Structural Models in Development: Migration, Marriage and the Family

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 8, 2017 1:00 PM – 3:00 PM

Hyatt Regency Chicago, Burnham
Hosted By: Econometric Society
  • Chair: Arthur Lewbel, Boston College

Where Did It Go Wrong? Marriage and Divorce in Malawi

Frederic Vermeulen
,
University of Leuven
Lauren Cherchye
,
University of Leuven
Bram De Rock
,
Free University of Brussels
Selma Telalagic
,
University of Oxford

Abstract

Do individuals divorce for economic reasons? Can we measure the attractiveness of new matches in the marriage market? We answer these questions using a structural model of the household and a rich panel dataset from Malawi. We propose a model of the household with consumption, production and revealed preference conditions for stability on the marriage market. We define marital instability in terms of the consumption gains to remarrying another individual in the same marriage market, and to being single. Based on our estimates of marital instability in the first wave of the data, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the wife's estimated consumption gains from remarriage is significantly associated with a 0.6 percentage point increase in divorce probability in the next three years. In a multinomial model, higher values of consumption gains from remarriage raise the odds of subsequent divorce and remarriage but not of divorce and singlehood. These findings provide out-of-sample validation of the structural model and shed new light on the economic determinants of divorce.

Terms and Engagement: Marriage and Migration in India

Andrew Beauchamp
,
Wright State University
Rossella Calvi
,
Rice University
Scott Fulford
,
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Abstract

Indian marriage markets are characterized by an enormous level of female migration, the presence of dowries, and by differing levels of participation in the decision by women. We formulate and estimate a dynamic, equilibrium, two-sided matching model which allows for estimation of separate preferences for men and women. We recover male and female preferences over partner characteristics, dowry, and migration costs in the presence of differing degrees of female independence and unobserved heterogeneity. In counter-factual simulations we focus on how likely changes in sex-ratios, female autonomy, and education affect equilibrium marriage matching and welfare. Our estimates suggest that men prefer less educated and less autonomous women, and so increases in female education and autonomy reduce the welfare of women in the marriage market, even if education and autonomy improve welfare outside of marriage. Declining sex-ratios improve welfare for some, but not all, women largely by increasing the value of marrying later.

Why Are Older Women Missing in India? The Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty

Rossella Calvi
,
Rice University

Abstract

Almost half of missing women in India are of post-reproductive ages. I argue that intra-household gender inequality and gender asymmetry in poverty account for a substantial fraction of these missing women. Using a natural experiment, I link changes in women's intra-household bargaining power to their health. Using a structural model of households, I estimate the age profile of women's bargaining power and construct relative poverty rates for women. I find that bargaining power declines with age, and that women's relative poverty rates closely match their higher than expected mortality rates by age. This match is nearly exact at post-reproductive ages.

LATE With Mismeasured or Mispecified Treatment: An Application On Woman Empowerment in India

Denni Tommasi
,
Free University of Brussels

Abstract

We show that a local average treatment effect (LATE) can sometimes be identified and consistently estimated when treatment is mismeasured, or when treatment is estimated using a possibly misspecified structural model. Our associated estimator, which we call Mismeasurement Robust LATE (MR-LATE), is based on differencing two different mismeasures of treatment. In our empirical application, treatment is a measure of empowerment: whether a wife has control of substantial household resources. Due to measurement difficulties and sharing of goods within a household, this treatment cannot be directly observed without error, and so must be estimated. Our outcomes are health indicators of family members. We first estimate a structural model to obtain the otherwise unobserved treatment indicator. Then, using changes in inheritance laws in India as an instrument, we apply our new MR-LATE estimator. We find that women's empowerment substantially decreases their probability of being anemic or underweight, and increases children's likelihood of receiving vaccinations. We find no evidence of negative effects on men's health.
Discussant(s)
Andrew Beauchamp
,
Wright State University
Seth Richards-Shubik
,
Lehigh University
Frederic Vermeulen
,
University of Leuven
Lauren Cherchye
,
University of Leuven
JEL Classifications
  • D0 - General