This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting,
reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for
land within a city. The key implication is that squatters "squeeze"
the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The
squatter organizer ensures that squeezing is not too severe, since
otherwise, the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction
by landowners. Because eviction is absent in equilibrium, the model
differs from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs
with some probability. It also facilitates a general equilibrium analysis
of squatter formalization policies. (JEL O15, Q15, R14)
Brueckner, Jan K., and Harris Selod.
"A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries."
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation
Land Use Patterns