Fiscal policy and the labour market: the effects of public sector employment and wages

JOB MARKET PAPER

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Abstract

I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions and two sectors in order to study the labour market effects of public sector employment and wages. The public sector wage plays an important role in achieving the efficient allocation. High wages induce too many unemployed to queue for public sector jobs, while if they are low, the government faces recruitment problems. The optimal steady-state wage premium depends mainly on the labour market friction parameters. In response to technology shocks, it is optimal to have procyclical public sector wages. Deviations from the optimal policy can increase the volatility of unemployment significantly. Public sector wage and employment shocks have mixed effects on unemployment. A wage shock raises the unemployment rate, while a reduction in the separations lowers it. Hiring more people can increase or decrease the unemployment rate. All shocks raise the wage and crowd out employment in the private sector. In the empirical part, I employ Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of the model for the United States. I find that the direct search mechanism between sectors is an important element to explain business cycle fluctuations of labour market variables.

JEL Classification: E24; E32; E62; J31; J45.

Keywords: Public sector employment; public sector wages; unemployment; fiscal shocks.

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1 Introduction

If you seek advice from a macroeconomist on how to model government consumption, you are likely to hear: *government consumption should be modelled as goods bought from the private sector.* However, the main component of government consumption is compensation to employees. As shown in Table 1, in most OECD countries the public sector wage bill represents between 50 to 60 percent of government consumption expenditures. Government employment is an important aspect of fiscal policy, but it is also a sizable element of the labour market. In OECD economies, between 10 to 30 percent of all employees are working in the public sector. Given its relevance, it seems plausible that part of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy occurs through the labour market.

The level of employment and wages in the public sector are relevant, not just because of their weight in the economy or in the government budget, but also because they play an important role over the business cycle. Since 2004, the Internet search engine *Google* releases a weekly index of keyword searches. Figure 1 shows the growth rate relative to the previous year, of keyword searches of “Jobs” and “Government jobs” for the United States. From August 2008, as the recession worsened, the number of searches for jobs has increased dramatically but it is clear that since February 2009, people are turning more towards government jobs. The difference between the growth rates is around 20 percentage points. Repeating the exercise for the United Kingdom gives a similar picture. Indeed, the change in the searching patterns of the unemployed has gained such proportions that it has been noticed by the press. The following quote is particularly insightful regarding its causes:

Wall Street may be losing its luster for new U.S. college graduates who are increasingly looking to the government for jobs that enrich their social conscience, if not their wallet. In the boom years, New York’s financial center lured many of the brightest young stars with the promise of high salaries and bonuses. But the financial crisis has tainted the image of big banks, and with fewer financial jobs available, Uncle Sam may be reaping the benefit. (Reuters, 11th of June 2009)

The quote hints that in the current recession more people are searching for public sector jobs for two reasons. First, as the wages in the private sector have fallen, more people are turning to the public sector where the wages are insulated from the market forces. Second,

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1 At least this is the approach taken by most articles that study the aggregate effects of government spending. For example: Barro (1990) and Baxter and King (1993) examine it in a Neo-Classical setting, Linnemann and Schabert (2003) extends it to the New Keynesian model and Gali, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) introduces rule of thumb agents. All these papers share the feature of considering government spending as goods bought from the private sector.
### Table 1: Public sector and the labour market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public wage bill (% gov. consumption)</th>
<th>Public Employment (% total employment)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (lut, lgt)</th>
<th>Correlation (u_l, t_l)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>30.5%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>−0.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>0.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>2.6%</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>2.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>3.4%</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>31.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>66.5%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Public wage bill, public employment and unemployment rate refer to the year 2000. The correlation between public sector employment and the unemployment rate is computed from quarterly data (1970 to 2007). Source: OECD.

### Figure 1: Growth rate of Google keyword searches in the United States

Note: The growth rate of the four-weeks average index of keyword searches, relative the same four weeks in the previous year.
there are less jobs available in the private sector relative to the public sector. Indeed, as shown in the fourth column of Table 1, in all but one country, public sector employment goes up during recessions. These two facts suggest that government employment and wages are important elements to explain the business cycle fluctuations of unemployment.

Compared to the theoretical research that focuses on government spending as buying part of the production of the economy, the literature that studies the effects of public sector employment and wages is relatively scarce. Early references, like Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Finn (1998), find that, contrary to government purchases of goods and services, the purchase of hours raises real wages and reduces private output. More recently, Pappa (2005) and Cavallo (2005) conclude that, in a perfectly competitive labour market, private sector hours and output go down after an increase in government employment. Ardagna (2007) and Algan, Cahuc, and Zylberberg (2002) study the issue in a unionised economy. In their setting, an increase in public sector employment, wages or unemployment benefits, raises the wage in the private sector and thus unemployment.

Looking at this issue in a perfect competition framework might be a useful starting point, but as is clear from Figure 1, to fully understand the transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy through the labour market it is crucial to model the existing search and matching frictions. There have been some attempts to do it. According to Holmlund and Linden (1993), an increase in public employment has a direct negative effect in unemployment but crowds out private employment due to an increase in wages. But, for all realistic calibrations, the direct effect of reducing unemployment is always stronger than the indirect effect through wages. Quadrini and Trigari (2007) examine the impact of public sector employment on business cycle volatility and find that the presence of the public sector increases the volatility of both private and total employment. Hörner, Ngai, and Olivetti (2007) study the effect of turbulence on unemployment when the wages in the public sector are insulated. They conclude that an increase in turbulence induces more unemployed, who are risk averse, to search for jobs in public companies, resulting in higher aggregate unemployment than if the companies were privately managed.

The aim of this work is to provide a comprehensive, yet simple, framework to study the macroeconomic effects of public sector employment and wages, and their role over the business cycle. I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions along the lines of Pissarides (1988) with both public and private sectors. The model shares several features with Quadrini and Trigari (2007). One of the main difficulties with it is the calibration of the friction parameters in the public sector. In order to do it accurately,
I explore information from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey for the United States, the Labour Force Survey for the United Kingdom, as well as from other sources.

In a first stage, I solve the social planner’s problem to find the optimal allocation. I then solve the decentralized equilibrium and determine the public sector wage consistent with the optimal steady-state allocation. The optimal wage premium depends mainly on the differences of the labour market frictions parameters of the public sector relative to the private sector. For the chosen calibration, the optimal wage is 3 percent lower than in the private sector. If the government sets a higher wage, it induces too many unemployed to queue for public sector jobs and raises private sector wages, thus reducing private sector job creation and increasing unemployment. Conversely, if it sets a lower wage, few unemployed want a public sector job and the government faces recruitment problems.

I also examine the properties of the model when subject to technology shocks. The optimal government policy consists of a countercyclical vacancy posting and a procyclical wage. If the public sector wages are acyclical, in recessions they become more attractive relative to the wages in the private sector, inducing more unemployed to queue for public sector jobs. This further dampens job creation in the private sector and amplifies the business cycle. Deviations from the optimal policy can entail significant welfare losses. If, for instance, the public sector wage does not respond to the cycle, unemployment volatility doubles relative to the scenario under optimal policy.

The model allows us to disaggregate fiscal shocks into wage and employment shocks and the latter into separation and hiring shocks. The response to the three shocks varies. Paying more to public sector workers raises unemployment through two channels. On the one hand, more unemployed direct their search towards the public sector. On the other hand, as it increases the value of unemployment, it spills over to private sector wages. These two channels are also in place under a separation or hiring shock, but they are offset by the direct effect of increasing public sector employment. In general, reducing separations always lowers unemployment, but increasing hiring can have opposite effects on unemployment, depending on the steady-state level of public sector wages. If the wages are high, when the government opens new vacancies it induces many more unemployed to search for these new jobs, enhancing the crowding out effect in the private sector and raising unemployment.

The opposite effects of the different components of fiscal policy is one of the key results of the paper. The extensive empirical literature that evaluates the macroeconomic effects of government spending tends to find mixed effects on private consumption, real wage or
private employment. As a consequence, the center of the debate has been on the technical methodology, particularly on the identification of fiscal shocks. I argue that the mixed evidence is more related to the data, rather than the methodological strategy used. Fiscal shocks can have distinct effects depending on the type of expenditure we are considering: employment, wages, purchases of privately produced goods or government investment. By including all components together, some in particular or using different samples in which the composition of spending has changed, we cannot expect to identify properly one type of fiscal shock. This hypothesis is consistent with evidence from Caldara and Kamps (2008) who, using the same variables and sample, conclude that alternative identification strategies yield similar results.

The argument that the various types of spending can have mixed macroeconomics effects is not new. In their seminal paper, Baxter and King (1993) find that government investment has different quantitative and qualitative effects than government consumption because it affects the marginal productivity of factors. As mentioned above, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Finn (1998) find that, contrary to government purchases of goods and services, an increase in government employment raises real wages and reduces output, employment and investment in the private sector. I show that if we disaggregate employment compensation into employment and in per-employee wage, they can have opposite effects on unemployment. To strengthen my argument I do a simple extension to the model, replacing public sector employment with services bought directly to the private sector. In such an economy, increases in the government purchase of goods lowers the wage and raises employment in the private sector, contrary to shocks in employment and wages.

Some of the model’s results are driven by the assumption that the unemployed direct their search towards the private or the public sector. The purpose of the rest of the paper is to argue that this is a relevant mechanism. First, I review the evidence from microeconometric studies on public sector wages that suggest that individuals self-select into the private or public sector based on the expected wage differential. Then, I employ Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of the model for the United States, between 1948 and 2007, using quarterly data on: government employment and wages, private sector wages, unemployment rate, job-separation and job-finding rates. I find evidence that the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs fluctuates over the business cycle. Additionally, the government follows a mildly countercyclical vacancy and a slightly procyclical wage policy.

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2 Model

2.1 General setting

The model is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with public and private sectors. The only rigidities present in the model are due to search and matching frictions. Public sector variables are denoted with superscript $g$ while private sector variables are denoted by $p$. Time is denoted by $t = 0, 1, 2, ...$

The labour force consists of many individuals $j \in [0, 1]$. Part of them are unemployed $(u_t)$, while the remaining are working either in the public $(l_t^g)$ or in the private $(l_t^p)$ sectors.

$$1 = l_t^p + l_t^g + u_t. \quad (1)$$

Total employment is denoted by $l_t$. The presence of search and matching frictions in the labour market prevents some unemployed from finding jobs. The evolution of employment in both sectors depends on the number of new matches $m_t^p$ and $m_t^g$ and on the separations. In each period, jobs are destroyed at constant fraction $\lambda$, potentially different across sectors.

$$l_{t+1}^i = (1 - \lambda^i)l_t^i + m_t^i, \quad i = p, g. \quad (2)$$

The number of matches formed in each period is determined by two matching functions.

$$m_t^i = m^i(u_t^i, v_t^i), \quad i = p, g. \quad (3)$$

I assume the unemployed choose which sector they want to search in, so $u_t^i$ represents the number of unemployed searching in sector $i$. The vacancies in each sector are denoted by $v_t^i$. The matching functions are assumed to have constant returns to scale and to be homogeneous of degree 1. An important part of the analysis focuses on the behaviour of the share of unemployed searching for a public sector job, defined as: $s_t = \frac{u_t^g}{u_t}$.

From the matching functions we can define the probabilities of vacancies being filled $q_t^i$, the job-finding rates conditional on searching in a particular sector, $p_t^i$, and the unconditional job-finding rates, $f_t^i$:

$$q_t^i = \frac{m_t^i}{v_t^i}, \quad p_t^i = \frac{m_t^i}{u_t^i}, \quad f_t^i = \frac{m_t^i}{u_t^i}, \quad i = p, g.$$  

The assumption of directed search implies that the number of vacancies posted in one sector only affects contemporarily the probability of filling a vacancy in the other sector through the endogenous reaction of $s_t$.  

7
2.2 Households

In the presence of unemployment risk we would observe consumption differences across different individuals. As in Merz (1995), I assume all the income of the members is pooled so the private consumption is equalised across members. The household is infinitely-lived and has preferences over private consumption good, $c_t$, and a public good $g_t$. It also has a disutility from working $\nu(l_t)$, which captures the foregone leisure and home production.

$$E_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c_t, g_t) - \nu(l_t)],$$

where $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the discount factor. The budget constraint in period $t$ is given by:

$$c_t + B_t = (1 + r_{t-1})B_{t-1} + w^p_t l^p_t + w^g_t l^g_t + \Pi_t,$$

where $r_{t-1}$ is the real interest rate from period $t-1$ to $t$ and $B_{t-1}$ are the holdings of one period bonds. $w^i_t l^i_t$ is the total wage income from the members working in sector $i$. Finally, $\Pi_t$ encompasses the lump sum taxes that finance the government’s wage bill and possible transfers from the private sector firms. I assume that there are no unemployment benefits, as the individuals are insured by the household.

The household chooses $c_t$ to maximize the expected lifetime utility subject to the sequence of budget constraints, taking the public consumption good as given. The solution is the consumption Euler equation:

$$u_c(c_t, g_t) = \beta(1 + r_t)E_t[u_c(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1})].$$

2.3 Workers

The value of each member to the household depends on their current state. The value of being employed in sector $i$ is given by:

$$W^i_t = w^i_t - \frac{\nu(l_t)}{u_c(c_t, g_t)} + E_t \beta_{t,t+1}[(1 - \lambda^i)W^i_{t+1} + \lambda^i U_{t+1}], i = p, g,$$

where $\beta_{t,t+k} = \beta^k \frac{u_c(c_{t+k}, g_{t+k})}{u_c(c_t, g_t)}$ is the stochastic discount factor. The value of being employed in a sector depends on the current wage and the disutility of working, as well as, the continuation value of the job, that depends on the separation probability. Under the assumption of directed search, the unemployed are searching for a job either in the private or in the public
sector, with value functions given by:

\[ U_t^i = E_t \beta_{t,t+1}[p_t^i W_{t+1}^i + (1 - p_t^i)U_{t+1}], \quad i = p, g. \]  

(8)

The value of being unemployed and searching in a particular sector, depends on the probabilities of finding a job and the value of working in that sector. Optimality implies there are movements between the two segments that guarantee there is no additional gain of searching in one sector vis-à-vis the other:

\[ U_t^p = U_t^g = U_t. \]  

(9)

This equality determines the share of unemployed searching in each sector. We can re-write it as:

\[ \frac{m_t^p E_t[W_{t+1}^p - U_{t+1}]}{(1 - s_t)} = \frac{m_t^g E_t[W_{t+1}^g - U_{t+1}]}{s_t}, \]

(10)

which implicitly defines \( s_t \). An increase in the value of being employed in the public sector, driven either by an increase in the wage, an increase in the probability of being hired or by a decrease in the separation rate, raises \( s_t \), until there is no extra gain from searching there. Under the directed search assumption the public sector wage plays a key role in determining \( s_t \). If the search was random between sectors, the public sector wage would not affect any variable of the model.

### 2.4 Private sector firms

The representative firm hires labour to produce the private consumption good. The production function is linear in labour, but part of the resources produced have to be used to pay the cost of posting vacancies \( \varsigma^p v_t^p \).

\[ y_t = a_t^p l_t^p - \varsigma^p v_t^p. \]  

(11)

At time \( t \), the level of employment is predetermined and the firm can only control the number of vacancies it posts. The value of opening a vacancy is given by:

\[ V_t = E_t \beta_{t,t+1}[q_t^p J_{t+1} + (1 - q_t^p)V_{t+1}] - \varsigma^p, \]

(12)

where \( J_t \) is the value of a job for the firm, given by:

\[ J_t = a_t^p - w_t^p + E_t \beta_{t,t+1}[(1 - \lambda^p)J_{t+1}]. \]  

(13)
Free entry guarantees that the value of posting a vacancy is zero \((V_t = 0)\), so we can combine the two equations into:

\[
\frac{s^p}{q^p_t} = E_t \beta_{t,t+1} [a^p_{t+1} - w^p_{t+1} + (1 - \lambda^p) \frac{s^p}{q^p_{t+1}}].
\]

The condition states that the expected cost of hiring a worker must equal its expected return. The benefit of hiring an extra worker is the discounted value of the expected difference between its marginal productivity and its wage, plus the continuation value, knowing that with a probability \(\lambda^p\) the match is destroyed.

Finally, I consider the private sector wage is the outcome of a Nash bargaining between workers and firms. The sharing rule is given by:

\[
(1 - b)(W^p_t - U_t) = bJ_t.
\]

### 2.5 Government

The government produces its good using a linear technology on labour. As in the private sector, the costs of posting vacancies are deducted from production.

\[
g_t = a^g l_t - \zeta^g v^g_t.
\]

The government collects lump sum taxes to finance the wage bill:

\[
\tau_t = w^g l^g_t.
\]

Finally, the government sets a policy for the sequence of vacancies and wage \(\{v^g_t, w^g_{t+1}\}_{t=a}^\infty\). I assume it sets the wage one period in advance, at the time it posts the vacancies. As \(s_i\) is determined based on the expected future wages in the two sectors, the current public sector wage does not affect any variable in the model. There is no time inconsistency problem because, as taxes are lump sum, the government does not gain from setting a current wage different than promised. Throughout the paper I contrast two types of policies. On the one hand, exogenous policies to help us understand the functioning of the model and the transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy. On the other hand, the optimal policy - the one arising from the social planner’s problem.
2.6 Competitive equilibrium

**Definition 1** A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices \( \{r_t, w^p_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) such that, given a sequence of government vacancies and wages \( \{v^g_t, w^g_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), the household chooses a sequence of consumption \( \{c_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), and the fraction of unemployed members searching in the public sector \( s_t \), and firms choose private sector vacancies \( v^p_t \), such that: (i) the household maximises its lifetime utility; (ii) the share of unemployed searching in the public sector is such that the values of searching in the two sectors equalise (equation 10); (iii) private sector vacancies satisfy the free entry condition (14); (iv) the private wage \( w^p_t \) solves the bargaining condition (15); (v) the private goods market clears: \( c_t = y_t \); and (vi) the lump sum taxes \( \tau_t \) are chosen to balance the government budget (equation 17).

2.7 Social planner’s solution

As a benchmark for the analysis of the model I consider the constrained optimal solution. The social planner’s problem is to maximize the consumers lifetime utility (4) subject to the labour market and technology constraints (1)-(3), (11) and (16). The first order conditions are given by:

\[
\frac{\varsigma^p}{q^p_t} = \beta E_t \{ u_c(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1}) \left[ (1-\eta^p) a^p_{t+1} - (1-\eta^p) \frac{\nu_t(l_{t+1})}{u_c(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1})} \right] + (1-\lambda^p) \frac{\varsigma^p}{q^p_{t+1}} - \frac{\eta^p \varsigma^p v^p_{t+1}}{(1-s_{t+1})u_{t+1}} \},
\]

\[
(18)
\]

\[
\frac{\varsigma^g}{q^g_t} = \beta E_t \{ u_g(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1}) \left[ (1-\eta^g) a^g_{t+1} - (1-\eta^g) \frac{\nu_t(l_{t+1})}{u_g(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1})} \right] + (1-\lambda^g) \frac{\varsigma^g}{q^g_{t+1}} - \frac{\eta^g \varsigma^g v^g_{t+1}}{s_{t+1}l_{t+1}} \},
\]

\[
(19)
\]

\[
\frac{u_g(c_t, g_t) \varsigma^g v^g_{t+1} \eta^g}{(1-\eta^g)s_t} = \frac{u_c(c_t, g_t) \varsigma^p v^p_{t+1} \eta^p}{(1-\eta^p)(1-s_t)}.
\]

\[
(20)
\]

The parameter \( \eta^i \) is the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment in sector \( i \). Conditions (18) and (19) describe the optimal private and public sector vacancies. On the left hand side we have the expected cost of hiring an extra worker. The right hand side gives us the marginal social benefit of hiring an additional worker. It consists of its expected marginal productivity minus the utility cost of working, weighted by the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, plus the continuation value. The last element, that enters with a negative sign, reflects the fact that hiring an additional worker makes it harder for both sectors to recruit a worker in the future.

The optimal split of the unemployed between sectors, pinned down in (20), depends on the marginal utility of consumption of both goods, on the number of vacancies and their cost, and on the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment in both sectors.
3 Calibration

To solve the model, we have to make assumptions on the functional form of the utility and the matching functions. I assume a CES utility function in logs which allows us to address different elasticities of substitution between the private and public consumption good. As typical in the literature, the matching function is Cobb-Douglas. The disutility of labour has the form of constant relative risk aversion preferences.

\[
m_p^t = \mu^p((1 - s_t)u_t)^{\eta^p}(v_t^p)^{1-\eta^p}, \quad m_g^t = \mu^g(s_t u_t)^{\eta^g}(v_t^g)^{1-\eta^g},
\]

\[
u(l_t) = \chi \frac{\lambda^{l+\tau}}{1 + \lambda}.
\]

One of the shortcomings of the model is that the quantitative predictions are tied to a number of parameters for which not much evidence exits, namely the friction parameters in the public sector \((\mu^g, \eta^g, \lambda^g\) and \(\varsigma^g\)). To fill in this gap I start by exploring several sources for the United States and the United Kingdom.

3.1 Evidence for the United States

The first graph in Figure 2 shows the monthly government employment since 1940, as a share of total employment and as a share of the labour force. The data are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. On average, government employment corresponded to 16 percent of total employment. Its counter-cyclical pattern is clear from the graph: government employment has increased in nine out of the eleven recessions.

The second graph shows the monthly separation rate for the two sectors, taken from the Job Opening and Labour Turnover Survey (JOLTS). The separation rate in the private sector is almost 3 times higher than in the government: 4.3 against 1.5 percent. The last graph plots the new hires of each sector as a share on the total unemployed, a proxy for the job-finding rate. The probability of finding a job in the government is only 4.5 percent compared with 62.5 percent in the private sector. Most of the business cycle fluctuations occur in the private sector.

To estimate the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies I regress, for each sector, the log of the job-finding rate (the ratio between hires in that sector and unemployment) on the log of tightness (the ratio between job openings in that sector and unemployment). The estimated coefficient for the private sector is 0.63, in line with estimates from the literature (Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)). For the public sector the coefficient is 0.79 which suggest
that vacancies are more important determinants of matches in the public sector.\footnote{\textit{}}

A recent paper by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2009) provides some insights on the duration of vacancies by sector. They use JOLTS data to study the behaviour of vacancies and hiring. After adjusting the data, they estimate that the duration of a vacancy is 30 days for the government and 20 days for the private sector.

\subsection*{3.2 Evidence on the United Kingdom}

An alternative to establishment level data is to look at household surveys. I explore data from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS samples around 60,000 households for five successive quarters. Its rotating structure allows us to observe the changes in the labour market status of 80 percent of the households and obtain the gross labour market flows. LFS employment can be decomposed into private sector and government. Government employment includes employment from local and central government, health authorities, universities and armed forces.\footnote{As the LFS is a household survey, the split is based on individuals self-reporting whether they work in the public sector and is therefore they are prone to misclassification error. See Gomes (2009) for a detailed study on UK labour market flows.}

Figure 3 shows the government employment, the job-separation and job-finding rates. Close to 22 percent of total employment is government employment. As in the United States, the turnover is higher in the private sector. Workers are 3 times more likely to lose their jobs (1.6 against 0.6 percent), but the unemployed are seven times more likely to find one there (23.6 against 3.4 percent).

\footnote{Strictly speaking, these regressions would only give an unbiased estimate of the two elasticities if the share of unemployed searching for a public sector job is constant. However, in Section 8 where I estimate the structural model, I find similar values.}
As there is no information on the vacancies by sector, I cannot estimate the matching
elasticity with respect to unemployment. However, the United Kingdom has a unique source
of data on the costs of recruiting. Every year, the Chartered Institute of Personal Develop-
ment carries out a survey of recruitment practices of around 800 organizations from different
sectors: manufacturing and production, private sector services, public sector services and
voluntary, community and not-for-profit (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development
(2009)). In the United Kingdom, the median firm takes 12 weeks to fill a vacancy while,
on average it takes 30 percent longer to recruit in the public sector. The costs of recruit-
ing, which encompass advertising and agency costs, are for the aggregate economy around
£4000, which corresponds to more than 8 weeks of the median income in United Kingdom
(£479 according to the ONS). On average in the public sector, these costs are 40 percent
lower.  

These values are in line with another study: “Recruiting Civil Servants efficiently” (Na-
tional Audit Office (2009)). This study analyses the recruitment practices of the six largest
organizations in central government between 2007 and 2008. It finds that on average it takes
16 weeks to recruit a new member of staff and it cost between £1600 and £2200.

3.3 Final calibration

The model is calibrated to match the US economy at a quarterly frequency. Table 2 shows the
baseline calibration and the implied steady-state values for some of the variables. Technology
in both sectors is normalised to 1.

Estimates of public sector wage premium have proved quite sensitive to the country
choice, education and sex of worker or even the sub-sector of the government. The survey
by Gregory and Borland (1999) places the premium between 0 and 10 percent. I set it close

\footnote{See appendix for the disaggregated values.}
Table 2: Baseline calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>( \alpha^p )</th>
<th>( \eta^p )</th>
<th>( \xi^p )</th>
<th>( \mu^p )</th>
<th>( \lambda^p )</th>
<th>( \omega^p )</th>
<th>( b^p )</th>
<th>( \phi^p )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha^g )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta^g )</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \xi^g )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Steady-state variables

- \( \bar{u} \) = 0.06
- \( \bar{q}^g \) = 2.5
- \( \bar{q}^p \) = 3.9
- \( \bar{f}^p \) = 0.79
- \( \bar{f}^g \) = 0.79
- \( \bar{p}^p \) = 0.79
- \( \bar{p}^g \) = 0.79
- \( \bar{s} \) = 0.20
- \( \bar{s} \) = 0.20
- \( \bar{W}^p \) = 0.42
- \( \bar{W}^g \) = 2.69

To the lower bound, at 2 percent (\( \pi \equiv \frac{\bar{w}}{\bar{w}} = 1.02 \)). Public employment is set to 0.15 of the labour force. I fix the quarterly separation rate in the private and public sectors at 0.06 and 0.03. The private sector matching elasticity with respect to unemployment, \( \eta^p \), is set to 0.5 while in the public sector is 0.2. The matching efficiency, \( \mu^i \), is calibrated to target an average time to fill a vacancy of 20 days in the private sector and 30 days in the public sector.

I consider the cost of posting a vacancy to be 2 in the private sector and 1.1 in the public sector. Given that the duration of a vacancy is higher in the public sector, these values imply an average cost of recruiting 15 percent lower than in the private sector. Under this calibration, the sum of recruitment costs correspond to 3 percent of the total labour costs, value found in Russo, Hassink, and Gorter (2005). It also implies that the cost of recruiting per hire is between 5 to 7 weeks of wages, which is consistent with the evidence presented for the United Kingdom and also with a study by Boca and Rota (1998).

For the model to satisfy the Hosios condition in the private sector, the worker’s share in the Nash bargaining is set to 0.5. The value of leisure in the utility function is calibrated, such that the unemployment rate in steady-state is 0.06 and implies an outside option equivalent to 42 percent of the average wage. I set the parameter \( \epsilon \) to 0 and the discount factor to 0.99.

The empirical evidence relative to the substitution elasticity between private and government consumption is not conclusive. Evans and Karras (1998) find that private consumption is complement to military expenditure and substitute to non-military expenditure. Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004), disaggregate expenditure into “public goods” (defence, public order, and justice) and “merit goods” (health, education, and other services). They find that “public goods” are substitutes and “merit goods” are complements to private consumption. As it is hard to select one value for \( \gamma \), I consider an elasticity of substitution of 1 (\( \gamma = 0.0 \)). The parameter \( \zeta \) is chosen such that the optimal level of public sector employment is 0.15.\(^6\)

\(^{6}\)In section 7 I discuss the cases where the goods are substitutes (\( \gamma = 0.5 \)) and complements (\( \gamma = -0.5 \)). Most of the results are unaffected.
4 Attaining the steady-state efficient allocation

The efficient steady-state allocation consists of a triplet of \( \{ \tilde{v}^p, \tilde{v}^g, \tilde{s} \} \). In order to achieve it, the government can post the optimal number of vacancies directly, but it still has to induce an optimal share of the unemployed searching for public sector jobs. The government can do so by choosing an appropriate level for the public sector wage.

Proposition 1 If the government sets the optimal level of public sector vacancies and sets a wage such that the share of unemployed searching for public sector is optimal then, if the bargaining power of the workers is equal to the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment in the private sector \((b = \eta^p)\), the level of vacancies in the private sector is optimal.

The proof is in Appendix, but the intuition is simple. It is the generalisation of the Hosios condition to an economy with a public sector. Let us assume the government sets its wage as a premium over the private sector:

\[ \tilde{w}^g = \pi \tilde{w}^p. \]

Even though we cannot get an analytical solution for the optimal wage ratio, we can find it numerically. Under the baseline calibration the optimal public sector wage is 3% lower than in the private sector. This value depends mainly on the difference between the friction parameters in the public and private sectors. Figure 4 shows how the optimal wage ratio varies with the parameters of the public sector and of the utility function.

When the cost of posting vacancies is lower or when the matching depends more on vacancies (lower \( \eta^g \)), it is more efficient to have more vacancies and fewer unemployed searching in the public sector. In order to induce it, the government should pay less to its workers. When the separation rate decreases or the matching becomes more efficient, many unemployed turn into the public sector but more than the optimal. The private incentive is too strong and thus the government should offer lower wages to correct this overshooting.

From the rest of the graphs we can see that the optimal wage does not depend on the coefficients of the utility function: \( \gamma, \zeta \) and \( \iota \), but it depends on the disutility of working \( (\chi) \) and on the productivity of the public sector. Higher \( \chi \), raises the value of employment in the private relative to the public sector, because people are more likely to have another spell of unemployment there. As it induces more unemployed to search in the private sector, the government needs to offer higher wages to offset it. If government jobs are less productive, the relative cost of posting vacancies is higher. Although the social planner wants fewer
government jobs, it prefers the new matches to be driven by the unemployment side, which requires higher public sector wages.

To investigate the consequences of paying more to public sector employees, I compare the unemployment rate and households’ welfare when the public sector wage is optimal (a gap of 3 percent) with the baseline case (a premium of 2 percent). The unemployment rate which was calibrated to 6 percent in the baseline steady-state, falls to 5 percent when the government sets the optimal wage. This happens because many unemployed that were queuing for public sector jobs, now find it more attractive to search in the private sector (from 20 to 3 percent), boosting job creation. The public sector wage is an important determinant of equilibrium unemployment. In terms of welfare, moving to the optimal wage generates a gain of 0.6 percent of steady-state consumption.
5 The effects of fiscal shocks

In this framework there are several possible fiscal shocks. We are able to distinguish shocks to wages from shocks to employment. Furthermore, an employment shock can be driven by hirings or by separations. We can represent the fiscal shocks as:

\[
\ln(\lambda_t^g) = \ln(\lambda^g) + \epsilon_t^l, \quad w_t^g = \bar{w}^g, \quad v_t^g = \bar{v}^g;
\]

\[
\ln(v_t^g) = \ln(\bar{v}^g) + \epsilon_t^v, \quad w_t^g = \bar{w}^g;
\]

\[
\ln(w_t^g) = \ln(\bar{w}^g) + \epsilon_t^w, \quad l_t^g = \bar{l}^g.
\]

The shocks \(\epsilon_t^i\) follow an AR(1) process with autocorrelation coefficient of 0.8. We start from the baseline steady-state. I assume that, under a hiring shock the government holds the public sector wage constant, while under a wage shock it maintains the level of employment constant.\(^7\) Finally, under the separation shock I consider that both the wage and vacancies are kept at their steady-state level.

Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of the variables to a separation rate and a vacancies shock that generate an increase of 6.6 percent of public sector employment, which corresponds to 1 percentage point of the labour force. The peak in government employment takes place 10 quarters after the shock. For comparison purposes I consider a shock to wages of 6.6 percent. In terms of magnitude, they are equivalent to a fiscal stimulus of around 1 percent of aggregate income.

Both employment shocks crowd out private sector employment through three channels. First, as there are fewer unemployed available the cost of hiring an extra worker increases. Second, either because the probability of getting a job is higher or the separation rate is lower, more unemployed search in the public sector which further reduces the firm’s vacancy-filling probability. Finally, as the overall job-finding probability increases so does the value of being unemployed, which raises the private sector wage through the wage bargaining.

Now, the question is whether the crowding out of private sector employment is partial, or whether it outweighs the increase in public sector employment and raises unemployment. Following the separation rate shock, the unemployment rate declines 0.2 percentage points but a vacancies shock raises unemployment rate by 0.4 percentage points. There are two

\(^7\)I could alternatively assume that under the wage shock the vacancies are constant. If the government sets the level of employment, it needs to post less vacancies to attract the same number of workers. If it maintains the number of vacancies, as more unemployed search for government jobs, public sector employment increases after a wage shock. Under this policy, the shock to wages also incorporates a shock to employment. This does not change qualitatively the results.
Figure 5: Response to fiscal shocks (Baseline steady-state)

Note: Solid line (vacancies shock); dash line (separations shock) and dotted line (wage shock). The response of the variables are in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment rate and the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs, which is in percentage points difference from the steady-state.

explanations for these reversed effects. First, an increase in employment through hiring induces many more unemployed to look for public sector jobs, rather than if it is done through retention of workers. Under the hiring shock, the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs goes up 12 percentage points, but only 2 percentage points following a separation shock. Additionally, the effect of a vacancy shock on the private sector wage is four times stronger than the shock to separations.

An increase in the public sector wage reduces private sector employment via two channels. On the one hand, the increase of the public sector wage spills over to the private sector, with an elasticity of around 0.05. On the other hand, it induces more unemployed to search for a job in the government, which reduces the probability of filling a vacancy for the firm. As a consequence, it posts fewer vacancies and unemployment rises.
Figure 6: Response of unemployment rate to fiscal shocks (baseline and efficient steady-state)

![Graph showing response of unemployment rate to fiscal shocks](image)

Note: Solid line (efficient steady-state) and dash line (baseline steady-state). The response is in percentage points difference from the steady-state.

All the fiscal shocks raise the private sector wage, even in the presence of a negative wealth effect. As they crowd out private production, they raise the marginal utility of private consumption, lowering the relative value of leisure. The increase in the probability of finding a job in the public sector or its value is large enough to offset this effect.

Figure 6 compares the response of the unemployment rate to fiscal shocks when we start from the efficient steady-state. With lower steady-state public sector wages, a hiring shock reduces unemployment, as opposed to when we start from the baseline steady-state. When the government opens new vacancies, if the wage rate is high, many more unemployed queue for these positions, thus enhancing the crowding out effect on private sector job creation.

The opposite effects of the different types of fiscal shocks on unemployment is an important result. The vast literature that tries to understand the effects of government spending tends to be inconclusive. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) find that after a military expenditure shock (both military purchases and employment) real wages go up, but Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) and Ramey and Shapiro (1998) find that after a government military purchases shock real wages go down. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Fatás and Mihov (2001) find that private consumption increases after a government consumption shock but Mountford and Uhlig (2008) and Ramey (2008) report a negative or zero response. Most of the discussion has focused on the technical methodology, particularly on the identification of fiscal shocks. In light of my results, I think the contradictory evidence is not due to methodological issues. Fiscal policy shocks can have different effects depending on the type of expenditure considered. Increasing 1 percent the wage of all employees is different from increasing employment by 1 percent. The model even suggests that the effects of government employment can be different, depending if the adjustment takes place through hiring or separations.
6 Public sector policies and the business cycle

One of the main conclusions of the Real Business Cycle literature is that governments should not pursue active business cycle policies. Although the model is, in essence, a real business cycle model with only real frictions, the policy prescription is quite different. Let’s examine the effects of a 1 percent negative private technology shock on the economy, under alternative government policies. I again consider an AR(1) shock with autoregressive coefficient of 0.9.

\[ \ln(a^p_t) = \ln(\bar{a}^p) + \epsilon^a_t. \]

Figure 7 shows the impulse responses, starting from the efficient steady-state, when the government follows the optimal rule. I contrast the optimal policy with simple rules for vacancies and wage, of the type:

\[ \log(v^g_t) = \log(\bar{v}^g) + \psi^v \left[ \log(v^p_t) - \log(\bar{v}^p) \right], \]  
\[ \log(w^g_{t+1}) = \log(\bar{w}^g) + \psi^w \left[ \log(w^p_t) - \log(\bar{w}^p) \right]. \]

Existing evidence by Lane (2003) and Lamo, Pérez, and Schuknecht (2008) suggest that public sector wages are less procyclical than private sector wages, particularly in the United States. For simplicity, I consider two cases where the public sector wage is acyclical \((\psi^w = 0)\). In one, the public sector vacancies decline proportionally to increases in private sector vacancies \((\psi^v = -1)\). In the second they are acyclical \((\psi^v = 0)\).

After the negative productivity shock, the private sector firm posts fewer vacancies, the probability of finding a job there decreases, and thus the unemployed increase their search of public sector jobs. The unemployment rate increases at most 0.05 percentage points, much less than after fiscal shocks. As pointed out by Shimer (2005), following technological shocks, the search and matching models are not able to generate enough fluctuations on unemployment.

The optimal government policy is to have countercyclical vacancies and procyclical wages. The argument for hiring more people in recessions is one of sector reallocation, different from the traditional demand argument (bringing to mind the famous metaphor of digging holes and covering them). If the private sector has lower productivity, it is better for the economy to absorb part of the unused labour force into the public sector. If the government jobs were not productive it would not be optimal to hire anyone in the first place.

\^8 Additionally, a study by Devereux and Hart (2006) using micro data for the United Kingdom, finds that for job movers in the private sector the wages are procyclical but for the public sector they are acyclical.
Figure 7: Response to a private sector technology shock under the optimal policy

Note: Solid line (optimal policy); dash line (countercyclical vacancies and acyclical wages) and dotted line (acyclical vacancies and wages). The response of the variables are in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment rate and the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs, which is in percentage points difference from the steady-state.

On the other hand, the public sector wage should follow the decline of the private sector wage. In recessions, if the government keeps its wage constant, it becomes more attractive relative to the private sector thus increasing the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs. This reduces the vacancy-filling probability in the private sector which further dampens job creation and amplifies the business cycle. We can see that under the two exogenous rules, the response of unemployment is much stronger. There is an increase of 1.6 percentage points of the share of unemployed searching of public sector jobs, much higher than under the optimal policy (0.02 percentage points).

Table 3 compares the standard deviation of the key variables under the alternative policies, as well as when there is no public sector. If the government follows the optimal rule,
the presence of public sector employment stabilises unemployment. However, if public sector wages are acyclical the volatility of unemployment increases twofold. The effects of the presence of public sector employment on the volatility of unemployment depends crucially on the government’s business cycle policy. The last column presents the welfare cost of business cycles under the different scenarios.\(^9\) When the public sector is absent, the welfare cost of fluctuations is very small - around 0.028 percent of steady-state consumption. This is a well known result from the literature. When the public sector is present, under the optimal policy the welfare cost of fluctuations is lower but if the government wages do not respond to the cycle, it can be up to four times higher.

In their paper, Quadrini and Trigari (2007) have two conclusions contrary to mine. First, that the best policy to stabilize total employment is to have procyclical public sector employment. Second, that the presence of the public sector increases the volatility of unemployment. In their model, the government does not choose their wage optimally. Instead, it sets a wage premium exogenously, which explains the disparity of the conclusions. As we have seen in the previous section, under a high public sector wage premium, after a hiring shock, the crowding out of private sector employment can be more than complete, raising unemployment. This switch alters the policy recommendations for government employment.

7 Extensions

7.1 Government services as goods bought from the private sector

To compare the results with the ones from a typical model of government consumption, I construct an extension where there is no public sector employment \((l_t^g = 0)\), but where the government buy its consumption good from the private sector \((c_t + g_t = y_t)\). I am interested in the response to a government consumption shock of 6.6 percent (Figure 8) and the optimal response of government consumption to a negative technology shock (shown in Appendix).

\(^9\)See appendix for details.
Figure 8: Response to a government consumption shock

Note: The response of the variables are in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment rate which is shown as percentage points difference from the steady-state.

There are three main differences relative to the benchmark model. Notice first, that the effects of a fiscal shock on private sector employment and wages are the opposite from the model with public sector employment. The wages go down because the reduction of private consumption raises its marginal utility, lowering the value of unemployment. Because of the direct stimulus, private employment goes up and unemployment goes down.

The second difference is the magnitude of the response of unemployment. A shock of 6.6 percent in government spending only reduces unemployment by 0.008 percentage points. Both technology and government consumption shocks have a small quantitative effect on unemployment. However, as public sector employment or wage shocks strike directly in the labour market, they have a much stronger effect. Finally, the differences are also visible in the optimal business cycle policy. In recessions, the government should buy fewer goods from the private sector, in order to equate the marginal utility of the two goods.

7.2 Productive sector public employment

A recent paper by Linnemann (2009) finds, in the context of a VAR, that a government employment shock generates a positive response of private sector employment. I want to see if this can be generated within the model, if we consider that public sector employment affects the productivity of the private sector. I consider that private sector technology follows:

\[
\ln(a^p_t) = \ln(\bar{a}^p) + \alpha[\ln(l^p_t) - \ln(\bar{P})].
\]  

(23)

In Appendix I show the responses of unemployment and private sector employment to a separation and vacancies shocks for different values of \( \alpha \). For higher levels of \( \alpha \), the crowding out effect on private employment is lower and therefore it has a larger negative impact on unemployment. However even with a value as high as 0.4, the crowding out is still substantial.
7.3 Different elasticities of substitution between goods

I have also re-done the exercises for the cases where the goods are substitutes or complements.\textsuperscript{10} Regarding employment shocks, the qualitative results do not depend on $\gamma$, and even quantitatively the differences are small. If the goods are complements, the increase in government services raises the marginal utility of the private good so the negative effect on private sector employment is smaller. If they are substitutes, the household reduces more private consumption, leading to a bigger crowding out of private sector employment.

With respect to the optimal business cycle policy, the result of counter-cyclical vacancies is only overturned if the goods are strong complements. If that is the case, during a recession, as the marginal utility of the government services falls with the consumption of the private good, the government should also decrease its vacancies. However, in all scenarios the public sector wage should follow the decline of the private sector wage.

7.4 Optimal policy under alternative sources of fluctuations

When discussing the optimal policy along the business cycle, I assumed it was generated by technology shocks of which the public sector was isolated. Now, I consider two alternative sources of fluctuations: an aggregate technology shock and a shock to the discount factor. The impulse responses are in the Appendix.

The result of procyclical wages holds for the two shocks, but the result of countercyclical vacancies is reversed. Following an economy-wide technological shock, as the public sector is also less productive, the argument for sector reallocation does not hold and the government should also decrease its vacancies. If people become more impatient, the present discounted value of a vacancy goes down. As it affects both sectors symmetrically, both the private sector and the government should decrease their vacancies and wages.

8 How important is the directed search between the public and the private sector?

The theoretical model has one important policy prescription: government wages should keep track of the private sector wages over the business cycle. If not, the volatility of unemployment is higher because of the fluctuation of the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs. It is clear that this result is entirely driven by the directed search

\textsuperscript{10}In my webpage one can find an appendix with all the results with alternative values of $\gamma$. 

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assumption. The aim of this section is to show that the assumption is realistic. I begin by presenting some evidence from micro-econometric studies.

As mentioned previously, public sector wage premium varies substantially within groups. As reported in Gregory and Borland (1999), the premium is much higher for females, veterans and minorities, and it is higher for federal government employees compared to state or local government employees. There are also differences across education levels. Katz and Krueger (1991) find that in the last twenty years, more educated individuals tend to be paid less in the public sector while individuals with less education tend to receive a higher premium. If people can direct their search, these differences should have repercussions.

Gregory and Borland (1999) report a number of studies that have found the existence of queues for federal public jobs. For example, Venti (1985) finds that for each federal government job opening, there are 2.8 men and 6.1 times as many women that want the job. Katz and Krueger (1991) find that blue collars are willing to queue to obtain public sector jobs whereas highly-skilled workers are hard to recruit and retain in the public sector. A recent study for the United Kingdom by Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) also finds evidence of job queuing for public sector jobs among low-employability individuals, whom face larger potential premia from working there.

Most studies that estimate the public sector wage premium use switching regression models. The idea is that the unemployed can self-select to work in the sectors in which they have more advantages. Blank (1985) finds that sectoral choice is influenced by wage comparison, among other factors. Heitmueller (2006) is able to quantify this effect and finds that an increase of 1 percent in the expected wage in the public sector, increases the probability of being employed there by 1.3 for man and 2.9 percent for women.

The micro evidence supports the directed search assumption but it does not imply that, from a macroeconomic perspective, the mechanism plays a role over the business cycle. In this section, I estimate a log-linearized version of the model using Bayesian methods as in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Sala, Söderström, and Trigari (2008). The main purpose is to evaluate the mechanism of directed search between the two sectors. Additionally, I can also assess the cyclicality of the public sector wages and vacancies, as well as get estimates for some of the key friction parameters.

8.1 Estimation preliminaries

In order to test if the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs fluctuates over the business cycle, I modify the equation determining it (10). The log-linearised expression
\[ \tilde{s}_t = \kappa (1 - \bar{s}) E_t (\tilde{x}_{t+1}^g - \tilde{x}_{t+1}^p - \tilde{m}_{t+1}^p + \tilde{m}_{t+1}^g), \]  

(24)

where \( \tilde{x}_t^i \) is the log-deviations from steady-state of \( W_t^i - U_t^i \). From the original expression, I have added the parameter \( \kappa \) that measures the significance of the mechanism. If it is close to 0, the data does not support the assumption. As in the theoretical section, I assume two rules for public sector wages and vacancies. However, I consider that each variable responds to a moving average of the private counterpart:

\[
\begin{align*}
\ln(v_{t}^g) &= \ln(\bar{v}_t^g) + \psi^v \left[ \frac{1}{4} \sum_{i=0}^{3} \ln(v_{t-i}^p) - \ln(\hat{v}_t^p) \right] + \ln(\omega_t^v), \\
\ln(w_{t+1}^g) &= \ln(\bar{w}_t^g) + \psi^w \left[ \frac{1}{4} \sum_{i=0}^{3} \ln(w_{t-i}^p) - \ln(\hat{w}_t^p) \right] + \ln(\omega_t^w).
\end{align*}
\]

Following one of the extensions, I allow the private sector technology to depend partially on the level of public sector employment, though a coefficient \( \alpha \).

\[
\ln(a_{t}^p) = \ln(\bar{a}_t^p) + \alpha (\ln(l_{t}^p) - \ln(\bar{p})) + \ln(\omega_t^a).
\]

I use US quarterly data from 1948:1 to 2007:1 for 6 variables: unemployment rate, government employment (% of labour force), government per employee real wage, private sector per hour real wage, aggregate job-separation rate and aggregate job-finding rate. The series of government per employee real wage is calculated by dividing total compensation of government workers from the NIPA tables, by total government employment. The monthly job-finding and job-separation rates are taken from Shimer (2007) and are transformed into quarterly, by allowing for multiple transitions between the two states within the quarter.\(^{11}\) All other variables are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

With the exception of the wages, all other variables are stationary. I use three alternative transformations of the data to estimate the model. In the first version the stationary variables enter in levels and the wages in demeaned log-differences. In the second version all variables enter in demeaned log-differences. In the third version all variables are detrended by regressing the log variables on a constant and a linear, quadratic and cubic trend. I include 6 different shocks: government vacancies, government wages, separation rates in both sectors, bargaining power and private sector technology. All the equations of the model in its log-linearized form and the relation of the observable variables with the model variables in each version can be found in Appendix.

\(^{11}\)For example, the job-finding rate is calculated as \( f^q = f^m (1 - \lambda^m)^2 + f^m \lambda^m f^m + (1 - f^m)^2 f^m (1 - f^m) f^m (1 - \lambda^m). \)
I calibrate the utility function parameter $\zeta$ to be equal to 0.18, $\beta$ to 0.99 and I normalise
the technology in both sectors to 1. In each iteration, the steady-state public sector vacancies
are set such that, in equilibrium, the employment in the sector is 0.15. As a consequence,
the scale parameter of the matching function cannot be identified so, in each iteration, the
public sector matching efficiency is such that the duration of a vacancy is 30 days. The
steady-state public sector wages are set as a premium over the private sector.

I assume the matching elasticities with respect to unemployment, the steady-state bar-
gaining power of the unemployed and the autoregressive coefficients of the shock process,
have a Beta distribution. I assume that the standard deviations of the shocks have a inverse
gamma distribution. All other parameters are assumed to be normally distributed. Given
the strong evidence presented in Section 3, the prior mean for the separation rates is 0.06
for the private and 0.03 for the public sector. However, as the matching elasticity in the
public sector came from a back-of-the-envelope calculation, I start with the prior that the
mean and standard deviation is the same across sectors. The prior distribution of $\kappa$ and of
the business cycle policy parameters is centered around 0 with a standard deviation of 0.3.

8.2 Results

I estimate the model with Bayesian methods. The likelihood function of the model is
combined with the prior distribution of the parameters to obtain the posterior distribution.
Then, 2,000,000 draws of the posterior are generated with the Metropolis Hastings algorithm,
where the step size is chosen such that the acceptance rate is around 1/3. The draws are
divided into five chains with different starting values. The first 20,000 draws of each chain
are dropped. Table 4 reports the prior distribution and the mean, the 5th and the 95th
percentile of the posterior distribution of the parameters.

The posterior distributions are similar across the 3 alternative versions. The mean of the
posterior distribution of $\kappa$, is always close 0.5 with the confidence interval between 0.35 and
0.6. This suggests that, although $s_t$ does not fluctuate as much as the model predicts, the
mechanism still has explanatory power.

The elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment is much lower in
the public sector. The posterior mean for the private sector is between 0.6 and 0.7, but only
0.2 in the public sector. The efficiency of the private sector matching function and the cost
of posting vacancies in the public sector do not seem to be identified. With respect to the

\[\text{See An and Schorfheide (2007) for a review.}\]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural parameters</th>
<th>Prior distribution</th>
<th>Posterior distribution</th>
<th>Detrended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity of substitution (public and private goods)</td>
<td>$\gamma$ Normal 0.071</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0,1) (-0.096,0.239)</td>
<td>(-0.148,0.226)</td>
<td>(-0.070,0.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disutility of work</td>
<td>$\chi$ Normal 0.362</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5,0.1) (0.211,0.509)</td>
<td>(0.259,0.561)</td>
<td>(0.200,0.483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour supply elasticity</td>
<td>$\iota$ Normal -0.004</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0,0.05) (-0.082,0.072)</td>
<td>(-0.082,0.079)</td>
<td>(-0.083,0.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of posting vacancy (private sector)</td>
<td>$\varsigma^p$ Normal 1.964</td>
<td>1.619</td>
<td>1.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.0,5) (1.194,2.735)</td>
<td>(0.806,2.393)</td>
<td>(0.456,1.859)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of posting vacancy (public sector)</td>
<td>$\varsigma^g$ Normal 1.037</td>
<td>1.080</td>
<td>1.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.0,1.030) (0.545,1.545)</td>
<td>(0.594,1.550)</td>
<td>(0.577,1.653)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matching efficiency (private sector)</td>
<td>$\eta^p$ Normal 2.071</td>
<td>2.120</td>
<td>2.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.0,2) (1.798,2.345)</td>
<td>(1.819,2.422)</td>
<td>(1.861,2.491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matching efficiency w.r.t. unemployment (private sector)</td>
<td>$\eta^p$ Beta 0.748</td>
<td>0.680</td>
<td>0.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0,0.1) (0.688,0.809)</td>
<td>(0.601,0.752)</td>
<td>(0.514,0.662)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matching efficiency w.r.t. unemployment (public sector)</td>
<td>$\eta^g$ Beta 0.243</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5,0.10) (0.159,0.328)</td>
<td>(0.123,0.298)</td>
<td>(0.103,0.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation rate (private sector)</td>
<td>$\lambda^p$ Normal 0.046</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0,0.006) (0.037,0.054)</td>
<td>(0.042,0.059)</td>
<td>(0.039,0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation rate (public sector)</td>
<td>$\lambda^g$ Normal 0.035</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0,0.005) (0.029,0.043)</td>
<td>(0.021,0.039)</td>
<td>(0.029,0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of direct search</td>
<td>$\kappa$ Normal 0.479</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0,0.3) (0.373,0.583)</td>
<td>(0.353,0.578)</td>
<td>(0.441,0.633)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity of public employment</td>
<td>$\alpha$ Normal 0.873</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td>0.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5,0.1) (0.834,0.915)</td>
<td>(0.781,0.895)</td>
<td>(0.788,0.888)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining power</td>
<td>$b$ Beta 0.987</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>0.889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5,0.15) (0.980,0.994)</td>
<td>(0.979,0.994)</td>
<td>(0.849,0.929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector wage premium</td>
<td>$\pi$ Normal 1.022</td>
<td>1.021</td>
<td>1.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.02,0.005) (1.014,1.030)</td>
<td>(1.013,1.029)</td>
<td>(1.014,1.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business cycle response of public sector wages</td>
<td>$\psi^w$ Normal 0.357</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0,0.3) (0.095,0.619)</td>
<td>(0.161,0.699)</td>
<td>(-0.391,0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business cycle response of public sector vacancies</td>
<td>$\psi^v$ Normal -0.532</td>
<td>-0.771</td>
<td>-0.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0,0.3) (-0.769,-0.288)</td>
<td>(-1.131,-0.435)</td>
<td>(-0.925,-0.351)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autoregressive parameters</th>
<th>Prior distribution</th>
<th>Posterior distribution</th>
<th>Detrended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Productivity</td>
<td>$\rho^a$ Beta 0.987</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>0.889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5,0.15) (0.980,0.994)</td>
<td>(0.979,0.994)</td>
<td>(0.849,0.929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector wage</td>
<td>$\rho^w$ Beta 0.978</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0.943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.5,0.15) (0.965,0.992)</td>
<td>(0.958,0.991)</td>
<td>(0.921,0.966)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public sector vacancies</td>
<td>$\rho^v$ Beta 0.916</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5,0.15) (0.860,0.977)</td>
<td>(0.139,0.837)</td>
<td>(0.237,0.423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector separation rate</td>
<td>$\rho^{lp}$ Beta 0.967</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5,0.15) (0.949,0.986)</td>
<td>(0.917,0.977)</td>
<td>(0.859,0.939)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public sector separation rate</td>
<td>$\rho^{lg}$ Beta 0.201</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5,0.15) (0.087,0.313)</td>
<td>(0.203,0.974)</td>
<td>(0.231,0.741)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining power</td>
<td>$\rho^b$ Beta 0.910</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>0.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5,0.15) (0.864,0.957)</td>
<td>(0.906,0.981)</td>
<td>(0.817,0.901)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard deviations</th>
<th>Prior distribution</th>
<th>Posterior distribution</th>
<th>Detrended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Productivity</td>
<td>$\sigma^a$ IGamma 0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01,0.15) (0.007,0.009)</td>
<td>(0.007,0.009)</td>
<td>(0.007,0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector wage</td>
<td>$\sigma^w$ IGamma 0.011</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01,0.15) (0.010,0.012)</td>
<td>(0.010,0.012)</td>
<td>(0.010,0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector vacancies</td>
<td>$\sigma^v$ IGamma 0.075</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01,0.15) (0.044,0.104)</td>
<td>(0.100,0.319)</td>
<td>(0.139,0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector separation rate</td>
<td>$\sigma^{lp}$ IGamma 0.100</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01,0.15) (0.079,0.121)</td>
<td>(0.061,0.072)</td>
<td>(0.062,0.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector separation rate</td>
<td>$\sigma^{lg}$ IGamma 0.122</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01,0.15) (0.094,0.150)</td>
<td>(0.002,0.115)</td>
<td>(0.002,0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining power</td>
<td>$\sigma^b$ IGamma 0.012</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01,0.15) (0.008,0.017)</td>
<td>(0.008,0.020)</td>
<td>(0.007,0.015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
policy, there is a countercyclical policy in vacancies with an estimated mean around \(-0.6\). Conversely, evidence on public sector wage policy is mixed. Two versions estimate \(\psi^w\) close to 0.4 but when we use the detrended variables, the mean is around \(-0.1\). It seems that public sector wages are slightly procyclical.

The posterior mean of the flow value of unemployment is around 0.35, while of the bargaining power is around 0.85. The posterior distribution of \(\gamma\) suggests that there might be a slight substitutability between the two goods. The posterior distribution of \(\alpha\) is centered around 0.15. This value suggests that public employment might increase the productivity of the private sector or, alternatively it might be capturing demand effects that are absent from the model.\(^{13}\)

### 8.3 Model Comparison

To show how the model with directed search performs, I compare it with two alternative models: one where there are no fluctuations in the share of unemployed searching in the public sector (\(\kappa = 0\)) and a model with random search, where the new matches depend only on the relative number of vacancies.\(^{14}\) I compare them from two angles. First, to see how well they explain the variables used in the estimation, I compare the logarithms of the marginal data density, computed using the Mean-Harmonic Estimator. An alternative way to compare the models is to look at the predictions for an unobserved variable. I use the Help-Wanted index as a proxy for private sector vacancies and look at its correlation with the predicted series, as well as compare the volatility of the two series. I also compare the prediction for labour market tightness. The results are shown in Table 5.

The marginal data density is higher for the directed search model, independently of the transformation of the data. If we look at the model estimated in differences, the numbers imply that we would need a prior probability over the directed search model parameters \(1.3 \times 10^{14} (= \exp(2963.3 - 2930.8))\) times larger than our prior over the random search model in order to reject the fact that the share of unemployed searching for a public sector jobs fluctuates in response to shocks.

\(^{13}\)I have also estimated the model for three subsamples of roughly 20 years: 1948:1 to 1967:3, 1967:4 to 1987:2 and 1987:3 to 2007:1. The main results are summarized graphically in appendix. The parameter \(\kappa\) was important in the first two periods (posterior mean close to 0.5), but its importance has diminished during the period of the great moderation. The parameter \(\alpha\) was quite high during the first period, suggesting that there were strong complementarities in the production function which have disappeared in the last two decades. All other parameters are quite stable.

\(^{14}\)Details in appendix.
Table 5: Model Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Marginal Prediction of vacancies</th>
<th>Prediction of tightness</th>
<th>Data Density</th>
<th>(\sigma^{ve}/\sigma^{vd})</th>
<th>Correlation ((\nu^{ve},\nu^{vd}))</th>
<th>(\sigma^{(\tilde{v})^{ve}}/\sigma^{(\tilde{v})^{vd}})</th>
<th>Correlation ((\tilde{v})^{ve},(\tilde{v})^{vd})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directed Search</td>
<td>4170.3</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directed Search ((\kappa = 0))</td>
<td>4153.2</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Search</td>
<td>4134.4</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences</td>
<td>2963.3</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directed Search ((\kappa = 0))</td>
<td>2949.5</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Search</td>
<td>2930.8</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detrended</td>
<td>3045.9</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directed Search ((\kappa = 0))</td>
<td>3029.3</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Search</td>
<td>3031.7</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The model that uses the differences in the observable variables does better than the other transformations, in predicting the behaviour of private sector vacancies, both in terms of volatility and correlation with actual vacancies and in terms of volatility. Within the models using differences, the Random search model does slightly better than the Directed search model in predicting actual vacancies, but it does poorly in predicting the volatility of labour market tightness.

9 Conclusion

This paper tries to understand the links between the public and the private sector through the labour market. I have built a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions, to analyse the effects of fiscal policies in the labour market and to determine the optimal employment and wage policy.

The first conclusion it that the public sector wage policy plays a key role in attaining the efficient allocation. Over the business cycle, as private sector wages fluctuate, the optimal response is to have a procyclical public sector wage. Otherwise, in recessions there will be too many people queuing for public sector jobs and in expansions few people will apply for them. Although I have abstracted from financing issues, this policy has an advantage of requiring a lower tax burden in recessions. Additionally, the baseline model suggest a leaning-against-the-wind vacancies policy. While the result of procyclical wage is very robust, the result of counter-cyclical vacancies should be interpreted with caution, because it does not hold in a number of settings: if the goods are complements, if the shocks affect both sectors symmetrically or if the steady-state wage is higher than optimum.
The second conclusion is that the response of unemployment to fiscal shocks depends on the type of shock considered. A reduction of separations lowers unemployment, an increase in wages always raises it, while hiring more people can increase or decrease unemployment. All shocks raise the wage and crowd out employment in the private sector. Conversely, when the government buys goods from the private sector, a fiscal shock lowers the wage and increases employment in the private sector. The mixed effects of the different components of government consumption on the labour market might be one reason why many empirical studies on the macroeconomic effects of government spending find ambiguous results.

Many of the model’s results rely on the assumption that unemployed can direct their search between the private and the public sector. I believe that this mechanism is playing a significant role during the current recession. A casual look in the newspaper gives the impression that the unemployed are turning to the public sector for jobs, but also that the wages there have not suffered as much as in the private sector. Albeit great praise for their reactions against the economic crises, governments can still do better.

References


Appendix I - Extensions

Figure A1: Optimal policy with government consumption

Note: The response of the variables are in percentage of their steady-state value, except for unemployment rate which is in percentage points difference from steady-state.

Figure A2: Response to a public employment shock

Note: Solid line ($\alpha = 0.0$); dash line ($\alpha = 0.2$) and dotted line ($\alpha = 0.4$). The response of the private employment is in percentage of its steady-state value and unemployment rate in percentage points difference from steady-state.
Note: The response of the variables are in percentage of their steady-state value, except for unemployment rate which is in percentage points difference from steady-state.
Appendix II - Derivations

**Social Planner's Problem**

The social planner's problem is to maximize the consumers lifetime utility (4) subject to the technology constraints (16) and (11) and the labour market conditions: (1)-(3). Setting up the lagrangean:

\[
\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t+k} \left\{ u(a_{t+k}^p l_{t+k} - \varsigma^p v_{t+k}^p, a_{t+k}^g l_{t+k}^g - \varsigma^g v_{t+k}^g) - \nu(l_{t+k}) \\
- \Omega^1_{t+k} [q_{t+k}^p - (1 - \lambda^p) l_{t+k} - m((1 - s_{t+k})(1 - p_{t+k}^p - l_{t+k}^q), v_{t+k}^q)] \\
- \Omega^2_{t+k} [q_{t+k}^g - (1 - \lambda^g) l_{t+k}^g - m(s_{t+k}(1 - p_{t+k}^g - l_{t+k}^q), v_{t+k}^g)] \right\}
\]

The first order conditions are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\nu^c_t & : u_c(c_t, g_t) s^p = \Omega^1_t (1 - \eta^p) g_t^p \\
\nu^g_t & : u_g(c_t, g_t) s^g = \Omega^2_t (1 - \eta^g) g_t^g \\
s_t & : \frac{\Omega^2_t \eta^g m^g_t}{\varsigma^g} = \frac{\Omega^1_t \eta^p m^c_t}{1 - \varsigma^c}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
p^c_{t+1} & : \Omega^1_t = \beta \{ a^p_{t+1} u_c(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1}) - \nu(l_{t+1}) + \Omega^1_{t+1} (1 - \lambda^p) - \Omega^1_{t+1} \eta^p \frac{m^c_{t+1}}{u_{t+1}} - \Omega^2_{t+1} \eta^g \frac{m^g_{t+1}}{u_{t+1}} \} \\
p^g_{t+1} & : \Omega^2_t = \beta \{ a^g_{t+1} u_g(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1}) - \nu(l_{t+1}) + \Omega^2_{t+1} (1 - \lambda^g) - \Omega^1_{t+1} \eta^p \frac{m^c_{t+1}}{u_{t+1}} - \Omega^2_{t+1} \eta^g \frac{m^g_{t+1}}{u_{t+1}} \}
\end{align*}
\]

Plugging the first two equations on the third gives the implicit expression for optimal level of search in the each sector:

\[
\frac{u_c(c_t, g_t) s^g \eta^g}{(1 - \eta^g)s_t} = \frac{u_g(c_t, g_t) s^p \eta^p}{(1 - \eta^p)(1 - s_t)}
\]

If we rewrite the third first order condition as \( \Omega^2_t \eta^g M^g_t + \Omega^1_t \eta^p M^c_t = \frac{\Omega^2_t \eta^g M^g_t}{s_t} = \frac{\Omega^1_t \eta^p M^c_t}{1 - s_t} \) we can use it to simplify the last two conditions and get:

\[
\begin{align*}
\varsigma^p_{q_t} & = \frac{\beta u_c(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1})}{u_c(c_t, g_t)} \left\{ (1 - \eta^p) a^p_{t+1} - (1 - \eta^p) \frac{\nu(l_{t+1})}{u_c(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1})} + (1 - \lambda^p) \frac{\varsigma^p}{q_{t+1}^p} - \frac{\eta^p \varsigma^p v_{t+1}^p}{(1 - s_{t+1})u_{t+1}} \right\} \\
\varsigma^g_{q_t} & = \frac{\beta u_g(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1})}{u_g(c_t, g_t)} \left\{ (1 - \eta^g) a^g_{t+1} - (1 - \eta^g) \frac{\nu(l_{t+1})}{u_g(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1})} + (1 - \lambda^g) \frac{\varsigma^g}{q_{t+1}^g} - \frac{\eta^g \varsigma^g v_{t+1}^g}{s_{t+1}u_{t+1}} \right\}
\end{align*}
\]
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1

Plugging the steady-state expressions for the value of job, unemployment and employment in the Nash sharing rule gives us:

\[
(1 - b) \frac{\bar{w}^p - \nu u_c}{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda^p - \frac{\bar{m}^p}{(1 - s)\bar{a}})} = b \frac{\bar{a}^p - \bar{w}^p}{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda^p)}
\]

The decision rule for private sector vacancies is given by the free entry condition of firms:

\[
\frac{\varsigma^p}{\beta \bar{q}^p} (1 - \beta (1 - \lambda^p)) = [\bar{a}^p - \bar{w}^p]
\]

Combining the two equations using \((\bar{a}^p - \bar{w}^p)\)

\[
\bar{w}^p - \frac{\nu u_c}{u_c} = (1 - \beta(1 - \lambda^p - \frac{\bar{m}^p}{(1 - s)\bar{a}})) \frac{b \varsigma^p}{(1 - b)\bar{q}^p \beta}
\]

Adding this equation to the free entry condition

\[
[\bar{a}^p - \frac{\nu u_c}{u_c}] = (1 - \beta (1 - \lambda^p)) \frac{\varsigma^p}{(1 - b)\bar{q}^p \beta} + \frac{b \varsigma^p \bar{m}^p}{(1 - s)\bar{a}(1 - b)\bar{q}^p}
\]

If we simplify it:

\[
[\bar{a}^p - \frac{\nu u_c}{u_c}] = (1 - \beta (1 - \lambda^p)) \frac{\varsigma^p}{(1 - b)\bar{q}^p \beta} + \frac{b \varsigma^p \bar{m}^p}{(1 - s)\bar{a}(1 - b)\bar{q}^p}
\]

The expression can be written as:

\[
(1 - \beta (1 - \lambda^p)) \frac{\varsigma^p}{\bar{q}^p} = \beta [(1 - b)(\bar{a}^p - \frac{\nu u_c}{u_c}) - \frac{b \varsigma^p \bar{m}^p}{(1 - s)\bar{a}(1 - b)\bar{q}^p}]
\]

Which is equivalent to the social planner’s first order condition for private sector vacancies if \(b = \eta^p\).

WELFARE COSTS OF HIGH PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES

Let \(\{c_{opt}, g_{opt}, l_{opt}\}\) be the steady state private and government consumption under the optimal public sector wage and \(\{\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l}\}\) the allocation under an exogenous public sector wage. We want to find out what is the welfare gain as a percentage of steady state private consumption of having public sector wage moving towards the optimum. This is given by \(x\)
that solves the following equation:

\[ u(c_{opt}, g_{opt}) - \nu(l_{opt}) = u((1 + x)c, g) - \nu(l) \]

Using the utility functions,

\[ x = \frac{\exp[\ln(c_{opt}^\gamma + \zeta g_{opt}^\gamma) + \gamma \chi(l - l_{opt})] - \zeta g^\gamma}{c} - 1, \gamma \neq 0 \]

If \( \gamma = 0 \), the utility function of consumption is not defined, so I use the equivalent \( u(c_t, g_t) = \ln(c_t) + \zeta \ln(g_t) \), so the welfare cost in terms of steady state consumption is given by:

\[ x = \frac{\exp[\ln(c_{opt}) + \zeta (\ln g_{opt} - \ln \bar{g}) + \chi(l - l_{opt})]}{\bar{c}} - 1, \gamma = 0 \]

**Welfare costs of business cycles**

I want to calculate the welfare costs of business cycles, when the economy is subject to technology shocks, under different policies for \( \{v^g_t, w^g_t\} \). Let us start by defining the variables in log deviations from the steady state:

\[
\tilde{c}_t = \log\left(\frac{c_t}{\bar{c}}\right) \quad c_t = \bar{c} \exp(\tilde{c}_t) \\
\tilde{g}_t = \log\left(\frac{g_t}{\bar{g}}\right) \quad g_t = \bar{g} \exp(\tilde{g}_t) \\
\tilde{l}_t = \log\left(\frac{l_t}{\bar{l}}\right) \quad l_t = \bar{l} \exp(\tilde{l}_t)
\]

If we do a second order approximation to the variables around the steady state \( \{\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l}\} \)

\[
c_t = \bar{c}(1 + \tilde{c}_t + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{c}_t^2) + o(3) \\
g_t = \bar{g}(1 + \tilde{g}_t + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{g}_t^2) + o(3) \\
l_t = \bar{l}(1 + \tilde{l}_t + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{l}_t^2) + o(3)
\]

The second order approximation of the utility function gives:

\[
U(c_t, g_t, l_t) = U(\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l}) + U_c(\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l})[c_t - \bar{c}] + U_g(\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l})[g_t - \bar{g}] + U_l(\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l})[l_t - \bar{l}] + \\
\frac{1}{2}U_{cc}(\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l})[c_t - \bar{c}]^2 + \frac{1}{2}U_{gg}(\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l})[g_t - \bar{g}]^2 + \frac{1}{2}U_{ll}(\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l})[l_t - \bar{l}]^2 + \\
U_{cg}(\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l})[c_t - \bar{c}][g_t - \bar{g}] + U_{cl}(\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l})[c_t - \bar{c}][l_t - \bar{l}] + U_{gl}(\bar{c}, \bar{g}, \bar{l})[g_t - \bar{g}][l_t - \bar{l}] + o(3)
\]

But for it to be a correct second order approximation we have to plug in the second order approximation of the variables. As we assume additive separability of the utility functions,
we can drop the cross terms of the consumption goods with employment.

\[
U(c_t, g_t, l_t) = U(c, \bar{g}, \bar{l}) + U_c(c, \bar{g}, \bar{l}) [\dot{c}(c_t + \frac{1}{2} \dot{c}_t^2)] + U_g(c, \bar{g}, \bar{l}) [\dot{\bar{g}}(\bar{g}_t + \frac{1}{2} \bar{g}_t^2)] + U_l(c, \bar{g}, \bar{l}) [\bar{l}(\bar{l}_t + \frac{1}{2} \bar{l}_t^2)] \\
+ \frac{1}{2} U_{cc}(c, \bar{g}, \bar{l}) [\dot{c}(c_t + \frac{1}{2} \dot{c}_t^2)]^2 + \frac{1}{2} U_{gg}(c, \bar{g}, \bar{l}) [\dot{\bar{g}}(\bar{g}_t + \frac{1}{2} \bar{g}_t^2)]^2 + \frac{1}{2} U_{l\bar{l}}(c, \bar{g}, \bar{l}) [(\bar{l}_t + \frac{1}{2} \bar{l}_t^2)]^2 \\
+ U_{cg}(c, \bar{g}) [\dot{c}(c_t + \frac{1}{2} \dot{c}_t^2)] [\dot{\bar{g}}(\bar{g}_t + \frac{1}{2} \bar{g}_t^2)] + o(3)
\]

Collecting terms and substituting the derivatives,

\[
U(c_t, g_t, l_t) = U(c, \bar{g}, \bar{l}) + u_c \ddot{c} + u_g \ddot{\bar{g}} + u_l \ddot{\bar{l}} + \\
\frac{\ddot{c}}{2} (c u_{cc} + u_c) \dot{c}_t^2 + \frac{\ddot{\bar{g}}}{2} (g u_{gg} + u_g) \dot{g}_t^2 - \frac{\ddot{\bar{l}}}{2} (l u_{l\bar{l}} + u_l) \dot{l}_t^2 + u_{cg}(c, \bar{g}) \bar{c} \bar{g} \bar{c}_t \bar{g}_t + o(3)
\]

and take the unconditional expectation, we can write the welfare loss in terms of the moments of the variables:

\[
E[u(c_t, g_t) - \nu(l_t) - u(c, \bar{g}) + \nu(\bar{l})] \approx u_c \bar{c} E[\ddot{c}] + u_g \ddot{\bar{g}} E[\ddot{\bar{g}}] - \nu l E[\ddot{l}] + \frac{\ddot{c}}{2} (c u_{cc} + u_c) E[\dot{c}_t^2] + \\
\frac{\ddot{\bar{g}}}{2} (g u_{gg} + u_g) E[\dot{g}_t^2] - \frac{\ddot{\bar{l}}}{2} (l u_{l\bar{l}} + u_l) E[\dot{l}_t^2] + u_{cg}(c, \bar{g}) \bar{c} \bar{g} E[\ddot{\bar{g}}_t] \equiv \Xi
\]

I solve the model up to a second order, using perturbation methods, simulate it for 50000 periods and compute the moments of the variables to find the value of \( \Xi \). If we want to express the welfare costs in terms of percentage of steady state consumption we solve the following equation:

\[
u((1-x)\bar{c}, \bar{g}) - u(\bar{c}, \bar{g}) = \Xi
\]

For the CES function, the derivatives are given by:

\[
u_c(c, \bar{g}) = \frac{c^{\gamma-1}}{\bar{c}^{\gamma} + \zeta \bar{g}^\gamma}
\]

\[
u_g(c, \bar{g}) = \frac{\zeta \bar{g}^{\gamma-1}}{\bar{c}^{\gamma} + \zeta \bar{g}^\gamma}
\]

\[
u_{cc}(c, \bar{g}) = \frac{(\gamma - 1) c^{\gamma-2}}{\bar{c}^{\gamma} + \zeta \bar{g}^\gamma} - \frac{\gamma c^{2\gamma-2}}{(\bar{c}^{\gamma} + \zeta \bar{g}^\gamma)^2}
\]

\[
u_{gg}(c, \bar{g}) = \frac{(\gamma - 1) \zeta \bar{g}^{\gamma-2}}{\bar{c}^{\gamma} + \zeta \bar{g}^\gamma} - \frac{\zeta^2 \bar{g}^{2\gamma-2}}{(\bar{c}^{\gamma} + \zeta \bar{g}^\gamma)^2}
\]

\[
u_{cg}(c, \bar{g}) = \frac{-\gamma \zeta \bar{g}^{\gamma-1} c^{\gamma-1}}{(\bar{c}^{\gamma} + \zeta \bar{g}^\gamma)^2}
\]
\[ \nu_l(l) = -\chi l \]
\[ \nu_t(l) = -\chi u l^{-1} \]

And the expression for the welfare cost is:

\[ \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln[((1 - x)\bar{c})^\gamma + \zeta \bar{g}^\gamma] - \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln[\bar{c}^\gamma + \zeta \bar{g}^\gamma] = \Xi \]

\[ x = 1 - \left\{ \exp[\gamma \Xi + \ln(\bar{c}^\gamma + \zeta \bar{g}^\gamma)] - \zeta \bar{g}^\gamma \right\}^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}, \gamma \neq 0 \]

If \( \gamma = 0 \) the solution is given by:

\[ x = 1 - \frac{\exp\{\Xi + \ln \bar{c}\}}{\bar{c}} \]

**Extension: Government Consumption**

The lagrangean of the social planner’s problem is:

\[
\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t+k} \left\{ u(a_{t+k}^p l_{t+k}^p - \chi^p v_{t+k}^p - g_{t+k}, g_{t+k} - \nu(p_{t+k}^p) - \Omega_{t+k}^1 [p_{t+k+1}^p - (1 - \lambda^p) v_{t+k}^p - m(1 - l_{t+k}^p, v_{t+k}^p)] \right\}
\]

The first order conditions are given by:

\[
\frac{\zeta^p}{q_t^p} = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{u_c(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1})}{u_c(c_t, g_t)} [(1 - \eta^p) a_{t+1}^p + (1 - \eta^p) \nu(l_{t+1}^p) v_{t+1}^p + (1 - \lambda^p) \frac{\zeta^p}{q_{t+1}^p} - \eta^p \zeta^p v_{t+1}^p] \right\} \quad (25)
\]

\[ u_c(c_t, g_t) = u_g(c_t, g_t) \quad (26) \]

**Appendix III - Bayesian estimation**

**Estimated model in levels**

The labour market is described by the following equations:

\[ 1 = l_t^p + l_t^q + u_t \quad (A1) \]

\[ l_{t+1}^p = (1 - \lambda_t^p) l_t^p + m_t^p \quad (A2) \]
\[
I_{t+1}^g = (1 - \lambda_t^g)I_t^g + m_t^g \\
\]
(A3)

\[
m_t^p = \mu^p((1 - s_t)u_t)^{\eta_p}(v_t^p)^{1-\eta_p} \\
\]
(A4)

\[
m_t^q = \mu^q(s_t u_t)^{\eta_q}(v_t^q)^{1-\eta_q} \\
\]
(A5)

\[
q_t^p = \frac{m_t^p}{v_t^p} \\
\]
(A6)

\[
p_t^p = \frac{m_t^p}{(1 - s_t)u_t} \\
\]
(A7)

\[
p_t^q = \frac{m_t^q}{s_t u_t} \\
\]
(A8)

The marginal utility of consumption and the stochastic discount factor.

\[
u_c(c_t, g_t) = \frac{c_t^{\gamma-1}}{c_t^{\gamma} + \zeta g_t^{\gamma}} \\
\]
(A9)

\[
\nu_t(l_t) = \chi(l_t^{p} + l_t^{q})^{\gamma} \\
\]
(A10)

\[
\beta_{t,t+1} = \beta \frac{u_c(c_{t+1}, g_{t+1})}{u_c(c_t, g_t)} \\
\]
(A11)

I define a new variable that is the difference between the value of working and being unemployed \(x_t^i\). I use it to re-write the equation that pins down the \(s_t\) and the Nash bargaining equation.

\[
x_t^p = W_t^p - U_t^p = w_t^p - \frac{\nu_t(l_t)}{u_c(c_t, g_t)} + E_t \beta_{t,t+1}(1 - \lambda_t^p - p_t^p)x_{t+1}^p \\
\]
(A12)

\[
x_t^q = W_t^q - U_t^q = w_t^q - \frac{\nu_t(l_t)}{u_c(c_t, g_t)} + E_t \beta_{t,t+1}(1 - \lambda_t^q - p_t^q)x_{t+1}^q \\
\]
(A13)

\[
J_t = a_t^p - w_t^p + E_t [1 - \lambda_t^p]J_{t+1} \\
\]
(A14)

\[
\frac{m_t^p E_t[x_t^{p+1}]}{(1 - s_t)} = \frac{m_t^q E_t[x_t^{q+1}]}{s_t} \\
\]
(A15)
\[(1 - b_t) x_t^p = b_t J_t \quad (A16)\]

Finally we have the production functions, the equation that determines the firm’s optimal vacancy posting and the policy equations.

\[c_t = a_t^p l_t^p - \varsigma^p v_t^p \quad (A17)\]

\[g_t = a_t^g l_t^g - \varsigma^g v_t^g \quad (A18)\]

\[\frac{\varsigma^p}{q_t^p} = E_t \beta_{t, t+1} [a_{t+1}^p - w_{t+1}^p + (1 - \lambda_t^p) \frac{\varsigma^p}{q_{t+1}^p}] \quad (A19)\]

\[\ln(v_t^g) = \ln(\bar{v}^g) + \psi^v \left[ \sum_{i=0}^{3} \ln(v_{t-i}^p) - \ln(\bar{v}^p) \right] + \ln(\omega_t^v) \quad (A20)\]

\[\ln(w_t^g) = \ln(\bar{w}^g) + \psi^w \left[ \sum_{i=0}^{3} \ln(w_{t-i}^p) - \ln(\bar{w}^p) \right] + \ln(\omega_t^w) \quad (A21)\]

\[\ln(a_t^v) = \ln(\bar{a}^v) + \alpha (\ln(l_t^g) - \ln(\bar{l}^g)) + \ln(\omega_t^a) \quad (A22)\]

I include 6 different shocks: a shock to government vacancies, to government wages, to private and public separation rates, private sector bargaining power and to technology. These shocks are described in the following equations:

\[\ln(\omega_t^v) = \rho^v \ln(\omega_{t-1}^v) + \epsilon_t^v \quad (A23)\]

\[\ln(\omega_t^w) = \rho^w \ln(\omega_{t-1}^w) + \epsilon_t^w \quad (A24)\]

\[\ln(\omega_t^a) = \rho^a \ln(\omega_{t-1}^a) + \epsilon_t^a \quad (A25)\]

\[\ln(\lambda_t^g) = (1 - \rho^g) \ln(\bar{\lambda}^g_t) + \rho^g \ln(\lambda_{t-1}^g) + \epsilon_t^g \quad (A26)\]

\[\ln(\lambda_t^p) = (1 - \rho^p) \ln(\bar{\lambda}^p_t) + \rho^p \ln(\lambda_{t-1}^p) + \epsilon_t^p \quad (A27)\]
\[
\ln(b_t) = (1 - \rho^b) \ln(b) + \rho^b \ln(b_{t-1}) + \epsilon^b
\]  
\hspace{1cm} (A28)

Finally, I define that overall separation rate and job finding rates:
\[
f_t = \frac{m^p_t + m^g_t}{u_t}
\]  
\hspace{1cm} (A29)

\[
\Lambda_t = \frac{\lambda^p_t l_t + \lambda^g t^g}{l^p_t + l^g_t}
\]  
\hspace{1cm} (A30)

**Estimated model - steady state**

I determine that the government employment in steady state is 0.15. As there is no recursive way to write the steady state values of the equations, they solve the following nonlinear system of equations:

\[
\bar{l}^g = 0.15
\]

\[
\bar{l}^p = 1 - \bar{l}^g - \bar{u}
\]

\[
m^p = \lambda^p \bar{l}^p
\]

\[
m^g = \lambda^g \bar{l}^g
\]

\[
m^p = \mu^p ((1 - \bar{s}) \bar{u})^{\eta^p} (\bar{v}^p)^{1 - \eta^p}
\]

\[
m^g = \mu^g (\bar{s} \bar{u})^{\eta^g} (\bar{v}^g)^{1 - \eta^g}
\]

\[
p^p_t = \frac{\bar{m}^p}{(1 - \bar{s}) \bar{u}}
\]

\[
p^g_t = \frac{\bar{m}^g}{\bar{s} \bar{u}}
\]

\[
p^p = \frac{\bar{m}^p}{\bar{v}^p}
\]

\[
\bar{x}^g = \frac{\bar{w}^g - \frac{\bar{v}}{\bar{u}^g}}{1 - \beta (1 - \lambda^g - \bar{y}^g)}
\]

\[
\bar{x}^p = \frac{\bar{w}^p - \frac{\bar{v}}{\bar{u}^p}}{1 - \beta (1 - \lambda^p - \bar{y}^p)}
\]

\[
\bar{m}^p \bar{x}^p \bar{s} = \bar{m}^g \bar{x}^g (1 - \bar{s})
\]

\[
(1 - b)(\bar{x}^p) = b \bar{J}
\]
\[
\bar{J} = \frac{\bar{a}^p - \bar{w}^p}{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda^p)}
\]

\[
\frac{\varsigma^p}{\bar{q}^p} (1 - \beta(1 - \lambda^p)) = \beta (\bar{a}^p - \bar{w}^p)
\]

\[
\bar{w}^g = \pi \bar{w}^p
\]

\[
\bar{c} = \bar{a}^p \bar{p}^p - \varsigma^p \bar{v}^p
\]

\[
\bar{g} = \bar{a}^g \bar{p}^g - \varsigma^g \bar{v}^g
\]

\[
u_t = \chi (\bar{p}^p + \bar{p}^g)^c
\]

\[
\bar{f} = \frac{\bar{m}^p + \bar{m}^g}{\bar{u}}
\]

\[
\bar{\Lambda} = \frac{\lambda^p \bar{p}^p + \lambda^g \bar{p}^g}{\bar{p}^p + \bar{p}^g}
\]

**Estimated Log-linearized Model**

The variables with tilde are expressed in deviations from steady state.

\[
0 = \bar{p}^p \bar{p}^p_t + \bar{p}^g \bar{p}^g_t + \bar{u}_t (L1)
\]

\[
\bar{p}^p_{t+1} = (1 - \lambda^p) \bar{p}^p_t - \bar{\lambda}^p \bar{m}^p_t + \bar{\lambda}^p \bar{m}^p_t (L2)
\]

\[
\bar{p}^g_{t+1} = (1 - \lambda^g) \bar{p}^g_t - \bar{\lambda}^g \bar{m}^g_t + \bar{\lambda}^g \bar{m}^g_t (L3)
\]

\[
\bar{m}^p_t = \eta^p (\bar{u}_t - \frac{s}{1 - s} \bar{s}_t) + (1 - \eta^p) \bar{v}^p_t (L4)
\]

\[
\bar{m}^g_t = \eta^g (\bar{u}_t + \bar{s}_t) + (1 - \eta^g) \bar{v}^g_t (L5)
\]

\[
\bar{u}_t = \bar{m}^p_t - \bar{v}^p_t (L6)
\]

\[
\bar{p}^p_t = \bar{m}^p_t + \frac{s}{1 - s} \bar{s}_t - \bar{u}_t (L7)
\]
\( \bar{t}_t = \bar{m}_t - \bar{s}_t - \bar{u}_t \) \hspace{1cm} (L8)

\[ \bar{u}_c(c_t, \bar{g}_t) = \bar{c}_t (\gamma - 1 - \frac{\gamma g^\gamma}{c^\gamma + \zeta g^\gamma}) - \bar{g}_t \left( \frac{\zeta g^\gamma}{c^\gamma + \zeta g^\gamma} \right) \] \hspace{1cm} (L9)

\[ \bar{v}_t(\bar{u}_t) = -\frac{1}{1 - \bar{u}_t} \] \hspace{1cm} (L10)

\[ \beta_{t,t+1} = E_t[\bar{u}_c(c_{t+1}, \bar{g}_{t+1}) - \bar{u}_c(c_t, \bar{g}_t)] \] \hspace{1cm} (L11)

\[ \bar{x}_t = \frac{\bar{w}_t}{\bar{x}_t} \bar{w}_t^p - \frac{\bar{v}_t}{\bar{x}_t \bar{u}_c} (\bar{v}_t - \bar{u}_c) - \beta(\bar{X}_t^\lambda \bar{X}_t^\mu + \bar{p}_t^p \bar{p}_t^p) + \beta(1 - \bar{\lambda}_t^\rho - \bar{p}_t^\rho) E_t(\bar{x}_{t+1}^p + \beta_{t,t+1}) \] \hspace{1cm} (L12)

\[ \bar{x}_t = \frac{\bar{w}_t}{\bar{x}_t} \bar{w}_t^g - \frac{\bar{v}_t}{\bar{x}_t \bar{u}_c} (\bar{v}_t - \bar{u}_c) - \beta(\bar{X}_t^\lambda \bar{X}_t^g + \bar{p}_t^g \bar{p}_t^g) + \beta(1 - \bar{\lambda}_t^g - \bar{p}_t^g) E_t(\bar{x}_{t+1}^g + \beta_{t,t+1}) \] \hspace{1cm} (L13)

\[ \bar{J}_t = \frac{\bar{a}_t}{\bar{J}_t} \bar{a}_t^p - \frac{\bar{w}_t}{\bar{J}_t} \bar{w}_t^p + \beta E_t((1 - \bar{\lambda}_t^\mu) \bar{\beta}_t + (1 - \bar{\lambda}_t^p) \bar{J}_{t+1} - \bar{\lambda}_t^\mu \bar{\lambda}_t^p) \] \hspace{1cm} (L14)

To test the relevance of the directed search assumption I add the parameter \( \kappa \) to the log-linearized equation that determines \( \bar{s}_t \)

\[ \bar{s}_t = \kappa (1 - \bar{s}) E_t(\bar{x}_t^p - \bar{x}_{t+1}^p - \bar{m}_t^p + \bar{m}_t^g) \] \hspace{1cm} (L15)

\[ \bar{J}_t + \frac{1}{1 - b} \bar{b}_t = \bar{x}_t^p \] \hspace{1cm} (L16)

\[ \bar{c}_t = \frac{\bar{a}_t^p \bar{p}_t^p}{\bar{c}_t} (\bar{a}_t^p + \bar{p}_t^p) - \bar{s}_t \bar{a}_t^p \bar{p}_t^p \] \hspace{1cm} (L17)

\[ \bar{g}_t = \frac{\bar{a}_t^g \bar{g}_t^p}{\bar{g}_t} (\bar{a}_t^g + \bar{g}_t^p) - \bar{s}_t \bar{a}_t^g \bar{g}_t^p \] \hspace{1cm} (L18)

\[ -\frac{s^p}{q^p} \bar{q}_t^p = \beta[\bar{a}_t^p \bar{a}_{t+1}^p - \bar{w}_t^p \bar{w}_{t+1}^p - (1 - \bar{\lambda}_t^p)^\frac{s^p}{q^p} \bar{q}_{t+1}^p - \bar{\lambda}_t^p \bar{X}_t^\mu \bar{p}_t^p + (\bar{a}_t - \bar{w}_t^p + (1 - \bar{\lambda}_t^p) \frac{s^p}{q^p} \bar{\beta}_t)] \] \hspace{1cm} (L19)

\[ \bar{u}_t^p = \psi^p \bar{v}_t^p + \bar{v}_{t-1}^p + \bar{v}_{t-2}^p + \bar{v}_{t-3}^p + \bar{w}_t^p \] \hspace{1cm} (L20)

\[ \bar{w}_{t+1}^g = \psi^w \bar{w}_t^g + \bar{w}_{t-1}^g + \bar{w}_{t-2}^g + \bar{w}_{t-3}^g + \bar{w}_t^w \] \hspace{1cm} (L21)
\[ \tilde{a}_t^p = \alpha \tilde{a}_t^g + \omega_t^g \]  
\[ \tilde{\omega}_t^v = \rho^v \tilde{\omega}_{t-1}^v + \epsilon_t^v \]  
\[ \tilde{\omega}_t^w = \rho^w \tilde{\omega}_{t-1}^w + \epsilon_t^w \]  
\[ \tilde{\omega}_t^a = \rho^a \tilde{\omega}_{t-1}^a + \epsilon_t^a \]  
\[ \tilde{\lambda}_t^g = \rho^g \tilde{\lambda}_{t-1}^g + \epsilon_t^g \]  
\[ \tilde{\lambda}_t^p = \rho^p \tilde{\lambda}_{t-1}^p + \epsilon_t^p \]  
\[ \tilde{b}_t = \rho^b \tilde{b}_{t-1} + \epsilon_t^b \]  
\[ f_t = \tilde{m}_t^p \frac{\tilde{m}_t^p}{\tilde{m}_t^p + \tilde{m}_t^g} + \tilde{m}_t^g \frac{\tilde{m}_t^g}{\tilde{m}_t^p + \tilde{m}_t^g} - \tilde{u}_t \]  
\[ \tilde{\Lambda}_t = (\tilde{\lambda}_t^p + \tilde{\lambda}_t^g) \frac{\tilde{\lambda}_t^p \tilde{\lambda}_t^g}{\lambda_t^p \lambda_t^g} + (\tilde{\lambda}_t^p + \tilde{\lambda}_t^g) \frac{\tilde{\lambda}_t^p \tilde{\lambda}_t^g}{\lambda_t^p \lambda_t^g} + \tilde{u}_t \frac{\tilde{u}}{1 - \tilde{u}} \]  

**Definition of observable variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Differences</th>
<th>Detrended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( l_{Ob}^t )</td>
<td>( \tilde{l}_t^g (1 + \tilde{l}_t^g) )</td>
<td>( l_{Ob}^t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( u_{Ob}^t )</td>
<td>( \tilde{u}(1 + \tilde{u}_t) )</td>
<td>( u_{Ob}^t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( w_{Ob}^g_t )</td>
<td>( \tilde{w}<em>t^g - \tilde{w}</em>{t-1} )</td>
<td>( w_{Ob}^g_t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( w_{Ob}^p_t )</td>
<td>( \tilde{w}<em>t^p - \tilde{w}</em>{t-1} )</td>
<td>( w_{Ob}^p_t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Lambda_{Ob}^t )</td>
<td>( \tilde{\Lambda}(1 + \tilde{\Lambda}_t) )</td>
<td>( \Lambda_{Ob}^t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( f_{Ob}^t )</td>
<td>( \tilde{f}(1 + \tilde{f}_t) )</td>
<td>( f_{Ob}^t )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MODEL WITH RANDOM SEARCH

A1 to A3 are the same

\[ m_t^p + m_t^g = \mu^p(u_t)^{\eta^p}(v_t^p + v_t^g)^{1-\eta^p} \]  

(B4)

\[ v_t^g m_t^p = v_t^p m_t^g \]  

(B5)

\[ p_t^p = \frac{m_t^p}{u_t} \]  

(B7)

\[ p_t^g = \frac{m_t^g}{u_t} \]  

(B8)

A6, A9-A11 are the same.

\[ x_t^p = w_t^p - \frac{\nu_t(l_t)}{u_c(c_t, g_t)} + E_t \beta_{t,t+1}((1 - \lambda_t^p - p_t^p)x_{t+1}^p - p_t^p x_{t+1}^p) \]  

(B12)

\[ x_t^g = w_t^g - \frac{\nu_t(l_t)}{u_c(c_t, g_t)} + E_t \beta_{t,t+1}((1 - \lambda_t^g - p_t^g)x_{t+1}^g - p_t^g x_{t+1}^g) \]  

(B13)

We drop equation A15 and all the other equations are the same. For the log linearized model the matching functions are

\[ \tilde{m}_t^p - \tilde{m}_t^g = \tilde{v}_t^p - \tilde{v}_t^g \]  

(93)

\[ \tilde{m}_t^p - \tilde{v}_t^p = \eta^p \tilde{u}_t - \eta^p(\frac{\tilde{m}_t^p}{\tilde{m}_p^p + \tilde{m}_g^g} \tilde{v}_t^p + \frac{\tilde{m}_t^g}{\tilde{m}_p^p + \tilde{m}_g^g} \tilde{v}_t^g) \]  

(94)

\[ \tilde{x}_t^p = \frac{\tilde{w}_t^p}{\tilde{x}_t^p} \tilde{u}_t^p - \frac{\tilde{v}_t^p}{\tilde{x}_t^p \tilde{u}_c}(\tilde{v}_t - \tilde{a}_c) - \beta(\tilde{\lambda}_t^p \tilde{\lambda}_t^p + \tilde{p}_t^p \tilde{p}_t^p) + \beta(1 - \tilde{\lambda}_t^p - \tilde{p}_t^p)E_t(\tilde{x}_{t+1}^p + \tilde{\beta}_{t,t+1}) \]  

(95)
### Appendix IV - Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost of recruiting (£)</th>
<th>All sectors</th>
<th>Manufacturing and production</th>
<th>Private sector services</th>
<th>Public services</th>
<th>Voluntary and not-for-profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior managers</td>
<td>15123</td>
<td>13396</td>
<td>18964</td>
<td>10452</td>
<td>8534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and professionals</td>
<td>9738</td>
<td>8050</td>
<td>12393</td>
<td>6067</td>
<td>6471</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative, secretarial and technical</td>
<td>4519</td>
<td>3680</td>
<td>5628</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>4976</td>
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<tr>
<td>Services (costumer, personal and sales)</td>
<td>8996</td>
<td>4565</td>
<td>13980</td>
<td>2327</td>
<td>1399</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manual, craft workers</td>
<td>2381</td>
<td>2498</td>
<td>2978</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1379</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time to fill a vacancy (weeks)</th>
<th>All sectors</th>
<th>Manufacturing and production</th>
<th>Private sector services</th>
<th>Public services</th>
<th>Voluntary and not-for-profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior managers</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and professionals</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative, secretarial and technical</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services (costumer, personal and sales)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual, craft workers</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A2: Data - definition and sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition and source</th>
<th>Availability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$f_t^g$</td>
<td>Government employment</td>
<td>All Employees: Government (BLS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_t^g$</td>
<td>Government per employee real wage</td>
<td>Government consumption expenditures: Compensation of general government employees / government employees, deflated by CPI (BEA-NIPA Tables and own calculation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_t^b$</td>
<td>Business sector hourly real wage</td>
<td>Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour (BLS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u_t$</td>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>Civilian Unemployment Rate (BLS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$v_t^p$</td>
<td>Vacancies</td>
<td>Index of Help Wanted Advertising in Newspapers (The Conference Board)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Lambda_t$</td>
<td>Separation rate</td>
<td>Job-separation rate (Shimer, own calculation for quarterly aggregation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f_t$</td>
<td>Job-finding rate</td>
<td>Job-finding rate (Shimer, own calculation for quarterly aggregation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A5: Looking at the data

Figure A6: Growth rate of Google keyword searches in the United Kingdom

Note: The growth rate of the four-weeks average index of keyword searches, relative the same four weeks in the previous year.
Figure A7: Subsample stability of selected estimated parameters