Political Economy and Economic Development in India

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 7, 2017 10:15 AM – 12:15 PM

Sheraton Grand Chicago, Jackson Park
Hosted By: Association of Indian Economic and Financial Studies
  • Chair: Chandana Chakraborty, Montclair State University

Is Partisan Alignment Electorally Rewarding? Evidence From Village Council Elections in India

Subhasish Dey
,
University of Manchester
Kunal Sen
,
University of Manchester

Abstract

Do ruling parties positively discriminate its own constituencies in allocating public resources? If they do, do they gain electorally in engaging in such a practice of partisan alignment? This paper tests whether partisan alignment exists in the allocation of funds for India's largest social protection program, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in the state of West Bengal in India, and whether incumbent local governments (village councils) gain electorally in the practice of partisan alignment.

Child Labor, Global Trade Policies, and Credit Availability: The Nexus

Badri Narayanan Gopalakrishnan
,
Infinite-Sum Modelling, Inc.
Terrie L. Walmsley
,
ImpactEcon
Meenakshi Rishi
,
Seattle University

Abstract

This paper will attempt to fill this gap in the literature by asking the following question - What is the joint impact of trade policies and improvements in credit availability and income transfers to the poor on the use of child labor?

Corruption, Third Party Influence, and the Poor Implementation of Public Welfare Programs in Developing Countries

Saktinil Roy
,
Athabasca University

Abstract

This paper asks if an honest bureaucracy could be corruptible in the context of poverty alleviation programs in developing countries where poor targeting is a persistent problem. The model demonstrates that corruption can exist as part of an equilibrium outcome in “triadic” interactions among an honest bureaucrat, its client, and a third-party intermediary from outside government. Thus, on many occasions, an apparently corrupt pursuit by a self-indulgent bureaucrat is in fact only partly so. The establishment of monetary incentives for bureaucrats is therefore neither obvious nor complete as a solution. We show that such a policy could even increase the scope of bureaucratic corruption.

Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal
,
Rochester Institute of Technology
Seung Jick Yoo
,
Sookmyung Women’s University

Abstract

In this note we study a simple game model of effort application by two individuals (1 and
2) who wish to have an arranged marriage. We first specify the net utility function of individual
as a function of this individual’s own effort and the effort applied by individual in three
distinct cases. Next, we compute the individual’s best response function. Finally, we analyze
effort application by two identical pairs of individuals who are located in two different nations.

Intergenerational Educational Persistence Among Daughters: Evidence From India

Mehtabul Azam
,
Oklahoma State University

Abstract

We examine educational transmission between fathers (mothers) and daughters in India for daughters born during 1962-1991. We find that educational persistence, as measured by the regression coefficient of father's (mother's) education as a predictor of daughter's education, has declined. However, the correlation between educational attainment of daughters and fathers (mothers), another commonly used measure of persistence, suggests only a marginal decline. Further we decompose the intergenerational correlation. We also find that the probability of a daughter attaining senior secondary or above education (top end of educational distribution) is not only positively associated with father's (mother's) education levels but the gaps in those probabilities have not declined over time. Similarly, there is no convergence over time in the probability of a daughter attaining senior secondary or above education with the same level of father's (mother's) education for daughters belonging to Higher Hindu Castes and disadvantaged groups such as Other Backward Castes or Scheduled Castes/Tribes. Although conditional on having same educated fathers, sons are more likely to achieve senior secondary or above education in each cohort compared to daughters, the gap in those probabilities has declined over time.

Economic Growth and Development in India and SAARC Countries

Keshab Bhattarai
,
University of Hull

Abstract

A strong pro-growth government in India with a good vision for the regional<br />
integration and development is instrumental in turning this region as another example<br />
of economic miracles in the global economy within the next few decades. By maintain-<br />
ing average 8 percent growth, it is possible that India will catch up the countries in the<br />
Western Europe in per capita income within a generation. Other SAARC members<br />
may be able to converge to India in per-capita income if they are able to become more<br />
stable and ready to march single-minded on the highway of economic growth.
Discussant(s)
H. K. Pradhan
,
XLRI-Xavier School of Management
Chandana Chakraborty
,
Montclair State University
Shailendra Gajanan
,
University of Pittsburgh-Bradford
Dweepobotee Brahma
,
Western Michigan University
Valerie Cerra
,
International Monetary Fund
Usha Nair-Reichert
,
Georgia Institute of Technology
JEL Classifications
  • O2 - Development Planning and Policy