The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the US Welfare Reform
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 13,
no. 2, May 2021
(pp. 26-57)
Abstract
How do governors' reelection motives affect policy experimentation? We develop a theoretical model of this situation, and then test the predictions in data on US state-level welfare reforms from 1978 to 2007. This period marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. Our findings indicate that governors with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment than governors with little support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected actually experiment more than governors striving for reelection. These findings are robust to controlling for ideology, preferences for redistribution, the state legislature, and cross-state learning.Citation
Bernecker, Andreas, Pierre C. Boyer, and Christina Gathmann. 2021. "The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the US Welfare Reform." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 13 (2): 26-57. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190690Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- I32 Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
- I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
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