Government and Regulatory Issues
Saturday, Jan. 7, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:15 PM
Sheraton Grand Chicago, Sheraton Ballroom II
- Chair: Mara Faccio, Purdue University
Political Information, Firm Value and Information Networks: Evidence From the Chinese National Social Security Fund
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the existence and impact of the policy information advantage, held by a government-backed institutional investor, on firm performance. The Chinese National Social Security fund (CNSSF) is used as our “laboratory” – wherein the CNSSF represents a major state sponsoring institutional investor in China with dual roles and a deep information network. Our results show a short-run positive and significant information advantage-stock performance linkage. In contrast, the long-run linkage is negative. We document that there is a network spillover of the information advantage across the Chinese mutual fund industry.
Political Influence and Government Investment: Evidence from Contract-Level Data
AbstractWe use contract-level data to study the effect of corporate political influence on the allocation, design, and real outcomes of government contracts. To isolate the treatment effect of political influence, we focus on campaign contributions in close elections and the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Firms with political influence win more contracts, with larger amounts, weaker competition, and looser oversight, and successfully renegotiate contract terms. While preferred access to government contracts improves performance and output, contractual laxity exacerbates agency problems and erodes efficiency. Overall, we provide estimates of the dual effect of political influence on firm outcomes.
Policy Uncertainty, Political Capital, and Firm Risk-Taking
AbstractWe link the cross-section of firms' sensitivities to economic policy uncertainty to their subsequent political activity and post-election risk-taking and performance. We first show that firms with a high sensitivity to economic policy uncertainty donate more to candidates for elected office than less-sensitive firms. Using a sample of close U.S. congressional elections, we then show that plausibly exogenous shocks to policy-sensitive firms' political capital bases produce large subsequent changes in these firms' investment, leverage, firm value, operating performance, CDS spreads, and option-implied volatility. We do not find similar effects among less policy-sensitive firms, suggesting that many existing results in the political connections literature appear to be driven by policy-sensitive firms. Our results provide a new explanation for corporate political contributions and represent the first attempt in the literature to link firms' government policy sensitivities with their investments in political capital and subsequent performance.
University of Tennessee
University of Notre Dame
- G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance