Arrow (1962) argued that since a monopoly restricts output relative to a competitive industry, it would be less willing to pay a fixed cost to adopt a new technology. We develop a new theory of why a monopolistic industry innovates less. Firms often face major problems in integrating new technologies. In some cases, upon adoption of technology, firms must temporarily reduce output. We call such
problems switchover disruptions. A cost of adoption, then, is the forgone rents on the sales of lost or delayed production, and these opportunity costs are larger the higher the price on those lost units. (JEL D21, D42, L12, L14, O32, O33)
Holmes, Thomas J., David K. Levine, and James A. Schmitz.
"Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure and Pricing: Monopoly
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes