Patchwork Policies, Spillovers, and the Search for Oil and Gas
AbstractThe United States has a complex patchwork of mineral ownership, where rights to oil and gas may be owned by the federal government, state governments, or private agents. I show why the policies imposed by one owner have theoretically ambiguous spillover effects on the drilling and production outcomes of neighboring plots of land. Exploiting a natural experiment in Wyoming with exogenous ownership assignment, I find significant spillovers: federal land close to state land has a lower probability of drilling than federal land far from state land.
CitationLewis, Eric. 2019. "Patchwork Policies, Spillovers, and the Search for Oil and Gas." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11 (1): 380-405. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20160373
- H82 Governmental Property
- L71 Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
- P14 Capitalist Systems: Property Rights
- Q35 Hydrocarbon Resources
- Q38 Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy