This paper exploits a natural experiment in information provision on US Disability Insurance (DI) applications: the Social Security statement. Although the effect of the statement on DI application was negligible in the general health and retirement study population, among those previously reporting a work limitation, biennial DI application rates approximately doubled. This effect was driven by previously uninformed individuals. Additional analyses show these were new applicants and were no less likely to be accepted onto DI, accounting for a substantial fraction of the rise in DI rolls from 1994 to 2004 and indicating the importance of informational frictions in disability policymaking.
"The Role of Information in Disability Insurance Application: An Analysis of the Social Security Statement Phase-In."
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
Social Security and Public Pensions
Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy