We study two sources of delay in teams: freeriding and lack of communication. Partners contribute to the value of a common project,
but have private information about the success of their own efforts.
When the deadline is far away, unsuccessful partners freeride on each
others' efforts. When the deadline draws close, successful partners
stop revealing their success to maintain their partners' motivation.
We derive comparative statics results for common team performance
measures and find that the optimal deadline maximizes productive
efforts while avoiding unnecessary delays. Welfare is higher when
information is only privately observable rather than revealed to the
Campbell, Arthur, Florian Ederer, and Johannes Spinnewijn.
"Delay and Deadlines: Freeriding and Information Revelation in Partnerships."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights: General