Husband, Wife, Parent, Child, Master, Slave:

The Economic Context of the New Testament Household Codes

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Abstract: The New Testament’s “household codes”—passages dealing with household relationships among husband, wife, slaves and children—are all references to the default economics text of first-century Mediterranean culture, the household codes that derive from Aristotle. The household (oikos/oikia) was taken to be the natural basic element of the economy, and its proper ordering was a fundamental economic and moral issue. By reading the New Testament documents in this cultural context, I hope to provide a fresh alternative to interpreters who find in the New Testament codes an oppressive patriarchy, as well as interpreters who see in the codes a conventional, hierarchical ordering of roles and duties. Since the most fully developed New Testament code is found in I Peter, I offer a close, paragraph-by-paragraph reading of that epistle’s code, in parallel with Aristotle’s code. Peter’s code emerges as something of a satire on Aristotle. This satire offers wisdom for issues surrounding gender and race that have deeply divided the Christian community.

The New Testament’s “household codes” (haustafel in theological circles) can be identified narrowly as the passages that parallel other secular texts while explicitly dealing with household relationships among husband, wife, slaves and children.
(Ephesians 5:21-6:11, Colossians 3:18-4:1, I Peter 2:13-3:33). *Haustafel* could be defined more broadly to include Jesus’ many references to household order and stewards of households, references that also presume familiarity with the parallel secular texts. One could define the *haustafel* more broadly still by acknowledging the silent context behind the many New Testament references to *oikos* (and feminine *oikia*), such as the “household of God” theme of Ephesians 2-3; in that passage the Church is likened (and contrasted) to the social structure of a first-century Roman household.

These passages, parables and themes are all invocations of the default economics text of first-century Mediterranean culture, the household codes that find their source in Aristotle’s household codes. The household (*oikos*) was taken by Aristotle to be the natural basic element of the economy, and its proper ordering was a fundamental economic and moral issue. Thus *oikonomos* (literally “household-law”), usually translated as “steward of the household,” is the origin of the English *economist*.

My aim is to provide an interpretation—a fresh one, I believe, though consistent with the general drift of scholarship on the topic—of these New Testament household-code themes. That interpretation is built on the following hypotheses:

- The texts should be read in their first-century context.
- That context is multi-layered: Historical, theological, literary, and cultural.
- The cultural and literary context includes a latent understanding among the original hearers of Aristotle’s codes and their successors, the default economics texts of the day.
- Writers who engage in subversive movements in totalitarian cultures sometimes communicate by quietly altering the “party line” in their writings—subtly, selectively twisting or deleting things that are normally present in official statements. The writers’ real message evades the censors and police state, but is
grasped by fellow dissenters. Given other statements in the New Testament epistles, and the role of early Christianity as one of the troublesome “Eastern Religions” in the Empire, I believe this may be happening in the New Testament authors’ use of the *haustafel*, much as happened, for example, among dissidents in the former Soviet Union.

- If I am correct, it is important to read the *haustafel* not only for what they say, but especially for what they do not say or amend relative to the surrounding secular statements of those codes.

Current *Haustafel* Literature

This appears to be a relatively understudied topic. “While there has been considerable discussion on the origins of the New Testament household codes, much less attention has been given to considering the function of the code when it makes its first appearance in early Christian literature in Colossians.” (Lincoln, 1999) Regarding their origin, Lincoln catalogs “the recent consensus that the code has links with the discussion of household management in the ancient world and played a role in debates over societal stability.” (*ibid*)

Regarding the codes’ function in the early Christian community, for at least a generation authors have debated the case—sometimes without reference to the surrounding secular household codes—that the Biblical texts call for mutual (not one-sided) submission. Hinson (1973), for example, argued that this was the distinctively Christian feature of the *haustafel*. There are of course traditionalists who, skeptical of this conclusion, argue that the codes encourage a more conventional or hierarchical ordering of roles and duties, circumscribed by the role of Christ’s love of the church;
they present a theological argument in favor of a male-headed household model and, in some cases, control of potentially subversive women. (See, e.g., Seim, 1995) Progressives have also argued that the texts endorse a conventional male-dominated hierarchy, and for that reason have excoriated the New Testament’s “unambiguously oppressive ethics.” (Standhartinger, 2000) Other authors have tried to form some combination of these views—for example, a subordination-with-mutuality ethic (e.g., Dudrey, 1999), or an argument that the New Testament codes were meant to endorse the more morally-restrained secular interpretations of the surrounding culture’s household codes. (MacDonald, 2007) Some authors have suggested an approach not at odds with my proposal. Lincoln (1999), for example, suggests that the Colossians code is one element of the letter’s argument against ascetic wisdom; the code is part of a response to an alternative philosophy, though Lincoln does not connect this philosophy to the household-code tradition as I would. Alter’s approach (1983 and others) to reading the Old Testament narratives as a literary critic includes the notion of reading narratives for what is not present as well as what is indeed present. Despite her belief that “the origin and intention of this text [Col 3:18-4:1] have not yet been explained despite form- and tradition-critical studies of the household codes” and that the New Testament codes present an oppressive ethic, Standhartinger (2000) indicates that “one may assume…the authors intend to challenge the community to read the household code against the grain.” Scheetz (2003) argues that, in the context of first-century Mediterranean culture’s emphasis on honor and shame (timocracy), the Ephesians code presents an alternative vision of marriage and other human relationships.

Aristotle, Arius Didymus, Yeshua Ben Sira
For Aristotle, law and social order depend on the relationships in the estate/household/oikos, as this, not the person, is the smallest and fundamental economic entity of civilization. It is from the oikos that the community (polis) is comprised; the polis is in turn the object of the common good for the oikos.

For Aristotle, households are comprised of two countervailing parts in creative tension: free and slave. This creative tension is essential and irreducible; the individual could not serve as the fundamental economic entity of culture, as individuals can not in themselves embody this tension. In much the same way, political culture is comprised of two complementary elements: free, self-sufficient oikos, and the polis. Both each the household and the political culture in which households are situated are compositions of complementary parts that would be incomplete on their own. Coming together in a household, then in the state, is the natural, ultimate end (telos) of the constituent parts. There is no legitimate constituent part beyond the polis—say, an empire.

Within the oikos, at the natural apex of its complementary rule-and-obedience is the paterfamilias, the family father, the estate owner/director, the male who rules the extended family. His word is local law. For example, he may order a wife to abandon a newly born child to die. No one in the family may take the paterfamilias to court, as it was assumed that the paterfamilias would represent them in court; Aristotle teaches that the family members are considered extensions of the paterfamilias’ body, and no one hurts their own body.

The relationships within the household thus meet their social responsibility and proper, natural end when ordered as follows:

- Husband rules his wife, wife obeys her husband.
- Paterfamilias rules the child, child obeys the paterfamilias.
- Master rules the slave, slave obeys the master.
These codes are based on an analysis of the “nature” of the persons involved. Men are taken to be, from birth, either of the nature to rule, or of the nature to serve (i.e., slaves). There are three forms of women: those who are to be wives and thus to be ruled directly in household/estate affairs; those born to provide sexual pleasure to men; and those born to provide intellectual stimulation and discourse with men. Justice is then conceived of as based on equality, and can exist only among those who are friends on the basis of equality, who are equals; those who are fundamentally not equal—those in different categories of male/female and ruling/serving—have only a weak sense of justice among themselves, not between themselves and other sorts of persons.

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Though Aristotle’s is the most frequently cited, there developed other “household codes” or “house tables” offering the advice of the wise to the politically free paterfamilias. Kruse observes: “Some sages advocated an authoritarian approach and others a more benevolent demeanor, but whatever their take was on style, they were unified in their conviction that the paterfamilias was obligated to rule his household for the good of society.” Since there may have been a variety of household codes by the first century BCE¹, there is some legitimate question concerning how to read the New Testament literature in its “proper” cultural and literary context. Which codes might Paul, Peter and Jesus have been considering (and potentially altering for effect) in their codes?

We are aided in this difficulty by the circumstance of two influential summaries of the household codes that apparently had fairly wide acceptance by the first century CE. First, there is the redaction by Arius Didymus, court philosopher and confidant to

¹ This should not be overstated, however; “our sources for Aristotelian political theory in the period after Alexander are extremely limited.” (Nagel, 198)
Caesar Augustus, who summarized (and amended to some extent) the Aristotelian tradition at Augustus’ request in his *Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics and Politics*. Kruse finds that “Arius Didymus spoke for considerable numbers of influential men in the Greco-Roman Empire of the first century C.E.”

Arius’ adjustments to Aristotle address opposition toward the codes dating back to the time of Alexander, by making the codes more amenable to imperial rule; Arius expands their original estate-based, polis-limited logic. Thus Arius alters the relationship of the *oikos* to the *polis*, and in the process is forced to make some changes in the definition and order of the *oikos*.

In Arius there appears to be some softening of the strict hierarchy between spouses and masters/slaves, though interpretation is complicated considerably by Arius’ brevity and style of exposition. The household is introduced and defined twice, in terms that are not necessarily completely in agreement with each other. It is worth noting that Arius’ literary style as well as his content may also serve as part of the cultural framework for the New Testament household codes: “[Theses] proposed by Arius on household management and politics are compressed and complex, and their arrangement often involves a considerable degree of subtlety. Information is presented incrementally, with a minimum of argument. Sometimes what looks like a forthright statement of doctrine is subsequently modified—or virtually negated—by what follows.” (Nagle, 200)

Arius first introduces the *oikos* as simply the association of a husband and wife, with no natural hierarchy, no aim of a shared life together, and no direct mention of slave or master. The *oikos*, for Arius, also provides the seeds of a variety of political constitutions, presenting models for kingship (parents to children), aristocracy (husbands to wives) and democracy (children to one another). (Again, at this point there is not yet mention of despotic master/slave models.) By leaving the household “incomplete” from
Aristotle’s viewpoint—without slaves—Arius subverts Aristotle’s structure of the *polis* as dependent on complete, self-sustaining household units, which then find complementary fulfillment in the *state/polis*. Independent property ownership had been the foundation of Aristotle’s non-barbarian state; barbarians, for Aristotle, have no hierarchy, and all members of the household are therefore slaves of the state. Arius appears to make his adjustments to *oikos* in the name of rationalizing empire; his household could exist in any kind of state, unlike Aristotle’s. It appears that Arius’ alterations to the household codes in his first definition of the *oikos*, which appear in the *Epitome* after the ethical section that lays the basis for a new view of the *polis*, are driven by his desire to justify empire, forced by consistency with the ethical changes. (Nagel, 221)

Arius of course does eventually include slavery as a component of the household, in his second definition of *oikos*—following closely on the first, and to some extent contradicting it. Here, when the married couple “takes in partnership a helper, whether a slave by nature (one who has a strong body suitable for service but who is dull and unable to live by himself, for whom it is beneficial to be ruled), or a slave by convention, from the union for the same purpose, and the consideration of all for what is mutually beneficial, a household is constituted.” Arius here retains much of the strength of the original codes on the matters that concern us; his “softening,” for example, of the role of the *paterfamilias* argues that “a man has the rule of this household by nature, for the deliberative faculty in a woman is inferior, in children it does not yet exist, and in the case of slaves, it was completely absent.” This husbandly rule spans four areas: paternal, conjugal, mastership of slaves, and wealth acquisition. In extremely condensed form, this discussion more closely follows Aristotle’s *Politics* than does Arius’ first household definition.
Arius’ influential summary of the haustafel is complemented by that of a second group, indicating that the Aristotelian teaching on the nature of persons and community also entered Rabbinic teaching in the late centuries BC. It received Biblical warrant by using narratives concerning Eve to portray women as easily deceived or as seductresses. The second-century-BC influential rabbi Yeshua Ben Sira, for example renders Genesis 2-3 (Sir. 25:24) as “From woman sin had its beginning, and because of her we all die.” The conclusion of his discourse on daughters reads “Better the wickedness of a man than the goodness of a woman.” He generalizes about “the headstrong daughter” thus: “She will sit in front of every tent peg and open her quiver to every arrow.” It is important to note both that the Hellenistic oikos logic appeared in Rabbinic teaching, and that this thinking appears to be the result of Greek/Aristotelian influence, not something original to the Hebrew tradition: “There is no precedent in Hebrew tradition for the view that woman is the source of all evil, but there is a clear Greek precedent in the story of Pandora’s box.” (Hesiod, Works and Days) “A tradition of Greek philosophy beginning with Aristotle insisted on the subordination of women in the codes of household behavior.” (Marriage, Divorce, and Family in Second Temple Judaism)

Jesus, Paul, Peter

We are now in a position to summarize my hypothesis on the New Testament household codes: Whereas Aristotle argues that some men are set out from the moment of birth to be leaders and others to be slaves, such that slavery is natural and an essential element of justice, Paul and Peter encourage slaves to graciously bear their “unjust treatment.” In fact, the New Testament codes are introduced with summaries that indicate all persons—male, female, slave, free—share a common nature, essential status and destiny. Whereas Aristotle speaks of three natural kinds of women with
separate roles in the household—wives, educated female raconteurs, and prostitutes—
Peter and Paul present a single woman of the household to whom the male head of the household (paterfamilias) is to be faithful on all levels. Paul also dramatically alters the authority of the paterfamilias relative to children, ruling out even verbally provoking children. The New Testament codes directly address women and slaves, and presume equal deliberative faculties of all in the household. Thus my working hypothesis is that the New Testament household codes are subversive of the dominant economic discourse of their time. By denying the core beliefs of the common cultural code of conduct, they are communicating a rejection of that code.

I will present one of the codes from the epistles (Colossians 3-4 and Ephesians 5-6 are parallel passages; see Appendix 1), citing the appropriate parallel passages in Aristotle, followed by brief comments. Appendix 2 presents a side-by-side comparison of the 1 Peter passage and the parallel passages from Aristotle’s Politics. Appendix 3 presents the excerpts from Politics in their original context.

1. 1 Peter 2-3

9 But you are a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God’s own people, in order that you may proclaim the mighty acts of him who called you out of darkness into his marvelous light.
10 Once you were not a people, but now you are God’s people; once you had not received mercy, but now you have received mercy.

11 Beloved, I urge you as aliens and exiles to abstain from the desires of the flesh that wage war against the soul. Conduct yourselves honorably among the Gentiles, so that,

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2 The author cites the Hebrew Scriptures, not natural reasoning or Hellenistic philosophy, to establish the common nature of men, women, slave and free.
though they malign you as evildoers, they may see your honorable deeds and glorify God when he comes to judge.  

13 For the Lord’s sake accept the authority of every human institution, whether of the emperor as supreme, or of governors, as sent by him to punish those who do wrong and to praise those who do right.  

14 For it is God’s will that by doing right you should silence the ignorance of the foolish.  

15 As servants’ of God, live as free people, yet do not use your freedom as a pretext for evil. Honor everyone. Love the family of believers. Fear God. Honor the emperor.  

18 Slaves, accept the authority of your masters with all deference, not only those who are kind and gentle but also those who are harsh.  

19 For it is to your credit if, being aware of God, you endure pain while suffering unjustly.  

20 If you endure when you are beaten for doing wrong, where is the credit in that? But if you endure when you do right and suffer for it, you have God’s approval.  

21 For to this you have been called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, so that you should follow in his steps.  

22 ‘He committed no sin, and no deceit was found in his mouth.’  

23 When he was abused, he did not return abuse; when he suffered, he did not threaten; but he entrusted himself to the one who judges justly.  

3 Further distancing of the church from its Hellenistic cultural context. Explicit mention that the church is a troublesome Eastern sect in the eyes of the Empire—considered atheistic, unwilling to join in the natural fertility cults that help assure the common good. This sets the stage for the following paragraphs to be read as dissident literature.  

4 Civil authority is grounded in its exercise of justice, not natural right.  

5 A shocking sentence, in its Aristotelian context, as Peter is about to address women and slaves directly. The “freedom” here, in context, is freedom from accepting political pressures to do what is not right, whether from Emperor or Governor or paterfamilias; that freedom is still bounded by the need to do what is right. This standard of justice transcends the husband/wife/slave/child categories, as these categories share a common nature.  

6 “Honor,” the prime virtue in Hellenistic timocracy, is here placed in context beneath love of believers and fear of God.  

7 The order of address is reversed from the norm; slaves, usually at the bottom of the social pyramid and not addressed directly at all since they lack powers of deliberation, are addressed first, then wives, and finally—briefly—husbands. The address to husbands is brief because it begins with “in the same way;” that is, the former instructions apply to husbands as well.  

8 For Aristotle, justice makes sense only among equals, and master and slave are not equals.  

9 This again assumes that slaves possess the deliberative capacity to understand that they have done right, that the master does not understand what is right, and that justice is being violated.  

10 There is no explicit address to “masters.” Instead there is a discussion of the suffering service of the Church’s master.  

11 True justice is again contrasted with Aristotelian natural justice.
body on the cross, so that, free from sins, we might live for righteousness; by his wounds you have been healed. For you were going astray like sheep, but now you have returned to the shepherd and guardian of your souls.

1Wives, in the same way, accept the authority of your husbands, so that, even if some of them do not obey the word, they may be won over without a word by their wives’ conduct, when they see the purity and reverence of your lives. Do not adorn yourselves outwardly by braiding your hair, and by wearing gold ornaments or fine clothing; rather, let your adornment be the inner self with the lasting beauty of a gentle and quiet spirit, which is very precious in God’s sight. It was in this way long ago that the holy women who hoped in God used to adorn themselves by accepting the authority of their husbands. Thus Sarah obeyed Abraham and called him lord. You have become her daughters as long as you do what is good and never let fears alarm you.

7 Husbands, in the same way, show consideration for your wives in your life together, paying honor to the woman as the weaker sex, since they too are also heirs of the gracious gift of life—so that nothing may hinder your prayers.

8 Finally, all of you, have unity of spirit, sympathy, love for one another, a tender heart, and a humble mind. Do not repay evil for evil or abuse for abuse; but, on the

12 Another stunning phrase, “in the same way,” which is used again to introduce codes for husbands. The codes’ standards are based not on an argument that essential human natures differ between husbands, slaves and wives, but on the presumption that these share a common nature, and experience unity in Christ, as portrayed in the atonement (see especially “our” and “we” in v. 24).

13 A reference to enormous braided wigs, composed of slaves’ hair, that rendered the wearer incapable of movement, let alone service to others. Thus the injunction is against conforming to aristocratic culture, not against self-respect. Aristocratic presumption is contrasted here to gentility. There would be some risk in refusing to accept this aristocratic culture in the case being discussed—a non-believing husband. Note that this injunction to reject aristocratic culture immediately follows the call to accept the authority of the husband. Thus that authority is clearly not meant to be absolute; it does not even extend to issues of clothing.

14 Again, the logic of the paragraph requires that this be read as “accept the authority in this limited way,” not “accept the authority in all things without question.” Again, Peter presumes deliberative capacity among women that is at least equal to their non-believing husbands.

15 Peter specifically mentions “a life together” as part of the marriage covenant, which Arius had dropped from Aristotle, arguing that marriage was a necessity for procreation. Aristotle, while allowing that a life together was a positive part of marriage, argues that marriage exists because of the animal-like desire for sex, basing his argument on animal and plant behavior. Peter does not place procreation or desire as the basis for marriage. Consideration and honor are central. The “weakness,” given the presumption of equal deliberative capacity in the prior paragraph, surely indicates relative physical weakness and the concomitant opportunity for abuse.

16 A reference to common nature across the sexes.
contrary, repay with a blessing. It is for this that you were called—that you might inherit a blessing. 10 For

‘Those who desire life
   and desire to see good days,
   let them keep their tongues from evil
   and their lips from speaking deceit;
11 let them turn away from evil and do good;
   let them seek peace and pursue it.
12 For the eyes of the Lord are on the righteous,
   and his ears are open to their prayer.
   But the face of the Lord is against those who do evil.’

13 Now who will harm you if you are eager to do what is good? 14 But even if you do suffer for doing what is right, you are blessed. Do not fear what they fear,* and do not be intimidated,
15 but in your hearts sanctify Christ as Lord.

Conclusion

The writers of the New Testament strove to hold together a movement that was harassed by the surrounding culture and always under threat of open persecution as an atheistic, impious cult. They did this, in part, by writing letters—letters that travelled long distances, were subject to being stolen or read by hostile parties, and would have served as evidence against the entire movement if allowed to do so.

Yet the writers were establishing a new social framework that, under Jesus’ own teaching (e.g., Matthew 20) must look radically different from the default secular culture—particularly where slavery and family relationships are concerned. It is reasonable to suggest that the New Testament writers responded to this situation as dissident writers in other places have responded, presenting radical ideas in the form of subtle “mis-statements” of common texts from the surrounding culture. I have argued that this is the way in which the New Testament’s household codes should be read.

17 As it began, this code ends with a joint address to all, as possessing a common nature.
Appendix 1: Parallel New Testament Household Codes

1. Colossians 3-4

11 In that renewal* there is no longer Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and free; but Christ is all and in all!

12 As God’s chosen ones, holy and beloved, clothe yourselves with compassion, kindness, humility, meekness, and patience. 13 Bear with one another and, if anyone has a complaint against another, forgive each other; just as the Lord* has forgiven you, so you also must forgive. 14 Above all, clothe yourselves with love, which binds everything together in perfect harmony. 15 And let the peace of Christ rule in your hearts, to which indeed you were called in the one body. And be thankful. 16 Let the word of Christ* dwell in you richly; teach and admonish one another in all wisdom; and with gratitude in your hearts sing psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs to God.* 17 And whatever you do, in word or deed, do everything in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God the Father through him.

18 Wives, be subject to your husbands, as is fitting in the Lord. 19 Husbands, love your wives and never treat them harshly.

20 Children, obey your parents in everything, for this is your acceptable duty in the Lord. 21 Fathers, do not provoke your children, or they may lose heart. 22 Slaves, obey your earthly masters* in everything, not only while being watched and in order to please them, but wholeheartedly, fearing the Lord.* 23 Whatever your task, put yourselves into it, as done for the Lord and not for your masters; 24 since you know that from the Lord you will receive the inheritance as your reward; you serve* the Lord Christ. 25 For the wrongdoer will be paid back for whatever wrong has been done, and there is no partiality.

Masters, treat your slaves justly and fairly, for you know that you also have a Master in heaven. 2 Devote yourselves to prayer, keeping alert in it with thanksgiving.

2. Ephesians 5-6

15 Be careful then how you live, not as unwise people but as wise, 16 making the most of the time, because the days are evil. 17 So do not be foolish, but understand what the will of the Lord is. 18 Do not get drunk with wine, for that is debauchery; but be filled with the Spirit, 19 as you sing psalms and hymns and spiritual songs among yourselves,
singing and making melody to the Lord in your hearts, giving thanks to God the Father at all times and for everything in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.

21 Be subject to one another out of reverence for Christ.

22 Wives, be subject to your husbands as you are to the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife just as Christ is the head of the church, the body of which he is the Savior. Just as the church is subject to Christ, so also wives ought to be, in everything, to their husbands.

25 Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her, in order to make her holy by cleansing her with the washing of water by the word, so as to present the church to himself in splendor, without a spot or wrinkle or anything of the kind—yes, so that she may be holy and without blemish. In the same way, husbands should love their wives as they do their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. For no one ever hates his own body, but he nourishes and tenderly cares for it, just as Christ does for the church, because we are members of his body. For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two will become one flesh. This is a great mystery, and I am applying it to Christ and the church. Each of you, however, should love his wife as himself, and a wife should respect her husband.

Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right. Honour your father and mother—this is the first commandment with a promise: so that it may be well with you and you may live long on the earth. And, fathers, do not provoke your children to anger, but bring them up in the discipline and instruction of the Lord.

Slaves, obey your earthly masters with fear and trembling, in singleness of heart, as you obey Christ; not only while being watched, and in order to please them, but as slaves of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart. Render service with enthusiasm, as to the Lord and not to men and women, knowing that whatever good we do, we will receive the same again from the Lord, whether we are slaves or free. And, masters, do the same to them. Stop threatening them, for you know that both of you have the same Master in heaven, and with him there is no partiality.
Appendix 2: Parallel of

1 Peter and Politics

1 Peter 2-3

9 But you are a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God’s own people, in order that you may proclaim the mighty acts of him who called you out of darkness into his marvelous light.
10 Once you were not a people, but now you are God’s people; once you had not received mercy, but now you have received mercy. [Quoting Scripture; the joint address to all establishes the common nature of men, women, slave, free.]

11 Beloved, I urge you [all addressed together] as aliens and exiles to abstain from the desires of the flesh that wage war against the soul. [distancing from cult worship] 11Conduct yourselves honorably among the Gentiles, so that, though they malign you as evildoers [atheistic, unwilling to join cult activity for the common good], they may see your honorable deeds and glorify God when he comes to judge.

Aristotle, Politics

2:10: Here the very constitution of the soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other is subject... Again, the state, as composed of unlikes, may be compared to the living being: as the first elements into which a living being is resolved are soul and body, as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite, the family of husband and wife, property of master and slave, so of all these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the state is composed; and, therefore,...

2:11-12...the virtue of all the citizens cannot possibly be the same, any more than the excellence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of the performer who stands by his side. I have said enough to show why the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and always the same... Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of democracy are all found in tyrannies. Such are the power given to women in their families in the hope that they will inform against their husbands, and the license which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters; for slaves and women do not conspire against tyrants; and they are of course friendly to tyrannies and also to democracies, since under them they have a good time.

13 For the Lord’s sake accept the authority of every human institution, whether of the emperor as supreme, 14or of governors, as sent by him to punish those who do wrong and to praise those who do right. [civil authority grounded in the exercise of justice, not natural right; impartial justice for all]
For it is God’s will that by doing right you should silence the ignorance of the foolish. As servants of God, live as free people [common address to men, women and slaves], yet do not use your freedom as a pretext for evil. [equal deliberative capacity among all hearers; freedom from bending to others’ judgments requiring one to do what is not right; yet freedom is bounded by the need to do right.]

Honor everyone. Love the family of believers. Fear God. Honor the emperor.

Slaves [addressed first, directly—with deliberation, self-possession], accept the authority of your masters with all deference, not only those who are kind and gentle but also those who are harsh.

2:14-16 But a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice… For the actions of a ruler cannot really be honorable, unless he is as much superior to other men as a husband is to a wife, or a father to his children, or a master to his slaves… For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave… For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient…

[No ‘love’ parallel in Aristotle! “Honor” is placed in a larger context]

2: 18 For … from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule… Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals … the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master… The master is not called a master because he has science, but because he is of a certain character, and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman…. The virtue of the ruler we maintain to be different from that of the subject; the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature… Although the parts of the soul are present in all of them (male, female, child, slave), they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all… Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another’s man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another’s man who, being a human being, is also a possession.
19 For it is to your credit if, being aware of God, you endure pain while suffering unjustly. [No inherent justice in the master-slave relationship; deliberative capacity of slaves is assumed superior to their masters.]

20 If you endure when you are beaten for doing wrong, where is the credit in that? But if you endure when you do right and suffer for it [assumes superior deliberation], you have God’s approval. 21 For to this you have been called [common virtues across slave and ultimate master], because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, so that you should follow in his steps.

22 ‘He committed no sin, and no deceit was found in his mouth.’

23 When he was abused, he did not return abuse; when he suffered, he did not threaten; but he entrusted himself to the one who judges justly. 24 He himself bore our sins in his body on the cross, so that, free from sins, we might live for righteousness; by his wounds you have been healed.

25 For you were going astray like sheep, but now you have returned to the shepherd and guardian of your souls.

1 Wives, in the same way, accept the authority of your husbands [not ‘obey;’ ‘in the same way’ that civil authority is conditionally accepted], so that, even if some of them do not obey [now ‘obey’] the word, they may be won over without a word by their wives’ conduct, ‘when they see the purity and reverence of your lives.’ Do not adorn yourselves outwardly by braiding your hair, and by wearing gold ornaments or fine clothing; rather, let your adornment be the inner self with the lasting beauty of a gentle and quiet spirit, which is very precious in God’s sight. 3 It was in this way long ago that the holy women who hoped in God used to adorn themselves by accepting the authority of their husbands. 4 Thus Sarah obeyed Abraham and called him lord. You have become her daughters as long as you do what is good [obedience is circumscribed, not “by nature”] and never let fears alarm you.[Appeal to scripture] 2:19 And therefore he who violates the law can never recover by any success, however great, what he has already lost in departing from virtue. For equals the honorable and the just consist in sharing alike, as is just and equal. But that the unequal should be given to equals, and the unlike to those who are like, is contrary to nature, and nothing which is contrary to nature is good. [Justice defined within, not across groups]

2:20 Although the parts of the soul are present in all of them (male, female, child, slave), they are present in different degrees … So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his duty… Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another’s man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another’s man who, being a human being, is also a possession.

[Absent master section]: The rule of a master, although the slave by nature and the master by nature have in reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him … The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals.

3:1 But the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying…

3:2 …And this holds of all other virtues… for those who say generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves.
Husbands, in the same way [common to all three groups], show consideration for your wives ... 

... in your life together, paying honor to the woman as the weaker sex [physical weakness requires honor, not rule], since they too are also heirs of the gracious gift of life [common nature; no mention of rule or fit for command]—so that nothing may hinder your prayers.

Finally, all of you, have unity of spirit, sympathy, love for one another, a tender heart, and a humble mind. "Do not repay evil for evil or abuse for abuse; but, on the contrary, repay with a blessing. It is for this that you were called—that you might inherit a blessing. "For those who desire life and desire to see good days, let them keep their tongues from evil and their lips from speaking deceit; let them turn away from evil and do good; let them seek peace and pursue it. "For the eyes of the Lord are on the righteous, and his ears are open to their prayer. But the face of the Lord is against those who do evil."

Now who will harm you if you are eager to do what is good? "But even if you do suffer for doing what is right, you are blessed. Do not fear what they fear, and do not be intimidated, but in your hearts sanctify Christ as Lord.
Appendix 3: Aristotle, *Politics*, *Haustafel* excerpts

Book One

II

He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest.

Now nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore the poets say,

It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians; as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.

Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he says,

First house and wife and an ox for the plough,

for the ox is the poor man’s slave. …

But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled ‘with the same milk.’ And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians
still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family
the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As
Homer says:

Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. …

When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be
nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare
needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if
the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and
the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call
its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final
cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a
political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is
either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the

Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,

whom Homer denounces -- the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be
compared to an isolated piece at draughts.

…Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since
the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed,
there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone
hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. … But he who is unable
to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either
a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by
nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man,
when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he
is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at
birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the
worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most
savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of
men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is
just, is the principle of order in political society.
Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state we must speak of the management of the household. The parts of household management correspond to the persons who compose the household, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by examining everything in its fewest possible elements; and the first and fewest possible parts of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore to consider what each of these three relations is and ought to be: I mean the relation of master and servant, the marriage relation (the conjunction of man and wife has no name of its own), and thirdly, the procreative relation (this also has no proper name). And there is another element of a household, the so-called art of getting wealth, which, according to some, is identical with household management, according to others, a principal part of it; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.

Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation than exists at present. …

IV

Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite sphere the workers must have their own proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management of a household. Now instruments are of various sorts; some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument which takes precedence of all other instruments. For if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet,

of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods;

if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction must be drawn; the instruments commonly so called are instruments of production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The
shuttle, for example, is not only of use; but something else is made by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use. Further, as production and action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the instruments which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action. Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another's man who, being a human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.

V

But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?

There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects -- for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work); for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to fight. Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But we are wandering from the subject. We will therefore restrict ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first place, consists of soul and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the
soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.

Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another's and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labor, the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite often happens -- that some have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the superior. And if this is true of the body, how much more just that a similar distinction should exist in the soul? But the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.

VI

But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention -- the law by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence and is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin of the dispute, and what makes the views invade each other's territory, is as follows: in some
sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the greatest power of exercising
force; and as superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of some
kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply one about justice (for it
is due to one party identifying justice with goodwill while the other identifies it with
the mere rule of the stronger). If these views are thus set out separately, the other views
have no force or plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue ought to rule, or
be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a principle of justice (for law and
custom are a sort of justice), assume that slavery in accordance with the custom of war
is justified by law, but at the same moment they deny this. For what if the cause of the
war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say he is a slave who is unworthy to be a
slave. Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves and the children of
slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore
Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in
using this language, they really mean the natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it
must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle
applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in
their own country, but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby
implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the
other relative. The Helen of Theodectes says:

Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung from the stem
of the Gods?

What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery, noble and humble
birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They think that as men and animals beget
men and animals, so from good men a good man springs. But this is what nature,
though she may intend it, cannot always accomplish.

We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion, and that all
are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in some
cases a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right
for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicing obedience, the
others exercising the authority and lordship which nature intended them to have.
The abuse of this authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and whole, of
body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but
separated part of his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave
between them is natural they are friends and have a common interest, but where it
rests merely on law and force the reverse is true.

VII
The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a master is not a constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of rule are not, as some affirm, the same with each other. For there is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another over subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals. The master is not called a master because he has science, but because he is of a certain character, and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still there may be a science for the master and science for the slave. … Hence those who are in a position which places them above toil have stewards who attend to their households while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics. … Enough of the distinction between master and slave.

VIII

Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art of getting wealth, in accordance with our usual method, for a slave has been shown to be a part of property. …

Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is a part of the management of a household, in so far as the art of household management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things necessary to life, and useful for the community of the family or state, as can be stored. They are the elements of true riches; for the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that

No bound to riches has been fixed for man.

But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; for the instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number or size, and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a household or in a state. And so we see that there is a natural art of acquisition which is practiced by managers of households and by statesmen, and what is the reason of this.

IX

There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly and rightly called an art of wealth-getting, and has in fact suggested the notion that riches and property have no limit. Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is often identified with it.
But though they are not very different, neither are they the same. The kind already described is given by nature, the other is gained by experience and art....Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth; had it been so, men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. ... But the art of wealth-getting which consists in household management, on the other hand, has a limit; the unlimited acquisition of wealth is not its business. ... Hence some persons are led to believe that getting wealth is the object of household management, and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, and not upon living well; and, as their desires are unlimited they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be without limit. ...

X

...There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honorable, while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of all modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural.

XI

Enough has been said about the theory of wealth-getting; we will now proceed to the practical part. ...

XII

Of household management we have seen that there are three parts -- one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already, another of a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature. But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one rules
and the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference of outward forms and names
and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-
pan. The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is
permanent. The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both
of love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore
Homer has appropriately called Zeus ‘father of Gods and men,’ because he is the king of
them all. For a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same
kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son.

XIII

... A question may indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a slave
beyond and higher than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities -- whether he can
have the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like; or whether slaves possess
only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a
difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the
other hand, since they are men and share in rational principle, it seems absurd to say
that they have no virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and children,
whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and
is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or not. So in general we may ask
about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or
different virtues. For if a noble nature is equally required in both, why should one of
them always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a question
of degree, for the difference between ruler and subject is a difference of kind, which the
difference of more and less never is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the one
ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and
unjust, how can he rule well? If the subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious
and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore, that both of
them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural subjects also vary among
themselves. Here the very constitution of the soul has shown us the way; in it one
part naturally rules, and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in
maintain to be different from that of the subject; the one being the virtue of the
rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same
principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled
according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; the freeman rules over the slave after
another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over
the child; although the parts of the soul are present in all of them, they are present in
different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but
it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily be
supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in
such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and rational principle is such an artificer; the subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other virtues, as will be more clearly seen if we look at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. (Italics added) Far better than such definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues. All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women,

Silence is a woman's glory,

but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined that a slave is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will obviously require only so much virtue as will prevent him from failing in his duty through cowardice or lack of self-control. Someone will ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work through the lack of self control? But is there not a great difference in the two cases? For the slave shares in his master's life; the artisan is less closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave. The meaner sort of echanic has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of mastership which trains the slave in his duties. Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need of admonition than children.

So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government. For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole, women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the constitution, if the virtues of either of them are
supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a
difference: for the children grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state
are women.

Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak at another time.
Regarding, then, our present inquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning. And,
first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state.

Book Two

V

Again, if Socrates makes the women common, and retains private property, the
men will see to the fields, but who will see to the house? And who will do so
if the agricultural class have both their property and their wives in common?
Once more: it is absurd to argue, from the analogy of the animals, that men
and women should follow the same pursuits, for animals have not to manage a
household.

Book Three

IV

Again, the state, as composed of unlikes, may be compared to the living being:
as the first elements into which a living being is resolved are soul and body,
as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite, the family of husband
and wife, property of master and slave, so of all these, as well as other
dissimilar elements, the state is composed; and, therefore, the virtue of all
the citizens cannot possibly be the same, any more than the excellence of the
leader of a chorus is the same as that of the performer who stands by his
side. I have said enough to show why the two kinds of virtue cannot be
absolutely and always the same.

VI

There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of authority; they
have been often defined already in discussions outside the school. The rule of
a master, although the slave by nature and the master by nature have in
reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to
the interest of the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if
the slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him. On the other hand,
the government of a wife and children and of a household, which we have called
household management, is exercised in the first instance for the good of the
governed or for the common good of both parties, but essentially for the good
of the governed, as we see to be the case in medicine, gymnastic, and the arts
in general, which are only accidentally concerned with the good of the artists
themselves.

IX

But a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only: if life
only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they
cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice.

Book V

XI

Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of democracy are all
found in tyrannies. Such are the power given to women in their families in the
hope that they will inform against their husbands, and the license which is
allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters; for slaves and
women do not conspire against tyrants; and they are of course friendly to
tyannies and also to democracies, since under them they have a good time. For
the people too would fain be a monarch, and therefore by them, as well as by
the tyrant, the flatterer is held in honor; in democracies he is the
demagogue; and the tyrant also has those who associate with him in a humble
spirit, which is a work of flattery.

Book VII

III

But it is an error to suppose that every sort of rule is despotic like that of a master
over slaves, for there is as great a difference between the rule over freemen
and the rule over slaves as there is between slavery by nature and freedom by
nature, about which I have said enough at the commencement of this treatise.
For the actions of a ruler cannot really be honorable, unless he is as much superior to other men as a husband is to a wife, or a father to his children, or a master to his slaves. And therefore he who violates the law can never recover by any success, however great, what he has already lost in departing from virtue. For equals the honorable and the just consist in sharing alike, as is just and equal. But that the unequal should be given to equals, and the unlike to those who are like, is contrary to nature, and nothing which is contrary to nature is good. If, therefore, there is any one superior in virtue and in the power of performing the best actions, him we ought to follow and obey, but he must have the capacity for action as well as virtue.

VII

Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is the best-governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world.
References


