Deleveraging Via Asset Sales: 
Agency Costs, Taxes, and Government Policies

Johann Reindl

BI Norwegian Business School

December 2013

Abstract

Do equityholders of a financially distressed firm have an incentive to buy back debt to achieve a more sustainable leverage ratio and avoid costly bankruptcy? I develop a dynamic structural model incorporating a dynamic game to determine conditions under which a firm would voluntarily do so. It allows me to assess the impact of debt-overhang and asset substitution on the restructuring decision and the holdout problem. I find that as long as the total firm value increases through the debt repurchase, equityholders benefit from it, as well. In a dynamic setting, the debt overhang problem takes the form of too early restructuring. Taxes on cancellation of debt income and government subsidies to debtholders can destroy equityholders’ incentives; so does low liquidity in the market for the firm’s assets; an asset purchase program fosters them. Finally, via threatening not to tender, debtholders can appropriate a large share of the firm’s restructuring gains. However, they cannot stop equityholders from gambling for resurrection, which in turn gives equityholders bargaining power to prevent debtholders from holding out.

JEL classification: G21, G28, G32, G33, G38, H81

---

1johann.reindl@bi.no. I would like to thank Engelbert Dockner, Dirk Hackbarth, Gyoengyi Lóránth, Neal Stoughton, Youchang Wu, and Josef Zechner for helpful discussions and comments.
1 Introduction

With the recent financial crisis, the question of how costly bankruptcy can be avoided, has gained a lot in importance. Any debate on regulatory measures requires first an answer to the question whether firms would voluntarily buy back debt in bad economic times to establish a more sustainable leverage ratio and avoid costly bankruptcy. A large part of the discussion on regulatory measures seems to build on the presumption that debt overhang prevents any proactive leverage management by firms altogether. Given that debt repurchases have already been a quite common phenomenon before the crisis, be it in the form of open market repurchases or tender offers, this conclusion is premature. For instance, Mann & Powers (2007) report that between 1997 and 2003 bonds with a total face value of at least 153 billion dollars were tendered. In 2004, the amount of debt repurchased even exceeded 60 billion dollars (Julio, 2007).

Indeed, equity-financed debt buy backs most likely fail to increase the value of equity (see Gertner & Scharfstein, 1991; Leland, 1994; Admati et al., 2012). Restructuring will generally increase the total firm value but it is the debtholders that profit from the repurchase in the form of cash for the part of their debt bought back and a lower likelihood of default for the remainder, while equityholders see their initial holdings diluted or cash injections handed over to debtholders

This paper argues that if debt repurchases are financed by asset sales, equityholders can benefit from the restructuring as well. Moreover, whenever debt buybacks financed by asset sales increase the firm value, equityholders will have an incentive to restructure, i.e., they will never forego a restructuring option that is valuable to debtholders. Nevertheless, the debt overhang problem still exists. In a dynamic setting it takes the form of too early restructuring, which is the mirror image of the underinvestment problem first noted by Myers (1977).

The model provides a dynamic framework to analyze under which conditions firms have an incentive to delever after being hit by a series of negative economic shocks. I take into account different agency conflicts arising between equity and debtholders. First, debt overhang induces equityholders to make divesture decisions that do not maximize the firm value. Considering the debt overhang problem in isolation, equityholders sell assets and repurchase debt too early compared to what would maximize total firm value. Second, equityholders’ limited liability provides an incentive to increase the risk of the firm in bad economic times and gamble for resurrection

---

2 If renegotiation between equityholders and debtholders is possible, debtholders could cede part of their gain to equityholders in order to incentivize them to carry out firm value increasing restructuring, which is an application of the Coase Theorem (see Haugen & Senbet, 1978). Yet for the Coase Theorem to hold debtholders not only must be able to make such side payments to equityholders but also they must not free-ride on each other. Both requirements are more likely to be met in the case of bank debt than diffusely held public debt.

3 Kruse et al. (2009) find that debt tender offers financed by asset sales generate positive announcement returns while equity financed offers do not increase the value of equity.
The asset substitution problem turns out to have the opposite effect on the timing of restructuring and, even more surprising, has the potential to overcome the holdout problem present if debtholders have the possibility to coordinate. The theoretical model allows assessing whether different policy measures foster firms’ incentives to reestablish a more sustainable leverage ratio or whether they replace equityholders’ incentives with taxpayers’ money. It also provides conditions for when liquidity issues in the market for the firm’s capital goods (fire sales) are likely to prevent voluntary restructuring.

In the model, the capital structure can be dynamically adjusted downward. The firm can sell parts of its productive assets and use the divestiture proceeds to finance a bond buy back; covenants ban the distribution of the proceeds as a special dividend to equityholders. The firm’s management, which works in the interest of current equityholders, will endogenously determine when to restructure, default, and at which risk to operate the productive assets. I will look at both methods to buy back debt: tender offers and open market repurchases. When equityholders announce a tender offer, debtholders decide on whether to tender or hold out. Knowing that the firm will be less risky after restructuring, every debtholder has an incentive to free-ride on the other debtholders tendering their bonds. In equilibrium, the tender-offer price must induce all debtholders to tender. When equityholders repurchase debt on the open market, bond prices will reflect debtholders’ rational expectations on the secondary market. The interaction between equityholders and debtholders takes place at issuance, restructuring, and default and gives rise to a non-zero-sum stochastic game in continuous time with optimal stopping and instantaneous volatility control. As in Hennessy & Tserlukevich (2008), the solution concept is Markov Perfect Equilibrium.

A particular contribution of the paper is the derivation of the bargaining power of equityholders and debtholders. In contrast to most existing papers on debt renegotiation such as Mella-Barral & Perraudin (1997), Christensen et al. (2002), or Hack Barth et al. (2007), who assume Nash bargaining, the bargaining power of the agents is endogenously derived. Debtholders’ bargaining power stems from their ability to hold out and not tender their bonds, thus free-riding on the other debtholders. If the equityholders want the restructuring to go through their offer has to outweigh the benefits from free-riding, thus solving the hold-out problem among debtholders. Debtholders can tremendously increase their bargaining power if they manage to coordinate and form a coalition. Costs of contracting and dispersion of bond holdings determine the ease with which a coalition can be formed. Equityholders, on the other hand, derive bargaining power from their ability to time the restructuring together with the fact that the inefficiency in the form of bankruptcy costs is ex post born by the debtholders. Equityholders’ bargaining power receives a boost if they have control over the riskiness of the firm. Interestingly, the ability to shift the riskiness of the firm annihilates debtholders’ bargaining power derived from collectively holding out but it does not resolve

---

4 A vulture fund achieves a similar concentration of bargaining power by buying up distressed bonds.
the free-riding problem and thus debtholders are able to preserve some gains from restructuring.

First, I will confine the analysis to a situation in which debt buybacks are not affected by asset substitution or debtholders collectively holding out. When deciding on whether to sell assets and repurchase debt or not, equityholders trade off the future cashflows foregone because of the capacity reduction against the interest payment decrease and later default both due to the reduction in the notional amount of debt outstanding. If the divesture can be sold at the price of an all equity-financed firm and no taxes are due on the cancellation of debt income, equityholders will always repurchase debt. The reason is that with nonzero bankruptcy costs, the fraction of debt to be repurchased always exceeds the fraction of capacity sacrificed to finance the repurchase. This improves the debt service ratio (cashflow to coupon payments) and makes restructuring profitable for equityholders. Debtholders’ gain would be maximized if the buyback took place just prior to default because this allows to reduce the coupon and, as a consequence, defer bankruptcy the most. However, equityholders have an incentive to restructure earlier. For them, repurchasing debt by selling assets is like saving fixed costs which they would like to reduce well in advance before default, even if repurchasing debt earlier means that the coupon reduction is lower.

The benchmark calibration shows that the lion’s share of the gains from restructuring goes to debtholders. However, as the equity value is low when the firm considers restructuring, the percentage gain to equityholders is large.

The tax payable on cancellation of debt income can have a large impact on equityholders’ incentive to repurchase debt. Firms that would gain little from restructuring may find taxes prohibitively high. Lowering those taxes can be a relatively cheap way for the government to avoid the deadweight losses of bankruptcy. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 did exactly that and, as predicted by the model, has led to a large increase in the amount of debt repurchased (see Levy & Shalev, 2011).

Government subsidies, on the other hand, are an inefficient way to avoid bankruptcy costs. They destroy equityholders’ incentives to reduce those welfare losses. In net, government subsidies are costlier than private intervention in this setting.

In order for asset sales to be profitable, the assets sold must be worth more to a potential buyer than in the hands of the debtholders after default has occurred, i.e., a potential liquidity discount in the market for capital goods has to be smaller than the bankruptcy costs. The model also shows that fire sales can prevent restructuring if the firms in an industry are very much alike and their assets are not easily redeployable elsewhere. In such a situation, where the lack of liquidity destroys the firms’ incentives to deleverage, an asset repurchase program would be an effective government intervention. However, when firms differ in their leverage or their exposure to the industry-wide shock, voluntary deleveraging financed by asset sales is likely to take place.
Open market repurchases are very similar to tender offers. Debtholders rationally anticipate that equityholders will buy back debt. At the time of restructuring, debtholders get paid the prevailing market price for a fraction of their holdings. The remaining fraction becomes a claim against the restructured firm. No arbitrage requires that the joint value of both fractions is equal to the market value itself. This can only be the case if the debt value per unit of principal is the same just before and after restructuring, which is the same condition that makes debtholders submit their bonds in a tender offer. The only difference is the size of the tax payment. While under the tender offer the whole issue is retired, open market repurchases retire only a fraction of the outstanding principal and, therefore, have a lower taxable income from the cancellation of indebtedness. Thus, in a setting excluding informational asymmetries or market microstructure issues in the bond market, open market repurchases are the preferred method to buy back debt, as long as the issuer does not require the bondholders’ consent to alter material terms of the indenture.

Risk shifting has two opposing effects. First, it decreases the debt reduction potential. The perspective to become a less risky firm if the economic situation improves, provides incentives for debtholders to embrace a coupon reduction when the distance to default shrinks. This offsets the bond price fall when default becomes more likely. As a consequence, letting the firm get closer to default does not accomplish such a large coupon reduction concession as in the case of no risk shifting. Second, higher risk, in general, induces equityholders to hang on to the firm for longer because of the convex nature of their claim. It also induces them to hold on longer to the larger production capacity and restructure later. This patience is rewarded by a larger leverage decrease as more debt can be repurchased leading to a larger reduction in coupon payments. Although the firm’s maximal debt reduction potential is lower if the firm can shift its risk, the management will buy back larger amounts of debt because it restructures later.

The limit results are unaffected by the risk shifting problem. Without frictions, firms will always restructure. Without taxes, the same lower bounds for liquidity in the market for capital goods apply. However, taxes are more likely to impede debt repurchases than in the no risk shifting case because of the lower debt reduction potential.

If debtholders find a way to coordinate, they can greatly increase their gains from restructuring by turning down the first restructuring offer and holding out until equityholders are just willing to restructure. If the firm cannot shift its risk, then debtholders will always benefit from a holdout. As those gains are large, equityholders have to offer large sums to make them accept the repurchase offer earlier. Since equityholders’ gains in absolute terms are small they will never afford to pay debtholders their reservation values unless coordination among them is very costly and decreases this value. However, if firms can shift risk, debtholders prefer to restructure earlier than later and will accept the first offer.
1.1 Literature Overview

One of the earlier papers dealing with debt restructuring is Gertner & Scharfstein (1991). They find that equityholders profit from debt tender offers financed by senior debt or cash. Mao & Tserlukevich (2012) look at cash-financed debt repurchases and how they are influenced by taxes and bankruptcy costs. In their model, debtholders do not anticipate the repurchase but, once the firm buys its bonds on the market, they understand that they are better off selling. The authors also look at the underinvestment problem and find that a firm should rather use its cash to carry out the investment than to repurchase debt. Julio (2007) looks at the underinvestment problem in particular and finds that repurchasing debt prior to investment can attenuate the problem and also provides empirical evidence for it. Admati et al. (2012) are also interested in whether equityholders have an incentive to restructure and avoid costly bankruptcy. Using a one period model, they find that if the firm’s assets traded at the post-restructuring firm value, equityholders would neither expand nor shrink the balance sheet. This result is similar to my finding in section 2.3. However, the dynamic setting of my model reveals that the debt-overhang problem is not only limited to whether a firm would buy back debt at all but also affects the timing of the restructuring, which, in turn, is influenced by the nature of agency costs involved.

The paper is also related to the debt-renegotiation literature. In Mella-Barral & Perraudin (1997), equityholders renegotiate the debt contract ex-post. By threatening to default, they can make debtholders agree to a reduction of coupon payments. Bankruptcy costs are saved entirely but equityholders’ ability to engage in ex-post hold-up reduces debt capacity ex-ante. A similar result is derived in Hart & Moore (1994), where the equityholders’ threat to withdraw value-increasing personal skills takes over the role of bankruptcy costs. Renegotiation with all debtholders is very likely to be unfeasible with a large number of dispersed bondholders but might be possible with a single or few lenders, such as a bank (see Hackbarth et al., 2007, for a model incorporating both negotiable bank loans and non-negotiable public debt).

While in the previously mentioned models debtholders make concessions in the form of coupon reductions, the model in Christensen et al. (2002) analyzes private workouts that comprise both principal and coupon reductions. Instead of letting the firm go into default, the existing debt is retired and the firm is recapitalized. The firm value increases because bankruptcy costs are saved and the optimal leverage ratio is reestablished. By letting equityholders take a share in the recapitalized firm, debtholders induce equityholders to agree to the workout. Again, this type of restructuring would require debt to be concentrated. My model, on the other hand, captures restructuring when direct renegotiation between a firm and its debtholders is not feasible.

---

5 A series of papers investigate buy backs of sovereign debt via open market repurchases (e.g. Bulow et al., 1988; Froot, 1989; Bulow & Rogoff, 1991)
Bhanot & Mello (2006) consider debt restructurings that are ex-ante specified in bond covenants. They analyze whether debt contracts that prescribe a pre-determined payment to debtholders in case of a downgrade can mitigate the asset-substitution problem. In their model, the firm commits ex-ante to either inject equity or sell assets in order to retire debt via paying back part of the principal, while my model considers ex-post restructuring at market prices.
2 The Model

A firm operating with capacity \( K \) generates an operating-income flow of size \( Q(K)X_t \), with \( X_t \) being a stochastic state variable following a geometric Brownian motion\(^6\):

\[
dX_t = \mu^P X_t dt + \sigma X_t dW_t^P
\]

\( W_t^P \) is a systematic risk factor that commands a market price of risk \( \lambda \) which is assumed to be constant\(^7\). Under the pricing measure \( Q \), the risk-neutral drift of the stochastic demand factor changes to \( \mu = \mu^P - \lambda \sigma \) and its \( Q \)-dynamics are given by

\[
dX_t = \mu X_t dt + \sigma X_t dW_t
\]

where \( W_t \) is a Brownian motion under the pricing measure \( Q \). One can think of the firm either as a monopolist, then \( Q(K)X_t \) would be equal to the inverse demand function times the quantity produced by the firm with capacity \( K \). In this case, \( X_t \) represents a stochastic demand shock. Or, the firm can be interpreted as a price taker in a competitive market. Then, \( Q(K) \) would represent the production function and \( X_t \) the exogenous price of the firm’s output.

The firm starts out with an existing capacity \( K^L \) which generates operating income of size \( Q(K^L)X_t \). For simplicity, I assume that there are no marginal costs of production, which makes the firm produce at full capacity. As a consequence, the production function for a given capacity is constant \((Q(K) = Q)\).

Similar to Carlson et al. (2004), I assume that the firm can switch to different sizes of capacity. In particular, the firm has an option to sell part of its production facilities and downsize its capacity\(^8\) from the larger capital stock \( K^L \) to the smaller \( K^S < K^L \). As the firm produces at full capacity, this means that the divesture decreases its operating income from \( Q^L X_t \) to smaller \( Q^S X_t \). Covenants ban the distribution of asset sales proceeds to equityholders but the money can be used to buy back debt and, thereby, reduce coupon payments, of which the fixed-cost character drags down the firm in times of low cash-flows. I employ a similar functional form for the value of the divesture as Lambrecht & Myers (2008) and assume that it depends on the size of the capacity reduction \((Q^L - Q^S)\), which is fixed, the current economic situation, \( X_t \), and fixed costs \( \phi_0 < 0 \). A parameter \( \phi_1 \geq 0 \) is used to capture liquidity effects in the market for for capital goods. I allow \( \phi_1 > 1 \) which

---

\(^6\)In section 3 I will relax the assumption of a constant volatility and give the management control over the risk level at which it operates the production facilities.

\(^7\)A constant market price of risk would be supported, for example, by a CIR economy populated by agents with log utility (cf. Cox et al., 1985).

\(^8\)A richer model would give the firm free choice over the size of the divesture. Dixit & Pindyck (1998) show that if a firm could increase its capacity in an unlimited way but with decreasing returns to scale then it behaves as if it only considered the next marginal expansion option.
could happen, e.g., if a completely equity-financed firm buys the capital goods and levers them up optimally increasing the value of the firm above the present value of the cashflow stream because of the interest tax shield. The price realized will then depend on the bargaining power of the seller and the buyer. Equation

\[ P^K(X_t) = \frac{(1 - T_C)\left(Q^L - Q^S\right)}{r - \mu} X_t \phi_1 + \phi_0 \]  

(3)

The firm’s existing capital structure consists of a single consol bond with coupon \(C_L\). Corporate income is taxed at rate \(T_C\), which yields an after tax income of \((1 - T_C)(Q^L X_t - C^L)\). In the absence of stipulations in bond covenants, bankruptcy is declared by equityholders who default upon coupon payments, invoke limited liability, and hand over the firm as a going concern to debtholders. A fraction \(\alpha\) of the firm value at bankruptcy is lost due to direct and indirect costs associated with the bankruptcy procedure itself but also with opportunity costs incurred when being financially distressed.

### 2.1 Tender Offers

I focus on debt repurchases via tender offers and provide a discussion of open market repurchases at the end of this section. I model a tender offer in its most common form: If a firm buys back debt it retires the whole issue\(^9\) and offers to pay a fixed, non-negotiable tender offer consideration to all debtholders tendering their bonds.

Debt holdings are assumed to be dispersed and debtholders are treated as atomistic. In a later section, I treat the case of concentrated debt holdings and analyze the effect of debtholders coordinating. For the moment, equityholders cannot affect the riskiness of the firm. After having derived the main results, I will relax this assumption and show how the bargaining power shifts due to the equityholders’ ability to engage in asset substitution.

To finance the debt buyback, equityholders make use of the option to sell part of the firm’s production facilities and use the proceeds to reduce leverage. Since they do not care about the total firm value but only about the equity value, they will only do this if deleveraging improves their situation as well. As outlined in the Gertner & Scharfstein (1991); Leland (1994); Admati et al. (2012), it is not optimal for equityholders to use their own funds for the leverage reduction. Therefore, they should not have to inject any additional money into the firm for restructuring. All costs associated with the restructuring will be paid from the proceeds of the asset sale. Such costs reduce the amount of money available for buying back debt. As the asset sale will not suffice to cover the costs of the tender offer, which consist of the tender offer price and the taxes due on the cancellation of

\(^9\)Mann & Powers (2007) find that the median size of the fraction of the issue retired is 94.6%.
indebtedness income, the firm has to issue new debt, denoted by \( d(X_R, C^S) \). \( X_R \) is an arbitrary restructuring threshold, for the moment. Let \( D^T(X_R) \) be the price offered to debtholders if restructuring takes place at \( X_R \). Then the restructuring condition, which ensures that equityholders don’t have to contribute to the restructuring, is given by

\[
p^K(X_R) + d(X_R, C^S) = D^T(X_R) + T_{COD} \left( D(X_0, CL) - D^T(X_R) \right)
\]  

(4)

The tax rate applying to cancellation of debt income (CODI) is denoted by \( T_{COD} \) and applies to the repayment value forgiven \( D(X_0, CL) - D^T(X_R) \). The principal is given by \( D(X_0, CL) \), which is the debt value at the issuance date if debt is issued at par\(^{10}\). Usually, the tax rate on CODI is the same as on corporate income. At the moment, however, the US government has allowed to defer the COD tax payments for up to 11 years. To allow for an active government tax policy, I treat \( T_{COD} \) as a distinct parameter, not necessarily equal to the corporate tax rate \( T_C \). The tax on CODI reduces the gain that can be made from the debt repurchase and might even make it unprofitable, as I will show in section 2.3.

Equityholders face an optimal stopping problem. The time point when equityholders optimally submit the tender offer will be given by the state variable \( X_t \) reaching an optimal threshold. This restructuring threshold will be denoted by \( X_R \). Debtholders will anticipate that the equityholders are going to buy back debt at a certain time and will adjust their valuation of debt accordingly. In equilibrium, the equityholders’ strategy will take this into account. Let \( E(\cdot), D(\cdot) \) denote the equity and debt value of the firm before restructuring and \( e(\cdot), d(\cdot) \) their value after restructuring.

I define an equilibrium with tender offers in the following way:

**Definition** An equilibrium with tender offers is defined as the vector of strategies \((X_R, X_D)\), a vector of prices \( E(\cdot), D(\cdot), e(\cdot), d(\cdot) \) and a tender offer price \( D^T \) satisfying:

1. \( X_R \) is the optimal restructuring threshold given prices are formed by \( E(\cdot), D(\cdot), e(\cdot), d(\cdot) \).
2. \( X_D \) is the optimal default threshold given the restructuring strategy and prices \( E(\cdot), D(\cdot), e(\cdot), d(\cdot) \).
3. Equityholders set the tender offer price \( D^T \) optimally such that it induces all debtholders to tender.
4. \( E(\cdot), D(\cdot), e(\cdot), d(\cdot) \) are formed rationally, i.e. bond and equityholders rationally anticipate that the firm will restructure at \( X_R \) and default at \( X_D \).

\(^{10}\)The income arising from cancellation of debt (CODI = cancellation of debt income) normally corresponds to the repayment value forgiven. Interest payments do not qualify if they would have been tax deductible. With a consol bond, the firm never has to repay the notional amount and the coupon payments do not qualify since they are deductible. I follow Goldstein et al. (2001) and assume that the notional amount is given by the initial value of debt, which corresponds to the money raised with the issuance.
To solve the model, I first analyze the bargaining problem arising between equityholders and debtholders at the time of restructuring for an arbitrary restructuring threshold. Then I derive the value of debt and equity and compute the optimal restructuring threshold taking the solution to the bargaining problem into account.

The value of the tender offer price, $D^T(X_R)$, is determined by the solution to the hold-out problem: Every debtholder has an incentive to individually hold out and not tender his bonds in order to free-ride on all the other debtholders, since the firm will be safer and the debt value will increase after restructuring. Thus, the tender offer price, $D^T(X_R)$, must be such that it induces all debtholders to tender. Suppose a debtholder holds a fraction $\epsilon$ of the existing debt. This entitles her to a coupon payment of $\epsilon C^L$ as long as the firm has not restructured. If she does not tender her bond, the new outstanding coupon will be $\epsilon C^L + C^S$ and $d(X_R, \epsilon C^L + C^S)$ will be the new total debt value. Her position will be worth $\frac{\epsilon C^L}{\epsilon C^L + C^S} d(X_R, \epsilon C^L + C^S)$. She will agree to the tender if

$$\epsilon D^T \geq \frac{\epsilon C^L}{\epsilon C^L + C^S} d(X_R, \epsilon C^L + C^S)$$

To see whether the marginal investor agrees I let $\epsilon$ go to zero:

$$D^T \geq \lim_{\epsilon \downarrow 0} \frac{C^L}{\epsilon C^L + C^S} d(X_R, \epsilon C^L + C^S)$$

$$D^T \geq \frac{C^L}{C^S} d(X_R, C^S)$$  \(5\)

If condition (5) holds, then every individual debtholder has the incentive to tender his position. The condition has a very straightforward interpretation. It requires that every bondholder must be offered a price as high as the value his position would have if he held out and did not tender. $\frac{d(X_R, C^S)}{C^S}$ is the price of the new debt per unit of coupon. The tender offer price per unit of coupon has to be at least as large as the price per unit of coupon which debt attains after the repurchase has taken place.

Since equityholders would lose if they offered more than $\frac{C^L}{C^S} d(X_R, C^S)$, this condition will hold with equality in equilibrium. Thus, the tender offer price will be given by

$$D^T(X_R) = \frac{C^L}{C^S} d(X_R, C^S)$$  \(6\)

It also is individually rational for every single bondholder to tender given that no one has tendered yet, if the firm offered $D^T$ to him, because the alternative, not to tender, will be shown to result in a lower debt value $D^0(X_R, C^L) < D^T$, where $D^0(X, C^L)$ denotes the value of a firm with the same assets and capital structure but no restructuring option. In particular, I will show that if the gain of equityholders is positive then the gain of bondholders is also positive, which yields a sufficient condition for the individual rationality constraint to be satisfied.
The restructuring condition becomes

\[ p^K(X_R) + d(X_R, C^S) = \frac{CL}{C^S}d(X_R, C^S) + T_{COD} \left( D(X_0, C^L) - \frac{CL}{C^S}d(X_R, C^S) \right) \]  \hspace{1cm} (7)

This condition yields the coupon of the new debt \( d(X_R, C^S) \) that has to be issued to cover the costs of the tender, which consist of paying the tender offer price and the taxes due on cancellation of indebtedness income.

Next, I will derive the values of debt and equity and solve for the optimal restructuring policy. After the divesture the firm operates at the same capacity \( Q^S \) and with the same capital structure, \( C^S \), until it defaults. The problem is standard (e.g. see Leland, 1994) and its results are summarized in the following proposition

**Proposition 2.1** The equity value of a firm that generates an EBIT of \( Q^S X \) and has a consol bond with coupon \( C^S \) outstanding is equal to

\[ e(X) = (1 - T_C) \left( \frac{Q^S X}{r - \mu} - \frac{C^S}{r} \right) - (1 - T_C) \left( \frac{Q^S X_D}{r - \mu} - \frac{C^S}{r} \right) \left( \frac{X}{X_D} \right)^{-\theta} \]  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Its debt value is given by

\[ d(X) = \frac{C^S}{r} - \left( \frac{C^S}{r} - (1 - \alpha)(1 - T_C)Q^S X_D \right) \left( \frac{X}{X_D} \right)^{-\theta} \]  \hspace{1cm} (9)

where \( \theta \) is given by

\[ \theta = \frac{(r - \mu - \sigma^2)}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{(r - \mu - \sigma^2)^2 + 2r\sigma^2} \]  \hspace{1cm} (10)

The optimal default threshold is given by

\[ X_D = \frac{\theta C^S}{1 + \theta} \frac{r - \mu}{Q^S} \]  \hspace{1cm} (11)

The equity value before restructuring (i.e. as long as \( X \in (X_R, \infty) \)) solves the following Hamilton-Jacoby-Bellman equation:

\[ \frac{\sigma^2}{2} X^2 E_{XX}(X) + \mu X E_X(X) + (1 - T_C)(Q^L X - C^L) = r E(X) \quad \forall X \in [X_R, \infty) \]  \hspace{1cm} (12)

The general solution to this ODE is given by

\[ E(X) = (1 - T_C) \left( \frac{Q^L X}{r - \mu} - \frac{C^L}{r} \right) + AX^{-\theta} \]  \hspace{1cm} (13)
The constant $A$ and the optimal restructuring threshold, which still need to be determined, are found from a value-matching condition that fixes the equity value at the restructuring boundary and from a smooth pasting condition that serves as an optimality condition.

At the time of restructuring, the firm sells part of its assets and reduces its capacity to $Q^S$. The divesture allows it to reduce its coupon to $C^S < C^L$. Absence of arbitrage opportunities requires that the equity-value function is a continuous function at the restructuring boundary, giving rise to a value-matching condition (14). When deciding on the optimal restructuring threshold, the firm trades off the loss from the capacity reduction against the saving of coupon payments which, acting like a fixed cost, drag down the firm in bad economic times. The optimal threshold, $X_R$ is given by the smooth pasting condition (15).

It is important to note that $C^S$ is itself a function of $X_R$ implicitly determined from the restructuring condition (7). When selecting the optimal repurchase threshold, the firm also takes into account the impact of the restructuring time on its future capital structure via the restructuring condition. This explains why the smooth pasting condition also involves the partial derivative of $e(X)$ with respect to the coupon $C^S$.

Thus, the equity value will be given by

$$E(X) = (1 - T_C) \left[ \left( \frac{Q^L X}{r - \mu} - \frac{C^L}{r} \right) - \left( \frac{(Q^L - Q^S)X_R}{r - \mu} - \frac{C^L - C^S}{r} \right) \left( \frac{X}{X_R} \right)^{-\theta} \right]$$

$$- (1 - T_C) \left[ \left( \frac{Q^S X_D}{r - \mu} - \frac{C^S}{r} \right) \left( \frac{X}{X_D} \right)^{-\theta} \right]$$

The first term in equation (16) is the present value of the income after taxes stream to equityholders. The second term is the value of the restructuring option. The firm gives up capacity but can reduce its interest costs which, acting as fixed costs, drags down the firm in bad economic times. The third term is the value of the default option.

In order to find the $C^S$ that can be obtained with the asset sale at $X_R$, I need to derive the debt value of the large firm first. Before restructuring, the debt value solves the following Hamilton-Jacoby-Bellman equation:

$$\frac{\sigma^2}{2} X^2 D_{XX}(X) + \mu XD_X(X) + C^L = rD(X) \quad \forall X \in [X_R, \infty)$$

Debt holders are assumed to be rational. In particular, they understand that if the state variable reaches $X_R$ they will be offered a consideration of $D_T(X_R)$ for their bonds tendered. This gives rise
to the following value-matching condition for debt:

\[
\lim_{X \downarrow X^r} D(X, C^L) = \lim_{X \downarrow X^r} D^T(X) \tag{18}
\]

\[
\lim_{X \downarrow X^r} D(X, C^L) = \lim_{X \downarrow X^r} C^L d(X, C^S(X)) \frac{C^S(X)}{C^S} \tag{19}
\]

where I plugged in the incentive-compatible tender offer price to arrive at the second equation. Equation (18) can be rewritten by plugging in the value of \(D^T\) from equation 7:

\[
D(X_R, C^L, C^S) = d(X_R, C^S) + P^K(X_R) - T_{COD} \left[ D(X_0, C^L, C^S) - D(X_R, C^L, C^S) \right] \tag{20}
\]

At the restructuring point, debtholders receive a payment of size \(P^K(X_R)\) minus the tax payment due plus new debt with coupon \(C^S\) in exchange for their old debt.

From equation (18), the debt value of the firm before restructuring is given by

\[
D(X, C^L, C^S) = \frac{C^L}{r} + \frac{\left( P^K(X_R) - \frac{C^L - C^S}{r} \right) \left( \frac{X}{X^r} \right)^{-\theta} - \left( \frac{C^S}{r} - (1 - \alpha) \frac{(1 - T_C) Q^S X_D}{r - \mu} \right) \left( \frac{X}{X^r} \right)^{-\theta}}{1 - \frac{C^L - C^S}{C^L} T_{COD} \left( 1 - \left( \frac{X^r}{X_D} \right)^{-\theta} \right)} \tag{21}
\]

The first term in the numerator comes from the restructuring option of equityholders. The second term is the value lost in default. The denominator contains the adjustment for the tax payment. If no tax were due, the denominator would equal one.

That this debt value can be transformed into a much simpler expression can be seen from (19).

\[
D(X, C^L, C^S) = \frac{C^L}{r} + \frac{C^L}{C^S} \left( 1 - \alpha \right) \left( 1 - T_C \right) Q^S X_D \frac{C^S}{r} - \left( \frac{X}{X^r} \right)^{-\theta} = \frac{C^L}{C^S} d(X, C^S) \tag{22}
\]

Similar to the equity value, the debt value before restructuring is a function of the coupon payment after restructuring, which is implicitly given by the restructuring condition. The debt value before restructuring is just the scaled-up value of the debt after restructuring. This is not true anymore in the more general model with asset substitution because at any \(X_t\) the large firm could, in general, be run at a different risk than the downsized firm which it is to become.

2.2 Without Frictions, a Firm Would Always Delever

**Proposition 2.2** If restructuring were costless and markets correctly priced the firm’s assets, then deleveraging via asset sales is always strictly preferred by equityholders as long as \(\alpha \in (0, 1]\).

**Proof** See appendix A.1
Proposition 2.3 If restructuring just prior to default does not improve the debt-service ratio, then restructuring is never profitable for equityholders nor for debtholders.

Proof See appendix A.2.

Note that the improvement of the debt-service ratio does not indicate how large the gain to equityholders or debtholders is but just whether restructuring is profitable at all.

The proof of proposition (2.2) reveals why equityholders always have an incentive to repurchase debt under the above-mentioned conditions. As long as bankruptcy costs are larger than zero, the fraction of debt to be repurchased is always larger than the fraction of capacity that has to be sold to finance the repurchase. The proof shows that this is always true, under the mentioned conditions, just before the firm declares bankruptcy. The threat of incurring losses in default depresses the price of debt the more, the closer the firm is to bankruptcy. Thus, the difference between the value of the assets if they are held by the firm and the value if they are sold is largest just prior to default. And proposition 2.3 shows that if restructuring does not improve the equity value just prior to default, it never does. For debtholders’ gain to be positive, the same condition has to hold, which implies that it also applies to the firm as a whole. Debtholders and equityholders agree on restructuring. Equityholders will always make use of a restructuring option that is valuable to debtholders. But they don’t agree on the timing of restructuring, as explained below. The reason for both types of stakeholders to agree to restructure can be seen from the role that the debt-service ratio plays in the proof of proposition 2.3.

The debt-service ratio is the indicator of whether it is profitable to restructure or not. Restructuring is profitable for equityholders, as long as it can improve the debt-service ratio at least at the latest possible restructuring point, namely the default threshold, i.e. $Q^S / C^S (X_D) > Q^L / C^L$. With the increase of the debt-service ratio, equityholders will see their instantaneous dividends $(Q^S X - C^S)$ rise. But the improved ratio will also induce them to default at a later time point $(X_D^0 < X_D)$, which immediately raises the distance to default and the value of debt. This is how debtholders benefit from restructuring. The farther the firm is away from bankruptcy the lower is the impact of expected bankruptcy costs on the debt value. With the decreasing impact of bankruptcy costs shrinks the amount of debt that can be repurchased.

Although the amount of debt that can be repurchased decreases if equityholders restructured earlier, equityholders might prefer a lower debt reduction carried out earlier. A closer look at the gains to equityholders reveals the tradeoff. I define the gain to equityholders as the difference between the equity value after restructuring and the equity value of a hypothetical firm without
Restructuring option \( (E^0(\mathbf{X}_R, \mathbf{C}^L)) \) both evaluated at the restructuring threshold (see equation 23).

\[
G^R_E = e(\mathbf{X}_R, \mathbf{C}^S) - E^0(\mathbf{X}_R, \mathbf{C}^L) \\
= (1 - T_C) \left[ \frac{C^L}{r} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{1 + \theta} \left( \frac{\mathbf{X}_R}{\mathbf{X}^0_D} \right)^{-\theta} \right) - \frac{C^S}{r} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{1 + \theta} \left( \frac{\mathbf{X}_R}{\mathbf{X}^0_D} \right)^{-\theta} \right) \right] \\
- (1 - T_C) \frac{Q^L - Q^S}{r - \mu} \mathbf{X}_R
\] (23)

Equityholders trade off losses from capacity reduction against gains coming from two interlinked sources: fixed costs in the form of coupon payments can be reduced and default postponed because of lower coupon payments. Waiting longer to restructure allows them to reduce debt more since debt is cheaper to repurchase as the present value of bankruptcy costs is higher. But waiting too long reduces the expected value of the future dividends since bankruptcy is more likely if the restructuring threshold \( \mathbf{X}_R \) is closer to the default threshold \( \mathbf{X}_D \). The extreme case \( \mathbf{X}_R = \mathbf{X}_D \) is used in the proof of proposition A.1. When restructuring takes place earlier the distance to default will be larger and so will be the present value of future dividends even though the coupon reduction is smaller. On the other hand, if they restructured too early, they would give up production capacity too early and pay too much for the debt reduction\(^\text{11}\).

Debtholders take the lion’s share of the total gain in the form of lower expected bankruptcy costs (see table 1 for an example). As they have to be compensated for the lower coupon payments in order to be willing to sell their bond holdings (see the equilibrium tender offer consideration derived in equation 6), they will always gain from restructuring, if it takes place. Note that the restructuring condition implies that the loss given default is independent of whether the firm restructures or not. Only the probability of default changes if debt is repurchased. As figure 1 shows, debtholders profit most if restructuring takes place just prior to default. At this point the coupon can be reduced the most and default happens at the latest possible time point.

\[
G^R_D = D(\mathbf{X}_R, \mathbf{C}^L, \mathbf{C}^S) - D^0(\mathbf{X}_R, \mathbf{C}^L) \\
= \frac{C^L}{C^S} d(\mathbf{X}_R, \mathbf{C}^S) - D^0(\mathbf{X}_R, \mathbf{C}^L) \\
= \frac{C^L}{r} \left( (1 - \alpha)(1 - T_C) \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} - 1 \right) \left[ \left( \frac{\mathbf{X}_R}{\mathbf{X}^0_D} \right)^{-\theta} - \left( \frac{\mathbf{X}_R}{\mathbf{X}^0_D} \right)^{-\theta} \right]
\] (24)

Table 1 summarizes the sources of the gain from restructuring and its attribution to the different stakeholders. The gain to equityholders is modest in dollar terms but the equity value is more than twice as high as without restructuring.

\(^\text{11}\)Note that the optimal restructuring threshold does not maximize the gain to equityholders that just illustrates the additional value that is created by the restructuring option. The optimal restructuring threshold solves the timing problem of a firm that always had a restructuring option.
Table 1: Restructuring Gain Analysis using \( r = 0.05, \mu = 0.01, \sigma = 0.3, Q^L = 2, Q^S = 1.5, T_C = 0.3, \alpha = 0.3, T_{COD} = 0.05, \phi = 0.95, \phi_0 = 0, X_0 = 3. \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Equityholders</th>
<th>Debtholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asset Sale</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax shield lost later</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax on CODI</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankruptcy costs saved</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% gain</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>106%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 depicts the coupon after restructuring. The longer equityholders wait the larger can the coupon reduction be as the debt value falls due to increased default risk. The graph in the lower left hand corner shows the gains to equity- and debtholders for different restructuring thresholds \( X_R. \) To debtholders the gain is highest at the default boundary because they receive the larger coupon for a longer time and the present value of bankruptcy costs to be saved is higher. This graph also clearly illustrates the trade-off of equityholders: They lose if they wait too long because the likelihood of default is high but if they restructured too early, they would give up production capacity too early and pay too much for the debt reduction.

2.3 When Do Firms Prefer Default to Downsizing?

Proposition 2.2 provides conditions under which equityholders always have an incentive to repurchase debt via asset sales. Together with proposition 2.3, it also allows to identify conditions under which a firm would rather default. I will analyze three different reasons for why firms might prefer default to restructuring: high taxes on cancellation of debt income (CODI), government subsidies, and liquidity in the market for capital goods.

2.3.1 Prohibitively High Taxes and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

The tax rate applying to cancellation of indebtedness income has a considerable impact on a firm’s willingness to buy back debt. As the example in figure 2 shows, small changes in the tax rate applying to CODI can considerably shift the restructuring threshold. If the tax rate on the CODI is high, the firm may prefer to go bankrupt before repurchasing any debt. In this example, taxes in the amount of 20% would suffice to eliminate any gains from repurchasing debt. At this level, the debt-service ratio cannot be improved any more. A tax rate on CODI as high as the corporate tax rate (30%) would prevent the firm from establishing a more sustainable leverage ratio.
**Figure 1:** Coupon and default threshold before and after restructuring, restructuring gain, and equity values for different restructuring threshold ($X_R$) choices using $r = 0.05$, $\mu = 0.01$, $\sigma = 0.3$, $Q_L = 2$, $Q_S = 1.5$, $\alpha = 0.3$, $T_C = 0.3$, $X_0 = 3$. $C^L = 5.88$ is the optimal coupon for the firm with restructuring option.
In this respect, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which allowed to defer COD tax costs for up to 11 years, served to improve the capital structure of firms by increasing their incentive to sell assets and buy back debt. Levy & Shalev (2011) provide strong empirical evidence that the introduction of tax rebates has led to a sharp increase in tender offers.

**Figure 2:** The impact of tax on COD income. $T_{COD}$ varies from 0 to 0.195. The other parameters are $r = 0.05, \mu = 0.01, \sigma = 0.3, Q^L = 2, Q^S = 1.5, T_C = 0.3, \alpha = 0.3, \phi_1 = 1, X_0 = 3.$

### 2.3.2 Government Subsidies and Crowding Out of Equityholders

Government subsidies granted in case of default have the potential to crowd out equityholders in improving the situation of debtholders and the entire firm. A case in point would be deposit insurance or government guarantees, either implicit or explicit, to intervene in case of default and either take over the firm or indemnify the debtholders for part or the total of their losses. As the government mitigates debtholders’ losses in bankruptcy, debt can become too expensive to buy back, especially if taxes on CODI are high. This destroys any gain that equityholders could make...
and they will never attempt to reduce the debt burden to avoid bankruptcy. The government has replaced equityholders in saving the firm. The government intervention might be welfare decreasing. Suppose the government takes over the total amount of bankruptcy costs, which amount to \( \alpha(1 - T_C) \frac{Q^L X_D^L}{Q^L - \mu} \) if equityholders do not try to save the firm. However, equityholders’ downsizing reduces the deadweight losses in case of bankruptcy to \( \alpha(1 - T_C) \frac{Q^S X_D^S}{Q^S - \mu} \), which at the time when the government subsidy would be paid is worth \( \left( \frac{X_D^L}{X_D^S} \right)^{-\theta} \) dollars. Welfare losses are lower under private intervention. Government intervention should be designed in such a way that equityholders first exhaust all their means before the government steps in. A more efficient form of government subsidies would be to buy the assets the firm wants to sell if the liquidity for these assets is low. This case is analyzed in the next section.

2.3.3 Liquidity in the Market for Capital Goods and Fire Sales

If the market for the firm’s assets is not liquid (small \( \phi_1 \)), the firm can only retire a small fraction of its debt with the assets to be sold (see figure 3, first panel). If liquidity is very low, the restructuring fails to improve the debt-service ratio and the equityholders’ incentives to buy back debt are eliminated. Note that a low value of the assets, caused by a bad economic situation, does not impede restructuring. What matters is the difference between the current owner’s valuation and that of the potential buyer (captured by \( \phi_1 \)). Proposition 2.3 provides a lower bound for market liquidity: \( \phi_1 \) must exceed \( (1 - \alpha) \), given that no other distortions affect the repurchase. As long as the assets are worth more to a new owner than to debtholders in case of default, equityholders will find restructuring profitable.

Although industry equilibrium is not explicitly considered, the model can provide some insights into what happens in case of fire sales. Suppose all firms in the industry are identical and the only source of risk is an industry-wide shock. A negative economic shock would hit all firms simultaneously and all would consider downsizing in order to reduce the burden of debt at the same time. If assets could only be sold to other firms in the industry, then the assets would sell at \( P^K(X_R) = \frac{v(X_R, C^S)}{Q^S} (Q^L - Q^S) \). \( \frac{v(X_R, C^S)}{Q^S} \) can be interpreted as the price per unit of installed capital after restructuring has taken place. This price contains the tax shield and bankruptcy costs of a firm operating with capital of size \( Q^S \) and capital structure \( C^S \). At this price, every firm is indifferent between selling the asset and keeping it. Plugging this price into the restructuring condition reveals that restructuring does not improve the debt-service ratio and equityholders do not have an incentive to repurchase debt in the first place because it is expensive compared to the value of the assets (see proposition 2.3). As a consequence, debt reductions do not take place. A similar result was derived in Admati et al. (2012). They show that equityholders will not repurchase debt if the assets are sold at a price equaling the value which the remaining assets of the firm attain after
Figure 3: Comparative Statics: Asset market liquidity varies from 0.7 to 1. The other parameters are $r = 0.5, \mu = 0.01, \sigma = 0.3, \lambda = 1.5, Q^L = 2, Q^S = 1.5, \alpha = 0.3, T_C = 0.3, X_0 = 5.$
the debt restructuring.

However, if firms in the industry are not homogeneous and some firms have suffered less from the economic shock, firms will have different leverage ratios and attach a different value to capital. Firms in greater financial distress could sell their assets to healthier firms which value them more. The price of the capital goods is most likely to exceed \( P_K(X_R, Q^L - Q^S) = v(X_R, Q^L - Q^S) \) and restructuring can take place. In addition, demand from firms in other industries might boost the prices of capital goods, as well. Its impact depends on the redeployability of capital goods in these industries.

### 2.4 Similarities Between Tender Offers and Open Market Repurchases

Instead of making a publicly announced tender offer, the firm can simply buy back its own debt at the prevailing market prices. Since the buyback is entirely financed by the asset sale, its revenues will determine how much of the bond can be retired, again taking into account the taxes which fall due on the cancellation of debt income.

\[
P^K(X_R, Q^L - Q^S) = \frac{C^L - C^S}{C^L} D(X_R, C^L) + T_C \left[ D(X_R, C^L) - D(X_R, C^L) \right]
\]

\( \frac{C^L - C^S}{C^L} \) is the percentage of debt the firm can repurchase. Note that the value of the outstanding debt depends on \( C^S \) as well as \( P(X_R, Q^L - Q^S) \) because debtholders will rationally anticipate the repurchase. If the state variable hits the restructuring boundary, they expect equityholders to buy back a certain fraction of the outstanding debt and realize that after the repurchase they will hold a claim against a firm with lower capacity \( Q^S \) and coupon \( C^S \). Thus, the value-matching condition for debt becomes:

\[
\lim_{X \downarrow X_R} D(X, C^L) = \lim_{X \downarrow X_R} \frac{C^L - C^S}{C^L} D(X, C^L) + d(X, C^S)
\]

\[
\lim_{X \downarrow X_R} D(X_R, C^L) = \lim_{X \downarrow X_R} \frac{C^L}{C^S} d(X, C^S)
\]

This value matching condition resembles the value matching condition in the case of a tender offer (equation 19) which indicates that open market repurchases are very similar to tender offers. The similarity is caused by the fact that debtholders rationally anticipate that equityholders will buy back debt. At the time of restructuring, debtholders get paid the prevailing market price for a fraction of their holdings (first term in equation 26). The remaining fraction now becomes a claim against the restructured firm (second term in equation 26). No arbitrage requires that the joint value of both fractions is equal to the market value itself. This can only be the case if the debt value per unit of principal is the same just before and after restructuring, which is the same
condition that makes debtholders submit their bonds in a tender offer. The only difference is the size of the tax payment for CODI. As the firm retires only a fraction of its debt and not the entire issue, the tax payment is smaller in the case of open-market repurchases and a larger amount of debt can be repurchased. This makes open-market repurchases the preferred way of buying back debt if no consent solicitation statement requesting to change material terms of the bond contract is necessary.

3 Asset Substitution and Deleveraging

In the following section, I will relax the assumption that the risk of the firm stays constant. The setup is based on Hennessy & Tserlukevich (2008). The managers of the firm can control the riskiness of how the assets in place are operated. In particular, they can choose an $F_t$-adapted volatility policy

$$
\sigma_t \in \Sigma \equiv [\underline{\sigma}, \bar{\sigma}], \quad \text{where } 0 < \sigma < \bar{\sigma} < \infty
$$

(28)

Increasing the riskiness comes at a cost, which I assume to reduce the drift of the cashflows produced by the assets in place. One can think of the cost as expenses necessary for establishing and upholding the riskier use of the assets. In particular, I assume that the instantaneous costs are proportional to the increase in variance and amount to $\rho(\sigma_t^2 - \sigma^2)$ with $\rho \geq 0$. Risk shifting does not only redistribute the value of the firm from debtholders to equityholders, as in the classical asset substitution problem, but has also valuation consequences for the entire firm value itself, since the risk-shifting costs decrease the unlevered asset value if $\rho > 0$. It shrinks the size of the pie to be distributed to the firm’s stakeholders. As equityholders can change the size of their slice they might go for a bigger slice from a smaller pie.

If the firm sells parts of its assets, the price that can be obtained in the market will depend on the risk level at which the assets are operated by the potential new owners. If the new owner of the capital goods is an all-equity financed firm, then the assets will be operated as safely as possible. If the assets are brought into a firm that is levered up optimally after the acquisition, then the price of the assets will depend on the risk strategy of the newly levered firm as well as on the gains to be made from the leverage choice, similar to Fischer et al. (1989), and on the bargaining power between seller and buyer. The buyer, who has the option to optimally adjust his firm’s leverage after the acquisition, will operate the assets at a lower risk than the seller, who has sold the assets out of financial distress. For simplicity, I assume that the assets are sold at their unlevered value, which leaves the specification of the asset sale price (3) unchanged. Similarly, if debtholders take over the firm in bankruptcy, they will also hold an all-equity financed firm which is run with minimal risk.

22
Higher equilibrium returns as risk-shifting costs - a short digression.

Let $\mu^P$ be the $P$-drift of the cashflow process. The $Q$-drift is given by $\mu = \mu^P - \lambda \sigma$ where $\lambda = \frac{\mu^P - r}{\sigma^2}$ is the market price of risk applicable to the firm’s (single) risk factor. $\mu^P_M$ is the equilibrium instantaneous expected return ($P$-drift) for this factor. If the firm increases the riskiness of its business, say from $\sigma_1$ to $\sigma_2 > \sigma_1$, the exposure vis-a-vis the risk factor increases. As a consequence the $Q$-drift has to change. I assume here that the firm is small enough to not affect the financial market equilibrium.

$$\mu_1 = \mu^P - \lambda \sigma_1 = r - (r + \lambda \sigma_1 - \mu^P) = r - \delta_1$$

$$\mu_2 = \mu^P - \lambda \sigma_2 = r - (r + \lambda \sigma_2 - \mu^P) = r - \delta_2$$

Note that $\mu^P = r + \lambda \sigma_i$ is the required expected return of a traded asset with risk exposure $\sigma_i$. As $\sigma_2 > \sigma_1$, $\mu_1 > \mu_2$, i.e. the $Q$-drift of the riskier technology decreases by $\lambda(\sigma_2 - \sigma_1)$. This can be interpreted as a punishment by the capital market for running a riskier business, which has valuation consequences in the form of a higher required expected return ($\mu_2 > \mu_1$). The cost equals the volatility increase (which corresponds to the increase in exposure towards the risk factor) times the market price of risk of the factor. However, my assumption about the cost differs somewhat because it is is proportional to the increase in variance.

### 3.1 Valuation and Optimal Deleveraging in the Presence of Risk Shifting

In order to solve the model with a risk shifting option, I will, as in section 2.1, employ backward induction and first solve the problem of a firm having exercised its restructuring option. Using this result, I will then solve the tender-offer game and derive the optimal restructuring, default, and risk-shifting policies of the firm.

#### 3.1.1 The firm without a divestiture option

After having sold the asset and reduced debt the firm operates at the same capacity $Q^S$ and with the same capital structure, $C^S$, until it defaults. The firm has the possibility to adjust the cashflow risk to different levels, i.e. $\sigma_i \in \Sigma = [\sigma^L, \sigma^U]$. As long as the firm has not defaulted ($X \in (X_D, \infty)$), equity fulfills the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:

$$re(X) = \max_{\sigma \in \Sigma}((1 - T_C)(Q^S X - C^S) + (\mu - \rho(\sigma^2 - \sigma^2))Xe_X(X) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}X^2 e_{XX}(X)) \quad (30)$$
The optimal volatility policy of the firm is a bang-bang solution:

\[
\sigma^*(X) = \begin{cases} 
\sigma^2 & \text{if } \frac{e_{XX}(X)X}{e_X(X)} \geq 2\rho \\
\sigma^2 & \text{if } \frac{e_{XX}(X)X}{e_X(X)} < 2\rho 
\end{cases}
\]  

(31)

One can interpret the ratio \(xe_{XX}(X)/e_X(X)\) as the firm’s risk appetite. If it exceeds twice the marginal cost of increasing volatility, the firm will be run with the highest possible risk; if it is lower than this threshold, then the managers will prefer the low-risk strategy.

For the optimal value function \(e(X)\) to be smooth enough, the following conditions have to be fulfilled at the threshold where the firm changes its riskiness, denoted by \(X^S_S\):

\[
\lim_{X \uparrow X^S_S} e(X) = \lim_{X \downarrow X^S_S} e(X) \\
\lim_{X \uparrow X^S_S} e_X(X) = \lim_{X \downarrow X^S_S} e_X(X)
\]

For the transitional boundary \(X^S_S\), the smooth pasting condition above is not an optimality condition. Hennessy & Tserlukevich (2008) show that the optimality condition for \(X^S_S\) can be expressed as a super contact condition.

\[
\lim_{X \uparrow X^S_S} e_{XX}(X) = \lim_{X \downarrow X^S_S} e_{XX}(X)
\]  

(32)

Having established \(e(X)\) in the continuation region, the optimal default boundary \(X_D\) has to be determined. As in the standard cases, the optimal default threshold will be determined by a smooth pasting condition. In addition, to ensure that \(e(X)\) is continuous at \(X_D\), it must also satisfy a value matching condition, given by equity’s limited liability. Thus the remaining conditions are given by

\[
\lim_{X \downarrow X_D} e(X) = 0 \\
\lim_{X \downarrow X_D} e_X(X) = 0
\]

The following two propositions will describe the risk-taking behavior of a firm with no restructuring option. The first condition states that the firm will always gamble for resurrection if its situation worsens, which is very intuitive given the option-like nature of the firm.

**Proposition 3.1** The firm will always be run at maximal risk close to the optimal default threshold.

**Proof** See Hennessy & Tserlukevich (2008, p390).
The second proposition states that the firm will also operate at low risk if risk shifting is costly.

Proposition 3.2 For \( \rho > 0 \), there exists a region \([X_S^\rho, \infty) \subset [X_D, \infty)\) where \( \sigma^* = \bar{\sigma} \). For \( \rho = 0 \), the firm will choose maximal risk.

Proof Let \( \bar{\sigma}(X) \) be the value function for the strategy \( \sigma(X) = \bar{\sigma}, \forall X \in (X_D, \infty) \). Then \( \lim_{X \uparrow \infty} \pi(X) = (1 - T_C) \frac{Q^S}{r - \mu} \). On the other hand, if \( \sigma^*(X) = \bar{\sigma}, \forall X > X_S^\rho \), where \( X_S^\rho \in (X_D, \infty) \) is some switching threshold, then \( \lim_{X \uparrow \infty} c(X) = (1 - T_C) \frac{Q^S}{r - \mu} \).

Furthermore, since \( e_{XX}(X) > 0 \), \( \sigma^*(X) = \bar{\sigma} \forall X \in (X_D, \infty) \) if \( \rho = 0 \).

The value of debt will also be affected by the risk taking behavior of the firm. Higher cashflow risk harms debtholders because it makes default more likely. Arbitrage considerations require that the debt value is sufficiently smooth when the risk of the firm is changed (see Dixit, 1993). Thus, like the equity value, the debt value has to satisfy a value-matching and a smooth-pasting condition at \( X_S \). Finally, the recovery value in default determines a value matching condition at \( X_D \). As discussed above, debtholders take over an all equity-financed firm which they, optimally, immediately run at low risk. The bankruptcy state takes its toll in the form of deadweight losses amounting to \( \alpha \) times the value of the unlevered firm.

\[
\lim_{X \uparrow X_s} d(X) = \lim_{X \downarrow X_s} d(X) \\
\lim_{X \uparrow X_s} d_X(X) = \lim_{X \downarrow X_s} d_X(X) \\
\lim_{X \downarrow X_D} d(X) = (1 - \alpha)(1 - T_C) \frac{Q^S X_D}{r - \mu}
\]

3.1.2 The firm with a divesture option

Similar to the case without risk shifting, equityholders can decide to sell part of the firm’s production facilities and use the proceeds to buy back debt. Again, the restructuring condition (7) ensures that equityholders do not have to inject money in order to finance the restructuring. Since equityholders now also have command over the riskiness of the firm’s production, the equilibrium incorporates the optimal risk-shifting strategy:
Definition  An equilibrium with tender offers is defined as the vector of strategies $(X_R, X^L_S, X^S_S, X_D)$ and a vector of prices $E(\cdot), D(\cdot), e(\cdot), d(\cdot)$ and a tender offer price $D^T$ satisfying:

1. $X_R$ is the optimal restructuring threshold given prices are formed by $E(\cdot), D(\cdot), e(\cdot), d(\cdot)$.
2. $X^L_S, X^S_S, X_D$ are the optimal risk-shifting and default threshold given the restructuring strategy and prices $E(\cdot), D(\cdot), e(\cdot), d(\cdot)$.
3. Equityholders set the tender offer price $D^T$ optimally such that it induces all debtholders to tender.
4. $E(\cdot), D(\cdot), e(\cdot), d(\cdot)$ are formed rationally, i.e. bond and equityholders rationally anticipate that the firm will restructure at $X_R$, default at $X_D$ and shift cashflow risk at $X^L_S, X^S_S$.

The equity value before restructuring solves the following Hamilton-Jacoby-Bellman equation in the continuation region:

$$rE(X) = \max_{\sigma \in \Sigma} (1 - T_C)(Q^L X - C^L) + (\mu - \rho(\sigma^2 - \sigma)XE_X(X) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} X^2 E_{XX}(X) \forall X \in [X_R, \infty)$$ (33)

Similar to the case without restructuring option, the optimal volatility strategy is given by a bang-bang solution:

$$\sigma^*(X) = \begin{cases} \sigma^2 & \text{if } \frac{E_{XX}(X)X}{E_X(X)} \geq 2\rho \\ \sigma^2 \sigma & \text{if } \frac{E_{XX}(X)X}{E_X(X)} < 2\rho \end{cases}$$ (34)

While the firm without restructuring option will at some point be run at high risk, at least close to default, the firm with restructuring option might always stick to the low-risk strategy. If the high-risk strategy is very costly (large $\rho$), the firm will operate all its production sides cautiously before it sells them. However, it will always be run at the same risk as the small firm directly after repurchasing debt, which is shown in the following proposition:

**Proposition 3.3** If the small firm is run at a high risk around the restructuring threshold, then there exists a right neighborhood of the optimal restructuring threshold where it is optimal for the large firm to follow the high-risk strategy too. Formally, if $X^S_S > X_R$ then $X^L_S > X_R$. 

**Proof** At $X_R$, $E(X)$ pastes smoothly into $e(X)$, i.e. $E_X(X_R) = e_X(X_R)$. For some neighborhood right to $X_R$, $E(X) > e(X), X > X_R$, otherwise, earlier stopping would have been optimal. Thus, $E_{XX}(X_R) > e_{XX}(X_R)$. From $\frac{E_{XX}(X_R)X_R}{E_X(X_R)} > \frac{e_{XX}(X_R)X_R}{e_X(X_R)} > 2\rho$. 

26
The derivation of the optimal restructuring policy is similar to the case without risk shifting possibility. At \( X_R \), the equity value satisfies the following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:

\[
\lim_{X \downarrow X_R} E(X) = \lim_{X \downarrow X_R} e(X),
\]

\[
\lim_{X \downarrow X_R} E_X(X) = \lim_{X \downarrow X_R} e_X(X) + e_C(X) \frac{dC^S}{dX},
\]  

(35)

To preclude arbitrage with the bonds of the firm, the debt value satisfies the following value matching condition:

\[
\lim_{X \downarrow X_R} D(X, C^L) = \lim_{X \downarrow X_R} D_T(X),
\]

(36)

\[
\lim_{X \downarrow X_R} D(X, C^L) = \lim_{X \downarrow X_R} C^L \frac{d(X_R, C^S(X))}{C^S(X)},
\]  

(37)

where the second line is derived by inserting the optimal tender offer price.

As before, the debt value also has to satisfy a value matching and a smooth pasting condition at the risk shifting threshold \( X^L_S \):

\[
\lim_{X \uparrow X^L_S} D(X) = \lim_{X \downarrow X^L_S} D(X),
\]

\[
\lim_{X \uparrow X^L_S} D_X(X) = \lim_{X \downarrow X^L_S} D_X(X)
\]

Note that the solution to the debt value in the case of risk shifting is not simply a scaled-up value of the debt value after restructuring as in (22).

3.1.3 The Effect of Risk Shifting on the Restructuring Decision

To illustrate the effect of risk shifting, I contrast a firm with vanishingly small risk-shifting potential (\( \sigma = 0.2, \bar{\sigma} = 0.21 \)) to a firm that can considerably increase its cashflow risk (\( \sigma = 0.2, \bar{\sigma} = 0.5 \)). Figure 4 depicts the coupon after restructuring, the optimal default as well as risk-shifting strategies, and the gain to debt and equityholders as a function of the restructuring threshold. The optimal restructuring threshold is 1.78 for the firm with the small risk-shifting potential and 1.72 for the firm with the large risk-shifting option.

The first striking difference to a firm that is run at the same risk is the lower debt reduction potential. The upper left panel of figure 4 depicts the coupon reduction that can be achieved for different restructuring threshold choices. Equityholders who can control the riskiness of the firm cannot exploit the firm’s economic decline at such a scale as equityholders without the ability to change the
risk. The coupon after restructuring, $C^S$, even gets convex in $X_R$ for low values. The underlying reason is that asset substitution lets debtholders embrace a lower coupon if the firm is close to default, because postponing default (and shrinking the region where equityholders gain for resurrection) outweighs the loss due to lower fixed payments. Note that this effect is also present without risk shifting (see Leland, 1994), but only with risk shifting is it substantial enough because equityholders’ gambling for resurrection if default becomes more likely makes debt more sensitive to changes in the default threshold. Due to the value-increasing effect of the coupon reduction that is the stronger the closer the firm is to default (low $X_R$), the firm cannot exploit the value reduction of lower $X$ so much and has, in principal, a lower debt-reduction potential.

The lower coupon-reduction potential eats up part of debtholders’ gains. As the coupon does not decrease that much, the default threshold remains higher, which enlarges the region where the equity value of the firm before restructuring is sufficiently convex to encourage risk taking. Hence, the fraction of the debt value that arises from the potential to become a safer firm shrinks substantially. This loss outweighs the gain from the decrease in the default threshold. As a consequence, the gain to debtholders even decreases as the firm gets closer to default.

Equityholders who can control the riskiness of the firm face a similar tradeoff as equityholders who cannot. The longer they wait with the repurchase, the more debt they can buy back. But, as the distance-to-default shrinks, the likelihood of a default increases, which means that the firm will not profit long from the coupon reduction. For large values of $X_R$, the increase in the coupon payment savings dominates and the gain rises. As equityholders wait longer, the probability of default increases and reduces their profit from restructuring, generating the concave pattern of the equityholders’ gain (see figure 4, lower right panel).

The debt-overhang problem is attenuated, as the equityholders’ optimal restructuring threshold is closer to the one maximizing the total firm value. However, this comes at the expense of introducing another agency cost through asset substitution which is required in the first place to make the equityholders’ optimal restructuring threshold agree more with what is optimal for the total firm value.

Figure 5 summarizes the effect of a larger risk shifting potential, i.e. of a larger difference between $\sigma$ and $\bar{\sigma}$. The upper left panel shows that the more the firm can shift its operational risk, the larger is the amount of debt repurchased. Although the debt-reduction potential is smaller for the firm with discretion over the riskiness of its cashflows, equityholders make greater use of the repurchase option. The possibility to run the firm with higher risk lets them hold on to it for longer and default later (cf. second panel in figure 5). Note that a greater risk-shifting opportunity (higher $\bar{\sigma}$) induces the firm to make greater use of it before restructuring while it will be run more safely after having restructured (cf. upper right panel of figure 5).
Figure 4: Large vs Small Risk-Shifting Option Coupon after restructuring, restructuring gain, and security values for restructuring different threshold choices $X_R$ using $r = 0.05, \mu = 0.01, \sigma = 0.2, \bar{\sigma} = 0.5$ for large risk-shifting option and $\bar{\sigma} = 0.21$ for small risk-shifting option, $Q^L = 2, Q^S = 1.5, \alpha = 0.3, T_C = 0.3, X_0 = 5$. $C^L = 7.25$ is the optimal coupon for the firm with restructuring option.
Figure 5: Comparative Statics: The highest possible asset volatility varies from 0.21 to 0.6. The other parameters are $r = 0.05$, $\mu = 0.01$, $\sigma = 0.2$, $\lambda = 1.5$, $Q^L = 2$, $Q^S = 1.5$, $\alpha = 0.3$, $T_C = 0.3$, $X_0 = 5$, $C^L = 7$. 
The gain to debtholders is convex in the risk shifting potential $\sigma$. First, it decreases in $\sigma$ because the distance to the risk-shifting threshold increases, i.e. the firm’s chance to become less risky shrinks. This outweighs the gain from becoming safer as the distance-to-default increases. For higher $\sigma$, the effect of risk shifting levels off, as the distance to $X_S$ shrinks and the bankruptcy costs savings accruing to debtholders dominate.

3.1.4 Risk-Shifting and the Choice Between Default and Downsizing

**Proposition 3.4** In the absence of taxes on cancellation of debt income, risk shifting does not affect the decision of a firm whether to buy back debt or not. It only affects the timing of the debt repurchase.

**Proof** In the absence of taxes, the restructuring condition (7) evaluated at $X_R = X_D$ is the same as in the case without risk shifting.

Risk shifting can only take place as long as equityholders have control over the firm. If the firm is close to bankruptcy, the risk-shifting decisions of the future owners of the production facilities, namely the buyer of the divesture and the debtholders who take over the remaining firm, matter. In the limit, where $X_R = X_D$, the equityholders’ risk taking does not impact the restructuring decision any more.

If the firm has to pay taxes on cancellation of debt income, then agency costs caused by the asset substitution problem matter. As these costs decrease the amount of debt that can be repurchased with the asset sale proceeds, a higher risk-shifting potential implies that a lower amount of taxes can be borne. With the additional loss caused by the asset substitution problem, the tax level preventing an improvement in the debt service ratio will be lower than in the case without risk shifting. As taxes increase, equityholders want to restructure later.

In a similar fashion, a lower level of government subsidies suffices to destroy equityholders’ incentives to voluntarily restructure.

The effect of liquidity in the market for capital goods is unchanged by the asset-substitution problem, as long as there are no taxes to pay for cancellation of debt income. $1 - \alpha$ is still the lower bound for $\phi_1$, i.e. the market price which the assets to be sold have to attain so that repurchasing debt is profitable remains the same.
3.2 The Coordinated Holdout Problem

In section 2.1, I derived the price which equityholders must offer to prevent individual debtholders from holding out. As a single debtholder’s reservation value was given by the value of her position if she did not tender, this was exactly the price to pay, as shown in equation (6). However, if debtholders could coordinate, there is more to gain. Debtholders know that equityholders will make another offer if they reject the first one, since equityholders are still to profit from restructuring, although at a smaller scale. If debtholders collectively hold out, they can force equityholders to either solicit the tender offer at the time where the gain to debtholders is maximized or pay the corresponding reservation value at an earlier time.

In the example without the risk-shifting option, the combined gain to debtholders is largest if restructuring is timed in such a way that the firm immediately defaults after having delevered. In this setting, debtholders as a group would reject any offer, based on the previously derived incentive compatible consideration (6), where restructuring took place earlier, i.e., \( X_R > X_D \).

Coordination among debtholders is costly. I assume that coordination costs are proportional to the debt value, \( qD(X, C^L) \). This form has the appealing feature that the coordination costs are the higher, the further away the firm is from bankruptcy, i.e. the longer debtholders have to hold out. Also, the more dispersed debt holdings are, the harder it will be to coordinate. Proportional costs \( q \) will be larger for more diffusely held debt.

Independent of whether debtholders collectively hold out or not, they know that they must at least be paid the value of debt after restructuring such that nobody individually holds out. Let \( X_R \) be an arbitrary restructuring point. This minimal offer price is given by

\[
\phi(X_R) = \frac{C^L}{C^S(X_R)} d(X_R, C^S(X_R))
\]

This value corresponds to the tender offer price without coordinated hold out. However, \( \phi(X_R) \) is not the tender offer consideration. This consideration will depend on the debtholders reservation value from the collective hold out. The reservation value is given by the value of debt restructured at the threshold that is optimal for debtholders subject to two restrictions. The threshold has to lie in the interval were equityholders are willing to make an offer and the equityholders pursue their optimal equilibrium risk-shifting policy. Let \( D^D_R \) be the optimal restructuring threshold for debtholders that satisfies the two restrictions and \( \tau^D_R \) the associated restructuring time. The reservation value of debtholders is given by:

\[
\hat{D}(X_t) = E^Q \left[ \int_t^{\tau^D_R} e^{-r(s-t)} C_L ds \right] + E^Q \left[ e^{-r(\tau^D_R-t)} \phi(X^D_R) \right]
\]
Let $X_R^E$ be the lowest $X$ where equityholders are still willing to make an offer (their gain to restructuring is just positive). The reservation debt value fulfills the following system of variational inequalities:

$$
\hat{D}(X_R^E) = \phi(X_R^E)
$$

$$
\hat{D}(X) \geq \phi(X) \quad \forall X > X_R^E
$$

$$
C^L + A^r \hat{D}(X) - r\hat{D}(X) \leq 0 \quad \forall X \geq X_R^E
$$

$$
\max(\hat{D}(X) - \phi(X), C^L + A^r \hat{D}(X) - r\hat{D}(X)) = 0 \quad \forall X \geq X_R^E
$$

As $\hat{D}$ is the off-equilibrium path debt value, it is subject to equityholders pursuing their optimal risk strategy $\sigma^*(X)$.

If equityholders do not change the risk profile of the firm, debtholders always have an incentive to coordinate and collectively hold out.

**Proposition 3.5** If $\Sigma$ is a singleton or $\rho = 0$, i.e. the firm has a constant risk strategy, then the debtholders would like to restructure as late as possible. Thus, $X_R^D = X_R^E$.

**Proof** See appendix A.3

Knowing that debtholders will behave that way, equityholders will behave optimally by paying debtholders their reservation value at $X_R$ in order to convince them to accept the first offer. The optimal $X_R^*$ takes this payment into account. Thus, at any restructuring threshold, equityholders have to offer

$$
D^*(X_R) = \max \left( \frac{C^L}{C^S(X_R)} d(X_R, C^S(X_R)), (1 - q) \hat{D}(X_R, C^L, X_R^D) \right)
$$

Using the benchmark calibration for the firm without risk-shifting option, I find that proportional coordination costs have to be as large as 6% of the current debt value such that equityholders can pay it and restructuring will take place before default. If costs are lower, debtholders reservation value is too large to make restructuring profitable for equityholders.

However, if the firm’s management is able to control the riskiness of how the firm is operated, the coordinated hold-out problem might disappear. Risk shifting provides bargaining power to equityholders. Debtholders know that the more they defer restructuring the larger is the equityholders incentive to gamble for resurrection. The increase in gain derived from a later restructuring time is more than offset by the increased riskiness of their position. Whether or not the ability to engage in asset substitution provides equityholders with enough bargaining power depends on the parameters. The large risk-shifting option depicted in figure 4 is one example for a case where
equityholders bargaining power is high enough to prevent a collective hold out. Proposition 3.6 summarizes this result.

**Proposition 3.6** If the firm can shift the riskiness of the cashflows, equityholders’ bargaining power might be high enough to deter debtholders from collectively holding out.

### 4 Conclusion

For the case of upward restructuring in good economic times, dynamic models of capital structure have been demonstrated to be an important improvement over static models, providing us with a series of new insights (see, e.g., Fischer et al., 1989; Goldstein et al., 2001; Bhamra et al., 2010; Chen, 2010). But for the opposite case, deleveraging in bad economic times, we have relied on static models so far. This paper develops a dynamic model of downward restructuring in order to derive general conditions under which a firm will voluntarily sell assets and use the proceeds to restore a more sustainable leverage ratio. It also reveals how a firm’s incentives to deleverage can be destroyed and which impact different forms of agency costs and policy measures can have on these incentives.

Equityholders do not find it in their interest to inject money and buy back debt in order to reduce the leverage of the firm and decrease the probability of default since only debtholders will benefit from it. But, if debt repurchases are financed via asset sales, equityholders can, under certain conditions, participate in the gains brought about by restructuring. Moreover, I show that if equityholders never make use of the option to deleverage, then it would not have increased the total firm value in the first place. The result that both equityholders and debtholders of a firm share a common interest in reducing the leverage in bad economic times differs from the insights derived by traditional models and is a consequence of the timing option of equityholders. If restructuring improves the debt-service ratio, then not only the total firm value increases because default becomes less likely and expected bankruptcy costs decrease but also equityholders can time the restructuring in such a way that the savings from the coupon reduction exceed the losses from the capacity shrinkage. If equityholders were not allowed to optimally choose the exercise time of the restructuring option, they would in many cases forgo the opportunity to deleverage. Nevertheless, the debt overhang problem still exists. While the total firm value would be maximized if restructuring took place just prior to default when debt is cheapest to repurchase and bankruptcy costs could be decreased the most, equityholders want to restructure earlier in order to benefit longer, in expectation, from the restructuring. The debt overhang problem in a dynamic setting is not that the firm forgoes total firm value increasing restructuring options but that managers will restructure too early, which is the mirror image of the underinvestment problem.
Debtholders extract the lion’s share of the total restructuring gains in dollar terms, since every individual debtholder can threaten to hold out. Nevertheless, the percentage gain to equityholders is large because they can considerably postpone default at a time when equity has already lost substantially in value.

The result that asset sale financed deleveraging is in the interest of the firm’s stakeholders also carries over to the more complex setting in which the management has control over risk level at which the firm is operated. With the risk-shifting option at hand, equityholders are able to appropriate a larger share of the restructuring gains. The possibility to shift the riskiness of the firm is especially valuable to them if the debtholders coordinate and threaten to collectively hold out. If the firm’s riskiness cannot be controlled, collectively holding out enables debtholders to maximize their gain from restructuring at the expense of equityholders. However, debtholders will refrain from holding out and immediately accept the first offer to tender, when equityholders are able to shift the riskiness of the firm and thereby redistribute its value in their favor.

Many times, however, we see firms rather go bankrupt than deleverage and try to avoid default. This setup allows me to identify three reasons for why equityholders would prefer default to restructuring. First, taxes on cancellation of debt income can make buying back debt too costly for the firm because the tax payment eats up the proceeds that can be distributed to equityholders. This is especially true for firms with less liquid assets or low bankruptcy costs, which therefore have little to offer to debtholders. It was no surprise that the number of debt buy backs rocketed after the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 had allowed to defer taxes due on cancellation of debt income.

A second example is government guarantees. While intended for reducing the costs associated with bankruptcy, they crowd out equityholders’ incentives to restructure as they make debt more expensive to repurchase. Since equityholders can restructure at a lower cost, government guarantees are always less efficient in bearing the deadweight cost of bankruptcy in this setting.

A third reason for why equityholders might prefer default to deleveraging is low liquidity in the market for capital goods. If the firms in an industry are very much alike and the assets can only be sold to firms within an industry, a situation similar to the Shleifer & Vishny (1992) setup, then fire sales are able to prevent restructuring. In this case, tax reductions fail to alleviate the situation and restore incentives, and government subsidies to debtholders would only do more harm. But an asset repurchase program can be an effective government intervention in this situation where the firm’s incentives to deleverage are lost. When firms differ in their leverage or their exposure to the industry-wide shock though, voluntary deleveraging financed by asset sales is likely to take place.
A Proof of Propositions

A.1 Proof of proposition 2.2

I will show that \( E(X_0, C^L, C^S) > E^0(X_0, C^L) \) under the above mentioned conditions. Let \( \tau_R \) be the time point when the firm buys back its debt and \( \tau_D^0 \) be the default time if the firm had no asset sale option. The equity values of the firm with the asset sale option and the firm without such an option are given by:

\[
E(X_0, C^L, C^S) = \mathbb{E}^Q \left[ \int_0^{\tau_R} e^{-rt} (1 - T_C) \left( \frac{Q^L X_t}{r - \mu} - \frac{C^L}{r} \right) dt \right] + \mathbb{E}^Q \left[ e^{-r\tau_R} e(X_R, C^S) \right]
\]

\[
E^0(X_0, C^L) = \mathbb{E}^Q \left[ \int_0^{\tau_D^0} e^{-rt} (1 - T_C) \left( \frac{Q^L X_t}{r - \mu} - \frac{C^L}{r} \right) dt \right]
\]

I will show that \( \exists X_R \) (or equivalently a stopping time defined by \( \tau_R = \inf\{t > 0 : X_t = X_R\} \) s.t. \( X_D^0 > X_R \geq X_D (\tau_D \geq \tau_R > \tau_D^0) \) which implies that \( E(X_0, C^L, C^S) > E^0(X_0, C^L) \). Note that \( X_R \) is not necessarily the equity value maximizing restructuring threshold. If the firm uses the smallest possible repurchase threshold, namely \( X_R = X_D \) the restructuring condition becomes

\[
(1 - T_C) \frac{Q^L - Q^S}{r - \mu} X_D = \frac{C^L - C^S}{C^S} (1 - \alpha)(1 - T_C) \frac{Q^S X_D}{r - \mu}
\]

\[
\frac{Q^L 1 - \alpha C^S}{C^L 1 - \alpha} = \frac{Q^S}{C^S}
\]

From (42), it follows that \( \frac{Q^L}{C^L} < \frac{Q^S}{C^S} \) for positive bankruptcy costs. As the default threshold is indirect proportional to \( Q^i / C^i, i \in \{S, L\} \), \( X_D^0 > X_D = X_R \) and \( E(X_0, C^L, C^S) > E^0(X_0, C^L) \).

A.2 Proof of proposition 2.3

If restructuring at \( X_R = X_D \) does not improve the debt-service ratio, \( X_D \geq X_D^0 \), since the default thresholds \( X_D \) and \( X_D^0 \) are indirectly proportional to \( Q^S / C^S \) and \( Q^L / C^L \), and we have \( Q^S / C^S \leq Q^L / C^L \). As \( \frac{dC^S}{dX_R} \geq 0 \) in a right neighborhood to \( X_D \), any earlier restructuring point \( X_R > X_D \) would make the debt-service ratio worse. Since \( \frac{Q^S X}{C^S(X)} < \frac{Q^S X}{C^S} \) for all \( X_R \in [X_D, X_R] \), \( e(X, C^S) < E^0(X, C^S) \) for all \( X \in [X_D^0, X_R] \), and, as a consequence \( E(X, C^L) < E^0(X, C^L) \) for all \( X \in [X, \infty) \). I.e, restructuring is never profitable to equityholders, if it does not improve the debt service ratio at the latest possible restructuring point \( (X_R = X_D) \). To see that the same condition applies to debt, it suffices to look
at the difference between the debt value of a firm with restructuring option and of a firm without
which is given in equation (24). The difference is determined by the different default thresholds.
When restructuring results in a lower default threshold it will be profitable. Since the default
threshold is indirectly proportional to the debt-service ratio, the debt value increases if the debt-
service ratio is improved.

A.3 Proof of proposition 3.5

Let \( X_R \) be an arbitrary restructuring threshold satisfying \( X_R \in [X_{ER}^E, \bar{X}_{ER}^E] \) and \( \tau_R \) the corresponding
restructuring time. Furthermore, assume that equityholders pursue a single risk strategy. The
reservation value of debtholders for this arbitrary restructuring threshold is given by:

\[
\hat{D}(X_t) = E^Q \left[ \int_t^{\tau_D} e^{-r(s-t)} C_L ds \right] + E^Q \left[ e^{-r(\tau_D-t)} \frac{C^L}{C^S(X_R)} d(X_R, C^S(X_R)) \right] \tag{43}
\]

Plugging in for \( d(X_R, C^S(X_R)) \) yields

\[
\hat{D}(X_t) = E^Q \left[ \int_t^{\tau_D} e^{-r(s-t)} C_L ds \right] + E^Q \left[ e^{-r(\tau_D-t)} (1-\alpha)(1-T_C) \frac{Q^S X_D}{r - \mu} \frac{C^L}{C^S(X_R)} \right] \tag{44}
\]

where \( \tau_D \) represents the default time determined by \( X_t \) hitting the default threshold \( X_D \). Note that
\( X_R \) affects \( X_D \) and \( \tau_D \) indirectly via its effect on the coupon of the restructured firm, \( C^S \). Thus,
debtholders prefer to restructure as late as possible if:

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{D}_t}{\partial X_D} \frac{\partial X_D}{\partial C^S} \frac{\partial C^S}{\partial X_R} < 0 \tag{45}
\]

\( \frac{\partial C^S}{\partial X_R} < 0 \) in a right neighborhood of \( X_D \) and \( \frac{\partial X_D}{\partial C^S} > 0 \) is straightforward (see prop. 2.1); the remain-
ing part of the proof is to show that \( \frac{\partial \hat{D}_t}{\partial X_D} < 0 \). To show this I rewrite the reservation value in (44) in
the following form:

\[
\hat{D}(X_t) = E^Q \left[ \int_t^{\tau_D} e^{-r(s-t)} C_L ds \right] - E^Q \left[ \int_{\tau_D}^{\tau_D} e^{-r(s-t)} C_L ds \right] + E^Q \left[ e^{-r(\tau_D-t)} (1-\alpha)(1-T_C) \frac{Q^S X_D}{r - \mu} \frac{C^L}{C^S(X_R)} \right] \tag{46}
\]

\[
= \frac{C^L}{r} + E^Q \left[ e^{-r(\tau_D-t)} (1-\alpha)(1-T_C) \frac{\theta}{1+\theta} - 1 \right] \frac{C^L}{r} \tag{47}
\]

The second term is smaller than zero. The larger is \( \tau_D \) (the smaller \( X_D \)), the larger is the reservation
value of debtholders.
References


