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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. November 2013
  5. A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information

  • Olivier Armantier
  • Charles A. Holt
  • Charles R. Plott
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 5, no. 4, November 2013
(pp. 142–62)
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Abstract

The proposed 2008 TARP auction was intended to remove "toxic" assets from portfolios of financially stressed banks. The Treasury selected a design whereby bids to sell different securities would be normalized by "reference prices" that reflect relative value estimates. We conduct a series of experiments indicating that a simple Reference Price Auction can be an effective mechanism for avoiding serious effects of adverse selection and strategic bid manipulation, even with inaccurate reference prices. Beyond the TARP auction, our results are relevant to various multi-object auctions with value heterogeneity.

Citation

Armantier, Olivier, Charles A. Holt, and Charles R. Plott. 2013. "A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5 (4): 142–62. DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.142

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages