 - \alpha_2^*) \right) + \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)}{2}(1 - \alpha_2^*) \right),
\]

(35)

As \( \frac{\partial \alpha_1^*}{\partial C_r} \leq 0 \), we deduce that the sign of \( \frac{\partial \mathcal{E}_2^*(C_r, C_p)}{\partial C_r} \) is opposite to the sign of the following function:

\[
G(\alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*) = \frac{\partial \alpha_2^*}{\partial \alpha_1^*} \left( \frac{C_p}{\alpha_2^*} - \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)}{2} \alpha_1^*(1 - \alpha_2^*) \right) + \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)}{2}(1 - \alpha_2^*)
\]

(36)

To determine the sign of \( G(\alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*) \), we first compute \( \frac{\partial \alpha_2^*}{\partial \alpha_1^*} \). Using eq.(28), we obtain:

\[
-\frac{\partial \alpha_2^*}{\partial \alpha_1^*} = \frac{\partial \pi_2(a_1^*, a_2^*)}{\partial \alpha_1^*} \frac{\partial a_1^*}{\partial \alpha_1^*} + \pi_2(a_1^*, a_2^*).
\]

Moreover, as \( 0 < \alpha_2^* \leq 1 \), we deduce from Proposition 2 that:

\[
\pi_2(a_1^*, a_2^*) = \frac{\theta}{2} \left( -2\theta + 1 \right) \alpha_1^* \left( \frac{1}{2 - \theta} + \left( 2(1 - \theta) - \frac{1}{2 - \theta} \right) \alpha_1^* \right) \left( 1 - \alpha_2^* \right).
\]

This implies that

\[
\frac{\partial \pi_2(a_1^*, a_2^*)}{\partial \alpha_1^*} = -\frac{\theta}{2} \left( 2\theta - 1 + \left( 2(1 - \theta) - \frac{1}{2 - \theta} \right) \alpha_2^* \right),
\]

47
\[
\frac{\partial \pi_2(\alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*)}{\partial \alpha_1^*} = -\frac{\theta}{2} \left[ \frac{1}{2 - \theta} + \left( 2(1 - \theta) - \frac{1}{2 - \theta} \right) \alpha_1^* \right].
\]

Therefore,
\[
- \frac{\partial \alpha_2^*}{\partial \alpha_1^*} = \frac{\alpha_2^* \left[ 2\theta - 1 + \left( 2(1 - \theta) - \frac{1}{2 - \theta} \right) \alpha_2^* \right]}{\alpha_1^* \left[ \frac{1}{2 - \theta} + \left( 2(1 - \theta) - \frac{1}{2 - \theta} \right) \alpha_1^* \right] - \frac{2C_p}{\theta} \frac{1}{\alpha_2^*}}.
\]

The denominator of this expression is equal to \(- \frac{\partial [\alpha_2^* \pi_2(\alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*)]}{\partial \alpha_2^*}\). This derivative is strictly positive in equilibrium (see the discussion that precedes Proposition 1). Hence, we deduce that \(G(\alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*) < 0\) iff:
\[
\alpha_2^* \left[ 2\theta - 1 + \left( 2(1 - \theta) - \frac{1}{2 - \theta} \right) \alpha_2^* \right] - (1 - \theta)(1 - \alpha_2^*) \left[ \alpha_2^* \left( \frac{1}{2 - \theta} + \left( 2(1 - \theta) - \frac{1}{2 - \theta} \right) \alpha_1^* \right) \right] \frac{2C_p}{\theta} \frac{1}{\alpha_2^*} > 0.
\]

After some algebra, one can show that this condition is equivalent to:
\[
\Upsilon(\alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*(\alpha_1^*), \theta, C_p) > 0,
\]
where
\[
\Upsilon(\alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*(\alpha_1^*), \theta, C_p) \equiv \frac{1 - \theta}{2 - \theta} \left( \frac{2C_p}{\theta} - \alpha_2^*(1 - \alpha_2^*) \right) + 2C_p \left( \frac{1}{\alpha_2^*} - 1 \right) - \alpha_1^* \alpha_2^*(1 - \theta)^2. \quad (37)
\]

In sum, \(G(\alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*) < 0\) iff \(\Upsilon(\alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*(\alpha_1^*), \theta, C_p) > 0\). Thus, when \(C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1^*) < C_p < C_{\max}(\theta, \alpha_1^*), \frac{\partial \Upsilon(C_p, \alpha_1^*)}{\partial \alpha_1^*} > 0\) iff \(\Upsilon(\alpha_1^*, \alpha_2^*(\alpha_1^*), \theta, C_p) > 0\).

**Case 3.** Last consider the case in which \(C_{\max}(\theta, \alpha_1^*) < C_p\). In this case, we deduce from eq. (30) that \(E_2(C_r, C_p) = E_1(C_r, C_p)\). As \(E_1(C_r, C_p)\) increases when \(C_r\) decreases, we obtain that this is also the case for \(E_2(C_r, C_p)\) when \(C_{\max}(\theta, \alpha_1^*) < C_p\).

**Proof of Proposition 6.** Note that \(\alpha_1^* = 0\) for all \(C_r \geq \frac{\theta}{8}\). Thus, \(E_2(C_r, C_p) = E_2(\frac{\theta}{8}, C_p)\) for \(C_r \geq \frac{\theta}{8}\). We denote the difference in price informativeness at date 2 when \(C_r = 0\) and when \(C_r \geq \frac{\theta}{8}\), for a given \(C_p\), by \(\Delta E_2(C_p)\). That is:
\[
\Delta E_2(C_p) \equiv E_2(\frac{\theta}{8}, C_p) - E_2(0, C_p) \quad (38)
\]
Observe that:
\[
C_{\text{max}}(\theta, 0) = \frac{\theta (2 - \theta)}{8} > C_{\text{min}}(\theta, 0) = \frac{\theta (1 - \theta)}{2(2 - \theta)} > C_{\text{max}}(\theta, 1) = \frac{\theta (1 - \theta)}{4},
\]
and that
\[
\alpha_{2}\text{max}(\theta, 0) = 1 - \frac{\theta}{2}, \text{ and } \alpha_{2}\text{max}(\theta, 1) = \frac{1}{2}.
\]

**Case 1.** First, consider the case in which \(C_p \in [0, C_{\text{max}}(\theta, 1)]\). In this case, using Proposition 1 and the previous observations, we obtain that if \(C_r = 0\) then
\[
\alpha^*_2 = \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 + \sqrt{1 - \frac{4 \theta}{\theta (1 - \theta) C_p}} \right) < 1
\]
and that if \(C_r \geq \frac{\theta}{8}\) then
\[
\alpha^*_2 = 1 + \sqrt{1 - \frac{2(2 - \theta)}{\theta (1 - \theta) C_p}} > 1.
\]
Hence, using eq. (30) and eq. (38), the previous observations, and the fact that \(\alpha^*_1 = 1\) if \(C_r = 0\), we obtain
\[
\Delta E_2(C_p) = \frac{\theta}{4} \left[ (1 - \theta) \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{4 \theta}{\theta (1 - \theta) C_p}} \right) - \frac{1 - \theta}{2 - \theta} \left( 1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{2(2 - \theta)}{\theta (1 - \theta) C_p}} \right) \right].
\]
We deduce that:
\[
\frac{4 \partial \Delta E_2}{\partial C_p} = \frac{1}{\theta} \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{4 \theta}{\theta (1 - \theta) C_p}}} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{2(2 - \theta)}{\theta (1 - \theta) C_p}}} \right).
\]
This is always positive iff \(\frac{4 \theta}{\theta (1 - \theta) C_p} > \frac{2(2 - \theta)}{\theta (1 - \theta) C_p}\), which is always true. Thus, for \(C_p \in [0, C_{\text{max}}(\theta, 1)]\), \(\Delta E_2(C_p)\) increases with \(C_p\). As \(\Delta E_2(0) = 0\) and \(\Delta E_2(C_{\text{max}}(\theta, 1)) > 0\), we obtain that \(\Delta E_2(C_p) > 0\) when \(C_p \in [0, C_{\text{max}}(\theta, 1)]\).

**Case 2.** Now, consider the case in which \(C_p \in [C_{\text{max}}(\theta, 1), C_{\text{min}}(\theta, 0)]\). In this case, using Lemma 1 and the previous observations, we obtain that if \(C_r = 0\) then
\[
\alpha^*_2 = 1 + \sqrt{1 - \frac{2(2 - \theta)}{\theta (1 - \theta) C_p}} > 1.
\]
and if \( C_r \geq \frac{\theta}{8} \) then

\[ \alpha^*_2 = 0. \]

Hence, using eq. (30) and eq. (38), and the fact that \( \alpha^*_1 = 1 \) if \( C_r = 0 \), we obtain

\[ \Delta E_2(C_p) = \theta \frac{1}{4} \left[ 1 - \theta - \frac{1 - \theta}{2 - \theta} \left( 1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{2(2 - \theta)}{\theta(1 - \theta)} C_p} \right) \right] = \frac{\theta}{4} \left[ (1 - \theta)^2 \frac{1 - \theta}{2 - \theta} + \frac{1 - \theta}{2 - \theta} \sqrt{1 - \frac{2(2 - \theta)}{\theta(1 - \theta)} C_p} \right] > 0. \]

**Case 3.** Finally suppose that \( C_p \in [C_{\min}(\theta, 0), C_{\max}(\theta, 1)] \). In this case, using Lemma 1 and the previous observations, we obtain that if \( C_r = 0 \) then

\[ \alpha^*_2 = \left( 1 - \frac{\theta}{2} \right) \left( 1 + \sqrt{1 - \frac{8}{\theta(2 - \theta)} C_p} \right) < 1, \]

and if \( C_r \geq \frac{\theta}{8} \) then

\[ \alpha^*_2 = 0. \]

Hence, using eq. (30) and eq. (38), and the fact that \( \alpha^*_1 = 1 \) if \( C_r = 0 \), we obtain that

\[ \Delta E_2 = \theta \frac{1}{4} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \theta + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{1 - \frac{8}{\theta(2 - \theta)} C_p} \right], \]

which is positive if \( C_p \leq (1 - (2 \theta - 1)^2)^{\frac{\theta(2-\theta)}{8}} \).

**Proof of Corollary 4.** Using the first parts of Propositions 1 and 2, we deduce that:

\[ x_1 = \mathbb{I}_{s=1} - \mathbb{I}_{s=0}, \text{ with } s = u \times V + (1 - u) \times \epsilon, \quad (39) \]

\[ x_2 = u \times [\mathbb{I}_{V=1} - \mathbb{I}_{V=0}] + (1 - u) \times [\mathbb{I}_{p_1=(1-\theta)/2} - \mathbb{I}_{p_1=(1+\theta)/2}], \quad (40) \]

where \( \mathbb{I} \) denotes the indicator function, which is equal to one when the statement in brackets holds. As \( \mathbb{E}[x_1] = \mathbb{E}[x_2] = 0 \), we deduce from eq. (39) and eq. (40) that:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Cov}(x_1, x_2) &= \mathbb{E}[x_1 x_2] = \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}[x_1 s = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}[x_2 s = 0], \\
&= \frac{\theta}{2} \mathbb{E}[x_2 V = 1, u = 1] + \frac{1}{2} (1 - \theta) \frac{\alpha^*}{Q} \mathbb{E}[x_2 \epsilon = 1, u = 0, p_1 = \frac{1 + \theta}{2}], \\
&- \frac{\theta}{2} \mathbb{E}[x_2 V = 0, u = 1] - \frac{1}{2} (1 - \theta) \frac{\alpha^*}{Q} \mathbb{E}[x_2 \epsilon = 0, u = 0, p_1 = \frac{1 - \theta}{2}], \\
&= \theta - (1 - \theta) \alpha^*_1.
\end{align*}
\]
As $\alpha^*_1$ increases when $C_r$ declines, we deduce that $\text{Cov}(x_1, x_2)$ decreases when $C_r$ decreases.
Moreover, $\text{Cov}(x_1, x_2) < 0$ iff:

$$\alpha^*_1(\theta, C_r) \geq \frac{\theta}{1 - \theta}.$$ 

Substituting $\alpha^*_1(\theta, C_r)$ by its expression in eq. (15), we deduce that $\text{Cov}(x_1, x_2) < 0$ iff $\theta < 1/2$ and $C_r < \frac{\theta^2(2\theta - 1)}{2(1 - \theta)}$.

**Proof of Corollary 5.** Using the second part of Proposition 1 and the first part of Proposition 2, we deduce that:

$$p_1 = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\theta}{2}I_{f_1 > 1 - \alpha^*_1} - \frac{\theta}{2}I_{f_1 < -1 + \alpha^*_1}$$

(41)

$$x_2 = U \times [I_{V = 1} - I_{V = 0}] + (1 - u) \times [I_{p_1 = (1 - \theta)/2} - I_{p_1 = (1 + \theta)/2}].$$

(42)

As $\mathbb{E}[x_2] = 0$ and $\mathbb{E}[p_1] = 1/2$, we deduce from (41) and (42) that:

$$\text{Cov}(p_1, x_2) = \mathbb{E}[(p_1^* - 1/2)x_2] = \frac{\theta \alpha^*_1}{4} \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[ x_2 | s = 1, p_1^* = \frac{1 + \theta}{2} \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[ x_2 | s = 0, p_1^* = \frac{1 - \theta}{2} \right] \right\}$$

$$= \frac{\theta^2}{4} \alpha^*_1 \mathbb{E} \left[ x_2 | V = 1, u = 1, p_1^* = \frac{1 + \theta}{2} \right] + \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)}{4} \alpha^*_1 \mathbb{E} \left[ x_2 | \epsilon = 1, u = 0, p_1^* = \frac{1 + \theta}{2} \right]$$

$$- \frac{\theta^2}{4} \alpha^*_1 \mathbb{E} \left[ x_2 | V = 0, u = 1, p_1^* = \frac{1 - \theta}{2} \right] - \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)}{4} \alpha^*_1 \mathbb{E} \left[ x_2 | \epsilon = 0, u = 0, p_1^* = \frac{1 - \theta}{2} \right]$$

$$= \theta(2\theta - 1)\alpha^*_1.$$ 

As $\alpha^*_1$ increases when $C_r$ declines, we deduce that $|\text{Cov}(p_1, x_2)|$ increases when $C_r$ decreases.

**Proof of Corollary 6.**

We first compute the expression for $\text{Cov}(x_1, r_2)$ given in eq. (19). As $\mathbb{E}[x_1] = 0$,

$$\text{Cov}(x_1, r_2) = \mathbb{E}[(p_2^* - p_1^*)x_1] - \mathbb{E}[p_2^* - p_1^*] \mathbb{E}[x_1] = \mathbb{E}[(p_2^* - p_1^*)x_1].$$

(43)

Now:

$$\mathbb{E}[p_1^*x_1] = \frac{1}{2}(\mathbb{E}[p_1^*x_1 | s = 1] + \mathbb{E}[p_1^*x_1 | s = 0]) = \frac{1}{2}(\mathbb{E}[p_1^* | s = 1] - \mathbb{E}[p_1^* | s = 0])$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \left( (1 - \alpha^*_1) \frac{1}{2} + \alpha_1 \frac{1 + \theta}{2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \left( (1 - \alpha^*_1) \frac{1}{2} + \alpha_1 \frac{1 - \theta}{2} \right)$$

$$= \frac{\theta \alpha^*_1}{2}.$$ 

(44)
Similarly, we have that:

$$E[p^*_2 x_1] = \frac{1}{2}(E[p^*_2 | s = 1] - E[p^*_2 | s = 0]). \quad (45)$$

We first compute $E[p^*_2 | s = 1]$. We have:

$$E[p^*_2 | s = 1] = \alpha^*_1 E[p^*_2 | s = 1, p_1^* = \frac{1 + \theta}{2}] + (1 - \alpha^*_1) E[p^*_2 | s = 1, p_1^* = \frac{1}{2}]. \quad (46)$$

The event $p_1 = \frac{1 + \theta}{2}$ implies that $s = 1$. Thus,

$$E[p^*_2 | s = 1, p_1^* = \frac{1 + \theta}{2}] = E[p^*_2 | p_1^* = \frac{1 + \theta}{2}] = p_1^* = \frac{1 + \theta}{2},$$

where the third equality follows from the fact that the equilibrium price is a martingale. Moreover, using Proposition 2, we deduce that if $\alpha^*_2 < 1$:

$$E[p^*_2 | s = 1, p_1^* = \frac{1}{2}] = \frac{1}{2}(1 - \theta)\alpha^*_2 \times \frac{1 - \theta}{2 - \theta} + (1 - \alpha^*_2) \times \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \alpha^*_2 \times \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\theta}{2} \alpha^*_2 \times 1$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \alpha^*_2 \left(1 - \frac{1}{2} + \frac{(1 - \theta)^2}{2(2 - \theta)} + \frac{1}{2(2 - \theta)} + \frac{\theta}{2}\right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\theta \alpha^*_2}{2(2 - \theta)}.$$}

and if $\alpha^*_2 \geq 1$,

$$E[p^*_2 | s = 1, p_1^* = \frac{1}{2}] = (1 - \theta) \frac{1}{2} + \theta \left[\frac{\alpha^*_2}{2} \times 1 + \left(1 - \frac{\alpha^*_2}{2}\right) \times \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2}\right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \theta \left[\frac{\alpha^*_2}{2} \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{2 - \theta}\right) + \frac{1}{2(2 - \theta)} - \frac{1}{2}\right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \theta \left[\frac{\theta}{2(2 - \theta)} + 1 - \frac{\theta}{2(2 - \theta)} \alpha^*_2\right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)(\alpha^*_2 - 1)}{2(2 - \theta)}.\]$$

We deduce from these expressions and eq. (46) that:

$$E[p^*_2 | s = 1] = \begin{cases} \frac{1 + \theta \alpha^*_2}{2} + \theta(1 - \alpha^*_2) \frac{\alpha^*_2}{2(2 - \theta)} & \text{if } \alpha^*_2 \leq 1, \\ \frac{1 + \theta \alpha^*_2}{2} + \theta(1 - \alpha^*_2)(1 - \alpha^*_2) & \text{if } \alpha^*_2 > 1. \end{cases} \quad (47)$$
Proceeding in a similar way, we obtain after some algebra that

\[
E[p_2^s | s = 1] = \begin{cases} 
1 - \theta \alpha_1^* - \frac{\theta \alpha_2^*}{2(2-\theta)} & \text{if } \alpha_2^* \leq 1, \\
1 - \theta \alpha_1^* - \frac{\theta}{2(2-\theta)}[1 - (1 - \theta)(1 - \alpha_2^*)] & \text{if } \alpha_2^* > 1.
\end{cases}
\] (48)

After some algebra, we deduce from equations (43), (44), (45), (47), and (48) that:

\[
\text{Cov}(x_1, r_2) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\theta(1-\alpha_1^*)\alpha_2^*}{2(2-\theta)} & \text{if } \alpha_2^* \leq 1, \\
\frac{(1-\alpha_1^*)\theta}{2(2-\theta)}[1 - (1 - \theta)(1 - \alpha_2^*)] & \text{if } \alpha_2^* > 1,
\end{cases}
\] (49)

which is equivalent to eq.(19) because \(\alpha_2^* > 1\) iff \(C_p < C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1^*)\) and \(\alpha_2^* \leq 1\) iff \(C_{\min}(\theta, \alpha_1^*) \leq C_p \leq C_{\max}(\theta, \alpha_1^*)\).

As \(\alpha_2^*\) decreases with \(C_p\) and \(\alpha_1^*\) does not depend on \(C_p\), it is immediate from eq.(19) that \(\text{Cov}(x_1, r_2)\) increases when \(C_p\) decreases. Moreover, if (i) \(\theta > \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}}\) or (ii) \(\theta \leq \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}}\) and \(C_r \geq \bar{C}_r(\theta)\), or (iii) \(\theta \leq \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}}\) and \(C_p \leq \bar{C}_p(\theta)\) then \(\alpha_2^*\) decreases when \(C_r\) decreases. Thus, as \(\alpha_1^*\) increases when \(C_r\) decreases, we deduce that \(\text{Cov}(x_1, r_2)\) decreases when \(C - r\) decreases if i) \(\theta > \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}}\) or (ii) \(\theta \leq \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}}\) and \(C_r \geq \bar{C}_r(\theta)\), or (iii) \(\theta \leq \frac{\sqrt{2} - 1}{\sqrt{2}}\) and \(C_p \leq \bar{C}_p(\theta)\).
References


