The Effects of Population Aging on the Relationship between Aggregate Consumption, Saving, and Income

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The Effects of Population Aging on the Relationship between Aggregate Consumption, Saving, and Income

By Karen E. Dynan, Wendy Edelberg, and Michael G. Palumbo

As is well known, the U.S. population has grown much older and is expected to continue to age. The share of adults age 65 or older, 16 percent in 1980, has been rising steadily and is projected by the U.S. Census Bureau to reach 22 percent by 2020. A key question for macroeconomic policymakers is how the shifting age distribution has affected the relationship between macroeconomic aggregates such as income, consumption, and saving. Some past studies have used time series data to try to identify the effects of population aging (for example, see Alan S. Blinder, 1975, and Ray C. Fair and Kathryn M. Dominguez, 1991). However, it can be difficult to obtain robust and precise estimates from such data, as changes in demographics are bound to be small and gradual compared with other determinants of aggregate spending. Our paper contributes to the literature by drawing lessons from on how population aging might change the relationship between aggregate consumption, saving, and income from times series data and household-level data. Adding household-level data to the analysis enhances our ability to identify the effects because of the rich variation in consumption, saving, and income that we observe across households. We focus on the implications of population aging for both the aggregate saving rate and the aggregate marginal propensity to consume (mpc).

I. Why Demographics Should Matter

The simplest form of the lifecycle hypothesis (LCH) argues that individuals smooth consumption over their lifetimes given expected lifetime resources. Because income tends to rise steeply during working years and decline significantly during retirement, the theory predicts that saving will tend to be negative in the early working years (as young households borrow in advance of higher earnings), become positive and large in middle age, and then turn negative
again in retirement (as retired households draw down accumulated wealth). Given this lifecycle path of saving, the aggregate saving rate will depend on the relative size of the different age groups in the population, or, more precisely, the relative size of resources going to different age cohorts (assuming that average propensities to consume are not a function of lifetime resources). Holding everything else constant, as a greater proportion of the population moves into middle age, the aggregate saving rate should rise.

However, the LCH abstracts from a number of factors that would complicate these predictions. Credit market constraints may effectively place a ceiling on borrowing by younger households; alternatively, a desire to build or maintain a precautionary buffer against possible adverse income or health shocks may mitigate canonical lifecycle incentives for young households to borrow or for older ones to dissave. More generally, models that permit household preferences for current consumption to vary with age—even ones that simply factor in the consumption “needs” of children—could generate age profiles for saving rates that take essentially any shape, with the implication that studying data, rather than models, is probably the more fruitful way to proceed.

The simplest version of the LCH would predict that the $\text{mpc}$ out of a given amount of extra income should increase with age. The intuition is that the extra income has a higher annuity value the closer one is to the end of the life cycle. From this (admittedly narrow) perspective, an aging U.S. population would be expected to yield a larger consumption increase in response to, say, a tax rebate. However, from the perspective of models in which borrowing constraints are important for younger households, or buffer-stock saving motives are important for younger or older households, this simple LCH prediction would not be expected to hold. Assuming a steeply sloped age-income profile, these models predict a very high $\text{mpc}$ when a
household is young, but a lower mpc in middle age when constraints are no longer binding or a buffer has been built, and a gradual rise in the mpc thereafter. As with model-based saving rates, though, different specifications of consumption preferences with respect to age (and other time-varying factors) are bound to result in different predictions for the age profile of the mpc, so we will take a purely empirical approach.

II. Using Cohort Methods in the Consumer Expenditure Survey

Our main household-level data source is the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The CEX is a quarterly survey of households that has been conducted continuously for close to four decades. The public-use data sets include information from up to four interviews per household, spaced three months apart. Information about the income and demographic profiles of respondents is also gathered, primarily during the first and the fourth of these interviews. After its final interview, a household is rotated out of the panel and replaced with a new randomly selected household. Roughly 5,000 households were interviewed each quarter through the late 1990s, at which point the panel size was stepped up to about 7,000 households per quarter.

The short time dimension of the CEX panel means that we cannot track individual households over long periods to see how the link between their spending and income changes as they age. Instead, we follow an extensive literature, pioneered by Martin Browning, Angus Deaton, and Margaret Irish (1985), that groups households of similar birth years and then tracks how variables associated with these “synthetic cohorts” evolve over the lifecycle. In the analysis that follows, we will focus on the spending, income, and saving of these cohorts.

Our sample is drawn from CEX data files corresponding to the period 1983:Q1 (earlier data had more significant problems with quality) through 2007:Q1 (the latest quarter available). Our main measure of consumption is derived from the detailed CEX expenditure files and
constructed to correspond as closely as possible to Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). For each household in our CEX sample, we measure total consumption as the sum across all four interviews; we dropped households for which fewer than four interviews were available. Our income measure is the household’s income after taxes for the past 12 months, taken from the CEX family file corresponding to the household’s final interview so that it covers the same period as the consumption measure. To adjust consumption and income for inflation, we construct household-specific deflators by taking a weighted average of the aggregate PCE chain-weighted price indexes for each major category of consumption, where the weights correspond to the share of each household’s consumption represented by that category.

We drop households for which we have some indication that the data might be of poor quality—those for whom reported income is flagged as being incomplete or for whom reported food consumption equals zero. Also, to avoid assigning households to the wrong cohort, we drop those for whom the reported age of the head of household changes by more than one year between two successive interviews. All told, our final CEX sample contains 80,214 households.

To create the synthetic cohorts, we group households by the birth year of the head, with the earliest cohort corresponding to those born between 1910 and 1919, the next cohort corresponding to those born between 1920 and 1929, and so on. In the analysis that follows, we focus on these 10-year birth cohorts, but we obtained similar empirical results using 5-year cohorts. For each cohort, we calculate medians for the variables of interest at every age observed. We use medians because, in contrast to means, they are unaffected by the CEX top-coding practices, whereby the amount recorded for a variable is set equal to a certain maximum value if the true amount exceeds some limit. We do not include in our analysis the medians for
the very youngest and oldest households observed in each cohort, as they are based on significantly fewer observations and tend to be less representative of the cohort as a whole. We also do not include the medians for ages below 20 or greater than 80; the latter group is particularly difficult to assign to cohorts because many of the top-coding of age in the CEX.

Figure 1 shows the raw age-profiles for median income (red) and consumption (black), with the separate line segments corresponding to different birth cohorts. As is well understood in the literature, the lines for each cohort embody both an underlying relationship between age and income or consumption, as well as cohort-specific effects and business-cycle effects; we will make use of techniques that isolate the former in the analysis follows. However, even without such adjustments, some features of the figure stand out. Most notably, consumption is much flatter over the lifecycle than income, consistent, to some extent, with the consumption smoothing predicted by the LCH. That consumption has any hump at all is not consistent with the simplest specification of the lifecycle hypothesis, but can be explained through some combination of borrowing constraints, buffer-stock behavior (see Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Jonathan A. Parker, 2002), or demographic influences on household preferences (see Orazio Attanasio, James Banks, Costas Meghir, and Gugliemo Weber, 1999). Net savings over the lifecycle—the difference between income and consumption—looks to be positive and
quite larger in magnitude than one would expect given the saving rates reported in the NIPA. We do not view this result as reflecting true behavior so much as a tendency for CEX respondents to be worse at remembering all of their expenditures than at recalling the full extent of their income. In any event, we make adjustments to reflect the discrepancy when we draw lessons for the NIPA saving rate from our CEX results.

**III. Using the CEX to Account for Demographic Effects on the Aggregate Saving Rate**

The aggregate U.S. saving rate has shown a pronounced downtrend over the past two decades, falling from an average of 9.1 percent in the 1980s, to 5.2 percent in the 1990s, to 1.6 percent in the first six years of the current decade. We will explore whether the aging of the population has contributed to this downtrend and how it should be expected to affect aggregate saving going forward, should current projections of the age structure turn out to be accurate.

The key challenge in using synthetic cohort data to estimate the effect of population aging on the aggregate saving rate is distinguishing between the various determinants of the saving of any given cohort at a particular age. In addition to the lifecycle influences on saving discussed in section I, one would expect saving to vary with the business cycle, as households seek to smooth their consumption in the face of job losses or other transitory shocks to income. One might also expect different cohorts to save more or less over the lifecycle, depending, for example, on differing tastes, shocks to wealth, or changes in social programs providing income in retirement.

We build on a framework suggested by Orazio Attanasio (1998) for distinguishing between these factors. We regress median cohort saving rates at each age on a 5th degree polynomial in age, cohort dummies, and year dummies. The year dummies are included to capture business-cycle effects; if left unrestricted, however, the coefficients will not be identified
because year can be expressed as a linear function of age and cohort. To achieve identification, we follow Attanasio in restricting the coefficients to average to zero and to be orthogonal to a linear trend. These identifying assumptions are strong—they imply that all linear trends in the data are attributable to age or cohort effects. One might be particularly worried that the estimated cohort effects might pick up business cycle effects if the sample covered just a short time span that was unbalanced in terms of the phase of the macroeconomic expansion or contraction. However, this possibility is not a significant obstacle to our analysis since our primary interest is in the estimated relationship between age and saving.

We compute saving as the difference between after-tax income and consumption, and we calculate the saving rate as the ratio of this difference to consumption multiplied by 100. Using consumption in the denominator reduces the occurrence of outliers, as near-zero readings of consumption are less prevalent than for income. As will be shown below, results based on this saving rate concept can easily be used to draw conclusions about the more conventional concept.

Figure 2 shows the raw age profiles for median saving rates, again using different line segments for each cohort. Saving rates are typically negative early and late in the life cycle. Saving rates rise steeply through about age 35. Saving rates peak around the age of 50—when
household income is at its highest—although differences in typical saving rates between about ages 35 and 55 are rather small. The saving rates also take on some very high values, both because we put consumption (not income) in the denominator and, we think more important, because of the aforementioned tendency for CEX households to underreport their consumption more than their income.

Table 1 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors on the age terms and the cohort indicators. Lower-numbered cohorts correspond to youngest observed (those born most recently) who are represented by the leftmost line segments in the chart. The first cohort dummy variable is excluded. Notably, the coefficients are more negative as one moves toward the cohorts with earlier birth years, with the estimates beyond the second cohort statistically different from zero. This implies that the earlier cohorts had lower saving rates than their later counterparts.

The result stands in contrast with that of Attanasio. Using a much shorter sample from the CEX (1980-1991), he concluded that the earliest cohorts showed some tendency toward having higher saving rates. Our results imply that this pattern has reversed since the early 1990s. While this could reflect a trend toward greater saving among the later cohorts, we suspect that measurement issues play a significant role. As shown in Figure 3, the ratio of average CEX consumption to a NIPA-based measure of consumption-per-household has declined by far more
than a similar ratio for after-tax income. Indeed, the aggregate saving rate implied by the CEX data (not shown) has actually risen a bit since the mid-1980s. We leave it to future researchers to pin down why CEX saving has not declined with aggregate NIPA saving. But, we note for the purposes of our analysis that an increasing positive bias in the measurement of saving over time would be reflected in the coefficients on our cohort dummies and would be indistinguishable from an actual increase in the saving of later birth year cohorts. Thus, we caution strongly against applying the latter interpretation to our results.

That said, assuming that the cohort dummies control for such measurement issues, we should be able to use the estimated coefficients on age—together with information about the changing age distribution in the economy—to infer how population aging has and will affect the aggregate saving rate. We emphasize that we are capturing the effects through the lifecycle-saving channel alone; a broader definition of demographic effects might also capture the interaction between any cohort-specific components of saving and population aging, but, as we have just discussed, we do not think that one can obtain reliable estimates of such components from the CEX. Arthur Kennickell (1990) showed that the demographic effect on the saving rate between two periods can be expressed approximately as:

![FIGURE 3. CEX MEASURES RELATIVE TO NIPA MEASURES](image-url)
\[
\Delta \frac{S}{Y} \approx \frac{1}{Y_0} \sum \Delta p_i \cdot S_i^0
\]

where the \(i\)'s denote different age groups, \(\Delta p_i\) represents the change in the share of households in group \(i\), \(S_i^0\) represents initial saving by group \(I\), and \(Y_0\) represents initial income.

We use U.S. Census Bureau estimates (for 1980, 1990, and 2000) and projections (for 2010 and 2020) to calculate shares of the population between ages 20 and 80 for five-year age groups. We then take changes in these shares relative to their values in 1980. We calculate initial saving for each age group in two steps. First, we estimate saving as would be reported in the CEX by multiplying CEX consumption for each group as of the beginning of our sample by the value of \(S/C\) for that group implied by the coefficients on the age variables in Table 1. Second, we scale CEX saving for each group by the ratio of aggregate CEX saving to NIPA saving to adjust for the differences in the levels. Initial income is NIPA disposable personal income measures over the same period as initial consumption.

The results are shown in Table 2.

The movement of the baby boomers into their prime saving years is estimated to have increased the aggregate saving rate by 0.8 percentage point in the 1980s and then by an additional 1.1 percentage points in the 1990s, for a two-decade total of close to 2 percentage points. Thus, lifecycle influences on saving behavior do not help us explain the decline in the saving rate between 1980 and 2000; instead, they leave us with more to be explained by other factors. With baby boomers increasingly entering retirement in the 2000s and 2010s, the pattern reverses—the saving rate is predicted to decline 0.2 percentage point over the current decade and to fall by an additional

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Change relative to 1980 value (percentage points)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Estimates reflect changes in saving related to lifecycle factors. They do not reflect cohort effects.
0.7 percentage point over the next decade. Note, though, that we do not see a full reversal—lifecycle effects, in isolation, would predict the saving rate to be 1 percentage point higher in 2020 than in 1980. Although the older baby boomers are dissaving in retirement in 2020, the youngest of the baby boomers have high saving rates because they are still in their peak saving years, and the children of the older baby boomers are entering their higher-saving years.

IV. Are these Results Consistent with Time Series Evidence on Aggregate Saving?

In the preceding section, we showed that household-level data suggest that lifecycle saving, in combination with population aging, provided a boost to aggregate saving rate over the past two decades, with some reversal expected in the current and next decades. In this section, we look for further evidence using time series data.

The starting point is a typical forecasting equation for aggregate personal consumption expenditures. The equation posits a long-run cointegrating relationship in (log) levels of personal consumption expenditures \((c)\), labor income \((y)\), transfer income \((\tau)\), and household wealth \((w)\), where (stationary) deviations \((\eta)\) between actual PCE each period and the target level given by the long-run coefficients are assumed to be proportional to the magnitude of spending:

\[
\tilde{c}_t = (\lambda y_t + (\theta - \lambda)\tau_t + \nu w_t) \exp(\eta_t)
\] (2)

We estimate a reduced-form model that uses a log approximation of equation (2). An error-correction specification relates quarterly percent changes in real consumption to the (lagged) deviation between actual and expected spending from the approximation of (2), the level of real interest rates \((r)\), lagged spending growth, income growth, an indicator of the potential growth of the economy \((\rho)\), an index of consumer sentiment \((S)\), and the change in the unemployment rate \((u)\). Thus, the model is estimated in two stages:
\[
\begin{align*}
\ln c_t &= \alpha_0 + \ln y_t + \alpha_1 (\tau / y_t) + \alpha_2 (w / y_t) + \varepsilon_t \\
\Delta \ln c_t &= \beta_0 + \Delta \ln p_t + \beta_1 \tau_{t-1} + \beta_2 (\Delta \ln y_t - \Delta \ln p_t) + \beta_3 r_{t-1} \\
&+ \beta_4 (\Delta \ln c_{t-1} - \Delta \ln p_t) + \beta_5 \Delta u_t + \beta_6 S_t + \mu_t
\end{align*}
\] (3)

We estimate the coefficients using aggregate data from 1963 to 2008. We draw aggregate consumption and income from the NIPA, wealth from the U.S. Flow of Funds Accounts, the unemployment rate from the Current Population Survey, and consumer sentiment from the Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers. The real interest rate is based on the federal funds rate, and we estimate potential output growth by feeding aggregate NIPA output through a Kalman filter model.

We use equation (3) to dynamically predict the level of the personal saving rate beginning in 1980—roughly the start of its steep downtrend—and compare the predictions to the actual saving rate.\(^4\) The model does a reasonable job of capturing the downtrend in the saving rate since 1980, with a standard error of the residual of only 0.6 percentage point.

As demographics are not included in the equation, their effect might show up in the percentage point difference between the actual and predicted saving rate over time, which is plotted against the left axis as the blue line in Figure 4. The pattern of the differences suggests that the actual saving rate was (relative to the fundamentals in the model) low in the mid-1980s, high in the early 1990s, low in the mid-1990s and then high since about 1999. The
latter result may seem surprising given the pronounced further decline in the saving rate since the late 1990s, but the model calls for an even lower saving rate because of a large net increase in the wealth-income ratio in the late 1990s and early part of this decade and the relatively high consumer sentiment readings for much of the period.

The red line (which is plotted against the right axis) corresponds to the share of the adult population between 40 years old and 64 years old. We plot this line as a benchmark—because the saving rate peaks in these years, the share is a reasonable good approximation of the demographic effects we estimated more precisely with household-level data. Indeed, the ratio climbs materially in the 1980s and 1990s, the period for which the household-level estimates suggested that demographics would be boosting saving. Casual inspection of Figure 4 hints at some relationship between the residuals and the share of households in the high saving years. Particularly after the mid-1990s, we see that saving rate residuals turned less negative and then positive as the fraction of the population in peak saving rate years increased.

To be sure, the residuals are likely influenced by other variables not included in the forecasting system. In addition, one might worry that they do not actually capture demographic effects via lifecycle saving because these effects are absorbed in the wealth measures included in the system. However, we do not view this as an important concern, as, in separate analysis of data from the *Survey of Consumer Finances*, we have found that the lion’s share of the movement in wealth over the past decade reflects higher wealth holdings of retired households rather than the increase in the share of retirees in the population.

More generally, the comparison of the two lines represents a fairly crude analysis. The next obvious step would be to try to add demographic variables directly to the forecasting system, but, as noted in our introduction, the very gradual movements in such variables make
identification difficult, particularly if factors such as tastes and the economic environment facing the household are also changing gradually.

V. Aging and the Relationship between Changes in Consumption and Income

We can use the CEX data to compare the relative magnitudes of typical changes in consumption from age to age with typical changes in income to get a handle on how closely they tend to move together. Algebraically, the ratio of the age-differentials for consumption, \( \frac{dc}{da} \), and income, \( \frac{dy}{da} \), defines a differential of consumption to income, \( \frac{dc}{dy} \). However, interpreting that ratio is not straightforward. With respect to income, we capture typical changes over the lifecycle—very different in nature from the sort of “shock” that is often considered when estimating the \( mpc \). Moreover, the correspondence observed between lifecycle changes in consumption and income may not even be causal. That said, we think it is informative to use our comprehensive CEX data to revisit how closely consumption tracks income over the lifecycle, in the spirit, for instance, of Christopher D. Carroll and Lawrence H. Summers (1991).

We estimate \( \frac{dc}{da} \) and \( \frac{dy}{da} \) with separate regressions. To preserve the nonlinear age-consumption and age-income profiles apparent in the raw CEX cohort data, we use linear spline regression models with knots that correspond to the 12 five-year age groups between ages 20 and 80. Using household-level data (restricted as above), we regress real consumption (and then real income) on the spline terms, as well as cohort and time dummies, with the latter restricted as in our saving rate regressions. Our procedure estimates the typical change in consumption (or in income) as households age; within a five-year age group, the relationship is linear, but the slope is allowed to vary non-linearly as households move across age categories.
Results are presented in Table 4.

Typical annual consumption changes are shown for the various age groups in left column, income changes are shown in the middle column, and the ratios of changes in consumption to changes in income are shown in the right column.

As had been seen in Figure 1, consumption and income are steeply upward-sloping for households from their early 20s through their mid-40s. Both variables reach their peak in the mid-50s and decline thereafter.

The regression coefficients in Table 4 also confirm that typical annual changes in consumption track annual changes in income fairly closely—the age bins associated with the largest increases in income also show the largest increases in consumption, and, as increases in income tend to slow in the late 30s and early 40s, so do increases in consumption. The ratios of the coefficients are fairly high through the mid-40s, consistent with the view that borrowing constraints or buffer-stock saving motives might be an important determinant of consumption early in life.

The estimated age-income profile flattens out in the late 40s and early 50s, as does the age-consumption profile, and both age profiles become distinctly downward-sloping from the late 50s through the late 70s. On average, the ratios of the coefficients are smaller for these

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Consumption</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>1595.2</td>
<td>2776.4</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-39</td>
<td>1306.0</td>
<td>3083.3</td>
<td>0.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>1276.9</td>
<td>2174.8</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>804.4</td>
<td>1278.1</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>1164.0</td>
<td>1930.4</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>200.9</td>
<td>644.4</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>592.8</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>-407.1</td>
<td>-849.4</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>-323.9</td>
<td>-1842.9</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
<td>-407.2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-74</td>
<td>-289.1</td>
<td>-474.4</td>
<td>0.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>75-79</td>
<td>-219.9</td>
<td>-497.6</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Notes. Regressions also included a constant, cohort dummies, and year dummies that were constrained to sum to 0 and be orthogonal to a linear trend.
groups than for the younger groups. One interpretation of the change would be that households’ incomes have risen sufficiently such that borrowing constraints no longer bind by this age or that households have already built their desired precautionary buffers. Given our concerns about the interpretation of the $\frac{dc}{dy}$ implied by lifecycle patterns of consumption and income in household data, we do not attempt to formally tie our estimates to the aggregate mpc as we did for the saving rate. However, the analysis is at least suggestive that the aggregate marginal propensity to consume might have been expected to decline as the baby boomers moved out of its early working years and into the years in which their spending patterns were not dominated by borrowing constraints or precautionary motives.

VI. Using Time Series Data to Estimate Demographic Effects on the Aggregate Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Disposable Personal Income

We now use the reduced-form model in equation (3) to see whether the estimated aggregate mpc out of current income ($\beta_2$) has fallen over time, as might be suggested by the analysis above. We estimate the model with rolling 20-year windows from 1963 to 2008 and plot the coefficients on the contemporaneous growth in income in equation (3). The coefficients from the midpoints of these rolling windows are shown by the brown line on the left axis in Figure 5. The bands defined by the pink lines represent the 95-percent confidence intervals around the point

![Graph showing the trend of demographic shifts and the sensitivity of quarterly growth of personal consumption expenditures to disposable personal income.](image-url)
estimates. As can be seen, the point estimates fall over the period shown. In fact, they are not statistically different from 0 after the mid-1980s.

There are different ways in which this parameter can be interpreted. John Y. Campbell and N. Gregory Mankiw (1990) interpret the coefficient on contemporaneous aggregate income from a similar framework as the fraction of the population represented by so-called “rule-of-thumb” households who spend their current income instead of smoothing consumption according to the LCH. One might also interpret this coefficient as the fraction of any given household’s consumption that is matched one-for-one with income changes—in other words, an mpc out of current income.

Again, as a benchmark, we show the fraction of the adult population between ages 40 and 64 (the dashed line plotted against the right axis). After 1980 or so, the mpc declines as the portion of the population in peak saving years increases. However, the share of the population in this group is also high in the 1960s and early 1970s, a period when the estimated aggregate mpc is much larger and statistically significant. Thus, the evidence for a significant demographic effect on the aggregate mpc is, at best, weak. Indeed, other factors are at play; for example, Karen E. Dynan, Douglas W. Elmendorf, and Daniel E. Sichel (2006) interpret the lower mpc observed since the early 1980s as reflecting a greater ability to smooth consumption because of financial innovation.

VII. Conclusion

Analysis based on household-level data suggests that population aging has had a material effect on the pattern of the aggregate saving rate over time. In particular, the movement of the baby boom into its higher saving years should have provided an increasing boost to the aggregate saving rate in the 1980s and 1990s. We expect some reversal of this pattern as this cohort moves
into retirement in the current and next decade. Furthermore, we show with time series data, that these effects appear to be at least roughly consistent with the realized pattern of the aggregate saving rate, after controlling for other determinants. Our analysis regarding the aggregate marginal propensity to consume comes to less firm conclusions. The household-level data are, at best, suggestive that demographics might explain why time series data exhibit a reduced response of consumption to contemporaneous income over the past two decades.
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1 An appendix with a more complete description of the data is available upon request from the authors.
2 For example, the medians for the 46-year-olds for the cohort born between 1960 and 1969 are based solely on data for households born in 1960 or the first quarter of 1961 and interviewed in 2006 or the first quarter of 2007.
3 Data limitations prevent us from doing the calculation precisely. For example, ideally, we would like to use shares of households with heads of different ages rather than shares of the population at different ages. However, the estimates presented are not very sensitive to modest changes in the underlying data, so we believe they are informative about the sign and the rough magnitude of the actual effects.
4 This simulation fixes all coefficients at the values estimated for the full sample and then conditions on actual realizations of the determinants of consumption.