Trade Agreements and Enforcement: Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 9,
no. 4, November 2017
(pp. 64-100)
Abstract
This paper examines implications of the terms-of-trade theory for the determinants of outcomes arising under the enforcement provisions of international agreements. Like original trade agreement negotiations, formal trade dispute negotiations are modeled as potentially addressing the terms-of-trade externality problem that governments implement import protection above the globally efficient level so as to shift some of the policy's costs onto trading partners. The approach first extends the Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2011) model from trade agreement accession negotiations to the setting of enforcement negotiations, and the resulting theory guides the empirical assessment on trade volume outcomes from WTO disputes over 1995-2009.Citation
Bown, Chad P., and Kara M. Reynolds. 2017. "Trade Agreements and Enforcement: Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9 (4): 64-100. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150145Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- K33 International Law
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment