Uncertainty Aversion and Systemic Risk*

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Abstract

We propose a new theory of systemic risk based on Knightian uncertainty (or “ambiguity”). We show that, due to uncertainty aversion, probabilistic assessments on future asset returns are endogenous, and bad news on one asset class induces investors to be more pessimistic about other asset classes as well. This means that idiosyncratic risk can create contagion and snowball into systemic risk. Furthermore, in a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) setting, we show that, surprisingly, uncertainty aversion causes investors to be less prone to run individual banks, but runs will be systemic. In addition, we show that bank runs are associated with stock market crashes and flight to quality. Finally, we argue that increasing uncertainty makes the financial system more fragile and more prone to crises. We conclude with implications for the current public policy debate on the management of financial crisis.

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Uncertainty and waves of pessimism are the hallmark of financial crises. Financial crises and bank runs are often associated with periods of great uncertainty and sudden widespread pessimism on future returns of financial and real assets. In addition, a puzzling feature of several recent financial crises has been contagion among apparently unrelated asset classes. For example, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 spread to the Russian crisis of 1998, which eventually brought the fall of LTCM (see Allen and Gale, 1999). Negative idiosyncratic news in one asset class can also snowball into systemic shocks. For example, the recent crisis of 2008/2009 was triggered by negative shocks in the relatively small sub-prime mortgage market, and then rapidly spread to the general financial markets, leading to a near meltdown of the entire financial system. These events put into question the very notion (and assessment) of systemic risk, and raise the question of the mechanism that triggers such systemic contagions.

In this paper we propose a new theory of systemic risk based on uncertainty aversion. Our model builds on the distinction between risk, whereby investors know the probability distribution of assets' cash flows, and Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921), whereby investors lack such knowledge. The distinction between the known-unknown and the unknown-unknown is relevant since investors appear to display aversion to uncertainty (or “ambiguity”) as originally suggested by Ellsberg (1961).

We study an economy where uncertainty-averse investors hold, either directly or through financial intermediaries (i.e., banks), a portfolio of risky assets. Investors are uncertain on the distribution of the returns on the risky assets.\(^1\) We argue that probabilistic assessments (or “beliefs” in the sense of de Finetti, 1974) held by uncertainty-averse investors on the future performance of each asset are endogenous, and depend on the composition of their portfolios. We show that this property implies that uncertainty-averse investors can be more optimistic on an uncertain asset when they can also hold other uncertain assets in their portfolios, a feature that we denote uncertainty hedging. Thus, “bad news” on one asset class makes investors also more pessimistic on other asset classes as well. In this way, a shock to one asset class spreads to other asset classes, creating contagion even in cases where shocks are idiosyncratic. Thus, uncertainty aversion is independently a source of systemic risk.

\(^1\)This uncertainty represents, for example, incomplete knowledge on the structure of the economy that generates asset returns, i.e., it can be viewed as model uncertainty (see Hansen and Sargent, 2008).
We build on the classic Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model to include two banks, each with access to a bank-specific class of risky assets in addition to the safe asset. Following existing literature, banks are benevolent, maximizing the welfare of investors who are exposed to uninsurable liquidity shocks. Risk factors in each asset class are independent given the state of the economy, but the state of the economy differentially affects each asset class and provides the source of uncertainty.

In the absence of uncertainty aversion, both banks invest in risky assets. Banks provide investors with (partial) insurance against liquidity shocks, but runs are possible in equilibrium at the interim date. Runs, however, are not necessarily systemic. Formally, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) there are multiple equilibria, with and without runs. There are both panic runs, due to coordination failure among investors, and fundamental runs, due to the arrival of (idiosyncratic) bad news about a bank’s expected profitability. In the absence on uncertainty aversion, however, there is no reason for bank runs to be systemic, that is to occur simultaneously on both banks.

With uncertainty aversion, however, investing in a class of risky assets is more valuable to investors if they hold other asset classes in their portfolio as well, due to uncertainty hedging. This feature has a number of important consequences. First, it generates two equilibria in banks’ investment decisions. When banks decide how much to invest in the risky asset, each bank is willing to make such investments if and only if the other bank invests in its risky asset as well. This implies that investors’ uncertainty aversion makes investment in risky assets strategic complements, with the possibility of a second Pareto-inferior equilibrium where both banks invest in the safe asset only, a situation that we denote as a “lending freeze.” This second (inefficient) equilibrium represents a new type of equilibrium in a Diamond and Dybvig setting with multiple banks.

The second effect of uncertainty aversion is that it creates the possibility of contagion across banks. This happens because, if a late investor withdraws early from one bank, it can now become optimal for that investor to withdraw early from the other bank as well, even if no one else runs. Thus, negative idiosyncratic shocks at any one bank can generate a deterioration of the probabilistic assessment on future returns on other banks’ assets and, thus, cause runs on those banks, creating systemic risk. In other words, negative news specific to one asset class may create a negative sentiment, or pessimism, that spreads to other asset classes. In this way, uncertainty aversion generates endogenous contagion and becomes a source of systemic risk. Note that this new source
of systemic risk is driven by investors’ preferences rather than by systemic shocks to economic
fundamentals. We also show that, interestingly, uncertainty aversion causes investors to be less
prone to run individual banks, but runs will be systemic.

In our model, bank runs can also be associated with stock market crashes leading to a “flight
to quality.” Distinct from existing literature, contagion between the financial sector and the real
economy is driven by investor preferences, creating a new channel through which a banking crisis
can affect the real economy which is different, for example, from the adverse effects of liquidity
 crunches.

Finally, we show that increasing uncertainty makes the financial system more fragile and more
prone to financial crises. Specifically, we show that for low levels of uncertainty idiosyncratic shocks
at a single bank generate local runs, while for greater levels of uncertainty such shocks spread to
other banks and become systemic. In addition, we show that for even greater levels of uncertainty
a second equilibrium exists where banks only invest in the safe asset, generating “lending freezes.”
In addition, we show our results extend to a setting with multiple banks.

We conclude our paper with a discussion of the empirical and public policy implications of our
model. First and foremost, the main thrust of our analysis is that financial crises can originate
in one sector of the economy and then propagate through the banking system and spill over to
the stock market amidst a wave of pessimism. Conversely, our paper implies that good news in
one industry can trigger additional lending to another sector, and thus result in a lending boom.
We also show that, because of the externalities introduced by uncertainty aversion, banks may be
exposed to a self-fulfilling (inefficient) lending freeze, whereby each individual bank in not willing
to lend, even if it were (collectively) advantageous to do so.

Our paper has implications for public policy and the management of financial crises. First,
we argue that greater transparency may be beneficial in periods of high perceived uncertainty by
investors. We also suggest that bank bailouts and assets purchases by the central bank may involve
not only the banks that are directly affected, but must also be extended to other banks that may
be affected by the systemic nature of the financial crisis. Finally, we suggest that, because the
risky equilibrium is preferred to the safe equilibrium, regulatory attempts to limit risk taking can
be harmful.
Our paper is related to several stands of literature. First is the theory of bank runs based on
the liquidity provision/maturity transformation role of financial intermediation originating with
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). This includes Jacklin (1987), Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), Jacklin
and Bhattacharya (1988), Chari and Jagannathan (1988), and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005),
among many others. Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) argue that aggregate volatility can induce
banks to stop trading among each other, effectively generating a lending freeze. Our paper shows
that uncertainty aversion creates externalities and strategic complementarities across asset holdings
which may lead to a new Pareto inferior equilibrium where banks refrain from investing in risky
assets (and, thus, runs are not possible).

More importantly, our paper is also linked to the recent emerging literature on contagion and
systemic risk. Allen and Gale (2000) generate contagion as the outcome of an imperfect interbank
market for liquidity. Kodres and Pritsker (2002) model transmission (i.e., contagion) of idiosyn-
cratic shocks across asset markets by investors’ rebalancing their portfolios’ exposures to shared
macroeconomic risks among asset classes. Garleanu, Panageas, and Yu (2014) derive contagion
across assets due to limited participation and overlapping portfolios of investors. Allen, Babus, and
Carletti (2012) examine the impact of financial connections on systemic risk. Acharya, Mehran, and
Thakor (2013) consider a model where regulatory forbearance induces banks to invest in correlated
assets, thus creating systemic risk. Acharya and Thakor (2015) argue that, while bank leverage
can be used to discipline a bank’s risk-taking, it generates excessive liquidations that convey un-
favorable information on the economy’s fundamentals generating systemic risk. Additional papers
include Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000), Rochet and Vives (2004), Acharya and Yorulmazer
(2008), Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007), among many others.

Closer to our paper is the model in Goldstein and Pauzner (2004). This paper argues that in-
vestors’ portfolio diversification may generate systemic risk. This happens because (idiosyncratic)
negative information on a bank (or, equivalently, an asset class), generates a wealth loss to in-
vestors. If investors have decreasing absolute risk aversion, this wealth loss may increase investors’
risk aversion sufficiently to trigger a run on other banks that are otherwise not affected by the
initial shock. Our paper differs from theirs in the fundamental mechanism that triggers contagion.
Specifically, in Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) the channel of contagion is through changing the
equilibrium discount rate in an economy, since the increase of investors’ risk aversion affects the market risk premium. In contrast, in our model the channel of contagion is through a deterioration of investor sentiment, potentially leaving the market discount rate unaffected. Thus, the two papers complement each other, and they can jointly explain the deterioration of beliefs and increase of discount rates that often characterize financial crises.

Closely related to our work is also the literature on uncertainty aversion. Uhlig (2010) highlights the role of uncertainty aversion in a financial crisis: the presence of uncertainty-averse investors exacerbates the falls of asset prices following a negative shock in the economy. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) examine a version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with uncertainty-averse investors. Uncertainty in their model concerns the extent of the investors’ liquidity shocks (and not a bank’s expected profitability, as in our model). Uncertainty aversion makes investors very pessimistic (that is, they “fear the worst”) triggering a “flight-to-quality.” In their model, uncertainty aversion acts as an “amplification mechanism.” Contagion (that is, the transmission mechanism) can happen, for example, through forced asset sales in unrelated asset markets due to investors’ balance sheet constraints. In our paper, uncertainty aversion itself is a new source of contagion and systemic risk, by its impact on investor sentiment.

Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we briefly discuss the model of uncertainty aversion that underpins our analysis. In Section 2, we outline the model. In Section 3, we develop our theory of systemic risk based on uncertainty aversion. In Section 4, we discuss the contagion effect of bank runs on the stock market. In Section 5, we discuss the effect of increased uncertainty on fragility of the financial system. Results are extended to a multiple bank setting in Section 6. In Section 7, we discuss the empirical and policy implications of our model. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.

1 Uncertainty aversion

A common feature of current economic models is to assume that all agents know the distribution of all possible outcomes. An implication of this assumption is that there is no distinction between

\[ \text{See also Krishnamurthy (2010) and, in a similar vein, Easley and O’Hara (2009).} \]

\[ \text{This section draws on Dicks and Fulghieri (2013).} \]
the known-unknown and the unknown-unknown. However, the Ellsberg paradox shows that this implication is not warranted.\textsuperscript{4} This introductory section briefly describes how various models have accounted for risk and uncertainty.

In traditional models, economic agents maximize their Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). Given a von-Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function $u$ and a probability distribution over wealth, $\mu$, each player maximizes

$$ U^e = E_\mu [u(w)]. $$

(1)

One limitation of the SEU approach is that it cannot account for aversion to uncertainty, or “ambiguity.” In the SEU framework, economic agents merely average over the possible probabilities. Under uncertainty aversion, a player does not know the true prior, but only knows that the prior is from a given set, $\mathcal{M}$.

A common way for modeling uncertainty (or ambiguity) aversion is the minimum expected utility approach (MEU), promoted in Epstein and Schneider (2011). In this framework, economic agents maximize

$$ U^a = \min_{\mu \in \mathcal{M}} E_\mu [u(w)]. $$

(2)

As shown in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the MEU approach is a consequence of replacing the Sure-Thing Principle of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), with the Uncertainty Aversion Axiom.\textsuperscript{5}

This assumption captures the intuition that economic agents prefer risk to uncertainty – they prefer known probabilities to unknown. MEU has the intuitive feature that a player first calculates expected utility with respect to each prior, and then takes the worst-case scenario over all possible priors. In other words, the agent follows the maxim “Average over what you know, then worry

\textsuperscript{4}A good illustration of the Ellsberg paradox is actually from Keynes (1921). There are two urns. Urn K has 50 red balls and 50 blue balls. Urn U has 100 balls, but the subject is not told how many of them are red (all balls are either red or blue). The subject will be given $100 if the color of their choice is drawn, and the subject can choose which Urn is drawn from. Subjects typically prefer urn K, revealing aversion to uncertainty (this preference is shown to be strict if the subject receives $101 from selecting Urn U but $100 from Urn K being drawn). To see this, suppose the subject believes that the probability of drawing blue from Urn U is $p_B$. If $p_B < \frac{1}{2}$, the subject prefers to draw red from Urn U. If $p_B > \frac{1}{2}$, the subject prefers to draw blue from Urn U. If $p_B = \frac{1}{2}$, the subject is indifferent. Because subjects strictly prefer to draw from Urn K, such behavior cannot be consistent with a single prior on Urn U. This paradox provides the motivation for the use of multiple priors. Further, the subject’s elicited beliefs motivate the failure of additivity of asset prices: in this example, $p_B + p_R < p(R|B) = 1$.

\textsuperscript{5}Anscombe and Aumann (1963) is an extension of the Savage (1972) framework: the Anscombe and Aumann framework has both objective and subjective probabilities, while the Savage framework has only subjective probabilities.
about what you don’t know.”

In this paper, we use the MEU approach with recursively defined utilities, as described in Epstein and Schnieder (2011). Formally, we model sophisticated uncertainty-averse economic agents with consistent planning. In this setting, agents are sophisticated: they correctly anticipate their future uncertainty aversion. Consistent planning accounts for the fact that agents take into account how they will actually behave in the future. Our results are smooth (a.e.) because we explore a setting where we can apply a minimax theorem.

An important property of uncertainty aversion that will play a critical role in our paper is that beliefs about an economy’s fundamentals held by an ambiguity-averse agent are endogenous, and depend on the agent’s overall exposure to the risk factors of the economy. This feature is the outcome of the fact that the minimization operator in (2), which determines the probabilistic assessment held by the investor, may depend on the composition of the investor’s overall portfolio. In particular, we will show that investors will be relatively more “pessimistic” about assets that represent a greater source of risk in their overall portfolio. We will refer to this feature by saying that (under ambiguity aversion) investors hold “portfolio-distorted” assessments.

An additional implication of ambiguity aversion is that ambiguity-averse investors may benefit from diversification across sources of uncertainty, a property that we will refer to as uncertainty hedging. This property can be loosely interpreted as the analogue for MEU investors of the more traditional “benefits of diversification” displayed by SEU preferences, and it be can be seen as follows. Consider two random variables, \( y_k, k \in \{1, 2\} \), with distribution \( \mu \in \mathcal{M} \), which is ambiguous to agents. Uncertainty-hedging is the property that uncertainty-averse agents prefer to pick the worst case scenario for a portfolio, rather than choosing the worst case scenario for each individual asset in its portfolio.

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6 Another approach is the smooth ambiguity model developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). In their model, agents maximize expected felicity of expected utility. Agents are uncertainty averse if the felicity function is concave. Our results follow also in that framework if the felicity function is sufficiently concave.

7 Siniscalchi (2011) describes this framework as preferences over trees.

8 Note that, as such, property (3) is reminiscent of the well-known feature that a portfolio of options is worth more than an option on a portfolio and, thus, that writing a portfolio of options is more costly than writing an option on a portfolio.
Theorem 1 Uncertainty-averse agents prefer uncertainty-hedging:

\[
q \min_{\mu \in \mathcal{M}} E_{\mu} [u(y_1)] + (1 - q) \min_{\mu \in \mathcal{M}} E_{\mu} [u(y_2)] \leq \\
\min_{\mu \in \mathcal{M}} \{ qE_{\mu} [u(y_1)] + (1 - q)E_{\mu} [u(y_1)] \}, \text{ for all } q \in [0, 1].
\]

If agents are SEU, (3) holds as an equality.

This property will play a key role in our model. It implies that uncertainty-averse agents prefer to hold a portfolio of uncertain assets rather than a single uncertain asset, because investors can lower their exposure to uncertainty by holding a diversified portfolio. It can immediately be seen that this property also implies that an investor will be more “optimistic” about a portfolio of assets rather than about a single asset. Thus, uncertainty hedging creates a complementarity between asset classes for investors so that the value investors place on any one type of asset is increasing in their portfolio exposure to other assets.\(^9\)

A second critical feature of our model is that we do not impose rectangularity of beliefs (as in Epstein and Schneider 2003). Rectangularity of beliefs effectively implies that prior beliefs in the set of admissible priors can be chosen independently from each other.\(^10\) In our model, the agent faces a restriction on the set of the core beliefs \(\mathcal{M}\) over which the minimization problem (2) is taking place. These restrictions are justified by the observation that the nature of the economic problem imposes certain consistency requirements in the set of the core beliefs \(\mathcal{M}\). In other words, we recognize that the “fundamentals” of the economic problem faced by the uncertainty-averse agent generates a loss of degree of freedom in the selection of prior beliefs.\(^11\) Alternatively, following Epstein and Schneider (2011), lack of rectangularity can be justified by requiring that beliefs in the core-belief set \(\mathcal{M}\) satisfy a minimum likelihood ratio or, equivalently, a maximum relative entropy with respect to a given set of reference beliefs.

\(^9\)We will show that such portfolio complementarity will induce banks to exhibit strategic complementarity in their investment decisions, resulting in multiple equilibria. In addition, we will show that uncertainty hedging generates contagion across asset classes, and it will provide the new channel through which financial panics spread in the economy.

\(^10\)Rectangularity of beliefs is commonly assumed to guarantee dynamic consistency. However, Aryal and Stauber (2014) show that, with multiple players, rectangularity of beliefs is not sufficient for dynamic consistency.

\(^11\)For example, an uncertainty-averse producer may face uncertainty on the future consumption demand exerted by her customers. The beliefs held by the uncertainty-averse agent on consumer demand must be consistent with basic restrictions, such as the fact that the consumer choices must satisfy an appropriate budget constraint.
2 The model

We study a two-period model, with three dates, $t \in \{0, 1, 2\}$. The economy is endowed with three types of assets: a riskless asset (or “safe technology”), which will serve as our numeraire, and two classes (or types) of risky assets denominated by $\tau$, with $\tau \in \{A, B\}$. Making an investment in a risky asset at the beginning of the first period, $t = 0$, generates at the end of the second period, $t = 2$, a random payoff denominated in terms of the riskless asset. Specifically, a unit investment in the type-$\tau$ asset produces at $t = 2$ a payoff $R$ (success) with probability $p_\tau$, and a payoff 0 (failure) with probability $1 - p_\tau$. A unit investment in the riskless asset, which can be made either at $t = 0$ or $t = 1$, yields a unit return in the second period, so that the (net) riskless rate of return is zero.

We assume that returns on risky assets depend on the state of the overall economy, which provides the source of uncertainty in the model, as described below.

Our economy has two classes of players: investors and banks. The banking system is specialized: each bank can only invest in one asset class. Thus, banks of type $\tau$ can only invest in type-$\tau$ assets, for $\tau \in \{A, B\}$, at $t = 0$. This assumption captures the notion that banks in our economy are specialized lenders with a well-defined clientele. At $t = 1$, a bank has the choice of (partially) liquidating the project, allowing it to recover a fraction of the initial investment. Thus, liquidation at $t = 1$ of a fraction $\ell$ of the investment in risky asset $\tau$ will generate a payoff $\ell$ at $t = 1$, and $(1 - \ell)R$ with probability $p_\tau(\ell)$ at $t = 2$.

The economy is populated by a continuum of investors. Each investor is endowed at $t = 0$ with $\$2$ in the riskless asset and, as we will show later, in equilibrium will invest $\$1$ in Bank $A$ and $\$1$ in Bank $B$. Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), each investor faces at $t = 1$ a liquidity shock with probability $\lambda$.\textsuperscript{12} Occurrence of the liquidity shock is privately observed by the investor and determines her “type.” An investor hit with the liquidity shock, that is, a “short-term” investor, must consume immediately, and her utility is $u(c_1)$, with $u' > 0 > u''$, where $c_1$ is consumption at $t = 1$. An investor not impacted by the liquidity shock, that is a “long-term” investor, consumes only at $t = 2$. For analytical tractability we assume that long-term investors are risk neutral in wealth, that is, their utility is $u_2(c_2) = c_2$, where $c_2$ is consumption at $t = 2$.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} Liquidity shocks are statistically independent across investors. Differently from Wallace (1988, 1990), and Chari (1989), among others, there is neither aggregate risk nor uncertainty on the liquidity shock.

\textsuperscript{13} While we make the assumption that the utility for consumption at $t = 2$ is linear for analytical tractability,
The model unfolds as follows. At the beginning of the period, \( t = 0 \), banks offer deposit contracts (described below) to investors. At \( t = 1 \), investors learn whether or not they are affected by the liquidity shock. Investors hit by a liquidity shock withdraw from the bank(s) where they made a deposit and consume all their wealth. Investors not hit by a liquidity shock must decide whether to keep their deposits in the bank(s) for later withdrawal, or to withdraw (part of) their deposits immediately from one or both banks, that is to “run” banks, and invest the proceeds in the storage technology for later consumption. At \( t = 2 \), cash flows from risky assets are realized and divided among investors remaining in the bank.

An important deviation from the traditional Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework is that we assume investors are uncertainty averse. Following Dicks and Fulghieri (2013), we model uncertainty aversion by assuming that the success probability of an asset of type-\( \tau \) depends on the value of an underlying parameter \( \theta \), and is denoted by \( p_\tau(\theta) \). Uncertainty-averse agents treat the parameter \( \theta \) as ambiguous, and assess that \( \theta \in C \equiv [\hat{\theta}_0, \hat{\theta}_1] \subseteq [\theta_0, \theta_1] \), where \( C \) represents the set of “core beliefs”.

We posit that the parameter \( \theta \) describes the state of the economy at \( t = 2 \), and that a greater value of \( \theta \) is “favorable” for asset \( A \) and “unfavorable” for asset \( B \).\(^{14}\) For analytical tractability, we assume that \( p_A(\theta) = e^{\theta - \hat{\theta}_1} \) and \( p_B(\theta) = e^{\theta_0 - \theta} \).\(^{15}\) In this specification, greater values of the parameter \( \theta \) increase the success probability of type \( A \) assets and decrease the success probability of type \( B \) assets. Also, for a given value of the parameter \( \theta \), the probabilities distributions \( p_\tau(\theta) \), \( \tau \in \{A, B\} \), are independent.\(^{16}\)

Finally, we assume that the core of beliefs is symmetric, so that \( \hat{\theta}_1 - \hat{\theta}_0 = \hat{\theta}_0 - \theta_0 \), and we let \( \theta^e \equiv \frac{1}{2} (\theta_0 + \theta_1) \). We will at times benchmark the behavior of uncertainty-averse agents with the behavior of uncertainty-neutral, or SEU, agents, and we will assume that uncertainty-neutral investors assess that \( \theta = \theta^e \), differently from uncertainty-averse investors who assess that \( \theta \in \) numerical analysis of the concave utility case yields similar results to the ones presented in our paper.

\(^{14}\)A simple example of our economy is one with two consumption goods, \( A, B \). Consumers’ preferences over the two consumption goods (that is, their relative valuation) is random and is characterized by the parameter \( \theta \). In this case, a higher (respectively, lower) value of \( \theta \) represents a stronger consumer preference for good \( A \) (respectively, \( B \)) with respect to the other good.

\(^{15}\)This assumption allows us to dispense with rectangularity of beliefs in a tractable way, but is not necessary. Our paper’s main results go through for \( \{p_A, p_B\} \in C \), as long as the core belief set \( C \) is a strictly convex, compact set with a smooth boundary. If the core of beliefs is the set of distributions that are sufficiently close to a (given) reference belief, measured by relative entropy, the core of beliefs will be strictly convex as the lower level set of a strictly convex function (details available upon request).

\(^{16}\)Our model can easily be extended to the case where, given \( \theta \), the realization of the asset payoffs at the end of the period are correlated.
Finally, we assume throughout that $e^{\theta_e - \theta_1} R > 1$, which from the definition of $\theta_e$, implies that $e^{\theta_0 - \theta^*} R > 1$ as well. These inequalities imply that the expected profits from risky assets are sufficiently large to make an uncertainty-neutral investor willing to invest in such assets. We will also later show that they will imply that a well-diversified uncertainty-averse investor is willing to invest in the uncertain assets.

### 2.1 Deposit contracts

In our model, banks are benevolent and offer investors deposit contracts that maximize their welfare. Because, banks can make risky investments, departing from Diamond and Dybvig (1983) deposit contracts have three components, which determine the contractual return to the investor depending on the date of withdrawal and the realization of the investment in the risky asset. Thus, a deposit contract offered by Bank $\tau$ is a triplet $d_\tau \equiv \{d_1, d_{2\tau}^s, d_{2\tau}^r\}$, as follows. Investors who withdraw at $t = 1$ receive an amount $d_1$ of the safe asset; investors who remain in the bank until $t = 2$ receive an amount $d_{2\tau}^s$ of the safe asset and an amount $d_{2\tau}^r$ of type-$\tau$ asset.

We assume that banks offer incentive-compatible deposit contracts such that “no-run” equilibria exist, which will be the main focus of our paper. Given a deposit contract $d_\tau \equiv \{d_1, d_{2\tau}^s, d_{2\tau}^r\}$ offered by Bank $\tau$, for $\tau \in \{A, B\}$, investors’ payoffs from holding contracts in the two banks are determined as follows. Absent a run, investors hit with the liquidity shock must withdraw early, and receive from the two banks a total payoff equal to $d_{1A} + d_{1B}$. Investors not hit with the liquidity shock, and who hold their initial deposits with both banks, have a payoff which depends on the realized return on each of the risky assets. If both asset classes are successful, investors receive a total payoff $d_{2A}^s + d_{2B}^s + R(d_{2A}^r + d_{2B}^r)$; if only type $\tau$ assets are successful, they receive $d_{2A}^s + d_{2B}^s + Rd_{2\tau}^r$; if neither asset class is successful, they receive $d_{2A}^s + d_{2B}^s$. We let $U_0$ be the value function of investors at $t = 0$, and let $U_L$ be the value function of investors who remain in the bank at $t = 1$, in the absence of run. Thus,

$$U_0 = \lambda u(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) + (1 - \lambda) U_L(\theta_L),$$

\[^{17}\]As typical in this class of models, “run” equilibria also exist. In Section 3, in the spirit of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) we will extend our basic model to have equilibria runs as well.
\[ U_L (\theta_L) = d_{2A}^s + d_{2B}^s + e^{\theta_L - \theta_1} Rd_{2A}^r + e^{\theta_0 - \theta_L} Rd_{2B}^r, \]

where \( \theta_L \) is the belief held at time \( t = 1 \) about the state of the economy, determined next.

### 2.2 Endogenous Probabilistic Assessments

An important implication of uncertainty aversion is that the investors’ assessment on the parameter \( \theta \) depend on their overall exposure to the source of risk in the economy and, thus, on the structure of their portfolios. Specifically, if a long-term investor does not run either bank, and both banks are solvent, the investor owns \( d_{2A}^s + d_{2B}^s \) units of the safe asset and \( d_{2\tau}^s \) units of type-\( \tau \) assets, for \( \tau \in \{A, B\} \). This means that the long-term investor holds an overall portfolio \( \Pi = \{d_{2A}^s, d_{2B}^s, d_{2A}^s + d_{2B}^s\} \). Because of uncertainty aversion, the investor’s assessment at \( t = 1 \) on the state of the economy, \( \theta^a \), is the solution to the minimization problem:

\[
\theta^a (\Pi) = \arg \min_{\theta \in C} U_L (\theta),
\]

and is characterized in the following Lemma.

**Lemma 1** Let

\[
\tilde{\theta}^a (\Pi) = \theta^a + \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{d_{2B}^r}{d_{2A}^r}. \tag{4}
\]

The assessment held by an uncertainty-averse agent with portfolio \( \Pi = \{d_{2A}^s, d_{2B}^s, d_{2A}^s + d_{2B}^s\} \) is

\[
\theta^a (\Pi) = \begin{cases} 
\hat{\theta}_0 & \tilde{\theta}^a (\Pi) \leq \hat{\theta}_0 \\
\tilde{\theta}^a (\Pi) & \tilde{\theta}^a (\Pi) \in (\hat{\theta}_0, \hat{\theta}_1) \\
\hat{\theta}_1 & \tilde{\theta}^a (\Pi) \geq \hat{\theta}_1
\end{cases}. \tag{5}
\]

Lemma 1 shows investors’ assessments on the parameter \( \theta \) and, thus, on banks’ expected profitability, as it is affected by the state of the economy, depend critically on the composition of their overall portfolio, \( \Pi \). We will refer to \( \theta^a (\Pi) \) as the “portfolio-distorted” assessment. We will say that the investor has *interior assessments* when \( \tilde{\theta}^a \in (\hat{\theta}_0, \hat{\theta}_1) \). Otherwise, we will say that the investor holds *corner assessments*. The following lemma can be immediately be verified.

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18 For additional discussion, see Dicks and Fulghieri (2013).
Lemma 2 Holding type-τ assets constant, a decrease in an investor’s holding in type-τ’ assets, $d_{2τ’}$, with $τ’ \neq τ$, makes the investor more pessimistic about type-τ assets, for $τ \in \{A, B\}$. In addition, portfolio-distorted assessments are homogeneous of degree zero in risky asset holdings, $\{d_{2A}, d_{2B}\}$.

Lemma 2 shows that when a investor has a relatively greater proportion of her portfolio invested in asset $τ$ (determined, for example, by a decrease in an investor’s holding in type-τ’), she will be relatively more concerned about the priors that are less favorable to that asset. Thus, the investor will give more weight to the states of nature that are less favorable for that asset, that is, to the unfavorable values of the parameter $θ$. In other words, the investor will be more “pessimistic” about the return on that asset. Correspondingly, the investor will become more “optimistic” with respect to the other asset. Proportional changes in an investor’s position in the risky assets will not affect her assessment.

Lemma 1 will play a crucial role in our analysis. Specifically, it implies that (idiosyncratic) bad news about Bank-τ, which will induce a run on that bank, will make investors also more pessimistic about Bank-τ’ profitability, possibly triggering a run also on that bank. In this way, the presence of uncertainty aversion creates the possibility of contagion, and thus systemic risk.

2.3 Optimal deposit contracts

We now examine the optimal deposit contracts offered by banks. Because liquidity shocks are privately observable only to investors at the interim date, $t = 1$, deposit contracts offered by a bank must satisfy appropriate incentive compatibility constraints. Early investors must consume immediately, since they gain no utility from $t = 2$ consumption. Late investors, in contrast, may pretend to be early investors and withdraw their deposits from either (or both) banks and invest in the safe technology for later consumption. Thus, to prevent runs on one (or both) banks, deposit contracts must satisfy three incentive compatibility constraints for late consumers, as follows.

First, late investors must prefer keeping their deposits in both banks rather than running on both of them:

$$U_L(θ^e) \geq d_{1A} + d_{1B}. \quad (6)$$
Second, they must find it optimal to not run only Bank $A$:

$$U_L(\theta^n) \geq d_{1A} + d_{s2B} + e^{\theta_0 - \hat{\theta}_1} Rd_{2B}^r; \quad (7)$$

and they must find it optimal to not run only Bank $B$:

$$U_L(\theta^n) \geq d_{1B} + d_{s2A} + e^{\hat{\theta}_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2A}^r. \quad (8)$$

Note that the incentive compatibility constraint (7) reflects the fact that, if a long term investor runs on Bank $A$ and not on Bank $B$, she will have a portfolio that includes risky assets of type-$B$ only. This implies that she will be concerned only with the states of the economy that are least favorable to asset $B$ and, thus, will set $\theta = \hat{\theta}_1$. If the long-term investor runs on Bank $B$, a similar argument leads the investor to hold assessment $\hat{\theta}_0$, and thus to (8). Finally, the deposit contract offered by Bank $\tau$ must satisfy the bank’s budget constraint

$$\lambda d_{1\tau} + (1 - \lambda) [d_{s2\tau} + d_{r2\tau}] \leq 1. \quad (9)$$

In an equilibrium without bank runs, the optimal deposit contract offered by Bank $A$, $d_A = \{d_{1A}, d_{s2A}, d_{r2A}\}$, maximizes $U_0$ subject to (6), (7), and (9); similarly, the optimal deposit contract offered by Bank $B$, $d_B = \{d_{1B}, d_{s2B}, d_{r2B}\}$, maximizes $U_0$ subject to (6), (8), and (9) We will also assume the following:

(A$_0$): Regularity conditions:

$$u'(2) > e^{\theta_1} R > u' \left( \frac{e^{\theta_1} R}{\lambda e^{\theta_1} R + (1 - \lambda)} \right). \quad (10)$$

The first inequality ensures that the optimal deposit contract offered by banks to uncertainty-neutral investors provides (partial) insurance against liquidity shocks, while the second inequality ensures that the optimal deposit contracts satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (6), that is, that the constraint is not binding in the optimal contract.$^{19}$

$^{19}$Note that the regularity conditions (A$_0$) have the same role as the assumptions in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) that investors have a coefficient of RRA greater than 1 and that $\rho R > 1$, which together ensure that in the optimal deposit contract in their model, $\{d_1^s, d_2^s\}$, satisfies $1 < d_1^s < d_2^s < R$. 

14
As a benchmark we consider first the case in which agents are uncertainty-neutral, as follows.

**Theorem 2** If investors are uncertainty neutral, the optimal deposit contract, $d^{R*}_{\tau} \equiv \{d^*_1, d^*_2, d^*_r\}$, has:

$$d^*_2 = 0, \quad 1 < d^*_1 < e^{\theta_{\tau} - \theta_1} R d^*_r, \text{ for } \tau \in \{A, B\},$$

that is, banks provide partial insurance against liquidity shocks and are exposed to runs. Finally, it is optimal WLOG for investors to invest equally in both banks.

Theorem 2 shows that, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a symmetric equilibrium with $d_{1A} = d_{1B}$ and $d_{2A} = d_{2B}$ always exists, whereby banks provide investors with (partial) insurance against liquidity shocks. In addition, insurance provision implies that, in equilibrium, banks are illiquid and, thus, exposed to runs. It is, however, important to note that bank runs are not necessarily systemic: a run on one bank does not necessarily induce a run on the other bank. Thus, the banking system is not necessarily fragile.

These results change dramatically when investors are uncertainty averse. From Lemma 1 we know that, because of uncertainty aversion, the investors’ assessment on the future state of the economy and, thus, on banks’ expected solvency, depends on their overall portfolio composition. In this way, uncertainty aversion creates a direct link between investor’s desired holding in each asset class, making asset holdings effectively complementary. The strategic complementarity due to uncertainty aversion generates the possibility of multiple equilibria.

There are two types of equilibria when investors are uncertainty averse. The first type of equilibrium has the same properties as the one in which investors are uncertainty neutral, as described in Theorem 2. In this equilibrium, banks invest in the risky assets, offer partial insurance to investors, are illiquid and exposed to runs. We will denote this equilibrium as the “risky” equilibrium. In the second equilibrium, banks invest only in the riskless asset, making the banking system effectively immune to runs, an equilibrium we will denote as the “safe” equilibrium. In this second “safe” equilibrium, banks refrain from investing in the (potentially) more profitable risky assets and, rather, invest only in the safe asset. Since investment in risky assets typically consists in carrying out banks’ ordinary lending activity, we interpret this equilibrium as a “lending freeze.”
We will make the following additional assumption:

\[ (A_1) : \ e^{\hat{\theta}_0 - \hat{\theta}_1} R < 1. \]

This inequality implies that in the core beliefs set there are priors such that an investor assessing cash flows with such priors is not willing to invest in risky project \( A \). In addition, since \( \theta_1 - \hat{\theta}_1 = \hat{\theta}_0 - \theta_0 \), this also implies that \( e^{\theta_0 - \hat{\theta}_1} R < 1 \) and, thus, that there are, in the core beliefs set, also (other) priors such that an investor assessing cash flows with such priors is not willing to invest in risky project \( B \). As will become apparent below, \((A_1)\) implies that an uncertainty-averse investor would not be willing to invest in a risky asset individually, while she may still be willing to invest in a portfolio of risky assets. The equilibrium with uncertainty-averse investors is characterized in the following.

**Theorem 3** If investors are uncertainty averse and \((A_1)\) holds, there are both a “risky” equilibrium, where the optimal deposit contract is again \( d_{R*} \) characterized in (11), and a “safe” equilibrium, in which both banks invest only in the safe technology and offer a safe deposit contract, \( d_{S*} \), with no insurance against liquidity risk: \( d_{2A} = d_{2B} = 0 \). Investors optimally invest equally in both banks. Furthermore: (i) The “risky” equilibrium Pareto dominates the “safe” equilibrium; (ii) runs are not possible in the “safe” equilibrium, but runs are possible in the “risky” equilibrium. (iii) All runs will be systemic.

Theorem 3 shows that the presence of uncertainty aversion has the effect of creating a second equilibrium in addition to the one prevailing in an economy populated by SEU agents. In addition to the equilibrium where banks invest in risky technology and offer (partial) insurance against liquidity shocks that prevails when investors are uncertainty neutral, there is also a “lending freeze” equilibrium in which banks refrain from investing in risky assets. In this second “lending freeze” equilibrium, banks invest only in the riskless asset and, thus, cannot provide any insurance against liquidity risk.

Existence of the “lending freeze” equilibrium depends critically on the fact that an uncertainty-averse investor is willing to deposit funds in one type of banks and, thus, be exposed to one type of risk, only if she can invest also in the other bank and, thus, be exposed to the other source of
risk as well. This implies that if one bank offers only the safe contract, the other bank will only offer the safe deposit contract as well. Thus, uncertainty aversion creates a strategic externality in the deposit-offering policy of banks: investors invest in one bank only if they have the opportunity to invest in the other bank as well. This externality creates the potential of a “coordination failure” among banks that leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria. In addition, the second “safe” equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the “risky” equilibrium where banks invest in both risky assets.

A second important effect of uncertainty aversion is that a run on a class of banks also causes a run on the other class of banks. A run by long-term investors on a bank of any given risk class shifts the composition of risky assets in their portfolios in favor of the other risk class. From Lemma 2, this change of portfolio composition causes the investors to become more pessimistic on the asset class still in their portfolios, triggering a run on that asset class as well. Thus, uncertainty aversion creates systemic risk.

3 Uncertainty aversion and systemic risk

There are two distinct categories of runs in our economy: panic runs and fundamental runs. Panic runs occur when investors run a bank, even though the bank would still be solvent if they did not run, and investors would prefer the outcome of no one running. Panic runs are essentially due to a coordination failure among agents in an otherwise solvent economy. A fundamental run occurs when there is a shock to fundamentals large enough so that it ceases to be optimal for a long-term investor to remain invested in the bank, even if everyone else stays in the bank. Since in the “safe” equilibria bank runs are not possible, we will focus on the (symmetric) “risky” equilibrium.

A further important distinction is that bank runs can either be “local runs,” that is, involving only one bank, or “systemic runs,” that is, runs that involve both banks. As shown in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, runs are always possible in a “risky” equilibrium. However, when investors are uncertainty neutral, runs may not necessarily spread from one bank to the other. In contrast, if investors are uncertainty averse, all runs will be systemic.

To model the possibility of equilibrium runs, following Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), we now
assume that, at \( t = 1 \), investors receive public signals, \( s_\tau, \tau \in \{A, B\} \), that are informative on the return on the risky assets at time \( t = 2 \). Specifically, we assume that \( R_\tau = s_\tau R \), with \( s_\tau \in \{\phi, 1\} \) and \( \phi < 1 \). We also assume that with probability \( \varepsilon > 0 \) investors observe “bad news” about type \( \tau \) assets only, \( s_\tau = \phi \) and \( s_{\tau'} \neq \phi = 1 \), for \( \tau \in \{A, B\} \), while with probability \( \Delta \), investors observe “bad news” about both type \( A \) and type \( B \) assets, \( s_\tau = s_{\tau'} = \phi \), and with probability \( 1 - 2\varepsilon - \Delta \), investors learn that both asset classes are unaffected, \( s_\tau = s_{\tau'} = 1 \). Because “bad news” about both banks generate the expected and arguably uninteresting outcome of fundamental systemic runs, we set \( \Delta = 0 \). For tractability, we now assume that investors’ utility function, \( u \), is piece-wise affine. Specifically,

\[
u(w) = \begin{cases} 
\psi w & w \leq \bar{c} \\
\psi \bar{c} + (w - \bar{c}) & w > \bar{c}
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \psi > e^{\frac{A}{2}(\theta_0 - \theta_1)} R \) and \( \bar{c} \in \left(2, 2 \frac{e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} R}{\lambda e^{\theta_0 - \theta_2} R_\tau (1 + \lambda)}\right) \). This utility function captures the notion that early investors value lower consumption levels, up to \( \bar{c} \), relatively more than larger consumption.

It also implies that early investors, who are subject to the liquidity shock, value consumption more than late investors, preserving the value of insurance against the liquidity shock.

In this section, we focus on fundamental runs, and we assume that investors run on a bank only if it is no longer profitable to stay in the bank, effectively ruling out panic-based runs. We start the analysis by establishing the possibility of systemic runs under uncertainty aversion for given (arbitrary) deposit contracts \( d_\tau = \{d_{1\tau}, d_{2\tau}, d_{r\tau}\}, \tau \in \{A, B\} \). We will then characterize the optimal deposit contracts.

**Theorem 4** Let \( d_\tau = \{d_{1\tau}, d_{2\tau}, d_{r\tau}\}, \tau \in \{A, B\} \) be symmetric deposit contracts with \( d_{2A} = d_{2B} = 0 \) and \( d_{r\tau} > 0 \) (i.e., risky deposit contracts) so that investors strictly prefer staying in both banks in the absence of bad news. If investors are not uncertainty averse, they will run Bank \( \tau \) following bad news about type \( \tau \) assets if \( d_{1\tau} > \phi p_\tau (\theta^c \cdot R d_{r\tau}) \), but investors will not run Bank \( \tau' = \tau \). If investors are uncertainty averse, they will run both banks if \( d_{1\tau} > \phi \frac{A}{2} p_\tau (\theta^c \cdot R d_{r\tau}) \).

Theorem 4 uncovers a new source of systemic risk that is due to uncertainty aversion, and provides one of the key results of our paper. The theorem shows that, in the presence of uncertainty-averse investors, bad news at one bank, say Bank \( A \), while it generates a fundamental run on that
bank, also induces investors to run on the other bank, Bank \( B \), even in the absence of bad news at the latter bank. Thus, bad news on one bank can create a systemic run; in other words, idiosyncratic risk can indeed generate systemic risk.

The mechanism behind the systemic risk described in Theorem 4 is the uncertainty hedging motive due to uncertainty aversion (see Theorem 1). As discussed earlier, investors’ demand for a risky asset depends on their overall portfolio. In particular, an uncertainty-averse investor is willing to be invested in one bank, and to be exposed to the risk of one type of assets, provided that she is also exposed to the other type of risky assets as well. This implies that, if the investor learns bad news about one risky-asset class, say \( \tau = A \), inducing a run on Bank \( A \), the investor’s portfolio will become overly exposed to the other risky asset class, \( \tau = B \). From Lemma 2, we know that the resulting portfolio imbalance causes a shift in the investor’s assessments against the other asset class, \( B \), making the investor relatively more pessimistic about risky asset \( B \). Thus, a run on Bank \( B \) may happen even if that bank was not affected by bad news. Thus, bad news about Bank \( A \) spills over to Bank \( B \) causing contagion and, thus, systemic risk. Note that this source of contagion and systemic risk is entirely driven by uncertainty aversion and is novel in the literature. It will be denoted as “uncertainty-based” systemic risk, which generates “uncertainty-based” systemic runs.

Theorem 4 describes investors’ behavior in response to negative shocks, given the contract that they are in. Banks, however, offer ex-ante optimal deposit contracts that anticipate such behavior.

**Lemma 3** Let early investors have piecewise affine utility as in (12) and \( \varepsilon \) be small enough.

(i) If investors are not uncertainty averse, the unique equilibrium is a “risky equilibrium” where banks invest in the risky technology and provide insurance against the liquidity shock by offering the deposit contract:

\[
d_{1\tau} = \frac{1}{2} \hat{c}, \quad d_{2\tau} = 0, \quad \text{and} \quad d_{2\tau} = \frac{1 - \lambda d_{1\tau}}{1 - \lambda}, \quad \text{for } \tau \in \{A, B\}.
\]

(ii) If investors are uncertainty averse, there are two equilibria: the “risky equilibrium” described in part (i), and a “safe” equilibrium where banks hold only the risk-free asset and the deposit contract is a safe deposit contract: \( d_{1\tau} = d_{2\tau} = 1, \ \tau \in \{A, B\} \).

Lemma 3 shows that the equilibrium contracts mimic those described in Theorem 2 and Theorem
However, the presence of a public signal on the return on the risky assets, and thus on the banks’ expected profitability, generates the possibility of fundamental bank runs, as follows.

**Theorem 5** Suppose early investors have utility as in (12), and banks invest in risky assets. If investors are not uncertainty averse, they run Bank-$\tau$ after observing bad news on that bank ($s_\tau = \phi$) iff $\phi < \phi \equiv \frac{(1-\lambda)\tilde{c}}{e^{2(\beta_{1}-\tilde{\sigma})_{1}R(2-\lambda\tilde{c})}}$, with $0 < \phi < 1$, but investors will not run the other bank. If investors are uncertainty averse, they will run both banks after observing bad news on either of the two banks, that is $s_\tau = \phi$ or $s_{\tau' \neq \tau} = \phi$, iff $\phi < \phi^2$.

Theorem 5 describes the two effects of uncertainty aversion on bank runs and systemic risk. First, as discussed in Theorem 4, the presence of uncertainty aversion creates the possibility of systemic runs even in cases where such runs would not occur under SEU. Thus, uncertainty aversion is a source of contagion and systemic risk. However, under uncertainty aversion, investors are slower to run after observing bad news on a bank than SEU investors. This happens because uncertainty-averse investors value their investment in a risky asset more if they hold the other risky asset in their portfolio as well. This means that an uncertainty-averse investor is more reluctant to run a bank after observing bad news on that bank. However, if the bad news is sufficiently bad to induce a run, the run spreads to the other bank. Thus, uncertainty-averse investors are less prone to bank runs, but when they run they generate a systemic run.\footnote{It should be noted, however, that Theorem 5 depends on the assumption that utility is piecewise affine, as in (12). Affine utility guarantees that banks set the intermediate cashflow at the kink, so $d_{1\tau} = \frac{1}{2}\tilde{c}$. Thus, the optimal contract does not change when investors anticipate learning news. If $u$ were strictly concave, results are similar but banks would decrease $d_{1\tau}$, unless there is an Inada condition for $u$. Because sufficient bad news induces a run on both banks, it would be possible for early households to receive 0, so banks would drastically change contracts to avoid that state even for very small probability events if there were an Inada condition. Also, banks would have to decide if they were going to avert a fundamental run, or to allow a fundamental run (optimally choosing the contract with the risk of a run in mind). In either scenario, banks decrease the insurance provided to early type, $d_{1\tau}$.}

## 4 Bank runs and the stock market

In the previous sections, we discussed the effect of uncertainty aversion on the systemic risk of the banking sector. An important question is the potential connection between bank runs and the performance of other parts of the financial sectors such as the stock market. For example, in the
recent financial crisis the near collapse of the (shadow) banking system was also associated with a substantial drop of the stock market. This observation raises the question of the transmission mechanism between the banking sector and the “real” sector. In this section, we show the contagion effect that we described in the previous sections can spread beyond the banking sector and spill over to the stock market as well.

We modify our basic model as follows. Suppose that Bank $A$ is still a bank, which now represents the overall banking sector, but Bank $B$ is now a stock company (or a mutual fund), denoted as Firm $B$, which now represents the stock market. In this new interpretation, the stock company has access to type-$B$ assets. In the spirit of Jacklin (1987), we posit that Firm $B$ promises to pay investors a dividend $\Delta_{1B}$ at time $t = 1$, and holds a portfolio $\{\sigma_{2B}, \rho_{2B}\}$ of the safe asset and type-$B$ asset, until $t = 2$. Similar to our discussion in the previous section, Bank $A$ offers a contract that gives investors the choice between receiving $d_{1A}$ at $t = 1$ and receiving $d_{2A}$ of the riskless asset of $d_{2A}$ of type $A$ assets at $t = 2$. Investors still face the possibility of a liquidity shock, so they would like to have insurance against it. For tractability, we will assume again that early investors have affine utility as in (12).

**Lemma 4** The stock company implements incentive-compatible cash flow of $\{d_{1B}, d_{2B}, d_{2B}\}$ by setting $\Delta_{1B} = \lambda d_{1B}$, $\sigma_{2B} = (1 - \lambda) d_{2B}$, and $\rho_{2B} = (1 - \lambda) d_{2B}$. Late investors use the dividend to buy shares from the late consumers for price $P_{1B} = (1 - \lambda)d_{1B}$.

Lemma 4 follows directly from the line of reasoning described in Jacklin (1987). The stock company, Firm $B$, can duplicate the payouts of a bank by committing to pay investors a certain dividend at $t = 1$. Early investors, because they must consume at $t = 1$, finance consumption using the dividend plus the proceeds from the sale of Firm-$B$ shares to late investors. Late investors, in turn, use the dividend they receive from Firm $B$ to purchase shares from selling early investors, and then consume at $t = 2$ the liquidating dividend they receive from Firm $B$. Investors' portfolio allocation between banks and the stock market is as follows.

**Lemma 5** Each investors deposits half of their wealth in the bank and buys equity with the other half. If investors are uncertainty neutral, the “risky” equilibrium will be implemented. If investors are uncertainty averse, there are both the “safe” equilibrium and the “risky” equilibrium.
Lemma 5 shows that the equilibrium from Lemma 3 is not sensitive to the institutional structure. In the spirit of Jacklin (1987), if no bad news arrives, the equilibrium allocation is identical whether the intermediaries are stock companies or banks. What happens if there is bad news?

**Theorem 6** *Idiosyncratic risk leads to systemic risk iff investors are uncertainty averse.* That is, *bad news about the bank harms the market value of the stock market, and bad news about the stock market can produce a run on the bank, iff investors are uncertainty averse.*

Theorem 6 establishes a new mechanism for bad news to spread across segments of the financial sectors in an economy. Specifically, uncertainty aversion generates complementarity among different asset classes in the economy. Because of asset complementarity, bad news spreads directly across asset classes, due to investor preferences. This means that systemic risk extends to the broader financial sector, generating fragility for the whole financial sector.

Theorem 6 implies that a run on the banking sector is associated with negative performance of the stock market as well, that it leads to a “market crash.” Our model also implies that investors would run to redeem their shares in mutual funds that have demandable features, such as money market funds, leading to a “breaking of the buck.” Also, our model proposes a new channel through which financial crises spread from the banking sector to the real sector. Note that this new channel is driven by the impact of a bank run on investors’ assessments, generating a negative effect on stock market valuations. Thus, our theory differs from the more traditional view that a crisis in the banking sector affects negatively banks’ lending and, thus, the real sector and stock market valuations.

Theorem 6 also implies that sufficiently negative news on the stock markets, which leads to a stock market “crash,” also induces a run on the banking system. The bank run is then followed by a subsequent rebalancing of the long term investors’ portfolios with a reinvestment of their holdings in the safe asset. Thus, a bank run generates a “flight to quality,” as often observed in reality.

## 5 Increased uncertainty and financial crises

In this section, we examine the impact of the “extent” of uncertainty on financial system fragility and contagion. We show that increasing uncertainty makes the financial system more fragile and
more prone to contagions and, thus, more vulnerable to systemic risk.

We measure the extent of uncertainty by the size of investors’ core assessment set, as follows. Let $\alpha \equiv \theta^e - \hat{\theta}_0$. We interpret an increase of $\alpha$ as characterizing “greater uncertainty.” In this paper we take as exogenous the factors that may induce time series variations of the parameter $\alpha$. However, Epstein and Schneider (2011) suggest that such variations in uncertainty may be the product of learning by uncertainty-averse agents. The impact of increasing uncertainty is characterized in the following.

**Theorem 7** There are critical values $\{\underline{\alpha}, \bar{\alpha}\}$ such that

1. for $\alpha \leq \underline{\alpha}$ the only equilibrium is the “risky equilibrium,” and there is no contagion;

2. If $\underline{\alpha} < \alpha < \bar{\alpha}$ the only equilibrium is the “risky equilibrium,” but there is contagion and all runs are systemic;

3. If $\alpha \geq \bar{\alpha}$, there both the “risky equilibrium,” with the possibility of contagion and systemic runs, and the “safe equilibrium” with a “lending freeze.”

Theorem 7 shows that greater uncertainty leads to a more fragile financial system. When uncertainty is low, that is, for $\alpha \leq \underline{\alpha}$, the only equilibrium is the “risky” equilibrium that mimics the usual Diamond and Dybvig (1993) scenario. In this case, fundamental runs are possible following bad news on a bank’s future expected profitability, but runs are local and do not create contagion. At intermediate levels of uncertainty, that is, for $\underline{\alpha} < \alpha < \bar{\alpha}$, bad news from one bank can spread to the other bank, thus creating contagion and systemic risk. At even greater levels of uncertainty, that is, for $\alpha \geq \bar{\alpha}$, “safe” equilibria are also possible. In this case, the financial system may retrench in a “safety mode” whereby banks invest only in the safe asset. This equilibrium may emerge when banks expect other banks to be in the “safety mode” as a consequence of the increased uncertainty. This is a “lending freeze” equilibrium, which is Pareto-inferior to the more ordinary “risky” equilibrium (see Section 2.3).
6 Multiple Banks

In this section, we examine a simple extension of our basic model by allowing the presence of multiple banks and assets, with multiple sources of uncertainty in the economy. We show that the main results of our paper readily extend to the more general setting.

We modify our basic model as follows. Similar to Section 2, the economy is now endowed with \( N + 1 \) types of assets: \( N \) classes of risky assets, \( \tau \in \mathcal{N} \equiv \{1, \ldots, N\} \), and a riskless asset. Specifically, making at \( t = 0 \) an investment in risky asset \( \tau \in \mathcal{N} \) generates at \( t = 2 \) a random payoff in terms of the riskless asset: a unit investment in type \( \tau \) asset produces at \( t = 2 \) a payoff of \( R \) with probability \( p_\tau \) and a payoff of 0 with probability \( 1 - p_\tau \). Similar to Section 2, risky assets have an early liquidation option at \( t = 1 \), so that liquidation of a fraction \( \ell \) of the risky asset generates at \( t = 1 \) a payoff \( \ell \) of the riskless and at \( t = 2 \) a payoff of \( (1 - \ell)R \) with probability \( p_\tau \) and a payoff of 0 with probability \( 1 - p_\tau \).

Different from Section 2, the economy is characterized by multiple sources of uncertainty, as follows. The success probability on risky asset \( \tau \in \mathcal{N} \), \( p_\tau \), depends again on the value of a parameter \( \theta_\tau \), and we set \( p_\tau(\theta_\tau) = e^{\theta_\tau - \theta_{\text{Max}}} \), with \( \theta_\tau \in [\theta_{\text{Min}}, \theta_{\text{Max}}] \). We now assume that investors are uncertain over the vector \( \overrightarrow{\theta} = \{\theta_\tau\}_{\tau=1}^N \), and assess that \( \overrightarrow{\theta} \in \mathcal{C} \subset [\theta_{\text{Min}}, \theta_{\text{Max}}]^N \). To capture the notion that assessments are not rectangular, we will assume that, for all \( \overrightarrow{\theta} \in \mathcal{C} \), \( \sum_{\tau=1}^N \theta_\tau = N\theta^e + \kappa \). Investors are uncertain on the value of \( \kappa \) as well, and assess that \( \kappa \in \mathcal{K} \equiv [-A, A] \). We assume that \( N\theta_L < N\theta^e - A \) and \( N\theta_H > N\theta^e + A \). We denote \( S \equiv \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{K} \) as the investors’ core assessment set. We can interpret \( \kappa \) as representing the aggregate state of the economy at \( t = 2 \), and \( \theta_\tau \) as measuring the exposure of each asset \( \tau \) to state of the overall economy.

In this spirit, we will denote the combination \( \{\overrightarrow{\theta}, \kappa\} \) as the “state of the economy” at \( t = 2 \).

Bank \( \tau \) offers investors the contract \( \{d_{1\tau}, d_{2\tau}, d_{3\tau}^*\} \). By depositing \$1 in each bank at \( t = 0 \), an investor receives a lifetime utility equal to

\[
U = \lambda \sum_{\tau=1}^N d_{1\tau} + (1 - \lambda) \min_{\overrightarrow{\theta}} U_L \left( \overrightarrow{\theta}, \kappa \right)
\]

where

\[
U_L \left( \overrightarrow{\theta}, \kappa \right) = \sum_{\tau=1}^N \left[ d_{2\tau} + p_\tau(\theta_\tau) Rd_{3\tau}^* \right].
\]
Investors’ assessments are again endogenous, and depend on the composition of their overall portfolio. Specifically, investors’ assessments at \( t = 1 \) on the state of the economy at \( t = 2 \) are the solution to the minimization problem

\[
\{ \theta^0, \kappa^0 \} = \arg \min_{(\theta, \kappa) \in \mathcal{S}} U_L(\theta, \kappa),
\]

and are characterized in the following Lemma.

**Lemma 6** Uncertainty-averse investors assess the worst about the aggregate state of the economy, and set \( \kappa^0 = -A \); furthermore, if banks offer contracts that have similar risky payoffs, ambiguity-averse investors have “interior” assessments on the exposure of each asset to the aggregate uncertainty in the economy, \( \hat{\theta} \), which are given by

\[
\theta^e_\tau = \theta^e - \frac{A}{N} + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{\tau' = 1}^{N} \ln d^{\tau'}_2 - \ln d^{\tau}_2, \text{ for } \tau \in \mathbb{N}.
\]

To proceed further, case, we make the following regularity assumption:

\[
e^{-\frac{1}{N}(N \theta^e - A - \theta_M)} R < e^{\theta^e - A - \theta_M} R.
\]

Similar to the two-bank case, the first inequality guarantees that it is a negative NPV project to invest in the risky asset if at least one of the other banks does not; the second inequality guarantees that it is a positive NPV project to invest in the risky asset, if all of the banks invests. The following theorem shows that the basic results of our paper extend to the case of multiple banks.

**Theorem 8** In the absence of uncertainty aversion, the only equilibrium is the risky equilibrium, and local shocks stay local. In the presence of uncertainty aversion, there are both the risky equilibrium (where all banks invest in risky assets) and the safe equilibrium (where no banks invest in the risky asset), and all runs will be systemic.
7 Empirical and policy implications

In this section, we discuss the empirical implications of our paper, and we outline the implications of our model for the recent public policy debate surrounding the financial crises.\(^22\)

1. Financial crises and investor sentiment. The main implication of our analysis is that financial crises can originate in one sector of the economy and then propagate through the banking system to other sectors and the stock market. The key distinguishing feature of our model is that the mechanism that trigger and propagates financial crises is deterioration of investors’ sentiment on the economy. This negative sentiment can be triggered by an idiosyncratic event, which creates a wave of pessimism that produces a systemic crises.

2. Lending booms. A key mechanisms in our model is that uncertainty averse investors are more optimistic about one asset class when they hold a larger portfolio position in another asset class. This implies that good news about one industry, like an increase in productivity of risky investment for that industry, \(R\), will result not only in increased lending to that industry, but also increased lending to other industries as well. This result property is a direct outcome of the externality across portfolio holdings created by uncertainty aversion. In different legal environments, lenders have varying abilities to force repayment. Our model suggests that, if they are uncertainty averse, the ability to pledge capital will affect lending not only in that industry, but also other industries as well. Thus, our model provides a rich set of implications for cross-country analysis.

3. Lending freezes. If banks believe that other banks are not lending, they will find it optimal to not lend as well, generating a self-fulfilling lending freeze. This result is due to the effect of uncertainty aversion on endogenous assessments, not because the banks are financially constrained. Thus, providing liquidity to banks will not be sufficient to induce them to start lending again.

4. Uncertainty and financial crises. Our model, specifically Theorem 7, shows that indiosyncratic shocks spread to systemic shocks iff investors are sufficiently uncertainty averse. This implies financial crises should be more likely when investors are faced with a shock to an unfamiliar risk, or when contracts are sufficiently complex (if investors treat contractual complexity as uncertainty).

5. Banks’ equity recapitalization. Negative idiosyncratic shocks at any one bank will have a

\(^{22}\)Thakor (2015b) provides a comprehensive survey of such debate.
negative effect on that bank’s equity capitalization. Our paper suggest that such negative shock may affect other banks' equity capitalizations as well triggering a widespread banking crisis. In other words, an idiosyncratic shock on one bank depresses its equity value, and the negative sentiment spreads to other banks which may now see distressed equity valuations. This may result in banks facing binding minimum equity requirements and may force banks to raise new equity at distressed equity prices. Thus, honoring excessive equity requirements would be very costly to banks.

Our paper also has implications for bank bailout strategies, asset sales and the management of financial crises. The role of regulation to curb systemic risk and promote financial stability has been the object of extensive discussion in the recent academic and public policy debate. To implement effective stabilization polices and regulations, it is critical to understand the source of systemic risk and to assess the nature of bailout policies that must be implement by a central bank to prevent bank runs.

If investors are uncertainty averse, our paper shows that the central bank must worry about idiosyncratic shocks that affect individual banks, since these shocks can have systemic effects. In addition, the implementation of the bailout policy depends on the size of the shocks affecting the banking sector. For sufficiently small shocks, the central bank can avert a run by bailing out just the affected bank. If the shock is large enough, however, the central bank must also bail out unaffected (potentially solvent) banks to avoid a systemic crisis. In contrast, if investors are not uncertainty averse, the central bank only needs to bailout the affected bank. In addition, one of the basic results of our paper is that uncertainty harms stability and creates the possibility of systemic runs. The financial system is more fragile in times of greater uncertainty. In these cases, regulatory authorities may wish to release relevant information that reduces such uncertainty, thus increasing the “resilience” of the financial and banking system.

Similarly, our paper has implications on a central bank’s choice in the event of financial crisis between interventions through bailouts or asset sales. Specifically, the central bank can either provide capital directly to the banks to fund their short term liquidity needs (a bailout, discussed above), or it can buy a bank’s risky assets and replace them with the safe asset (asset sales). The distinction is important because bailouts inject liquidity without changing a bank’s balance sheet, while asset sales change the risk structure of the bank’s portfolio. If investors are uncertainty averse,
and the shock is large enough, our paper suggests that the optimal intervention policy involves asset sales. However, the central bank must purchase assets from the unaffected bank, not from the affected bank. Bad news to one bank effectively shifts the composition of investors’ portfolios toward the other bank’s holdings, so investors become more pessimistic about the unaffected bank’s holdings. The central bank will be able to purchases these assets at distressed prices, which means that, ex post, the central bank will make large profits from these asset sales. If investors are ambiguity neutral, there is no place for asset sales. By extension, our model also suggests that the crisis will be harsher in countries that are not allowed to use asset repurchases, like Europe, than in countries that utilize asset repurchases, like the United States.

Finally, our paper has also implications for the Volcker Rule. We interpret here the Volcker Rule as forcing banks to be robust to a run at other banks, that is, to systemic runs. Our paper shows that to be immune to runs at other banks, this requirement means that banks must invest only in the safe asset, effectively ruling out the Pareto-superior “risky” equilibrium. Thus, regulation aimed that ensuring systemic stability may in fact imply efficiency losses. The upside of the Volcker Rule, however, is that regulating traditional banks can kill the shadow banking sector (similar to Section 4, model the shadow banking sector as Bank $B$). This could be optimal if runs impose large negative externalities on the economy as a whole.

8 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a new theory of systemic risk based on uncertainty aversion. We show that uncertainty aversion creates complementarities among investors’ asset holdings, a feature that we denote uncertainty hedging. Because of uncertainty hedging, bad news on an asset class may spread to other asset classes, generating systemic risk. A second implication of uncertainty hedging is that banks may individually refrain from investing in risky assets even if, collectively, it would be beneficial to do so. In these situations, risky asset are valued by investors at distressed prices, and banks invest only in the safe assets, a feature that we describe as a “lending freeze.” Finally, we derive empirical and public policy implications of our model.
References


A Appendix

Proof of Theorem 1. Let $V_\mu = q E_\mu [u(y_1)] + (1-q) E_\mu [u(y_2)]$, and define $\mu_1 = \arg \min E_\mu [u(y_1)]$, $\mu_2 = \arg \min E_\mu [u(y_2)]$, and $\mu_q = \arg \min V_\mu$. Thus, $E_{\mu_1} [u(y_1)] \leq E_{\mu_q} [u(y_1)]$ and $E_{\mu_2} [u(y_2)] \leq E_{\mu_q} [u(y_2)]$, so $q E_{\mu_1} [u(y_1)] + (1-q) E_{\mu_2} [u(y_2)] \leq q E_{\mu_1} [u(y_1)] + (1-q) E_{\mu_2} [u(y_2)] = \min V_\mu$. Thus, (3) holds. Because uncertainty-neutral agents can be modeled as uncertainty-averse agents with a singleton for their core of assessments, the inequality holds with equality in the absence of uncertainty aversion. ■

Proof of Lemma 1. Note $U'_L(\theta) = R \{ e^{\theta_0-\theta_1} d_{2A}^2 - e^{\theta_0-\theta} d_{2B}^2 \}$. Because $U''_L > 0$, $U_L$ is convex in $\theta$, so first order conditions are sufficient for a minimum. Note $U''_L = 0$ iff $\theta = \hat{\theta}^a$ where

$$\hat{\theta}^a (\Pi) = \frac{1}{2} (\theta_0 + \theta_1) + \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{d_{2B}^2}{d_{2A}^2}.$$ 

Thus, if $\hat{\theta}^a (\Pi) \in \left[ \theta_0, \theta_1 \right]$, $\theta^a = \hat{\theta}^a$ (because $\hat{\theta}^a$ is minimizes $U_L$). If $\hat{\theta}^a < \theta_0$, $U'_L > 0$ for all $\theta \in \left[ \theta_0, \theta_1 \right]$, so $\theta^a = \theta_0$. Similarly, if $\hat{\theta}^a > \theta_1$, $U'_L < 0$ for all $\theta \in \left[ \theta_0, \theta_1 \right]$, so $\theta^a = \theta_1$. Therefore, (5) corresponds to the worst-case scenario for investors. ■

Proof of Theorem 2. We will guess that (7) and (8) are lax, solve the relaxed problem then show that these two constraints are satisfied. Because investors are not uncertainty averse, $C = \{ \theta^a \}$. For $\tau \in \{ A, B \}$, Bank $\tau$’s problem is

$$\max U_0$$

$$\lambda d_{1r} + (1-\lambda) \left[ d_{2r}^2 + d_{2r}^2 \right] \leq 1$$

$$U_L (\theta^a) \geq d_{1A} + d_{1B},$$

where

$$U_0 = \lambda u (d_{1A} + d_{1B}) + (1-\lambda) U_L (\theta^a),$$

and

$$U_L (\theta) = d_{2A}^2 + d_{2B}^2 + p_A (\theta^a) Rd_{2A} + p_B (\theta^a) Rd_{2B}.$$ 

Let $\kappa_{r1}$ be the multiplier for the budget constraint of Bank $\tau$, let $\kappa_{r2}$ be the multiplier for the incentive compatibility constraint of Bank $\tau$, and let $L_r$ be the Lagrangian function for Bank $\tau$, for $\tau \in \{ A, B \}$. Thus, the FOCs for Bank $\tau$ are

$$\frac{\partial L_r}{\partial d_{2r}} = \lambda u' (d_{1A} + d_{1B}) - \lambda \kappa_{r1} - \kappa_{r2},$$

$$\frac{\partial L_r}{\partial d_{2r}} = (1-\lambda) - (1-\lambda) \kappa_{r1} + \kappa_{r2},$$

and

$$\frac{\partial L_r}{\partial d_{2r}} = (1-\lambda) p_A (\theta^a) R - (1-\lambda) \kappa_{r1} + p_B (\theta^a) R \kappa_{r2}. $$

Because $\theta^a = \frac{1}{2} (\theta_0 + \theta_1)$, $p_A (\theta^a) = p_B (\theta^a) = e^{\theta_0-\theta_1}$. Because $e^{\theta_0-\theta_1} R > 1$, $\frac{\partial L_r}{\partial d_{2r}} > \frac{\partial L_r}{\partial d_{2r}}$. Because there is no upper bound on $d_{2r}$ or $d_{2r}$, this implies that $d_{2r} = 0$.

It can be quickly verified that the constraints will be identical for both banks.23 If the IC constraint binds

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23 We have four equations (\frac{\partial L_r}{\partial d_{2r}} = 0, \frac{\partial L_r}{\partial d_{2r}} = 0, \frac{\partial L_r}{\partial d_{2r}} = 0, \frac{\partial L_r}{\partial d_{2r}} = 0) which are linear in four multipliers ($\kappa_{A1}, \kappa_{A2}, \kappa_{B1}, \kappa_{B2}$). Thus, there will be a unique set of multipliers that satisfy the FOCs because the system of equations is full rank. Because the equations are symmetric ($u' (d_{1A} + d_{1B})$ is the same for both banks and $e^{\theta_0-\theta_1} = e^{\theta_0-\theta^a}$ by definition of $\theta^a$), $\kappa_{A1} = \kappa_{B1}$ and $\kappa_{A2} = \kappa_{B2}$. Therefore, the same constraints will bind at both banks. The budget constraint always binds (monotonicity). Either the IC constraint binds at both banks or it is lax at both banks.
(\(\kappa_{A2} = \kappa_{B2} > 0\)), the equilibrium is given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda d_A + (1 - \lambda) d_A^2 &= 1 \\
\lambda d_B + (1 - \lambda) d_B^2 &= 1 \\
e^{\theta - \theta_1} Rd_A^\sigma + e^{\theta_0 - \theta^0} R d_B^\sigma &= d_A + d_B,
\end{align*}
\]

Solving for \(d_A + d_B\), it follows that

\[
d_A + d_B = 2 \frac{e^{\theta - \theta_1} R}{e^{\theta - \theta_1} R + (1 - \lambda)}
\]

However, we assumed that \(u'(2) < p_A(\theta^e) R\), so this cannot be an equilibrium: banks would decrease \(d_A\) and \(d_B\).

Thus, the IC is lax at both banks: \(\kappa_{A2} = \kappa_{B2} = 0\). \(\frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_A} = 0\) implies that \(\kappa_{A1} = u'(d_A + d_B)\), and \(\frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_A} = 0\) implies that \(\kappa_{A1} = e^{\theta - \theta_1} R\), so \(u'(d_A + d_B) = e^{\theta - \theta_1} R\). Thus, banks set \(d_A + d_B = (u')^{-1}(e^{\theta - \theta_1} R)\), \(d_A = \frac{1 - \lambda d_A}{1 - \lambda}\), and \(d_B^2 = \frac{1 - \lambda d_B}{1 - \lambda}\). Because \(u'(2) > e^{\theta - \theta_1} R\), it follows that \(d_A + d_B > 2\), so banks provide insurance against the liquidity shock. This insurance is imperfect because (6) is lax. WLOG, it is optimal for investors to invest equally in both banks.

Thus, \(e^{\theta - \theta_1} R d_A^\sigma > d_A > 1\). Because \(d_A > 1\), runs are possible (the bank will be insolvent if all investors run). Because \(e^{\theta - \theta_1} R d_A^\sigma > d_A\), investors prefer to stay in the bank if all other late investors stay. Thus, there are four equilibria at \(t = 1\). The efficient equilibrium is that late investors stay in both banks. There is also a second equilibrium where late investors run only Bank A at \(t = 1\), and a third where investors run only Bank B. Finally, there is an equilibrium where investors run both. Because a bank run on only one bank is an equilibrium, runs are not necessarily systemic.

**Proof of Theorem 3.** We will guess that (7) and (8) are lax, solve the relaxed problem then show that these two constraints are satisfied. Investors are uncertainty averse: they consider \(C = [\hat{\theta}_0, \hat{\theta}_1]\). For \(\tau \in \{A, B\}\), Bank \(\tau\)’s simplified problem is

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{\theta \in \mathcal{C}} U_0 \\
\lambda d_\tau + (1 - \lambda) [d_\tau^2 + d_\tau^2] &\leq 1 \\
\min_{\theta \in C} U_L(\theta) &\geq d_A + d_B,
\end{align*}
\]

where

\[
U_0 = \lambda u(d_A + d_B) + (1 - \lambda) \min_{\theta \in C} U_L(\theta),
\]

and

\[
U_L(\theta) = d_A^2 + d_B^2 + p_A(\theta) Rd_A^\sigma + p_B(\theta) Rd_B^\sigma.
\]

Let \(\kappa_{\tau1}\) be the multiplier for the budget constraint of Bank \(\tau\), let \(\kappa_{\tau2}\) be the multiplier for the incentive compatibility constraint of Bank \(\tau\), and let \(L_\tau\) be the Lagrangian function for Bank \(\tau\), for \(\tau \in \{A, B\}\). Thus, the FOCs for Bank \(\tau\) are

\[
\frac{dL_\tau}{dd_\tau} = \lambda u'(d_A + d_B) - \lambda \kappa_{\tau1} - \kappa_{\tau2},
\]

33
Similarly, investing in matter what happens at Bank shock, for sure). Thus, there are no runs in the safe equilibrium.

Because where Also, the investor may want to save extra funds, and that all IC constraints are lax, so individually, (7) and (8), simplify to possible, so the IC binds. Thus, \( d_{1A} = d_{2A} = 1 \) and \( d_{1B} = d_{2B} = 1 \). The constraints that investors not run each bank individually, (7) and (8), simplify to \( d_{2A} \geq d_{1A} \) and \( d_{2B} \geq d_{1B} \), which are both satisfied (because they are all 1).

**Safe Equilibrium:** Suppose Bank B sets \( d_{2B} = 0 \). Then, by Lemma 1, \( \theta^* = \hat{\theta}_0 \) for all \( d_{2A} > 0 \). However, \( e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} R < 1 \), so Bank A finds it optimal to set \( d_{2A} = 0 \). Similarly, if Bank A sets \( d_{2A} = 0 \), Bank B optimally sets \( d_{2B} = 0 \), because \( e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} R < 1 \). Because \( u'(2) > 1 \), banks provide as much insurance against the liquidity shock as possible, so the IC binds. Thus, \( d_{1A} = d_{2A} = 1 \) and \( d_{1B} = d_{2B} = 1 \). The constraints that investors not run only one bank is lax as well. Note that \( e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} R > 1 \), banks provide as much insurance against the liquidity shock as possible, so the IC binds. Thus, \( d_{1A} = d_{2A} = 1 \) and \( d_{1B} = d_{2B} = 1 \). The constraints that investors not run each bank individually, (7) and (8), simplify to \( d_{2A} \geq d_{1A} \) and \( d_{2B} \geq d_{1B} \), which are both satisfied (because they are all 1).

**Risky Equilibrium:** The symmetric equilibrium described in Theorem 2 is also an equilibrium here. Guess that all IC constraints are lax, so \( \kappa_{1,2} = 0 \) for \( \tau \in \{A, B\} \). \( \frac{dL_r}{dR_{2,\tau}} = 0 \) requires that \( \kappa_{1,2} = u'(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) \), so \( \kappa_{1,2} = \kappa_{B1} \). The constraint that investors will not run only one bank is lax as well. Note that \( e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2A} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2B} > d_{1A} + d_{1B} \) but \( d_{1A} = d_{1B} > 1 \). Further, \( d_{2A} = 1 - \frac{d_{1A}}{d_{1A} + d_{1B}} \). Because \( d_{1A} > 1 \), \( d_{2A} < 1 \). If a investor runs only Bank B, they will assume the worst-case scenario for their remaining portfolio: \( \theta^* = \hat{\theta}_0 \), so the investor’s utility of long-term assets in Bank A is \( e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2A} < 1 < d_{1A} \). Therefore, \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} > d_{1B} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2A} \), implying

\[
e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2A} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2B} > d_{1B} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2A}.
\]

Therefore, investors will not run only Bank B. By identical logic, investors would also refuse to run only Bank A.

In the risky equilibrium, investors strictly prefer to exit one bank if they cannot access the other because \( d_{1A} > 1 > e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2A} \). Thus, an investor will either run both banks or not run either one. Thus, under the risky equilibrium, there are two ex post equilibria: investors run both banks or they run neither.

In the safe equilibrium, \( d_{1A} = d_{2A} = 1 \), so investors are indifferent to running Bank A and not running, no matter what happens at Bank B. Because the safe equilibrium does not provide insurance against the liquidity shock, \( d_{1A} = 1 \), other investors running the bank does not harm those who stay in the bank (the bank will be solvent for sure). Thus, there are no runs in the safe equilibrium.

Finally, we must show that investors find it optimal to invest equally in both banks in the risky equilibrium. Investing \( w_A \) in Bank A gives an investor the choice, at \( t = 1 \), between \( d_{1A}w_A \) at \( t = 1 \) or \( d_{2A}w_A \) of type A assets. Similarly, investing in \( w_B \) in Bank B gives an investor the choice between \( d_{1B}w_B \) at \( t = 1 \) or \( d_{2B}w_B \) of type B assets. Also, the investor may want to save extra funds, \( 2 - w_A - w_B \), on their own.

Given that the investor withdraws early iff they are affected by the liquidity shock, by investing \( w_A \) in Bank A and \( w_B \) in Bank B, the investor earns payoff

\[
U_0 = \lambda u (d_{1A}w_A + d_{1B}w_B + 2 - w_A - w_B) + (1 - \lambda) \min_{\theta \in C} U_L(\theta)
\]

where

\[
U_L(\theta) = e^{\theta - \theta_1} Rd_{2A}w_A + e^{\theta - \theta_1} Rd_{2B}w_B + 2 - w_A - w_B.
\]

with the constraint that \( w_A + w_B \leq 2 \). Define \( L \) as the Lagrangian, and let \( \gamma \) be the multiplier on the constraint.
Applying the minimax theorem:

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial w_{\tau}} = \lambda u' (d_{1A} w_A + d_{1B} w_B + 2 - w_A - w_B) (d_{1\tau} - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (p_{\tau} (\theta^a) Rd_{2\tau}^A - 1) - \gamma$$

for \( \tau \in \{A, B\} \). Because \( d_{1A} = d_{1B} > 1 \), the first term is strictly positive. Because \( d_{2\tau}^A = d_{2\tau}^B, p_{\tau} (\theta^a) Rd_{2\tau}^A > 1 \) for \( \tau \in \{A, B\} \), if \( w_A \) and \( w_B \) are not too far from each other, \( p_{\tau} (\theta^a) Rd_{2\tau}^A > 1 \) for \( \tau \in \{A, B\} \). Therefore, \( \gamma > 0 \), so \( w_A + w_B = 2 \). Because \( d_{1A} = d_{1B}, \frac{\partial L}{\partial w_A} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial w_B} = 0 \) implies that \( e^{\theta^a - \theta_1} = e^{\theta_0 - \theta^e} \), which implies that \( \theta^a = \theta^e \).

Therefore, the investor optimally sets \( w_A = w_B \).

**Proof of Theorem 4.** First, suppose investors are SEU, so they assess \( p_A = p_B = e^{\frac{1}{2} (\theta_0 - \theta^e)} \). Following the shock to type A assets, the payoff to the investor of staying in both banks is \( p_A \phi Rd_{2A}^A + p_B \phi Rd_{2B}^B \). The payoff of running only Bank A is \( d_{1A} + p_B Rd_{2B}^B \), while the payoff of running only Bank B, is \( p_A \phi Rd_{2A}^B + d_{1B} \). Finally, the payoff of running both banks is \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} \). Note the IC is lax, \( p_A Rd_{2A}^A + p_B \phi Rd_{2B}^B > d_{1A} + d_{1B} \), and the contract is symmetric \( (d_{2A}^A = d_{2B}^B \) and \( d_{1A} = d_{1B} \). Because \( p_B \phi Rd_{2B}^B > d_{1B} \), any run on Bank B would be a panic-based run. However, it would be a fundamental run for investors to run Bank A if \( d_{1A} > p_A \phi Rd_{2A}^A \).

Suppose instead that investors are MEU. Suppose that bad news about type A assets arrives, yet the investor thinks all other investors are staying in both banks. The payoff to the investor of staying in both banks is

$$\min_{\theta \in \left[ \theta_0, \theta_1 \right]} \left\{ p_A (\theta) \phi Rd_{2A}^A + p_B (\theta) Rd_{2B}^B \right\} = 2e^{\frac{1}{2} (\theta_0 - \theta^e)} R \left[ \phi \left( d_{2A}^B \right) \right]^2 = 2e^{\frac{1}{2} (\theta_0 - \theta^e)} \phi \frac{1}{2} Rd_{2A}^A.$$ 

The first equality follows from Lemma 1, assuming that assessments are interior. The second equality holds by symmetry, because \( d_{2A}^A = d_{2B}^B \). If the investor runs only Bank A, they receive payoff \( d_{1A} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2B}^B \), while if the investor runs only Bank B, they receive payoff \( d_{1B} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} \phi Rd_{2A}^B \). If the investor runs both banks, they receive payoff \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} \).

If the investor runs Bank A, they will run Bank B as well. Recall that \( e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} R < 1 \), and the budget constraint implies that \( d_{2B}^B = \frac{1 - \phi d_{2A}}{d_{2B}}, d_{1B} > 1 \), so \( d_{2B}^B < 1 \), so \( e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2B}^B < d_{1B} \). Thus, \( d_{1A} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} Rd_{2B}^B < d_{1A} + d_{1B} \). Therefore, it is better to run both banks than only Bank A. Because Bank A received the bad news, it is worse to run only Bank B than only Bank A. Therefore, the investor will either run both banks or run neither.

So far, we have guessed that the bad news still resulted in interior assessments. We will now show that any shock bad enough to cause corner assessments will induce a run, thus proving that assessments are interior at the cutoff. Following bad news on type A assets, investors assess, from Lemma 1, \( \theta^a = \theta^e + \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{e}{\theta_0} \). Thus, \( \theta^e = \hat{\theta}_1 \) if \( \phi \leq e^{-2 (\hat{\theta}_1 - \theta^e)} \). At the boundary, \( \phi = e^{-2 (\hat{\theta}_1 - \theta^e)} \) and \( \theta^a = \hat{\theta}_1 \), the payoff to staying in both banks is

$$p_A \left( \hat{\theta}_1 \right) e^{-2 (\hat{\theta}_1 - \theta^e)} Rd_{2A}^A + p_B \left( \hat{\theta}_1 \right) Rd_{2B}^B = d_{2A}^B R \left[ e^{\hat{\theta}_1 - \theta_1} e^{-2 (\hat{\theta}_1 - \theta^e)} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} \right].$$

Note \( \hat{\theta}_1 - \theta_1 - 2 (\hat{\theta}_1 - \theta^e) = -\hat{\theta}_1 - (\theta_1 - \theta_0) \). Thus, the payoff to staying in both is \( Rd_{2A}^e e^{\theta_0 - \hat{\theta}_1} [e^{-\hat{\theta}_1} + 1] \). Because \( \hat{\theta}_1 > 0, e^{-\hat{\theta}_1} < 1 \). Also, \( e^{\theta_0 - \hat{\theta}_1} R < 1 \) and \( d_{2A}^B < 1 \). So we know that the RHS is less than 2, which is less than \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} \), so the investor will run both banks if news is bad enough to give her corner assessments.

Thus, uncertainty-averse investors run the bank if \( d_{1A} > \phi^2 p_A (\theta^e) Rd_{2A}^A, \) and they will run both banks if they run either.

**Proof of Lemma 3.** To find the optimal contract, we must find the optimal contract that allows a run, the optimal contract that deters a run, then find which one is best. The assumption of affine utility guarantees that the optimal contract is the one that allows a run.

Consider what happens during a run on Bank A (runs on Bank B are symmetric). Applying the sequential service constraint, the first \( \frac{Rd_{2A}^A}{d_{1A}} \) receive \( d_{1A} \) while the remaining \( \left( 1 - \frac{Rd_{2A}^A}{d_{1A}} \right) \) receive nothing. Because \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} \leq \hat{c} \) (we will prove this to be optimal later), early types receive expected utility \( \psi \) in a run, while late investors receive expected utility of 1 in a run.
We will first consider when the optimal contract that allows runs when investors are SEU. As shown in Lemma
5, investors only run the affected bank when they hear bad news about that bank, so the expected payoff if there is
bad news about type A assets is

\[ U_B = \lambda \left[ \frac{1}{d_{1A}} u(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{d_{1A}} \right) u'(d_{1B}) \right] + (1 - \lambda) \left[ 1 + d_{2B}^* + p_B(\theta^*) R d_{2B}^* \right], \]

the expected payoff if there is bad news about type B assets is

\[ U_A = \lambda \left[ \frac{1}{d_{1B}} u(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{d_{1B}} \right) u'(d_{1A}) \right] + (1 - \lambda) \left[ d_{2A}^* + p_A(\theta^*) R d_{2A}^* + 1 \right], \]

and the expected payoff in the absence of bad news is

\[ U_{AB} = \lambda u(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) + (1 - \lambda) \left[ d_{2A}^* + p_A(\theta^*) R d_{2A}^* + d_{2B}^* + p_B(\theta^*) R d_{2B}^* \right]. \]

Therefore, the contract provides investors with expected utility of

\[ U = (1 - 2\varepsilon) U_{AB} + \varepsilon U_A + \varepsilon U_B. \]

Bank \( \tau \) maximizes investor utility, subject to the budget constraint

\[ \lambda d_{1\tau} + (1 - \lambda) (d_{2\tau}^* + d_{2\tau}') \leq 1, \]

for \( \tau \in \{A, B\} \). Let \( \kappa_\tau \) be the multiplier on Bank \( \tau \)'s budget constraint, and let \( L_\tau \) be the the Langrangian functions
for Bank \( \tau \) (we will ignore the incentive compatibility constraints, then check them later). Note

\[ \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{1A}} = (1 - 2\varepsilon) \frac{\partial U_{AB}}{\partial d_{1A}} + \varepsilon \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial d_{1A}} + \varepsilon \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial d_{1A}} - \lambda \kappa_A. \]

Note \( \frac{\partial U_{AB}}{\partial d_{1A}} = \lambda u'(d_{1A} + d_{1B}), \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial d_{1A}} = \lambda \left[ \frac{1}{d_{1B}} u'(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{d_{1B}} \right) u'(d_{1A}) \right], \)
and

\[ \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial d_{1A}} = \frac{\lambda}{d_{1A}} \left( d_{1A} u'(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) - [u(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) - u(d_{1B})] \right). \]

Thus,

\[ \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{1A}} = (1 - 2\varepsilon) \lambda u'(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) + \varepsilon \lambda \left[ \frac{1}{d_{1B}} u'(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{d_{1B}} \right) u'(d_{1A}) \right] + \varepsilon \frac{\lambda}{d_{1A}} \left( d_{1A} u'(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) - [u(d_{1A} + d_{1B}) - u(d_{1B})] \right) - \lambda \kappa_A. \]

Similarly,

\[ \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{2A}} = (1 - 2\varepsilon) (1 - \lambda) + \varepsilon (1 - \lambda) - (1 - \lambda) \kappa_A, \]

and

\[ \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{2A}} = (1 - 2\varepsilon) (1 - \lambda) p_A(\theta^*) R + \varepsilon (1 - \lambda) p_A(\theta^*) R - (1 - \lambda) \kappa_A. \]

Because \( p_A(\theta^*) R > 1 \), \( \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{2A}} > \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{2A}} \). By complementary slackness, \( \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{2A}} = 0 > \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{2A}} \), so \( d_{2A}^* = 0 \). Thus, \( \kappa_A = (1 - \varepsilon) p_A(\theta^*) R \). Because utility is piecewise affine, for \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} < \bar{c}, \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{1A}} \) simplifies to

\[ \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{1A}} = \lambda (1 - \varepsilon) (\psi - p_A R), \]

and for \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} > \bar{c} > \max \{d_{1A}, d_{1B}\} \),

\[ \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{1A}} = (1 - \varepsilon) \lambda (1 - p_A(\theta^*) R) + \varepsilon \lambda \left(1 - \frac{1}{d_{1B}} \right) (\psi - 1) - \varepsilon \frac{\lambda}{d_{1A}} (\psi - 1) (\bar{c} - d_{1B}). \]
The first term is negative, the second term is positive, and the third term is negative. To guarantee that \( \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{1A}} < 0 \) for all \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} > \bar{c} \), it is sufficient that \( \varepsilon < \frac{\kappa_A(\theta^*) R - \frac{1}{\psi + p_A(\theta^*) R} c}{\psi + p_A(\theta^*) R} \). Note this condition on \( \varepsilon \) is sufficient, but not necessary.\(^{24}\)

Therefore, Bank A selects \( d_{1A} \) so that \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} = \bar{c} \) and sets \( d_{2A}^* = \frac{1 - \lambda d_{1A}}{\lambda} \). By symmetry, Bank B selects \( d_{1B} \) so that \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} = \bar{c} \) and sets \( d_{2B}^* = \frac{1 - \lambda d_{1B}}{\lambda} \). Because investors treat investment in the different asset classes as perfect substitutes, they are indifferent to all feasible choices of \( d_{1A} \) and \( d_{1B} \), so WLOG banks set \( d_{1A} = d_{1B} = \frac{1}{2} \bar{c} \).

In order to deter a run, banks must offer contracts so that investors do not run following bad news. That is, they must set \( d_{1A} \leq \phi p_A(\theta^*) R d_{2A}^* \) and \( d_{1B} \leq \phi p_B(\theta^*) R d_{2B}^* \). After some messy algebra, it can be verified that banks will implement contracts that allow a run, because \( \psi > e^{\frac{\bar{c}}{2}(\theta - \theta_1)} R \) and \( \phi < 1 \).

Let us consider the optimal contract that allows runs when investors are MEU. As shown in Lemma 4, investors will run both banks when they receive bad news about either bank. When there is bad news, investors run both banks, so they earn an expected payoff of

\[
U_R = \lambda U_{ER} + (1 - \lambda) U_{LR}
\]

where

\[
U_{LR} = \frac{1}{d_{1A} d_{1B}} (d_{1A} + d_{1B}) + \frac{1}{d_{1A}} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{d_{1B}} \right) (d_{1A} + 1) + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{d_{1A}} \right) \frac{1}{d_{1B}} (d_{1B})
\]

and

\[
U_{ER} = \frac{1}{d_{1A} d_{1B}} u (d_{1A} + d_{1B}) + \frac{1}{d_{1A}} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{d_{1B}} \right) u (d_{1A} + 1) + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{d_{1A}} \right) \frac{1}{d_{1B}} u (d_{1B}).
\]

Note that \( U_{LR} \) simplifies to \( U_{LR} = 2 \). Because \( u \) is piecewise affine, if \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} \leq \bar{c} \), \( U_{ER} = 2 \psi \). If \( d_{1A} + d_{1B} > \bar{c} \)

\[
max \{d_{1A}, d_{1B}\} \text{, } U_{ER} = 2 \psi - (\psi - 1) \frac{1}{d_{1A} d_{1B}} (d_{1A} + d_{1B} - \bar{c}) \].\(^{26}\)

If there is no run, investors earn a payoff of

\[
U_S = \lambda u (d_{1A} + d_{1B}) + (1 - \lambda) \min_{\theta \in [\theta_0, \theta_1]} U_L (\theta)
\]

where

\[
U_L (\theta) = d_{2A}^* + d_{2B}^* + e^{\theta - \theta_1} R d_{2A}^* + e^{\theta - \theta_0 - \theta} R d_{2B}^*.
\]

Therefore, investor welfare is given by

\[
U = (1 - 2\varepsilon) U_S + 2\varepsilon U_R.
\]

Therefore, \( \kappa_A \) be the multiplier on the budget constraint for Bank A, and let \( L_A \) be the respective Lagrangian functions of Bank A.

\[
\frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{1A}} = (1 - 2\varepsilon) \frac{\partial U_S}{\partial d_{1A}} + 2\varepsilon \frac{\partial U_R}{\partial d_{1A}} - \lambda \kappa_A,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{2A}^*} = (1 - 2\varepsilon) \frac{\partial U_S}{\partial d_{2A}^*} + 2\varepsilon \frac{\partial U_R}{\partial d_{2A}^*} - (1 - \lambda) \kappa_A,
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{2B}^*} = (1 - 2\varepsilon) \frac{\partial U_S}{\partial d_{2B}^*} + 2\varepsilon \frac{\partial U_R}{\partial d_{2B}^*} - (1 - \lambda) \kappa_A.
\]

FOCs of optimality for Bank B are symmetric. Because late investors receive an average of 2 in a run, and this does not depend on the contract they receive, \( \frac{\partial U_R}{\partial d_{2A}^*} = \frac{\partial U_R}{\partial d_{2B}^*} = 0 \). Further, \( \frac{\partial U_S}{\partial d_{2A}^*} = 1 - \lambda \) if \( d_{2B} = 0 \), \( \frac{\partial U_S}{\partial d_{2B}^*} = 0 \).

\(^{24}\)We derived this cutoff by ignoring the third piece, which is strictly negative, and ignoring the \( \frac{1}{d_{1B}} \), because that will be a negative term as well. Finally, if \( d_{1B} > \bar{c} \), the third term disappears, but \( \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{1B}} < 0 \) so long as \( \varepsilon \) is less than this cutoff.

\(^{25}\)Banks cannot make either of the promised intermediate cash flows too big, so that late investors do not run following no bad news at \( t = 1 \), which requires that \( p_A(\theta^*) R d_{2A}^* \geq d_{1A} \) and \( p_B(\theta^*) R d_{2B}^* \geq d_{1B} \).

\(^{26}\)Similarly, if \( d_{1A} > \bar{c} > d_{1B} \), \( U_{ER} = (\psi - 1) \frac{\bar{c}}{\psi - \theta_1} (d_{1A} - 1) + 1 + \psi \). Finally, if \( \bar{c} < \min \{d_{1A}, d_{1B}\} \), \( U_{ER} = \psi - 1 \frac{\varepsilon}{\psi - \theta_1} (d_{1A} + d_{1B} - 1) + 2 \). It will never be optimal to set \( d_{1A} \) and \( d_{1B} \) this large, however, because \( \varepsilon \) is small.
the shares, because different asset classes are complements (prices are the same because the stock is priced by cash news, because

Theorem 2, uncertainty-neutral investors are indifferent between asset classes, the claim holds WLOG. Similarly, the

to pay dividend

d_1 = 0. Thus, the safe equilibrium is an equilibrium (the IC constraint requires that \( d_{1A} = 1 \) and \( d_2 = 1 \)).

Similar to the proof of Theorem 3, we can also show that the risky equilibrium is an equilibrium here. Note that

\[
\left(1 - \lambda\right)e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} R < 1 - \lambda, \quad \text{so} \quad \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{1A}} < \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{2A}},
\]

which implies by complementary slackness, that \( \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{1A}} < \frac{\partial L_A}{\partial d_{2A}} = 0 \), so \( d_{2A} = 0 \). Thus, the safe equilibrium is an equilibrium (the IC constraint requires that \( d_{1A} = 1 \) and \( d_2 = 1 \)).

Proof of Theorem 5. The claim follows directly from Theorem 4 and Lemma 3.

Proof of Lemma 4. The stock company agrees to pay dividend \( \Delta_{1B} \) at \( t = 1 \), and hold portfolio \( \{\sigma_{2B}, \rho_{2B}\} \), which are risk-free and type-B assets respectively, until \( t = 2 \). Suppose that the stock is traded at \( t = 1 \) for price \( P_{1B} \). Because households are identical, they will all behave the same at \( t = 0 \), so all investors hold one share of the stock at \( t = 0 \).

Early investors are willing to sell their share of the stock for any \( P_{1B} > 0 \), because they place no value on \( t = 2 \) consumption. Thus, they will consume \( \Delta_{1B} + P_{1B} \) at \( t = 1 \). They will sell to the late investors. Late investors are willing to buy the shares from the early investors iff it improves their utility. If investors are SEU, they value shares of the mutual fund at \( \sigma_{2B} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta} R \rho_{2B} \), so they are willing to buy iff \( \sigma_{2B} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta} R \rho_{2B} > P_{1B} \). Because they invested all their funds at \( t = 0 \), late investors can only reinvest the dividend, so market clearing requires

\[
\lambda P_{1B} \leq (1 - \lambda) \Delta_{1B}.
\]

If \( \Delta_{1B} \) is not too large, this binds, so \( P_{1B} = \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda} \Delta_{1B} \). Thus, the early type receives \( \Delta_{1B} + P_{1B} = \frac{1}{\lambda} \Delta_{1B} \), while the late type receives \( \frac{1}{\lambda} \sigma_{2B} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta} R \rho_{2B} \). Thus, the late type is willing to use all of their funds to buy if \( \sigma_{2B} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta} R \rho_{2B} > \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda} \Delta_{1B} \). Note that this collapses to the incentive compatibility constraint that the late type does not want to run the bank.

Therefore, the stock company can implement the same cash flows as the banking contract \( \{d_{1B}, d^*_2B, d^*_2B\} \) by setting \( \Delta_{1B} = \lambda d_{1B}, \sigma_{2B} = (1 - \lambda) d^*_2B \), and \( \rho_{2B} = (1 - \lambda) d^*_2B \). The stock will trade at price \( P_{1B} = (1 - \lambda) d_{1B} \).

The case with MEU investors follows with similar logic, except that MEU investors are even more willing to buy the shares, because different asset classes are complements (prices are the same because the stock is priced by cash in the market).

Proof of Lemma 5. Lemma 4 showed that the stock company can implement contract \( \{d_{1B}, d^*_2B, d^*_2B\} \) by promising to pay dividend \( \Delta_{1B} = \lambda d_{1B} \), holding risk-free assets \( \sigma_{2B} = (1 - \lambda) d^*_2B \), and type-B assets of \( \rho_{2B} = (1 - \lambda) d^*_2B \). By identical logic to Theorem 2, it can be shown that the optimal contract to offer is sets \( d_{1r} = \frac{1}{\lambda} \tilde{c}, d^*_2r = 0 \), and \( d^*_2r = \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda} e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1 + \tilde{c}} \) where \( \tilde{c} \) satisfies \( u'(\tilde{c}) = e^{\frac{1}{2}(\theta_0 - \theta_1)} R \) with concave \( u \), or \( \tilde{c} \) is the kink in \( u \) as in (12). All that remains to show is that it is optimal for investors to invest $1 in the bank and $1 in the stock. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, uncertainty-neutral investors are indifferent between asset classes, the claim holds WLOG. Similarly, the case with uncertainty-averse investors follows by identical logic to Theorem 3.

Proof of Theorem 6. Two things need to be shown to prove the claim about uncertainty averse investors. First, we must show that a bank run harms the stock market. Second, we need to show that a sufficiently big shock to the stock market induces a bank run.

Consider first stock valuation. Late investors are willing to buy from early investors only if \( P_{1B} \leq e^{\theta_0 - \theta} R \rho_{2B} \), where \( \theta^* \) is determined by the overall portfolio of late investors, as in Lemma 1. Because \( \rho_{2B} = (1 - \lambda) d^*_2B \), and because the initial allocation is incentive compatible, \( d_{1B} < e^{\theta_0 - \theta} R d^*_2B \), this constraint is lax in the absence of bad news, because \( \theta^* = \theta' \). Thus, if there is no bad news, \( P_{1B} = (1 - \lambda) d_{1B} \). If there is a run on the bank, however, \( \theta^* = \theta_1 \) (because late investors only hold type B assets), so \( P_{1B}^{\text{Run}} = e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} R \rho_{2B} \), because \( d_{1B} > 1 > e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} R d^*_2B \). Because \( P_{1B}^{\text{Run}} < P_{1B} \), a run on the bank harms stock market valuation.

Bad news on the bank can harm the stock even if the bad news is not sufficiently bad that it produces a run.
As shown above, stock valuation is depressed iff $e^{\theta_0 - \theta^*} R d_{B}^r < d_{1A}$. If there is bad news about type $A$ assets, but not sufficiently strong bad news to induce a run, Lemma 1 implies that $e^{\theta_0 - \theta^*} R d_{B}^r = e^{\theta_0 - \theta^*} R d_{A}^{r/2} d_{2A}^r d_{B}^r$. By symmetry of the optimal contract, the stock is harmed by bad news to the bank iff $\phi < \frac{1}{2}$. By Theorem 5, the tradeoff in Bank $A$ is symmetric, so it is optimal to run the bank if

$$d_{1A} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta^*} R d_{B}^r \geq 2e^{\frac{1}{2}(\theta_0 - \theta^*)} R d_{A}^{r/2} d_{2A}^r d_{B}^r. \tag{1}$$

Because the optimal contract is symmetric, it is optimal to run the bank if

$$\phi \geq \frac{1}{2} - \left[\phi + e^{\theta^* - \theta_1}\right].$$

By (A1), it can be quickly verified that $e^{\theta^* - \theta_1} < \phi$. Because this implies a strictly smaller cutoff for $\phi$, it is possible to have bad news about the bank that harms stock valuation without triggering a run (a sufficiently bad shock induces a run and harms the stock). Also, this implies that the bank is less prone to runs when paired with a stock than when paired with another bank.

When there is bad news about the stock, it may be optimal to run the bank. Following bad news about the stock, if late investors stay in the bank, by Lemma 1, $\theta^* = \theta^* + \frac{1}{2} \ln \left(\phi d_{A}^r d_{2A}^r\right) - \frac{1}{2} \ln d_{A}^r$, so staying in the bank provides utility $2e^{\frac{1}{2}(\theta_0 - \theta^*)} R d_{A}^{r/2} d_{2A}^r d_{B}^r$. Running the bank provides late investors with utility $d_{1A} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta^*} \phi R d_{2B}^r$, so it is optimal to run iff $d_{1A} + e^{\theta_0 - \theta^*} \phi R d_{2B}^r \geq 2e^{\frac{1}{2}(\theta_0 - \theta^*)} R d_{A}^{r/2} d_{2A}^r d_{B}^r$, or, by applying symmetry, if $e^{\theta^* - \theta_1} \phi - 2\phi^2 + \frac{d_{1A}}{e^{\theta_0 - \theta^*} R d_{A}^r} \geq 0$.

Applying the quadratic formula, it can be quickly shown that it is optimal to run the bank if $\phi < \left[\frac{1 - \sqrt{1-\frac{\alpha}{\alpha}}}{\alpha}\right]^2$, where $\alpha \equiv \theta_1 - \theta^*$ and $\phi = \phi R A$. As in Theorem 5. Therefore, sufficiently bad news about the stock spreads to the banks and causes runs.

Finally, note that there is no contagion when investors are uncertainty neutral. When the investors are uncertainty neutral, they always assess $\theta = \theta^*$, so, by Theorem 4, they run the bank iff there is bad news on type $A$ assets with $\phi \leq \frac{1}{2} - \left[\phi + e^{\theta^* - \theta_1}\right]$, and this will not affect the stock market. Similarly, bad news in the stock market will depress stock prices, to $e^{\theta_0 - \theta^*} R d_{2B}^r$ if $\phi$ is small enough, but will not affect the bank.

**Proof of Theorem 7.** If there is run on Bank $B$, late investors receive $d_{1A}$ by running Bank $A$, but they receive $e^{\theta_0 - \theta^*} R d_{B}^r$ if they stay in Bank $A$ (and so do all the other late investors), because late investors hold only type $A$ assets, so they assess $\theta^* = \theta^* - \alpha$. Thus, it is an equilibrium for late investors to stay in $B$ only if $d_{1A} \geq e^{\theta^* - \theta_1} R d_{2A}^r$, or equivalently, only if $\alpha \leq \ln \frac{e^{\frac{1}{2}(\theta_0 - \theta^*)} R d_{2A}^r}{d_{1A}}$. The tradeoff in Bank $B$, is symmetric, so define $\alpha \equiv \ln \frac{e^{\frac{1}{2}(\theta_0 - \theta_1)} R d_{2A}^r}{d_{1A}}$. Alternatively, if $\alpha > \alpha$, all runs will be systemic.

Similarly, the safe equilibrium arises iff assumption (A1) holds: $e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} R < 1$. Because $\theta_0 = \theta^* - \alpha$, the safe equilibrium arises iff $\alpha > \ln R - \frac{1}{2} (\theta_1 - \theta_0)$. Thus, define $\tilde{\alpha} \equiv \ln R - \frac{1}{2} (\theta_1 - \theta_0)$. Because $d_{1A} > d_{2A}^r$, $\tilde{\alpha} > \alpha$.

**Proof of Lemma 6.** Bank $\tau$ offers contract $\{d_{1\tau}, d_{2\tau}, d_{3\tau}\}$. Note that uncertainty only affects the payoff of the risky portfolio of the too. Thus, investors’ worst-case scenario is

$$\min_{\theta} \sum_{\tau=1}^{N} e^{\theta - \theta_{Max}} d_{2\tau}^r$$

subject to $\theta_\tau \in [\theta_L, \theta_H]$ and $\sum_{\tau=1}^{N} \theta_\tau \in [\theta^* - A, \theta^* + A]$. Because $N \theta_L < N \theta^* - A$, $\exists \theta$ s.t. $\theta_L > \theta^*$. Similarly, because $N \theta_H > N \theta^* + A$, $\exists \theta$ s.t. $\theta_L < \theta_H$. Because the bank offers only long contracts, $d_{2\tau}^r \geq 0$, increasing $\theta$ helps the agent, so the minimization problem sets the sum of $\theta$ as low as possible. Thus, $\kappa^* = -A$. Let $\lambda$ be the multiplier on the constraint that $\sum_{\tau=1}^{N} \theta_\tau = \theta^* - A$, let $\gamma_{\tau L}$ and $\gamma_{\tau H}$ be the respective constraints on $\theta_\tau$, and let $L$ be the

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27This assumes that the shock is not sufficiently bad to induce corner beliefs. If the shock is sufficiently bad to induce corner beliefs, however, investors will always run, because $d_{1A} > 1 > e^{\theta_0 - \theta_1} R d_{2A}^r$. 

39
Lagrangian for the minimization problem. Thus,
\[ \frac{\partial L}{\partial \theta_r} = -e^{\theta_r - \theta_{Max}} d_{2r}^* + \lambda + \gamma_{rL} - \gamma_{rH}. \]

If \( \gamma_{rH} > 0, \theta_r = \theta_H \). This holds iff \(-e^{\theta_r - \theta_{Max}} d_{2r}^* + \lambda > 0\), or equivalently, if \( d_{2r}^* < D \equiv e^{\theta_{Max} - \theta H} \lambda \). Similarly, if \( \gamma_{rL} > 0, \theta_r = \theta_L \). This holds iff \( d_{2r}^* > \overline{D} \equiv e^{\theta_{Max} - \theta L} \lambda \). If \( \gamma_{rH} = \gamma_{rL} = 0, \theta_r \in (\theta_L, \theta_H) \), so \( e^{\theta_r - \theta_{Max}} d_{2r}^* = \lambda \), so \( \theta_r = \theta_{Max} + \ln \left( \frac{1}{d_{2r}^*} \right) \). Define \( A_L = \{ \tau : d_{2r}^* \geq \overline{D} \} \), \( A_H = \{ \tau : d_{2r}^* \leq \underline{D} \} \), and \( A_I = \{ \tau : d_{2r}^* \in (\underline{D}, \overline{D}) \} \). Similarly, define \( N_L = |A_L|, N_H = |A_H|, \) and \( N_I = |A_I| \). Because \( \sum_{\tau \in A_I} \theta_r = N \theta^e - A \), this implies \( \sum_{\tau \in A_I} \theta_r = N \theta^e - A - N_H \theta_H - N_L \theta_L \). We can also express \( \sum_{\tau \in A_I} \theta_r = N \theta_{Max} + N_I \ln \lambda - \sum_{\tau \in A_I} \ln d_{2r}^* - \sum_{\tau \in A_I} \ln d_{2r}^*. \) This implies that
\[ \theta_r = \frac{1}{N_I} [N \theta^e - A - N_H \theta_H - N_L \theta_L] + \frac{1}{N_I} \sum_{\tau' \in A_I} \ln d_{2r}^* - \ln d_{2r}^*. \]

This gives the general expression for endogenous assessments. Investors hold extremely pessimistic assessments, \( \theta_r = \theta_L \), on their largest risky positions, \( d_{2r}^* \geq \overline{D} \). They hold very optimistic assessments, \( \theta_r = \theta_H \), on their smallest risky positions, \( d_{2r}^* \leq \underline{D} \). They hold interior assessments on the positions between.

Finally, consider the case when all assessments are interior: \( \theta_r \in (\theta_L, \theta_H) \) for all \( \tau \). In this case, \( N_H = N_L = 0 \), \( N_I = N \), and all \( \tau \in A_I \), so investor assessments are
\[ \theta_r = \theta^e - \frac{A}{N} + \frac{1}{N_I} \sum_{\tau' \in A_I} \ln d_{2r}^* - \ln d_{2r}^*. \]

Note an increase in \( d_{2r}^* \) decreases \( \theta_r \) and increases \( \theta_{r'} \) for all \( \tau' \neq \tau \) (this holds weakly for corner assessments).

**Proof of Theorem 8.** For uncertainty-neutral investors, the proof is obvious: they assess \( \theta = \theta^e \), so investment in risky assets is positive NPV because \( e^{\theta^e - \theta_{Max}} R > e^{\theta^e - \frac{1}{N} \theta_{Max}} R > 1 \). Thus, banks set \( d_{1r} \) optimally: so \( u'(Nd_{1r}) = e^{\theta^e - \theta_{Max}} R \) in the case of concave utility, and \( Nd_{1r} = \tilde{c} \) in the case of piece-wise affine utility, as in Theorem 2 and Lemma 3, respectively. Local shocks stay local by identical reasoning to Theorem 4.

If investors are uncertainty averse, by identical reasoning to Theorem 3, Theorem 4, and Lemma 3, it is sufficient to show that investment has a positive NPV iff investors can invest in all the other uncertain assets as well. If all banks select the same risky payoff, \( d_{2r}^* = d_{2r}^* \), \( \theta_r = \theta^e - \frac{1}{N} \) by Lemma 6. Because \( e^{\theta^e - \frac{1}{N} \theta_{Max}} R > 1 \), it is positive NPV to invest in all the uncertain assets, so the risky equilibrium is an equilibrium. If all banks except one select the same risky payoff: \( d_{2r}^* = d_{2r}^* \) for all \( \tau \neq \tau' \) and \( d_{2r}^* = 0 \), investors will assess \( \theta_{r'} = \theta_H \) and \( \theta_{r} = \frac{1}{N - 1} [N \theta^e - A - \theta_H] \).

Because \( e^{\theta_H} \left( N \theta^e - A - \theta_H \right) R < 1 \), it is a negative NPV project to invest in any of the uncertain projects, so the safe equilibrium is an equilibrium and all runs will spread.\(^{28}\)

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\(^{28}\)This cutoff is sufficient, but not necessary. Because banks want to insure against the liquidity shock, \( d_{1r} > 1 > d_{2r}^* \) in the risky equilibrium. For runs to spread, it must be the case that \( e^{\theta^e - \theta_{Max}} R d_{2r}^* < d_{1r} \), by identical reasoning to Theorem 5. Similarly, if \( (N - 1) \theta_H + \theta_L \geq N \theta^e - A \), then the safe equilibrium is an equilibrium if \( e^{\theta^e - \theta_{Max}} R \).