This paper develops a theory of outsourcing in which the circumstances
under which factors of production can grab rents play the leading role. One factor has monopoly power (call this labor) while a second factor does not (call this capital). There are two kinds of production tasks: labor-intensive and capital-intensive. We show that if frictions limiting outsourcing are not too large, in equilibrium labor-intensive tasks are separated from capital-intensive tasks into distinct firms. When a capital-intensive country is opened to free trade, outsourcing increases and labor rents decline. A decrease in outsourcing frictions lowers labor rents. (JEL J31, L22, L24)
Holmes, Thomas J., and Julia Thornton Snider.
"A Theory of Outsourcing and Wage Decline."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing