We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population
divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum
of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who
aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources
across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on
whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We
study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative
assortative interactions generate highly asymmetric equilibrium
outcomes between ex ante identical groups. When groups have an
underlying difference, even a small amount of intergroup contact
generates large asymmetries. (JEL D71, D85)
Galeotti, Andrea, and Brian W. Rogers.
"Strategic Immunization and Group Structure."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory