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Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution

  • Samuel Lee
  • Petra Persson
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 14, no. 3, August 2022
(pp. 87-127)
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Abstract

Certain markets are illicit because part of the supply is coerced, but little is known about the optimal regulation of such markets. We model a prostitution market with voluntary and coerced prostitutes and ask what regulation can restore the benchmark outcome that would arise under laissez-faire absent coercion. Whereas current policies—decriminalization, criminalization of the buy or sell sides, and licensing—are ineffective against trafficking or harm voluntary suppliers, we show that an alternative policy can restore the benchmark outcome. Our results are relevant to the ongoing debate about decriminalizing prostitution and provide guidance for empirical work on prostitution regulation.

Citation

Lee, Samuel, and Petra Persson. 2022. "Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 14 (3): 87-127. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180622

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D45 Rationing; Licensing
  • J47 Coercive Labor Markets
  • J82 Labor Standards: Labor Force Composition
  • K38 Human Rights Law; Gender Law
  • K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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