We consider a war of attrition where the players can learn about
a state that determines their payoffs at stochastic deadline. We
study how the incentives to acquire information depend on the
(un)verifiability of information and its implications for efficiency.
Unverifiability creates distortions (strategic delay in concession or
duplication in information acquisition), but encourages information
acquisition. In our model, provided that the information acquisition
cost is small, these two effects cancel each other out and the players'
expected payoffs in symmetric equilibrium are identical whether
information is verifiable or not. We also show that shortening
deadlines may prolong the conflict.
Kim, Kyungmin, and Frances Zhiyun Xu Lee.
"Information Acquisition in a War of Attrition."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief